Syadvadbhasa of Shubhvijay Gani

Author(s): N M Kansara
Publisher: Z_Nirgrantha_1_022701.pdf and Nirgrantha_2_022702.pdf and Nirgrantha_3_022703.pdf
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SYĀDVĀDA-BHÁŞĀ OF SUBHAVIJAYA GANI
N. M. Kansara Among some of the famous Jaina ācāryas, Śrī Vijayahirasuri, popularly known as Sri Hīravijayasuri, flourished in the first half of the 16th century A. D. He is distinguished in the Jaina monachical tradition as the acārya who enlightened Akabar the Great, the Mughal Emperor of that period. Pandit Subhavijaya Gani has mentioned himself as a disciple of this acarya', who inherited the leadership of the famous Tapā-gaccha after the death of Sri Vijayadānasüri in V. S. 1621 (A. D. 1665). Subhavijaya Gani is recorded to have composed the following works : Haimi-namamalabījaka (V. S. 1661 / A.D. 1605), Mahāvīra-svämi-saptavimsati-bhāva-stavana (V. S. 1662 / A. D. 1606), Tarkabhäsā-vārtika (V. S. 1663 / A. D. 1607), Kavya-kalpalatā-vrttimakaranda (V. S. 1665 / A. D. 1609), Syadvada-bhāṣā with its vrtti (V. S. 1667 / A. D. 1611), and Kalpasūtra-tikā (V. S. 1671 / A. D. 1615). Thus, he seems to have lived during the latter half of the 17th century of the Vikrama Era, corresponding to the first half of the 17th century A. D. The Syādvāda-bhāṣā has been composed as an introductory monograph meant to enable the beginners to study the Syadvada, the well-known doctrine of Jaina logic. This work is meant to provide a facility for the Jainas, much in the same way as the Tarkabhāsā was composed by Keśava Miśra for introducing the beginners to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika system of Indian philosophy. Obviously, śubhavijaya Gani seems to have been inspired in the matter when he composed his Varttika on the Keśava Miśra's Tarkabhāsā, about a couple of years ago, before he undertook the task. He seemingly had utilized his proficiency acquired due to his deep study of Miśra's works for composing his Syadváda-bhāsā. The Syādavăda-bhāṣā was first published in the Pothi form by N. G. Jahveri in the Śresthi Devacandra Lālbhāi Jaina Pustakoddhāra Series (No.3), Mumbai, in A. D. 1911. It was reprinted and published again by Sri Jina Sāsana Arādhanā Trust, Murnbai, in Vira Samvat. 2516 (i.e. C.E 1990), along with the Devadharma-pariksa and other works of Mahopadhyāya Yaśovijaya. These two editions showed some parts of the text as sutras printed in bold types, while the rest of the text printed in running types was supposed to be the auto-commentary. On close examination it was clear that the editors of both these editions were not sure which portion of the text comprised the sūtras and which the commentary. Consequently, the problem was opened anew, and the work has been re-edited and published in the Sambodhi Vol. XVIII, Ahmedabad 1992 (pp. 103122) by the present author. Herein, the sūtra portion has been clearly printed in bold fonts in contrast to the commentary portion; and both these parts make a whole homogeneous work. Moreover, in view of the comparative study of the text of this work, since it is declared to be meant also as an introduction to the principles of

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Nirgrantha
pramana and naya with the alternative title 'Pramāna-naya-tattva-prakäsika", the work has been duly divided into nine paricchedas, and the sūtras have been given the numbers in each of the paricchedas, although none of the extant MSS. show anything like this division, nor numbering either. But, this expedient was necessary for enabling the scholars to undertake an intensive comparative study of the work with reference to its source, namely the Pramāna-naya-tattvalokālaṁkāra (PNT) of Vadi Devasūri with his auto-commentary named the Syadvada-ratnākara", which is mentioned by Subhavijaya Gani, and which is a standard work on the Jaina medieval logic, psychology, and epistemology; both these works are very tough. The Syādvăda-bhāṣā (SVB) consists of 282 sūtras, suitably divided into nine paricchedas, each of which containing (1) 17, (II) 24, (III) 67, (IV) 8, (V) 9, (VI) 67, (VII) 54, (VIII) 25, and (IX) 11 respectively, most of which being drawn from its source work of Vādi Devasūri, and a few of them from the Parīksamukha-sūtra (PMS) of Mänikyanandin (about 900-950 C. E.), a Digambara author; this latter work, in its turn is based on that of Akalańka. And Vādi Devasūri, a Svetāmbara scholiast, has closely followed Manikyanandin, many of whose sutras are freely adopted by the former, and a few also criticized. The Critical Text of the SVB, edited is based on four MSS., two (Nos. 9164 and 25920) deposited in the L. D. Institute of Indology MSS. Library, Ahmedabad, and two (Nos. 2609 and 11710) deposited in the Vādī Pārsvanātha Bhandāra in Hemacandrācārya Jñāna Mandir, Patan.
The SVB commences with a salutation to Jina Mahavīra and Śrī Hīravijayasūri, and then the author reveals his intention that he has composed this work for the sake of beginners who are eager to study the system of Syādvāda, and that it is but just elementary. Towards the end of the work, he has made it clear that those who are interested in knowing about the detailed refutations of various systems of Indian philosophy may look for them in the Syädvādaratnākara? At the outset, in the First Paricched, he enumerates nine basic concepts (padārthāḥ), namely Jiva, ajīva, punya, pāpa, asrava, samvara, nirjarā, bandha, and moksa, by the knowledge and activity of which one attains to the highest bliss (niņśreyasa). With I. 2 onwards up to the end of this pariccheda are treated the definition of valid knowledge (pramana) as that about the self and the non-self, capable of making us accept the agreeable things and discarding the disagreeable ones. This is essentially valid as it is opposed to superimposition (samáropa), which consists in determining a matter to be what it is not (a-tad). Samāropa is of three kinds, namely illusion (viparyaya), doubt (sambaya), and inattention (anadhyavasāya). The certain knowledge of the Self consists in the clear illumination of the Self. The validity of knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable. The invalidity of knowledge consists in the opposite of that. With respect to their origination, both of these are due to something other than itself while their consciousness is due to itself and the other. Here, in the auto-commentary, the author has refuted the Mimāṁsaka view that it is

