Role Of Drstanta Indignagas Logic

Author(s): Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269461/1

Page #1
The Role of drstanta in Dignaga's Logic Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University 0. Dignaga discusses drstanta (example) and drstantabhasa (pseudo-example) in the Pramanasamuccayavrtti (=PSV) Chapter IV. Most of his discussions in the svamata section can be traced back to his earlier work, the Nyayamukha. In the paramata section he criticizes the views presented in the Vadavidhi attributed to Vasubandhu as well as those of Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas.2 The aim of this paper is to present a summary of Dignaga's discussions on drstanta in the svamata section, from which we will be able to draw some conclusions about the role of drstanta in Dignaga's logic." The first part of my presentation at the panel in Lausanne, 1999, which dealt with Dignaga's theory of trairapya, has appeared under the title of "Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke," in Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, Indo no Bunka to Ronri (Culture and Logic in India), ed. by Akihiko Akamatsu, University Press of Kyushu, Oct. 2000, pp. 241-266. 2A synopsis of PS/PSV/PST Chapter IV: 1 Dignaga's own views (svamata) on drstanta and drstantabhasa 1.1 Dignaga's own views on drstanta (Derge8b4-9a4/60a2-63a3/212b3-226b3) 1.1.1 drstanta statement expresses the second and third characteristics of a valid reason (hetu) 1.1.2 Two kinds of drstanta and their proper formulations 1.1.3 Necessity of the two kinds of drstanta in a single proof 1.1.4 Purpose of drstanta; components of a proof: reason, pervasion (vyapti)& a proposition to be proved (sadhya) 1.1.5 Independent status of drstanta from a reason 1.1.6 Relation between a reason and drstanta 1.1.7 Critique of the Nyayasutra 1.1.34 1.1.8 Critique of the Nyayasutra 1.1.35 1.1.9 Necessity of pervasion to be expressed in drstanta statement 1.2. Dignaga's own views on drstantabhasa (Derge 9a5/63a3-b1/226b3-22763) 2 Dignaga's critique of the views held by other schools (paramata) 2.1 The Vadavidhi views (Derge 9a5-9b1/63b1-64a5/227b3-229a5) 2.2 The Naiyayika views (Derge 9b1-3/64a5-66a3/229a5-236b6) 2.3 The Vaisesika views (Derge 9b3-4/66a3-7/236b6-237b3) 3 This portion of PSV has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in Kitagawa (1965). He edited two versions of Tibetan translations of PS and PSV and tranlsated them into Japanese wtih detailed annotations. Muni Jambuvijaya restored Sanskrit texts of the beginning portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV in Jambuvijaya (1966). He translated into Sanskrit the Dignaga on Example - 1

Page #2
1. Introducing PS IV.6, Dignaga assumes the following process of 'inferece for oneself (svarthanumana, 'inference in short): (1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (linga, e.g. a piece of smoke) in the object to be inferred (anumeya, e.g. at the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteritics (trirupa) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., paksadharmatva. (2) Next we recall that we previoiusly experienced elsewhere presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya, e.g. a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (asat, e.g., a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., anvaya (a positive concomitance) and vyatireka (a negative concomitance). (3) Then, we can have an ascertainment (niscaya) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as e.g., that there must be a fire, though imperceptible, hidden at the top of the moutain." In short, an inferential mark possessing the three characteristics (paksadharmatva, anvaya and vyatireka) can produce an ascertainment of a certain state of affairs regarding an object to be inferred. He then states PS IV.6 as . follows: "[In 'inference for others' (pararthanumana, 'proof' in short), on the other hand,] with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (niscaya) as we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason(hetu)'s] being a property relevant portions of PST in its footnotes. Furthermore he did the same for the Vaisesika section of this chapter in Jambuvijaya (1961). Most recently Waso Harada translated the beginning. portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV (vv.1-5) in the footnote (13) of Harada (1999). I would like to acknowledge my indebtness to those previous studies. I briefly discussed Dignaga's treatment of drstanta in Katsura (1984). I would also like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner and his staff at the Austrian Academy of Science for their great help in recovering the fragments of PS and PSV Chapter IV. PSV[K] 150b5-7: rjes su dpag pa la yang tshul 'di yin par mthong ste/gal te rtags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la nges par bzung na / gzhon du de dang rigs mthun pa la yod pa nyid dang/med pa la med pa nyid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i nges pa bskyed par yin no // Cf. PSV[V] 61b5-, Kitagawa (1965: 521); PST (Derge) 223a6: rjes su dpag pa la yang zhes rang gi don rjes su dpag pa la'o /; NMukh $5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.). Cf. PS II.1 ab: anumanam dvidha; svartham trirupal lingato rthadrk / Dignaga on Example - 2

