Three Essays On Aesthetics

Author(s): Archie J Bahm
Publisher: Archie J Bahm
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269291/1

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THREE ESSAYS on AESTHETICS by ARCHIE J. BAHM
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME LV, No. 20
SEPTEMBER 25, 1958
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND
MORAL EXPERIENCE
Ι TXPERIENCE is “aesthetic" when it is enjoyed as complete in
L itself and "moral" when it is felt as incomplete and as needing something more to complete it. Hence "aesthetic" and "moral" are conceived as opposites. The term "moral" as used here has a much broader than usual denotation. (If the reader is unhappy about this usage, he may wish to suggest a more suitable term.) Both "aesthetic" and "moral" are value terms and valueless experience is not considered a possibility in the perspective from which this paper is written. Every experience has a value aspect. If the term "value" also is too broadly conceived to suit the preferences of the reader, he may be reminded that the distinction between value and facts, or between value-facts and non-value facts, is a highly sophisticated, highly artificial, and highly specialized one, not to be found ordinarily in primitive, children's, or everyday experiences. It is my purpose not to belabor this point but merely to indicate that non-value aspects of experience are irrelevant to the present discussion. The focal issue revolves about the distinction between experience enjoyed without desire, or any other feeling of incompleteness, and experience enjoying desire, or any other feeling of incompleteness. It should not be said that the "aesthetic' consists in satisfaction of desire, for both satisfaction and frustration retain implicit in them the desire which they satisfy or frustrate. A feeling of satisfaction is "moral" to the extent that it is felt as incomplete without the preceding and now-partly-nonexistent desire.
This distinction between "aesthetic" and "moral" may be stated also in terms of intrinsic and instrumental values. Disregarding for present purposes those values, intrinsic or instrumental, which may exist independently of experience, we may define the "aesthetic" and the "moral" in terms of experiences as intrinsic and instrumental values. An experience is itself an intrinsic value to the extent that it is experienced as complete in itself. Such an experience is "aesthetic." An experience is itself an instrumental
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value to the extent that it experiences itself as a means to something more. Such an experience is "moral.” This paper is limited to a consideration of problems involved in the aesthetic" and the "moral" so conceived.
II
If the "aesthetic" consists in what is experienced as complete in itself, are there any limits to the kinds of aesthetic experience! Except for those which are essentially and clearly moral, No. Even experiences which are moral may, as we shall see later, be aesthetic also. We shall not take time to review the history of ideals of those who restrict the aesthetic to only one kind of object, or at most to a few kinds of objects. But we may illustrate the range of variety by citing some examples. Sensations may be experienced aesthetically, and debate will continue as to whether only the visual, or also the auditory, or also the olfactory and gustatory, or also all of the some sixteen kinds of sensation, may be so experienced. (The term “aesthetic" itself originally denoted sensory experience.) Lines, shapes, forms, patterns, arrangements may be aesthetic, whether sensed or imagined. Ideas, ideals, essences may be aesthetically contemplated, as advocated by Plato, Aristotle, and Santayana. Feelings, emotions, impulses, sentiments may be enjoyed as aesthetic, as pointed out by romanticists. And nirvanic peace, whether enjoyed as fullness, or void, or indifference, has been claimed to be the pinnacle of aesthetic experience by Hindu. thinkers.
Debates continue also as to whether aesthetic experiences are primarily simple or complex, concrete or abstract, of particulars or universals, sensuous or imaginative, intellectual or emotional, contemplative or impulsive, pacifying or inspiring. Occidental aestheticians are so completely preoccupied with problems regarding aesthetic objects that they commonly overlook a major controversy as to whether the object or the subject is the ultimate constituent in aesthetic experience. Advaitins, for example, consider objects illusory, including aesthetic objects, and distractive from the profounder enjoyment of Atman, the universal soul, whose real nature can be grasped only in aesthetic enjoyment. The writer wishes to note, and advocate, that the term "aesthetic" can and should be used, on occasion, in each of these senses. What makes each of these kinds, and others to be mentioned later, "aesthetic" is not that they are simple or complex, concrete or abstract, sensuous or imaginative, etc., but that they are experienced as complete in themselves. The various specific criteria of aestheticness, such as harmony, novelty, arrestingness, psychical distance, significant form,

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etc., are all inadequate representatives of this ultimate characteristic of the aesthetic.
III If the "moral" consists in what is experienced as incomplete in itself, are there any limits to the kinds of moral experience ? Except for those which are essentially and clearly aesthetic, No. Most, if not all, experiences are moral, for even most of those which are aesthetic are moral also. As illustrative of some varieties of experienceable incompleteness, we may cite several examples.
These may be treated under the headings: volition, expectation, implication, and obligation. Volition is exemplified in desire which, as yet unsatisfied, projects a not-given satisfaction, or in purpose which, as unrealized, entails an unreached goal, or in inspiration or enthusiasm which, as a stirring toward action, prompts some acting which is obviously unfinished. Expectation is anticipation of future experience; this may take many forms, ranging from uncertainty as to what to expect to faith that unrepeated portions of a remembered habitual pattern of behavior will recur as expected. Implication provokes inference from something given to something not given. Obligation is a feeling that something not yet done ought to be done and, like all ethical categories such as duty, justice, responsibility, and conscience, requires that one be forwardlooking.
Whenever one experiences doubt, uncertainty, or error; fear, hate, or mistrust; anxiety, restlessness, or worry; ambition, greed, or grasping; pride, jealousy, or regret; curiosity, choice, decision; his experience is moral. Furthermore, those more complex interests, which are called science, philosophy, religion, engineering, business, government, love, marriage, and parenthood, are all highly moral. One's Weltanschauung, which may also have aesthetic aspects, is primarily moral.
IV It should be clear by now that the writer contends that the aesthetic and the moral are both aspects of experience, or of almost every experience. Granted that some experiences are predominantly moral and others predominantly aesthetic, nevertheless, with few exceptions, all moral experiences have an aesthetic aspect and all aesthetic experiences have a moral aspect.
Moral experiences are implicitly aesthetic in at least two ways. First, the goal is implicit in the aim; completion is felt implied by the incomplete; that which is to be enjoyed as an end-in-itself is the purpose for which what is felt as incomplete is felt as means.

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The goal, completion, the end-in-itself, is previsioned as aesthetic. The aesthetic is the goal of the moral. Secondly, almost every present moral experience is accepted, in part, for what it is. If one desires, longs, aims, intends dialectically he presupposes that it is worth desiring, longing, aiming, intending. Even one who fears must, dialectically, consider it worth his while to fear. Except for those caught in the grip of excruciating pain, terror, a tantrum, or utter hopelessness, any element of realism, i.e., of willingness to face things as they are, contributes an aesthetic aspect. Even those experiencing pain, terror, tantrum, or hopelessness, have implicit in such experience an opposite as an ideal which would be enjoyable. If one is not overwhelmed by the unendurable, must one not be accepting, in some small degree at least, what he experiences as it is; and is not this experiencing it, to this extent, as an end-in-itself? That is, incompleteness, or what is experienced as incomplete, is also experienced as complete-in-itself, not in the same sense in which it is incomplete, but in the sense that it is a complete incompleteness" which does not really demand some other incompleteness to complete its incompleteness. So, in at least a second way, moral experiences are implicitly aesthetic.
On the other hand, aesthetic experiences are implicitly moral, also in at least two ways. First, the aim is implicit in the goal; that which is good-in-itself is the axiological source of whatever is good for it; the end not only justifies, but requires, the means. The good-in-itself, the goal, is that at which all desire aims. But the good-in-itself remains incompletely realized, except as an ideal, in moments of ecstacy or, more rarely, in the lives of saints, yogins, sages, or bodhisattvas. Experience is dynamic, changing, flowing; and that which is experienced as complete is, normally, so experienced only temporarily. To live is to adjust, and to enjoy life is to attain and reattain satisfaction. Ideally, it would seem better if intrinsic value could stand by itself, or if experience could be eternally complete in itself. One function of God in human experience is to exemplify that ideal. But actually temporary experiences of intrinsic value are inseparable from the instruments upon which they depend. Hence the aesthetic actually continues to depend upon the moral.
Oughtness, may I suggest, consists in the power which a greater good has over a lesser good in compelling our choices. Now intrinsic value existing is better than intrinsic value not existing. Hence intrinsic value ought to exist. Or, the aesthetic ought to exist. The aesthetic implies moral obligation to support it. And this obligation is an ever-present, implicit, and at least subconscious, factor in human nature.

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The second way in which the aesthetic involves the moral may be seen by distinguishing between two kinds of satisfaction, namely, that in which satisfaction is so complete that the desire is extinguished and that in which satisfaction is so enjoyable that it arouses desire for more of the same. Now which kind of satisfaction is better, that which extinguishes desire or that which stimulates it? Satisfaction is aesthetic, but not purely aesthetic, for the preceding desire remains implicit in the satisfaction, whereas purely aesthetic experience would be so complete in itself that no evidence of such preceding desire would remain. Now satisfaction which extinguishes desire is more aesthetic, in the sense that no tendency toward further desire is present, than satisfaction which stimulates desire. But, further desire is desire for further satisfaction, for further enjoyment of an end-in-itself, it entails a greater, or at least some more, aesthetic enjoyment than that which merely terminates. Now this stimulation of further desire is moral. Hence, an aesthetic experience which leads to more aesthetic experiences is
better than one which does not. Or, inherent in the nature of that · which is aesthetic are reasons why the moral ought to exist.
V Paradox is present in the interrelations between the aesthetic and the moral. No matter how we examine them, paradox appears. When each is taken in isolation from the other, each is self-destructive. When taken together, each is involved in dialectical tailchasing.
The moral, by itself, has no purpose, no goal, no place to go, no reason for being. The moral, as incompleteness, as instrumentality, aims at completeness, at intrinsicness. Without its aesthetic goal, morality could not be moral. On the other hand, the aesthetic by itself is a goal which can neither aim nor be aimed at, can neither sèek nor be sought, can neither serve nor be served. It can only be, which is the same as being dead. If anyone is to experience it alone, he must be, if not completely, then either almost or momentarily, dead. Taken in isolation, the moral would be an aim which aimed at nothing and the aesthetic would be a goal at which nothing aimed.
Taken together, each is dialectically involved in the other. The moral, by aiming at and ending in the aesthetic, requires that which it is not in order to complete itself. But the aesthetic, as completeness, would also put a complete end to the moral were it not for the fact that that which is aesthetic is not a mere terminus or is not dead. The aesthetic, if it is to continue and to continue to be that in which the moral terminates, must be involved in some

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thing which continues it, something which is not complete in itself, something which is alive.
It is life itself which rescues us from the fate of extinction to which mere thought would assign us. Life is inherently both moral and aesthetic at the same time, even if in varying degrees at different times. Life itself, as well as its moral and aesthetic aspects, is dialectical. And it is in dialectic that the basic' clues to achievement of happiness are to be found. Art and society are involved in this same paradox and can be freed, so to speak, only dialectically.
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VI
It is time to indicate an additional double thesis of this paper, namely, that: that which is both aesthetic and moral may be more completely aesthetic than that which is aesthetic merely; and that which is both aesthetic and moral may be more completely moral than that which is moral merely.
Support for this contention requires awareness that the goal of life is to be found not outside of life, but within life itself. He who recognizes that life as actually lived is all the life that he can live thereby accepts life as complete in itself. He has an aesthetic attitude toward life. Now, since being moral, in all of the various ways of being moral, is part of life as actually lived, one who accepts, and experiences, such moral life as complete in itself thereby experiences it as aesthetic. He who would try to eliminate morality which cannot be eliminated thereby becomes more moral and less aesthetic in his enjoyment of life.
On the other hand, since the goal of life is aesthetic, the extreme moralist, who would eliminate the aesthetic from life and put it beyond life, would thereby extinguish all enjoyment of life. Rather, as moral, we should want to experience the actual as the ideal, for thereby we find the goal of life in life and not elsewhere. Does this mean elimination of ideals? Oh no. For having ideals is itself a part of human nature, and part of what has to be accepted by anyone who accepts life as complete in itself.
Thus, as moral, we should want that which is both moral and aesthetic, and as aesthetic, we should enjoy what is inclusive of both moral and aesthetic.
VII
Let us turn now to some consequences of these theses for art and society. First, consider art. Is art aesthetic or moral or both? It is both, but much more moral than aesthetic.

