Satkaryavada And Asatkaryavada

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269534/1

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Satkāryavada and asatkaryavāda
Johannes Bronkhorst
Point of departure of this lecture will be the correspondence principle, i.e. that the words of a sentence correspond, one by one, to the elements that constitute the situation described by that sentence. A full discussion of the historical background of this principle is not possible at this moment. For our present purposes it must suffice to state that the correspondence principle appears to have occupied the minds of the best Indian thinkers for a number of centuries during the first millennium of the common
era.
What is the problem with the correspondence principle? A simple example may explain this. In the case of a sentence like "John reads a book" it makes sense to assume that the situation described by this sentence contains someone called 'John', a book, and the activity of reading. The words of the sentence correspond, therefore, one by one to the elements that constitute the situation described. Put differently, the correspondence principle is valid here. It is not, and cannot be, valid in the sentence "John writes a book". The situation described by this last sentence, too. contains John and the activity of writing, but it does not contain the book. For the book is not yet finished. The same is true of sentences like "he makes a jar" or even "the jar comes into being". The situations described by these last two sentences do not contain the jar that is being made, or that comes into being. If it did, there would be no need to make the jar, or the jar would not have come into being.
The correspondence principle clearly raises questions which it is not easy to answer as long as one holds on to it. Yet most

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with other things - the universal. The word "jar" in "he makes a jar" will have something to refer to, and the problem would be solved.
It is true that from a certain date onward Vaiseșika authors opt for this solution. The Padārthadharmasangraha, or Prasastapädabhāşya, does not however touch this problem, and nor does the Vaišesika Sütra. Since we have pratically no other texts for the early period, one might be tempted to conclude that Vaišeșika authors have chosen this solution right from the time they became aware of the problem of origination. This position will however have to be modified in the light of some of the Vaiseșika points of view that have been preserved for us in the works of non-Vaiseșika authors, which inform us about the period before the Padārthadharmasangraha
Consider to begin with a passage from the Vibhäsāprabhavrtti, a commentary on the Abhidharmadipa, a text of the Buddhist Sarvästivāda school. It attributes the following position to the Vaišesikas:
thinkers of the period under consideration appear to have accepted the principle. And many of them tried to deal with the problem of origination, which is the most obvious problem it evokes. Famous among them is the buddhist thinker Nagarjuna, who did not hesitate to conclude from the dilemma that nothing can come into being. Some followed him in this respect, even from among those who were not Buddhists. The ajativada of Gaudapäda is a famous example. Gaudapāda is considered - at least by the later tradition; many questions surround the historical person or persons who composed the works attributed to him - an early Vedānta author, the teacher of the teacher of Sankara.
Yet most thinkers were not at all that keen to deny the possibility that things can come into being. They had to find other solutions. They all had to find something in the situation de scribed by the sentence "the jar comes into being"/ "he makes a jar", to which the word "jar" could refer. Many chose the universal, sometimes along with other things, such as the individual. The universal "jar-ness" being eternal, it is already there when the jar comes into being, or is made. Others maintained that the jar is present in its causes, and therefore already there in a way while it is being made. This second position is known by the term Satkāryavāda "the position according to which the effect exists in its causes)". I do not think that the Satkäryavada was created, or invented, in order to solve the difficulties connected with the correspondence principle, but its appeal grew inevitably once these difficulties attracted general attention.
But not everyone accepted the Sarkaryavāda. Some emphatically resisted it, preferring the asatkāryavada "the position according to which the effect does not exist in its causes)". The Vaiseșika shool of philosophy accepts this position.
How did Vaiseșika deal with the difficulties connected with the correspondence principle? After what I have said so far, its reaction is almost predictable. Vaiśeşika does not accept that the jar is already there before it comes into being; that solution to the problem is consequently not open to it. Its ontology, on the other hand, does allow for universals. One would therefore expect a solution of the kind that the word "jar" denotes - perhaps along
The Vaisesika thinks as follows: The substance jar', which is not present in the potsherds out of which it will be constituted. and the substance 'cloth, which is not present in the threads out of which it will be constituted, come into being as the result of the contact between the potsherds and that of the threads respectively. And through Secondary thought (gaunya kalpanaya) one speaks of the existence of the agent of coming into being. existence which has as object a state of the jar which is opposite to the present.
