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II. 10-14 ] CHAPTER II
[ 77 perception and knowledge, the former has necessarily a limited province.
The author in these verses, in order to establish his view of oneness ( of knowledge and perception ) leaves five charges with equal force against both the Kramavādin and Sabavādin,
1. Both the Kramavādin and Sahavādin hold that knowledge and perception are two separate functions. Naturally they must hold that the province of Absolute knowledge is 'the particular and that of Absolute perception is the general'. It follows, therefore, that both these functions (Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception) like other kinds of knowledge such as Mati, Śruta and others comprehend only one of the many objects. If they once accept this, they have to admit that in their view there is no function of knowledge wbich has the capacity to comprehend all things, in other words there is no such thing as Absolute knowledge. If this be so how can a Kramavādin or Sabavādin account for Absolute knowledge or Absolute perception ? Now to account for Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception one has to suppose that every comprehension has as its object the partial and the general aspect of the world at every moment. If this is believed, we will have also to believe in a comprehension of all things through one comprehension, to make room for Eternal knowledge and Eternal perception. While doing this the distinction between knowledge and perception will be effaced
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