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Art involves three distinguishable factors: the artist, creator, or producer; the art instrument or object created; and the appreciater, enjoyer, or consumer. The producer and consumer may, of course, be the same person. Each of these three factors will be dealt with briefly.
Is artistic creativity aesthetic? While creating, the artist must, of course, have some goal in mind, a job to do, one which is not yet done, and which, hence, is experienced as incomplete. Unless he is unusually sure of himself, he is uncertain as to just how his work will turn out. If, further, he is creating for an audience, he must be concerned about how it will be received. Only to the extent that he is doing just what he wants to do is his experience of creativity aesthetic. The aesthetic quality of his creativity is more likely to reflect the character of his life than of the particular scene or shape (“object” or “non-object”) which he is trying to depict. One who is more completely and spontaneously devoted to enjoyment of the aesthetic is more likely to be able to abstract an enjoyable portion of life and crystalize it for others to apprehend. But his creativity is experienced both as aesthetic and as moral, for the more highly aesthetic he feels, the more he believes, morally, that the product will be worth while. The artist, more often than not, does what he feels he ought to do; and the more strongly he feels that he ought to produce the aesthetic, the more moral he is.
The art object is an instrument for producing further aesthetic enjoyment. The various principles which aid in aesthetic expression will not be discussed here, except to repeat that they must all somehow contribute to a sense of completeness. However, there is a difference between a feeling of completeness and boredom, for an inspiring work of art may produce a feeling of completeness more successfully than a boring one, one which inspires a desire to get away from it. Great art is highly aesthetic, but not merely aesthetic. Great art is also highly moral, but never merely moral.
The more an art object attracts and holds attention to the aesthetic experience intended, the more aesthetic it is as an object. But the more such an object suggests a fitness into the total life scheme of the appreciator, the more it contributes to an aesthetic life. Life itself may be aesthetic, as well as objects. If an art object, in order to be appreciated, isolates man from the rest of his life, it is aesthetic only so long as it holds his attention from the rest of life. But if an art object, such as a beautiful dress or automobile, contributes harmoniously to making life as a whole felt more satisfying, as more complete in itself, it is really more wholesomely aesthetic. One further remark about the moral character of art objects is worth adding. When an object created does in fact com

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monly produce aesthetic experiences, then it ought to be treated as a precious instrument. Art objects are moral objects-objects of moral concern. They ought to be created; they ought to be preserved; they ought to be appreciated. And, anticipating some of what will be said about society, society ought to promote conditions of creation, preservation, and appreciation, including wide-spread distribution of art objects.
The consumer or appreciater, if he be other than the creator, also enjoys both moral and aesthetic experience, again usually more moral than aesthetic. If he compares what he sees with other works, of the same or different artists, inquires concerning its meaning and purpose, thinks how it would look in his own home, wonders how much it would cost, imagines how proud he would be as its owner, his experience is largely moral. When his experience is genuinely complete in itself, he will have little inclination to talk about it, for to talk about it is to un-complete it, to relate it to something else, to moralize about it. Of course, among artists and aestheticians, acceptance of the moral aspects of artistic experiences may be so complete that analysis and criticism may occur without distracting from, but rather contributing to, an aesthetic whole.
VIII
Not only art, but also society, or social experience, may be both moral and aesthetic. That social experience is moral, no one doubts. But that it is aesthetic remains far from clear. The writer contends that society has the aesthetic as its ultimate goal. Does this mean that we should, as a matter of public policy, rush about and produce more artists and distribute more art objects ? Not necessarily. These are means which may or may not be wisely used to achieve the ends. Ours is an age of artistic specialization. Often discovery of the locus of what in the object is intended as of primary aesthetic importance requires specialized instruction regarding specialized appreciation. So long as such instruction is lacking, distribution of some art objects may result only in disgust or dismay.
The goal of aesthetic living may be described variously as confidence, assurance, security, acceptance, faith, belief, conviction Let us recall that as moral man is anxious, concerned, worried, nervous, restless, but as aesthetic he is calm, quiescent, peaceful, contented. Those who live with confidence that what they are doing is right live more aesthetically than those troubled by doubt. One cannot live aesthetically until he has mastered fear. Fear is moral. Those who say "We have nothing to fear but fear itself" are wishing for the aesthetic life. Social security, whether politi

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cal, economic, legal or medical, is conducive to, but no guarantee of, an aesthetic life. Firm convictions, especially if they be unchallenged, may contribute; for dogmatists often speak with aesthetic authority. Being esteemed, admired, or loved contributes to confidence. Love is aesthetic when one enjoys the beloved for what he is and moral when he desires to retain, continue, or repeat the aesthetic. Religion aims at restoring confidence (peace that passeth all understanding), assurance of achievement of intrinsic value, even though one may be undeserving. Religion has a double-direction: the one is external to the self, even cosmic: to assure confidence that “all's right with the world." The other is internal: to assure confidence that all is right deep down in the self. A third function has to do with providing confidence that these two are in harmony with each other.
Oriental philosophies (especially Taoism, Buddhism, and several varities of Hindu philosophy) come closer to stating the aesthetic goal of life than Western philosophies and religions which, by and large, give much more emphasis to the moral. The willingness to accept things as they come—i.e., as sufficiently complete in themselves—is essential to aesthetic living. To establish this willingness is part of society's moral goal. This does not mean stagnation, however, for, dialectically, the job ahead, with all its trouble and anxiety, is part of things as they come. There are levels of confidence and levels of anxiety; and one lives more aesthetically when more of his levels, especially the deeper levels, are quiescent. One whose life is deeply aesthetic can endure amazing amounts of surface turmoil. To reattain a feeling of depth security is a major function of prayer in orthodox Christianity. But Christianity suffers imbalance: God is primarily aesthetic; man is primarily moral; or God alone is perfect, complete in himself, man is imperfect, incomplete, hence essentially unaesthetic. To attain confidence that the soul is indestructible was the message of the god, Krishna, in the Gita, to Arjuna who needed confidence that war was right. Kamikazi pilots crashed to death with confidence; the U.S. Army is weak regarding the aesthetics of war.
One can see a kind of hierarchy of aesthetic levels in human experience. First, one may experience an art object as aesthetic. Secondly, his whole experience at one time, including the art object, may be aesthetic. Thirdly, his whole life, including the just-mentioned whole experience, may be aesthetic. Fourthly, he may live in a community in which many lives lived aesthetically heighten the aesthetic quality of each particular life. Finally, he may live in a world with many communities and cultures intermingling and aesthetically influencing each other. There may be, of course, still

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other levels, but the point here is that one who can enjoy many aesthetic levels, from art object to world-society, may have a richer aesthetic experience than he whose aesthetic range is more limited.
ARCHIE J. BAHM UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

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Reprinted from The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXIV/1, Fall 1965. Printed in U.S.A.
ARCHIE J. BAHM
Comparative Aesthetics
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE consists in intuition of intrinsic value. This conclusion has been forced upon me as a result of studying Oriental philosophies after teaching (Western) aesthetics for twelve years. The purpose of the present article is to compare Hindu, Chinese, and Western conceptions of the nature of the aesthetic, to indicate some metaphysical sources of differences in aesthetic theory, and to make clear how all may be interpreted as implying the above conclusion.
Any attempt to compare the ideals of the three major civilizations, each with its long, complex, and variegated history, exposes itself to justified criticism. Exceptions to general patterns, even when these have been correctly discerned, may be found within each of the three. Hence, the views presented about them here are intended as hypotheses about persisting emphases rather than as final conclusions about universal generalizations. Each of the three should be viewed as an evolving history of cultural ideals rather than as a clearly distinguishable monolithic scheme. Abstractions and sketchy summaries entail fictition. Yet discernment of pervasive patterns of presupposition, and summary exposition of their key ideas, may serve to provide hypothetical guides for further exploration.
DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF
THE AESTHETIC
Western thought, prompted by vigorous and persistent struggle to understand the aesthetic, has blossomed with many varieties of conclusion. These range from enjoy
ment of sensuous pleasures to numbers symbolizing measured ratios of distinguishable portions of complex shapes, from joyous impulses to eternally subsisting forms or beings, from creative processes to appreciative attitudes, and from the work of uniquely individualistic genius to movements collectively manifesting underlying and pervasive motifs dominating a cultural milieu. Generalization about such variety may be unwarranted. Yet, for purposes of comparison, I venture to suggest that Western interest in aesthetics historically preoccupied itself first with real things functioning as works of art, usually associated with religious, political, and other practical pursuits. Even today, I suspect, a majority of both philosophers and artists regard aesthetics as concerned primarily with philosophy of art. Varieties of art forms, disagreements about taste, and conflicting conclusions proposed by theorists all have induced many to believe that beauty exists "in the eye of the beholder." But despite a shift of interest from philosophy of art to philosophy of beauty, there remained preoccupation with how the qualities of real things produce experiences of beauty and with how experiences of beautiful objects, whether imagined (created) or real, can be projected upon real things by the appreciator (through empathy) or the artist ("extrinsicator"). Some Romanticists excepted, few Western aestheticians have located the aesthetic in subjective factors exclusively.
Hindu philosophy, typically conceiving ultimate reality and value in terms of sat

