Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

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Slokavārtika-a study
show that it is on the momentarist hypothesis that it is impossible for the same agent to be both the doer of an act and the enjoyer of its fruit; the following is how he argues (vv. 32-72,: "Io the case of an act that takes time to be completed even the doership on the part of the same agent is impossible on the momentarist hypothesis (v. 36), while the contingency that the doer and the enjoyer are not the same is present here in the case of all act whatsover (v. 38). Nor will it do to say that the doer and the enjoyer belong to the same series (santāna), for if this series is something momentary it will not serve the purpose while if it is something ever-lasting it will be either like the soul posited by the Vaiseșika which is absolutely different from its states or like the soul posited by the Sankhya which is partly different from its states (vv. 39-42). It is also futile to say that an impression (vāsanā) left by tbe doer makes possible the reaping of fruit on the part of the enjoyer, for on the momentarist hypothesis there is nothing where their impression can get seated during the interval separating doing from enjoying (vy. 44-45) Even granting that the doer and enjoyer belong to the same line-of-succession (paramparā) the fact remains that they are not one and the same (v. 46). On its part, however the concept of line-of-succession or series itself remains untenable on the momentarist hypothesis, for nothing can go to unite the members of a series under one title unless they bave something in common (which showing is here dismissed as impossible) (vv. 4750). Resorting to an analogy the momentarist argues : 'A man and his son are different from each other and yet this man rears up this son and later on receives a benifit from him. This sort of relationship does not obtain between persons not belonging to the same line of descect. Similarly, the relation of doer and enjoyer obtains, between tvo cognitions which are different from each other and yet belong to the same series (v. 51-52).' But it is never our expreience that the doer is different from the enjoyer; moreover a man in order to receive from his son benefit later on must be one and the same personality throughout the interval (something which the momcatarist dismisses as impossible) (vv. 53-54). Nor is it possible for cognitions to migrate from one body to another; certainly, an intangible entity like cognition cannot be pushed away from one place to another as air pushes from one place to another a flame of fire (vv. 59-61). As a matter of fact, even in the case of a living body it is inconceivable how cognition associated with it moves on from place to place (v. 61). As for the concept of an intermediary body created temporarily and acting as the medium of transmigration it is utterly illogical; and even if such a body exists it would not make possible the movement of cognition from one place to another (vv. 62-64). As for the contention that cognition gets seated in a foetus it is nonsensical: for cognition means apprehension of an object and such an apprehension is possible only on the part of a full-fledged body fully equipped with the needed cogoitionapparatus (vv. 65-66). As a matter of fact, cognition has to be deemed absent in the states of swoon etc. precisely because then there takes place no apprehension of an object (v. 66). Nor will it do to say that during the states in question cognition