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the knowledge itself which is responsible for its validity (svatah-pramanya). And in his elaboration of the the valid knowledge defined in 1.2, he has criticized Mānikyanandin's definition. Out of the 20 sūtras of the First pariccheda in the PNT, śubhavijaya Gani has drawn 17, most of them verbatim, but four with small modifications. In the second pariccheda, valid knowledge is classified into two kinds, namely direct and indirect. The direct is clear, in revealing the details to a greater degree than that done by inference, etc. It is of two modes, namely the practical (samyyāvahārika) and transcendental (paramarthika). The first of these is of two kinds, namely the sensual and unsensual, i.e., mental. Each of these two has four modes, namely grasp, attention, determination, and retention. Inquisitiveness (iha) is to be distinguished from doubt (sambaya) which precedes it. Though these are in some respects one and the same, yet they are to be distinguished owing to the peculiarity in modifications. Their order is such, because they are perceived in such an order and because their origination is due to gradual destruction and abatement of one's own karma. Otherwise the object of knowledge would remain unknown. What is not sensed is never grasped, the ungrasped is not doubted, the non-doubted is not attended to, the non-attended- to is not determined, and the undetermined is not retained. Sometimes this order is not apparent; this is due to the immediate succession of those processes, like the imperceptibility of the order in which the hundred petals of a lotus are pierced. The transcendental perception, on the other hand, is dependent on the soul alone for its genesis. It is wither partial or complete. The partial is of two kinds, namely clairvoyance (avadhi) and telepathy (manahparyāya). Clairvoyance is knowledge which arises when its enveloping hindrance subsides in a particular way, which is connate with some and in others acquired by means of righteousness, and which has, for its objects things that have a form. Telepathy, which has for its object the mental substance and its modes, arises from the subsidence of its peculiar cover, the subsidence being due to self-control and purity. The complete knowledge is pure one consisting in the direct cognition of all substances and their modes, which arises when, owing to a peculiar group of conditions, all the covering hindrances are annihilated. Arhat is possessed of that, as he has no faults. He is devoid of faults, because his words are unopposed to the valid knowledge. As his doctrine is not contradicted by the valid knowledge, the non-opposition of his words to it is established. Out of the 27 sütras of the second pariccheda of the PNT, Subhavijaya Gani has dropped three (11, 13 and 27) and adopted the remaining 23, three of these with slight modifications.
The third pariccheda starts with the consideration of indirect knowledge; it is not clear. It is of five kinds--recognition, conception, induction, deduction and authoritative. Recognition is the recollection of an object cognised before, in the form, it is that, and is due to the waking up of an impression; as for instance, 'that image of the

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Divine Teacher'. Conception is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge of a thing under observation with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics: for example, that cow is of that species; a Gavaya is like a cow.' Induction (tarka or üha) is the knowledge of the forms 'this being, this is, etc., arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three. times, such as that between the proven and the mark; for example, 'whatever smoke there is, all that is only when there is fire; if it be not there smoke would not be there.'

Nirgrantha
Inference is of two kinds: for one's own self (svärtha) and for others (parartha). Of these, the inference-for-one's-own-self consists in a knowledge of the proven (sādhya), through the apprehension of the mark (hetu) and the recollection of its inseparable relation to the Dharma. The one and the only characteristic of the mark (hetu) is that its incapability of being known otherwise than in connection with the Dharma is known for certain. The proven (sadhya) is what is undetermined, unopposed, and desired. It is a well-known abode (dharmi) having that phenomenon; it is otherwise called Paksa. The Dharmi is known to us either through mere supposition or through the pramānas, or through both. An inference consisting in a statement of the abode and the mark is called the inference-for-the-sake-of-others (parartha), by transference of epithet. To show that the proven is in the particular occasion connected with the abode, the explicit statement of the abode is certainly necessary, just like the statement showing the inherence of the mark. The mark may be indicated in two ways: 'It is got along with it', and 'otherwise it is not got at all'. The first of these two implies that the mark exists only when the proven exists; and the second implies that the mark does not exist if the proven does not exist; for instance, 'that kitchen has fire in it because only if there be fire, smoke can be perceived there, or if there be no fire, smoke cannot be perceived there. To establish the proven, the use of one of them being sufficient, the use of the other is unnecessary where one has been used. And since, because of its internal inseparable connection (antar-vyäpti) the mark is capable or incapable of establishing the proven, the development of the external inseparable connection (bahir-vyāpti) is valueless. To convince the dull-minded persons, however, the premises of the example, the application and the conclusion, etc., are to be used. Example is the place where the inseparable connection can be known. It is of two sorts owing to its homogeneity and heterogeneity. In the case, where the nature of the mark being present, the nature of the proven is found to exist as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the homogeneous example; for instance, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in the kitchen.' In the case, however, where the proven being absent, the mark is shown to be absent as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the heterogenous example; for instance, 'where there is no fire, there can be no smoke, e.g. in the pond'. Application is showing the mark to be