Page #3
of the topic (paksa) of a proposition (paksadharmatva), (2) [its inseparable] relation (sambandha) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (sadhya). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof]." Thus the purpose of a logical proof (pararthanumana) is to produce in the opponent the same kind of ascertainement that is obtained by the proponent through an inference (svarthanumana). That indicates a close parallelism between an inference and a proof. Commenting upon the above verse, Dignaga clarifies the roles of the three members (avayava) of his logical proof, viz., 'proposition/thesis' (paksa), 'reason' (hetu) and 'example' (drsstanta) in the following manner: (1) The statement of a proposition (paksa-vacana) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (anumeya). (2) The statement of a reason (hetu-vacana) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (paksadharmatva). (3) The statement of an example (drstanta-vacana) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (avinabhava) to the property to be inferred (anumeya). Then he excludes 'desire to know' (jijnasa), 'application' (upanaya), 'conclusion' (nigamana) and others from the members of a proof and concludes that there are no members of a proof other than the above three. svaniscayavad anyesam niscay spadanecchaya sambandhasadhyokter anyvarjanam // = NMukh v. 13: [] . Quoted in PVA (487); padas cd in VNT (64) and NV (130). / paksadharmatva Cf. also Hetubindu of Dharmakirti, ed. by Steinkellner (Wien: 1967) 6: svaniscayavad anyesam api niscayotpadanaya ca sadhanam ucyate / Prasannapada of Candrakirti, ed. by L. de La Vallee Poussin (St. Petersburg: 1903-13) 19: yo hiyam artham pratijanite, tena svaniscayavad anyesam niscayotpadanecchaya yayopapattyasav artho 'dhigatah salvopapattih parasmay upadestavya Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara (ed. by X) v. 10: svaniscayavad anyesam niscayotpadanam buddhaih/ parartham manam akhyatam vakyam tadupacaratah // 7 PSV[K] 150b8-151a2: gang gi phyir phyogs kyi chos nyid bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa dang/yang de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba dang med na mi byung ba'i don du dpe brjod pa dang/rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa'i don du phyogs brjod pa ste rjes su dpag pa'i yan lag gzhan yod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir gzhan dag ni shes pa la sogs pa rnams dang nye bar sbyor ba dang mjug bsdu ba dag 'dir spangs pa yin no // Cf. PSV[V] 61b7-62a1, Kitagawa (1965: 521-522); NMukh SS5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.). Dignaga on Example - 3

Page #4
The statement of a proposition is actually a re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself, while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., paksadharmatva) of a valid mark in an inferential process. The i the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (sambandha/avinabhava), must correspond to the recollection of anvaya and vyatireka. It is true because, as I investigated elsewhere, anvaya and vyatireka with eva-restriction represent such an inseparable realtion between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, pervasion (vyapti) of the former by the latter. Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof. In any case, according to Dignaga the role of the statement of an example (drstanta-vacana) in a proof is to present the relation (sambandha) called 'inseparable' (avinabhava) between a reason (hetu, i.e., a proving property, sadhana-dharma) and a property to be proved (sadhya-dharma), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (a-bhava) without (vina) the latter, for example, a piece of smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (linga) and the marked (lingin, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference. It is called 'restriction' (niyama), . 'pervasion' (vyapti), concomitance' (anubandha), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the second and the third characteristics (anvaya and vyatireka) of a valid reason and an inferential mark. 2. With the theory of the 'inseparable relation' or 'pevasion' as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignaga is much concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of 'example' (drstanta). In PS IV.1 he states as follows: "It has been said that a valid reason (hetu) possesses the three characteristics (trirupa). According to the convention (rudhi), however, it (i.e., reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (paksadharma) only. * See my article mentioned in the footnote 1. See PS II.21: linge lingi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punah / niyamasya viparyase 'sambandho lingalinginoh // Quoted in Hetubindutika of Arcata (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda: 19xx) 18. Dignaga on Example - 4

Page #5
The reamining two characteristics (of a valid reason) are (to be presented by an example[-statement) (drstanta)."10 Here Dignaga seems to be criticizing some unsatisfactory formulation of a proof given by other Indian logicians of his time. In this conection, I suppose that he is presupposing, as for example, the following formulaiton: (proposition] "anityah sabdah" [reason] "krtakatvat" [example) "krtako ghato 'nityo drstah" [application] "tatha ca krtakah sabdah" [conclusion] "tasmat krtakatvad anityah sabdah" LaPP [Proof 1] According to Dignaga, the first characteristic of a valid reason, i.e., paksadharmatva, is implicitly stated in the statement of a reason of the above Proof 1 because the word 'sabdasya' is understood there and the statement becomes "sabdasya krtakatvat". The second and the third characteristics (anvaya and vyatireka), however, are not mentioned at all in the entire proof and they must be formulated in the statement of an example in a valid proof. Thus it is clear that in a proof of Dignaga, the statement of a reason expresses the first characteristic (paksadharmatva) and that the statement of an example expresses the second and the third characterisitos (anvaya and vyatirekc). Furthermore, Dignaga states in PS IV.2 as follows: "An example is that [object] in which a reason (hetu) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (sadhya) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two kinds: 'similar' (sadharmya) and another (i.e. 'dissimilar' vaidharmya)." 10 trirupo hetur ity uktam paksadharme tu samsthitah / rudhe rupadvayam sesam drstantena pradarsyate // Quoted in VNT (88) with a variant reading. 11 sadhyenanugamo hetoh sadhyabhave ca nastita / khyapyate yatra drstantah sa sadharmyetaro dvidha // = NMukh v. 11 E **T# H=49R TE Quoted in Dignaga on Example - 5