Abhidh-d ad kariká 310. p. 274 I. 5-7: tiesiko manyute: kapules uvidyamūnam ghaladravyan U SM Cavid vumāna putudraram kapulutantastyogád padyule gaud cakalpanava viprakriausthāvisayd junikartata uyupadisyutu it. Le mot viprakyta est obscur. The editor, Padmanabh S. Jaini, suggests an emendation into vipraksta 'distant, but this does not improve much. Apte's dictionary gives vipraksia, among other meanings, the sense 'opposed' which seems to fit more or less both here and two lines further down where the word is used a second time.
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The main discussion takes place in the seventh chapter (lit. spoke, ara) of the Dvādaśāranayacakra. The asarkäryavcīda of Vaisesika is attacked right from the very first line:
If the effect is not present in its causes, it would not come into being, for there would be no agent of the operation of coming into being at hand, just as in the case of a sky flower. Or alternatively, also a sky-flower would come into being, because there would be no agent of the operation of coming into being al hand, just as in the case of ancilcct.
Mysterious as this passage is it states quite clearly that the jar exists prior to its coming into being, thanks to a secondary thought. No further details are provided.
If this passage has whetted our appetite, a discussion in the Dvadasāranayacakra of Mallavādin, and in its commentary the Nyāyagamananusarini of Simhasūri will give us further material to think about. We learn here that in Vaišesika things that have come into being are called "existing" because of a connection with the universal "existence" (sanasambandha). This connection with the universal "existence" takes place at the moment of or immediately after their coming into being; it is the reason of the denomination and of the idea of the things concerned.'
Here the following question arises: Are objects completely non-existent before this connection with existence takes place? According to Mallavādin, the Vaiseşikas give a negative answer to this question. Things do exist in a certain way before they come into being. True, they have not connection with existence at that moment, but they have some kind of essence (astitva, svabhāva, svabhāvasatta) which allows them to come into being. This means that even without connection with existence, a substance (or, for that matter, a quality of a movement) has an identity. The Vaišeșika, according to Mallavādin, goes to the extent of reinterpreting the expression asal, which normally means "non-existent". The Vaisesika takes it as a bahuvrihi compound, and interprets it to mean that which does not have existence". The expression asatkāryavāda, seen this way, does not say that the effect is not there before it comes into being; it only says that it has no connection with the universal 'existence as yet.
This is, of course, the familiar problem, which is based on the correspondence principle. The Vaiseșika recognizes the problem, and maintains that the effect does not exist before it comes into being. However, there are two kinds of existence. The effect has no connecion with the universal 'existence (satta) before it comes into being; but it is there, in a certain way - it has astiva, This is why the Vaišeşika answers:2
Unlike the sky-flower, the effect, having come into being through its own ustitvu, becomes, even without the relationship of inherence with the univera! 'existence, a support for that universal.
The opponent of the Vaiseșika then raises the question whether existence (satta) makes existent that which exists, or that which does not exist, or that which exists and does not exist. It is here that the Vaišesika observes that one can deny that substances etc. have a connection with existence, but not their existence
DNC vol.2, p.459 1. 8.9: ... Sattasambandho 'blidhānaprafyayahetuh. DNC vol.2, p.462 1.3-5: N u asar ity atra nana uttarapadábhidheya i varandrrhardt sapratisedhartharval katham asya satmakarvam? na, unekāntar, apuirabrahmanavad agunagunavail yaiha násya putro srity aputro brahmanah ndsya gunosity guno gunuh fathehapi ndsya sad ily usat/: cp. Simhasüri, DNC p.460 1. 10-11.
