Sramana Tradation

Author(s): G C Pandey
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001576/1

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bhAratIya lapata bhAI saMskRti Egation late. SRAMANA TRADITION ITS HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN CULTURE L. D. SERIES 66 GENERAL EDITORS DALSUKH MALVANIA NAGIN J. SHAH BY G. C. PANDE EX-VICE-CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN JAIPUR L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 9 winelibrary.org

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SRAMANA TRADITION ITS HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN CULTURE L. D, SERIES 66 GENERAL EDITORS DALSUKH MALVANIA NAGIN J. SHAH BY G, C, PANDE Ex-Vicexchancellor University of Rajasthan Jaipur . . STIUTE OR INDOLOGY ANDAMAN L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD-9 AN CIEL Y

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FIRST EDITION February, 1978 PRICE RUPEES-29boRevised3 Price Rs 2-5 L. D. Indology Rs 4 Printed by Shivlal Jesalpura Swati Printing Press Rajaji's Street, Shahpur Chakia Ahmedabad 380001 and Published by Nagin J. Shah Director L. D. Institute of Indology Ahmedabad 9

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PREEACE The L. D. Institute of Indology has great pleasure in publishing the three lectures on Sramana Tradition - its history and contribution to Indian Culture', delivered by Professor Dr. G. C. Pande, ViceChancellor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, in the L. D. Lecture Series in February, 1977. The first lecture deals with the Sramanic outlook on life and its impact on Vedic thought as developed in the Upanisads. The second lecture brings out clearly the salient features of moral and social outlook of Sramanism. The learned Doctor maintains that the Dharma which Asoka sought to preach in his edicts represents the quintessence of the Sramanic ethos for lay life. He concludes the lecture by declaring that sramanism constitutes a system of universal, rational a ethical religion wbich is wholly non-sectarian, as applicable and rele. vant today as it was 2500 years ago. The third lecture is devoted to the Sramanic critique of Brahmanism. The author acquaints us with the rational Gramanic criticism of casteism, validity of the Vedas and idea of God. His concluding words are memorable. He says : Sramamanic atheism is not a variety of irreligion. It faces the evil and suffering of life squarely and attributes it to human failings rather than to the mysterious design of an unknown being. It stresses the inexorableness of the moral law. No prayers and worship are of any avail against the force of karman. It emphasises self-reliance in the quest of salvation. Man needs to improve himself by a patient training of the will and the purification of feelings. Such purification leads to an inward illumination of which the power is innate in the soul or mind. This is quite different from the Vedic view where illumination comes from outside, either from an eternally revealed word or from the grace of God. His introduction to the three lectures is thought-provoking and illuminating. Therein he clearly brings out the distinction between culture and civilization, and shows how they are inextricably intertwined in the historical process. Again, he successfully attempts to demonstrate the origin, development and dialectical interweaving of two attitudes of Pravrtti and Nivitti in Indian Culture.

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Preface The treatment has throughout been dispassionate, critical and arresting. His acquaintance with the subject is deep and extensive. He bas strictly followed the maxim na'mulam likhyate kincin na'napeksitam uchate. The style is lively. All this has made the present work a brilliant treatise on the subject. We are grateful to Dr. G. C. Pande for these three lectures which he prepared at our instance. I have no doubt that the students teachers and others interested in the subject will find this book interesting and intsructive. L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-380 009. 1st February, 1978 Nagin J. Shah Director

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INTRODUCTION The nature and origins of Indian culture have been the subject of much controversy. The controversy arises as much from uncertainties of a conceptual and methodological kind as from factual uncertainties. The great Orientalists of the nineteenth century looked upon Indian culture essentially from an anthropological point of view. Max Muller, for example, felt that the chief use of Vedic study lay in discerning through it the earliest phase of the development of the human mind. - Historical and cultural studies in nineteenth century Europe were dominated by the idea that all past culture had been aspiring to achieve what only the modern West has actually succeeded in accomplishing. This assumption has dominated Western thought since the 18th century. It tends to confuse culture with civilization and forgets the inner life of the spiritual individual in its concentration on Society, Science and Technology." It confuses the search for happiness with the perpetually restless craving for pleasures and it confounds the quest for knowledge with the quest for power over sense objects. Such knowledge is a species of action or behaviour confined to the natural sphere. "Jnanamasti samastasya jantorvisayagocare".4 Such knowledge cannot free man from the vicissitudes of life or the shadow of its transitoriness. Nor can it satisfy men's inevitable search for the Beyond. That is why man has through the ages sought not merely power at the social level but also Immortality, Infinity, Transcedence.5 This quest most clearly manifest in religion has also been manifested in greater or lesser measure in Art and idea. listic philosophy, Every human being by his nature shares in this quest, though as in our times, he may be blinded by the 1. What can India Teach Us, p. 85. 2. Cf. Pande, G. C.: Meaning and Process of Culture. 3. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan (Everyman's Lib. Ed.), p. 49. 4. Durgasaptasati. 5. Cf. Narada's dialogue with Sanat Kumara in the Chandogya Upanisad.

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Introduction prejudices of his age and may fail to realise the true nature of his own quest and suffer like the tormented musk deer seeking outside what lies within. While culture as the spiritual search for values must be distinguished from the search for social security and power, it cannot be denied that the two are inextricably intertwined in the historical process. Spiritual symbolism and emphasis tend to vary according to the mood of the age and civilisation While the long history of Indian culture and civilisation stretching back to proto-historic times shows a remarkable continuity, it is nevertheless true that it has passed through many phases and cycles, interacting with civilisational vicissitudes and responding to new influences and challenges presented from outside or arising dialectically from within. In particular one can discern in the course of Indtan history a dialectical interweaving of two types of spiritual attitudes which are apparently contradictory. In later times these were called Pravrtti-dharma and Nivytti-dharma. Classical Brahmanical tradition as well as the common run of modern historians tend to attribute both the spiritual outlooks to the Vedic tradition. Classical tradition attributes the Pravstti-dharma to the ritualistic side of Vedic religion and the Nivetti-dharma to the gnostic side of the same tradition, to Jnana-kanda as opposed to Karma-Kanda.. Modern scholars like Jacobi and Oldenberg basically accept this thesis and attribute the gnostic and ascetic traditions of Indian spirituality to a reformist school within the Vedic tradition evidenced by the Upanisadic literature as also by the dharmasutras.' Buddhist and Jaina ascetics are then believed to continue this reformist and antiritualistic trend. Against this there has been a hypothesis which attributes these two streams to other sources. Some scholars had attributed them to different ethnic traditions, Aryan and non-Aryan, the ascetic tradition being attributed 6. Cf. Sankara in his introduction to the Commentary on the Gita. 7. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfange des Buddh ismus; Jacobi, S. B. E., Vol. s. 22 and 45.

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Introduction to the latter. 8 Some other scholars attribute the rise of the ascetic movements to the social changes implicit in the break up of tribal society, rise of classes and castes and the various changes ushered in by the Second Urban Revolution. There is still another view which attributes the great ascetic movements to an ancient tradition independent of the Vedic Aryan tradition, Whatever may be the origin of the distinction between Pravstti and Nivytti, there can hardly be any doubt that this distinction itself is of vital importance in the understanding of Indian culture. If Indian civilisation is composite' in the sense that many ethnic and cultural communities have contributed to its development, Indian culture continues as an original tradition developing by its own inner dialectic. While no culture can afford to be composite or synthetic without being spurious, no civilisation can grow without constantly absorbing the results of scientific, technological and economic developments occurring anywhere else. Civilisation is essenti. ally a matter of means and exchanges between societies at that level are common and natural. That is why like race no civilisation is or can afford to be pure or unalloyed except at the pain of being stagnant. The very first civilisation which arose in India is already the product of far-flung exchanges. There is hardly any doubt that earlier Near Eastern civilisations played a part in its growth, and yet the characteristic Indianness of the civilisation is equally indubitable. "It has a particular character which differentiates it from other civilisa. tions of the ancient world, and in this particularity one can trace the roots of some of later Indian civilisation. The Harappan civilisation is a unified civilisation made cohesive by a common theme, an ethos universally understood."! This inner ethos which gives unity, vitality and character to the 8. R. P. Chanda, Indo-Aryan Races; S. K. Chatterji in Vedic Age; G. C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism. 9. Fairservis, The Roots of Ancient India.

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Introduction civilisation, may be described as its cultural or spiritual core. 10 Civilisation is the repertoire of means whereby a society adjusts itself to its external environment in the search of security and higher material standards. The structure of means, however, as an operative and controlling fact of social life is not wholly value-neutral and is in this sense not wholly separable from the cultural ethos or style of the civilisation. The interplay of continuing inner spirituality with a ready responsiveness in civilisational contacts has given to Indian history a distinctive pattern: "the diffusion and acceptance of new ideas and techniques from outside but with an apparent slowness of pace and an integration which changes their style so that we can recognize them as fully subcontinental whatever their origin". 11 The Harappan civilisation already gives evidence of both the moments of Indian culture. In the worship of the Great Mother one can discern the worship of the creative principle, of Mother Earth, of Nature in its fertility. All over the ancient Near East as well as in the later Tantric tradition the worship of the Mother belonged to the religion of Pravrtti. At the same time the worship of Pasupati seated in the midst of wild and tame beasts clearly reminds one of the Yogic tradition of Nivrtti. Other evidence of Yoga may also be discerned from the Harappan civilisation. 12 It would not thus be correct to think of Pravytti and Nivytti as belonging to different ethnic and historic strata. Mountain caves and forest hermitages have been as much part of the Indian cultural scene as hamlets, villages and towns. Nevertheless it cannot be gainsaid that early Vedic literature is clearly marked by the belief that divinity is, above all, creativity. Nature is indwelt 10. Cf. "Paradoxically, it would appear that the Indus Civilisation transmitted to its successors a metaphysics that endured, whilst it failed utterly to transmit the physical civilisation which is its present monument". (Wheeler, The Indus Civilisation, p. 95). 11. Fairservis, op. cit. 12. Pande, G. C.: Studies in the Origins of Buddhism.

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Introduction 7 by divine power and man is surrounded by it in diverse forms. 13 Man must act and live rightly in accordance with Rta and hope to win the grace of gods. 14 While life after death is shadowy, 15 life is a blessing when the gods are favourable.16 The Vedic seers felt the aspects of Nature to be sweet and described the world to be the best of all possible worlds. "Madhu vatartayate madhu ksaranti sindhavah"11"Visvamidam varistham"ls Man owes sacrificial worship to them. The creator instituted the sacrifice at the same time as he created beings. The sacrifice was to be the means of obtaining all good. The sacrifice was to be the perpetual link between men and gods, men fulfilling their obligations and gods responding graciously. "Sahaya jnah prajah sustva purovaca pra japatih anena prasavisyadhvam esa vostvistakamadhuk. ...Deyanbhavayatanena to deva bhavayantu vah". 19 When the Upanisads progressed from the idea of many gods to the idea of Brahman, 20 they did not abandon the idea of the reality or worth of creation.21 Brahma was, in fact, defined as the creator -"Yato va imani bhutani jayante" 22 "Sa aiksata bahu syam prajayeya ".28 The Brahmasutras in systematizing the Upanisadic ideas, thus, define Brahman as "janmadyas ya yatah".94 Although the later Advaitic tradi. tion interprets this as the tatastha-laksana of Brahman, there can be no doubt that the obvious meaning represents the original tradition. Since the universe is the genuine manifestation of the higest spiritual reality, Ananda or bliss is the deepest feature of experience - kohyevanyat kah pranyat yadesa akasa anando na syat.35 Anandaddhyeva khalvimani bhutani jayante.26 It is true that the perpetual vision of truth is covered by a 13. e. g.; Rg. 1.1.54, 2.12; 4.50; etc. adlib. 14. e. g. Rg., 4.23; 2.33. 15. Cf. Rg., 10.14-16. 16. Cf. Rg., 10.7; 2.28. 17. Rg. 1.90.6. 18. Mundaka. 2.2.11. 19. Bhagavadgita. 20. Cf. Sakalya's dialogue with Yajnavalkya in Brhadaranyaka. 21. This is clear in the famous dialogue of Uddalaka with Svetaketu in the Chandogya. 22. Taittiriya 23. Chandogya. 6.3. 24. Brahmasutra. 1.1.2. 25. Taittiriya. 2.7. 26. Ibid., 3.6.

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Introduction veil of untruth and men are harassed by false desires. 81 What they need is the knowledge of what they really are. The knowledge of Truth will make men the heir of eternal bliss. Life and nature are not basically evil or painful. They are the expression of the inherent bliss of spiritual reality. Early Vedic Devayada as well as the later Vedic Brahmavada, both have a distinctly positive attitude towards life, activistic and optimistic. As against this positive outlook of the Vedic tradition, one notices the powerful current of Nivrtti which was popularised by Buddhism and Jainism and which was in course of time accepted by the Brahmanical tradition.28 The Dharmasutras and the Smrtis included the renunciation of life within the Vedic scheme of life as the Fourth Asrama. The second Asrama continued to be held the most important since on it depended the performance of Vedic religious duties as also the continuance of the social tradition. The challenge of the Niyrtti dharma led to a transformation of the Vedic tradition through a new synthesis. The ubiquity of suffering was recognised and it was traced to the desire for transitory things arisings from the ignorance of spiritual reality. 2 ) Reality is eternal and blissful while the hallmark of Ignorance is suffering. Positive and negative attitudes in spirituality are thus combined by the distinction of reality from appearance. We must shun the illusions of egoistic life to appreciate the bliss of spiritual life. Meanwhile, so long illusions persist we must not neglect the duties of social and religious life. The Gita. indeed, held that duties must not be abandoned at all. With this synthesis Manu could say that " Vaidike karma-yoge tu saryany etany asesatah antarbhavanti kramasah tasmin tasmin kriyavidhau'.30 27. Isa, Hiranmayena patrena satyasya pihitam mukham'. Cf. Brhada ranyaka. 1.2.1.: "In the beginning all was covered by Hunger that is Death". 28. Cf. Sri Aurobindo, Life Divine, Vol. I, Chap. II-III - The Two Negations. 29. The Sankhya-yoga as well as the Nyaya-Vaisesika accept the universality of Duhkha. 30. Manu. 12.83-87.

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Introduction This interactive synthsis was, however, not confined simply to the Vedic tradition; it affected the Buddhist, Jaina and other traditions of ascetic and other worldly spirituality. They developed elaborate forms of monastic life where educational, literary and artistic activities found ample scope. Not merely this, these ascetic sects had to creat adequate attraction for the laity. They had to develop large systems of plastic and ritual symbols. Images, temples and monastaries, Puranic myths and legends, devotional cults with boly names and mystic charms became the common repertoire of all the sects, orthodox and heterodox. Thus the development of Indian spirituality seems to have passed through three stages - a Vedic phase which emphasised active life in the world, an early post-Vedic phase when powerful ascetic movements can be seen, emerging and spreading all over the country and beyond it, and finally, a phase of synthesis which rolled on till it created an almost uniform religion of asceticim and devotionalism in the medieval period. Unfortunately this medieval synthesis played down the role of action and it was left to the great reformers and savants of the nineteenth century to re-emphasise the activism of the Gita and the Vedas. These basic spiritual movements may be said to constitute the inner history of Indian culture. It will be obvious that a leading key to the understanding of Indian cultural history lies in the negative challenge posed by the ascetic Sramanism in its several varieties and the interaction of the Vedic tradition with it. This constitutes the theme of the present lectures which seek to highlight some aspects of the Sramanic challenge and the consequent interaction. I am greatly beholden to the L. D. Institute and its present and former Directors, Professor Dalsukhbhai Malvania and Dr. Nagin J. Shah, who were kind enough to give me the opportunity to deliver these lectures and took such good care of me during the occasion. Jaipur, 24-12-'77 Govinda Chandra Pande

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CONTENTS I Sramanism as a Weltanschauung and its Relationship to the Tradition II Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism III Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism Bibliography I TIUIO 1-26 27-51 52-73

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LECTURE ONE SRAMANISM AS A WELTANSCHAUUNG AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE VEDIC TRADITION Sramana sects did not believe in the authority of the Vedas, nor did they believe in the existence of God in the sense of a personal creator or determiner of destiny. For this reason Sramana philosophies were described in later times as Nastika or Nihilist. Originally, however, Nastika could properly apply only to the materialists. In a wellknown sutra Panini says 'Astinastidistam matin' (4.4.60). As Patanjali explains, the words Astika, Nastika and Daistika should be understood to mean one who believes that it exists', 'one who believes that it does not exist', and one who believes that it is fated respectively. 1 Pradipa and Kasikaa both explain that the subject of existence here is the other world or life after death. " Paralokostiti matir yasya sa astikah tadviparito nastikah". Although the Mahabhasya and the Kasika analyze the words Astika etc., differently, the net result is the same. The Padaman jari identifies Nastika with Laukayatika. Dista has been explained as daiva or fate and Daistika thus becomes a fatalist such as the founder of the Ajivikas, Maskari Gosala was. Panini has the sutra "Maskara-niaskarinau venuparivra jakayoh (6.1.154). Kasika following the Mahabhasya, explains "Makaranasilo maskari, karma pavaditvat parivra jaka ucyate sa tv evam aha ma kuruta karmani santir vah sreyasi ti". Maskari denotes a wandering ascetic who denies the freedom of action or will and declares that one should not engage in actions since quiescence constitutes the greater good. The denial of free will or action did not, however, mean the denial of the power of Karman as the determinant of destiny. Since the belief in the other world also rested on belief in Karman, it follows that the real issue on which the Astikas, Naatikas and Daistikas were divided was the 1. Mbh. Vol. IV, p. 749. 2. Kasika, Vol. III, p. 765,

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Sramana Tradition issue of Karman. The doctrine of Karman constituted the essential doctrine of the Srananas and its impact created an unprecedented ferment in the thought-world of the sixth century B. C. in India. This phenomenal thought-ferment has been noted by many scholars but its genesis and significance have been explained in many different ways.3 The commonest assumption has been that this thoughtferment was a reaction to the ritualism of Vedic religion. Professor R. G. Bhandarkar pointed out that while in the north-east of India this thought-ferment was anti-Vedic, in the north-west it sought to reconcile the newer tendencies with orthodoxy.4 Buddhist and Jaina literatures represent the former while the Gita represents the latter tendency. It has also been noted by Professors Ranade and Belvalkar that this thought-ferment is clearly traceable in Upanisadic literature and that the Upanisads give evidence of heterodox thinkers who did not accept the Vedic tradition. I had myself argued that this heterodoxy can, in fact, be discovered even in an earlier epoch since there are references to Munis and Yatis in Vedic literature. I had also argued that the essence of this heterodoxy consisted in the doctrine of Karman and rebirth as also in the practice of asceticism and Yoga. In this sense this heterodox stream could perhaps be traced back to the Indus civilization. While this is undoubtedly speculative it does remain a possibility which could only be confirmed if and when the Indus script could be deciphered. While Hrozny and S. R Rao have sought to read an Aryan language in the Indus seals, Parpola brothers have sought to decipher them on the hypothesis of a Proto-Dravidic and claim to discover an ancient astral religion in the Indus civiliza. tion.5 All such attempts, however, remain speculative. It is interesting to note that Dr. H. L. Jain has sought to argue for the historicity of Rsabhadeva by trying to correlate the description found in the Bhagavata with some references in the Rgvedasam 3. Belvalkar & Ranade, Creative Period of Indian Philosophy; Otto Schrader, Uber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas (1902); B. M. Barua, History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy; G. C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism. 4. R G. Bhandarkar, Vaisnavism, Saivism and other Minor Religious Systems. 5. S. R. Rao, Lothal and the Indus Civilization ( 1973), pp. 127 ff,

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung hita, The Blugavata speaks of the royal sage Rsabha who became an avadhuta and in this context mentions the Vatarasana sramanas and uses the epithet Kesa bhuri-bharah' for Rsabha. Now the Rgvedasamhita has a Kesi.sukta which mentions'munayo vatarasanah'. Dr. Jain thus supposes that the Vedic reference is to Rsabha who was the first of the Tirthaikaras. While the references to Munis and Yatis in Vedic literature had been pointed out by me much carlier and the Kesi-sukta had been interpreted in this context, the correlation of the evidence from the Bhagavata by Dr. Jain is of some interest. However, we cannot overlook the possibility of the Bhagavata actually having the Kesi sukta in mind. In any case, it is clearly arguable that the Sramana tradition already existed in the Vedic period as an independent though little known tradition. What was the shape of sramanisin in that archaic period can only be a matter of some speculation. The Sramanas or Munis were apparently homeless wandering ascetics who did not follow the ritualistic religion of the Vedic tradition. Vedic religion emphasized social and ritual obligations, emphasized happiness in this world as in the other and hoped to gain it from the gods. The idea of a beginningless cycle of lives, governed by an overarching law of Karman from which freedom could come only by the total renunciation of all the claims and impulses of instinctive life, this is an idea which falls outside the purview of early Vedic thought. In the middle Vedic period we do find references to the idea of Punarmstyu or repeated death, but that is in another world and does not clearly imply a rebirth here.' To take the idea of Punarmirtyu as a foreshadowing of the idea of Punar janma does not appear to be sufficiently warranted. Actually, the idea of Punarmotyu occurs within a context where the efficacy of ritual is unfettered by any law of Karman. In the Upanisads a great change of ideas occurred and traditionally it has been assumed that the aim of the Upanisadic quest is to gain emancipation from the cycle of existence. Although there is no doubt that the Upanisads are not unacquainted with the ideas of Karman and Rebirth, it is equally clear that they do not wholly break away from the positive and life-affirming 6. H. L. Jain, Bharatiya Sanskrti men Jaina Dharma Ka Yogadana. 7. Cf. G. C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, p. 28%.