Page #6
In this connection it is to be noted that Dignaga uses the same word 'drstanta' in two distinct meanings, viz. an ohject (artha) as an example for a proof in PS IV.2 and a statement (vacana) whch presents an example together with a general law (i.e., an inseparable relation or pervasion between a reason and a property to be proved) in PS IV.1. That is clear from his own comment that yatra in PS IV.2c refers to an object to be referred to (abhidheya)." Jinendrabuddhi justifies Dignaga's usage by means of 'superimposition of identity' (abhedopacara) between the expression (abhidhana) and the expressed (abhidheya). Thus the name 'drstanta', which means an example-object (artha, i.e. abhidheya), is metaphorically applied to a statement of an example (vacana, i.e., abhidhana)."" The Nyayasutra (= NS), on the other hand, distinguishes an example (drstanta)' from exemplification (udaharana), i.e., the third member (avayava) of their five-membered proof. It may be a weak point in Dignaga's system of logic Dasavaikalikasutraharibhadrivrrri 34B mentioned in Jambuvijaya (1966 Appendix: 133); cf. NMukh v. 4 = PS III.15 mentioned in footnote 23. 12 PSV[K] 148a7: gang la zhes brjod par bya ba la thams cad la 'gro ba ni rjes su 'gro ba'o // PSV[V] D60a4: rjes su 'gro ba thams cad du 'gro 'o // gang zhes pa ni brjod par bya'o // (sarvatra gamo 'nugamah / yatreti abhidheye) 13 PST D21262-4: de'i phyir de'i don du dpe brjod par bya ba'o zhes pa dang/dpe yis rab tu gsal bar byed // ces kyang ngo // rjod par byed pa dang brjod par bya ba dag tha mi dad par nye bar btags pa la 'di skad ces brjod do Il gzhan du na gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa'i tshig las don kho na dpe nyid de / don gyis gsal bar byed pa yang ma yin no zhes pas 'di mi rigs par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir tha mi dad pa nye bar btags pa las dpe rjod par byed pa'i ngang tshul can gyi tshig ni 'dir dpe'i sgras brjod do // (atas tadartham drstanta ucyatam iti drstantena prakasyata iti ca/abhidhanabhidheyayor abhedopacarad evam uktam /anyatha yatrety abhidheya iti vacanad arthasyaiva drstantata / na carthena prakasyata ity ayuktam etat syat / tasmad abhedopacarad drstantabhidhayivacanam atra drstantasabadenoktam PST D213a1-2: gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa 'dis don dpe nyid gsungs so // tshig ni de'i rjod par byed pa nyid kyi phyir nye bar btags pa'i dpe'o // 'di yang/dpe yis rab tu bstan par bya // zhes pa 'dis sngar nyid rig par byas zin to // (yatrety abhidheya ity anenarthasya drstantatam aha / vacanam tu tadabhidhayitvad upacarena drstantah / etac ca drstantena pradarsyata ity anena prag evaveditam ) 14 See NS 1.1.25: laukikapariksakanam yasininn arthe buddhisamyam sa drstantah II, and NS1.1.36: sadhyasadharmyat .taddharmabhavi drstanta udaharanam //Uddyotakara certainly notices this distinction. See NV ad NS1.1.36: nanu ca karanakarakaparigrahat vacanam udaharanam, drstantas carthah; na canayoh samanadhikaranyam yujayte, na hi visanadimad ity abhidhanam gava samanadhikaranam bahvati / naisa dosah vacanavisesa natvena drstantasyopadanat, na svatantro drstanta udaharanam ...... For details, see Prets's article in this volume. Dignaga on Example - 6