1 DNC vol. 2, p. 455 I. 1-2 yadyasar karyam notpadyela unannihitabhuvitrkaival khapuspavail khapuspumapi votpadyeta asunnihitabhavitrkatvár karyavat! ? DNC vol. 2, p. 456 I. 1-2 - asrayisamavāyad pre 'pi karyant svanaivastitvenotpannam asrayo bhavari khapuspavaidharmyena ... 3DNC vol. 2 p. 459 1. 1-2: iha prāk sattasambandhar satâm và asarām va sada satan dravyddinām sarkari santa? Similar criticism in the Madhyamakahrdayakärika and Tarkajvālā of Bhavaviveka; see Tachikawa 1994: 898.

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through their own form: the universal 'existence does not, therefore make inexistent things existent.
I will not bother you with all the passages in this long discussion that concern the state of a thing before it is connected with existence. I must however cite the following sentence, which Mallavädin ascribes to the Vaisesika:?
And the object which is asar is not, for that matter, without identity, like a hare's horn. Even without connection with satta, it is in our system like in another one, where pradhana etc. have an iden
tity.
Elsewhere in the discussion Vaiseșika recalls that sämanya, viseșa and samavaya - all Vaiseșika categories - exist without having connection with satta. But the comparison with the pradhana of Samkhya for there can be no doubt that a comparison with the Samkhya system of philosophy is made here -- is stunning. For Sämkhya adheres to the Satkāryavada, and is therefore in may ways the exact opposite of Vaiśeşika with its asatkaryavāda. The comparison shows that the Vaiseṣikas to whose writings Mallavädin had access came dangerously close to the position of the sämkhyas where they tried to solve the problem of origination.
A very important question remains to be discussed. If the Vaiseṣikas maintained that things exist in a certain way before they come into being, can one determine the beginning of this half-existence? Are they there from beginningless time, as the Sämkhyas believed? To my knowledge Mallavädin and Simhasüri's discussions offer no answer to this question. We may find the answer in another early text, the Yuktidīpikä, which comments upon the samkhyakärikā. Around kärikā 9 this text contains a discussion with a Vaiśesika on the satkaryavāda. Where it presents the argument that one cannot make something
DNC vol. 2, p.460 1. 1-2: dravyādinām sattasambandhaḥ pratișidhyate na tu svarupasadbhava iti satta naiväsatām satkarī
2 DNC vol. 2, p.462 L 6-7: na ca tad api niratmakam sasaviṣaṇavat. sattasambhandad rte 'pi yatha parapakṣe pradhānādinām satmakarvan tuthehapi syat."
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that is not there an argument which we are familiar with it puts the following words in the mouth of the Vaisesika:
But the effect is made by the agent etc. in the intermediate time. Which is this intermediate time? The answer is (follows a verse): They call "intermediate time" the time during which the causes have started to do the work, until the production of the effect.
I conclude, be it with much caution, that the preexistence of somethinmg that is going to come into being is not without beginning. This passage from the Yuktidipikā suggests rather that this preexistence starts when the different factors that contribute to produce the effect, i.e. to make the jar, start fulfilling their various functions. The intermediate time is neither without beginning, nor momentary.
Two questions remain to be asked in connection with the preceding observations. First of all, what is in general the relationship between words and things in Vaiseșika? Since the correspondence principle presupposes a close link between the words of a sentence and the elements that constitute the situation it describes, this question is of some importance. The second question to be asked concerns the literature of Vaiseṣika in which the positions just described were originally expressed.
First the relationship between words and things. In a recent article I have argued that Vaiseșika is to a large extent based on four axioms. Two of these axioms are of special interest in the present context. In Vaiśeșika composite objects are looked upon as real, as real as their constituents, and as existing alongside them. The vase is different from the two halves that it is com
YD p. 52 1. 16-21: aha, nanu ca madhyame kale kurträdibhiḥ karyam krivatel kah punar asan madhyamah kala iti" aha:
arambhaya prasṛta yasmin kale bhavanti kartärah karyasyänispädäi tam madhyamam kalam icchamill iti yada hetavah pravṛttarambha bhavanty uddisya karyam na ca tavan naimittikasyamalabhaḥ samvartate sa madhyamah kalah tasmin kriyate kärakaiḥ käryam iti. Cp. Motegi, 1994: 815 sq: Motegi draws attention to the fact that the reading käryasyänispädät in the verse is an emendation which deviates from the manuscripts.
