Studies On Bhartrhari 5 Bhartrhari And Vaisesika

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269426/1

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STUDIES ON BHARTRHARI, 5: BHARTRHARI AND VAISESIKA
Johannes Bronkhorst, Lausanne
There are reasons to think that Bharthari's writings may shed light on the early history of Vaiśesika. One of these is that he obviously knew the Vaišesika system. Almost all of its categories play a role in his work. Separate sections (samuddeśa) of the Vākyapadiya are dedicated to the categories jāti, dravya, guna and kriya. The relationship called samavāya - a special feature of Vaiśesika - is mentioned and used repeatedly. Vaiśesika substances appear as 'powers' (sakti), most notably kāla (time) and diś (space)
A second reason is Bhartrhari's chonological position. I have argued in another publication that Prasastapāda's Padārthadharmasarngraha; as well as Dignāga's Pramānasamuccayavrtti before it, were heavily indebted to the katandi, a work written not long before Dignāga. This Katandi, I further argued, exerted a dominating influence on all Vaiśesika literature that came after it, including perhaps the versions of the Vaiśesika Sutra itself, not to speak of the surviving commentaries on this Sūtra work.? Bhartrhari, on the other hand, lived long enough before Dignāga that someone different from Bhartrhari could write a commentary on the first two kändas of his Vakvapadiya still before Dignāga. Bhartrhari, therefore, lived and worked most probably before the katandī! If his work provides information on Vaiśesika, it would then be one of the very few sources of information dating form the pre-Katandi period of this system.
In what follows we shall consider some possible links between Bhartshari's Vākyapadiya and the Vaiśesika of his days.
1
I thank A. Wezler and J. Houben for critical comments. The earlier articles in this series have appeared in the following periodicals: no. 1, Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 6 (1988), 105-143, no. 2, Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 15 (1989), 101-117, no. 3, Asiatische Studien /Etudes Asiatiques 45 (1991), 5-18, no. 4, Asiatische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques 46, 1 (1992), 56-80. See Bronkhorst, forthcoming.
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JOHANNES BRONKHORST 1. The variegated colour (citrarūpa)
Karl H. Potter explains the variegated colour in his Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. II, which deals with the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśesika up to Gangesa, in the following terms (1977: 118): "Consider a substance with a mottled surface of more than one shade. Nyāya-Vaiśesika insists on treating this substance as a single entity with one color of its own, but surely it is evident that it has several colors. Does this mean that one thing can be both, say, red and green all over at once? Uddyotakara seems to have originated one sort of answer to this, which is that in the list of shades one has to count as one kind of color that called 'variegated color' (citrarūpa)."
The problem which the variegated colour is meant to solve is clear. An object is, in Vaiśesika ontology, different from its parts; it is a completely different entity, which has, necessarily, a colour of its own, different from the colours of its parts. What is the colour of a whole whose parts do not all have the same colour?
The problem is inherent in the most fundamental assumptions of Vaiśesika, and is likely to be as old as the system itself. Why then do we not find this particular answer until Uddyotakara, a Nyāya author who may have been a contemporary of Prasastapāda?
The reason why we don't find the variegated colour mentioned in our earliest Vaiśesika texts appears to be that we have so few of them. There is reason to believe that the variegated colour played a role in the system already before Prasastapāda.
Otto Grohma (1975: 151f.) has drawn attention to the passage in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa Bhāsya which polemicizes against the existence of a whole cloth as different from its parts. Vasubandhu mentions here the variegated colour in the following lines (p. 189 1. 24-26): “In case the threads have different colours ... the cloth could not have a colour .... If you accept] 'variegated' as its colour ... there would be production of (a colour) belonging to a different universal (from the colours in the threads)." (bhinnarūpajātikriyesu tantusu patasya rūpādyasarbhayāt/ citrarūpāditve vijāfiyārambho 'pi syāt).
It must be admitted that the variegated colour in this passage from the Abhidharmakośa Bhäsya is rather hypothetical, and does not prove beyond doubt that anyone known to Vasubandhu believed in it.
Vyomaśiva's commentary on the Padārthadharmasarngraha, called Vyomavati, cites a sūtra in its discussion of the variegated colour. The