Page #7
that he uses one and the same technical term in more than one meanings. For example, he applies 'paksa' to both a content of a proposition to be proved and a statement of such a proposition in a proof formulation; the latter (i.e., the first member of a proof) is called 'pratijna' in NS. It is to be noted in passing that Dignaga clearly states that the main purpose of an example-statement is to indicate an external object (bahyartha) as an example. This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality. Furthermore, it is most likely Dignaga who classified examples into two types and named them accordingly; i.e., 'a similar example' (sadharmya-drstanta) and 'a dissimilar example' (vaidharmyadrstanta). His convention was generally followed by Indian logicians after him. 2.1. Now let us see how Dignaga formulates his example-statement. He seems to assume the following formulation as a valid proof: [proposition] "anityah sabdah" [reason] "prayatnanatariyakatvat (similar ex.) "yat prayatnanantariyakam tad anityam drstam yatha ghatah" [dissimilar ex.)"(yan) nityam (tad) aprayatnanantariyakam drstam yathakasam" [Proof 2116 When we compare the two Proofs quoted above, it is clear that the difference lies in the statement of an example (drstanta), besides the absence of the statements of application and conclusion in Proof 2. Proof 1 simply refers to an object, i.e., a pot, which is both 'produced' (krtaka) and 'non-eternal', in other words, possesses both a proving property (sadhanadharma/hetu )and a property to 15 PSV[K] 148b6: phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no (bahyarthapradarsanam hi nidarsye pradhanam). 16 PSV[K] 148a7-8: re zhig chos mthun pas ni sgra mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro // gang rtsol ba las byung ba de ni mi rtag par mthong ste dper na bum pa bzhin zhes bya ba dang /chos mi mthun pas rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin par mthong ste nam mkha' bzhin zhes bya ba Ita bu'o // (sadharmyena tavad anityah sabdah prayatnantariyakatvat / yad dhi prayatnanatriyakam tad anityam drstam yatha ghata iti / vaidharmyena nityam aprayatnanatriyakam drstam yathakasam iti :) Dignaga on Example - 7

Page #8
be proved (sadhyadharma). As Dignaga criticizes, it does not mention any relation (sambandha) between the two properties. Proof 2, on the other hand, mentions such a relation; namely "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal" (or whatever is Pis Q) in a similar example and "Whatever is eternal (i.e., not non-eternal) is not produced by a human effort" (or whatever is not Q is not P) in a dissimilar example. It is to be noted that those two statements are logically equivalent because they are in contraposition. In any case an example-statement of Dignaga, whether similar or dissimilar, expresses the relation of pervasion (vyapti) of a proving property by a property to be proven." We should not ignore the fact that the word 'drsta' (observed) qualifies those apparently universal relations mentioned in the example-statements of Proof 2, so that they amount to mean: It is observed that whatever is Pis Q, or it is observed that whatever is not Q is not P. This suggests that Dignaga's statement of pervasion does not neccessary imply a universal law but a general law derived from our observations or experiences; in other words, it is a kind of hypothetical proposition derived by induction. In order to justify such an inductive process 17 Paksilasvamin/Vatsyayana, who must have been active before Dignaga, gives the two parallel proofs which he seems to regard as independent, though both prove the same proposition by the same reason. Dignaga appears to have incorported the two proofs into one by adopting both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof. See Prets's article in this volume. Nyayabhasya ad NS 1.1.39: (proposition "anityah sabdah" [reason] "utpattidharmakatvat" [exemplification)"utpattidharmakam sthalyadi dravyam nityam drstam" [application] "na ca tathanutpattidharmakah sabdah, kim tarhi utpattidharmakah" (conclusion] "tasmad utpattidharmakatvad anityah sabdah" [Proof a] (proposition "anityah sabdah" [reason] "utpattidharmakatvat" [exemplification]" anutpattidharmakam atmadi dravyam anityam" (application] "tatha cotpattidharmakah sabdah" [conclusion] "tasmad utpattidharmakatvad anityah sabdah" [Proof b] 18 I would like to suggest an etymology of the word drstanta, which is the end' or the culminating point (anta) of 'observation' (drsta). It fits well with the inductive nature of Indian Dignaga on Example - 8

Page #9
Dignaga needed to present both positive and negative examples in one set of a proof. Thus, I think, Dignaga's presentation of example-statements clearly indicate the inductive nature of his logic. 2.2. Now let us go back to PS IV.2: "An example is that [object) in which a reason (hetu) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (sadhya) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved." This contains Dignaga's suggestion of how to formulate similar and dissimilar examples. Namely, a similar example should be formulated by a reason being followed by a property to be proved (hetoh sadhyena anugamah), and a dissimilar example by a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sadhyabhave hetos nastita). Their formulations may be called anvaya (continued presence) and vyatireka (continued absence) respectively, for they can be put into the following formulae: "When a reason (P) is present, a property to be proved (Q) is present." "When a property to be proved (Q) is absent, a reason (P) is absent." Since P is a reason and Q is a property to be proved by that reason, you can rephrase and symbolize the above formulae in the following manner: If x is P, then x is Q. If x is not Q, then x is not P. Px > Qx Qx > -Px Let us compare the above formulae with anvaya and vyatireka in the trairupya formulae. PS II.5cd reads:" [A valid inferential mark (linga)'s presence in what is similar to the [object to be inferred) and its absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred)" ([lingasya] tattulye sadbhavo nastitasati)." If we assume that 'what is similar to the object to be inferred (anumeya)' and 'the absence of the property to be inferred' in PS II.5cd respectively correspond to the traditional concepts of a set of similar examples (sapaksa) and that of dissimilar logic. 19 For a detailed discussion of the trairupya formulae of Dignaga, please see my article mentioned in the footnote 1. Dignaga on Example - 9