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Sramana Tradition ethos of the earlier Vedic tradition and although they transmute the idea of the gods they do not adopt an atheistic point of view. With respect to ritualism, again, the Upanisads sometimes esoterically reinterpret them, occasionally reject them and more often ignore them in favour of a moral, contemplative and gnostic life. The Upanisadic point of view is thus a development of Vedicism and a half-turn towards sramanism, or rather, a position where further interaction between Brahmanism and Sramanism could take place, an interaction which did take place in the subsequent age and had the profoundest effects on the origin and development of Buddhism, Sankhya and Vedanta. Let us consider the Upanisadic evidence to discover the earliest definite traces and echoes of the Sramanic Gedankenkreis. The Chandogya and the Brhadaranyaka are among the most ancient Upanisads. The Chandogya begins with a discussion of the mystery of the Udgitha which is identified with Prana, Aditya and Akasa. This realization of the Udgitha leads to freedom from sin (papman), fulfilment of desires and the attainment of spacious and exalted worlds. The second Adhyaya goes on to elaborate the esoteric meditations of Saman but mentions that there are three sections of Dharma, sacrifice, sacred study and liberality, and identifies sacrifice with Tapas, Adhyayana with Brahma. carya and liberality with a total gifting to the Preceptor. These virtues lead to immortality (amstatva ). While Tapas, Brahmacarya and Amotatva are reminiscent of Sramanism, it seems that these words here have a different meaning. Tapas stands for creative energizing rather than austerities while Brahmacarya stands for Vedic study with a preceptor. What the precise meaning of immortality would be, is not clear. The whole context repeatedly shows awareness of death and sin but seeks to avoid them with the help of ritualistic knowledge which simultaneously assures worldly fulfilment also. 'Devatanam salokatam sarstitam sayu jyam gacchati sarvamayureti jyog jivati mahan pra jaya pasubhirbhavati mahan kirtya.' The great Acarya Sankara. however, interprets this passage in a very different manner. He construes 'Prathamah' to refer to the enumeration ending with 'iti', dvitiyah' to refer to tapah and trtiyah to refer to 'brahmacart etc.' The passage would then read thus : 'trayo dharmaskandhah / yajno'dh

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung yayanam danam iti prathamah| tapa eva dvitiyah | brahmacaryacaryakulavasas trti yo'tyantam atmanam acaryakule vasadayan / sarva ete punya. loka bhavanti brahmasamstho'mrtatvam eti/'8 On this construction Sankara holds that here we have an enumeration of the threefold Asrama dharmas followed by a reference to the Parivra jaka with wisdom who attains to emancipation from Samsara in contrast to the other three who attain to meritorious worlds' ( Punya-lokas). Sacrifice, study and liberality are thus referred to the house-holder, tapas as austerities to the Vanaprastha, and life-long study, dwelling with the preceptor, to the Brahmacarin. On Sankara's interpretation we have here a reference to all the three asranias as well as to the fourth state beyond them. The distinction between the attainment of heaven through action and of emancipation through knowledge and renunciation is thus held to be implied in this passage. If this interpretation is correct we must believe that the impact and absorption of Sramanism was already complete in the later Vedic age. However, since the nomenclature of the asramas and the position of the fourth asrama was not settled even in the early Dharmasutras, such an assumption appears doubtful. It is true that the first three asramas must have, in fact, evolved by the later Vedic age. The first two asramas are implied in the whole of Vedic religion while the third asrama was obviously a resultant of the practice of pondering and meditating over the significance and symbolism of sacrificial ritual. The acceptance of a fourth state, however, was a revolution which changed the significance of the other three also. As far as one can see, the context being examined refers only to Upasana and its results. Sankara himself in his brief preamble to the Chandogya distinguishes Upasana from Jnana. While both are mental states ( manovrttimatram), Upasana means concentration of the mind over some object as distinct 8. This is how Hume translates the passage : "There are three branches of duty. Sacrifice, study of the Vedas, alms-giving - that is the firsi. Austerity, indeed, is the second. A student of sacred knowledge (brahmacarin) dwelling in the house of a teacher, setting himself permanently in the house of a teacher, is the third. All these become possessors of meritorious worlds. He who stands firm in Brabma attains immortality". (The Thirteen Principal Upanisads, pp. 200-201).

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Sramana Tradition from Jnana which eradicates the false sense of dualities. As Vidyaranya has pithily stated,"Vastutantram bhaved jnanam kartatantram upasanam."'9 The mental state which is Upasana is directed by the will as an interior action and is quite different from Jnana which is of the nature of discovery or revelation entirely independent of the agent. Upasana rests on imagination and will while Jnana arises from the subsidence of imagination and will. Within the Brahmanical tradition the external Karmakanda developed into the internal Upasanakanda but before this could develop into Jnanakanda proper, the realizaticn of the basic limitations of worldly life was necessary and this was the point where Brahmanism and Sramanism came together. The Brahmanic tradition generally reached this revaluation of instinctive life or Pravrtti, not through a meditation over the sufferings of life and the fact of death, but through an extension of the concept of sacrificial worship. The Purusa-ya jna-vidya of Mahidasa Aitareya and Ghora Angirasa in the third adhyaya of the Chandogya furnish an example of the notion of regarding life itself as one continued worship, which implies making an offering of it to the gods, an attitude which certainly effects a profound change in the character of instinctive and egoistic life. It was this line of development which was taken up in the Bhagavadgita and propounded as an alternative to the Sramanic ideology of the total renunciation of life. The fourth adhyaya of the Chandogya contains a clearer recognition of Sramanic ideas and values. The legend of Janasruti and Raikva clearly indicates that the knowledge of Brahman is far superior to wealth and liberality and that the man who knows does not really care for worldly things. And yet we notice that Raikva ultimately accepts the gifts of the king including his daughter as wife. Again, we find Upakosala Kamalayana lamenting that human life is full of desires, transgressions and diseases so that death is no worse ( bahava ime's. min puruse kama nanatyaya vyadhibhih prati purno'smi nasisyamiti'). His teacher Satyakama states that one who knows is never tainted by sin like a lotus leaf in water (yatha puskarapalasa apo na slisyanta evam evamvidi papam karma na slis yata iti') Here by implication sinful 9. Pancadasi, 9.74.

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung action is imaged as sticking to the sinner on account of his ignorance, an imagery reminiscent of later times. Further, a Devapatha or Brahmapatha is mentioned as leading to Brahman. Those who follow it are said not to return to the human whirlpool. ('imam manavam avartam navartante navartante') The human whirpool' to which one may return can only refer to the doctrine of Rebirth which is here connected with sin and ignorance. Most of the elements of Sramanism can be seen here except that the conception of after-life and saving know ledge continue to be in line with the older Vedic tradition. This very theme of afterlife and return (Punaravartana) is taken up in the so-called 'royal wisdom' (Ksatriya vidya) which Prava hana Jaivali, the ruler of Pancala (or rather, the chief of the Pancala samiti), claims to expound to Uddalaka and Svetaketu. After death one may follow one of the two paths, Devayana or Pitryana, the former leading to Brahmaloka, and the latter to Pitsloka. According to Sankara the former destiny does not mean emancipation. After the sojourn in the other world one returns to this world and is reborn, high or low, according to the qualities of one's deeds. If one has wisdom or lives in the forests practising austerities with faith one goes by the Devayana, if one practises sacrifices and liberality living in the world one follows the Pitsyana. With good deeds (ramantyacaranah) one gets a birth in one of the three upper Varnas. Bad deeds (kapayacaranah ) lead one to an animal birth or birth in a candala family. Apart from these two modes of after-life and rebirth for good men, there is a third mode of being born and dying without any moral quality, which is illustrated by the existence of insects and such lowly beings. The idea of the cycle of existence and its relation to the moral quality of conduct is clearly expounded here. The interpretation of the idea, however, is in terms of sacrifice. Human birth and death are parts of a cosmic sacrifice. After-life may mean the companionship of the gods or the Pitrs. While sraddha and tapas, ista and a purta are significant, the knowledge of this sacrificial symbolism is of the highest importence. It seems that here we have the instance of the idea of rebirth taken from a non-Brahmanic or Ksatriya tradition adapted to

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Sramana Tradition and dressed up in a typical Brahmanic ideology and symbolism. It is possible that the Ksatriyas themselves sought to effect this synthesis between Sramanic and Brahmanic ideas. It may be recalled that the Gita, spoken by a Ksatriya, similarly refers to a Ra jarsi-parampara and represents a synthetic point of view.10 It is also possible that while the Ksatriyas of the north-east were nearer the original Sramanic legacy, the rulers of the north-west or west like Pravabana Jaivali or Vasudeva Krsna, being nearer the home of Vedic orthodoxy, sought to reconcile the doctrines of Samsara with the world of ritualism. In contrast to this Kastriya wisdom relating to the birth, death and rebirth of man, the essence of the Brahmanical doctrine of cosmic unity and its spiritual nature is to be found in the famous 6th chapter of the Chandogya. Vedic speculation had begun with the search for an ultimate cosmological principle, which came to be called 'Brahman and was successively indentified with such material principles such as anna, vayu, or akasa. Ultimately this led the Upanisadic seers beyond a merely natural philosophy. They discovered gradually that the spirit in-dwelling man is nothing but the revelation of the ultimate cosmological principle. The Upanisadic philosophy thus culminated in spiritual monism which made the ultimate reality at once spiritual and divine and divinity at once personal and impersonal. Thus far it is a straight development from early Vedic philosophy. The occurrence of the word jiva in the present text is, however, noticeable since it is this word which became the common word for the soul in the absequent period. What is more, we also find here a clear contrast between the undying soul and the perishable body. The non-spiritual world of names and forms is also found to be devalued as of an ephemeral nature. Although the 7th chapter of the Chandogya develops the chara. cteristic Upanisadic view about ultimate bliss being available only in infinity (yo vai bhuma tat sukham nalpe sukham asti), nevertheless, this section for the first time connects brahma jijnasa with the realisation of the sorrowfulness of life. Narada declares that he is suffering misery from which he seeks deliverance through self-knowledge. "Such 10. IV.2,

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung a one am I, Sir, knowing the sacred sayings but not knowing the soul. It has been heard by me from those who are like you, Sir, that he who knows the soul crosses over sorrow. Such a sorrowing one am I, Sir. Do you, Sir, cause me, who am such a one, to cross over to the other side of sorrow." Mrs. Rhys Davids had distinguished the search for More from the search for a mere deliverance from evil 11 While this is a correct formulation for the Upanisads as a whole and for Vedic thought in general, we do find at places in the Upanisads a sense of Weltschmerz reminiscent of the Sramanic outlook. In fact the section goes on to assert that what is mortal (martya), is limited and that unlike common opinion, cattle and wealth, wife and slaves, fields and houses, are all merely limited things and they are contrasted with the infinity and self-sufficiency of the spirit. Here again an old verse is quoted where there is a unique occurrence of the word duhkhata (na pasyo mrtyum pasyati na rogam nota duhkhatam/). It mentions granthis and kasaya. Both these words are of crucial occurrence in early Buddhist and Jain literature. It is clear from this that while the basic doctrine of Atmadvaita has a different metaphysical and psychological attitude than that of Sramanism, nevertheless at this stage we have a clear contact between the two. Of course, one can argue for independent perallelism or even anticipation. Nevertheless, the total context does not appear to support such a hypothesis. The development of Atmadvaita can be traced from the earlier Vedic polytheism through the gradual unification of the gods and their identification with the inner reality in man. Sramanism in any case, remained pluralistic and generally accepted the reality of a non-spiritual principle also in opposition to the spiritual principle. This dualism of the spiritual and the non spiritual is fundamental to Sramanism and in a sense excludes the doctrine of creation which traces the origin of Nature from the Spirit. In the 8th chapter of the Chandogya distinction is made between true and false desires and it is asserted that the knowledge of the self leads to complete fulfilment where it is implied that false desires are to be shed and only the true desires are to be fulfilled. The doctrine 9 11. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism (HUL). The Upanisadic passage cited above is in Hume's translation.. $-2 ,

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10 Sramana Tradition of karma and rebirth is fully accepted here. It is stated that just as the world won by karma is impermanent here, so is the other world acquired by merit-tad yatha karmajito lokah ksiyata evamevamutra punya jito lokah ksi yate. However, it is to be noticed here that the final end here is not conceived in terms of desirelessness. On the contrary, it is declared that whatever end is desired by the man who knows, that very end is realised for him by mere willing. It is a stage not of being niskama, but of being satyakama or satyasankalpa. So here also we see the difference as well as a contact between the Vedic and Sramanic points of view. ' The best proof of the contact belween the two streams and also of their independence may be seen in the sections relating to Yajnavalkya in the Brhadaranyaka. Yajnavalkya is said to be about to leave home life (udyasyan). Whether he wished to repair to the forest as an anchorite or ascetic or to become a wandering mendicant, is not clear. However, in contrast to the earlier values he roundly declares that the quest for immortality is quite different from the quest for wealth (amrtatvasya tu nasa'sti vittena). This is a new contrast between spiritual and secular life. Spiritual life leads to an end where all dualistic consciousness is lost. The psyche dies with the body; only the great being' (mahadbhutam) remains. "Sa yatha saindhavakhilya udake prasta udakam evanuviliyeta na hasyodgrahanayaiva syad yato yatas tvadadita lavanam evaivam ara idam mahadbhutam anantam aparam vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhutebhyah samutthaya tanyevanuvinasyati na pretya sanjna'stityare bravimiti hovaca Yajnavalkyah."- This is as a piece of salt, thrown into water, dissolves in it and cannot be taken out separately. Wherever one tries, one picks up salt. Similar is the great being, infinite and shoreless. The lump of consciousness arises from these material elements and perishes after them. There is no consciousness after death. This is what I say; thus said Yajnavalkya.' Apparently, here the destruction of Vijnanaghana and of sanjna is contrasted with the eternity of the great being'. Sankara, however, construes Vijnanaghana to be in apposition to Mahadbhutam'. Hume follows him and translates the passage thus: "It is as a lump of salt cast in water would dissolve right into the water, there would not be in any one of it to seize forth, as it were, but wherever one may take, 6

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung it is salty indeed - so, lo, verily this great being (bhuta) infinite, limitless, is just a mass of knowledge. Arising out of these elements (bhuta) into them also one vanishes away. After death there is no consciousness". Consciousness or sanjna is interpreted by Sankara as visesa sanjna - the consciousness that I am such and such'-'ahamasavamusya putro mamedam ksetram dhanam sukhi duhkhityevam adi laksana.' It may be recalled here that the Buddhists used both terms - vijnana and sanjna but with a distinction. San jna is used for conceptual consciousness where objects are named, as for example 'blue' or 'yellow'.12 Vijnana is used for perception but also for consciousness in general. It is Vijnana that transmigrates13 and that becomes infinite and radiant (anantam sabbatopabham) after purification.14 " The most obvious interpretation of this is that it is similar to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mortality of the psyche and the immortality of Active Reason except that here it is not the death of Every man that is in question but the death of one who has known. Here we find the first expression of the utterly transcendent character of emancipation. The stream of psychic life and dualistic consciousness gets destroyed while in the eternity of the Supreme Being there is no distinction between the subject and the object with the result that one can hardly speak of knowledge or consciousness in the usual sense. This description remarkably anticipates the Buddhist description of Nirvana especially as understood by the Vijnanavadins. The Upanisadic passage runs thus - 'yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram jighrati...pasyati...abhivadati...manute...vijanati...yatra va asya sarvamatmaivabhut... kena kam jighreta...kena kam vijantyat | yenedam sarvam vijanati tam kena vijaniyad vijnataramare kena vijantyaditi' | 'Where there is duality there one can perceive or know another; who will perceive or cognize whom where everything has become the self? That by which he knows all this, by what will he know it. By what will he know the knower?' In a later section Yajnavalkya makes it 12. Cf. Suttanipata, Paramatthaka sutta. v. 7. Where sanna is described as pakappita, Cf. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 18. 13. For Sati's heresy, Majjhima (Roman ed.), I, pp. 256ff. 14. Majjhima, I, pp. 329 - vinnanamanidassanumanantam sabbato pabham 11

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12 Sramapa Tradition clearer by saying 'yaddhaitan na vijanati vijanan vai tan na vijanati na hi vi jnatur vijnater viparilopo vidyate'vinasitvan na tu tad dviti yam asti tato'nyad vibhaktam yad vijaniyat'. 'In not knowing, it is knowingly that he does not know since the knowledge of the knower does not disappear being imperishable. There is no second to him so that he could know something different.' It is the consciousness of duality that is lost, not all consciousness, because consciousness is eternal. For the Vijnanavadins also when the grahya-grahaka-bhava is transcended, the stream of Vijnana yields place to Vijnaptimatrata.15 While the early Buddhists had emphasized the variable and particular of Vijnana, the Upanisadic tendency to absolutize it continued within Buddhism and ultimately made a powerful impact on the Vijnanavada school. In the description of the symposium at the court of Janaka, Jaratkarava Artabhaga asks Yajnavalkya - What happens to man after death ? " Kvayam tada puruso bhavatiti." To answer this Ya jnavalkya took his interlocutor aside and the two are said to have discussed Karman." Karma haiva taducaturatha yat prasasamsatuh punyo ha vai punyena karmana bhavati papah papena." "They spoke of Karman : What they praised was Karman. One becomes meritorious by meritorious Karman and sinful by sinful Karman.' As has been pointed out, this description suggests that although the doctrine of Karman was not wholly unknown to some Brahmanical thinkers, still it was not generally known to the Brahmanas from Kuru-Pancala who had gathered at the Court of Janaka. This is confirmed by the fact that at the end of the debate Yajnavalkya asks the gathering to tell him the root from which man is born again after death. Yadvykso vrkno rohati avatarah punah mart yah syin mrtyuna vrknah kasman mulat 15. On Vijnana, see my Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 494-95, fn. 244. Cf. Sthiramati - 'tatra grahakacittabhavad grahyarthanupalambhac ca acitto'. nupalambho'sau dhruvo nityatvad aksayyataya sukho nityatvad eva' (On Trimsika, v. 29-30 : acitto'nupalambho'sau jnanam lokottaranca tat/ asrayasya paravsttir dvedha dausthulyahanitah // sa evanasravo dhatur acintyah kusalo dhruvah/ sukho vimuktika yo'asu dharmakayo'yam mahamune) //