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sūtra reads: "Because there cannot be, in one non-omnipresent substance, (several] specific qualities (višesaguna) that are perceived by the same sense-organ." It is not impossible that this sütra was indeed meant to justify variegated colour as a quality. Unfortunately it is only known through this passage of the Vyomavafi; it does not occur in the different versions of the Vaiśesika Sütra that have been preserved, nor does it appear to be cited by any other commentator.
For the most certain attestation of the variegated colour in early Vaiśesika we have to turn to the following verses of Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya:
Just as the single variegated colour is described by way of different (colours) such as blue etc., which point to divisions in the one and indivisible variegated colour); in the same way the single sentence, which is completely self-sufficient, is described by way of other linguistic units (viz. words) which require one another.
It is not necessary to recall here that for Bhartrhari the sentence is the real unit of language, the individual words being the result of an artificial analysis. The comparison with the variegated colour is therefore particularly appropriate, for that colour too cannot be looked upon as a collection of constituent colours. The comparison further reminds us of the fact that Bhartrhari's observations on the sentence as an indivisible unit are of an ontological rather than linguistic or psychological nature.
2. Sound (1)
Sound (sabda), in classical Vaiśesika, is a quality of ether (ākāśa). It is already described as such in the Padārthadharmasangraha of Praśastapāda, in Candramati's *Daśapadārthī, and in some of the Vaišesika sūtras. The Padārthadharmasargraha gives the following description:
fabdo 'mbaragunah frotragrāhyah ksanikah.../sa dvividho varalaksano dhvani- (v.l. 'varna-) laksanas ca/ tatra akārādir varalaksanah Sarikhădinimitto dhvanilaksanas
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Vy vol. 1, p. 63 1. 20: avibhuni drave samānendriyagrāhyānām visesagunānām asambhavār. VP 2.8-9: citrasyaikasya rūpasya yathābhedanidaršanaih/nīlādibhih samākhyānar kriyate bhinnalaksanaih// tathaivaikasya vākyasya ninäkāriksasya sarvatah/ Sabdāntaraih samākhyānam sākāriksair anugamyate // I thank W. Halbfass for some useful observations. Np. 287-88, ki p. 262, Vy vol. 2 p. 237.
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ca (v.l. vamalakṣaṇaḥ)/ tatra vamalakṣanasyotpattir ātmamanasoḥ samyogat smrtyapeksad vamoccaraneccha/ tadanantaram prayatnah/ tam apekṣamānād atmavayusamyogad vayau karma jāyate/ sa cordhvam gacchan kanthadin (v.l. urahkanthadin) abhihanti/ tataḥ sthanavayusaṁyogāpekṣamānāt (v.l. -āpekṣāt) sthänākāśasamyogad varnotpattih/
Sound is a property of ether. It is perceptible by the ear. It is momentary.... It is of two kinds (1) in the form of speech sounds and (2) in the form of noise in general. [Sound] in the form of speech sounds is [the sounds] a etc. [Sound] in the form of noise in general is produced by the blowing of a conch and such things. Sound of the former kind proceeds from the contact of the mind and soul as influenced by remembrance: - First of all there is desire for pronouncing the sound; this is followed by an effort on the part of the speaker; and when this effort brings about the conjunction of the soul with wind, there is produced in this wind a certain motion; this wind moving upwards strikes such places as the throat and the like; this contact of the places of articulation and the wind brings about contact of the places of articulation with ākāśa; and this contact produces the speech sounds. (tr. Ganganatha Jha, modified)
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This passage is quite clear that speech sounds are the sounds of the alphabet (a etc.) and are momentary. Words and phrases, on the other hand, are combinations, or rather sequences, of speech sounds. They present, therefore, a problem which resembles to some extent that of the variegated colour, discussed above. There are, however, important differences. Words and phrases are sequences of speech sounds, and cannot in any way be looked upon as collections of simultaneously existing sounds. Moreover, words and phrases do not, unlike the variegated colour, have a different substrate from their constituent sounds. It is further of some interest to note that the sūtra cited in the Vyomavafi and discussed above, which was supposedly meant to justify the existence of the variegated colour, confines itself explicitly to non-omnipresent substances. It may here be recalled that ether, the substrate of sound, is omnipresent. How, then, did the Vaiśesikas look upon words and phrases?
No statements from early Vaiseṣika texts are known to me that attribute or deny ontological status to words and phrases. But some passages discuss the link between words and the things they denote. VS 7.2.19/19/19 sabdarthāv asambaddhau claims that "words and designated objects have no connection", and VS 7.2.24/20/20 samayikaḥ śabdad arthapratyayah adds that "the understanding of an object from a word is based on convention". It seems clear that the presence of an 'existent' link between words and things is here rejected. This, however, would seem to imply that the 'existence' of words is not in doubt.
A similar position appears to be taken in Vyomasiva's Vyomavati. This commentary raises the problem that the definition of samavaya risks to

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cover the relation between a word and its designated object as well, as happens in the case of the word 'ether' and its designated object. The solution to the problem presented by Vyomaśiva has no relevance to our question. The fact that he does not point out that the word ākāśa ('ether') does not exist' creates however the impression that Vyomaśiva, too, accepts the existence of whole words. Yet in another passage he points out that we understand the meaning 'cow' when we hear the sequence g-au-h.
Candrānanda's commentary on Vaiśesika Sūtra 7.2.23 (which has no parallel in the other versions of this text) discusses the link that exists between sound and ether, and the one between ether and objects. The combined link which thus exists between a word and the object it denotes is not accepted, because it leaves a doubt as to which object is denoted by which word. But Candrānanda, too, fails to point out that the designating words do not exist in the first place. He seems to have no difficulty accepting the existence of whole words.
Turning now to the Vakyapadiya, we notice that Bhartrhari knows the conception of sound as a quality of ether. This we must conclude from a number of stanzas in the Sambandhasamuddeśa, which discuss the relation, in Vaiśesika terms, between words and objects. We find here, for example, the following statement (VP 3.3.16ab):
svāśrayena tu sariyuktaih samyuktar vibhu gamyate What is 'omnipresent' is known, being in contact with (objects that are in contact with its own substrate.
We know from the Padārthadharmasangraha (Kip. 148 1. 16; N p. 141 1. 5; Vy vol. 2 p. 72 1. 19) that omnipresent objects have no mutual contact. We may therefore conclude that 'its own substrate' is omnipresent. But it seems certain that 'it' is sound (more precisely, the word vibhu 'omnipresent (object)'); it would be difficult to make sense of the surrounding stanzas without this assumption. This in its turn means that sound has as substrate an omnipresent substance, which can only be ether. From stanza 3.3.13 we learn, moreover, that the relation with the own substrate is
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Vy vol. 1 p. 26 1. 13-17: tathā hy ākāśasabdenākāśam abhidhiyata ity anayor adhāryādhārabhāve sati vācyavācakabhāvah .../ tadvyavacchedārtham avadhāranam ādhāryādhānabhūtānām eva yah sambandhah sa samavāya iti. Vy vol. 2 p. 241 1. 23-25: yatra yatra gakāraukāravisarjanīyānām itthambhūtānupūrvim upalabhase, tatra tatra gorvavifisto'nthah pratipattavah pratipādayitavyas ceti sariketagrahe sati tathāvidhar sabdam upalabhamānas tam arthar pratipadyate pratipadayati ceti. See also the discussion on p. 184.