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Syādvāda-bhāṣā...
existent in the abode; for instance, 'there is smoke in this place'. Conclusion is applying the proven to the abode; for instance, 'so, there is fire here'. These five propositions, stating the abode, etc., are also described as limbs (avayava). The reason, defined above, is of two sorts, it being differentiated on the basis of being positively cognized or negatively cognized. Both prove the affirmation and the negation of some fact.
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The affirmation is the aspect of existence; the negation is the aspect of non-existence. The latter is of four kinds, namely prior non-existence (prägabháva), posterior nonexistence (pradhvamsabhäva), reciprocal non-existence (itaretarabhava) and absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva). That subsiding, a fact in the form of its effect comes into existence is its prāgabhāva; for instance, the lump of clay is the prior non-existence of the pitcher which is formed out of it on its cessation to exist. That arising a fact which was an effect, come to an end as a matter of necessity is its pradhvaṁsābhāva; for instance, the collection of pitcher-pieces is the posterior non-existence of the pitcher which is necessarily destroyed on the rise of the pitcher-pieces. Reciprocal nonexistence implies the retrogression of the nature of a thing from the nature of its opposite; for instance, the retrogression of the nature of a pitcher from the nature of a pillar. Absolute non-existence is what, in all the three times, contradicts its identical nature; for instance, the conscious and the unconscious.
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There are two kinds of the positively cognized (upalabdhi) marks, namely the positively-cognized-compatible (aviruddha-upalabdhi) and the positively-cognized. incompatibility (viruddha-upalabdhi). Of these, the former proves affirmation or existence, and is of six kinds a mark, compatible-with-the-proven may be positively cognized as pervaded (vyäpya), the effect (karya), the cause (kärana), the antecedent (purvacara), the subsequent (uttaracara) or the concomitant (sahacara) of the proven. Thus, (1) vyäpya-aviruddha-upalabhi, (2) karya-aviruddha-upalabhi, (3) käranaaviruddha-upalabdhi, (4) purvācara-aviruddha-upalabdhi, (5) uttaracara-aviruddhaupalabhi, and (6) sahacara-aviruddha-upalabdhi are illustrated, respectively, as follows: (1) Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product; whatever is a product is seen to be subject to modification, e.g. a pot; and this also is a product, hence subject to modification; that which is not subject to modification is not seen to be a product, e.g. a son of a barren woman; and this is a product, therefore, subject to modification.' (2) 'There is fire on this mountain, because smoke is noticed.' (3) There is shadow here, because of umbrella.' (4) The constellaion Śakata will rise, because of the rise of Krttikä.' (5) Bharani has arisen, because it was preceded by the rise of Kṛttikā. (6) There is a shape in this mango fruit, because of the juice."
The positive-cognition (upalabdhi) of what is incompatible (viruddha)-with-pervadable (vyäpya), etc. of what is negated is of six types: Therein, (1) positively cognised (upalabdhi) of the pervadable (vyapya) by incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g. there is no cool touch here, because of warmth'; (2) the mark positively cognised (upalabdhi) to be the effect (kärya) of incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g.

