Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

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Slokavårtika-a study
words are incapable of conveying a meaning (v. 71). The idealist might say that all cognition other than that produced by his inference is false; Kumārila retorts that in that case too the cognition of 'otherness' in question should be false (it being not produced by the idealist's inference) and then it should be impossible to decide as to what cognition is false and what not false (vv. 76-78). These last arguments of Kumârila might seem frivolous but let us keep in mind that after completing his refutation of the idealist inference Kumärila is going to consider at length as to why the idealist has no right at all to enter into a debate with a rival. Se for the present we only note that in the course of v. 70-87 Kumārila has said about so many positions that even if the idealist does maintain them he has logically no right to maintain them on account of his basic contention that all cognition is false. But one point of material importance has emerged in the meanwhile. For Kumarila has once proposed a counter-inference somewhat as follows: "An ordinary waking cognition is true, because it is not followed by a contradicting cognition, just like the cognition that contradicts a dream-cognitioa” (vv. 79-80) Kumārila feels that even the idealist cannot contest the validity of his corroborative instance, for to do so will mean that in the case of the latter's own inference there obtains no valid corroborative instance; after all, dream-cognition is false precisely because the waking cognition that contradicts it is true and Kumärila's point is that other waking cognitions are true just like this particular waking cognition (vv. 80-81). So after finishing that point about the impossibility of word-employment on the part of the idealist Kumãrila reverts back to the question as to why an ordinary waking cognition, even if it is not followed by a contradicting cognition, should be declared to be false (vv. 87-90). As we have just noted, Kumārila knows that the idealist cannot argue that waking cognition is false because it is contradicted by dream-cognition (for that will imply that dream-cognition is true); but he is ready to consider the idealist argument that ordinary waking cognition is false because it is contraticted by a yogin's extra-ordi. nary cognition. (vv. 90–92). On consideration, however, Kumārila finds this latter argument too to be inconclusive, and his simple point is that there is no knowing what a yogia sees or does not see, there being so many conflicting parties all claiming the support of this yogin or that (vv. 94-95). Nay, Kumärila goes on to add that the yogin who says that no external objects exist is saying something for which no corroboration comes from a non-yogin's perception while the yogin who says that external objects exist is saying something for which such corroboration is readily available (vv. 93-96). Kumārila also shows that even the analogy of the illusory perceptions of waking life does not prove that the ordinary perceptions of waking life too are false, for the former type of perceptions are called false precisely because they are contradicted by the latter type of perceptions-which means that these latter type of perceptions are true; moreover, in that case it will have to be granted that the yogin's perceptions are as well false because they too are perceptions of the waking life (vv. 96-98). Lastly, Kumārila submits that the yogin whose perception