2 Bronkhorst, 1992.

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posed of; together they constitute three entities. The Vai eşikas, moreover, present a list of categories which constitutes, in their opinion, a list of all there is. The question is: how could the Vaisesikas find out what filled their world?
Their answer is directly relevant to the theme of this lecture. It is: the Sanskrit language. The Sanskrit language allowed them to find out what exists. Words are for them the key that gives access to reality. This they explain by pointing out that names were given by seers who could perceive everything. This in its turn
Vaiseșika Sürra (ed. Jambuvijaya) 2.1.18-19: sajnakarma iv asmadvisistānam lingam/ praryakspårvakalvā! salljäkarmanah. See also Wezler, 1985. The theme of seers who have given names to things is already present in the Rgveda and other early texts, as we have seen. Other texts take over the same theme. The yukridipika (ed. Pandeya, p. 5 19 f.) ascribes the original function of naming things to the supreme seer (paramarsi), who is, of course Kapila. The Mahabhārata (12.262.8), probably inspired by the Nirukta passage cited earlier.. states that the seer Kapila had an insight into the nature of things (pruryakyadharma): The Mahabhasya (ed. Kielhorn vol. I p. 111. 11f.) uses the same expression (here pratyaksadharman) in connection with seers known as yurvanas tarvånas (so Cardona 1990: 7 and 16 n. 24). The Nyāya Bhäsyu use the same expression as the Nirukra (sāksäikytadharman) with reference to "reliable persons" (apa); see Franco 1994: 241. See further Rucg8, 1994, 1994a; also Bharthari's yogic perception has played a role in Vaišeşika from an early date onward. The idea that poets have a special insight into the nature of things was to have a long life in India. Rajasekhara, the author of the treatise on poetry called Kavyamimansa (9th or 10th century C.E). observes in chapter 12 (p. 62, 117.p.63,1.1, tr. Granoff, 1995:364): "The true poetic eye, gained from propitiation of the goddess Sarasvati, without need of external aids reveals things that have been directly experienced before, in a process that is beyond the range of human conception and cannot be described in words. For it is said that the goddess Sarasvati reveals even to the sleeping poet both the theme of his poem and the language in which to express it. But others though awake are as if blind. For this reason it is said that really great poets are blind to things that have already been seen by others, but possess a kind of divine sight that enables them to perceive that which no one before them has ever seen. Even the Three-eyed god Siva or Indra with his thousand eyes cannot see that which mortal poets see with their ordinary eyes. In the mirror that is the mind of poets the whole universe is reflected. Words and what they express vie with each other in their rush to be present to great minded poets. Poets explore with their words that which yogins see through the power of their religious accomplishments. And so the
explains why the Vaiseșika texts frequently emphasise that this or that ontological situation justifies this or that current expres. sion. The quality prthaktva (separateness), for example, explains that people speak of distinction. Sometimes the reasoning works in the opposite direction: the fact that the personal pronoun "I" cannot be used in apposition with some such term as "earth", proves that the soul is different from the body. Many further examples could be adduced to illustrate the parallelism between words and things from the Vaiseșika point of view, but they tend to be rather technical; I will not, therefore, harrass you with more of them. But I would like to add one more observation: even though the texts are not explicit about this, the conscious belief in the intimate connection between words and things may explain why the three most important and perhaps oldest) categories of Vaišeşika- substance (dravya), quality (guna) and movement (karman) - correspond to the three main types of words: nouns. adjectives and verbs.
These considerations show that Vaišeşika takes a close connection between words and things for granted. This makes it all the more understandable that the principle of correspondence exerted a strong attraction on them.
We now turn to the other remaining question. Which were the Vaiseșika texts in which the positions outlined above found expression?