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"this man's temper is not yet cooled down, because he has an angry face'; (3) the mark positively cognised (upalabdhi) to be the cause (kārana) of what is incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g. 'there is no happiness in this embodied one, because of pain in heart'; (4) the mark positively cognised (upalabdhi) to be the antecedent (purvacara) of incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g. 'the constellation Śakata will not rise after the end of this muhurta, because of the rise of Revati; (5) the mark positively cognised (upalabdhi) to be subsequent to (uttaracara) incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g. 'the constellation Bharanī did not rise, because of the rise of Pusya before muhurta'; (6) The mark positively cognised (upalabdhi) to be the concomitant of incompatible (viruddha) with the proven, e.g. 'this man has no false knowledge, for he has got the right faith'. The negatively cognised (anupalabhi) mark also is of two kinds, namely the negatively. cognised compatible (aviruddha) and the negatively-cognised incompatible (viruddha). Of these the negatively-cognised mark which is compatible (aviruddha) and proves negation is of seven modes, as may be differentiated by identity of nature (syabhāva), pervader (vyāpaka), effect (kārya), cause (kārana), antecedent (pūrvacara), subsequent (uttaracara) and concomitant (sahacara). Thus : (1) svabhāvānupalabdhi, (2) vyāpakānupalabdhi, (3) kāryānupalabdhi, (4) käranānupalabdhi, (5) pūrvacarānupalabdhi, (6) uttaracaranupalabdhi, and (7) sahacaranupalabdhi. The examples are: (1) there is no pitcher in this place, for its nature as known is not cognised'; (2) 'there is no simśapa tree here, for no tree is found here'; (3) 'there is no unimportant fire, for no smoke is found'; (4) 'there is no smoke here, because of the lack of fire'; (5) 'a muhurta after, Sakata star will not rise, for Kịttikā is not seen to rise'; (6) 'a muhurta before, Bharani did not rise, for, Krttikā is not seen to rise' (7) 'this man has not got right knowledge, for he is not found to possess right faith. A negatively-cognised (anupalabdhi) mark which is incompatible (viruddha) leading to an affirmative conclusion (vidhi) is of five kinds. And thus : (1) viruddha-karya-anupalabdhi; (2) viruddha-kārana-anupalabdhi; (3) viruddha-svabhāva-anupalabdhi; (4) viruddha-vyäpaka-anupalabdhi; and (5) viruddha-sahacara-anupalabdhi. The examples are as follows: (1) 'In this person, there is a particular disease; for the operative signs of good health are not found in him.' (2) 'In this embodied being there is pain; for it is not united with what is liked.' (3) 'An object has many aspects; for the nature of having only one aspect is not found in it). (4) 'There is shade here; for heat is not felt.' (5) 'This man has false knowledge; for, he is not found to have right faith.' Out of the 109 sūtras of the third Pariccheda of the PNT, śubhavijaya Gani has adopted in all 79 sütras, of which 26 are slightly modified, and 77-82 and 96-102 are combined into 51 and 62, respectively; the rest of them are incorporated verbatim. The fourth Pariccheda starts with the definition of Agama. It is the knowledge arising from authoritative sayings. It is so called by transference of epithet. For instance, 'there is a treasure here; there are things like Meru'. An authority (apta) is he who knows

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a thing under consideration as it is and describes it in accordance with his knowledge. He is either of the two, human or superhuman. Here, the father, etc., are the human, while the Tirthakara, etc., are superhuman authorities. A word signifies an object by means of both its natural force and applied meaning. Letter-sounds, e.g. A, etc., are atomic.
Here, out of the 47 sutras of the fourth pariccheda of the PNT, Subhavijaya Gani has adopted only 8, two of which (3 and 11) are modified slightly, and the order of the 9th and the 11th has been reversed, as 8th and 7th.
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The fifth pariccheda begins with the consideration of the object of pramana. It is defined as a thing having a nature which has many aspects, namely the general, the particular, and so on; because it is perceived to have a nature corresponding to, and different from, that of some things (of the same class); and because it is capable of producing effects by the modification characterised by the modification of its nature which consists in its persistence through the giving up of its old form and the assuming of a new form. Generality is of two kinds, distinguished by species and substantiality etc. Therein, the specific-idea (tiryak-sāmānya) consists in similar features found in each of the individuals of a class; for instance, cowhood in Sabala, Sabaleya and other individual cows. Persistent substance (ürdhvata-samanya) is the substratum which remains in all its modifications, anticedent and subsequent; as for instance, gold which continues through the ornaments like bracelet, bangle, etc. The particular also is of two sorts, namely the mode and the distinction. Modes are gradually arising evolutes in the same thing; as the feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., in the soul. Distinction is the dissimilar modification, as cow, buffalo, etc.
Out of the 8 sütras of the fifth pariccheda of the PNT, Subhavijaya Ganī apparently seems to have adopted 5 of them with slight modifications, but in fact he has adopted all the nine sütras of the fourth pariccheda of the Parikṣämukha-sütra of Manikyanandin in toto within the fifth one of his SVB.
The sixth pariccheda starts with the consideration of the fruit or the result that is effected by the pramana; such as, removal of ignorance and discarding, acceptance and disregard. It is of two sorts, namely the direct and the indirect. As regards the direct fruit, that of all the pramānas is the annihilation of ignorance. As regards the indirect fruits, they are a spirit of avoidance, that of appropriation, and that of indifference. As the fruit cannot otherwise be understood to be as such it is in some respects both separate from and identical with the pramāṇa. The fruit is to be judged as not different from the pramana as both of them have the same identical knower, because the same self which is modified into pramāna is found to be modified into the fruit. He that cognises does also appropriate, renounce, and neglect the objects of his cognition, as the case may be; this is the invariable experience of all observers; and because knowledge and its fruit appear as that which does effect and that which is effected. Because of his independence, the doer is he who effects (sädhaka) something, while