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samavāya (samavāyāt sva ādhārah ... prafiyate); that is to say, the relation between the word 'ether' and ether is samavāya. Sound is therefore clearly looked upon, in this passage of the Vākyapadiya, as a quality of ether.
But this passage does more than this. Like the passages from Vyomaśiva and Candrānda discussed above, and like the Vaiśesika Sūtra itself, it does not appear to find fault with the idea that whole words (such as vibhu 'omnipresent (objects and ākāśa 'ether') are treated as 'existing entities, about the 'existence' of whose links with the denoted objects one can reasonably discuss.
It may be worthwhile to recall at this point that there were thinkers in the age concerned who did not look upon words as entities in their own right. An example is found in the Sābara Bhäsya, the classical commentary on the Mimārsā Sūtra which is probably earlier than the Padārthadharmasarigraha." According to this text words are nothing but collections of speech sounds, which alone 'exist'. This point of view is introduced in the so-called Vrttikäragrantha on sūtra 1.1.5, and attributed to someone called Upavarsa.
3. Sound (2)
There is a further problem with sound in early Vaiśesika. The Vaišesika sūtra that enumerates all the qualities, no. 1.1.5, does not mention sound, nor several of the other qualities that figure in the classical list. Instead of the classical number of 24 qualities, it lists 17 of them. This smaller number is confirmed by the Jaina author Jinabhadra, in his Viśesāvasyakabhäsya. 2 We are entitled to assume that the Vaiśesika sūtras that do mention or treat sound as a quality are later additions to the text. Their removal offers valuable insights into the earlier construction of the Vaiśesika Sūtra.
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Bhartrhari does not even hesitate to speak about the universals residing in (whole) words, see Bronkhorst, 1991: 9. There are reasons to think that Bharthari did not yet know the Sabara Bhäsya; see Bronkhorst, 1986, 1989. Frauwallner, 1968: 38: atha 'gaurity atra kah sabdah? gakāraukāravisarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarşah/ Compare this passage with the one from the Vyomavali cited above. See Halbfass, 1980: 285 n. 55; Wezler, 1983: 36 n. 5.

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These sutras occur in two groups, in Ähnikas 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The first group follows sūtra 2.1.20/19/20 which presents leaving and entering a place as the inferential mark of ether (niskramanaṁ praveśanam ity ākāśasya lirigam)." This inferential mark is rejected in the then following group of sütras, and replaced by another inferential mark, sound, which is proved to be a quality of ether. This whole discussion - which covers sūtras 21-26 in Jambuvijaya's edition, 20-30 in Thakur's, and 21-27 and 30-31 in Sinha's - is therefore added onto another, older inferential mark meant to prove the existence of ether. Since ether is enumerated as one of the substances in sūtra 1.1.4, we may safely assume that in earliest - or at any rate, earlier - Vaišesika the motions of leaving and entering a place were deemed to prove the existence of the substance ether. This conclusion also teaches us to regard with suspicion any discussions that may occur within the body of the Vaiśesika Sūtra.
Sound is again discussed in Ahnika 2.2. The context is, again, peculiar. Sūtra 2.2.19/17/17 introduces the topic, which is doubt (sambaya); this topic continues until 2.2.23/21/20. Then the topic sound is introduced, in 2.2.24/22/21, and the following sūtra 25 (it occurs only in Candrānanda's version) makes clear that this topic is meant to illustrate a particular case of doubt: is sound a substance, an action, or a quality (tasmin dravyam karma guna iti sarśayah)? This illustration now steals the show completely, and is the sole topic of discussion - according to the commentators - until the end of the Ahnika. It seems clear that this long excursus on sound is an intrusion into the text, and that Adhyāya 2 originally ended with a discussion of 'doubt'.
Vaiśesika, then, underwent a change in its conception of sound. The new conception, according to which sound is a quality of ether, is already known to Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.12-14. Caraka Samhita, Sūtrasthāna 1.49, moreover, enumerates the Vaiśesika qualities in such a manner that it is clear that its author knew the expanded list: mention is made of guru etc., and we may conclude that sound, too, was considered a quality. All this suggests that the change took place at a rather early date.
However, Jinabhadra's Visesavasyakabhāsya states in so many words that the number of Vaiśesika qualities is 17, as we have seen. This text
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Compare this with "giving room" (avakāšadāna), mentioned as mark of ether in the (according to Ruben, spurious) Nyaya sūtra gandhakledapakavyūhāvakāśadānebhyah pāricabhautikam, see Ruben, 1928: 64. Cf. Adachi, 1990: 909 (35); Narain, 1976: 108f.