The oldest clearly understandable and unitary Vaišeşika text which we possess is the Padārthadharmasangraha of Prasastapāda, which I mentioned earlier. I am tempted to believe that this text belongs to the sixth century of the common era, and I have the impression that most researchers would more or less agree with this date. Besides the Padārthadharmasangraha we have a short text, that has only survived in Chinese translation, and which may have been called Daśapadārthi; it is unfortunately too short to derive much information from it. And then there is, of course, the Vaiseșika Sutra. The Vaiseșika Sūtra is the oldest
words of great poets are potentially infinite".
See Bronkhorst, 1992: 99f., for these and other examples.

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Vaiseşika text we possess, and I am tempted to think that it is the earliest Vaiseṣika text that ever existed. It, or rather its earliest version, must date back to the early centuries of the common era, for Vaiseṣika is already referred to in the Buddhist Vibhāṣā. Unfortunately the Vaiśeşika Sūtra which is known to us is not identical with its earliest version. Five versions have been preserved, all of which share features that belong to a time well after the beginning of the system. Sütras have been added and removed, and even the order of the Sutras appears to have occasionaly been changed so as to allow of a different interpretation.3
It is not clear until what date modifications were still introduced into the Vaiśeşika Sūtra. Certain is that a long time separates the earliest version of this text from the Padärthadharmasangraha. And it is also becoming more and more clear that during this period much happened to the system. The Sūtra that enumerates qualities, for example, has just seventeen of them. The Padarthadharmasangraha, on the other hand, enumerates twenty-four qualities. Among the added qualities we find sound, and there is indeed evidence that early Vaiseṣika look upon sound, not as a quality, but as a substance, a form of wind.+ Another example concerns the creator god: the Vaiśeşika Sūtra contains no trace of a creator god, in the Padarthasangraha he has resumed his position. We even have the evidence from the Yuktidīpikä and from the Vedantin philosopher Sankara to the extent that early Vaiseṣika did not accept a creator god, whereas the later thinkers of the school did.
Most of these changes were not introduced into the system by Prasastapāda. The idea of a creator god may be an exception; here there is some reason to assume that Prasastapāda himself
Ui, 1917: 38f.
? Three versions were known, accompanied by the commentaries of Candrananda, Bhatta Vadindra and Sankara Miśra respectively; two more have been brought to light in Harunaga Isaacson's recent doctoral dissertation (1995).
3 See Bronkhorst, 1995.
4 Bronkhorst, 1993a.
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may have played a crucial role. Most of the other developments must have found their earliest expression in a number of texts that have existed during the long time that separates the original Vaiseşika Sūtra from the Padarthadharmasangraha. Of most of these texts even the names will probably forever remain unknown to us. About a few of them, however, we have some little information. One is a commentary written by Prasastapāda. the author of the Padarthadharmasangraha. The other is the one on which he wrote a commentary, and which appeared to have been well-known in its time. By collecting the various testimonies in the texts of other schools, I have come to think that this text was called Kaṭandī, and that its author was known by the name Rāvana. The Kaṭandī was itself a commentary, on the Vaiseșika Sūtra, and it was written in the so-called varttika-style, which explains that we sometimes find references to vakyas and bhäṣyas; the värttika-style is characterised by the presence of short nominal vakyas followed by somewhat more elaborate explanations called bhāṣyas.
This Kaṭandi (or whatever may have been its name) appears to have been an authoritative text for quite some time. It is indeed the text to which Mallavädin constantly refers while describing and criticizing the Vaiśeşika position. It seems likely that also the other texts we have referred to the Buddhist Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti and the Samkhya Yuktidīpikā based their information concerning Vaiśeşika on this text. However this may be, it seems probable that the problem of origination did not play much of a role, if any, during the time of composition of the original Vaiśeşika Sutra, and that it came up at a later time, perhaps for the first time in the Kaṭandi, or already before this text.