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N. M. Kansara Nirgrantha the act, on the other hand, is what is to be effected (sadhya), because it is dependent on the doer for its effectuation. A pramana-fallacy is what is other than a pramana and its nature. The fallacies, regarding the nature of the pramana are : the view that is essentially unconscious; that it does not reveal the Self; that it reveals the Self only; the theory of the undetermined perception; and the fallacy consisting in ignorance (samaropa). It would be fallacious to regard as valid knowledge such phenomena as, for instance, contact etc., knowledge unconscious of the Self, knowledge not revealing any non-Self, pure sensation, illusion, doubt, and inattention. Pramana-fallacies are, for instance, cognition of two moons, etc., and of its being broken; this is the fallacy of sensuous perception. Fallacious recollection consists in knowing a thing in which it is not there; for instance, knowing Yajnadatta to be Devadatta. To identify one thing with another which is only similar to it; and conversely to regard one and the same thing as two similar things; cases like these are examples of fallacy regarding assimilation; like the case of twin children. Induction-fallacy consists in the cognition of a thing where no relation exists; e.g. 'whoever is his son is dark-complexioned'. Pervasion (vyapti) is invariable concomitance; e.g. 'He is dark-complexioned, as he is the son of Maitra'. Cognition arising from a false knowledge about the abode, etc., is inference-fallacy. That which is undesirable, etc., is fallacy regarding the abode. The unproved (asiddha), the opposed (viruddha), and the doubtful or uncertain (anaikantika) are (the three classes of) the mark-fallacy. The mark whose inseparable connection with the proven is not determined through the instruments of valid knowledge (pramana) is the unproved (asiddha). It is of two modes, namely unprovedto-both-parties and unproved-to-one-party. The former is unproved to both the disputant and the opponent; e.g. 'sound is subject to modification, because it is visible.' The latter is unproved to either the disputant or to the opponent; e.g. 'trees are unconscious, because they have not the death characterised by a suppression of the power of cognition of sense-faculty and of vitality. Opposed (viruddha) reason is one the invariable connection of which is the opposite of the proven; e.g. 'the soul is eternal or non-eternal, because it is possessed of the faculty of conception, etc.' The doubtful (anaikantika) reason is one whose existence is unopposed even in the dissimilar abode; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' It is of two kinds, namely that of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is known, and that of which it is suspected. The reason of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'sound is eternal, because it is knowable. That of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is doubted is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'the person in question is not omniscient, because he is a speaker'. The fallacious example is one in which both what effects and what is effected are unproved and in obverse relation; e.g. 'Sound is not-man-made, being endowed with form; like sensual pleasure, an atom and a pot. Reverse agreement also, e.g. 'whatever is not man-made is unmanifest, being liable to

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Vol. XX, 1996 Syadvada-bhasa... 51 be overlapped by lightening etc. In the case of inverse relation, those whose difference is unproved; e.g. like the atom, the sensual pleasure and the ether. The one having the reverse difference; e.g. 'that which is not endowed with form is not not-man-made?. In respect of homogeneity, the fallacy of the example is of nine modes, thus : That which is opposed to the proven phenomena (sadhya-dharma-vikala); that which is opposed to the reason-phenomena (sadhana-dharma-vikala); that which is opposed to both the phenomena (ubhaya-dharma-vikala); that which is doubtful with regard to the provenphenomena (sandigdha-sadhya-dharma); that which is doubtful with regard to the mark-phenomena (sandigdha-sadhana-dharma); that which is doubtful with regard to both the phenomena (sandigdhaubhaya-dharma); that in which the reason and the proven are unconnected (ananvaya); that in which the connection between them is unshown (apradarsitanvaya); and that in which the connection between them is in inverse order (viparitanvaya). (1) The sadhya-dharma-vikala; e.g. 'Sound is not manmade, because it is formless, like misery? (2) The Sadhana-dharma-vikala; e.g. The proposition and the reason being the same as above, 'like an atom.' (3) The Ubhayadharma-vikala; e.g. like a pitcher'. (4) The Sandigdha-sadhya-dharma; e.g. 'that man has passion etc., because he is a speaker, like Devadatta'. (5) The Sandigdha-sadhanadharma; e.g. 'that man is mortal, because he has passions etc., like Maitra'. (6) The Sandigdha-ubhaya-dharma; e.g. that man is not an all-seer, because he has passions etc., like a particular vower'. (7) The Unconnected homogeneous example; e.g. 'the person referred to has passions, etc., because he is a speaker'. (8) The one with unshowed connection; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pitcher'. (9) The one with inverse order; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product; whatever is non-eternal is a product like a pitcher'. In respect of heterogeneity also, the fallacy of the example is of nine modes : That in which the negation of the proven is unproved (asiddha-sadhya-vyatireka); that in which the negation of the reason is unproved (asiddha-sadhana-vyatireka); that in which the negation of both is unproved (asiddha-ubhaya-vyatireks); that in which the negation of the proven is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka); that in which the negation of the reason is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka); that in which the negation of both is doubtful (sandigdha-ubhay-vyatireka); that in which there is no negative relation between the proven and the reason (avyatireka); that in which the negative relation is unshown (apradarsita-vyatireka); and that in which the negative relation is in inverse order (viparita-vyatireka). These are illustrated below : (1) asiddha-sadhyavyatireka; e.g. 'Inference is fallacious; because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not fallacious is not valid knowledge; as for instance, the dream consciousness.' (2) asiddha-sadhana-vyatireka; e.g. 'Perception is undetermined; because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not undetermined is not valid knowledge; as for instance, inference, (3) asiddha-ubhaya-vyatireka; e.g. Sound is both eternal-and-non-eternal; because it is existent; whatever is not both eternal and non-eternal is not existent; as for instance, the pillar.' (4) Sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka; e.g. Kapila is not