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may have been composed in the year 609 C.E.,'' i.e., much later than Bhartrhari. It appears, therefore, that the earlier conception of sound existed for a long time side by side with the one that came to replace it. It is, for this reason, not impossible that it was still known to Bhartrhari.
Before we deal with this question, we must address another one: what conception did early Vaiśesika have of sound?
Note first that it is not possible to assume that the author of sūtra 1.1.5, which enumerates the qualities, simply overlooked sound. Such an argument may be possible in the case of 'heaviness' (gurutva), 'fluidity' (dravatva), viscidity' (sneha), and the other qualities (sarskāra, dharma, adharma) that do not figure in the original list. Sound is too obviously a "thing - besides colour, taste, smell, and touch, all of them accepted as qualities in early Vaišesika - not to be given a place in the Vaiśesika scheme of what there is.
What then was sound? Given the Vaiśesika ontological scheme, it must have been a substance, a quality, an action, a universal, a particular, or the special type of relationship which is called samavāya. It seems clear that, out of this list, sound can only belong to the categories substance or quality. Since quality is excluded, sound must then have been looked upon as a kind of substance. Which substance? Vaiśesika enumerates nine substances, among them the five elements earth, water, fire, wind and ether. If we are forced to make a choice, wind (vāyu) seems most appropriate. It seems therefore a priori not unlikely that for the early Vaišeşikas sound was a form of wind.
The link between sound and wind is obvious where speech sounds are concerned. The Padārthadharmasagraha explains how the movement of wind plays a crucial role in the production of speech sounds in the passage which we studied in the preceding section. A verse cited in the Vrtti on Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya describes the same process in almost the same terms, with this difference that here wind itself is stated to become sound:16
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Chatterjee, 1978: 109. Unfortunately I have had no access to the Visesavajyakabhāsya. Ed. Iyer, Kända 1, p. 173; included in Rau's edition as 1.111. Sabara's Bhāsya on Mimarnså sūtra 1.1.22 ascribes to the Siksakāras the words: wäyur ápadyate sabdatām. (D'Sa, 1980: 79 n. 8, surprisingly, ascribes this position to the Vaišesikas, see however further below.) Sabara makes a further remark which may explain how sound could be conceived of as wind: vāyaviyaś cec chabdo bhaved vãyoh sannivesavisesah syar "If sound were made of wind, it would be a special configuration of wind". The idea that sound is wind occurs elsewhere, too; p. Somānanda's Sivadrsti 2.36: vāco väyvātmatā na kim?