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(pure being), chit (pure awareness) and ananda (pure bliss), idealizes the aesthetic as intuition of such ultimacy. Believing that perfect quiescence, with all desires stilled, all distinctions vanquished, and all movement ceased, alone is perfectly enjoyed, Vedantists depict demergence into imperfect (illusory) being through successive levels of consciousness, self-consciousness, mind (with imagination), sensations, the sense organs, objects sensed, and real things (as well as hallucinations and erroneously inferred real things). Art objects, as real things, belong to almost the lowest order of illusory beings. They appeal to the senses, and so long as attention fastens upon the sensuous arts, it is distracted and disunited from the truly aesthetic. Consequently, orthodox theorists experienced some difficulty in reconciling the arts, especially music, as in any way contributory to attaining the ultimate aesthetic goal. However, Hindu thought eventually added a "fifth Veda" (including theory of drama, Natyaveda, of music, Sangitaveda, and of architecture, Vasuveda) revealing how mastery of these arts may be used to advance one toward the ultimate goal. Dramatic enactment of sacred stories symbolizing divine processes may draw the observer from daily cares to holier ideas and moods. An actor may lose self-consciousness by identifying himself with the cosmic deity he portrays. Temple architecture preserves these stories in stone, and songs preserve them in memories. But even merely instrumental music, which demands extreme concentration by the musician and entices the listener away from more mundane affairs, may serve as a kind of yoga. Although Hindu philosophers, reluctant to admit still another competitor to their Way of Knowledge (Gnana Yoga), may regard this "fifth Veda" as a "soft way" suited to the lesser capacities of the masses, a rationale can be established which justifies the artist as a proponent of ultimacy. Only when the general is wedded to the specific, as in art, can the general be comprehended by ordinary men. Hence, art in some form or other is necessary for religious instruction.
ARCHIE J. BAHM
Risking presumptuous familiarity in an aside, I illustrate the foregoing by recalling thoughts entertained while enjoying a performance by Sitarist Ravi Shankar in Albuquerque on December 5, 1964. Part of the significance of Hindu sacred music can be found in its inducement to silence, within which transcendental ecstasy may be experienced. The significance of silence is seldom understood by Western audiences (though Hindu artists performing in the United States often cater to Western preferences for vivacity and virtuosity instead of quiescent sanctity). For example, deceleration of rhythm and decreasing loudness of sounds at the end of a performance may not merely fade into silence but be projected as if into a profounder silence by continued plucking motions for visual appearance after actual plucking has ceased. Western anxiety cannot restrain itself from breaking (rudely) into applause; but the longer the pause before applause, the greater the quiescent effect, the achievement of the artist, and the appreciation by the audience. Another significant part of Hindu music is the drone, accomplished variously by the Tampura, Tabla and Harmonium, for example. Establishment of an underlying, invariant rhythm conditions. the spirit to remain unmoved by distractions while following the Sitar music or song. The more stable and prolonged the mood, the more it resembles or embodies the stability and eternality idealized as ultimate reality.
As I continue my aside even more presumptuously, allow me to wonder why Hindu musicians do not still further exploit musical potentialities for inducing silence. Deliberate deceleration of rhythm, a technique commonly employed by Hatha Yogins, using breathing practices to induce evacuations of consciousness, may be repeated continuously. Just as a yogin may prolong each successive breath cycle by the length of an additional heartbeat, so a musician may both decelerate his rhythm more slowly and extend the period of silence a moment longer in each of a successive series of movements toward quiescence until the listener's spirit tends toward expecting per

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fect quiescence. The Nirvanic effect of such silence, it appears to me, would be much greater than is usually achieved, at least in popular performances. But, without some comprehension of Hindu ideals about the utterly quiescent nature of ultimate aesthetic value, the significance of such silence is lost on Western audiences. But use of such techniques in India, if not already common, would doubtless persuade more yogins who prefer non-musical approaches to Nirvana of the efficacy of music for approaching the ultimate goal.
Although Hindu philosophy tends to idealize location of the aesthetic in subjective quiescence perfectible normally only after death, many other theories about its nature and location have occurred. The enlightening insight of Gotama, the Buddha, consisted in finding "comfort" (enjoyment of the aesthetic) "wherever you go, stand, sit, or lie down" here and now, not by cessation of motion or extinction of desire but through a middle way between desiring more than you are going to get and desiring more stopping of such desiring than you are able to stop.1 This kind of yea-saying, so impalpable to his fellow Hindus that they perforce proceeded to interpret him as reaffirming extinction of desire, smoothed the way for his acceptance in China. The aesthetic may be experienced here and now if we will but assent to the present as just what we want. When one devotes full time to the art of fine (i.e., enjoying intrinsic value) living, interest in the arts may constitute irrelevancy. But Gotama too was typically Hindu in locating aesthetic value as something primarily subjective.
Chinese philosophy, even less familiar to Western thinkers, also recognizes art objects as artificial and prefers to seek the aesthetic in ordinary experiences. But the distinction between subjective and objective aspects of experience is itself something artificial and unnecessarily divisive. Generally speaking, Chinese civilization has idealized being natural and the interpretation of such naturalness in a relatively naive way. Myriads of thinkers have depicted the aesthetic in unique ways. Yet, whether mistaken or not, I detect a perva
111 sive attitude appreciative of the simple, ordinary, everyday experiences. Interest in distant objects and in subjective depths is equally missing or secondary. Aesthetic value is to be found in the present as it appears; if it appears as if in some real thing, such as bubbling tea, or as if in some inner feeling, as when one's sagging spirits are buoyed by tea, so be it. The aesthetic should be enjoyed however it presently appears, not explained away in terms of external forms or of subjective quiescence.
Even something so artificially formal as the Tea Ceremony is intended to remind us, and to reembody within us, something of the natural. "Teaism is a cult founded on the adoration of the beautiful among the sordid facts of everyday existence.... It is essentially a worship of the Imperfect, as it is a tender attempt to accomplish something possible in this impossible thing we know as life." 2 The rural Taoism of Lao Tzu, the familial Taoism of Confucius, and the urbanized Taoism of Zen Buddhism all reject the artificial and, perhaps excepting Confucian patronage of the arts including music, all locate the aesthetic in perfection of yea-saying to life as it presents itself. This is indeed an attitudinal perfection; but it is not an idealized perfect state, whether of formal harmony or of calmed desires. Life is imperfect so long as we want more than we will get; and no matter how smartly we scheme to construct some ideally perfect world in which to live, we only make ourselves miserable to the extent that we fail to appreciate actual appearances as they come. The aesthetic is to be located not in intuition of some supposed perfect quietude nor in emotional response to some supposed really beautiful thing but in an intuition of the actual present as being, self-evidently, the best that actually is.
IMPLICATIONS OF METAPHYSICAL
DIFFERENCES
Aesthetic theories imply, and are implied by, metaphysical theories. By cohering, aesthetic and metaphysical theories support

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ARCHIEJ. BAHM each other. Let us examine and compare of form, eulogizes forms as not only ultigeneral metaphysical tendencies in each of mate reals but also as ultimate goods. When the three major civilizations in which their forms are regarded as goods, the aesthetic is respective aesthetic theories are grounded. to be located in intuitive apprehension of Ideally, comparisons should be made in them, whether in Plato's pre-existence or in such a way that other cultures will be com- Aristotle's contemplative reason. Attempts pared with the ideals of each culture, taken at analysis of forms lead to ideals of harin turn, as standard. Each, then, may well monious forms and of harmony between be judged superior by its own standards forms, with subcategories such as symmetry, and inferior by other standards. I choose balance, and equilibrium. After idealized to compare Hindu and Chinese views in reason was incorporated into the Christian terms of two metaphysical traits which God, such reason constituted a part of the have dominated Western culture, though glorious perfection of God, who not only I discovered that they so dominated only embodies good will but also the only perfect after studying Hindu and Chinese cultures intrinsic value. For Thomas Aquinas, God and finding these traits deemphasized and becomes not only his own end-in-itself but despised.
also "man's last end." The ultimate in the way of aesthetic experience is coming "face to face" with God. "God alone," says
Jonathan Edwards, "is truly beautiful." These two traits, Will and Reason, stem Western philosophy, when pursuing the respectively from the two main taproots of ideals of its Greek ancestors, locates the Western civilization, the Hebraic and the aesthetic in intuiting reason as intrinsic Greek. Will has status in ultimate reality value, even though its conceptions of the as the will of God, whereby God creates nature and pervasiveness of reason vary. and governs the world. God's will is good, Our Hebraic heritage, first idealizing will and so is man's, except when man sins by as the source of both power and satisfacwilling to go against the will of God. Greek tion, locates good in feelings of satisfaction, philosophers, idealizing reason, regarded and eulogizes "peace on earth" as freedom will as irrational and distrusted it as evil. from conflict among wills. The Greeks Reason, as the principle of order, regularity, taught harmony of forms; the Hebrews stability, and eternality in both man and harmony of wills. The aesthetic, conseuniverse, provides the basis for the nature quently, is to be located in feeling securely of things and for deductive certainty about at home in a happy family. Christian thethem. Faith in the discernibility of the ology absorbed not only God's will but also forms of things begot ideals of perfect de- located the aesthetic, for both God and finability, whether as Platonic Ideas, man, in experiencing the doing of what is Aristotle's Forms, or the laws of nature or pleasing to God. Intrinsic value consists of logic. Will acts rightly only when assent- in the satisfaction of desire. In fact, "desire ing to reason. In Christian theology, as de- is the only basis of value; value itself does picted in the Augustinian synthesis, reason not exist until desire is being satisfied." 3 and will are identical in God, who is per- The aesthetic consists in intuiting such satfect, but never quite so in man, who is im- isfaction. The aesthete, the artist, and the perfect. Two significant facts need to be aesthetician must look for those elements, noted: Both will and reason are idealized as or wholes, or organic unities in experiences, ingredient in ultimate reality. Persisting including the objects experienced, which opposition between will and reason resulted tend to produce such satisfaction. Art obin recurrent outbreaks of intellectual indi- jects may be described as beautiful when gestion in Western thought, not only in they produce a satisfying experience, e.g., theology but also in conflicting aesthetic as when they are "restful." theories.
But Western idealizations of will shifted Our Greek heritage, idealizing perfection emphasis from satisfaction of desire to de
Du

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113 siring itself, or from Voluntarism to Ro- "authentic," in enjoying self-willed, hence manticism. The thrill, zest, gusto, vivacity self-created and freely-chosen, value. experienced while enthusiastically desiring Quarrels between voluntarists and rocame to be regarded as a greater intrinsic manticists, compounded by disputes with value than satisfaction, which terminates varieties of rationalists, to say nothing of and thus destroys desire. Desirousness, hedonists,5 leave Western civilization still variously described as impulse, emotion, a caldron of seething issues, in aesthetics as or sentiment, and idealized as intense and well as religion and politics. The reasonprolonged, as exciting and as infinite, as will controversy has undergone many atvoluptuous and as heroic, appealed to the tempted reconciliations. William James young and healthy more frequently as food proposed a pragmatic compromise: By way supplies became more abundant. "To travel of criticizing the rationalistic doctine that hopefully is better than to arrive." 4 "Our "The good is that at which all things aim," reach exceeds our grasp, or what's a heaven he asserted that it is as true to say that for?” Feelings of enthusiasm are intuited things are good because we like them as as intrinsic values. Hence the aesthetic is that we like them because they are good. to be located in the enjoyment of impul. But discord continues. And the welter of siveness. Art works which stir our senti- variations of each of these theories may ments, arouse our impulses, inspire our en- leave an impression that Western civilizathusiasms, and prolong and intensify our tion thrives in a chaos of relativisms. Westyearnings should therefore be sought. Since ern aestheticians cannot be expected to give satisfactions diminish desire while frustra- a final definition of the nature of the aestrations intensify them, those bored with thetic so long as Western civilization canlesser stimuli deliberately seek the frustrat- not make up its collective mind. However, ing, the embarrassing, the mean, the unjust, as we shall see by observing Hindu and the cruel-not to produce evil but to mag- Chinese ideals, the persistent preoccupation nify that good which exists as intensity of of Western civilization with the reason-will feeling. The "dialectics of the Romantic controversy involves having its mind made soul" reveal the tortuous meanderings of up in certain very characteristic ways. Only an enthusiast in search of ever more pi- after understanding how tenaciously Oriquant excitement for his flagging energies. ental civilizations reject both reason and The art idealized by the Romanticist is will as having either status or value in ultinot "restful” but “arresting," not familiar mate reality can we recognize how distincbut novel, not formal but unique, not clear tively reason and will have shaped the ways but intriguing.
in which the Western mind is made up. Idealization of willfulness not only promoted ambition, ideals of progress, and ap- 1 preciation of the beauty of "success" but also appeared in Lutheran and Pietistic Hindu civilization, although flourishing faith (and "the beauty of holiness"), in with a jungle-like plethora of theories and Bergson's élan vital, in Freudian libida- practices, also seems to embody a dominatnism, in pragmatism's "will to believe," and ing pervasive mood. Within this mood the in existentialism. Extreme existentialists issue of whether reason or will is more ultiwill good to exist even where otherwise mate, either as reality or value, is relatively there is none. Kierkegaard demanded the insignificant. Both represent either illusory existence of God and of goodness even when or degenerate forms of being and value, and rational argument demonstrated their non- function more often as evils than as goods. existence. Atheistic existentialists urge us to The dominating ideals of Hindu and Westcontemplate the valuelessness of non-exist- ern civilizations oppose each other so comence so that we may be prompted to will pletely that what is taken as most real, and some value into what pitiful little existence good, in the one is regarded as least real, we have. The aesthetic is located in the and good, in the other. Not only do both
The donizations opptaken as mostleast real,