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52 N. M. Kansara Nirgrantha omniscient nor an authority; because he upholds the doctrine of absolute unmomentariness; one who is omniscient or an authority upholds the doctrine of unmomentariness; as for instance, Sugata.' (5) Sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka; e.g. The person referred to is one whose words are not to be accepted; because he has passions, etc.; as for instance, the son of Suddhodana.' (6) Sandigdha-ubhaya-vyatireka; e.g. 'Kapila is not free from passions; because he has not, out of pity, given to beings, who deserve mercy, a piece of flesh from his body; one who is free from passions, gives out of pity a piece of flesh from his body to beings who deserve mercy; as for instance, Tapana-bandhu.' (7) avyatireka; e.g. The person referred to is not one who is free from passions; because he is a speaker; one who is free from passions is not a speaker; as for instance, a piece of stone.' (8) apradarsita-vyatireka; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; as for instance, ether.' (9) viparita-vyatireka; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; whatever is not a product is eternal; as for instance, ether. Fallacies with regard to application and conclusion consist in stating them in contravention of the principles, implied in their definitions. The examples are as follows : (1) upanayabhasa; e.g. 'Sound is subject to modification; because it is a product; whatever is a product is subject to modification; as for instance, a pitcher.' (2) nigamanabhasa; e.g. in that very instance, (to say) 'So sound is a product, or to say "So a pitcher is subject to modification.' (3) Agamabhasa consists in cognition arising from the words of a false authority. For instance : 'On the bank of the Mekalakanyaka, at the foot of the tala and hintala, dates are found in abundance; make haste; go on, go on, o Ye calves!' (4) Samkhyabhasa; e.g. 'Direct perception is the only form of valid knowledge.' (5) Visayabhasa consists in regarding the class-essence alone or the particular alone, or both of them isolated from each other as the object of valid knowledge. (6) Phalabhasa consists in thinking that the fruit is the same as valid knowledge, or that fruit is different from it. Out of the 87 sutras of the sixth pariccheda of the PNT, subhavijaya Gani has adopted 57 sutras for his sixth pariccheda of the SVB; out of these, about 15 apparently seem to be slightly modified, but in fact they are adopted from Manikyanandin's Pariksamukha-sutra in toto, along with seven more. The seventh Pariccheda of the SVB opens with the definition of Naya. It consists in taking cognition of a part of the object known through the Pramana, The Naya-Fallacy (nayabhasa) consists in denying the aspects other than the one with which one is concerned for the time being. It is of two kinds: the Expounded (vyasa) and the compounded (samasa). In its expounded form it is of many sorts. In its compounded form it is of two kinds, namely the Dravyarthika, i.e. the naya which considers the substantial aspect, and the Paryayarthika, e.g. the one which considers a thing in its modifications. The first is of three kinds, namely the Naigama, i.e. non-distinguished, the Samgraha, i.e. generic, and the Vyavahara, i.e. practical.

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Vol. XX, 1996 Syadvada-bhasa... 53 The Naigama signifies both of either two characteristics or of two substances or of a characteristic and a substance, holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'In soul, there is an ever-existing consciousness' we have an instance of holding up two characteristics, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A thing is substratum, modified' we have an instance of holding up two substances, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A self engrossed in the worldly affairs gets happiness for a moment only' we have an instance of holding up a substance as the chief and the characteristic as its adjunct. Now, their fallacies : (i) Naigamabhasa consists in a tendency to absolutely separate the two attributes, etc; e.g. to consider that 'in the soul existence and consciousness are absolutely separate from each other'; similarly other instances. The Samgraha-naya takes account only of the common or the general aspect. It is of two kinds : ultimate and non-ultimate : (i) The ultimate (parasamgraha) consists in assuming an attitude of indifference to the infinite particulars of a thing and fixing solely upon its barest substratum which is equal to pure existence; e.g. The universe is one, for there is no difference in the being of all things'. Its fallacy consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and denying all the particularities; e.g. 'pure existence is the only reality, for particularities apart from that are not apprehended. (ii) The non-ultimate (aparasamgraha) consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate generalities as substantialities, etc., and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes; e.g. 'Principles of motion, rest, space, time, matter, soul - all these substances are one, because all of them have substantiality which is identical; and so on. The fallacy with regard to this consists in recognising the generalities such as substantiality etc., alone and denying the reality of their modes; e.g. 'Substantiality is the only reality, because substances other than it are not perceived'; and so on. The Vyavahara-naya is that view-point by which matters which are objects of the Samgraha-naya are systematically divided; e.g. 'Whatever is existent is either a substance (dravya) or a mode (paryaya).' The fallacy with regard to it consists in a tendency to divide the substances and the modes into unreal sub-classes; e.g. the Carvaka philosophy. The Paryayarthika is of four kinds : the straight-expressed (Rjusutra), the Verbal (Sabda), the subtle (samabhirudha), and the Such-like (evambhuta). (i) The Rju-sutranaya consists in a tendency to fix on, or emphasise, only the mode which is straight, i.e., existent for the present; e.g. 'Now, there is pleasure.' Its fallacy consists in denying the substance in toto; e.g. the philosophy of the Tathagata. (ii) The Sabda-naya attributes different meanings to a word in accordance with the difference in tense, etc.; e.g. "The Sumeru mountain was, is, and will exist in future, and so on. Its fallacy consists in maintaining a real difference in objects in accordance with the difference in tenses, etc.; e.g. In the expression, 'Sumeru was, is, will be', the words