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labdhakriyah prayatnena vaktur icchānuvartinā/ sthänesy abhihato vāyuh sabdarvari pratipadyate// The wind set in motion by the effort corresponding to the desire of the speaker, strikes at the different places of articulation and is transformed into sounds (tr. Iyer, modified)
The parallelism between these two passages, combined with the fact that icchā (desire) and prayatna (effort) are qualities of the soul in the Vaišesika scheme of things, suggests that the quoted stanza in the Vrtti draws upon Vaiśesika ontology, and may even express a Vaiśesika point of view. This point of view, however, is that wind becomes sound, in other words, that sound is wind.
Consider now the following passage of the Padārthadharmasargraha. It reads, in the translation of Gangānātha Jhā (p. 129):17
Sound cannot be the property of those substances that can be touched - (1) because, being perceptible, its production is not preceded by any quality in the material cause of the substance (to which it belongs); (2) because it does not pervade over, and is not coeval with, the substance to which it belongs; (3) because it is perceived elsewhere than in the substratum wherein it is produced. It cannot be regarded as belonging to the soul, (1) because it is perceptible by an external senseorgan; (2) because it is perceived by other souls; (3) because it is not found to inhere in the soul; and (4) because it is perceived as apart from all idea of 'I'. It cannot be the quality of space (dis), time and mind, (1) because it is perceptible by the ear, and (2) because it is a visesaguna (a specific quality). And thus the only substance to which it could belong as a quality, and be a distinguishing feature of, is ākāsa. As the distinguishing feature of sound is common to all äkāśa, this is regarded as one only. From this unity follows its individual separateness or isolation. ākāśa being spoken of as vibhu (omnipresent or all-pervading), it points to its dimension being the largest or highest. In as much as ākāśa is spoken of as the cause of sound, it follows that it has conjunction and disjunction.
Every sentence in this passage reflects a Vaiśesika sūtra;18 this is not
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Pdhs Ki p. 71-74, N p. 58, Vy vol. 1 p. 108: sabdah pratyaksarve saty akāranagunapūrvakatvād ayāvaddravyabhävitvad asrayād anyatropalabdhes ca na sparsavadvisesagunah/ bāhyendriyapratyaksarvādātmāntaragráhyatvādātmany asamavāyād aharikārena vibhaktagrahanāc ca nātmagunah/ (frotragrāhyatvād vaibesikagunabhāvác ca na dikkālamanasām/ parisesad guno bhütvä äkātasyādhigame lirigam Sabdalirgāvisesād ekatvarn siddham/ tadani vidhănādekaprthaktvam/vibhavavacanāt paramamahat parimānam/sabdakāranatvavacanāt sarnyogavibhāgāv iti/. The part in brackets has been omitied in Ki, no doubt by mistake. Compare with the preceding note the following sūtras (2.1.24-26) found in Jambuvijaya's edition: kāranagunapürvah kärye guno drstah, kāryāntaräprădurbhāvāc ca sabdah sparsavatām agunah/ paratra samavāyāt pratyaksatvāc ca nātmaguno na manogunah/ lirigam ākāśasya). Corresponding sutras are found in the other two versions of the text.
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however indicated. Yet it is Prasastapāda's habit to give an indication to that effect when he refers to a sūtra. The final portion of our passage illustrates this. Consider the sentence "ākāśa being spoken of as vibhu, it points to its dimension being the largest or highest". This refers to sūtra 7.1.28/24/22: vibhavan mahān ākāśah "because of its omnipresence ether (ākāśa) is large". The sūtra contains an argument (if perhaps a bad one), which Prasastapāda could have simply repeated. Instead he invokes the authority of the sūtra. This only makes sense on the assumption that Prasastapāda prefers referring to a sūtra to repeating its contents on his own authority.
This assumption, if correct, has far-reaching consequences. It implies that all the other sūtras whose contents are repeated in this passage, were not yet recognized as such by Praśastapāda. In other words, some of the Vaiấesika sūtras which describe sound as a quality were not yet considered sūtras by Prasastapāda. Others, to be sure, were. The Padārthadharmasangraha (Kip. 235 1. 1-3; Np. 239 1. 14-16; Vy vol. 2 p. 200 1. 14-15) cites VS 2.2.26/x/22 from a 'śāstra', most probably from the Vaiśesika Sūtra. Moreover, Prasastapāda expresses in no uncertain terms that he looks upon sound as a quality.
Our passage refers explicitly to two sūtras. The first one has already been discussed. The second one cannot but be 2.2.36/30/31: saryogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca sabdanispatteh / -nispattih "sound originates from conjunction, from disjunction, and from (other) sound". We may assume that this second sūtra was accepted as such by Prasastapāda, and may therefore be older than at least some of the sūtras which describe sound as a quality. With this in mind we turn to Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya.
Consider Vakyapadiya 1.105:
yah sarnyogavibhāgābhyān karanair upajanyate/ sa sphotah Sabdajāh Sabda dhyanayo 'nyair udahntäh// Others declare that the sphota is what is produced by the organs (of speech] by means of contact and separation; the sounds born from (this initial] sound are the dhvanis.
Note the similarity of this verse, at least of certain parts of it, with the Vaišesika sūtra (2.2.36/30/31) which appears to be old. It seems likely that
The version edited by Sinha contains some additional elements in the sūtras 2.1.27, 30-31: parisesäl lingam ākāšasya/ Sabdalirgāvifesad visesalirgābhāvāc ca/tadanuvidhänād ekaprthaktvaṁ ceti. Sutra 28 tattvarn bhāvena refers back to 1.2.18 sallirgāvisesad visesalirgābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti.

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Bhartrhari had this sūtra in mind when he wrote the verse. Our next question must be: how is this verse to be understood?"
To begin with, note that this verse describes the opinion of 'others'. It offers, by doing so, an alternative to the opinion of 'some', which is presented in the preceding verses. The first of these preceding verses is nr. 1.96, which reads:20
Some consider that the sphota is the universal revealed by the various individual instances, and they consider that the individuals belonging to this universal) are the dhvanis.
We see that two alternatives are placed side by side. According to the first alternative, the sphota - that is the real, eternal word - is a universal; according to the second one the sphota is produced by the speech organs. But what is produced by the speech organs? Several factors combine to show that the sphota, on the second alternative, is some form of substance (dravya).
Recall, to begin with, that for Bhartrhari the world has two sides: the one real and eternal, the other unreal and non-eternal. Regarding the real, eternal side, Bhartrhari does not care much what we call it. Some consider the eternal aspect of an object to be its universal, others its substance. We are free to choose, as long as we agree that every object has an eternal aspect. The second verse of the Jātisamuddeśa (3.2) states therefore:21
In the analysis of objects denoted by words, the eternal objects denoted by all words have been described as 'universal' or as 'substance'.
The remainder of the Jātisamuddeśa occupies itself with the alternative that the eternal part of all objects is its universal; the then following Dravyasamuddeśa takes up the alternative view that substance constitutes their eternal part.
What is true for all things', is true for words, too. The real, eternal part of words is either a universal or a substance; both views are acceptable. The conclusion cannot but be that the verse (1.105), which appears
19 20
See in this connection also Bronkhorst, 1991: 14. VP 1.96: anekavyaktyabhivyarigvā jātih sphota iti smrtā/ kaiścid vyaktaya eväsyä dhvanitvena prakalpitāh// VP 3.1.2: padārthänām apoddhāre jätir va dravyam eva vā/ padārthau sarvaśabdānā nityāv evopavarnitau//
21