Page #10
ones (asapaksa/vipaksa), they can be reformulated in the following manner: "When a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present." "When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is not present." (N.B.: an inferential mark is equivalent to a reason of a proof.) When we compare them with the formulae of the two examples mentioned above, the difference lies in anvaya formula; namely, the order of P and Q are reversed. As a matter of fact, the anvaya and vyatireka of trairupya, rather than those of the examples, represents more orthodox formulation of 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' named by George Cardona: X Y and -X -Y. anvaya and vyatireka of the trairupya formulae show how a valid inferential mark is distributed in our Induction Domain (a la Richard Hayes) consisting of a set of similar examples and that of dissimilar examples. If P is found in the domain of Q and not in the domain of -Q, we can assume a certain relation between P and Q. For example, P (e.g., smoke) is a result of Q (e.g., a fire). In the case of trairupya, P is discovered to be a valid logical mark (linga) of a property to be proved, Q. In this connection, following Vasubandhu's lead, Dignaga considered that a valid mark/reason (P) is inseparably related (nantariyaka/avinabhavin) to a property to be proved (Q). In other words, in order to be a valid mark/reason, the domain of P should be restricted to and included in the domain of Q. He named such a relation 'pervasion' (vyapti) of P by Q and successfully formulated it by introducing the restrictive particle eva into the formulae of anvaya and vyatireka in the following manner: "Only (eva) when a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present." "When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is never (naiva) present." It is to be noted that the above formulae present not a logical but ontological Dignaga on Example - 10

Page #11
relation between two items P and Q, though we can easily derive from such a relation a kind of general law that whatever is P is Q. The puropse of Dignaga's example statements is precisely to formulate such a general law; that is why the order of P and Q is reversed there in order to present it in a logically proper way. In order to avoid a confusion, anvaya and vya tireka expressed in the two examples are by later authors called anvaya-vyapti (a positive pervasion) and vyatirekavyapti (a negative pervasion) respectively. It is to be noted in passing that Dignaga does not give any argument for justifying the introduction of eva restriction; in other words, he never tried to justify the very foundation of his theory of vyapti. Consdiering Dignaga's allusion to anvaya and yyatireka in PSV chapter V, I am inclined to think that he proposed vyapti ora general law solely on the basis that no counter-example is so far observed (adarsanamatrena) in the domain of dissimilar examples.20 It suggests the hypothetical nature of deductive part of Dignaga's logic. 2.3. Let us see again how Dignaga actually formulates a logical relation or vyapti in the example statements of Proof 2. [similar ex.) "yat prayatnanantariyakam tad anityam drstam yatha ghatah" . [dissimilar ex.]"yan nityam tad aprayatnanantariyakam drstam yathakasam" It is clear that he uses the relative pronouns yad and tad in order to express a kind of universal relation: Whatever is Pis Q, or whatever is not Q is not P. He also indicates that the same relation can be expressed by inserting the restrictive particle eva in an appropriate place.21 For example, [similar ex.] "anityam eva prayatnanantariyakam yatha ghato vidyuc ca" [dissimilar ex.)"aprayatnanantariyakam eva nityam yathakasam" In this context the restrictive particle ena is behaving almost like a 'universal 20 Please see my article. 21 See PSV[K] 14868-149a3, which is to be discussed later. Dignaga on Example - 11

Page #12
quantifier'. Generally speaking, Dignaga admits the following two ways in order to express a logical relation or vyapti in Sanskrit: (1) yad P tad Q/ (2) Q eva P/ & & yad -Q tad -P/ -P eva -Q/ Dignaga is very much concerned with the problem of how to formulate a logical proof in a proper way. We can now present his formulation in a formal manner. 'a' stands for a topic of a proposition (paksa) or an object of inference (anumeya); P stands for a proving property (sadhana-dharma), a reason (hetu), or an inferential mark (linga); Q stands for a property to be proved (sadhya-dharma); s stands for a similar example (sadharmya-drstanta) or a member of a set of similar examples (sapaksa); and v stands for a dissimiar example (vaidharmyadrstanta) or a member of a set of dissimilar examples (vipaksa). It is to be noted that in Dignaga's system of logic a, being a topic under examination, is not a part of our Induction Domain which consists of sapaksa and vipaksa. Furthermore, the underlying structure of an Indian proof statement is: "A property-possessor (dharmin) a possesses a property (dharma) P"; the notion of 'possession' is expressed by the Genitive or the Locative case ending or by the suffixes of possession, i.e., -mat and -vat, or even by the convention of elision of those suffixes (matup-lopa). [proposition] "a possesses Q." [reason] "Because a possesses P." [similar ex.] "It is observed that whatever possesses P possesses Q as e.g. S." [dissimilar ex.] "It is observed that whatever does not possess Q does not possess P as e.g. v." We can somehow translate the above formulae into the following standard symbolism but it is impossible to convey the sense of 'it is observed that ...' without introducing some device of Modal Logic: Dignaga on Example - 12