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54 N. M. Kansara Nirgrantha used in different tenses refer to essentially different objects, because they are words used in different tenses, like other words which refer to really different objects. (iii) The Samabhirudha-naya consists in attributing different meanings to synonyms according to their derivations; e.g. 'Indra' is one who rains; 'Sakra' is one who is potent; 'Purandara' is one who penetrates into (enemy) city-fort, and so on. Its fallacy consists in maintaining the difference in objects in accordance with the difference in synonyms; e.g. To maintain that the words 'Indra', 'Sakra' and 'Purandara', etc. signify really different objects, as they are different words like the words 'elephant', 'deer', 'horse', etc. (iv) The evambhuta-naya maintains that words signify those objects which have the activities denoted by them; e.g. 'indra' is so called because he rains; Sakra is so called because he exercises power; purandara is so called because he breaks through the enemy) city-fort.' Its fallacy consists in refusing to give the object its usual name when it is not functioning; e.g. To hold that the thing called the 'pitcher should not be so called when it is not doing the particular function indicated by the word; because it is then devoid of the function indicated by the word; like cloth and so on. At this point, Subhavijaya Gani has given seven verses as samgraha-slokas in his auto-commentary to summarise their definitions succinctly. Of these nayas enumerated above, the first four are artha-nayas as their nature is to determine objects. The last three are sabda-nayas as they reveal the significations of words. The contents of each preceding naya are fuller and fuller, and those of each succeeding one are more and more limited. The contents of the naigama which has within its scope the existents as well as non-existents are fuller than those of the samgraha which reveals only the existents. The contents of the samgraha which has within its view all the existents are fuller than those of the vyavahara which reveals only some modes of the existents. The scope of the vyavahara which has for its objects things of the past, the present, and the future is wider than that of the rjusutra which considers the things of the present only. The sabda signifies different objects in accordance with the difference in tense, etc., but the rjusutra indicates the opposite; hence the scope of the latter is wider. The scope of the samabhirudha which tends to attribute a different meaning to each of the synonyms is smaller than that of the sabda which does quite the different thing. The evambhuta indicates different objects in accordance with the difference in functioning. The samabhirudha does quite the different thing, and its contents are consequently fuller than those of the former. A naya statement also in its application to its object, follows the law of the Sevenfold predication (sapta-bhangi), through affirmation and negation. Its fruit also is to be determined in the same way as that of the pramana. Out of the 57 sutras of the seventh pariccheda of the PNT, subhavijaya Gani has adopted 54, of which 11 are slightly modified. And, the sutra 56, slightly modified, is transferred in the next pariccheda of the SVB. The eighth pariccheda of the SVB has the statement about the nature of the basic

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Vol. XX, 1996 Syadvada-bhasa... 55 concepts, called padarthas, which are associated with origin, destruction, persistence, and are equal in nature, right from a lamp to the sky. Of these, jiva is characterised by consciousness, modifications, difference as well as non-difference from the qualities like knowledge, is a doer, direct enjoyer, having the size of the body possessed by it, different in every body, atomic, and having the adrsta. In the auto-commentary on the sutra 3, Subhavijaya Gani has elaborarely discussed the various aspects of the nature of the jiva as propounded in the works on Jaina philosophy. This discussion covers about one-fifth of the extent of this entire work. After explaining the meaning of the sutra 3, he has referred to jiva as endowed with prana, which is further classified under two types, namely dravya-prana and bhava-prana; and jiva is so called because he lives (jivati) through them. Next, he switches over to the term atman and puts forth logical inferences proving that it is perceptible, creator of body, master of the senseorgans, enjoyer. After proving the existence of jiva and showing its two broad typesthe liberated and the one subject to rebirth-he proceeds to prove the sub-types of the latter, namely sura, naraka, manusya, and tiryak, as also the two sub-types of manusya, the garbhaja and the sammurcchaja, and the five sub-types of tiryak, namely ekendriya, dvindriya, trindriya, caturindriya and pancendriya. Then he proceeds to prove the Jivahood of the earth, water, light, air, and vegetation as sub-sub-types of the ekendriyas, in a very detailed and systematically presented sets of logical inferences. The non-jiva is of five kinds : dharma, adharma, akasa, kala, and pudgala. Having defined the first two, he discusses the concept of astikaya as applicable to these five kinds of ajiva, especially in relation to kala. In the sutras 11-20, the nature and types of pudgalas are propounded; they are endowed with the qualities of touch, taste, flavour, and colour. They are atomic and found in the form of atoms as well as molecular aggragares (skandhas). The atoms of good actions, and those of bad ones are known as merit (punya) and sin (papa) respectively. After explaining the concepts of asrava, samvara and nirjara, that of moksa is defined in sutra 25, and discussed in detail in the auto-commentary. Except the 3rd one which is adopted from the PNT, all other sutras here seem to have been formulated by Subhavijaya Gani himself on the basis of the verses of the fourth adhikara of the Sad-darsana-samuccaya(r) (SDS) of Haribhadra Suri, and the commentary, named the Tarka-rahasya-dipika (TRD) on it by Gunaratnasuri. At times it happens that what is supposed to be a sutra in the SVB is a part of a sentence of Gunaratna Suri's commentary, and in the Vrtti part of the sutra 3 of the 8th Pariccheda of the SVB, especially the elaborate discussion pertaining to the soulness (jivatva) of prithvi, ap, tejas, vayu, and Vanaspati has been borrowed verbatim from Gunaratna Suris TRD on verse No. 49 of the SDS, in the fourth ucchrasa propounding the Jaina System of Indian Philosophy in comparison with the Bauddha, Naiyayika, Samkhya, Vaisesika, and Jaiminiya ones. And, this is quite justified for the author of the SVB, whose endeavour is to present authentic views. The ninth pariccheda explains the concept of vada, which is expected for arriving at