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idea ultimate reality.ch
way in which extremely
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ARCHIEJ. BAHM reason and will have no status or value in This principle, which denies rationality ultimate reality but also the difference to ultimate reality, has molded Hindu between them, presupposed as extremely ideals throughout the centuries. Anyone important by the way in which Western who describes the aesthetic in words which civilization insists on being plagued by it, fail to entail this principle falls short of is regarded as utterly insignificant. Conse- ultimacy. The ultimate intuition of intrinquently, the aesthetic, as viewed from sic value must itself be indistinct from these opposing moods, is conceived as hav- such pure indistinctness. That such intuiing antithetical natures. Generalization tion remains unavailable to human minds about the nature of the aesthetic, difficult should be obvious, though Hindu tradition enough when attempted within any one of holds out the hope that some especially the major civilizations, often appears im- favored saints may attain jivanmukti, a possible when the seemingly contradictory beatific vision, while still lingering in bodily character of ideals of different civilizations connection. Just as indistinctness and discomes to be understood.
tinctness appear to be contradictories, so Taking reason first, let us observe how Hindu and Western ideals appear to remain Hindus typically eliminate it from ultimate poles apart. Just as the Western mind reality. Advaita Vedanta calls ultimate idealizes distinctions sharpened to perfecreality "Nirguna Brahman,” being without tion, hence divided by a "Law of Excluded qualities. Samkhya-Yoga philosophers call Middle," so the Hindu mind idealizes inthe ultimate state of purusha (soul) kai- distinctness so completely that the distincvalya, perfect liberation from all limita- tion between distinctness and indistinctness tions. Theravada and Sunyavada Buddhists is itself regarded as indistinct. If Western call it "Nibbana" (Nirvana, no wind), minds cannot apprehend as significant both whether conceived as bhavanga or sunya. the metaphysical, logical, and epistemoAll alike, despite their other metaphysical logical ultimacy of the Principle of Fourdisagreements, depict ultimacy as pure in- Cornered Negation, they remain unable to distinctness. Hence it is beyond reason, for appreciate Hindu ideals of the aesthetic. reason begins to act by making distinc- But just as Westerners idealize God tions, and rationality exists only where "alone as truly beautiful" because perfect there are ratios, relationships, differences, (where perfection, as omnipotence, embodand distinctnesses. Reason cannot appre- ies and, as omniscience, knows all actual hend it, for it is utterly non-relational and possible distinctions, after Aquinas, Attempts to reason about it must begin by Calvin, Spinoza, Leibniz, J. Edwards, and saying, relative to every distinct thing, "It Whitehead), so Hindus idealize ultimate is not this, it is not that, it is not the reality as "Nirvana" because perfect other...." Yet, since ultimate reality does (where perfection consists in complete abnot cease to be, and to be what it is, when sence of distinctions). Hindus idealize predicates are asserted, one may also say, omnipotence as power to eliminate all relative to each distinct thing, "Its reality distinctness, and omniscience as intuition is not different from this, its reality is in- of such perfect indistinctness. All-goodness distinct from that, its reality is identical (not "omnibenevolence," which involves with the other...." The epitome of rational good will) is ananda, the blissful being and attempts to apprehend ultimate reality is awareness of such perfect indistinctness. to be found in the "Principle of Four- The ultimate in the way of the aesthetic Cornered Negation," the negation of all consists in such bliss. Art objects may sugnegation (or difference): Regarding any gest, symbolize, or lead us toward such thing, quality, predicate, difference, or dis- bliss, but, generally speaking, so long as we tinction, here symbolized by "x," one may devote our attention to art objects we resay of ultimate reality that "It neither is main distracted from the best way to the x, nor is not x, nor is both x and not x, nor aesthetic goal. If painting, sculpture, pois neither x nor not x." 6
etry, or music can transport us toward in
such perte
epitome of dentical

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tuition of indistinctness (the identity of all things), it may serve as an aesthetic instrument. If artistic experience may embody in us "a sip of eternity," it may condition us with inclinations toward such ultimacy. But the more an artist devotes his attention to details, whether to colors or shapes, symmetry or asymmetry, harmony or uniqueness, the more apprehension of aesthetic ultimacy escapes him. Western admirers of Hindu women, garlanded in saris and bedecked with a forehead beauty mark, usually misunderstand the full significance of the patch of color. A beauty mark it is, indeed; but not because it blends harmoniously with size and shape and color of a partly veiled face. It is beautiful because it both symbolizes the ultimate unity of all things and embodies some of that unity (indifference) in a dot which, when expanded, remains plain, uniform, and usually circular. Orthodox women wear a symbol of holiness on their forehead just as orthodox Christians wear a cross; that either may contribute also the lesser, or more sensuous, beauties may serve as an additional value, but when the lesser detracts from the greater, its function is evil.
Turning next to will, let us consider how Hindus typically exorcize it from ultimate reality. Will is called desire, and desire is condemned not merely in its more violent forms, as lust, greed, avarice, and hatred, but also in its more subtle forms, as anxiety, restlessness, love, and hope. Desire often ends in frustration; hence, to avoid frustration, avoid desiring. The way to the goal of life is to surrender individual will, not to some superior will of God, as with Hebrews, Christians, and Moslems, but to will-lessness. Why? Because ultimate reality, whether conceived as Nirguna Brahman, as purusha enjoying kaivalya, as annata (no-soul) freed from all attachment in nibbana, or as atman (soul) indistinguishing itself in sunya, is utterly will-less. To be perfect is to lack (want) nothing; to desire is to want (lack) what is desired. Only by eliminating desire, thereby eliminating all want (lack), can one become perfect. In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna, speaking as ultimate reality divinely mani
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festing itself in the world, explains why a soldier should fight with indifference to the consequences of his dutiful killing. What is ultimate about the soul of anyone killed remains eternally indestructible; therefore killing cannot destroy what is really ultimate about any man. And desire for rewards, either for killing or for refraining from killing, prevents one from attaining the goal of eternal desirelessness. In order to convince Arjuna by a final clinching argument, Krishna asserts that, despite his own activity in creating the universe again and again and again, "doing these things does not bind me to desire for rewards. [I am] like one sitting unconcerned, without interest in how they (i.e., people) are affected." 7
Reality and value exist in their ultimate state only when all desire has been quieted, all will has been eliminated, all interest has subsided. Experience is aesthetic to the extent that being is enjoyed as quiescent. Intuition of intrinsic value, an-anda, unendingness, consists not in infinite longing, as with romanticists, but in unending peace, quiescence, will-lessness. A person enjoys the aesthetic most fully when he experiences life as most completely contented. The yogin, not the artist, seeks the aesthetic in its highest level. The orthodox view holds that a person can hardly be a good artist unless he is also something of a yogin.
Hindu civilization thus has rejected both reason and will, the two most highly idealized virtues of Western civilization, which gives them status or value in ultimate reality. Not reason, but intuition alone, can apprehend ultimate reality and value. Not willfulness, but will-lessness alone deserves and enjoys the ultimate value and reality. Furthermore, to the extent that reason and will prevent one from achieving the final intuition and complete will-lessness, they function as evils, not goods. One may, of course, will to attain will-lessness and reason his way to the ultimacy of intuition; thus will and reason may serve as instrumental goods. Reason and will may indeed serve as instrumental values in art, but the aesthetic, at least in

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its purest form, cannot be attained until all traces of reason and will have been extinguished.
III
Chinese civilization also exhibits a dominant mood and typical ideals in spite of conflicting varieties of specific views. Whereas Western civilization has been typically dualistics and Hindu civilization has been typically spiritualistic, Chinese civilization seems predominantly naturalistic. The ultimate reality of the universe is Tao (Nature), and each particular thing has its own tao (nature) or ultimate reality. Nature is good, and each nature is also good, at least so long as it keeps to itself without either meddling willfully in the natures of other things or being imposed upon by the wills of others. The aesthetic consists in appreciating each nature as it is-intuitively, of course. Reason and will, as idealized in Western civilization, are both rejected, but not so completely as in India. Will-lessness and intuition of pure indistinctness, as idealized in India, are also rejected, but not so completely as in Europe and America. Why China developed ideals quite different from those in both India and Europe may be glimpsed in a brief review of the philosophies of Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Zen.
The ages-old naturalism inherent in rural life in China received a classic formulation in a work attributed to Lao Tzu, who lived about the sixth century B.C. The Tao Te Ching describes Nature as the unending source and end of all things. Each thing, whether a desire, a day, a year, a lifetime, or a dynasty, comes into being, continues to exist for a natural period, and then declines and dies. "Nature's way is a joint process of initiation and completion, sowing and reaping, producing and consuming." 10 Each pair of processual opposites involves arising and subsiding, or yang and yin. Both are good, each in turn. It is good to be born and grow up, and it is good to mature, ripen, and die. But when men try to reverse the natural order of things, i.e., to ripen first and grow up later, then things
ARCHIE J. BAHM
will go wrong. Whoever would either prolong or shorten his life meddles with nature. "Those too eager for activity soon become fatigued. When things exhaust their vigor, they age quickly. Such impatience is against Nature. What is against Nature dies young." 11 Teh is the ability of things to act naturally, an ability which becomes apparent when we observe that some people act in accordance with natures which are not their own. It is the willingness to let Nature, and each nature, take its course. This is the best way of doing things.
This willingness to allow nature to proceed naturally, without willful interference, either to accelerate or retard, is typically regarded as good. Whereas Western civilization idealizes willfulness, and Hindu civilization idealizes will-lessness, Chinese civilization eulogizes willingness. The aesthetic is enjoyed most fully when one is most willing to accept whatever is presented as "the best of all actually presented worlds," which, of course, it is, since it is the only actually presented world. "The chief contribution of Taoism to Asiatic life has been in the realm of aesthetics," says Okakura Kakuzo. "Chinese historians have always spoken of Taoism as the 'art of being in the world,' for it deals with the present ourselves. It is in us that God meets Nature, and yesterday parts from tomorrow. The Present is the moving Infinity, the legitimate sphere of the Relative. Relativity seeks Adjustment; Adjustment is Art. The art of life lies in a constant readjustment to our surroundings. Taoism accepts the mundane as it is and... tries to find beauty in our world of woe and worry." 12 Lin Yutang agrees with Kakuzo: "I think of all the phases of Chinese civilization, Chinese art alone will make a lasting contribution to the culture of the world.... Calm and harmony [with Nature] distinguish Chinese art, and calm and harmony come from the soul of the Chinese artist. The Chinese artist is a man who is at peace with nature.... " 18 He neither willfully desires to have nature different nor willfully suppresses desires which naturally arise. When one becomes hungry, he willingly accepts his desire for food and

