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Siokavārtika—a study
should form one sentence (and why should the usages like 'The fuel-sticks cook cookedrice' be possible) (vv.73-75). Not can it be said that the specific acts of the agents other than the chief agent will be expressed by the verbal suffix, for that is not the function of a verbal suffix (vv. 75-76). As a matter of fact, on the present theory there obtains no relation between the verbal root and the verbal suffix (vv.77-79). For a verbal suffix expresses 'causing' which invariably requires an objective and an instrument; but the verb 'to cook', e.g., offers an objective in the form 'pakan (= to cooking) and an instrument in the form 'pākena' (=through cooking)--neither of which is present there when we have before us in the form of 'pacati' (=cooks) the verbalroot 'pac' (=to cook) and a verbal suffix (viz tip). Nor is any relation possible between a 'causing' (bhāvanā) and an 'injunction' (vidhi) (vv.79-86 ). For we are told that the same verbal suffix expresses 'causing' as well as 'injunction', and this means that an injunction has performed its job even before the 'causing' could get linked with an objective, an instrument, a maoner-of-doing (vv. 79-80). But how can an injunction impel one to undertake 'causing' as such (vv. 80-81) ? And if an in junction has thus forfeited the right to get linked with objective Fetc. expressed in the same sentence then the Vedic scholar's practice to posit a mannerof-doing on the basis of contextual references becomes particularly objectionable (v.82). For there obtains no relation between the deficient sentence and the alleged contextual sentence just as there obtains no relation between the words, 'cow' and 'white' in the sentence 'Here is a white cow' (v. 83). Nay, in the latter case some relation might well be posited on the basis of an empirical evidence but in the former all establishment of a relation must prove utterly arbitrary (vv. 83-83)."
After having thus disposed of Kumārila's theory the opponent resumes his general onslaught. He pays tribute to Kumārila's theorty by saying something which implies that it is strongest of all the theories that are in the field. For he argues, "The relation of agent and act is the root of all objective relations and when the former is shown to be untenable the latter must follow suit (vv. 86-87)". Then he seeks to show that the prefixes and particles have no independent meaning in a sentence but his chief endeavour lies in pointing out that whatever role is allegedly attributed to them by the theoreticians is anomalous (vv. 87-98). For example, a prefix is said to act as a qualifier in relation to a verb, but as a matter of fact in certain cases its employment is just redundant, in certain cases it altogether changes the meaning of a verb, in certain cases it gives to a verb a meaning just opposite of the original-- none of which things a genuine qualifier is expected to do (vv. 90-93), Similarly, a particle denoting negation (say 'not) seeks to do away with a thing that has already been posited--an impossible task (vv. 96-97). Lastly, a particle denoting alternation (say 'or) proposes to attribute two contradictory features to the same thing---a still more impossible task (v. 98). By way of concluding his enquiry the opponent raises certain points that have already been discussed in some way or other. For he
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