Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 25

šlokavārtika—a study
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is that it is so because the two are located at the same place (v.8). In the end, however, Kumārila concedes that there is no harm even in maintaining that dewlap etc. and the cow-universal are not absolutely different from each other (v. 10). The opponent agrues that a unsversal is not different from the particulars concerned, because it is not cognized when the latter are not cognized just like a row, a herd, a forest (which are of the form of a group that is not cognized when its members are not cognized) (v. 11). Kumārila's first reaction is that such argumentation is of no avail when a universal is a matter of universal popular acceptance (vy. 12-15), but in his heart of heart he knows that it needs convincing rebuttal and so gets ready for that. But before doing that he incidentally argues that a universal is not the same thing as configuration (Kumārila's favourite Sanskrit word for a universal is aksti which literally means configuration). His point is that in the case of things like air and fire there airses no question of configuration (v. 16) while in a portrait of cow we observe the cow-configuration but no cow-universal (v. 19). Similarly, when one golden ornament is converted into another there is a change of configuration but a continuity of the gold-universal (the illustration is obscure) (vv.20-23); and when a heap of pulse- seeds is observed there is observed the universal concerned even in the absence of a configuration concerned (v. 24). Then coming to his original point Kumārila submits that a universal is a matter of plain perception, that being why even from a distance we observe a man as man though remaining in doubt whether he is Brahmin or not (v. 25). He however concedes that in certain cases a universal might be recognized on the basis of observing certain relevant features; e. g. gold is recognized as distnict from copper on the basis of its colour, oil as distinct from ghee on the basis of its smell and taste, ash-covered fire on the basis of its touch, a distant lying horse on the basis of the sound it makes (vv.26-28). Then Kumārila ayers that there is nothing incongruous about a universal residing in each and every particular object that exhibits it, for that is what we plainly perceive (v.30). And he argues that a universal does not become different by being located in different particular objects simply for the reason that as a result of coming in contact with different objects a thing does not cease to be what it is (vv. 30-31). As for the ubiquitous and impartite character of a universal Kumārila recommends that it be established just as in the case of a word; (let us recall that on Kumārila's showing a word is ubiquitous and impartite because it exhibit absolutely the same form wherever it is uttered) (v.31). We are further told that a universal is eternal because it can possibly belong to the part. culars that are separated by a time-gap (v.32). As for whether a universal resides in a particular partly or wholly Kumārila remarks that the question makes no sense in the case of an impartite entity like universal (v. 33). His point is that an impartite entity might well reside in its different seats in a manner sui generis (v.37), just as fire is hot in a manner sui generis (v.39) Kumārila then argues that the cognition of two cows as cow is not a case of just cognising two similar things; for the things in question have got an identity of form, and just as the valid recognition