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Comparative Aesthetics
seeks to eat. When his desire is satisfied, he willingly accepts and enjoys the feeling of satisfaction. When his desire is frustrated, he willingly accepts his feeling of frustration. If he abhorred his desires and satisfactions, like a Hindu ascetic, or if he aggravated his desires and frustrations, like Western voluntarists and romanticists, he would be artificial and out of harmony with Nature. The aesthetic is to be found. neither in artificial willfulness nor in artificial will-lessness, but in natural willing
ness.
Reason, too, is mistrusted in China, and the ultimate in the way of reality and value (ie., what Nature presents here and now) must be intuited or apprehended directly. Reason takes what is presented and analyzes it. Reason abstracts artificial parts from natural wholes. Reason cuts and subdivides but can never restore the natural wholes it destroys; when it struggles to resynthesize, it does so with partial patterns, and the result is always an artificial whole. Reason not merely cuts by making distinctions but then sharpens them so much that differences come to be idealized as completely different-divided by an excluded middle. Taoism rejects the artificial results of reasoning. When differences are presented, they are accepted as they appear. When similarities are presented, they are accepted as they appear. And when similarities and differences both appear, both are accepted. When both appear, to see only the differences, or to regard the differences as more real than the similarities, as Western minds tend to do, and to admit only the similarities (indifference), or to regard the similarities as more real than the differences, as Hindu minds tend to do, must be regarded as artificial and out of harmony with Nature.
Whereas Western civilization idealizes an "either, or, but not both" logic, based on "the Law of Excluded Middle," and Hindu civilization worships a "neither is, nor is not, nor both is and is not, nor neither is nor is not" logic, ending in the exclusion of all exclusiveness (or negation of all negation), Chinese civilization tends naturally toward a "both-and" (yin-yang) logic,
a
Either, or, but not both Western
Both-and Chinese
о
Neither, nor... Hindu
117
The
based on a willingness to accept distinctions which are only partially distinct, and similarities that are only partly similar. idealizes Tao symbol this tendency. Given a circle to embody symbolically ultimacy in the way of logic, the Western mind wants to divide it into two equal halves by a straight line, the Hindu mind wants to keep the circle completely empty of divisions,14 while the Chinese mind divides it by an S-curve in such a way that, although any diameter has an equal amount of white (yang) and black (yin), a circulating radius which begins by including only a little white increases the amount until its length is occupied wholly by white, yet does not finish covering the white until the black also appears and increases. The moments, if any, when such circulating diameter completely excludes the white and black from each other, as is done at all times in the Western ideal, are very few. Comparison of

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the ideals depicted in these diagrams reveals clues to something basic in the mentality of the three civilizations, not merely in logic and metaphysics but also in epistemology, axiology, ethics, religion, politics,15 and aesthetics. The Tao symbol is the chief symbol of one of the three great civilizations, and its symbolic significance should be better known to Western artists and aestheticians.
Western artists often seek sharp contrasts which may then be harmonized, and sometimes maximize a contrast so as to exhibit willful mastery in overcoming it harmoniously-perhaps one reason why tragic plots have such a strong appeal to Western minds. Hindu artists often symbolize identity (one and the same God manifest in a jungle of avatars), without trying to embody it; e.g., musicians prolong a song or instrumentation more extensively than silence. Chinese artists, depicting nature, include both empty space and variegated content in each painting and deliberately include both harmonious and disharmonious sounds, often imitating a whole menagerie of animals, in such a way that sometimes one dominates and sometimes another.
Turning from the Taoism of Lao Tzu, who was so extremely naturalistic in a rural way that his "shun artificiality" included "shun society" and "shun art," to the Taoism of Confucius, who studied and approved music and the arts as part of his philosophy of proper family and courtly (i.e., social) life, what happens regarding reason and will as ideals? For Confucius, family and courtly life was just as natural as any other. He found principles for the best way (tao) for people to live together. The principle of reciprocity-do to others as you would have them do to you if you were in their shoes-is inherent in social life. Parent-child relations are not artificial but natural, and filial piety is a manifestation of what is natural.16 Themes about ideal family life become central. Paintings of family and courtly scenes, especially in their natural, including home, surroundings result appropriately. If canons of good taste, in painting, music, dress, and archi
ARCHIE J. BAHM
tecture, develop naturally, accept them willingly. Reason, although used by Confucius, was not idealized except as a means to discovering what is appropriate in natural, especially social, living. Will, in the sense of good will (jen), was central to his teaching, though this consists in a willingness to let each one follow his own nature and to take the trouble to gain insight into the nature of others before acting toward them. Children should willingly accept the good will of their parents for them, and parents should willingly accept the responsibility which comes to them naturally as parents. Likewise, in learning music, the pupil should willingly accept instruction, and the teacher should willingly submit to his duties in requiring what is needed from the learner. The highest ideal is that of perfectly embodying completely spontaneous willingness (chih) to whatever life brings. Hence, willingness, not either willfulness nor will-lessness, must characterize the successful artist.
Zen, a Taoized form of Buddhism, epitomizes actualization of spontaneity, in life and in art. "Art-meaning all the fine arts, including painting and calligraphy, flower arrangement and gardening, haiku poetry and other literature, music, and drama-is an area of life reaping enormous riches through Zen attitudes. If aesthetic experience means something enjoyed as an end in itself, then Zen experience is always aesthetic. The Zen spirit, which looks not beyond the present, interprets every experience as intrinsically aesthetic.... The 'art of living' becomes self-evident in Zen." 17 A Zen painter, for example, starting with whatever inspiration happens to arise within him and only a partially formed idea of how to express it, may begin by depicting some portion of an animal and, alertly noticing new potentialities in unintended aspects of his brush strokes, will evolve his idea as he works, using suggestions in each modification for rounding out some completed whole. The entire work, often completed in a few seconds or minutes, requires embodiment in the painter of the Taoistic attitude of willingness to enjoy being guided by appearances as they

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119 appear. Rationalistic, preplanned designs, whether as creator, appreciator, or even prolonged, meticulous, detailed execution, owner of an art work, whether utilitarian and perpetual revision and retouching, re- or fine, or whether minute or magnificent, tard, when they do not extinguish, the Zen involves as an essential aspect some enspirit. Voluntaristic expression of individ- joyment of an end in itself. ual willfulness, whether for "success" or from egotistical desirousness, tends to de- The University of New Mexico stroy something of the demure willingness with which a Zen artist submits himself to the opportunities presented to him.
See Archie J. Bahm, Philosophy of the Buddha CONCLUSION
(London, 1958; New York, 1959, 1962).
"Okakura Kakuzo, The Book of Tea (New York, Despite diversity, not merely in varieties 1906, Tokyo, Rutland, 1956, 1958), p. 4.
• Dewit H. Parker, Human Values (New York, of art forms, histories of art and of aes
1931), p. 24. thetic theories but also in the dominating Robert Louis Stevenson, El Dorado. metaphysical ideals and their differing im- 5"Beauty is pleasure objectified.” George Santaplications for aesthetics, common elements yana, The Sense of Beauty (New York, 1896), p. running through all particular views can be 52.
See P. T. Raju, "The Principle of Fourfound. Although the problem of finding Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," Review such common elements presents greater duithe common Shements thresents
of Metaphysics, VII (1954), 649-713.
enrer difficulty when one seeks through all three Bhagavad Gita, tr. Archie J. Bahm, Ch. IX, civilizations than when one is content to Sloka 9. In press.
In many ways, i.e., opposing Spirit versus study only one civilization or some portion
Matter, Justice versus Grace, as well as Reason of it, when a theory drawn from such
versus Will. broader bases has been achieved, it should See my edition: Tao Teh King, or Book about prove to be sounder, more adequate, and Nature and Intelligence (New York, 1958). more enduring. Too often aestheticians
19 Ibid., p. 18.
11 Ibid., pp. 51-52. working within the confines of a single
Op. cit., p. 44. culture waste their genius in drawing con- 1 Lin Yutang, My Country and My People clusions, unaware that some principles oc- (New York, 1935, 1939), pp. 287, 288. cur as ideals peculiar to that culture rather
" See Plate VIII of "The Ten Cowherding than as universal among mankind. Who
Pictures" in D. T. Suzuki's Essays in Zen Bud
dhism (New York, 1949), p. 371. ever proposes an aesthetic theory which
15 West: "iron curtain"; India: "neutralism"; does not apply equally well within the per- China: first on one side and then on the other, spectives of each culture has not yet without ever abandoning either side completely. reached a finally satisfactory view.
E.g., with some Chinese on the mainland (yang)
and some on Formosa (yin), those on Formosa My conclusion is, as I stated at the be
expect to return to domination of the mainland, ginning: Aesthetic experience consists in despite control of the mainland by a Marxist (i.e., intuition of intrinsic value. Each aesthetic Western "either-or, but-not-both") philosophy. experience, no matter how simple or com- For further exposition of the philosophy of plex, static or dynamic, reasonable or un
Confucius, see The World's Living Religions (New reasonable, exciting or satisfying, nor
17 Ibid., pp. 215-216. See further, pp. 206-221, whether in life or in any of the arts, especially pp. 215-218, for details.

