Book Title: Some Remarks on the Analysis of the Sensuous cognition Process
Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Z_Parshvanath_Vidyapith_Swarna_Jayanti_Granth_012051.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250315/1

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Page #1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Some Remarks on the Analysis of the Sensuous Cognition (Mati-jnana) Process Piotr Balcerowicz* In the Tattvarthadhigamabhasya commenting upon the sutra 1. 15, that deals with the successive stages of mati-jnana (sensuous, perceptual cognition), we find a brief description of the cognitive process leading to the finally formed perceptual knowledge (or cognition; mati-jnana ) acquired with the help of the five senses and a quasi-sense organ or mind'; the four stages are namely avagraha (perception, sensation), iha (speculation, stage of hypotheses), apaya2 (perceptual judgement) and dharana (retention, memorizing enabling future recollection). The method employed in the description of the each stage by the author of the T.S.Bh. is two-fold: insertion of synonyms of the technical terms concemed, and a definition or a brief characteristic of a given step. Thus the synonyms of the perceptual judgement, the third stage of the sensuous cognition, given in the Bhasya are as following: apaya, apagama, apanoda, apavyadha, apeta, apagata, apaviddha and apanutta. It is evident, that we can group them in two sets, each of them numbering four synonyms, and - besides - one can group them into four pairs, each pair derived from the same root. or derivative basis, namely apa i, apa gam, apa nud, apa vyadh, all meaning etymologically "to destroy; to remove". The four synonyms of the first division are formed with the help of krt-affixes* denoting nomena agenti or abstract nouns, for instance : (a) 'apaya' is formed with the help of ac-suffix and therefore it means literary going away; destruction; annihilation' (the Prakrt form 'avaa' having similar meaning); (b) 'apagama', being formed with the ap-suffix forming abstract nouns, has therefore, the meaning 'going away; departure; destruction' (the Prakrt form has got similar meaning); (c) 'apanoda' as well as 'apavyadha' take ghan-suffix and bear the meaning 'removing; taking away' (the Prakrt form avanoya' meaning 'eliminating; elimination') and 'piercing; removing; removal", respectively. Page #2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ 44 Piotr Balcerowicz Unlike the active meaning of the words belonging to the first group, the synonyms of the second division are Past Passive Participles. We can, therefore, ask why the author of the Bhasya has combined terms grammatically bearing opposite or rather contradictory meaning as synonyms? In the Jaina epistemology the terms under examination denote rather a cognitive process although their etymological meaning is slightly different. Apaya or perceptual judgement is defined in 'Sarvarthasiddhi" as "comprehending of the true nature on account of the distinctive cognition (nirjnana ) of particular chara cteristics". A closer examination of the definition of the perceptual judgement (apaya) found in T.S. Bh. may lead us to the conclusion that the author upheld the opinion, quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra" as well as by Yasovijaya", which regarded apaya as only excluding the non-existent characteristics: "the perceptual judgement is a removal of the mental process analysing the pros and cons (of the hypothesis dealing with) the real and non-existing (qualities; the hypotheses that were formed previously at the stage of speculation or iha) after perceiving an object". It is therefore self-explanatory that according to the author of the T. S. Bh. in the apaya stage of the cognitive process the incorrect possibilities are excluded in the course of a deliberate inquiry and only the accurate hypothesis remains. We may also note that the opinion quoted by Yasovijaya in 'Jaina Tarkabhasa'12 is testified positively by the set of synonyms, given in the Bhasya I. 15, related to dharana or retention of the resultant cognition.13 Having taken into consideation that the synonyms of apaya of the second group are Past Passive Participles denoting a result of a cognitive operation indicated by the first division of the synonyms, i.e., they are to indicate the hypothesesexcluded due to the examining process of apaya, we may state that to the author of the Bhasya the perceptual judgement (apaya) is not a mere process of negative analysis leading to a determinate judgement but it includes, as well, the result of such inquiry: the congnitive process and the final decision are inseparable. The above ascertainment is justified also by a statement found in the Bhasya commenting upon the T.S., I. 11: "sensuous cognition is conditioned by a perceptual judgement and by actual substances.""" We may thus, conclude that according to the T. S. Bh. the cognitive process, namely the perceptual judgement (apaya ) as well as the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana ), does not exist without its result in the form of a resultant judgement and, as such, the judgement is an inseparable and essential part of the cognitive process. Page #3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Some Remarks on the Analysis of the Sensuous Cognition Process 45 Besides, the author of the Bhasya can be reckoned a supporter of an opinion considering, on the one hand, the perceptual judgement as a negative process excluding non-existent particulars and on the other hand, the retention (dharana) as a positive process determining the existent characteristics as well as the retaining of the resultant cognition enabling recollection, which distinguishes him from the Agamic tradition. References 1. T. S., I. 14. 2. or 'avaya' which is rather a form of 'apaya' inherited form Prakrt. 3. The authorship of T. S. Bh. ascribed to Umasvati is still questionable; vide BRONKHORST, Chronology of the Tattvartha-sutra, Wiener zietschrift, BAND XXIX, 1986. 4. Vide Kale, 777ff. 5. See also 'Laghusiddhantakaumudi', No. 905, 906 and 932. 6. S. Si., 1.15. 7. Compare : N. Tatia, p. 41. 8. Vi. Bh. 185; after N. Tatia, p. 41. 9. J. T. Bh., I. (7), 15. 10. Vide N.Tatia, p. 41. 11. T. S. Bh., avagarhite visaye samyag asamyag iti guna-dosa-vicaranadhya vasayapanod payah : In this connection I would like to point out in order of better understanding. Another possibility of interpreting this passage according to which the opinion expressed in T. S. Bh. might be unanimous with the Agamic conception of apaya as well as with Jinabhadra's statement concerning the nature of the perceptual judgement : "The perceptual judgement is - after perceiving an object ( threefold, namely ) a speculation upon and apprehension of the correctness and the inaccuracy (of our earlier hypothesis ) as well as removing the uncorrect suggestions or doubts"; but such construction is rather hardly tenable. 12. J. T. Bh., 1/7/15; asadbhutartha-visesa-vyatirekavadharanam apayan, sadbhutartha-visesavadharanam ca dharana. 13. T. S. Bh., I. 15; dharana pratipattir avadharanam avasthanam niscaye vagamah avabodha ityanarthantaram. Page #4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Piotr Balcerowicz 14. T. S. Bh. , I. Il; apaya-sad-dravyataya mati-jnanam. Bibliography 1. Bronkhorst, Chronology of the Tattvartha-sutra, Wienerzeitschrift, Band XXIX, 1986. 2. M. L. Kale, Higher Sanskrit Grammer; Motilal Banarasidass, 1960. 3. Pujyapada : Sarvartha-siddhi' ed. by Mallinathan, Madras, Published by B.Gangawal, Jaipur, 1951. (S. Si. ) 4. N. Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951. 5. Varadaraja, Laghusiddhantakaumudi, ed. by J. R. Ballantyne, Motilal Banarasidass, 1961. 6. Umasvati, Tattvarthadhigama-sutra & Bhasya, ed. by K.P. Mody, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1903. ( T. S. &T. S. Bh.) 7. Yasovijaya, Jaina-tarka-bhasa, ed. by Dr. D. Bhargava, Motital Banarsidass, 1973. ( J. T. Bh. ) 8. Visesavasyaka-bhasya, Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamala No.35. *Oriental Studies Department Warsaw University, Poland.