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung prarohatill 'A tree cut down grows a new from the root. From which root does man grow when cut down by death.' This also implies that the doctrine of Karman was not generally known, for otherwise this would be a ridiculously easy question to answer. In the subsequent dialogue of Yajnavalkya with Janaka, the king asks the former to expound what may lead to Vimoksa - so'ham bhagavate sahasram dadamyara urdhyam vimoksayaiva bruhiti / Yajnavalkya speaks of the state of deep sleep beyond waking and dream: ing-evamevayam purusa etasma antaya dhavati yatra supto na kancana kamam kamayate na kancana svapnam pasyati | Just so this person bastens to that state where, asleep, he desires nothing and sees no dreams. In deep sleep a man is freed from sin and fear and enjoys a wholly innate bliss not dependent on anything external - apahatapapma'bhayam rupam tadyatha priyaya striya samparisvakto na bahyam kincana veda nantaram -- taddha asyaitadaptakamamatmakamamakamam rupam sokantaram / 'As a man when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person that is his (true) form in which his desires are satisfied, where he only desires himself, where no desires are left and where there is no sorrow ?' It is a state where a man transcends all social and moral descriptions and all misery.' 'atra pita'pita bhavati mata'mata loka loka deva'deva veda aveda atra steno'steno bhavati bhrunaha'bhrunaha candalo'candalah paulkaso'paulkasah framano'sramanah tapaso'tapasonanvagatam punyena ananvagatam papena tirno hi tada sarvan sokan hedayasya bhavati / "There a father becomes not a father; a mother, not a mother; the worlds, not the worlds; the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas; a thief, not a thief. There the destroyer of an embryo becomes not the destroyer of an embryo. (It may be recalled that this charge of being a bhrunaha was once labelled against the Buddha.) A Candala is not a Candala; a Paulkasa is not a Paulkasa; a mendicant is not a mendicant; an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart." The reference to Sramana along with Candala, Paulkasa and Tapasa is highly interesting. This condition is explained as one of non-dual consciousness, as one of imperishable self-knowledge. It is, therefore, described as the state of the highest bliss. 'eso'sya parama ananda

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Sramana Tradition etasyaivanandasya anyani bhutani matramupa jivanti.' It may be emphasized, that this is a bliss higher than any other and that attaining to it the Sramana and the Tapasa transcend themselves. Describing death, Yajnavalkya says that the actions, character and deeds of a person accompany him at the moment of departure. * Tam vidyakarmani samanvarabhete purva prajna sal' Just as a caterpillar creeps from one blade of grass to another, so the soul transmigrates from one body to another. 'tadyatha tyna jalayuka trnas yantam gatva'nyam akramam akramyatmanam upasamharaty evamevayamn atmedam sariram nihatya avidyam gamayitva 'nyam akramam akram yatmanam upasamharati | Just as a goldsmith may make a new ornament from the gold taken from an old one, so the soul makes for itself a new body the quality of which depends on the moral quality of his deeds. Yathakari yathacari tatha bhavati sadhukari sadhur bhavati pa pakari papo bhavati punyah punyena karmana bhavati papah papenal' "According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become, the doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action." Not only are the facts of transmigration and the doctrine of Karman described here but the psycho-ethical principles underlying the law of Karman are also clearly stated. From desire proceeds will and from will action which in turn produces consequences for the soul. 'atha khalvahuh kamarnaya evayam purusa iti sa yathakamo bhayati tatkratur bhavati yatkratur bhavati taikarma kurute yatkarma kurute tadabhisampadyate l'Hume translates "But people say 'A person is made (not of acts, but ) of desires only. (In reply to this I say): As is his desire, such is his resolve; as is bis resolve, such the action he performs; what action he performs, that he procures for himself." Here the first sentence is made out as a kind of purvapaksa to be rebutted by what follows. This does not appear to be correct. As Sankara has pointed out the opening words - kamamaya evayam purusah - go to the root of the matter. Desire is the source of Samsara. In its absence even Karman does not bind. Kamaprahane tu karma vidyamanamapi punya punyopacayakaram na bhavati l' This is a typi. cally Buddhist doctrine. This is almost a simple description of Pratityasamutpada such as is found in some of the earlier texts like

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Sramanism As Weltanschauung 15 the Suttanipata. It is curious that Yajnavalkya appears to quote here the opininon of some group of thinkers. This is strengthened by the express verse quotation which follows. Tad esa sloko bhavati || tad eva saktah saha karmanaiti lingam mano yatra nisaktam asya| prapyantam karmanas tasya yatkinceha karotyayam | tasmallokat punar etyasmai lokaya karmana iti // Hume translates "Where one's mind is attached the innerself goes thereto with action, being attached to it alone. Obtaining the end of his action, whatever he does in the world he comes again from that world, to this world of action." The reference to the linga or subtle body is highly interesting. Do we have an opinion drawn from the Sankhya tradition? Yajnavalkya describes the emancipation of the soul from this round of birth and death through nondesiring (atha akamayamanah) which comes from its realization of its own highest nature as Brahman. The true nature of the self transcends the realm of Karman na sadhuna karmana bhuyan no evasadhuna kantyan' He neither waxes through right action, nor wanes through wrong action.' This has an almost antinomian ring and reminds one of Purana Kassapa. Yajnavalkya goes on to say that the Brahmanas, the Munis and the Parivra jakas, all seek this very end. The Brahmanas seek it through reciting the Vedas, through sacrifice and liberality; one becomes a Muni knowing it through austerities and fasting. 'Tam etam vedanuvacanena brahmana vividisanti ya jnena danena tapasa'nasakenaitam eva viditva munir bhavati/ It may be noted that Sankara ends the sentence after anasakena and thus reserves knowledge alone for the Muni. The Parivra jakas leave home for its sake. The ancient seers (purve Vidvamsah) renounced the desire for children, wealth and fame for its sake and took to mendicancy (bhiksacaryam)etam eva pravrajino lokam icchantah pravra janti etaddha sma vai tatpurve vidvamsah prajam na kamayante kim prajaya karisyamo yesam no'yam atma'yam loka iti te hasma putraisanayas ca vittaisanayas ca lokaisanayas ca vyutthayatha bhiksacaryam caranti yahy eva putraisana sa vittaisana ya vittaisana sa lokaisana ubhe hy ete esane eva bhavatah 'Wanting this very realm, the mendicants abandon their homes. The ancients knowing this did not desire children.' 'What shall we do with children, we whose world is this soul,' thinking thus they renounced the seeking for children, wealth and recognition and took to mendicancy. The seekings for children, wealth and the world are all the same." "

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Sramana Tradition It is obvious that Ya jnavalkya is fully aware of the Sramanas and Sramanism. He draws a clear distinction between the Vedic way of the Brahmanas, which accepts social and ritual obligations, and the way of the Muni-Parivra jakas which disregards such obligations in view of the liability to repeated death through the force of Karman. Nevertheless, Yajnavalkya fully affirms a doctrine of the emancipation which lays stress on the knowledge of the divine self, the one creator and ruler of the world, ever beyond sin and virtue which belong to the realm of duality. The theistic affiliation of Yajnavalkya clearly distinguishes his philosophy from that of sramanism even though the sage takes note of it. In the metrical Upanisads which are relatively later, the acquaintance with the doctrine of Samsara becomes clearer. The Kathopanisad raises the all important question, what survives after death? This query about after-life (samaparaya) was traditionally answered in ritualistic terms. It is through the proper performance of sacrifices that a man may hope for a blessed afterlife which may be in the company of Pites or of the gods. The Katha, especially in its earlier portion constituted by the three Vallis of the first Adhyaya which ends with a phalasruti, is not yet wholly free from this older notion. The performance of the Naciketagni is said to ensure everlasting felicity in heaven. The God of the yonderworld, Yama, even goes so far as to say that he has himself attained his immortal status through the impermanent means of ritual - tato maya naciketas cito'gnir anityair dravyaih praptavan asmi nityam/ This assertion of finding the eternal through the perishable sounds so incongruous in the light of the Sramanic revolution. It may be recalled that since Yama is the ancient god who presided over the Pitrloka, it is fitting indeed that he should be the one to clarify the question about survival after death. At the same time, the Upanisad draws a categorical distinction between the impermanent and degrading pleasures of the senses and the true good of man. This distinction between Anitya and Nitya, Adhruva and Dhruva, Preyas and Sreyas, Bala and Dhira, is a distinction which became of the greatest importance in Sramanic poetry later on. The contrast between the highest destiny and samsara is clearly drawn and in fact samsara is here mentioned as such for the first time, Na sa

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung tatpadam apnoti samsarancadhigacchati | He does not obtain that state. He obtains samsara.' The hierarchy of being which is mentioned in this context - indriyebhyah para hy artha arthebhyas ca param manah. The objects are beyond the senses, the mind beyond the objects etc.--- has been connected by scholars with the Sankhya. It may be remember: ed, however, that in the Sankhya, the senses are beyond the gross objects. So in the Gita we find indriyani parany ahuh. This, however, is generally based on the assumption that the Sankhya has an Upanisadic origin, an assumption similar to the assumption that the later Sramanic sects owe their origin to the Upanisads. In fact, the hetero. dox nature of the Sankhya is clearly recognized by the Vedantasutras in the well-known aphorism iksaternasabdam.' The Pradhana or insenti. ent nature cannot be the cause of the world because the cause is described in the scriptures as sentient'. Here the Sankhya Pradhana is described as 'heterodox' or asabdam. The Vedic view of the universe is Purusavada, tracing the universe to a sentient, divine being (Satkaranavada), while the Sankhya is Pradhanavada, a doctrine of material or natural transformations. The Vedic tradition emphasized a positive and optimistic view of the life visvam idam varistham (Mundaka). This is the best of all the worlds, kamasyaptim jagatah pratistham, 'The sati. sfaction of desires and recognition of the world,' (Katha ), anandam brahmano vidvanna bibheti kutascana, 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, is not afraid of anything? The Sankhya, on the other hand, counted even the supreme happiness of contentment as part of Duhkha' and set about to seek final and absolute liberation from Duhkha. In view of these considerations it would be reasonable to suppose that the origins of Sarkhya are Sramanic rather than Brahmanic. The present context should then be interpreted not as an anticipation of Sankhya but as an influence of Sarikhva ideas. This hypothesis would hold about the other places such as in the Svetasvatara where Sankhyan echoes can be discovered. The Svetasvatara does not give atheistic, Ur-Sankhya but a theistic adaptation of Sankhya which is achieved by converting Prakrti into a power controlled by the Lord. It should be noticed that both in the Svetasvatara and the Katha the central Upanisadic doctrine 1. Jaigisavya quoted in V yasa-bhas ya, S-3

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Sramana Tradition is that of one supreme spirit that controls the universe and is the goal of all aspirations. This doctrine is quite irreconcilable with the essential point of view of Sankhya, which posits many individual spirits seeking disengagement from the bondage of an alien Nature. * The second Adhyaya of the Katha mentions the Muni directly and goes on to clearly describe the processes of human bondage and liberation, yonim anye prapadyante sariratvaya dehinah/ sthanum anye. 'nusam yanti yathakarma yathasrutam| Some souls incarnate in a womb, others even reach the plant life according to their deeds and learning.' Immortality is gained when one perceives the inner self and is freed from all desires in the heart -- " tam atmastham ye'nupasyanti dhiras tesam sukham sasvatam netaresam" Those wise persons who see him in the soul, they alone attain everlasting happiness, not others' tesam santih sasvati netaresam'-their is everlasting peace ' yada sarve pramucyante kama ye'sya hydi sthitah / atha martyo'myto bhavaty atra brahma samasnute || When all the desires in his heart are remov. ed, then the mortal becomes immortal and attains to Brahman here.' This even suggests the possibility of jivanmukti or Arhattva. Again, corresponding to kama, the word 'granthi' also occurs here. There can be no doubt that the second half of the Katha belongs to an age when Sramanism was known as a full-fledged doctrine and some of its basic principles were being adopted into the Brahmanical tradition. The high watermark of such adoption is reached in the Mundaka, an Upanisad the very name of which suggests the Sramanas. The second section of the first Mundaka begins by recapitulating the older ritualistic formulae for gaining the Brahmaloka - Esa vah panthah sukstasya loke'- This is your path for the world of righteousness'. But it goes on to condemn the sacrifices as 'frail boats' (plava hy ete adTdha yajnaru pah) and declares that those who, moved by desires (ragattena. turah) follow the ritualistic path or engage in charitable works, keep on revolving in the cycle of existence. The heaven they might gain is but a temporary respite. Here we find for the first time a clear rejection of Vedic ritualism on account of the doctrine of Samsara which holds the world of desires and actions to be coextensive with the world of transmigration. The relative lateness of this Upanisad clearly emerges from the fact that it adapts a passage from the Chandogya

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Siamanism As Weltanschauung giving it a clearer interpretation - tapah sraddheye hy upavasanty aranye santa vidvamso bhaiksacaryam carantah/" Those who dwell with austerity and faith in the woods, the pacified, men of wisdom engaged in mendicancy." While the Chandogya seems to have referred only to the anchorites in the forests, here we have a unique Upanisadic reference to mendicancy - bhaiksacarya / This Upanisad again gives a clear picture of emancipation, its nature and process. Meditation is essential and it leads to the resolution of the knot of ignorance (avidyagranthi), a phrase, of which this is a unique reference. The destruction of ignorance leads to the destruction of the doubts and of the accumulated force of Karma (bhidyate hrdayagranthih chidyante sarvasamsayah/ ksiyante casya karmani tasmin dTste paravare (1) The knot of the heart is split, all doubts are destroyed and so are all his Karmans on seeing Him, the transcendent.' Hrda yagranthi is apparently parallel to avidya. granthi and suggests that ignorance here is not intellectual but transcendental. We may recall that in the Yogasutras it is stated that the subtle klesas of which Avidya is the first, can be removed only through the practice of meditation or bhavana. In the third Mundaka we hear of the Yatis who abandon inner evils (ksinadosah ) and practise truth, austerities (tapas ), brahmacarya and right knowledge (samyak jnana). It again mentions the Yatis who adopt the vow of renunciation and are thus purified (samnyasa-yogat yatayah suddhasattvah). The Yatis, however, are said to be well-versed in the Vedantic science (Vedantavi jnanasuniscititarthah). The description of emancipation or Vimukti reminds one of a closely parallel verse in the Buddhist Sutta Nipata (yatha nadyah syandamanah samudre astam gacchanti namarupe vihaya/ tatha vidvan namarupad vimuktah parat param purusam upaiti divyam 11) * Just as the flowing rivers reach home in the sea by abandoning name and form, so does the man who knows, freed from name and form, attain to the divine person who is higher than the highest.' This may be compared with the following verse from the Upasiva.manavapuccha -'acci yatha vatavegena khitto attham paleti na upeti samkham, evam muni namakaya vimutto attham paleti na upeti samkham || ' 'Just as a flame struck by the breeze disappears and cannot be discovered, so the Muni, freed from name and body disappears and cannot be discovered.' We must also advert here to two verses from the Santiparvan

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Sramana Tradition which are highly illuminating-yatharnavagata nadyo vyaktir jahati nama ca nadas ca tani yacchanti tadrsah sattvasamksayah || evam sati kutah sam jna pretyabhave punar bhavet | jive ca pratisamyukte grhyamane ca sarvatah ' These verses from the Mbh not only interpret the famous Brahadaranyaka passage quoted earlier but also state in philosophical language what is implied in the description of emancipation in the Upanisadic and Buddhist passages. 20 6 At the end, the Mundaka states that this Brahmavidya should be taught only to those who have systematically followed the capital vow' (Sirovratam vidhivad yastu cirnam). Sankara explains 'sirovratam as' sirasy agnidharanam yatha atharvananam vedavratam prasidhham.' It is not clear what is meant by tending the fire on the head. Could it mean shaving the head and being a mundaka ? The Isopanisad like the Gita is seized of the contradiction between the traditional Vedic philosophy of action, ritual and moral, and the Sramanic doctrine of the renunciation of action. It asserts that if action is done from the spirit of dedication and a sense of the presence of God, action does not bind. Indeed action must not be abandoned. kurvann eveha karmani, jijivisec chatam samah ''One must seek to live for a hundred years, all the time engaged in work.' In this way action does not stick to the soul-'na karma lipyate nare / Those who abandon action and even proceed to the extent of laying down their life must be guilty of suicide and are liable to be born in the sunless world of endless darkness. 'asurya nama te loka andhena tamasavrtah/ tams te pretyabhigacchanti ye ke catmahano janah ||' Sankara interprets atmahano janah as prakrta avidvamso janah. However, the earlier reference to the need of living for a hundred years suggests that atmahanah may be taken literally. In that case one may, following the late Pandit K. Chattopadhyaya, hazard the guess that the reference here may be to the Jaina practice of laying down one's life voluntarily as an extreme form of Tapas. If we keep in mind the fact that these Upanisadic references are only occasional islands in the general stream of Upanisadic thought, we would be able to assess their significance properly. It is true that some Upanisads like Katha and Mundaka are generally aware of the doctrines of transmigration, Karman and renunciation and they contain

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung the earliest version of the later Vedantism which combines Brahmatmavada with Samsaravada and Sannyasa. This is the doctrine of Jnana as leading to Nivrtti in opposition of Karma as tied with Pravrtti and transmigration. However, from this we cannot assume that the Upanisads as a whole are familiar with the doctrine of Samsara and advocate a Nivriti-laksana-dharma as Sankaracarya describes it while opening his commentary on the Bhagavadgita "divividho hi vedokto dharmah pravyttilaksano nivsttilaksanas ca/" The prevailing doctrine in the Upanisads is that the universe is a manifestation of divine being and energy. The many gods of the earlier period were undoubtedly merged into one Great Being identified with the Self but the result was a spiritual view of the universe where everything falls into place as part of a great harmony if only one realizes that every finite object is nothing but a limited expression of Brahman. Creation and manifestation are here held to be real, not illusory. It is true that occasional utterances denying duality or asserting the unreality of Name and Form can be quoted on the other side. But as the Vedantasutras expound the Upanisadic passages, the realistic interpretation appears to be the correct one. The very definition of Brahman as janmadyasya yatah sets the pace and to explain this as an aupadhika laksana appears to be a tour de force. Duality and finitude are due to a real but limited manifestation of the infinite and one reality. They are not a beginning. less illusion due to Nescience. Such a view tends to consecrate worldly life, properly lived, as a stepping stone to the ultimate destiny of man. Action as ritual is not sufficient for man but is not an inherent evil. Moral action is indeed more important than merely intellectual knowledge -"navirato duscaritannasanto nasamahitah / nasantamanaso va'pi prajnanenainam apnuyat ||" "No one can attain to the spirit by intellect, if he has not desisted from evil action." The knowledge of the self leads to happiness all round. The quest of the self, indeed, arises not from the realization of the truth of ubiquitous sorrow but from the search for truth in a mind which seeks to understand things in their ultimate nature. In modern times Tagore and Aurobindo have read the principal doctrine of the Upanisads in this way and even the interpretation of Ramanuja has been acknowledged by Thibaut as more appropriate to the Brahmasutras than that of Sankara.

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Sramana Tradition It would be seen thus that the main stream of Vedic thought as developed in the Upanisads is still one of a positive, active and robust outlook on life which does not deny life as unreal or reject it as evil but rather seeks to affirm that there is a higher reality behind what we see and which gives ultimate value to human life and quest. In this context it is undeniable that the Upanisads give evidence of an occasional but increasing impact of Sramanic ideology especially in the Katha and the Mundaka. The later Sankarite development of Vedanta became possible only through a full synthesis of Sramanic negativism with the Vedic positivism. Sankara was indeed led in this direction by the inexorable logic which the Buddhists had discerned in the very nature of change. If change is real, eternity is impossible. If Brahman produces the world really, He must bz changeable and perishable. The only logical alternative then is to deny the reality of creation. As soon as that is done life becomes devalued and stark pessimism stare; one in the face. This is the starting point of Sramanic philosophy - the misery of human life subject to the bondage of passions and actions, birth and death. It seeks not an upgrading of life to the level of the divine, not its perfection, but its transcendence, the return of the soul to its own realm "far from the sphere of our sorrow".