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Reprinted from The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXVI/4, Summer 1968. Printed in U.S.A.
ARCHIE J. BAHM
The Aesthetics of Organicism
CONCEIVING "the aesthetic" as intuition or intrinsic value,1 i.e., as any experience enjoyed as an end-in-itself or as complete in itself, places the aesthetic, or the subject-matter of aesthetics as a science, at the core, not only of philosophy of art and beauty but also of axiology, ethics, and religion (to say nothing here of political, social, and economic philosophy, and even logic and philosophy of science). The purpose of the present essay is to summarize for aesthetics some implications of this view in particular and of Organicism2 in general, under the following headings: Value, Beauty, Art, Morality, and Religion.
VALUE
Presupposing as obvious the distinction between means and ends, or instrumental and intrinsic values, we can state the Organicist view as holding that there are at least four distinguishable kinds of intrinsic value, namely, feelings of pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction, and contentment.
Each of these kinds has been exploited by a historical movement: Hedonism holds that pleasant feelings, whether sensuous or intellectual, are the only goods, and that unpleasant feelings, especially pains, are the only evils.3 Romanticism idealizes desireousness or willfulness, especially when occurring as enthusiasm, zest, gusto,
ARCHIE J. BAHм is professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico. His last article in this journal was on Comparative Aesthetics in the Oriental issue (Fall, 1965).
eagerness, passion, or zeal, but also as hope, longing, and sentiment, as the only true good, with apathy as the ultimate evil.* Voluntarism claims that satisfaction is the only good, frustration the only evil. "Desire is the only basis of value; value itself does not exist until desire is being satisfied." 5 Anandism, the Hindu view that ultimate reality, knowledge, and value (sat-chit-ananda) consist in perfect quiescence, purified of all desires, objects, distinctions, regards bliss (nirvana) as a feeling of contentment completely freed from all anxiety."
Organicism incorporates the positive aspects of each of the foregoing theories by claiming that pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction, and contentment are all obvious kinds of enjoyment, and condemns each theory to the extent that each denies or neglects the positive claims of the other three. It contends, further, that the four kinds of value not only intermingle and blend, often indistinguishably, with each other but also supplement each other in providing a richness of variety of intrinsic value. Often the four may be experienced successively, as when, in eating, the pleasing flavor of a tasty tidbit arouses desire for more and the satisfaction experienced during chewing each bite gives way to contentment when one has eaten enough. Succession and intermingling combine in orgasm, which may begin with sensory stimulation, proceed through arousal and intensification of passion, subside with clear feeling of satisfaction, and be followed by a prevading sense of quiescent

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ARCHIE J. BAHM peace. If there are other distinguishable value as connoting staticity. For Organikinds of intrinsic value, which are not cism, the end-in-itself quality of intrinsicbest understood as variations of these, I value experiences is aspectival. Regardless have not yet discovered them.?
of whether a value experience is enjoyed Although the foregoing analysis may for an instant or enduringly for an hour, seem clear, especially to those familiar a day, a year, or, as reputedly with saints, with the history of axiological controver- for much of a lifetime, the end-in-itself sies, actual experiences of enjoyment and quality is experienced as requiring nothing suffering involve complex dynamic gestalts beyond itself in order to be enjoyed as which can be comprehended, if at all, only intrinsic value. Staticity, in the sense of through further analyses of multidimen- eternality or metaphysical non-temporal. sional polarities. These include 1. an aspect ity, is not essential to the nature of inversus-class logic, 2. static-versus-dynamic trinsic value, as conceived in Organicism. existence, 3. immeasurable-versus-degree Experience is, by its very nature, dynamic, variations, 4. subjective-versus objective ap. i.e., an organic mixture of events and pearance, 5. apparent versus-real location, duration, and enjoyment of intrinsic and 6. isolated versus-contextual or gestalt- value may or may not be experienced as integrated occurrence.
enduring for more than a few seconds. 1. The four kinds of value will be un- Organicism reduces experiences of intrinderstood better if regarded as distinguish- sic value neither to momentary events, able aspects of enjoyed experiences rather such as an isolated pleasant sensation, nor than as separable kinds of entities isolat- to enduring enjoyment, such as contemable in discrete classes. Intellect abstracts plating an unchanging work of art undisclear-cut classes of entities which exist, tracted for an hour. Value experiences are actually, only as varying aspects embedded more or less enduring, and variability in concretely in the dynamic flux of experi. such duration is to be expected normally. ence. Awareness of the four together or, 3. Value experiences vary also in many rather, enjoying awareness without analy- other ways. Although, in a sense, each sis of the four, either all at once or in value experience is immeasurable when rapid succession, normally provides a taken merely in itself, in another sense, richer value experience than awareness of when a value is experienced as increasing only one, or even of only two or three of or decreasing in any way, and when we them. For want of better names, I call stop to compare values as greater or less such experience organic enjoyment and in any manner, value experiences are inexperience of pain, apathy, frustration, terpretable as measurable, in principle. and anxiety (all or some) together as Although no enjoyment-meter has been, organic suffering. The meaning of the term perhaps ever will be, discovered, it is organic should be interpreted as stipulated an obvious characteristic of common sense here, and in other Organicistic writings, that value experiences do differ in degree. rather than in its biological connotations Despite our inability to measure such demerely. The Organicist use of this term grees, in any exact way, we do, and should, has sociological, aesthetic and metaphysi- speak of feeling more or less pleased, more cal, and ancient and modern, as well as or less enthusiastic, more or less satisfied, biological, antecedents. For Organicism, and more or less contented. Without acorganic enjoyment, which includes feelingscepting all details of Jeremy Bentham's of pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction, and "calculus of pleasures,” Organicism recogcontentment as variable aspects, is ideal. nizes that number, intensity, duration, ized as the type of intrinsic value to be and frequency may be factors in any value kept in mind, rather than either alone, experience, i.e., not merely in feelings of when the aesthetic is referred to as in- pleasure, but also of enthusiasm, satistuition of intrinsic value.
faction, contentment, and, furthermore, in 2. Some theorists interpret intrinsic the richness involved in experiencing them
in any value
..e., not merely
pleasure.

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The Aesthetics of Organicism
451 variably together. These variations may obtain a pie, a painting, or a view of the be basic not only to actual enjoyments, sunset reflecting in a mountain lake, bewhether ordinary or artistic, but also cause we believe they, and the value-exfoundational in aesthetic judgment and periences which they produce, have a art criticism.
real, not merely apparent, existence. And, 4. Are intrinsic values subjective or ob- until we become habitually critical about jective? For Organicism, they are both. perceptual inferences, we tend to locate Enjoyment is obviously subjective, yet, the values experienced in the objects with a few exceptions, enjoyment involves themselves. It is a strange lover who does what is enjoyed. A taste sensation usually not value his beloved. is not only pleasant but sweet or sour or T he role of ideals, i.e., ideas of valued experienced with some other sensuous objects, or objectives (ends-in-view), not content, familiar or unfamiliar. A desire yet actualized, should not be underestiordinarily is experienced not merely with mated in understanding how intrinsic more or less exuberance but as a desire values are experienced. Although we do for some particular thing, object, or ob- not need to go so far as to reify ideals jective. A feeling of satisfaction normally is as eternal entities, as Platonists have done, experienced as having achieved what was the pragmatic functioning of persisting wanted. Contentment, unless one falls into ideals provides a practical kind of evidence a dreamless sleep, usually retains un- of the apparent reality of what is idealized. anxious traces of awareness of the satis- The experienced recurrence or endurance factions attained, the present context, or of some as if intrinsic value provides imaginative or anticipatory possibilities. pragmatic warrant for believing and beThe shape, content, or significance of having as if such intrinsic value were what is enjoyed appears as objective, i.e., real. Hence, the Organicist view is that, as objects of attention. Normally, enjoy- "When anything appears as, or as if, real, ment is neither merely subjective nor it both appears as real and it appears merely objective but a blend of both or, as real.” 11 Although attention may be rather, an organic flux from which neither focused upon either the apparent aspect subjective nor objective aspects are totally or the as-if-real aspect of experience, both absent.
are regarded as mutually dependent, and 5. Are intrinsic values real or apparent? as constantly available for reflective obThey may be experienced as either, or servation whenever one cares to observe. even both at the same time. Objects valued Organicism, holding that experiences of in dreams and daydreams, when we intrinsic values may be richer when such awaken from them, seem merely apparent, values are intuited as having both apthough while we are dreaming they often parent and realistic aspects, opposes both seem as real as those which appear when those who regard such values as merely we are awake. Most of us are naive real- apparent, or merely real, or as both but ists10 most of the time, with regard to involving some unlikely correspondence intrinsic values as well as to physical between them. things and their qualities, such as shapes 6. The Hedonistic paradox that, aland colors. Although some intrinsic goods though pleasant feeling is the intrinsic and evils appear to have their locus pri- value we seek, we can find it, normally, marily within ourselves, such as a tickling only by seeking some object or activity sensation, a heartburn, a frustrating per- which yields such pleasant feeling as a plexity preventing us from reaching a by-product, becomes generalized, in Ordecision, or a fear persisting after our ganicism, as an intrinsic-value paradox. anxious belief has been demonstrated That is not only pleasant feeling but mistaken, we naturally believe that the also enthusiasm, satisfaction, contentment, objects we value exist independently of our and organic enjoyment usually occur only being aware of them. We exert effort to within some complex context and in such

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452
a way that the value aspect of a total gestalt is experienced indistinctly. The whole of an anticipated symphony, festival, or marriage is idealized as valuable. And awareness of the interdependence of parts and whole of such events is often experienced as multiple-enriched variegations as well as a unitary grandeur. Analysis of intrinsic value into four kinds is a sterile exercise if one fails to recognize that, in actual awareness, such values ordinarily exist as aspectival permeations of complex perceptual and anticipatory experiences. The "intrinsic value paradox" occurs in experience as paradoxical only if such values are first regarded as isolated entities to be sought as such, rather than as aspectival emergents pervading intricate dynamic gestalts. For the Organicist, that intrinsic values are to be found organically embedded within a perceptual-conceptualmemory-anticipation context is something to be expected. The paradox appears only when one mistakes what is organically interdependent as if it were, or should be, isolatable and independent.
BEAUTY
"Beauty," says George Santayana, "is constituted by the objectification of pleasure. It is pleasure objectified." 12 Organicism agrees, except that it extends objectification of feeling (empathy or einfühlung) to include feelings of enthusiasm, satisfaction, contentment, and organic enjoyment. That is, not only do we project the sweetness tasted in our mouth into the cake on the plate before us, but also project the intrinsic value intuited in our eagerness for an objective, such as tomorrow's party, as if in the object, and integrate the object achieved, such as a new house, with our feeling of satisfaction, and extend our feeling of contentment into our environment and even, at times, as if into the whole universe when we have become completely pacified; and organic enjoyment may include a variegated assortment of objectifications, as when reveling in a carnival, or retain a steady object, such as our beloved during conjugal orgasm.
ARCHIE J. BAHM
The aesthetic consists in intuition of intrinsic value, and beauty consists in objectification of the aesthetic.
Objectification seldom occurs as mere objectification. Experience, and consequently aesthetic experience, is characterized by organic unity.13 But organic unity is not merely an objective unity, which I described earlier: "Organic unity is incomplete unity and also incomplete plurality. Organic unity solves the problem of the one and the many by consisting both at the same time of oneness and manyness, sameness and difference, unity and disunity." 14 It involves also a subjective unity-and-plurality, or at least a subject continuingly attentive through many successive acts of attention, which remains organically unified with such objective unity. The intuited objectification of value which constitutes beauty is never freed from the subject which objectifies, even though, like the glasses through which we see, subjectivity may become so transparent as to remain practically oblivious. Beauty is not something merely in the eye of the beholder, even though without the eye there is no beauty.
Some gorgeous sunsets and some works of Michelangelo are "really beautiful." "Really," here, means that the intrinsic value experienced appears to be "out there" in the object. The more fully a self appears to itself to be dependent upon what appears as objective to contribute to its experienced enjoyment, the more it tends to regard it as real, i.e., as existing independent of such experienced enjoyment, and as being the locus as well as source of the value enjoyed. Doubtless there are eon-long historical, biological conditions causing a self to project and reify its values in this way. Pragmatic justification of the seeming reality of experiences of beauty is often attained when people agreeably compare experiences of intrinsic-value projicience in the presence of the same physical things. Comparisons based on compared feelings of contentment, satisfaction, and enthusiasm, as well as pleasure, provide a richer, and seemingly sounder, basis for judgments that an ap

