Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 28

Perbal - Testimony
19
but it deserves no comparison with a universal which is an object of genuine perceptioh (vv. 94-96)"
Section--XV (Sambandbāksepaparibāra) In this section Kumärila considers the question whether the establishment of the relation between a word and its meaning be not the result of some sort of convention on someone's part. In this connection two views are taken into account, one according to which the connotation in question is established by a teacher at the time when he teaches the word-meaning concerned to a learner, the other according to which it is established by God at the time of world-creation (v.13). The following is how Kumārila argues against the first view. “If a new convention about the meaning of a word be established whenever a new teacher teaches it to a leaner then there will be no unabimity as to the employment of this word which will thus be rendered practically useless (vv.14-21). Moreover, if a word uttered on different occasions is a different word then the word whose meaning the teacher had himself learnt will not be the same word whose meaning he is teaching to the learner - an obvious anomaly (vv.21-23) The difficulty is somewhat obviated if it be granted that a word uttered now and it uttered on another occasion both possess the same universal, for then this universal, will be the common vehicle of meaning in the two cases, but the trouble is that a word does not exhibit a universal feature and a perticular feature, it being ono and the same whenever it is uttered (v. 27). As for the relation of a word to its meaning it is nothing but the denotative capacity of this word, and this capacity exhibits one and the same fort whenever it makes its appearance -- which too should mean that a word is one and the same whenever it is uttered (vv. 28-29). Of course, even if a word is a single entity possessed of a single denotative capacity this word becomes practically useful only to one who has taken cognizance of this capacity, but the point is that one cannot take cognizance of this capacity unless it already exists there in its own right (vv.30-36). To cite an analogy, a thing cannot be seen without an eye but it must already exist there if it is to be seen with the help of an eye (vv.37-39).". As against the view according to which the convention regarding word meaning is. established by God at the time of word-creation Kumārila's chief objection is that the very concept of God and world-creation on his part is untouchable. It will be conduce tive to convenience if this objection is quoted after notice has been taken of Kumärila's other objections against the view in question; they are as follows : “God is supposedi to be a superordinary person but nobody can become superordinary person withouto performing religious observances, nobody can perform religious observances without knowing about them, nobody can know about them without learning Vedas, nobody can learn Vedas without being in possesssion of words etc. All this, in turn, meangii that 'the process of employing words is beginingless (vv.114-17). Then he empbatically? refuted those who would argue that someone must have established convention regardu ing the meaning of a word because everyone is found to learn this meaning frotdog predecessor (vv.118-19). Another point. If a word yields meaning because it is assigned
focess of emut being in
refuted
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