Page #13
[proposition] Qa [reason] Pa [similar ex.] (x)(Px [dissimilar ex.] (x)(-Qx Qx) & (Ex) (Px & Qx) & (x a) -Px) & (Ex)(-1x & -Qx) & (xa) Based on his conviction that a valid proof should be formulated in the way discussed above, Dignaga criticizes what he regards as the wrong formulations of a proof given by rival schools. For example, he picks up the following anonymous proof:22 [proposition] "nityah sabdah" (Sound is eternal.) [reason] "sarvasya anityatvat" (Because everything is non-eternal.) [Proof 3] On the first sight, the proposition and the reason of Proof 5 appear to be incompatible with each other (viruddha). However, if you take into an account that the topic of a proposition is not included in our Induction Domain in the traditional Indian logic, Proof 5 makes sense by interpreting its reason in the sense that everything except for sound (i.e., the topic of the proposition) is non-eternal. In this connection, Dignaga points out that the reason of Proof 5 does not really express the reason but actually expresses the dissimilar example. Then he proposes the following formulation: [proposition] "nityah sabdah" (Sound is eternal.) [reason] (sabdasya) asarvatvat " (Because sound is not everything.) [dissimilar ex.] "sarvam anityam yatha ghatah" (Everything is non-eternal as e.g. a pot.) [Proof 4] Having criticized the above reason from various points of view, Dingaga 22 NMukh SS1.4, Katsura (197x: xx). and PS III. 6: hetupratijnavyaghate pratijnadosa ity asat/sa hi drstanta evokto vaidharmyenasusiksitaih // Quoted in PVA: 563; and PSV ad PS III.6. Dignaga on Example - 13

Page #14
proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example, by following the basic structure discussed above; namely, the absence of a property to be proved (i.e. nityatva) should be followed by the absence of a reason (asarvatva). Thus, we obtain the following formulation: [proposition] "nityah sabdah" (Sound is eternal.) [reason] " (sabdasya) asarvatvat" (Because sound is not everything.) [dissimilar ex.) "yad anityam tat sarvam yatha ghatah" (Whatever is not eternal is everyhting as e.g. a pot.) [Proof 5] Further Dignaga criticizes the formulation of the folloowing proof:23 [proposition] "anityah sabdah"/ [reason] "krtakasya anityatvat, nityasya akrtakatvac ca" [Proof 6] According to Dignaga, this apparently correct proof should be re-formulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation: (proposition] "anityah sabdah" [reason] "krtakatvat" [similar ex.) "yat kytakam tad anityam, yatha ghatah" [dissimilar ex.) "yan nityam tad akrtakam, yathakasam" [Proof 7] Unlike Dignaga's theory of pervasion (vyapti) which was accepted by the post-Dignaga Indian logicians on the whole, whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignaga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians sticked to the traditional five-membered 23 NMukh $2.8, Katsura (19xx:xx). NMukh v. 4: (E T MUT# # FIRMA HAHEAE) =PS III. 15:hetoh sadhyanvayo yatrabhave 'bhavs ca kathyate /pancamya(m) drstanto hetus tupanayan matah // (Quoted in PVA: 647; Cf. VNT: 82) hetus tipas) =PS III. 15:heatsura (19XXXX). Dignaga on Example - 14

Page #15
proof fromulation, while Dharmakirti, as is well known, adopted a new proof formulation which consists of the statements of pervsion (vyapti) and a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (paksadharmata) and which was adopted by the post-Dharmakirti Buddhist logicians. Here is a sample of Dharmakirti's formulation. [vyapti] [paksadharmata] "yat sat krtakam va, tat sarvam anityam, yatha ghatadih" "san krtako va sabda"24 [Proof 8] 3. In PS IV.3 and its Vrtti Dignaga tries to characterize the two examples by similarity (sadharmya) and dissimilarity (vaidharmya) or by implicative negation (paryudasa) and simple negation (prasajya-pratisedha). "In [the presence of] a proving property (sadhana, i.e. a reason) a property to be proved (sadhya) should be presented affimatively and [a reason should be shown to be] absent when a property to he proved is absent. Such being a case, an implicative negation (paryudasa) [of a similar example) and a simple negation (nisedha) [of a dissimilar example) are of different characteristics."25 * The first half of the verse repeats the same formulation of the two examples, i.e., annvaya and vyatireka, as presented in PS IV.2. When Dignaga refers to the two kinds of negation in the second half, he must have in his mind the two kinds of examples in Proof 2 quoted above and the negative phrases, such as 'a-nityam' in the similar example and 'na anityam', which is actually expressed as ' nityam' by considering the double negation, in the dissimilar example. According to Dignaga, the negative particle 'a-' of 'a-nityam' (non-etenal) in the similar example should be interpreted as an implicative negation (paryudasa), so that the negation of eternal things (nitya) implies/affirms the existence of non-eternal (anitya) things. The negative particle (na) of 'na anityam' (not non-etenal, i.e., eternal) in the 24 Vadanyaya of Dharmakirti, ed. by M.T. Much, Vienna, 19xx: 1. 25 PS[K] IV.3: bsgrub bya bsgrub las sgrub pa yis // bstan bya bsgrub bya med la med // de lta yin na ma yin par // dgag pa mthsan nyid mi mthun no // (vidhina sadhane sadhyam khyapyam sadhye 'sati tv asat / evam sati paryudaso nisedhas ca vilaksanau //) PSV[K] 148a8-b3; PSV[V} D60a6-7; Kitagawa (19xx: 514-5). Dignaga on Example - 15