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The Aesthetics of Organicism
parently real beauty is properly judged to be an apparently real beauty. Disagreements also enter the picture, leaving the field forever open to controversies about in how far beauty may be said to be real, both in general and, more commonly, with regard to specific objective details.
ART
Art is anything man-made; fine art is art intended, by either maker or appreciator, to be capable of producing experiences of beauty or ugliness under suitable circumstances. Thus art involves instruments and control of instruments which may serve as instrumental values yielding intrinsic values. Fine art involves intention to make or modify some instrument, the making ("creative") activity, the instrument made or modified, and appreciation (i.e., intuition of intrinsic value, beauty, or disvalue, ugliness), even if only by the maker. The instrument need not be external to one's own body, for deliberate variations in one's vocal cords used in singing suffice to constitute an art instrument.
as
Is imaginary art art? Is a soprano, imagining a new melody without vocalizing it, being artistic? Is dream art art? Are the aesthetic experiences produced intentionally by hallucinogens, such opium, mescalin, or LSD, properly called art? Yes. Such art is purely private, of course, and purely private art is not public art; but, as in the case of different kinds of public art, such as symphonic music and sculpture, each is to be judged by standards relevant to the peculiarities of its particular nature and circumstances. Organicism agrees with Croce in asserting that art exists, in a minimal sense, in imagination, but also with John Dewey in asserting that art exists more fully in a created work of art being appreciated by an audience. It is a mistake to judge imaginary art as equivalent to publically actualized art, just as it is a mistake to equate sculpture and music. Thus, for Organicism, not merely beauty but also art may be wholly subjective in the sense
453
that imaginary existence is sufficient for its existence. On the other hand, as noted previously, beauty, as well as art, may be judged to be as if real, where pragmatic agreement supports sustained inferences. Both beauty and art may exist anywhere on a polar range between extremes of subjectivity and apparent reality. But the great bulk of what is commonly called art is of a publicly appreciable sort. And artists, aestheticians, and art critics properly focus their attentions primarily upon
these.
Having mentioned Croce with approval, I hasten to express disagreement also, when he says that "... art cannot be a utilitarian act; and since a utilitarian act aims always at obtaining a pleasure and therefore at keeping off a pain, art, considered in its own nature, has nothing to do with the useful and with pleasure and pain, as such." 15 Rather, art cannot exist without some instrument, for even imagination itself functions instrumentally in the creation of imaginary art, and an instrument is nothing if not useful, potentially at least, in the production of enjoyed intrinsic values. Organicism, in extending the range of intrinsic values to include enthusiasms, satisfactions, and contentments, as well as pleasures, identifies art with intentional, hènce instrumental, production of enjoyments of these as such, even though most cases of such enjoyments are embedded aspectivally in contexts. Furthermore, richly intricate since art is intentional, I must disagree with Croce when Croce says that art "does not arise as an act of the will." 16 Although artistic creativity and appreciation need not always involve moral action, most of it does, as we shall see below. And, although not all art experience involves conceptual knowledge, most of it does involve concepts; and some art is intended to express
truth.
Edward Bullough's important contribution of the idea of psychical distance refers to something which can be explained better in terms of my distinction between aesthetic experience and moral experience.
Experience is "aesthetic" when it is enjoyed as

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called "isolation » 18 identification of the
454
ARCHIE J. B AHM complete in itself and "moral" when it is felt as the other, except momentarily, is, in effect, incomplete and needing something more to com- to destroy them plete it. ... This distinction between "aesthetic"
This issue recurs in disputes as to and "moral" may be stated also in terms of intrinsic and instrumental values. Disregarding for whether an art object is restful or arrestpresent purposes those values, intrinsic or instru- ing. If one's attention is not arrested by mental, which may exist independently of ex. it. he will not come to rest in it. If one's perience, we may define the "aesthetic" and the
interest is not aroused, it cannot be held "moral" in terms of experiences as intrinsic and instrumental values. An experience itself is an in suspense, peace, or repose. The paraintrinsic value to the extent that it is experienced doxicalness of disinterested interest, to as complete in itself. Such an experience is "aes- say nothing about obligations to become thetic." An experience is itself an instrumental interested in disinterested interest has value to the extent that it experiences itself
been grappled with at great length in as a means to something more. Such an experience is "moral." 17
Hindu21 and Buddhist22 wisdom literature.
The goal of life is disinterested enjoyBullough uses the term practical instead ment, i.e., aesthetic, but one cannot lose of moral and the terms unconcern or interest in life, i.e., remain purely aesthetic, disinterest to designate the aesthetic. Al- without thereby soon losing a goal for life. though ideas and feelings of distance, One must remain interested in disinterestwhether in space or time or culture, may edness or disinterestedness itself will disindeed serve as one of the principles of appear.
The foregoing issues all seem to involve called "isolation," 18 identification of the polarities for Organicism. And Organiaesthetic, which involves intrinsic value, cism depicts resolution of such issues in with a non-value principle and, worse, terms of the nature of polarity.23 Consewith only one of several such principles, quently, it approves focusing attention must be regarded as inadequate, to say directly upon the polar nature of issues the least. The problem with which Bul- in aesthetics, as does Theodore M. Greene lough struggles valiantly, but unsuccess in discussing fully according to most critics, about in
... three specific polarities or tensions which creasing the distance (with which he
must be resolved if a work of art is to possess identifies the aesthetic) which does not in artistic merit. These are (a) the polarity of simfact always increase the aesthetic, may be plicity versus complexity, whose resolution is the
mean of organic unity; (b) the polarity of order restated in terms of the aesthetic and the
versus novelty, whose mean is expressive origimoral being aspectival ingredients in most
nality; and (c) the polarity of the denial versus experiences. Whereas some Hindus, e.g., the idolatry of medium, whose resolution is the Advaitins and Theravada Buddhists, ideal- expressive exploitation of the medium. These ize complete absence of the moral from
polarities and means are all equally applicable
to works of art in any medium. ... These three the aesthetic, Gotama, the Buddha,19 and
means ... are obviously aspects, or factors, of a Zen,20 tend to prefer experiencing detach- single organic mean of artistic perfection as ment continuingly in everyday life rather such. than, as in arahatship and zazen, in isolation My reaction to Greene's analysis, after from such life. The art of living is the most initial admiration, is four-fold: A. There important of the fine arts, and such art is are polarities involved in works of art better when one recognizes the variable in- because they are polarities of experience, terdependence of the aesthetic and the not merely of art experience. B. There moral, or of intrinsic and instrumental are more than three polarities of experivalues, as something desirable, rather than in ence, all of which may also be taken into seeking to eliminate either one or the other. account in artistic analysis. C. One does If enjoyment, i.e., intuïtion of intrinsic not seek an Aristotelian mean between value, is the end of life, then the practical extremes, but rather regards the poles as or the moral is properly defined in terms of idealized limits projected from an exits service to the aesthetic; to isolate one from perienceable range of variations in either

Page #28

whether
interpreters an issue long
The Aesthetics of Organicism
455 direction. Organicism emphasizes dimen- pressed or expressed, vague or clear, sigsion rather than mean. For the range be- nificant (symbolical) or self-contained in tween perfect simplicity and complete meaning, unique or universal in nature, complexity is very wide, and one may, at private or social in character, important times, properly devote himself to search or unimportant, compared (evaluated) or for greater complexity, or for greater uncompared. In order to illustrate in simplicity, in the interest of organic unity. greater detail the Organicist way of treatTo the extent that Greene interprets such ing polarities in art, I select an issue long a "mean" as "a happy resolution of the debated among interpreters of poetry, dynamic tension between the extremes of namely, whether a poem is better underempty simplicity and unorganized com- stood in terms of what is presented within plexity," however, our seeming disagree the poem itself or in terms of its backment is merely verbal. D. Although each of ground, causes, associations, and comparithe three, and more, polarities may con- sons. The method used by those who hold tribute to larger and more complicatedly the former view is called explication, and interdependent sets of criteria for judging adherents to this view have established an artistic experiences, I am disinclined to expository journal called The Explicator. speak of aristic perfection, even though Stipulatively naming the two views "exenjoyment of intrinsic value is, in a funda- plicationism" and "implicationism," I premental sense, what may be meant by per- sent, in skeleton outline, the Organicist fection. Organicism idealizes imperfection view, which might be called "organiplicaor incompleteness as well as perfection or tionism." completeness as joint contributers to or- 1. Extreme explicationism: A poem (or ganic unity. The paradoxicalness witnessed any work of art as experienced) is best in discussing Hedonism and disinterested appreciated when it is understood cominterest remains inherent in the nature pletely in terms of its own contents without of polarity generally. So, there is a sense reference to anything external to it whatin which an experience which is both soever. 2. Extreme implicationism: A poem perfect and imperfect, both complete in is a product of multiplicities of causal some sense and incomplete in some other factors, etc., and so is best appreciated sense, is more perfect, or more complete, when understood completely in terms of than one from which incompleteness is such external factors. 3. Modified explicamissing. Here we have a clue to the nature tionism: A poem involves both internal of the organic which Organicism idealizes. and external aspects, or factors, but the That which is perfect merely is imperfect internal factors are more important in in the sense that such imperfection is understanding and appreciating it than the missing; that which is merely imperfect is external factors. 4. Modified implicationperfect in whatever sense it is "mere." ism: A poem involves both internal and Thus the joint, or successive, relative external aspects, but the external factors domination by both complete and in- are more important in understanding complete aspects of experience provides a and appreciating it than the internal facdynamic richness which is better (i.e., in tors. 5. Extreme middlism: The internal one sense more perfect) than an experience and external factors involved in the nature which is impoverished, relatively speak of a poem are exactly equal in significance ing, by being completely dominated by for understanding and appreciation. 6. either the complete (aesthetic) or incom. Modified middlism: The internal and explete (moral) aspects alone.
ternal factors involved in the nature of a Other polarities which may be involved poem are never exactly equal in signifiin any artistic experience include all of cance for understanding and appreciating the categoreal polarities of existence25 and it, for actually one or the other is always experience. Experiences vary, for example, somewhat more important than the other. relative to whether an art object is im- 7. Extreme dualism: The internal and ex