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to draw its inspiration from the Vaiśesika sūtra, concerns the sphota as substance.
This conclusion is confirmed by verse 1.110, which is one of the verses that elaborate the notions introduced in 1.105. This verse states how different schools of thought conceive of sound:22
Some accept that sound is wind, (others) that it is atoms, (others again) that it is knowledge, for in the presentations the different points of view are endless.
The identification sound = knowledge looks puzzling at first. But obviously any idealistic school of thought will maintain that substance derives its reality from, is nothing but, thought or knowledge. In fact, Bharthari himself says so in a passage of his commentary on the Mahābhāsya. We may conclude that the three points of view according to which sound is wind, atoms, and knowledge respectively, share in common that sound is substance.
We have seen that the view in which sound is knowledge must belong to an idealistic school of thought. The view that sound is atoms is part of the world-view of the Sarvāstivādins and the Jainas.24 Remains the view according to which sound is wind. The fact that Bhartrhari appears to refer to a Vaišesika sūtra in this very passage, suggests that this view belonged to the early Vaibesikas.
It would seem, then, that Bhartrhari knew indeed both the positions of Vaisesika with regard to sound: the more recent one according to which it is a quality of ether, and the older one according to which it is wind.
One final observation. Bhartrhari may not yet have known Sabara's Bhāsya on the Mimāṁsā Sūtra. He may therefore be earlier than Sabara, or roughly contemporaneous with him. For Sabara, sound is eternal and resides in the omnipresent ether. The fleeting sounds we hear are manifested, and not produced by the speaker who utters them. In this context Sabara adds the following intriguing remark:26 "But for him who
22
VP 1.110: vājor anūnā irānasya sabdatvāpattir isyate/ kaiścid darśanabhedo hi pravādesv anavasthitah// CE I P. 22. I. 19-20, AL p. 27 1. 4-5, Sw p. 32 1. 11-13: 'dravyan hi nityam'/ nityah prthividhātuh/ prthivīdhātau kim satyam/ vikalpah/ vikalpe kiṁ satyam/jñānam/... For a description of the way in which, according to the Sarvāstivādins, sound joins other atoms in order to form a molecule, see La Vallée Poussin, 1980: I: 144-145. For the position of the Jainas, see Jaini, 1920: 118 (Tattvārtha Sūtra 5.24). See note 10, above. Sabara on sutra 1.1.13 (p. 93 1. 5-6): yasya punah kurvanti tasya vāyaviyāh sarnyogavibhāgā vāyväsritatvād vāyusv eva karisyanti, yatha tantavas tantus eva param.
26

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believes that contacts and separations produce [sounds rather than manifest them], contacts and separations, which occur in wind, will produce (sounds) nowhere else than in wind, because they subsist in wind; just as yarns produce a cloth in the yarns themselves." Sabara's ideas are frequently close to those of the Vaišesikas, so that it is possible to believe that he had the Vaiśesikas in mind while writing this passage. For the Vaiśesikas do indeed believe that sounds are produced, not manifested. It is therefore possible that Sabara, too, still knew of Vaiśesikas who believed that sound is wind.
4. The omnipresent soul?
VS 5.2.18-20 read, in Candrānanda's version:
5.2.18: kāyakarmanātmakarma vākhyātam 5.2.19: apasarpanam upasarpanam asitapitasaryogah
kāryāntanasamyogaś cety adrstakāritāni 5.2.20: tadabhāve saryogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvah sa moksah
The first of these sūtras has a different form in the Vyākhyā edited by Thakur: kāyakarmanātmakarmadharmayor anupapattiḥ (5.2.16); as observed by A. Wezler (1982: 659), it is difficult to make satisfactory sense of this reading. Nothing corresponding to this sūtra is found in the version known to Sankara Miśra. The remaining two sūtras, on the other hand, occur in the other versions with only insignificant variations.26
Candrānanda's explanation of these sūtras contains some suspect features, most notably the following: 1) Candrānanda interprets ātman in 5.2.18 to mean wind (vāyu). 2) In his interpretation 5.2.19 is about the manas. A straightforward interpretation of the sūtras would rather suggest that 5.2.18 talks about the acitivity of the soul (ätmakarman), and that 5.2.19 continues this topic and therefore talks about the soul too.29 Regarding 5.2.19 we know that already Prasastapāda interpreted it like Candrānanda: his Padārthadharmasangraha refers to this sūtra in the
27 Some of the questions here discussed have also been dealt with in a paper called
"Mysticisme et rationalité en Inde: le cas du Vaišesika", to be published in the Proceedings of the Colloque 'Mystique et rationalité: Inde, Chine, Japon' (Geneve, November 29-30, 1990), Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 47 (4), 1993.
..pītasaryogah instead of pītasarnyogah; "prādurbhāvas ca instead of 'prădurbhāvah. 29 See Wezler, 1982: 654f.