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APPENDIX [A] The interpretation of Kesi-sukta ( Rg. 10,136 ) The seers of the different ;ks of the hymn are mentioned as Juti, Vatajuti, Viprajuti, Vrsanaka, Karikrata, Etasa and Rsyasonga who are described as the sons of Vatarasana. kesyagnim kesi vinam kest bibharti rodasi / kesi visvam svardlse kesidam jyotir ucyate || (1) The verse apparently identifies Kesi with the sun. As Sayana says "ittham mahanubhavah kesi ko namety ata ahal idam drsyamanam mandalastham yaj jyotir idam eva keszty ucyate // " While this interpreta. tion is the obvious one, the meaning of visam does not fit in with it. Sayana says of Visam 'udakanamaitat'. If, on the other hand, 'Kesi' is supposed to refer to a poison-eating, wonder-working, long-haired ascetic, then this verse would have to be regarded as an attempt to exalt the ascetic by identifying him with the sun. munayo vatarasanah pisanga vasate mala / vatasyanudhra jim yanti yaddevaso aviksata 11 (2) Sayana interprets vatarasanah as vatarasanasya putrah and pisanga mala as " pisangani kapilavarnani mala malinani valkalarupani vasamsi". Thus Sayana interprets the whole verse as 'The seers of supersensuous vision (atindriyarthadarsinah) are clad in tawney.coloured and dirty rags. When the gods, shining by their greatness enter their divine nature, these seers through the worship of breath attain to the form of air ("pranopasanaya pranarupino vayubhavam prapanna ityarthah"). Dr. H. L. Jain interprets it to mean that the sages enter the state by stopping the breath (op. cit., p. 13). While the second line remains obscure, what is the meaning of Vatarasanah ? For a patronymic, it is strange indeed. I would still think, as I had suggested earlier, that vatarasanah' refers to the flying' of the Munis which would make it possible for them to follow the sweep of the wind as

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24 Sramana Tradition stated in the second line. It does not appear correct to see a reference in vatarasanah to nudity, since there is a clear reference to being clad in ochre coloured dirty clothes. unmadita mauneyena vatam a tasthima vayam Sariredasmakam yuyam martaso abhi pasyatha 11 (3) According to Sayana the Munis claim here to have reached inner identity with the wind and that is why having abandoned all worldly ways, they appear to the people to be mad since the common people can only see the external body, Munibhavena laukikasaryavyavaharavisarjanena...unmattavad acarantah...nirupena vayuna sayu jyam praptah | Dr. Jain interprets vayubhava to mean 'asariri dhyanavrtti'. In any case, the mauneya definitely shows that the state of being a Muni' was a recognized and distinctive state and was seen as a state of ecstasy or frenzy. antariksena patati visva rupavacakasat / munirdevasya devasya saukstyaya sakha hitah || (4) According to Sayana here we have a reference to the sun or the wind flying through space and showing all things for the proper performance of the sacrifice. It seems to us that 'antariksena patati' seems to recap, ture and expand the sense of vatarasanah'. vatasyasvo vayoh sakhatho devesito munih/ ubhau samudra va kseti yasca purva utaparah || (5) The divinely inspired Muni is the friend of the wind, the horse of breath and dwells or rules over the eastern and the western oceans. Sayana interprets Asva as "asvo vyaptah| yadva / vayor asita bhokta / va yur eva tasyaharah ity arthah/" Perhaps the idea of trembling in ecstacy suggested the connection with the wind. apsarasam gandharvanam mrganam carane caran kesi ketasya vidvan sakha svadurmadintamah || (6) Here Kesi may be seen to alternate with Muni. He walks in the track of the water-nymphs and their companions as well of the wild animals. He knows the signs and is a friend enjoying or helping enjoyment and being ecstatic.

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Sramanism As a Weltanschauung va vurasma upamanthatpinasi sma kunannama / kesi visasya patrena yadrudrenapibatsahal) (7) This is very obscure. Kesi drinks poison along with Rudra and the wind stirs it up for him while Kunannama grinds it for him. Sayana explains Kunannama as "kutsitamapi bhr sam namayitri vak" and connect the whole with the sun drawing up water, the wind gathering clouds and the lightening stirring them up. What is clear in the whole hymn is the identity of Kesi and Muni, his use of ochre robes and his distinctive condition of ecstasy. The hymn uses the image of Kesi-Muni for the sun who is similarly ochrerobed and wondrous. The rays of the morning sun are his matted hair and the sun flies with the wind as the Muni claims. [B] The Chronological position of the Upanisads It has been argued in the lecture that the Upanisads show in some parts an influence of Sramanic ideology. This assumes that the chronological position of atleast some of the Upanisads is not too far removed from the time of Buddha and Mahavira. At least such a proximity would tend to support the assumption of contact and influence between the Upanisadic and Sramanic traditions. The Prasnopanisad mentions the following sages by name - Sukesas Bharadvaja, Saibya Satyakama, Sauryayani Gargya, Kausalya Asvalayana, Bhargava Vaidarbhi, and Kabandha Katyayapa. Of these it has been suggested that Kabandhi Katyayana should be identified with Kakuda or Pakudha Kaccayana who was a contemporary of Buddha. Similarly it has been suggested that Asvalayana of Kosala should be indentified with Assalayana of Savatthi mentioned in Majjhima (11.147 ff) as well as Asvalayana, the author of the Gphyasutras. Again, Svetaketu whose name occurs in the Chandogya, 1. Barua, Op. cit., pp. 281-82; Ray Chowdhuri, PHAI, p. 34. 2. Raychaudhuri, 1. c. This has been strongly contested by Dr. Pathak, History of Kosala, p. 204. S-4

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26 Sramana Tradition has been described by Apastamba in his Dharmasutras ( 1.2.5, 4-6) as an avara or modern authority. By implication Uddalaka Aruni the famous father of Svetaketu could not be much older. Yajnavalkya, again, appears as a junior contemporary of Uddalaka from the lists of teachers in the Byhadaran yaka. Panini appears not have recogniz ed Yajnavalkya among the older sages. * Kasika quotes, "Yajnavalkya. dayah acirakala ity akhyanesu varta". Of the two rulers, Ajatasatru of Kasi and Janaka of Videha, who were contemporaries, while identification is not possible, it may cleary be said that they represent a set up earlier than that contemporary with Buddha when Kasi was under Kosala and the Vajji Gana ruled Videha. However, it may be plausibly suggested that the great Janaka should have belonged to the dynasty which ended with Karala Janaka and led to republican government.5 Ajatasatru could have belonged to the famous Brahmadatta dynasty. It seems thus that some of the famous sages of the Upanisads were not far removed from the Sutrakaras like Panini, Apastamba d Asvalayana, and some of the famous kings like Janaka and Ajatasatru were nearer the age of Bimbisara than of Pariksit. 3. Cf. Barua, Op. Cit., p. 125. 4. Panini, IV 3.105., 125... 4. Panini, IV 3.105 and Mahabhasya on it.'puranaproktesu brahmanakalpes ity atra ya jnavalk yadibhyah pratisedho vaktavyah' (Vol. III, p. 719). 5. Cf. Yogendra Misra, History of Vaisali, pp. 97-98.

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LECTURE TWO MORAL AND SOCIAL OUTLOOK OF SRAMANISM It is a common enough notion now-a-days that social life is built round economic and political structures and that the moral attitudes of a society are somehow derivative from such realities. On the other hand, it is perhaps truer to say that man is essentially a moral being and that his moral consciousness, however inarticulate, is the matrix out of which his social attitudes evolve. In the western tradition man has been defined as a rational or social animal; in the Indian tradition, man is distinguished from the animal as a 'moral being'. As a famous verse runs "food, sleep, fear and sex are common to men and animals : Dharma is what distinguishes them. If men are without Dharma, they are like animals". Dharma or morality has two aspects, an objective context of norms or prescriptions (vidhi) and a subjective sense of value (artha) to be realized through volitional efforts (Pravrtti-visa ya, kstisadhya). It includes socially recognized rules of behaviour and an inner sense of desirability or rational seeking. In the Vedic tradition the source of moral norms is ultimately the Vedic-revelation. Subject to the ultimate authority of the Vedas, the Smotis, the example of the good and the subject's own conscience act as further sources of dharma. Sramanic tradition the emphasis is on the example and precept of the founding teachers as illustrating the spiritual ideal as available to any one in his own heart. Universally available principles inscribed in the luminous book of the heart thus become the source of guidance in moral life "carittam khalu dhammo jo so samo tti niddiqho mohakkhohavihino parinamo appano hi samo 1/ (Pravacanasara,) Morality lies in conduct, in equanimity, in the equanimous, luminous and untroubled modification of the soul. As a form of self-consciousness morality synthesizes subjectivity and objectivity, inner attitude and

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28 Sramana Tradition outward behaviour, thus seeking to realize the ideal and idealize the real. At the social level this becomes a dialectical process between the moral ideas perceived and expressed by great minds and the concrete norms of institutional life. The development of the concept of Dharma shows a simultaneous development of both these aspects. On the one hand, the definition of ideal personality in terms of virtues becomes clearer and, on the other, the institutional regulation of behaviour is increasingly systematized and codified. Early Vedic literature contains the first expression of Indian moral consciousness. Here we find much emphasis placed on will, choice and action and the necessity of directing them in accordance with the Cosmic Law or Rta. Rta is uncreated and eternal, the ground of all order in the created world. Gods themselves exercise their will in accordance with Rta, which is natural and spontaneous for them. The gods are the protectors of Rta in the created world. The human will must seek to follow this ultimate law which is discoverable through reason (dhi) since Rta or order is inseparable from Satya or Truth. Gods are wise and good and inspire the truth-seeking mind in accordance with Rta. Untruth (ansta), insincerity and treachery (droha), disorder (Nistti), these constitute the prime evil. Rta is, to use mediaeval European terminology, not only the eternal law', it is also the principle of social ethics and the law of religious observances and ritual. Just as man owes a debt to the gods, has an obligation to serve them through religious rites and observances, similarly he has an obligation to serve his ancestors and the sages. Gods regulate life and nature and give inspiration and guidance. The sages intuit and reveal the truth and the Law and thus educate mankind. Man, thus, has a duty to acquire learning and maintain the educational tradition. Similarly the family tradition must be maintained so that the lineage of the ancestors continues. As a young Brahmacarin one must study the scriptures. As a mature householder one must bring up one's family, fulfil obligations to men and gods, indeed, to all creation. Here economic activity, social activity and religious activity, are all fused into one moral activity. As an old man one must 1. Rg. 10.85.1 -- Satyenottabhita bhumih suryenottabhita dyauh|

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism 29 retire from the social activities of production and reproduction' and engage in the performance of ritual, austerities and the contemplation of mysteries. This view of moral life is an integral and activistic view. There is no trace of otherworldliness or pessimism here, nor of any sense of original sin' or inherent evil in natural life. It accepts human life as good, and the social, religious and educational tradition as the progressive fulfilment of man's moral consciousness. The Vedic notion of order - Rta or Dharma was crytallized in three concrete socio-ethical orders - the order of Varnas, the order of Asramas and the order of ritual observances both grhya and srauta. By the later Vedic age the concept of the caturvarnya was well established. The Varna order gave social leadership to the priests and the rulers and gradually lowered the relative position of the Vaisyas and especially the Suiras. Although a certain rivalry could be noticed between the Brahmanas and the Ksatriyas in the later Vedic age even in the sphere of philosophical learning, the prevailing theory was that cooperation and mutual respect between these classes was to their mutual advantage. The Aitareya Brahmana? declared that the priest is the other half of the Ksatriya ( ardhatmo ha va esa ksatriyasya yat purohitah). The Vaisyas in this age stood for the producing classes generally, looking after agriculture, cattle-rearing, trade and crafts. The upper or ruling classes depended on them and hoped that they would willingly follow the rulers. The Vaisyas are thus called 'adya's, literally, 'fit to be eaten', exploitable, usable. The Satapatha explains that giving a share to Maruts after Indra ensures an obedient populace --' tatksatrayaivetad visam krtanukaramanuvartamanam karotis | Although the Sudras were regarded as an integral part of the social order, their position was distinctly inferior and even humiliating. Sabara quotes a sruti to the effect that the sudra should not hear the Vedas ('tasmacchudrasamipe nadhyeyam'). In one of the Brahmanas the Sudra is considered unfit for sacrifice (ayajniyah), even if he be rich (bahupasuh).4 In another he is said to be unceremoniously at the 2. Ait. Br., 34.8. 3. Sat. Br., IV.3.3.10. 4. Tand ya Br., VI.1.11.

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30 Sramana Tradition beck and call of others (anyasya presyah),5 In the Chandogya, when Raikva turns away Janasruti Pautrayana as a Sudra, while it may be debated whether the epithet is meant literally or merely as an invective, there can be no doubt that the appelation Sudra was intended to convey a sense of incongruity between being a Sudra and seeking Brahmavidya. As has already been stated, at least three asramas can be clearly distinguished in Vedic literature - Brahmacarya, Garhasthya and Vanaprastha. The Vanaprastha was connected with the Vaikhanasa sastra - (Vanaprastho Vaikhanasa-sastra samudacarah).' Now the Vaikhanasa Sastra is connected by Haradatta with Sravanakagnis for which Vasisthao has Sramanakagni. It is thus not impossible that there was a Sramanic connection even in the development of the third Asrama As for the fourth Asrama, I have argued elsewhere in detail that its regular adoption within the Brahmanical scheme of things could not have been earlier than the formulation of the order of Caturasramya as such and that formulation was done in the age of the DharmaSutras, 10 though reference to Bhaiksyacarya or Pravrajya does occur in the Upanisads. It is unnecessary to dwell here on the order of ritual observances. The grhya ceremonies were relatively simpler and widely popular. The srauta ritual, on the other hand, became ever more complicated owing to its elaboration by the priestcraft. Originally the sacrifice was a simple offering of food and drink to the gods as part of their worship and since the Vedic Aryans were meat-eaters this offering could include meat also. The growth of the Brahmanas as a numerous and influential guild of priests led to the elaboration of the sacri. fices through the operation of magical superstition and esoteric symbo. lism. Wealthy and powerful kings became the patrons of this sacri. 5. Ait. Br., 35.3. 6. Chandogya, Up., 4 2.3. 7. Baudhayuna., 2.6.16. 8. Gautama, 1.3.26. 9. Vasistha, 9.10. 10. See my Studies in the Origins of Buddhism (Allahabad, 1957), pp. 324-26.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism ficial religion and found in it a medium for the expression of power and pomp. It is only in this background that we can understand by contrast the moral and social outlook of the Sramanas. The notion of obligation, of giving in response to what one has received from society and the gods, constituted the key-stone in the arch of Vedic social ethics. This view linked man to nature and to the divine powers manifested in it. It also stressed man's social dependence and linked the generations together in the common effort of maintaining and developing a tradition. The Bhagavadgita beautifully summarizes this Vedic view in the third chapter concluding: evam pravartitam cakram nanuvartayatiha yah | aghayurindriyaramo mogham partha sa jivati || 31 (3.16) The sacrifice is the basic principle of creation, representing a mutual bond between gods and men. It stands for a cycle of ritual giving and receiving. In contrast to this, Sramanism cut man lose from the sense of dependence on the gods and also sundered the bond of moral obligation tying the individual to his community. It replaced the gods by the force of Karman. What man receives he does not owe to the favour or frowns of any god but to his own past actions and efforts. This also affects the relationship of the individual to society. The individual becomes morally free. Social claims become conventional and cease to be final. The individual is himself responsible for his actions and cannot avoid their moral consequences. Man's character and history decide his destiny. His response to the environment should be the stoic one of apathia. He must seek to transcend his natural and social personality, not to fulfil it through the cultivation of its faculties and the satisfaction of its instincts and desires. Natural instincts and passions must be restrained and finally given up so that, the egoistic personality is dissolved by losing its habitual supports. Sramanic morality is an ascetic morality of wantlessness which identifies the past life with withdrawal from society. If niggard liness and sterility are held to be the main evil in the Vedic tradition, pleasure-seeking, egoism and violence are the main evils on the Sramanic view.

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Sramana Tradition Vedic ethics is based on theistic belief. It is the gods who uphold the moral order and punish its transgression and they have the authority to remit or waive punishment in their graciousness in response to human prayer and worship. It is through their inspiration and guidance, directly or through revelation, that man is enabled to perceive and practise the good. In contrast, man is wholly dependent on himself in Sramanism : ' tumam yeva tumam mitta kim bahiya mittamicchasi', 'atta attano natho kohi natho paro siya', 'attadipa viharatha attasarana anannsarana', 'kammassaka satta kammadayada' /1! The force of Karman is inexorable and impersonal. The law of moral retribution is eternal and works by itself without requiring any support from the gods who are themselves subject to it. Although the doctrine of Karman should logically mean selfreliance and strenuous activity i. e., the principle of Kriyavada, it is a curious fact that some of the Sramana sects which we encounter in the 6th century B. C. had turned fatalistic or otherwise rejected the possibility of real action. They thus exemplified what is called Akriya. vada. One variety of it was illustrated most prominently by the Ajivikas, another by the Sankhyan' Purana Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccayana. For the Ajivikas, there is a mysterious force which gradu. ally unwinds itself during the course of numberless lives and man obtains release from Samsara only when this force is exhausted through the experiencing of pleasure and pain caused by it. The measure of predestined pleasure and pain is fixed and predestined (donamite sukhadukkhe). Their occurrence depends on Niyati, Sangati and Bhava, and emancipation from them is obtained through the process of transmigration itself (samsaritva dukkhassantam karissanti). As the Sutrakstanga puts it, "Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain ) are not caused by the souls) themselves, nor by others, but the indi. vidual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny". 19 lt is a denial of free will, of purusakara, virya, utthana or kriya. To accept a fixed course of transmigration without accepting Kriya is to accept 11. Dhammapada'attavagga' (Nal. ed.) p. 32; Digha (Nal. ed.), II, p. 89; Angut tara (Nal. ed.), IV, pp. 339-40. 12. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, Pt. II, pp. 239-40.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism an impersonal but individual predestination. As the famous passage in the Samannaphala suttanta says, 'natthi..hetu nathi paccayo sattanam samkilesaya, ahetu appaccaya satta samkilissanti / natthi......hetu visu. ddhiya natthi attakare natthi parakare natthi purisakare natthi balam natthi viriyam natthi purisathamo natthi purisaparakkamo, savve satta savve pana savve bhuta savve jiva avasa abala aviriya niyati-sangati-bhavaparinata chasvevabhi jatisu sukhadukkham patisamvedanti |13 " There is no reason, no cause for the suffering of beings. They suffer without reason and cause. There is no reason for purification, neither is the self a free agent, nor another. There is no freedom of the will, no force, no power, no human strength, no human effort. All beings, all organisms, all creatures and all souls are helpless, powerless, forceless. determined by destiny, conjuncture and situation, experiencing pleasure and pain in the six types of births". This total denial of human freedom did not, however, mean a rejection of the concept of Karman. In fact, the very passage quoted just now goes on to mention that are 500, 5, 3, 1 and half karman : What these numbered classes of Karman are we do not know. But apparently Karman is like a potential energy which exhausts itself by producing pleasure and pain, life and death. 'Seyyathapi suttagule khitte nibbeshiyamanameva phaleti evameva bale ca pandite ca sandhavitva samsaritva dukkhassantam karissanti' 14" Just as a ball of thread unwinds itself, so fool and wise alike come to the end of their suffering by repeated birth and death". This force of Karman can neither be hastened nor abbreviated by human effort. 'Tattha natthi im inaham silena va tapena va brahmacariyena va aparipakkam va kammam paripacessami paripakkam va kammam phussa phussa vyanti karissamiti hevam natthi'/15 " It is not true that we can mature immature Karman or end mature Karman deliberately by means of good conduct, vows, austerities or Brahmacarya". Apart from the sakyaputriyas and the Nigganthas the Ajivikas were the most important Sramana sect in the sixth century B. C. and 13. Digha Nikaya (Nal. ed. Ed. Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap), Vol. I, p. 47, 14. Digha (Nal. ed.), I, p. 47. 15. Ibid. S-5