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56 N. M. Kansara Nirgrantha the final determination on the basis of the pramanas, nayas and tattvas. A debate (vada) consists in the system of argumentative statements, pro-et-contra, for establishing the subject-matter of one proposition, which is maintained by a party, by refuting the subject-matter of the other, the two subject-matters being opposed to each other. In the debate, the party who begins i.e. either one-who-wants-a-victory (jigisu) or one-who-wants-to- determine-a-truth (tattva-nirninisu). A seeker-of-victory (jigisu) is one who wants to defeat another by advancing arguments of proof and refutation in order to establish his own contention. A seeker of-truth (tattva-nirninisu) is one who wants to establish truth in those ways. That is of two classes, namely 'In himself and 'In others'. The disputant and the opponent are like two wrestlers, the first begins and the other answers. What each of them is to do is to establish his own position and to refute that of the other in accordance with the pramanas. The members are such as are approved by both the disputant and the opponent and are well aware of the nature of the positions of the disputant and the opponent, have the power of retention, are erudite, intellectually brilliant, forgiving, and strictly impartial. Their businesses are to make the debating parties accept the usual prescribed forms in regard to the points at issue, to determine their right to the priority or the posteriority of speech, to find out the merits and the demerits of the supporting and the contradicting arguments, to stop where necessary the debate by revealing the truth and to declare truly the result of the debate before the assembly. Where both the debaters are desirous of determining the truth, the debaters are to argue, so long as the truth is not determined and so long as argument is possible. Or, in the case of the lack of determination, parties may talk as many times as they can. Then follow the three concluding verses. Out of the 23 sutras of the eighth pariccheda of the PNT, subhavijaya Gani has adopted verbatim the first five, 16th to 19th and the last two ones in his ninth pariccheda of the SVB; the order of the last two sutras being reversed as the 11th and 12th. And, in the colophon only has he mentioned the alternative title of his work as the 'Pramana-naya-tattva-prakasika'. We, thus, find that subhavijaya Gani has chosen to provide a well-knit monograph of Jaina philosophy and Jaina logic by amalgamating the best of both the PNT of Vadi Devasuri and the SDS of Haribhadrasuri, both of them being the svetambara luminaries. He has succeeded, with a high degree of authenticity, in presenting a succinct account of all the three aspects-pramana, naya, and tattva-of Jainism, and has in this manner fully corroborated his claim of enlightening the beginners as regards these three aspects.

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Vol. XX, 1996 Syadvada-bhasa... 57 REFERENCES : The present Paper was presented at the All India Oriental Conference (38th Session), Calcutta 1996. It is here published with some small additions and alterations. 1. Subhavijaya Gani - Syadvada-bhasa (SVB), Ed. Narayan M. Kansara, Sambodhi, Vol. XVIII (1992-93), L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, pp. 103-124, Mangala-sloka 1 od : SriHiravijayasuri-prasadam asadya punar atulam ; also the Colophon at the end - Sri-Hiravijaya surisvara-sisya-pandita-subhavijaya-Ganina... Syadvadabhasa viracita // 2. Mohanlal Dalichand Desai, - Jaina Sahitya-no Samksipta Itihasa (Gujarati), (JSSI), Shri Jaina Shvetambar Conference Office, Mumbai 1933, para 875, p.594. 3. SVB, Colophon : ... Pramana-naya-tattva-prakasika paranamni syadvada-bhaya... // 4. SVB, 9.11, auto-commentary, vs.2 : Bhangah katha - trayasyasya nigraha-sthana-nirnayah / Srimad-ratnakara-granthad dhidhanair-avadharyatam // 5. H. S. Bhattacharya, Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay 1967 (Eng. Tr. and Com.), "Preface", p.vi. 6. SVB, Introductory Vs. 2 : sisur-api vanchati laghudir alasah syadvada-sastram adhyetum/ Tasya krte Ipartha-yuta kriyate syadvada-bhaseyam 11 7. Ibid., Epilogue, Vs. 2, quoted above in Ft. Nt. 8. Ed. Luigi Suali of Bologna - Sad-darsana-samuccaya (SDS) by Haribhadra with Gunaratna's commentary Tarka-rahasya-dipika (TRD), Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1905, TRD on Vs. 49, particularly the passage commencing with the words : Jivas ca prthivyaptejovayuvanaspatidvitricatuh'.. up to 'satmakarvasiddhih' on pp. 153-159 of the SDS.