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context of the description of the manas, in order to show that the manas can have samyoga and vibhāga.30 Note in passing that Prasastapada's remark shows that he looked upon VS 5.2.19 as a sūtra. Elsewhere in the Padarthadharmasangraha it is pointed out that the two activities of the manas called apasarpana and upasarpana are the result of contact between the soul and the manas, which depends on adrsta;31 again the sūtra is interpreted as referring to the manas.
88
There is evidence to show that the above sūtras at one time concerned the ātman and its activities. Consider first VS 6.2.19/18/16: ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ. Wezler (1982: 654) observed already that this sūtra "obviously refers back to VS 5.2.20". It does, however, more than just this: it suggests strongly that 5.2.20, and therefore 5.2.19 as well, concern atmakarman 'the activity of the soul'.
With this in mind we turn to Bhartṛhari's Vakyapadiya. The Sambandhasamuddeśa of this work explores the question what connection exists - to be described in Vaiseṣika terms, i.e., combinations of samyoga and samavāya - between a word and the object it designates. This leads to no satisfactory results. Indeed, VP 3.3.17 points out that this approach would not limit the designation of a word to its appropriate object. Here VP 3.3.18 counters:
adrstavṛttiläbhena yatha samyoga ātmanah/
kvacit svasvamiyogakhyo 'bhede 'nyatrapi sa kramah//
Just as the samyoga of the soul is [only] called 'connection of owner and owned' with regard to certain objects, because adrsta operates [in these cases], even though there is no difference [between this special kind of samyoga and samyoga in general], just so is the situation in the case of other [relations], too.
This verse cannot but mean that a virtually limitless number of samyogas of the soul is limited by the operation of adrsta to those few which link the soul to 'its' body, etc. This in its turn implies that, in Bhartṛhari's opinion, the soul of the Vaiseṣikas is in contact with far more objects than just its 'own' body etc., and therefore most probably infinitely large, as it is in classical Vaiśesika.
30 Ki p. 101 1. 16-17; N p. 89 l. 15-16; Vy vol. 1 p. 156 1. 14-15: apasarpanopasarpanavacanāt samyogavibhāgau.
31 Ki p. 270 1. 12; N p. 308 1. 22-23; Vy vol. 2 p. 266 1. 6: apasarpanakarmopasarpaṇakarma catmamanaḥsamyogad adrstäpekṣāt.

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The explicit mention of adrsta in this verse leaves little doubt that Bhartrhari paraphrases here VS 5.2.19, which he apparently considered to concern the soul. If we now try to translate VS 5.2.18-20 in agreement with the interpretation which Bhartrhari to all appearances accorded them, we get:
5.2.18: The activity of the soul is explained by the activity of the body 5.2.19: Retreating, approaching, contact with what is eaten and drunk, contacts with other
effects, (these functions of the soul] are caused by adrsta. 5.2.20: When there is no (activity of the soul], there is no contact (with objects that belong
to it), no manifestation (of the soul in a body); that is moksa.
In view of VP 3.3.18, the contacts of the soul referred to in VS 5.2.19-20 pertain to the subgroup of saryogas called 'contact between owner and owned'. Contacts in general exist between each soul and every finite object, the soul being omnipresent; but these general contacts are not relevant in the context of 'activity of the soul'. This 'activity of the soul', too, must be interpreted to bring about the special contacts called 'contact between owner and owned'. These special contacts are confined to the body, and so is therefore this 'activity of the soul'.
It goes without saying that this limitation of the contacts of an infinitely large soul to a restricted number of objects is hard to explain in terms of the Vaišesika categories. Adrsta is meant to explain, or cover up, this mystery, and would not seem to have much to do with dharma and adharma, which constitute adrsta in the classical system. Indeed, if adrsta in VP 3.3.18 meant dharma and adharma, also the connection between words and their meanings should be determined by dharma and adharma, a point of view which Helārāja rects as impossible.
At this point we must pay attention to a passage of the Nyāya Sūtra, along with Paksilasvāmin's Bhāsya (3.2.61-73 (Ananda Aśrama ed.)/60-72 (tr. Jhā)/ 59-71 (ed. Ruben)). This passage deals with the formation of the body and with the factors that play a role in it. Sutra 61/60/59 gives the opinion of the author: "Its formation is due to the persistence of previous acts” (pūrvakrtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattih). Sūtra 67/66/65 explains further: "Just as karman is the cause of the formation of the body, so is it also of the connection (of the body with a particular soul]" (śarīrotpattinimittavat samyogotpattinimittaṁ karma; tr. Jhā). Sūtras 6973/68-72/67-71 now reject an alternative opinion regarding the formation
32 My attention was drawn to this passage by J.E.M. Houben.