Page #16
dissimilar example, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a simple negation (prasajyapratisedha), so that the negation of non-eternal things does not imply/affirm the existence of eternal things, such as ether (akasa). Thus Dignaga concludes that the dissimilare example of Proof 2 is meaningful even for those who do not acknowledge the existence of eternal things, such as the Sautrantikas.26 This implies that for Dignaga the dissimilar example does not necessarily need an objective support in reality, provided that there is an objective support for the similar example. 3.1. A question arises: Why the two examples are formulated in the way explained in PS IV.2 and 3? In other words, if a similar example is formulated by "A reason is followed by a property to be proved (hetoh sadhyenanugamah)" or "Px > Qx", why a dissimilar example is formulated by "In the absence of a property to be proved a reson is absent (sadhyabhave hetor nastita)" or "-Qx -Px", not by "In the absence of a reason, a property to be proved is absents (hetvabhave sadhyasya nastita) or "-Px > -Qx"? It is apparent that the law of contraposition was not known to the opponents and it is perhaps Dignaga who for the first time among Indian logicians came to realize that such a law should be applied to the formulations of similar and dissimilar examples; unfortunately, however, he does not give either name or definition of such a law. In any case Dignaga answers to the above question: Only in that way, not in the reversed way (na viparyayat), we can show that a reason under consideration possesses the second and the third characteritics of a valid reason; namely, "A reason's presence in a set of similar instances only (hetoh sapaksa eva sattvam)" and "Its definite absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sadhyabhave casattvam eva)". 27 Here again we see the definitive role played by the restrictive 26 PSV[K] 148b2-3: de lta na snga ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no zhes smras pa yin no ll de Itar na rtag pa khas ma blangs kyang chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no // (evam ca purvatra paryudasah uttaratra tu prasajyapratisedha ity uktah / evam ca nityanabhyupagamasyapi vaidharmaydrstantah siddhah) Cf. Kitagawa (19 ) 27 PSV [K] 148b3-4: gal te gcig la ni gtan ts.rigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar bshad la / gnyis pa la ni bsgrub bya med na gtan tshigs med pa yin gyi gtan tshigs med na bsgrub bya med pa ma yin no zhes bya ba la rgyu ci zhig yod ce na / de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang/bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid bstan par nus pa yin gyi bzlog pas ni ma yin no // (kim punah karanam ekatra sadhyanugamo hetoh ukto dvitiye tu sadhyabhave hetor nastita, na hetvabhave sadhyasya nastiteti / evam hi hetoh sapaksa eva sattvam sadhyabhave casattvam Dignaga on Example - 16

Page #17
particle eva to equate the trairupya formulae with the formulation of the two examples. An objection arises: In that case an actual object like a pot cannot be regarded as a part of an example formulation because with reference to an actual object we see that a reason is followed by a property to be proved and vice versa. Dignaga rejects that objection: Just as in the statement of a reason a particular property, such as "being a product', is not intended, similarly in the statement of an example a particular object, such as a pot, is not meant to be followed by a property to be proved, such as 'non-eternity'; thus, the objection is irrelevant. Further, he states that the main purpose of referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in the external reality.28 3.2. In PS IV.4 Dignaga points out what kind of undesirable consequences result if, as suggested by the above question, both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated in the same manner; namely, "Px > Qx" and "-Px -Qx" or "Qx) Px" and "-Qx -Px". "In this connection, if [both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated] in the same way of concomitance, even if unmentioned as a property to be proved], 'eternity' (nityata) would be proved (krta) by means of a property of 'not being a product' (akrtakatva), and a property of being a result (karyata, i.e., a product) by means of a property of 'cessation' (nasitva, i.e., non-eternity); and (that which does not pervade [the domain of a property to be proved] would not be accepted [as a valid reason)."29 eva sakyam darsayitum na viparyayat) The latter half is quoted in VNT 8. Cf. PSV [V] D60a7-61; Kitagawa (19 ) 28 PSV[K] 148b4-6: 'on te de Itar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bzhin du/bsgrub bya yang gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no zhe na /ma yin te byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gor ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro Il phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // (evam tarhi ghato 'nudaharanm / tatra hi yatha hetoh sadhyaeanuugamas tatha sadhyasyapi hetvanugama iti cet / na, krtakatvaviceso 'vivaksitahetur iva ghate sadhyanugamasyavivaksitatvat / bahyarthapradarsanam hi nidarsye pradhanamCf. PSV[V] D60b1-3; Kitagawa (19 ). 29 nityatakrtakatvena, nasitvad va'tra karyata / syad anukta krtavyapiny anistam ca samanvaye // Quoted in VNT: 8 with variant readings. =NMukh v.12: WELCOM #* #* Suo Zuo Ruo Er Ying Cheng Fei Suo Shuo Bu Bian Fei Le Deng He Li , Dignaga on Example - 17