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Sramana Tradition it was a sect which continued to survive for centuries. There is also no doubt that this sect already existed as an old sect in the days of Buddha and Mahavira. Apart from Makkhali Gosala, we hear of two other Ajivika teachers viz., Nanda Vaccha and Kisa Sankicca, from Buddhist sources. The names of Udai Kundiyayana and the six other teachers whose bodies were successively reanimated are apparently the names of Makkhali Gosala's predecessors, 16 who were all claimed by him to be a series of bodies animated by the same soul successively. The interpretation of this principle of Pauttaparihara is somewhat uncertain1 but it seems to be an alternative to the normal course of death and rebirth. It reminds one of the Nirmanakaya of the Yogasutras, which could be used by the Yogi to work out his Karman, or better still of Sankaracarya's Para kaya-pravesa. It is also true that some founding prophets of religions have been regarded as having had a miraculous birth which serves to distinguish them from the common run of sinful mortals, The masters of the Ajivika sect also appear to have claimed that they had a supernatural continuation without generation. 34 The doctrine of the Ajivikas is not to be identified with fatalism as such but rather with a special variety of it which included many other little understood dogmas. For this reason Professor Basham's assumption that Purana Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccayana played a not inconsiderable part in the development of early Ajivikas appears unnecessary. 18 The references in Manimekalai or the Tarka-rahasyadipika of Gunaratna are too late to have any independent value. In all probability they reflect the occasional confusion in the ascription of doctrines to particular Parivrajakas, which can be discerned in the early Buddhist and Jaina texts. With fatalism the Ajivikas combined an extreme form of asceticism which included nudity, and austerities culminating in a voluntary suicide through' not drinking '.19 As already 16. Cf. A. L. Basham, History and Doctrine of the Ajivikus, (London, 1951), p. 31. 17. B. M. Barua, calls it Parinama ada, see his Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, pp. 315-318. 18. Basham, op. cit., pp. 23ff, 19. Ibid., pp. 127-129,

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism 35 stated the Ajivika saints claimed miraculous powers and especially the power of 'reanimation '. The metaphysical basis of the Ajivika doctrine remains obscure. The word 'bhava' in Niyati-sangati-bhavaparinata' could hardly mean 'svabhava' since 'svabhava-vada' generally implied materialism.20 Ajivikas make a contrast between the innate purity of the soul and the determined but temporally limited process of time. As in the later doctrine of Malapaka or of Prarabdha Karman, human emancipation must await the moment when Karman matures and ultimately ceases through fruition. The Ajivikas remain the most forceful exponents of the belief that 'nabhuktva ksiyate karma kalpakotisatairapi' | Unexperienced Karman is not exhausted even in tens of millions of cycles of existence'. In their contrast of the soul and Karman, and their extreme asceticism culminating in religious suicide, the Ajivikas were very near the Nigganthas with whom they were sometimes confused. The attribution of atomism to the Ajivakas is not supported by reliable early evidence and Prof. Basham's reliance on Tamilian sources is open to doubt.2 1 The Ajivika doctrine of the six Abhijatis is another point of contact between them and the Nigganthas who hold a similar doctrine of the six lesyas. 2 2 Purana Kassapa is said to have denied the reality of Papa and Pun va. Neither does any sin or crime lead to Papa, nor any good action to Punya....... panam atimapayato adinnam adiyato...... musa bhanato karoto na kariyati pa pam......danena damena samyamena sacca vajjena natthi papassa natthi punnassa agamo '/23 " Violence, stealing, do not produce any sin. Nor is any virtue produced by liberalities, control of the senses, self-restraint or truth". This is not a doctrine of fatalism and has nothing to do with the Ajivika position. This is an antinomianism from the point of view of the ultimate immutability of the soul. It reminds one of the Gita that the soul neither kills nor is killed 20. Cf. Basham, op. cit., p. 26. 21. Cf. Basham, op. cit., pp. 263ff. 22. On les yas see Uttaradhyayana, xxxiv : Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, Pt. II, pp. 194 203; See also K. C. Lalwani (ed. & tr.), Bhagavati Sutra, Vol. I (Jain Bhawan, Calcutta ), p. 235 for his note on les ya. 23. Digha Nikaya (Nal. ed.), I, p. 46.

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Sramana Tradition (nayam hanti na hanyate). 24 It is like the Sankhyan position where the soul is never involved in real action. The Ajivikas deny only the freedom, not the reality of action. In any case they do not deny the the moral status or consequences of action. Pakudha Kaccayana is said to have questioned the possibility of interaction between the seven ultimate and immutable elements. Sattime... kaya akata... van jha kutattha te na in janti na viparinamanti na annamannam vyabadhenti... katames atta parhavi-kayo, apokayo tejokayo vayokayo sukhe dukkhe jivasattame ... 3 5 " There are these seven bodies, uncreated, sterile, unchangeable. They neither move nor undergo alteration nor do they interact. Which are the seven ? Earth, water, fire, air, pleasure, pain and the soul". This doctrine is somewhat peculiar because it separates experience from both matter as well as the soul. The one thing common to these three philosophers is 'Akriyayada' a denial of the spiritual efficacy of action.28 The Buddhists and the Jainas condemned Akriyayada as being morally subversive in its consequences. The Ayaramga defines the Niggantha as Kiriyavayi. The Suyagadamga, criticizing the rival doctrines of Akriyavada, Vinayavada and Ajnanavada, explains "misery is produced by one's own works, not by those of somebody else, but right knowledge and conduct lead to liberation".91 Silanka explains that action becomes sufficient for liberation only when it is combined with knowledge. The wise man avoids injury to living beings and restrain their actions. Only he "who knows the influx of sin and its stoppage; who knows misery and its annihilation - he is entitled to expound the Kriyavada ".28 This doctrine is criticized by the Buddhists who said - "abhavvo dithisampanno puggalo sayamkatam sukhadukkham paccagantum abhavvo ditthisampanno puggalo paramkatam sukhadukk paccagantum.29 Prof. Barua has shown on the basis of the Devadatta 24. Gita, II, 19. 25. Digha (Nal. ed.), I, p. 49. 26. For a detailed discussion on akri yayada see my Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 341ff. 27. Jaina Sutras, II, p. 317. 28. Ibid., p. 319. 29. Anguttara-Nikaya, quoted in Barua, op: cit., p. 386, fn. 1.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism 37 suttanta of the Majjhima that the Buddhist view differed from the Nigantha view in as much as the latter held that a man's experiences depend not only on his present actions but also on circumstances determined by fate on the basis of his past life. However, one must remember that there are Buddhist canonical texts which place other factors by the side of Karman and also that the role of past deeds is certainly acceptable to the Buddhists. The Jatakas popularly illustrate this. The real difference between the Jaina and Buddhist views of Karman must be formulated in terms of the character of the dialectic accepted by them rather than simply in terms of the fact that Mahavira accepted a dialectical point of view. The Buddhist dialectic is negative. Karman is neither one's own nor another's; there is, in fact, no identical agent. The Buddhist dialectic seeks a middle way' between Asti and Nasti by rejecting the exclusive claims of each. The Jaina dialectic is positive and synthetic. It holds that karman may be looked upon from different points of view since the soul is identical as dravya but different as paryaya. Hence Karman may be described as belonging to the agent as well as not belonging to it. The two alternatives are here sought to be combined into a more flexible point of view. The Jainas seek to reach the state of the purity of the soul, the Buddhists to renounce the very notion of the soul. But both believe in the efficacy of action and the reality of moral responsibility. Whether metaphysical belief by itself is sufficient to determine the moral character of one's actions must remain questionable. We hear of a materialist Ajita-Kesakambali and of an Agnostic Sanjaya Belatthaputta among the leaders of the Parivrajakas. They are like the others described as 'ganacariyo', 'titthakaro', 'sadhusammato' and 'cirappabajito'.30 Whatever the shade of their metaphysical belief they all showed a common pessimism towards life. Life and its pleasures are ephemeral and death unavoidable. There is no assurance of success and in so far as man seeks to win happiness through the satisfaction of desires he is at the mercy of forces over which he has no control. What brought together the different heretical philosophers was their common endorsement of asceticism in practice. 30. Digha (Nal. ed.), I, pp. 41-52.

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Sramana Tradition The rise of asceticism must be counted as a revolutionary and unique movement in the history of religion. While religion is as old as man, asceticism can be discerned for the first time only in Indian Sramanism. Its appearance within Orphicism and later among the Essenes and the Theraputae and still later among the Christi in all probability not without a historical contact with India, especially as induced by the missionary activities of Asoka and the Buddhist Samgha.31 We have already argued that the origin of asceticism in India should not be traced to a reform which first began within the Brahmanical fold and led to the recognition of the fourth Asrama. This view which was strongly argued by Jacobi rests on the similarities between the vows of the mendicants, Brahmanical as well as Sramanic, and the assumption that the fourth Asrama must be older e Sramana sects. 32 This second assumption we have already disputed. The similarities between the vows of mendicants are of a general type relating to the very ideal of an ascetic. The five great vows' (panca-maha-yratas ) as they are described, for example, in the Yoga-sutras are Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacarya and Aparigraha. The Caturyama samvara of Parsva included non-injury, truth, nonstealing and non-possession. It may be noted that the Buddhist account of the Caturyama samvara appears confused as it speaks of restraint in the use of cold water, evil, sin and ease on account of purification of sin.33 Mahavira added celebacy as the fifth vow and thus the Panca-maha vratas of the Jainas came to be identical with those mentioned by Patanjali. Thus the Ayaramga34 describes the first mahavrata as Panaivayao veramanam and details its five bhavanas and goes on to mention the other mahavratas implying aviodance of musavaya, adinnadana, mehuna and pariggaha and similarly describes the five bhavanas for each. Among the Buddhists the Pancasilas include desisting from destroying life, from stealing, from telling lies, from wrong sexual conduct and from drinking intoxicating liquors. These become the eight-fold Sila if one adds to it not eating unseasonable 31. Cf. H. C. Raychaudhuri, Political History of Ancient India, (7th ed., Calcutta, 1972), pp. 294-295. 32. See Jaina Sutras, Pt. I, pp. xxiii-xxxii. 33. Barua, op cit., p. 378. 34. A yaramga, 2.15.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Siamanism 39 food at nights, not wearing garlands or use of perfumes and sleeping on a mat spread on the ground. These, again, become the Ten Silas by adding abstention from dancing, music and stage, and abstention from the use of gold and silver.85 The Brahmanical mendicant was similarly required to abstain from causing injury to living, beings, lying, misappropriation, incontinence and niggardliness. 3 6 It is hardly necessary to point out that there is a basic identity in the broad conception of ascetic life among the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Brahmanical Dharmasutras. This ideal consists in the training of the attitude of the ascetic and also involves a regulation of his relations with society. Vyasa in his commentary on the Yogasutras says that Ahimsa is the chief vow and quotes an ancient Sankhya tradition to the effect that it is for the perfection of Ahimsa that the other vows are undertaken.37 A similar view of the matter may be easily discerned in Buddhist and Jaina literature. For example, Aryadeva declares that the Buddhas describe dharma compendiously as Ahimsa.38 Akalanka says 'ahimsayah pradhanatvadadau tadvacanam.'89 Respect for life and the total avoidance of violence is fundamental to ascetic life. Violence presupposes egoism, cupidity, intolerance, lack of self-restraint, ignorance of the nature of living beings and often fraud and treachery. On the other hand, the total avoidance of violence is not possible without self-control, giving up of egoistic claims and ambitions, recognition of the similarity of self and another and the cultivation of wantlessness. This emphasis on non-violence distinguishes the sramanic from the old Vedic tradition where animal sacrifices and meat-eating were common. Similarly victory in war was one of those things which the Vedic Aryans frequently prayed for. Their gods although generally wise and beneficient, were not unoften gods of might and power. Ya jna-dharma and Ksattra-dharma both 35. The ten Silas as well as the Sikkha padas appear to have developed out of the five Silas. See Pali Dictionary (Pali Text Society). 36. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Vol. II, Pt. II (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1941 ), pp. 930ff. 37. See my Bauddha Dharma ke Vikasa ka Itihasa (Lucknow, 1963), p. 123. 38. Catuhsataka. 39. Tattvartha varttika.

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40 Sramana Tradition legitimized violence and were part of the system of Varnasramadharma. The emergence of emphasis on non-violence in Sramanism and its gradual adoption in Indian culture meant a profound revolution in Indian ethos by accenting the feminine virtues. The doctrine of Ahissa starts from a perception of the sameness of life, the equality of all souls. This was accepted in the Vedic tradition also but as part of the ultimate matephysical realization which had its truth at a level other than that of common social life which rests on the cooperation of differences rather than on an abstract sameness. Thus it is that the inequalities of Varnasrama Dharma remain valid at the empirical level while the absolute and faultless sameness of Brahman (nirdosam hi samam brahma') is a matter for inward realization. What made the doctrine of Ahimsa imperative for the Sramanas was the belief in the transmigration of the soul which linked the lowliest forms of life with the highest in one interacting chain of being. The Jainas, indeed, held that even the four material elements are inhabited by the souls which are thus ubiquitous and turn any careless action into a form of violence. 40 The Jaina view is in such marked contrast to the western view where even the animals were not held to have souls. Since pleasure and pain do not depend on reason, the lack of a rational faculty in the animals is not really a sufficient reason for regarding them as different from men in respect of being the objects of human actions. Indeed the modern realization of the need for avoiding cruelty to animals is a vindication of the principle of non-violence. It is welcome indeed that the new changes in our constitution give due importance to respect for life and compassion. The emphasis on truth is, however, ancient and was one of the chief virtues in the Vedic tradition. The avoidance of falsehood implies not merely sincerity and mindfulness towards truth but also restraint in speech for much talk is difficult to reconcile with true speech. The avoidance of stealing apparently refers to the respect for other people's claims of property while Aparigraha renounces any such claims on behalf of the ascetic himself. While non-stealing is the avoidance of a crime, aparigraha or non-possession is distinctive of 40. See Acaranga Sutra : Jaina Sutras (tr. Jacobi), Pt. I, pp. 31-34.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism 41 mendicancy and the outward expression of the ascetic's renunciation of worldly quests and relations. The sacrificial religion presupposes family life as well as property. The wife is a partner in such worship and one cannot make offerings of material goods to the gods without having material possessions oneself. This is clear in the philosophy of the school of Mimamsa.41 Even the Bhagavata says " dharmadaksipyate hyarthah." In this tradition religion and morality are essentially tied with the maintenance of social life. In contrast sramanism despairs of happiness in the pursuit of instinctive life which underlies the patterns of social behaviour and institutions. In this sense Sramanism is an extreme form of spiritual individualism which has even been called soteriological egoism. In the Patisambhidamagga Sila is defined as will, as mental disposition, as restraint, as non-transgression. Kim silam ti ? cetana silam, cetasikam silam, samvaro silam, avitikkamo silam ti/42 Buddha himself had defined Karman or moral action as volition and its disposition. As Nagarjuna has quoted the Master, 'cetana cetayitva ca karmoktam paramarsina/43 Now Vrata has a similar sense. It refers to a rule or conduct adopted by a deliberate act of the will. The mental dispositions which are an essential part of the moral consciousness include greedlessness (anabhijjha), friendliness (abyapada) and an outlook based on proper knowledge (samma-ditthi). Samvara or restraint has been described as fivefold. 44 Of these the first is the adoption of the Patimokkha rules. The second is restraint imposed on the senses, called the Satisamvara. Nanasamvara arises from the right introspection into the occasions of experience. Forebearance is Khantisamvara. Disregarding desires and desire-prompted thoughts is Viriyasamvara. The Buddhist theory of ethics rests on a psychological as well as an axiological theory. Buddhist psychology is analytical - Vibhajya41. Mimamsa School explains sacrifice as 'dravya-tyaga', which presupposes owner ship. See esp. the discussion of Visvajit in Mimamsa Sutras 6.7.1 ff. 42. Patisambhidamagga. 1. Buddhaghosa has also quoted this definition. See, Visuddhimarga (tr. Bhikkhu Dharmarakshita : Varanasi, 1956), I, p. 8. 43. Madhyamala, 17.2-3. 44. See Visuddhimarga, 1, p. 8. S-6

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Sramana Tradition vada. 45 It explains mental phenomena by regarding them as compos. ed of various combinations of atomic' factors and processes. Of these factors cetana or will is one and it is influenced by right or wrong motives called Kusala or Akusala hetus. The wrong motives are desire, aversion and insensibility or ignorance (moha), the right motives are their opposites. This functioning of right and wrong motives itself depends on the previous habits as well as the state of spiritual enlightenment of the subject. Right actior, thus, depends on the cultivation of a spiritually enlightened point of view on life, the assiduous cultivation of good habits and immediately, on acting under the impulse of higher emotions. The Buddhist theory of value considers inward peace of greater moment than sensuous enjoyments which being ephemeral quickly turn into their own opposites. Desire is a snare, which promises happiness but only brings unhappiness and bondage. Desire rests on the mistaken belief in the permanence of things and selves, a mistake under which men seek to recapture and ensure fleeting pleasures in the future. Imagination under this mistaken belief is the foremost instrument of human bondage. It is the wind which pushes the sails of desires. So the Buddha is said to have exclaimed : kama janami te mulam samkalpat kila jayase 1/'46 "Desire, I know your origin. You arise from imagination." The Buddhist morality, thus, is essentially a spiritual morality which seeks eternal peace and quiescence and countenances action only as occasions for the cultivation of purer feelings which would liberate man from his own egoism and extroversion. The Jainas define Vrata as Virati or desisting from violence, falsehood, theft, sex and possession. 'Himsanstaste yabrahmaparigrahebhyo viratirvratam /'47 It is a rule deliberately adopted (abhisandhiksto niyamah). The adoption of such rules is distinct from Samvara bu a preparation for it. If the application of these rules is unlimited, they are called mahayratas. Otherwise, they form the Anuvratas. Five bhavanas have been prescribed for each of the five Vratas so that they 45. Cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids. The Birth of Indian Psychology. 46. Words attributed to the moment of enlightenment, Sankalpa here is not Manasain Karnan' but 'clipping together of experiences in imagination. 47. Tattvartha, 7.1.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Siamanism could be stabilized. For making the Ahimsa-Vrata firm one must exercise care in speech and thought, in walking and other movements, in accepting and placing things and in inspecting food and drink before taking them. For practising truth one must abandon anger, greed, fear and ridicule and at the same time avoid speaking contrarily. For practising the avoidance of theft, one should dwell in lonely or abandoned places, not obstruct others, take only pure alms and cease disputing proprietory rights with one's companions. For chastity one should abandon attending to tales of passion or to feminine beauty, nor should one recall previous love or partake of aphrodisiacs or tasty food nor should one decorate oneself. For non-possessiveness one should cultivate equanimity towards the pleasant and the unpleasant objects of the five senses. 48 Apart from these particular bhavanas, one should meditate on the fact that violence etc., are in reality of the nature of suffering. Just as they cause suffering to oneself they cause suffering to another. It is worth noticing that this way of explaining why violence etc., are of the nature of suffering, is different from the Buddhist approach which insists on describing everything as suffer ing which undergoes change and is impermanent. 4 9 It is well known that for the Jainas souls are ubiquitous and hence all motion is liable to cause injury to living being. In fact it was even said jeeringly - jale jantuh sthale janturakase jantureva cal jantumalakule loke katham bhiksurahimsakah// 'There are living beings in water and on land and in the sky. When the whole world is teeming with life, how will the mendicant be free from violence?' In answer to this it was stated that the very minute forms of life are not easily injured, while injury to the grosser forms of life can be avoided by deliberate care. It has also to be remembered that the Jainas distinguish bhavendriya from dravyendriya. Moral life depends primarily on the condition of the bhavendriya or the psychic sense. Its purification requires the eradication of the Kasayas i.e., anger, pride, crookedness and stupidity. When the passions are eradicated, 48. See Acaranga Sutra: Jaina Sutras, Pt. ), pp. 202-210. 49. See my Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 397ff.