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456
ARCHIE J. BAHM ternal factors involved in the nature of a reduced in any way to similarity, a poem poem are completely unlike each other in is also something of a whole, such that nature; each is important in its own way, both internal and external factors conbut neither contributes to the other in tribute to it, or are aspects of it, as a any way. 8. Extreme aspectism: The dis- whole, without being reduced to functiontinction between internal and external ing as mere aspects of such a whole. Such factors in a poem is completely artificial similarity and difference should be equally and only serves to prevent understanding recognized, even though, in dynamic exand appreciation, for every aspect involved perience, one or the other tends to domiin a poem is an aspect involved in the nate more at different times. In sum, each nature of a poem regardless of whether it of the previous twelve theories has a conmay seem internal or external. 9. Modified tribution to make, even though each of dualism: The internal and external fac- the extreme theories is less adequate, taken tors involved in the nature of a poem by itself, than the corresponding modified are more different than alike; each is more theories. Organicism, as a joint assertion important when taken by itself than when of their positive claims, and as a joint taken in relation to the other. 10. Modified denial of their negative claims (i.e., in aspectism: The internal and external as- denying what any of the other of the pects involved in the nature of a poem are twelve theories asserts), regards itself as more alike than different; each is more a much more adequate theory for how a important when understood in relation to poem should be interpreted than any of the other than when understood in terms the other twelve.26 of itself alone. 11. Extreme equalism: The The foregoing twelve-fold formula will similarities and differences between inter- seem a sterile pattern to those who fail nal and external factors are exactly equal to understand it as a way of summarizing 12. Modified equalism: The similarities a multidimensional set of battles, all going and differences between internal and ex- on continuously. Although Organicism ternal factors are never exactly equal. aims at being anti-negative, i.e., in deny
13. Organicism (organiplicationism): A ing the denials of all such theories, it poem is best appreciated when its inter- cannot help being, and intends to be, a nal and external aspects are understood negation of such negations. That is, for interdependently. To be interdependent, example, it asserts that extreme explicatwo or more things must be both partly tionism is false because extreme explicaindependent of and partly dependent tionism denies what is true in not only upon each other. To the extent that a extreme implicationism, but also in all of poem is something in itself, it is better the other eleven isms. That is, Organicism understood in terms of its inner aspects, conceives itself as always fighting twelve and it is possible to concentrate upon the enemies at once, and its diagram of types inner aspects to the exclusion of outer of theories is a kind of intellectual aspects. To the extent that a poem is a mandala summarily, and formally, deproduct of other factors, it is better un- picting its perpetual multi-dimensional derstood in terms of those factors, and it war. is possible to concentrate upon the outer aspects to the exclusion of inner aspects.
MORALITY To the extent that both inner and outer factors contribute to the nature of a poem, Art is intimately related with morality, in one ought to recognize the presence of one many ways. To make clear how this is so, just as much as (equally) the other, even the Organicist view of the nature of ethics though the ways in which each contributes must first be stated. Ethics is concerned is different (unequal). Although internal with what is good and with what ought to and external factors are different in na- be done in order to obtain it. The goods ture, and such difference should not be sought, ultimately, are intrinsic values

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criator are le their
any identif
The Aesthetics of Organicism
457 which, in order to be appreciated, must and appreciator are constantly preoccupied be intuited, i.e., experienced aesthetically. with morality while their attention is So long as they are unobtained, one's ex- upon art. Unfortunately, too many identify periences are moral, i.e., are concerned morality narrowly with limited areas of with doing what is believed necessary to conduct, such as those pertaining to dress, obtain them. Hence moral experiences are language, sexual behavior, and any deviaconcerned primarily with instrumental tion from such norms begets judgments values. Since our ideas of intrinsic values about immorality. So long as an artist usually appear as complex gestalts involv. lives in a particular community, he is not ing physical, social, etc., dimensions, we freed from the social needs and norms of have come to depict our ideals in terms of that community. But his lack of interest specific kinds of duties. The omnipresence in such morality does not thereby eliminate of the Hedonistic, or rather the intrinsic- his interest in all morality, for there is a value, paradox leads those who seek clarity morality inherent in his artistic endeavors. to formulate their ideals in factual terms To separate these two kinds of morality is in which the intrinsic-value aspects often to misunderstand ethics. remain unclear. Furthermore, since occu- Furthermore, as ethical, a person ought pation with instrumental values puts a to be concerned with art to the extent premium upon foresight, much, even most, that it contributes to his enjoyment of of our ethical concerns pertain to con- life. That is, appreciation of artistic ditional oughts, i.e., what one ought to do beauty and creation of works of art are if conditions are so and so. Hence, the among the goods of life which one ought need for concern about potential instru- to seek, other things being equal. As apmental and potential intrinsic values com- preciator, one may, perhaps, be obligated plicates the situation, providing additional to visit art museums, to attend operas, ambiguity and unclarity which many find assuming they are available, to sing and very baffling. When art is regarded as listen to singing, and to compliment the concerned primarily with beauty, i.e., in- dress and behavior of gracious associates. tuition of intrinsic value, and morality As social, an appreciator may feel obliwith obligation, i.e., efforts with instru- gated to share with others aesthetic exmental values, the two may seem quite periences available from art works which different in nature.
he owns. As creator, a person with skill However, such a view can prevail only may feel obligated to create, not merely when one lacks awareness of the intimate because the result is enjoyable but because interdependence between intrinsic and creative activity itself may be enjoyed. instrumental values. Neither can exist When an artist finds his work beautiful, without the other. The artist is thoroughly then he may feel an obligation to publish immersed in instrumental values while he it, i.e., to make it available for public is creating, for he has to do, and has to appreciation. If mankind may be enfeel obligated to do, what he does in order riched by the discovery or invention of to produce his desired result. (Even if new kinds of arts, then feelings of obligawhat he does involves spontaneity, he tion tend to exist in those who are aware ought to do what is needed to provide of such potentialities. Art is pervaded conditions promoting such spontaneity.) with morality, and morality which comSuch activity is moral activity. The appre- pletely neglects art is inadequate (i.e., ciator also is involved in moral obligations, immoral). for example, in deciding whether or not Art criticism, whether by professional he should look at a painting and, if he critics or in everyday life, is a moral experiences beauty, whether or not he enterprise. The multitudes of ways in ought to look again, and for how long, and which a work of art may or may not so forth. Except during moments of total contribute to the enjoyment of life by absorption in appreciation, both artist different people under varying circum
the
available for public
appreciation. If
ed to de has to Lalues whileshly
to do, what he sand has to

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rely other a weddin.chitecturea
good.
458
ARCHIE J. BAHM stances leaves the field wide open for it as art and life as artistic. Thus a wellasserting preferences of one sort or an- planned and well-executed wedding, or other. To the extent that people are in- funeral, or inauguration of a president, fluenced in their appreciation and en- may indeed be among life's greatest works joyment by expressions of criticism, such of art. The Catholic sacraments are escriticism takes on additional moral involve- sentially both artistic and religious in ments. The problem of seeking standards intent. Art which is appreciated both for for judging standards of judgment becomes its symbolism and for its immediate values a central one for aesthetics as a science. tends to be greater than that which is The science of aesthetics, like all sciences, merely one or the other alone. is a moral endeavor. For, as scientist, one Consider a wedding, for example, with seeks to understand what is true so that he, beautiful church architecture, beautiful or others, may better use such understand music, beautiful costumes and coiffures, ing in order to obtain more of what is beautifully conducted. It is richer when,
and because, it is experienced by all, both
as presently enjoyed and as significant (i.e., RELIGION
moral) in contributing to the fulfillment
of life as a whole, and still richer when it Religion, as conceived here, is man's quest contributes to other lives, of parents and for his ultimate values. That is, one does ancestors, children in prospect and other not become religious until he discovers descendants, and contributor to local that his life is worth while and that he society, to mankind and, if possible somelacks something in the way of achieving how, to cosmic value. The artist, struggling its fullness. How one conceives that lack, with details of recalcitrant materials, may and what will be required to eliminate be unable to keep in mind the interrelait, varies with cultures, societies, and in- tions of his particular artistic activity dividuals. But, however depicted, the ulti- with the intrinsic value of life as a whole, mate value is regarded as an intrinsic but it is a function of Organicism, as a value which must be intuited in order philosophy, art, morality, and religion, to to be appreciated. Hence, the goal of life help more people become more aware of is aesthetic in its fulfillment. And the their interdependence, and of how to quest itself, to the extent that the end enrich life by regarding them as joint is not already being enjoyed, is highly aspectival contributors to its enjoyment. moral. The art of living is the supreme art. Religious art, in this meaning of the term religious, is the greatest art. To the extent that living is essentially social, 1 See my "Comparative Aesthetics," JAAC, XXIV social arts, and socialized art, may con
(Fall, 1965), 109.
See my "Organicism A New World Hypothetribute fundamentally to religion.
sis," Memorias del XIII Congreso Internacional de For Organicism, art tends to be more
Filosofia (Mexico City, Sept. 7-14, 1962), IX, 21-43; valuable when integrated with life; and and my "Organicism-The Philosophy of Interdethe more ways in which it is integrated pendence," International Philosophical Quarterly, with life, the more valuable it is. And,
VII (June, 1967), 251-284.
See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and conversely, life is more valuable when it
Legislation, Ch. IV, and John Stuart Mill, Utiliis organically integrated with art, and
tarianism, Ch. II. with art in more ways. Although each art, Romanticism appears in various forms in the and each aspect of each art, including each writings of J. J. Rousseau (will to freedom from reshade of each color. may be appreciated. striction), J. G. Fichte (will to be a self opposing, momentarily, for what it is in isolation a not-self), F. Nietzsche (will to power), R. W. Emerfrom all else, appreciation of both its
son (will to appreciate), and the Existentialists (will
to exist significantly). value in itself and its contribution to DeWitt H. Parker, Human Values (New York, other value-aspects of life enhances both 1981), p. 24.
social e fundanicism, artated wiis integrand
and each in more wegrated with le when it

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459 The Aesthetics of Organicism See my Yoga: Union with the Ultimate (Yoga Sutras of Patanjali), (New York, 1961), pp. 76, 126. * For more extended treatment of these kinds of value, see my "Four Kinds of Intrinsic Value," Darshana International, V (July, 1965), 22-31. * See my "Matter and Spirit: Implications of the Organicist View," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XX (Sept., 1959), 104-105. Hence, a calculus of organic enjoyment would be much more intricate than the Hedonistic calcu- lus. 10 Benedetto Croce, "The Breviary of Aesthetic," The Rice Institute Pamphlet, XLVII, (4 Jan. 1961), 9-10. 16 Croce, p. 12. 17 My "Aesthetic Experience and Moral Experience," The Journal of Philosophy, LV (Sept., 1958), 837, 837-838. 18 See my "Beauty Defined," p. 585. 1. See my Philosophy of the Buddha (N.Y., London, 1938), esp. Chs. 1, 4-8. 20 See my The World's Living Religions (New York, 1964), pp. 206-221. A See Bhagavad Gita, esp. Ch. 5. 22 See Philosophy of the Buddha, Ch. 8, "Dhyana." 23 My "Polarity: A Descriptive Hypothesis," Phi. losophy and Phenomenological Research, XXI (March, 1961), 347-860. 24 The Arts and the Art of Criticism (Princeton, 1947), p. 401. 26 My "Existence and Its Polarities," The Journal of Philosophy, XLVI (Sept., 1949), 629-637. 24 For a more detailed account of the nature of Organicism as an interpretive instrument, see my "Theories of Polarity," Darshana, II (Oct., 1962), 1-23. 10 For a critical exposition of naive realism, see my Philosophy, An Introduction, II (New York, 1953; Bombay, 1964). 11 My Types of Intuition (Albuquerque, 1961), p. 6. See further for summary expositions of subject- object, apparent-real, and aesthetic-incomplete po- larities. 1 The Sense of Beauty (New York, 1896), p. 52. 18 I became acquainted with this term through the lectures and writings of DeWitt H. Parker, my teacher. See his The Principles of Aesthetics, V (Boston, 1920; New York, 1946). 14 My "Beauty Defined," The Philosophical Re- view, LVI (Sept., 1947), 584. P.