I have already pointed out to you that the later Vaiseṣika came to adopt a solution to the problem of origination that was quite different from the one offered (if I am right) in the Katandi. Later Vaiseșikas joined the Naiyayikas in thinking that the fact that words refer to universals solved that problem. Once this solution accepted, the complicated distinction between two forms of
1 Bronkhorst 1996.

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existence, and the attempt to use it to answer the question of how something can come into being, became superfluous, and the weaknesses of the earlier solution, such as its vagueness (when exactly does the preexistence of a jar begin?), could not but contribute to its decline. The earlier solution was not just refuted, worse, it was forgotten, and noone talked about it any more. I do not exclude that this change of position of the Vaisesika thinkers is responsible for the fact that the Katandi and its commentary by Prasastapada, once the main works of the school, soon stopped to be handed down. Prasastapada's Padarthadharmasangraha, on the other hand, does not touch the question of origination; is this the reason that it continued to be handed down in a fairly large number of manuscript copies until today? It is hard to prove these suspicions, but I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that the loss of philosophical texts may in certain cases have been occasioned by the fact that points of view changed. Granoff, Phyllis (1995): "Sarasvati's sons: biographies of poets in me dieval India." Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 49(2), 351-376. Houben, Jan E.M. (forthcoming ): "Bhartshari's perspectivism(1): The Vstti and Bhartphari's perspectivism in the first kanda of the Vakyapadiya." Isaacson, Harunaga (1993): "Yogic perception (yogipratyaksa) in early Vaisesika." Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 18, 139-160.. Isaacson, Harunaga (1995): Materials for the study of the Vaisesika System. Doctoral dissertation, Leiden University (unpublished). Jambuvijaya, Muni (ed.)(1961): Vaisesika Sutra of Kanada. With the commentary of Candrananda. Reprint. Baroda: Oriental Institute 1982. Motegi, Shujun (1994): "Some Vaisesika thoughts referred to in the Yuktidipika." AS48(2), 807-817. Pandeya, Ram Chandra (ed.) (1967): Yuktidipika An ancient commen tary on the Samkhya-Karika of isvaraklsna. Delhi: Motilal Banarsi dass. Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1994): pramanabhuta, *pramana(bhuta)-purusa, pratyaksadharman and saksatkrtadharman as epithets of the rsi, acarya and tathagata in grammatical, epistemological and Madhyamaka texts." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 57, 303-320. Tachikawa, Musashi (1994): "The concept of universal in Bhavaviveka's writings." AS 48(2), 891-902. Ui, H. (1917): The Vaiseshika Philosophy according to the Dasapadartha-Sastra. Chinese text with introduction, translation and notes. Edited by F.W. Thomas. Second edition: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1962. (ChSSt, 22.) Wezler, Albrecht (1985): "Bemerkungen zu Vaisesika-Sutra 6.1.1-3 (resumee)." Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Supplement VI, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, p. 282. References Bronkhorst, Johannes (1992): "Quelques axiomes du Vaisesika". Les Cahiers de Philosophie 14 (L'orient de la pensee; philosophies en Inde"), 95-110. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993): "The Vaisesika vakya and bhasya". Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 72-73 (1991 1992),145-169. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993a): "Studies of Bhartrhari, 5: Bharthari and Vaisesika." AS47(1), 75-94. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1995): "Once again Vaisesika Sutra 3.1.13." AS 48(2), 1994-1995, 665-681. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996): "God's arrival in the Vaisesika system." Journal of Indian Philosophy 24, 281-294. Cardona. George (1990): "On attitudes towards language in ancient In dia." Sino-Platonic Papers 15 (Department of Oriental Studies, Uni versity of Pennsylvania), 1-19. Franco, Eli (1994): "Yet another look at the framework of the Pramanasiddi chapter of Pramanavarttika." Indo-Iranian Journal 37, 233-252. Abbreviations Abhidh-d Abhidharmadipa with Vibhasaprabhavstti. ed. P.S. Jaini, Patna 1959 (TSWS 4). DNC Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Mallavadin, with the commen tary of Nyayagamanusarini of Simhasuri, 3 parts, ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavnagar: Sri Jain Atmanand Sabha (Sri Atmananda Jaina Granthamala no. 92, 94, 95), 1966, 1976. 1988.