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Sramana Tradition the senses controlled and the accumulation of Karman reduced through the practice of austerities, then a man may be said to be set on the path of moral and spiritual progress. The basic similarity of the Jaina and Buddhist points of view on morality is obvious. Apart from the difference in the metaphysical basis, the difference between them is only one of exposition and detail. The most important difference between them lay in the attitude of moderation which the Buddha advocated, the famous madhyama pratipada, in contrast to the extremism which was advocated by the Jainas. The Buddha after the most severe penance realized its futility and felt that there was no reason to be afraid of the pure happiness which arises from meditation - ' kim nu aham tassa sukhassa bhayami yam tam sukham annatreva kamehi annatra akusalehi dhammehi '50 He then followed the path of dhyana which he recalled from early childhood. Mahavira, on the other hand, succeeded in gaining omniscience from the practice of extreme austerities. Each of them taught in the light of his own experience and the modern student has no option but to attribute this difference to the difference of spiritual personalities. 44 It is the corpus of monastic rules which seeks to give a concrete form and shape to the ideal of asceticism. These rules which regulated the food, drink, clothes, dwelling, begging of alms and religious prac tice of the monks varied from sect to sect. The Ajivaka monks, as already mentioned, adopted complete nudity and were called acelakas. They did not carry any begging bowl and ate directly from the hand and were for this reason called hatthapalekhanas. They were permitted the use of cold water, unboiled seeds and specially prepared food. They practised extreme mortification and finally committed suicide through not drinking.51 The Niganthas have been described as nude, or having few cloths or having one piece of cloth (ekasataka). It is generally believed that Mahavira introduced the more rigorous rule of complete nudity which was not practised by all the Niganthas.52 Removal of hair from the roots was one of the distinguishing fea 50. Majjhima, I, p. 247 (Roman ed.) 51. On the Ajivaka monastic organization and ascetic observances etc., see Basham, op. cit., pp. 107ff. 52. Cf. S. B. Deo, History of Jaina Monachism (Poona, 1956), pp. 160-162.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism tures of the Nigantha community. Whatever clothes were used were not allowed to be washed or dyed in any case. 53 Apart from the clothes or Vattha, the Ayaramga permits the Jaina monk the use of a bowl or Paya, a blanket or Kambala and a cloth for dusting the feet, Payapunchana. The blanket was permitted as a covering against cold or during sleep. The Payapunchana or rajoharana was a kind of broom with bristles. A piece of cloth for being tied over the mouth and nose was permitted just as the use of a stick was also permitted.54 For use as a bed grass, stone or a wooden plank could be used. The monk could also borrow a bedding or matting from the householder but was expected to return it back-padihariyam pidha-phalaga-sejjasantharagam':55 On the subject of begging for alms numerous restrictions existed. Umbrellas and shoes were not allowed to the Jaina monks. The position of the Buddhist monks was much more favourable. 50 In the beginning perhaps the monks were merely allowed the Four Nisrayas. The 'four Nisrayas' were (a) food obtained in the alus, (b) robes made out of rags, (c) dwelling under the tree and (d) cow's urine as medicine. Gradually with each one of these were permitted extra acquisitions or atirekalabhas. The monk was allowed to have three pieces of clothes - antaryasaka, sanghati and uttarasanga, a girdle for the loins, an alms-bowl, a razor, a needle and a water-strainer. He could use a variety of materials for his clothes such as co or wool. Although the monks were not allowed to eat after midday they could accept invitation from householders. As medicine they could use butter, oil, honey or ghee. Several types of dwellings were also permitted to them.5? In the beginning the ideal of the Buddhist monks was also eremitical but gradually with the growth of lay patronage an increasing coenobitism was the result. The practice of the rain retreat aided this process. 5 8 53. Ibid., p. 163. 54. Ibid,, pp. 164-167. 55. Ibid., p. 167. 56. For the general life and monastic observances of the Buddhist Monks see G. S. P. Misra, The Age of Vinaya, (New Delhi, 1972), ch. IV. 57. Cullavagga ( Nal. ed.), p. 239. 58. Cf. S. Dutt, Early Buddhist Monachism (Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 90ff.

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Sramana Tradition Thus both the Jainas and the Buddhists, thanks to lay patronage, came to live in monasteries where they formed a new society standing over against the mad rush of the world moved by desires and fears. These monasteries became in course of time noble monuments of art and architecture, places of pilgrimage and centres of education and learning. Beginning as the isolation of the monk from society, the movement ultimately placed him in the midst of a new society ! All the sramana sects were organized under a leader as a gana. The leader - gani, sattha -- directed the followers in their conduct and instructed them in doctrine and also appointed his own successor. The Buddha made a great departure in this respect. He organized the Sangha as an ini personal, democratically organized body and instead of nominating a successor declared that the Dharma itself should govern the Sangha 59 The entry to the Sangha was governed by Pravrajya which made the novice a Sramanera till he received the Upa. sampada or confirmation. The novice to be ordained was required to fulfil the conditions of eligibility such as being at least fifteen years old, hav. the permission of the parents and having the requisite articles like the aims bowl, the three robes etc. He was ordained by the Trisarana formula and placed under an Upadhyaya or Acarya. The relationship between the Acarya and the Antevasika or Saddhaviharika was pattern. ed on that in the Brahmanical school and this state of pupilage or training itself was called Brahmacarya. The monks in each locality met periodically to recite the Pratimoksa and confess any transgression of which they might be guilty. Such assemblies were called Uposatha, a custom widely prevalent among the Sramana sects. The Rain-retreat or Varsavasa was another common custom. Among the Buddhists the Varsayasa ended with the ceremony of the distribution of robes or Kathina and a general confessional called Pravarana. In course of time the Buddhist monks were allowed the use of a variety of goods in the monasteries.co They were thus permitted robes (parara ), blankets (Kambala), bathing clothes (udaka-satika), towels and bags (Parikkha. 59. Cf. Muhaparinibbanasutta : Digha Nikaya ( Nal, ed.) II, p. 118 : maya dhammo ca vina yo ca desito pannatto, so yo mamaccayena sattha / 60. G. S. P. Misra, op. cit, pp. 124-127.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism racolaka ). They were permitted to accept not only invitation from the laity but also a wide variety of alms. They could use medicines also. Beginning with the meagre four Nissayas, Buddhist monasteries deve. loped into elaborate set ups which had considerable property and several officials. As for monastic architecture the Buddhist monks were ordinarily allowed to dwell in five types of dewllings - Vihara, Addhayaga, Pasada, Hammiya and Guha. As is well known, rock-cut Viharas were used in later times by Buddhists as well as the Jainas and the Ajivakas and they provided occasions for decorative sculpture and painting The names of Ajanta and Nalanda are sufficient to bring to one's mind the amazing contribution of monasteries in the sphere of education, art and culture. The richness and glory of monastic life in classical times can be easily gleaned from the glowing accounts of Chinese travellers, especially I-tsing. 1 Although sramanism is essentially asceticism which developed into monasticism, it had to provide a lesser but necessary ideal to its lay followers. The Jainas logically distinguished the Mahavratas from the Anuvratas. The householder is required to follow the same five ideals of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, chastity and non-possessiveness but within limitations necessary for leading the life of a householder. Thus chastity comes to mean for them fidelity in marriage and poverty means not avoiding wealth and property but cultivating detachment, contentment and liberality. What is more, the householder must avoid the use of foul means in the course of his professional and business life. Sramanism for the laity means an ideal of spiritually inclined ethical humanism. It does not condemn the pursuits of secular life but holds them to be subordinate to the cultivation of a moral and spiritual attitude which would combine simple living with high thinking and inward training of the will with purity of feeling. In the Uvasagadasao, which may be taken as an example of the Jaina attitude towards laity, we are told that the merchant Upasaka 61. Takakusu (tr.) 1-tasing : The Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malaya Archipalago (Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1966), especially Ch. XXXIV.

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Sramana Tradition Anand of the city of Campa, not essaying to be a monk, accepts the five Anuvratas : 'aham nam devanuppiyanam antie pancanuvvaiyam sattasikkhavaiyam duvalasaviham gihidhammam padivajjissami '62 As a result he accepts restrictions on his conduct which would help in the direction of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, chastity and non-possession. With respect to the last two, marital faithfulness and a voluntarily accepted ceiling on different forms of property are resolved upon. Lord Mahavira specifies five transgressions of each of the Anuvratas, which need to be avoided. For example, with respect to Pranatipata one needs to avoid bandha, vadha, chaviccheda, atibhara and bhakta panavyavaccheda / This excludes gross violence to men and animals done directly or through cruel treatment or indirectly by oppressing them. Falschood, again, must be avoided even in the form of rash speaking or speaking out secrets or giving wrong advice or preparing false documents. Similarly, stealing must be avoided in the shape of aggression as well as cheating such as through the use of false weights and measures or counterfeits. Marital faithfulness must be combined with a general restraint or moderation of sexual passions. A number of industrial business enterprizes are stated to be undesirable and fit to be avoided. Such are professions connected with the cutting of trees, extraction of tusks, manufacture of lac, sale of poisons, castration of animals, burning of forests, draining out of lakes etc. The extension of the concern for life and organic environment shown in such precepts is one of tremendous significance socially. If we turn to a Buddhist text such as the Sigalovadasutta of the Dighanikaya, which has been described as Gihivinaya, we find the duty of the householder summarized in terms of his social obligations, Sigala, a householder's son was found by Buddha worshipping the different quarters of the earth and sky. Buddha substituted the performance of moral duties in place of such external ritual. I crave your indulgence to quote from Dr. Rhys David's translation of the suttanta - "Mother and father are the Eastern View, And teachers are the quarters of the South, And wife and children are the Western view, 62. Suttagame (1953), p 1128.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism And friends and kin the quarter to the North, Servants and working folk the nadir are, And overhead the Brahmin and the recluse These quarters should be worshipped by the man Who fitly ranks as houseman in his clan". Consideration and compassion for all life is here joined to the norms of social ethics and a sense of gentleness and humanity. The asceticism of the monk emphasizes the complete purification of the soul and its ultimate emancipation from all natural and social bondage so that it would enter the state of eternal peace. On the other hand, the out. look prescribed for the laity in Sramanism is that of ethical humanism and is not only an antechamber for progressing towards the more strenuous point of view of mendicancy but its valuable complement. The cultivation of purer feelings and right action necessarily precede the direct attempt to transcend the realm of actions and feelings altogether. The earlier phase of self-restraint, training and activity prepare the soul for detaching itself from its habitual extroversion, distraction and dullness and the cultivation of higher emotions suffuses it with an inward peace and happiness which makes rigorous contemplation as well as unfailing austerities possible. The lay follower gradually develops a new moral personality, self-controlled, gentle and humane. He thus develops an inward life and the seeking for spiritual peace and enlightenment gradually finds a suitable base in his personality so that he can in course of time take the ultimate plunge and renounce the world. Brahmanical morality was bound up with religious and ritual servations and with the fulfilment of traditional social obligations. The soul was thus released from its debts especially to the gods and by being obedient to their will made itself eligible for happiness here and hereafter. If the soul acquires true knowledge of itself or God, it transcends the realm of good and evil and enters one of eternal felicity. In contrast the Sramanic tradition accepted the fulfilment of social obligations with a difference. It rejected much of the traditional ritual, emphasized inward morality and accepted social obligations, not as something absolute but as something which provided an occasion for 5-7

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Sramana Tradition the practice of certain voluntarily accepted moral vows. Here the justification of social duties is in terms of the purification of the individual's psyche, which is in contrast to the Vedic view where the obligations are absolute and arise from the individual's relationship to the gods and the social tradition. Similarly even the Upanisadic notion of salvation joins the soul to a higher or cosmic self; it does not isolate the soul but unites it to cosmic yet personal reality. In contrast, the Buddhist, the Jaina and the Sankhya views of salvation, all tend to reject creation and seek to return the soul to its original isolation or simply to end the psychic process. Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar had argued that the Dhamma which Asoka sought to preach in his edicts may be traced back to Buddhism for he laity.63 Even if this view is doubted there can still be no doubt that Asoka's Dhamma represents the quintessence of Sramanism as applicable to the laity. Asoka's Dhamma rejects animal sacrifices and possibly the privileges of the Brahmanas stand rejected in his principle of Vyavahara-samata and danda-samata. He defines the duty of man in terms of moral qualities and humane social relations. His distrust of ritualistic religion in general comes out most clearly in R. E. IX where he declares -"Every worldly rite is of a dubious nature. It may or may not accomplish its object. Dhamma-mangala, however, is not conditioned by time. Even though it does not achieve that object here, it begets endless merit in the next world". Dhamma mangala itself fined as "seemly behaviour towards the servants and menial classes, reverence towards perceptors, self control in regard to animals (and) liberality to Brahmanas and Sramanas". Elsewhere reverence to parents and the aged is recommended (e. g. R. E. III). Among moral qualities, the dhamma stands for "freedom from depravity (apasinave ), much good (bahukayane), mercy (daya), liberality (dane), truthfulness (sace), purity (socaye)" (R. E. II ). To these is added elsewhere moderation (madave). The evil emotions to be avoided are ' violence, cruelty, anger, conceit and envy. (R. E. III). A whole edict (R. E. II) is devoted to the compassion for men and beasts by providing medical treatment for them. It is unnecessary to elaborate here on the contents of Asoka's dhamma since it has been the subject of extensive 63. Bhandarkar, Asoka (University of Calcutta, 1955 ), pp. 107-116.

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Moral and Social Outlook of Sramanism writing. What is important here is to note that Asoka's dhamma can be easily recognized as an almost classical formulation of the Sramanic ethos for lay life. Asoka, in fact, goes beyond its description and lays bare its inmost essence. In R. E. VII he says that all sects desire "self-restraint (samyama) and purification of heart (bhavasuddhi)". "...even the lavish liberality and firm faith are quite worthless, if he has no self-restraint, purity of heart or knowledge of what is right ". Here the roots of social ethics are traced to inner character which is implicitly defined in terms of the disposition of the will as influenced by feelings. Pure feelings or higher emotions such as compassion and liberality and the restraint of the senses are the essence of a moral character. It is worth noticing that while compassion is typically Sramanic, liberality continues a typical Vedic virtue. Asoka's dhamma is so broadly conceived that even with a sramanic background and the rejection of animal sacrifice and ritualism, it could well be the meeting point of the pure ethical traditions of sramanism and Brahmanism. It would in fact be noticed that in this form Sramanism cannot be distinguished from Brahmanism except negatively since it avoids ritual sacrifices or reference to the worship of the gods or to the inequalities of the caste-system. In this form it constitutes a system of universal, rational and ethical religion which is wholly non-sectarian, as applicable and relevant today as it was 2500 years ago.

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LECTURE THREE SRAMANIC CRITIQUE OF BRAHMANISM In my first lecture I had tried to trace the impact of the sramanic doctrine of Karman and Rebirth on Upanisadic thought and in my second lecture I had tried to indicate the range of sramanic ascetic and monastic practices which influenced the growth of the fourth Asrama in the Brahmanical tradition. On these points although sramanism was originally different from Brahmanism, the latter gradually imbibed Sramanic ideas and came to approximate it so that in classical times the doctrines of Samsara, Karman, asceticism and monasticism became the common repertoire of Sramanism as well as Brahmanism. However, there were certain points of belief on which the Sramana sects continued to be critical of Brahmanism. The three most important of these points were the caste system, the authority of the Vedas and the belief in God. There is a well known verse of Dharmakirti which may be recalled in this connection - Veda-pramanyam kasyacitkartlvadah | snane dharmeccha jativadavalepah|| santaparambhah papa-hanaya ceti/ dhvastaprajnanam panca lingani jad ye // "There are five signs of the folly of those who have lost their intelligence - belief in the validity of the Vedas, belief in a creator, expecting ethical merit from ablutions, pride of caste, and engaging in violence to be rid of sin.' From this one can easily surmise how rational, even modern, Dharmakirti was. In fact, Buddha had himself said -" pariksya madvaco grahyam bhiksavo na tu gauravat" - "Monks, you should accept my words only after examining them, not out of everence." Against the traditionism, even, dogmatism of the Vedic tradition, we can discover a spirit of protest and criticism in the Sramana tradition.

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism 53 The Buddhists as well the Jainas rejected the dogma of the superiority of the Brahmanas, sought to elevate the relative position of the Ksattriyas, gave due importance to the mercantile class as their patrons and threw open the monastic order to the persons of the lowest classes in contrast to the regulations of the Brahmanical law givers. The Svetambaras held the belief that the embryo of Mahavira was transferred from the womb of the Biahmani Devananda to that of the Ksattriyasi Trisala since it was alleged "That a Brahmana or another woman of low family was not worthy to give birth to a Tirthankara ". As the Kalpasutra states, the king of the gods, on learning of the descent of Mahavira into the womb of Devananda, reflected, "It never hashappened, nor does it happen, nor will it happen, that Arhats, Cakravartin, Baladevas, or Vasudevas, in the past, present or future should be born in low families, mean families, degraded families, poor families, indigent families, beggar's families, or Brahmanical families. For indeed Arhats, Cakravartins, Baladevas, and Vasudevas, in the past, present and future are born in high families, noble families, royal families, noblemen's families, in families belonging to the race of Iksvakus, or of Hari, or in other such families of pure descent on both sides."1 By its side we may place the Buddhist tradition which makes Buddha a scion of the Sakyas who claimed descent from the Iksvakus. In the Ambatthasutta of the Dighanikaya we are told that the Brahmana Ambattha who was a disciple of the Brahmana teacher Pokkharasati, went to the Buddha and accused the Sakyas of being rude to the Brahmanas. The Buddha in answer praises the Sakyas and to humble the pride of Ambattha, describes the Kanhayana gotta to which he belonged as having been founded by a slave of the king Iksvaku. He goes on to declare that the status of the Ksattriya was higher than that of a Bra: hmana because while the Brahmanas accept the offspring of an intermarriage between the Brahmanas and the Ksattriyas, the latter do not. - This is a somewhat strange statement which finds no parallel in Bra* hmanical literature. Buddha then quotes a gatha supposed to have been enunciated by the Brahma Sanankumara to the effect - "khattiyo settho jane tasmim ye gottapatisarino / vijjacaranasampanno so settho deva manuse till " 1. Jacobi, Jaina Sutra, Vol. I, p. 225.

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Sramana Tradition 'Among those who follow the lineage or gotra, the Ksattriya has superiority. However, the person who has learning and character is superior to men as well gods.' The Buddhist point of view expressed here departs from the orthodox Brahmanical point of view in two respects. It places the Ksattriyas above the Brahmanas in social hierarchy and at the same time decries the caste hierarchy in favour of spiritual learning and achievement. It has been suggested by Prof. Rhys Davids that the caste system was not yet fully established. "The key-stone of the arch of the peculiarly Indian caste organisation - the absolute supremacy of the Brahmanas - had not yet been put in position, had not, in fact, been yet made ready. The caste-system, in any proper or exact use of the term, did not exist." This conclusion, however, does not seem to be sufficiently warranted. The fact seems to be that the Buddhists represent the caste hierarchy in a manner different from the Brahmaincal texts and evalute its idea and the hierarchy itself differently. In the Sonadanda sutta, the Brahmana Sonadanda declares that there are five pre-requisites for being regarded as a Brahmana. These are - "In the first place, Sir, a Brahmana is well born on both sides (ubhato sujato hoti) on the mother's side and on the father's side, of pure descent back through seven generations, with no slur put upon him, and no reproach in respect of birth (avikkhitto anupakutto jativadena). Then, he is a repeater of (of the sacred words ), knowing the mystic verses by heart (ajjha yako hoti mantadharo ), one who has mastered the three Vedas (tinnam vedanam paragu) with the indices, the ritual, the phonology, and the exegesis and the legends as a fifth (itihasapamcamanam), learned in the phrases and in the grammar, versed in Lokayata sophistry, and in the theory of the signs of a great man " (lokayata-mahapurisalakkhanesu anavayo)." Apart from being well born in a Brahmana family and possessing learning, a Brahmana requires in the third place that he be "handsome, pleasant to look upon, inspiring trust, gifted with great beauty of complexion, fair in colour, fine in presence, stately to behold." In the fourth place the Brahmana has to be virtuous (silaya hoti buddhisili buddhisilena samanvagato) / Finally he has to be " learned and wise, the first, 1. Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. I, p. 101.