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of the body and its connection with its soul (?). The first two of these sūtras are of most interest to us:
69/68/67: tad adrstakāritam iti cet punas tatprasargo 'pavarge
If (it be asserted] that the (formation of the body) is due to adrsta, then (our answer is that in that case) even after final release there would be likelihood of
(a body being produced). (tr. Jhā) 70/71/72: manah (v.l. manasah) karmanimittarvāc ca saryogānucchedah
There would be no severance of connection - this being due to the action of mind. (tr. Jha)
The then following sūtras go on to show absurd consequences of the rejected opinion, but the above two are most important, for they allow us to identify the rejected opinion as that of VS 5.2.19-20, studied above. The link with VS 5.2.19 is again emphasized by the Nyāya Bhāsya on NS 3.2.70/69/68, which raises questions regarding the apasarpana and upasarpana of the manas, using exactly the terms also found in VS 5.2.19.
Two observations must be made here. The first concerns the interpretation of VS 5.2.19 offered in these Nyāya sūtras. NS 3.2.70/69/68 speaks of the activity of the mind (manahkarman), and this is apparently how it interpreted the Vaišesika sūtra - just like Prasastapāda and Candrānanda, as we have seen. The second observation pertains to the meaning of adrsta in NS 3.2.69/68/67. Adrsta cannot here be identical with karman, nor even be the fruit of previous acts (pūrvakrtaphala), because these are presented as the true causes of the formation of the body in sūtras 61/60/59 and 67/66/65 (see above). The author of the Nyāya Bhāsya understood this very well: he offers two interpretations of adrsta, neither of which appears to have much to do with karman and its effects.
It appears, then, that NS 3.2.69-70/68-69/67-68 directly criticise VS 5.2.18-20, which they interpret in a way that deviates from the original interpretation. The meaning assigned to adrsta, on the other hand, is still pre-classical. The criticism centres in a way on VS 5.2.20, which describes moksa, liberation. According to these Nyāya sūtras, liberation would not be possible if VS 5.2.19 were correct.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Nyāya sūtras just considered must be later than VS 5.2.18-20, so much later that the original interpretation of VS 5.2.19 was no longer known, or used. This is all the more surprising since Bhartrhari, as we have seen, still knew the original interpretation of VS 5.2.19. Is it possible that the section NS 3.2.61-73/ 6072/59-71 was added later?

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This is indeed likely, for this group of sūtras constitutes an excursion which interrupts the regular order of topics, as was already noted by Ruben (1928: 209 n. 237). It may here further be observed that tad- in tadutpattih (NS 3.2.61/60/59) supposedly refers to the body; but the body is not mentioned in the preceding sūtras! We may safely conclude that the whole group of sūtras constitutes a later addition to the text.
The results of the above investigation can be presented as follows. A verse of Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya allows us to catch a glimpse of the earliest interpretation of VS 5.2.18-20. It shows us that then already the Vaišesikas looked upon the soul as infinitely large. This did not prevent them from speaking about the activity or movement of the soul (ātmakarman). The soul can be active because besides the general contact (saryoga) which it has with every finite object, it can have a specific contact - described as 'contact of owner and owned' - with a restricted number of objects, primarily the ‘own' body and all that is contained in it. The 'activity' of the soul that brings about, or maintains, these special contacts, coincides therefore normally with the movement of the body. In terms of the Vaišesika system there is something very mysterious about these special contacts; this is why they are stated to be occasioned by adrsta, the unseen. These special contacts, as well as the 'activity' ascribed in this way to the soul, can come to an end; the soul does then no longer manifest itself in a body. This state of the soul is called 'liberation' (moksa).
The implausibility of this way of speaking about the 'activity' of a none-the-less omnipresent soul is obvious. It does not surprise that the idea was discarded. But discarding an idea proved easier than discarding the sütras which expressed it. This led to a reinterpretation of the sūtras concerned. We find the first evidence of this in a set of sūtras inserted at an unknown date into the Nyāya Sūtra. This set criticizes VS 5.2.18-20, but while doing so it shows that the idea of an activity of the self had been given up. Contact between the soul and 'its' body are now ascribed to the activity of the mind (manas), which corresponds to the later, classical doctrine. But the interpretation of the term adrsta had not yet reached its classical form. Adrsta is not yet short-hand for dharma and adharma, which are the effects of karman; adrsta is, on the contrary, contrasted with karman and its effects. It will be clear that with the interposition of a manas between a soul and its body, the mystery of the special relationship between the soul and its body disappears, and that, consequently, preclassical adrsta has no more role to play in it. No wonder that our set of Nyāya sūtras attacks this notion.

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With Prasastapāda we arrive at the classical exposition of the Vaiśesika system, and apparently also at the classical interpretation of VS 5.2.18-20. It is clear that Prasastapāda knows at least VS 5.2.19 and considers it a sūtra. He believes, furthermore, that it concerns the manas. But also adrsta has with Prasastapāda reached its classical meaning: it has become more or less identical with the effect of karman (pūrvakrtaphala). Prasastapāda does no longer have to attack the notion of adrsta; the new interpretation of this term allows him to agree with the author of the above set of Nyāya sūtras, while yet accepting the Vaišesika Sūtra as authoritative.
Abbreviations
N
Mahābhāsyadipikā of Bhartrhari, ed. Abhyankar-Limaye "Critical edition of Bhartrhari's Mahābhāsyadīpikā Padärthadharmasarigraha of Prasastapāda, ed. Jetly Padārthadharmasarigraha of Prasastapāda, ed. Dvivedin Mahābhäsyadipikä of Bharthari, ed. Swaminathan Väkyapadiya of Bharthari, ed. Rau Padanthadharmasarigraha of Praśastapäda, ed. Gaurinath Sastri
Sw VP Vy
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