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism or it may be second, among those who hold out the laddle. (pandito ca hoti medhavi paghamo va dutiyo va sujam pagganhantanam)/ When Buddha presses the Brahmana to declare what is indispensable out of the five qualities - Varna, Jati, Mantra, Sila and Panditya - the Brahmana agrees that the first three are not really necessary and that what really makes a person Brahmana is conduct and learning. In this praise of conduct and learning ritualistic conduct and Vedic learning are expressly excluded as becomes clear in the Kutadanda and Tevijja suttas. The Buddhist argument against the Brahmanical theory of caste finds expression at several places in canonical writings. In the Assalayana sutta, the Brahmana Assalayana says "Brahmana is the superior Varna, inferior are the other Varnas." The Buddha points out that Brahmanas and Brahmanis conceive and produce children in the same manner as all the others. In fact, the four Varnas do not obtain in all the countries, e. g., in Yona and Kamboja there are only two classes - Arya and Dasa. Again, Brahmanas, Ksattriyas etc., are all of the same human species capable of interbreeding unlike different natural species. Moreover, the destiny of men depends on their moral attainment, not their caste. Any one, whatever his caste, is capable of moral and spiritual progress. Just as there is no difference between the fire lighted from one sort of wood by one caste and another sort of wood by another caste, but all fire is equally fire, bright and burning, similarly men have the same potentiality for moral and spiritual progress whatever the circumstances of their birth. The Vasettha sutta tells us of a debate between the Brahmanas - Bharadvaja and Vasistha. The former held jativada believing that Brahmanahood depends on birth. The latter contested this and propounded that Brahmanahood depends on conductor Srla. They both go to Buddha and ask him, "jatiya brahmano hoti udahu bhavati kammuna / Does one become a Brahmana by birth or by deeds? The Buddha begins by contrasting the differences between species and castes. The species differ in physical features but not so the human classes - yatha etasu jatisu lingam jatimayam puthu / evam natthi manussesu lingam jatimayam puthu ||

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56 Sramapa Tradition Among men class distinction rests on their vocations. A man might become a cultivator, an artisan, a trader, a servant, a soldier, a priest or a ruler. None of these is really a Brahmana. A Brahmana is one who has high moral qualities and is detached and wise. na jacca brahmano hoti na jacca hoti abrahmano / kammuna brahmano hoti kammuna hoti abrahmano // One does not become a Brahmana by birth, nor does one become a non-Brahmana by birth. It is by deeds that one becomes a Brahmana or ceases to be one. Again, tapena brahmacariyena samyamena damena ca| etena brahmano hoti etam brahmanamuttamam // It is through austerities, chastity, self-restraint and control of the senses, that one becomes a Brahmana. And such a Brahmana is the noblest. This remained the standard Buddhist theory of caste. It disputed the idea of Brahmana superiority based on birth and gave a spiritual meaning to Brahmanahood. It threw open the monastic order to persons from the lowest castes. For example, the Agganna and Madhura sutta expressly mention the Sudras joining the order. In the postcanonical period this point of view persisted. The famous text Vajrasuci attributed to Asvaghosa, thus, attacks caste in broadly the same way as the Vasettha sutta. Vajrasuci begins by asking the meaning of Brahmanahood. "Ko yam brahmano nama/ kim jivah kim jatih kim Sariram kim jnanam kimacarah kim karma kim veda iti/" The first alternative that the jiva may be Brahmana is rejected by establishing on scriptural authority that the soul transmigrates among gods, men and animals. The Vajrasuci Upanisad states the argument clearly. It is, in fact, a notable characteristic of this work (Vajrasuci) that it quotes from Brahmanical writings throughout. It goes on to argue that jati cannot be Brahmanahood because the Smotis declare famous sages to have been born through miscegenation. For example, Vyasa had a fisherwoman as his mother. Nor can it be argued that the caste of the mother is immaterial because in that case even the son of a slavewoman - dasiputra - would be a Brahmana. Even if it were accepted that a person is a Brahmana if he is the son of a Brahmana, one connot be sure of the purity of the paternal lineage. Again, the Smytis

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism speak of the loss of caste. For example, " sadyah patati masena laksaya lavanena ca/ tryahacchudrasca bhavati brahmanah kstravikrayill" If a Brahmana can fall into sudrahood, birth could not be the basis of Brahmanahood. "Kim khalu dusgo 'pyasvah sukaro bhavet ?/" Can a bad horse become a pig ? Nor can the body be Brahmana. Otherwise burning the dead Bra. hmana would cause brahma-hatya ! It may be recalled here that this particular alternative has been supported by Kumarila. Nor, again, can knowledge cause Brahmanahood, else all the learn. ed sudras would be Brahmanas. The same argument excludes conduct because we find low caste people engaged in austerities and having good conduct. As for profession it is found in a mixed state among the different castes. Vedic study was practised even by the raksasas. The true source of Brahmanahood is the purity of the heart. "Brahmanatvam na sastrena na samskarairna jatibhih/ na kulena na vedena na karmana bhavettatah | Kundendudhavalam hi brahmanatvam nam sarvapapasyapakaranamiti!" Brahmanahood is not by scriptures, or sacraments or birth or family, Vedic learning or profession. Brahmanahood is avoidance of sins and is pure like the Kunda flower and the moon.' Moral and spiritual qualities make one Brahmana. Asvaghosa then goes on to argue that all men belong to the same race. There is only one Varna which gets functionally divided into four. "Kriyavisesena khalu caturvarna-vyavastha kriyate / " Vaisampayana is quoted to say -- "eka-varnamidam purvam visvamasid Yudhisthira | karmakriya-visesena caturvarnyam pratisthitam // " One may recall here that Silanka in his commentary on the Ayara says that there is only one human race where the rulers were called the Ksayattriyas, the rest through suffering and lamenting were the Sudras. Those who took to manufacture and trade when fire was discovered became Vaisyas while the Brahmanas arose from the Sravakas. (Comm. pp. 14-15.) 6-8

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Sramana Tradition However, it must be added that despite the theoretical opposition to the theory of the Caturvarnya, the Buddhists could not in practice disregard caste altogether. For example, it is interesting to note that the famous Chinese pilgrim Yuan Chwang generally mentions the castes from which the famous monks of his time were derived. We have also to remember Udayana's remarks that there is no sect which disregards the Vedic samskaras in practice even though they might decry them as 'conventional'-nastyeva taddarsanam yatra samvrtametadityuktvapi garbhadhanadyantyestiparyantam vaidikim kriyam nanutisthati janah| ( Atmatattvaviveka). There is no school where people do not perform the Vedic rites from conception to the funerary rites even though they might sometime describe them as conventional'. Apparently the Buddhist laity did not wholly cut themselves away from the mores of the society in which they lived. The fact seems to be that the Buddhist protest was satisfied when the Buddhist monks obtained a venerable position in society without reference to their caste origin. They did not carry out any sustained vendetta against the caste system itself. That system proved so flexible indeed that it allowed all those who disputed it to be themselves regarded as a distinct community within the broader framework of caste. Views similar to the Buddhist, indeed, found mention even in the Mahabharata. In the famous dialogue in the Ajagaraparvan in the Vanaparvan, Yudhisthira is asked " brahmanah ko bhavedrajan" 'who, O King, is a Brahman ?' and his answer is "Satyam danam ksama silamanrsamsyam tapo ghrna / dysyante yatra nagendra sa brahmana iti smytah |/" "A Brahmana is one who evinces truth, liberality, forbearance, virtue, mildness, austerity and pity'. At this the questioning python promptly points out that such qualities may be found in the Sudras also. Yudhisthira, however, sticks to his definition and declares that anyone possessing these qualities should be called a Brahmana and any one bereft of these should be called a Sudra" yatraitallaks yate sarpa vittam sa brahmanah smotah/ yatraitanna bhavet sarpa tam Sudra. miti nirdiset // " The python, then logically asks - If the Brahmana is to be defined in terms of conduct, then birth would cease to be a criterion of caste. " Yadi te vyttato rajan brahmanah prasamiksitah / vrtha jatistada yusman kstiryayanna vidyate || Yudhisthira answers that on

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism 59 account of intermixture the purity by birth of the Varnas is impossible to discover. What is more, men are alike in social as well as sexual behaviour. It is conduct alone which distinguishes them. All men are alike Sudras before they are born through Vedic studies. One becomes a Brahmana only through refined and purified conduct. 'Jatiratra mahasarpa manus yatvemahamate / sankarat sarvavarnanam dus pariksyeti me matih // sarve sarvasvapatyani jana yanti sada narah/ van maithunamatho janma maranam ca samam nanaml/ tavacchudra samo hyesa yavad vede na jayate / tasminnevam matidvedhe manuh svayambhuvo'bravit // patredanim mahasarpa samskytam vrttamisyate / tam brahmanamaham purvamuktavan bhujagottamall' "O wise and great serpent, it is my belief that caste is extremely difficult to ascertain among men because of miscegenation among all classes. Any man is capable of begetting a child in any woman. All human beings are alike in speech, sexual behaviour, birth and death. A man remains a Sudra till he is born in the Veda. In this dilemma such is the decision of Manu, the son of Svayambhu. O great serpent, if sacramentally purified conduct is to be found in some one, I would call him Brahmana". It is worth noticing that in this context the supreme end of man is described as one which is free from pain and pleasure -- nirduhkhamasukham ca yat/' Such a state is attainable through truth, liberality and non-violence. The stress on Ahimsa, the emphasis on an end be. yond desires, and on conduct as the basis of social respect, not birth, these ideas together constitute a world of belief which is distinctly Sramanic and appears to represent a kind of adaptive reform move. ment within orthodoxy, a situation which is illustrated most conspi. cuously by the Gita and the Santiparvan. It is worth mentioning at this point that some scholars have pro posed to link the anti-caste attitude of Buddhist and Jaina thinkers with the fact of their affiliation with the Ksattriya republics of northeastern India. Just as it was held at one time that these reform movements were championed by the Ksattriyas against Brahmanic orthodoxy,

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Sramana Tradition it is now proposed by some scholars to connect them with the fact that the emergence of the caste-system served as a social solvent of the Ganas so that the thoughtful or leaders of this passing clan society were led to protest against the Brahmanically formulated caste-system. However, it is not really established that the Ganas lay outside the purview of the Varna system. So far as clearly known the Ganas were a form of polity rather than society. Even the Vedic clans or Janas were not free fron the distinction of Varnas. When the Janas turned into Janapadas, whether these were ganadhina or Rajadhina, they did not exclude the Varnas which all along stood primarily for a class distinction, arising functionally but gradually becoming more and more hereditary, especially on account of the privileged position of the upper classes and sacerdotal theory. Even as regards polity, the new empires rising into prominance at the time were not firmly wedded to either Brahmanism or Sramanism so that to seek to explain these ideologies in terms of social and political set-up does not appear convincing. If we turn to the early Jaina canon we discover an anticaste attitude similar to that of the Buddhist texts. In the famous legend of Hariesa Bala from the Uttarajjhayana we find that a monk who belonged to the lowest caste of the Svapaka or Candala is reviled by the Brahmanas engaged in a sacrifice who feel that the presence of the outcastes will pollute the ritual. The incident makes one recall the ancient Vedic legend of Kavasa Ailusa where a priest having been discovered of low birth is turned out by the others as ineligible and inauspicious. At another place a Brahmana turned monk instructs the Brahmanas about what is a true sacrifice and who is a true Brahmana. "The binding of animals (to the sacrificial pole), all the Vedas, and sacrifices, being causes of sin, cannot save the sinner, for his Karman is very powerful, one does not become a Sramana by tonsure, nor a Brahmana by the sacred syllable Om, nor a Muni by living in the woods, nor a Tapasa by wearing clothes of Kusa-grass and bark. One becomes a Sramana by equanimity, a Brahmana by chastity, a Muni by knowledge, and a Tapasa by penance. By one's actions one becomes a Brahmana. or a Ksattriya, or a Vaisya, or a Sudra. him who is exempt from all Karman, we call a Brahmana ".1 1. Jacobi, Jaina Suttras, Vol. II, pp. 130-40.

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism The Mimamsakas who were the champions of Brahmanical ortho. doxy sought to rehabilitate the most extreme view about the nature of caste. Kumarila stated in the Tantravartika that Brahmanahood is not a mere collection of moral qualities, or a character produced by them or a species manifested by them. It is a physical class character which is apprehended in perception as aided by the knowledge of the person's heredity -'na ca tapa adinam samudayo brahmanyam na tajjanitah sanskarah na tadabhivyangya jatih/ kim tarhi ? matipitr jatijnanabhivyangya pratyaksasamadhigamya /'1 It may be recalled that the phrase 'na ca tapa adinam samudayo brahmanyam' recalls a view which was already mentioned by the Mahabhasya. The Nyayasudha? explains the Purvapaksa as asserting that since no distinct Brahmanical form or appearance is apprehended, Brahmanahood should be deemed an Upadhi or accident, not a jati or species - 'na ca ksatriyadibhyo vyavitto brahmanesvanuvrtah kascidakaraviseso matapitrsambandhajnenapi pratiyate / tasmad brahmanadisabdavyapadesyamatapitrsantanajanmatvaupadhiko bralmanadisabdo na jati vacanah/' One cannot apprehend a common and specific form for all the Brahmanas, which might be distinguished from the Ksattriyas etc. Thus one cannot do even by knowing the relationship with the parents. Hence the words Brahmana etc., refer not to a jati but to an Upadhi depending on one's heredity. This is answered by saying that Jati is a peculiar character which is not necessarily a distinct physical form - 'yaccakaraviseso na pratiyata ityuktam/ tatra yadyakarasabdena samsthanam mudraparanamadheyamabhi. pretam tatastasya jatitvanangikaradadosah, brahmanapratyaya-vedyastu dharma-viseso'nubhava-siddhatvannapahnavamarhati/' As for the statement that one cannot perceive any specific physical character, it is not a relevant objection because we do not regard jati as consisting in a visible physical character. This does not mean that we can deny the fact of an empirically attested characteristic corresponding to of Brahmanabood. Brahmanahood, thus, is known by perception aided by information about lineage and such information not being rendered suspect by rumours about its unreliability, would deserve to be accepted as true.' The whole argument rests on the assumption that 1. Tantra Vartika, 1.2.2. 2. Vol. I, pp. 10-11.

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Sramana Tradition an uninterrupted tradition of pure heredity exists reliably and corresponds to a real physical difference of a genetic kind and that the Sastric pronouncements as well as social belief relating to such genetic distinctions do not furnish any reasonable ground for doubt. Jati is not a species or race but a distinctive heredity. It has a physical and genetic base but it is not a characteristic bodily form. 62 This mode of argument was severely criticized by both the Buddhists as well as the Jainas. Thus Prajnakaragupta says in his Vartikalankara that Brahmanahood may mean either a species or Jati or a lineage or Gotra, or a distinctive capacity (Kriyasamarthyatisaya). Since Brahmanas and Sudras look alike, Jati is clearly not in question - 'na tavad gotvadi jatimiva tajjatimakaravisesadeva kecidavadharayitumisate akrtisankarasya darsanat | Sudradyabhimatanamapi saivakrtirupalabhyate No one can determine the caste by the inspection of the physical appearance as we can determine the species of cows etc. In the case of men, appearances are all mixed up. Moreover, those who are held to be Sudras have the same form as others. As for lineage one cannot be certain of the past. In fact, it only pushes the problem to the unknown past. 'avicchedasca gotrasya pratyetum sakyate na ca'. The uninterruptedness of the gotra cannot be known. What is more, one cannot know of the purity of distant heredity. Nor is any distinct capacity seen in the Brahmanas now. Brahmanahood connot be preceived without instruction where the instruction itself constitutes no authority. Nor can the Vedas establish the Brahmanahood of any given person since the Vedas have no relevance to particular persons at all. Hence-naivam brahmanatvadikam pratyaksadupadesadubhayad vedadvapratiyate tatah samvyavaharamatraprasiddham brahmanyam /'1 Thus Brahmanahood is not known by perception or instruction or both or the Vedas. Hence it is only a social convention. Against this Kumarila has in turn argued that because the perception of something requires a special vantage point for the perceiver, it does not cease to be perceptible. Similarly the possibility of misalliance does not mean that one should hold it as an actuality without further evidence. 'na hi yadgirisrngamaruhya grhyate tadapratyaksam na ca strinam kvacid vyabhicardarsanat sarvatraiva kalpana yukta ' If something is perceived by 1. pp. 10-12. "1

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism climbing the hill top, it does not cease to be regarded as perceptible. If women are occasionally unfaithful it does not follow that we must always imagine them so. Against the Mimamsakas, the great Jaina Acarya, Prabhacandra argues that nothing distinctive can be perceived by the senses as Brahmanahood since a Brahmana does not look different from a nonBrahmana. 'na khalu yatha mahisyadisamghe gavam gojatih vailaksanyena pratibhasate... tatha brahmanyamapi/' A Brahmana cannot be distinguished from non-Brahmanas as cows from buffaloes. Nor can one adduce any other sufficiently valid factor which would produce such perception. It cannot be the knowledge of the father's Brahmanahood (brahmanabhutapitrjanyatvam) which is similarly in need of being known. Nor can the uninterruptedness of a pure lineage be known without doubt since there is no definite way in which impurity of lineage manifests itself. Nor, again, can Brahmanahood be deciphered in terms of conduct which may equally belong to Brahmanas as well as nonBrahmanas. The fact is that Brahmanahood is a social description which depends on function and socially acquired characteristics. Human beings constitute one race which is distinguished into varnas not by birth or Jati but by functional social ascriptions. manusya-jatirekaiva jatinamodayodbhava vrtti-bhodahitadbhedaccaturvidhyamihasnute || 1 A single human race is divided into four classes by social functions. 63 The denial of the hereditary caste system was closely connected with the denial of the authority of the Vedas. The Mimamsakas sought to defend the authority of the Vedas by logical argumentation. They began with the doctrine Svatahpramanyavada, i. e., the self-validating character of knowledge If knowledge were not to be self-validating, nothing would ever suffice to validate it because any other knowledge advanced as an argument to validate the earlier one will itself need validation and thus we would be led to an infinite regress. As Madhavacarya puts it kim ca tavakamanumanam svatah pramanam na va adye anekantikata ( dvittye tasyapi paratah pramanyamevam tasya, tasyapityanavastha duravastha syat/2 "Is your inference against self-valid by itself or does it have to be validated by another? If it is self-valid, then your reason 1. Adipurana, 38.45. 2. Sarvadarsanasangraha.

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64 Sramana Tradition becomes uncertain since you have yourself produced a counterexample. If on the other hand, your inference needs further validation that would need still another and one would be caught in a vicious infinite regress." The very causes which produce knowledge also produce the validity of knowledge and the reflective awareness of knowledge is thus accompanied by its certitude also. 'pramajnaptirapi jnanajnapaka-samagrita eva jayate l' As for error or doubt it arises from the operation of a defect or dosa in addition to the normal causal factors in knowledge. To this principle of Svatah pramanyavada the Mimamsakas add the doctrine of the eternity of the word. The principal argument on which they rely is that we recognize the words and letters to be the same. We recognize the phonemes or Varnas as identical with what have been encountered earlier. The Mimamsakas have certainly hit upon a very subtle principle, that of the ideality of the phonetic distinctions. They have, however, chosen to forget the equally evident impermanece of words as sounds. While phonemic distinctions have an element of ideality, the phonetic elements themselves are sensuous and ephemeral particulars. Apart from the ideality and recognizable identity of phonemic elements, the Mimamsakas argue from the persistence of the semantic force of words, which shows that words must themselves be identically persistent to be able to signify the same meaning at different times and places to different persons. The words could only refer to universals as meanings and as such would be as ideal as the concepts themselves. 'pratyabhijna yada sabde jagarti niravagraha , anityatvanumanani saiva sarvani badhate // The unrestricted liveliness of recognition in words is alone sufficient to contradict all the syllogisms proposed to prove the impermanence of words.' Combining Svatahpramanyavada and Sabdanityatvavada the Mima. msakas hold the Vedas to be eternal as well as authoritative. They also add to this the principle of the impersonal character or Apauruseyatva of the Vedas. The principal argument used here is that we have an uninterrupted tradition of Vedic study without any memory of any personal authorship of the Vedas. 'apaurase ya vedah sampradayavicchede satyasmaryamanakartrkatvadatmavat/' The Vedas have not been com posed by any person because while there is no interruption of the tradition of Vedic study, no one remembers such an author',

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism Buddhists as well as Jainas have attacked these formulations of the orthodox Vedicists in many ways. The Buddhists argue that the validity of knowledge is not a constant feature of knowledge, which proves that the causes producing knowledge are not the same as those which produce its validity or invalidity. As for the eternity of the word it is sufficiently disproved by the consideration that words are produced and hence cease to be, anityah sabdah krtakatvat | Again, it is neither possible to prove the beginninglessness nor the uninterruptedness of Vedic study. Besides, the authorship of the Vedic hymns is found to be ascribed to sages. The Vedas refer to particular persons and places and hence could not be prior to these. What is more, the Vedas preach faulty doctrines and hence cannot be regarded as authoritative. sambhavyate ca vedasya vispastam pauruseyata kamamithyakriyapranihimsasatyabhidha tatha ||' 'The human authorship of the Vedas may be clearly surmised from the fact that it speaks of passions, violence and falsehood'. Like the Tattvasangraha, Prabhacandra's Nyayakumudacandra also deals at length with the Mimamsaka orthodoxy about the Vedas. The argument that recognition proves the identity of Varnas, is held to be unreliable because it mistakes similarity for identity. That such recognition is mistaken is proved by the perception of the word being produced and ceasing to be. That the word is able to convey a stable meaning does not mean that the word itself is an identically stable entity. Different words serve the same function by virtue of their similarity. As to the Mimamsaka assertion that the utterance of the word is not the produc tion but the manifestation of the eternal word, such an assertion really suffers from a petitio principii. There is no reason to suppose that the word exists prior to its utterance. " 65 Again to argue that the Vedas have no author because none is remembered is to adduce a reason which is unproven and non-existent in the subject or Paksa. The probandum or Apauruseyatva belongs to the Vedas while the reason Kartuh smaranabhava does not belong to them. Besides, that someone should fail to remember the authorship of the Vedas $-9

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Sramana Tradition proves precisely nothing except the failure of his memory. If someone fails to remember something it does not follow that something does not exist. On the other hand, one cannot universalize the proposition that no one remembers the author of the Vedic texts since there is no way of substantiating such a universal proposition. What is more, the so-called Abhava Pramana does not apply in such cases since that Pramana functions only when all the other five Pramanas fail to apply. In the present case the Vedas themselves speak of their author. The various Vedic recensions are thus ascribed to different sages like Kanva etc. Decisive, again, is the consideration that the Vedas are compositions like other human compositions. Pauruseyo vedah racanavatvat bharatadivat padavakyatmakatvadva |' The argument that Vedic composition is wholly distinctive and singular is difficult to countenance. Wherein lies the distinctiveness of Vedic composition - in its unpronunciability, harshness of sounds, deviation in grammatical usage, use of uncommon rhythm and metre, propounding of supersensuous meanings, or having magical power? Now none of these features is superhuman since they can all be paralled in human compositions. In particular, the magical character of Vedic utterances (mahaprabhavopetamantrayuktatva) is in no way different from the similar power of non-Vedic mantras, which is all due to the will of some superior or powerful person. 66 The doctrine of the apauruseyatva of the Vedas was not accepted by the Naiyayikas also who concurred with the Buddhists and the Jainas in rejecting the doctrine of the eternity of the word and the authorlessness of the Veda. But the Naiyayikas like all the other Brahmanical schools accepted the authority of the Vedas. For the Naiyayikas the authoritative character of the Vedic texts rested on the assumption that they are texts revealed by God. It is here that the Jainas and the Buddhists combined again to oppose the doctrine of theism as much as the authenticity of the Vedas. The idea of God arose in the Vedic tradition in terms of the worship of His visible or manifest forms in nature. As the greatest poet of India prayed, 'pratyaksabhistanubhiravatu vastabhirastabhirisah. This was, in effect, the Vedic view. The visible deities of the Vedic age hardly required any proof. In the later Vedic age the many gods

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism 67 were gradually merged into one God who was believed to be the creator of the universe, a function formerly shared by many. That the world with its diversity should be understood as the product of some primordial substance under the will of a primal person, is naturally assumed in the Upanisads. How diverse things are produced from the same material like pots from clay appeared a sufficient analogy for Upanisadic seers to conclude that there is an overarching sentient reality determining the universe. The fact of creation is taken for granted. Natural things are like human artifacts and God is the prime artificer. While another line of argument of a transcendental nature developed into the theory of Advaita Vedanta, emphasising divinity as the ground of world appearance rather than as its active cause, later theism continued to rest primarily on the argument that the world needs a first cause and that can only be God. As the idea of God was attacked by materialists and the Sramana schools, the Nyaya system arose to furnish a logical defence of theism and this debate went on for a thousand years, culminating in the great work of Udayana, Nyayakusumanjali. Udayana interprets the concept of God in a broad catholic sense as that of the supreme person who is omniscient, gracious and the creator of the universe. He considers and answers five sets of objections against theism. In the first place he rebuts the Carvaka conten. tion that there is no supernatural means assuring afterlife (alaukikasya paralokasadhanasyabhavat). It is really a denial of any non-natural force determining human life and ensuring the existence of life after death, Udayana rebuts it by pointing out that the human vicissitudes of pleasure and pain postulate their dependence on definite but indivi. dualized causal forces and all mankind believes that religious ritual is relevant for securing a desirable destiny. sapeksatvadanaditvat vaicitryad visvavyttitah/ pratyatmaniyamad bhukterasti heturalaukikah|!' "There is a supernatural cause of pleasure and pain because of the following reasons-causal dependence of such experiences, the beginninglessness of the chain of such causes, the diversity of human situation, the universality of the belief in ritual efficacy, and the specific

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Sramana Tradition determination of individual destiny'. He then goes on to answer the atheistic Mimamsakas who accept Paraloka and its Alaukika sadhana but substitute God by the Vedas. Udayana points out that the validity of utterances is not self-evident and that revelation itself has a beginning and its authority derives from the person who makes the revelation -- pramayah paratantratvat sargapralayasambavat/ tadanyasminnanasvasat na vidhyantara sambhavah // 'No other rule is acceptable since valid knowledge depends on a quality which the cause of knowledge may possess and because the creation and dissolution of the world occur periodically and, finally, because there can be no assurance of truth except from a revelation by God'. Udayana then turns against the Buddhists who argue the nonexistence of God as of the soul from their non-perception (Anuplabdhi). It may be rebutted that it is only yogyanupalabdhi which can prove nonexistence, not ayogyanupalabdhi. If something is by its nature perceivable in a certain manner and in fact not so perceived, then it would be right to infer its non-existence. But if something is by its nature not amenable to perception, we could not infer its non-existence from its non-perception. The atoms, for example, do not cease to exist because they are not perceived. Even the soul is not perceived during deep sleep but does not on that account cease to be. The Buddhists counter this by arguing that in that case even the hare's horn could not be rejected and one could propound a syllogism like 'sasah srngi pasutyat', 'The hare has horns because it is an animal.' Suppose it is argued that the 'horn' is as such perceptible and hence its non-perception on the head of the hare is its sufficient disproof. In that case it will have to be similarly accepted that being a sentient creator of the universe, God would have a body like the potter etc., and as such should be held amenable to perception. Udayana's answer is that a sentient creator does not need to have a body and a bodyless creator not being amenable to perception, is in no wise disproved by nonperception. The supposedly Jain objection that the knowledge which God has, not being the knowledge of something previously unknown, would cease to have the character of Prama, is then disposed off by Udayana by

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism affirming that God's knowledge being the true knowledge of reality continues to be Prama. Prama is not to be defined either by agrhitagrahijnanatva nor by Pramanajanyatva but only by Yatharthanubhava which is independent of another experience. Finally Udayana sums up the positive arguments for the existence of God in the famous verse - 69 'karyayojanadhrtyadeh padat pratyayatah sruteh vakyat samkhyavisesacca sadhyo visvavidavyayah ||' Here eight reasons have been adduced to prove the existence of God. The eight syllogisms may be rendered thus - (1) The world consisting of the earth etc., has a maker because it is a product like the pot. (2) The initial motion of atoms at the beginning of creation presupposes voluntary effort since it is a movement like that of our own bodies. (3) The solar and celestial system are held in a fixed position in space by a force which presupposes effort. (4) Linguistic and social behaviour is acquired in a tradition which must have been originated by some first person. (5) The authority of the Vedas implies a reliable person from whom the Vedas must have proceeded. (6) The Vedas being compositions must owe their origin to a person who is God. (7) Vedic sentences imply a person as their author. (8) The law of numbers operates in the formation of compounds from atoms at the beginning of creation but since numbers are inconceivable without a mind which relates objects, there must have been a superhuman mind to explain the efficacy of numbers at that time when no human mind existed. This last argument needs some explanation. On the Nyaya theory the magnitude of composite products arises in three different ways. It may arise from the summation of constituent magnitudes (parimanayoni) or it may arise from the interstitial spaces between the constituents (pracayasithilavayavasamyoga) or it may arise from the number or plurality of constituents (samkhyayoni). When the atoms form an aggregate or binary compounds of atoms combine further to form Tryanukas an increase in magnitude takes place. Now what is its cause? The normal rule is that the aggregation of magnitudes increases the magnitudes in their own original kind. Thus the combination of

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70 Sramana Tradition impartible atomic magnitudes would lead to atomic magnitudes of a still lower dimension if it were possible. Actually the magnitude increases and becomes partible. Hence the Naiyayikas assume that this increase in magnitude must be due to the number or plurality of the atoms involved. Since numbers have meaning only in relation to a percipient mind, apeksabuddhi) such a mind must be postulated at the very beginning of creation to account for its possibility. Now such an original mind can only be the mind of God. It is interesting to recall here the way in which the famous Eng. lish philosopher Green has sought to prove the dependence of nature on the mind by emphasizing the element of relatedness in nature and by arguing that relations are necessarily dependent on the mind. It might be remarked here that while Dignaga accepted the conceptual nature of relations ( na sambandha indriyena grhyate), he used this as an argument against the ultimate unreality of relations themselves ! All these eight arguments can be summed up into two. The first of these is the cosmological argument which observes the meaningful structure and laws of nature and concludes that these are evidence of the working of a perfect mind as their cause. The second argument may be called theological and amounts to having faith in a supreme person which would be the basis of regarding the scriptures as authoritative revelations of truth beyond the ken of mere human knowledge. Of these the second argument has no force with the Buddhists nd the Jainas since they accept a personal authorship of the Vedas but deny their authority. Religious faith requires an authentic revelation but that does not need to be identified with the Vedas. Nor is it necessary that the revelation should proceed from the creator of the universe. To be authentic the revelation should come from a person who is fully knowledgeable about spiritual matters and is free from all motivation except that of compassion and helpfulness towards suffering humanity. The Buddhists and the Jainas thus accept omniscient human teachers as the source of their religious scriptures and do not feel the need of accepting any God for that purpose. It would be clear that the atheism of the Sramana sects relates only to the idea 1. Cf. Pringle Pattison, The Idea of God (OUP, 1920 ), p. 203. Cf, Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (OUP, 1907), p. 17.

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism 71 of a personal creator of the world not to the idea of a religious saviour. The Buddha and the Jina are in one sense hardly to be distinguished from God. They are omniscient as also the saviours of mankind and are in this sense exactly like God in His aspect of grace. This doctrine of omniscient human teachers was in turn vehemently criticized by Brahmanical thinkers especially the Mimansakas. The Jainas had, like Patanjali, argued that from observing different degrees of knowledge we may infer someone with the highest perfection of knowledge. This is capable of being interpreted as a variety of the ontological argument but the Mimamsakas refuted it empirically by arguing that some differences among men cannot be taken to be evidence for postulating unlimited differences. Some men jump more than others but from this it does not follow that some man can fly. The Buddhists reformulated the argument for omniscience by reinterpreting omniscience itself. It is the knowledge of spiritual truth that is relevant, not the knowledge of trivial or irrelevant things. This interpretation is more in harmony with the common belief of the Buddhists and the Jainas that omniscience is the spontaneous result of the purification of the mind which is thus set free to express its innate knowledge. Whether this innate knowledge of the soul or mind is only self-knowledge or also a knowledge of existence would remain disputable even if one accepts the view that spiritual experience is the revelation of some kind of reality. The Jainas analyse the notion of being an effect' or Karyatva in some detail. Thus Prabhacandra asks - Is it being a whole with parts, or inhering in the actuality of its cause before becoming existent, or being the object of the notion of 'making', or being subject to change ? yattavat ksityaderbuddhimaddhetukatvasiddhaye karyatvam sadhanamuktam, tatkim savayavatvam, pragasatah svakaranasattasamavayah, kytamiti pratyayavi sayatvam, vikaritvam va syat l'One must remember that of these the first had been specially emphasized by Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers. Thus Vacaspati Misra had argued - 'na cainamutpattimatvamasiddham, savayavatvena va mahatve sati kriyavatvena va vastradivat tatsiddheh/l' i. e., 'nor is it unproved that bodies, trees, mountains etc., have an origin because they are composed of parts, or one could say, because, not being of atomic dimension, they are subject to action just as cloth etc. are.' Prabhacandra asks, does

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Sramana Tradition sayayavatva mean inhering in the parts ? In that case even partness (avayavatva) could become a whole ! Does it mean being produed by parts'? This would, however, beg the question; or does savayavatva mean having spatial parts or extendedness' (pradesavatva ) ? If it is a plainly false reason because the sky too has Pradesas but is not a product or effect. Being the object of the notion of production' does not help, because such notions are not always literally or accurately applied. Inherence in causal existence' is meaningless because inherence itself has no plausible meaning. To argue from the changeability ( vikaritva) of the world would not prove its being an effect because everything that has being must change thereby. God himself must, to be real, have modal change. How else would He create the world, if He remained totally changeless ? If then, change means production and a producing cause, the notion of a First Cause become self-contradictory. The fact is that the world like God is ever-existent. It exists and changes and has always existed and changed. Even if one postulates cause for such production, it does not follow that the cause should be intelligent or perfect. The sramanic opposition to the idea of God as creator arises essentially from their belief in the autonomy and centrality of the doctrine of Karman. That there is some order and structure in the world and some purposiveness in the adaptation of life to environment need not be questioned. It may prove that the organization and happen. ings in the world have some relation to mental purposes and volitions but it does not prove that a single, perfect and eternal mind is the cause of such partial order. In fact, if we see structures like a city we have to conclude that they owe their origin not to one but to many and fallible minds. There are even accidental structures. At best we can only be justified in thinking of the working of human minds, directly or through the unseen force of Karman, to understand whatever order we do find in the world. In the Vedic tradition the universe is the expression of a personal will. In the Sramanic tradition it is determined by an impersonal natural law. This view is distinguished from simple naturalism by its belief that the moral law is not inerely a human idea but a causally operative law in nature,

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Sramanic Critique of Brahmanism Sramanic atheism is not a variety of irreligion but of religion. It faces the evil and suffering of life squarely and attributes it to human failings rather than to the mysterious design of an unknown being. It stresses the inexorableness of the moral law. No prayers and worship are of any avail against the force of Karman. It emphasizes self-reliance in the quest for salvation. Man needs to improve himself by a patient training of the will and the purification of feelings. Such purification leads to an inward illumination of which the power is innate in the soul or the mind. This is quite different from the Vedic view where illumination comes from outside, either from an eternally revealed word or from the grace of God. Sramanism represents a sterner variety of religion where the consolation of a personal God is replaced by the guidance of a spiritual teacher which must be practised by the individual himself on the basis of his own resources. S-10

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BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT WORKS 1. Acarangam Sri Bhadrabahusvami - ketaniryukti - Srisilankacarya Krta. vrttiyutam, Surat, 1935. 2. Anga-suttani, 3 vols. ed. Muni Nathmal, Ladnu. 3. Aitareya Brahmana ( Anandasrama ed.) 4. Anguttara Nikaya (PTS ed.) 5. Atmatattvaviveka (Chowkhamba) 6. Baudhayana Dharmasutra (Mysore, 1907). 7. Bhagavati sutra, ed. and tr. by K. C. Lalwani, Calcutta, 1937. 8. Bhagavati sutra ed. Sri Banthik, Sailana (M.P.) 1966, 7 vols. 9. Catuhsataka (Vishvabharati). 10. Cullavagga (Nalanda ed.) 11. Dhammapada (Nalanda ed.) 12. Dasopanisadah, with Sankara's Commy. (Vanivilasa, Kasi) 13. Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. I (P. T. S.) 14. Dighanikaya (PTS ed. : Nalanda ed.) 15. Gautama Dharmasutra (Anandasrama ed.) 16. Gita with Sankara's Commy. (Gita Press) 17. Kalpasutra (Tr. Jacobi, SBE.) 18. Kasika, 6 vols, Varanasi, 1965. 19. Madhyamaka Karikas (Paussins ed.) 20. Mahabharata (Citrasala Press, Poona ) 21. Mahabhasya, Rohtak, 1963. 22. Majjhimanikaya (Nalanda ed.) 23. Mimamsadarsana with Sabara's commy. (Anandasrama) 24. Nyayakumudacandra, 2 vols. ed. by Mahendra Kumar Sastri, Bombay, 1938. 25. Nyayakusumanjalih, with four commentaries, ed. by Padma Prasad Upadhyaya and Dharmadhiraj Shastri (Kasi Sans krit Series, Varanasi, 1957). 26. Nya yasudha, 2 vols. (Chowkhamba Ed.). 27. Pancadasi (Bombay).

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Bibliography 28 Patisambhidamaggal Nalanda ed.) 29. Pramanavartika (ed. Jaiswal Institute, Patna). 30. Pravacanasara, with Amrtacandra's commy. 31. Rgvedasamhita with Sayana's commy., 4 vols. (Chowkhamba) 32. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Chowkhamba, 1964. 33. Satapatha Brahmana, 2 vols. (Acyuta Granthmala ) 34. Suttanipata ( Nalanda ed.) 35. Suttagama, Bombay, 1953. 36. Takakusu, The Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malaya Archipalago (New Delhi, 1966). 37. Tand ya Maha Brahmana, 2 vols. (Chowkhamba). 38. Tattvarthavarttika, 2 vols. (Murti Devi Jaina Granthmala ) 39. Tattvasangraha, 2 vols. (Varanasi). 40. The Thirteen Principal Upani sads (Tr. Hume) 41. Uttarajjhayana (Tr. Jacobi, S. B. E.) 42. Vasistha Dharmasutra (Poona, 1930) 43. Vajrasuci, 2nd ed. (Visvabharati, 1960). 44. l'artikalankara of Prajnakara Gupta (Patna) 45. Visuddhimaggo (Varanasi Sanskrit University) 46. Visuddhimarga tr. Bhikkhu Dharmaraksita (Varanasi, 1956). 47. Sanga yogadarsana ( Chowkhamba ). MODERN WORKS 1. Barua, B. M. Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy (Motilal Bana rasidass, Reprinted ). 2. Basham, A. L. History and Doctrine of the Ajivikas. 3. Belvalkar & Ranade. Creative Period of Indian History, 4. Bhandarkar. Asoka (Calcutta, 1955). 5. Bhandarkar, R. G. Vaisnavism, Saivism and other Minor Sects. 6. Davids R. Buddhism. 7. Davids, Mrs. R. The Birth of Indian Psychology. 8. Deo, S. B. History of Jaina Monachism. (Poona, 1956). 9. Dutta, S. Early Buddhist Monachism. 10. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics (V. P.)

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76 Bibliography 11. Hume The Thirteen Principal Upani sads. 12. Jacobi Jaina Sutras (S. B. E.) 13. Jain, H. L. Bharatiya Sanskriti men Jaina Dharma ka Yogadan (Bhopal, 1962). 14. Kane, P. V. History of Dharma Sastras. 5 vols., Poona. 15. Mishra, G. S. P. The Age of Vinaya (New Delhi, 1972). 16. Pande, G. C. Buddha Dharma ke Vikasa ka Itihasa. (Lucknow, 1963). 17. Pande, G. C. Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, 2nd Edn. (New Delhi) 18. Pringle Pattison. The idea of God (0. U. P. 1920). 19. Raychaudhury H. C. Political History of Ancient India. ( Calcutta, 1972). 20. Rao, S. R. Lothal and the Indus Civilization. 21. Schrader, o. Uber den Stand der indischen Philosophie Zurzeit Mahayiras and Buddhas. 22. Stcherbatsky. Central Conception of Buddhism. 23. Yogendra Misra. History of Vaisali.

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