Page #18
He presupposes the following proof formulae which corresponds to Hetucakra No. 2: [proposition] "anityah kabdah" [reason] "krtakatvat" [similar ex.] "yat krtakam tad anityam yatha ghatah" [dissimilar ex.] "yan nityam tad akrtakam yathakasam" Dignaga points out that if the dissimilar example of Proof 8 were formulated in the reversed way as "yad akrtatakam tan nityam", then instead of 'non-eternity' (anityata) 'eternity' would be proved by the property of 'not being a product', which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the similar example were formulated in the reversed way as "yad anityam tat krtakam", then instead of 'non-eternity' a property of 'being a product' would be proved by 'non-eternity', which is absurd.30 Then he examines Hetucakra No. 8 whose 'reason' (hetu) does not pervade the whole domain of a property to be proved or the set of similar instances (sapaksa) unlike in the above case. It runs as follows: [proposition] "anityah sabdah" [reason] [similar ex.] "yatha ghato vidyuc ca" [dissimilar ex.] "yathakasam" "prayatnanantariyakatvat" [Proof 8] [Proof 9] Dignaga sees the problems if two examples are not properly formulated. If a similar example is formulated as "Whatever is no-eternal is produced by a human. effort" (anityam prayatnanantariyakam eva) and a dissimilar example as Dignaga on Example - 18 30 PSV[K] 148b7-8: gal te chos mthun pa'i dbang gis gang ma byas pa de rtag go zhes brjod na/ ma byas pa'i phyir dam ma bcas pa nyid Kyi rtag pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ci ste chos mi mthun pa'i dbang gis gang rtag pa de ni bya ba'o zhes de ltar yang brjod na mi rtag pa'i phyir byas pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // (yadi sadharmyavalena yad akrtakam tad anityam ity ucyate/akrtakatvenapratijnatam eva nityatvam sadhitam syat/atha viadharmyavasena yadanityam tat krtakam ity evam apy ucyate / anityatvena krtakatvam sadhitam syat ) Cf. PSV (V] D 60b3-4; Kitagawa (19).

Page #19
"Whatever is not produced by a human effort is eternal" (aprayatnanantariyakam nityam eva), then one of the similar examples, i.e., lightening (vidyut), which is non-eternal but not produced by a human effort, should be regarded as eternal as well as being produced by a human effort, which is absurd. In order to avoid such an absurd consequence, Dingaga suggests the following formulation: (proposition] "anityah sabdah" [reason] "prayatnanantariyakatvat" [similar ex.] "anityam eva prayatnanantariyakam, yatha ghato vidyuc ca" (dissimilar ex.] "aprayatnanantariyakam eva nityam, yathakasam" [Proof 10] There may arise an objection: If the domain of a reason should be restricted to the domain of a property to be proved as in Hetucakra No. 8 (=Proof 10), then the other type of reason (in Hetucakra No. 2=Proof 8), whose domain is coextensive with that of a property to be proved, would not be a proper reason because there is no restriction of a reason (hetvavadharana). Dignaga answers by saying that the restriction (avadharana) is made in accordance with a speaker's intention (vaktrabhiprayavasat); in other words, a speaker chooses which property to be restricted, so that it can become a reason. So in Hetucakra No. 2, not a property of being non-eternal (anityatva) but a propety of being a product (krtakatva) is chosen to be restricted as a proper reason, though their domains are theoretically co-extensive.32 31 PSV[K] 148b8-149a3: ma khyab pa la yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi gtan tshigs la nyes pa 'di yod de / glog la sogs pa rnams rtag pa nyid dang/rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi nyes pa yod do Il rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa nyid yin la mi rtag pa yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid yin no zhes gal te de latr nges par gzung na skyon dir 'gyur ba yin na/gang gi tshe rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa nyid ni rtag ces nges par gzung ba yin gyi /rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes ma yin pa de'i tshe nyes pa med pa yin te / de Itar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba la med par brjod pa yin no ll de bzhin du mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba las zhes bya ba (avyapiny api prayatnanantariyakatve hetav asty ayam dosah/vidyudadinam nityatvam prayatnanantariyakatvam ca prasajyata iti doso 'sti / asty ayam dosah yady evam avadharyeta aprayatnanatariyakam nityam evety anityam ca prayatnanantariyakam eveti / yada ty evam avadharyate aprayatnnantariyakam eva nitym na prayatnanatiyakam iti tada nasti kascid dosah / evam nityatvasya prayatnanatariyake abhava ukto bhavati / tatha anityam eva prayatnanatariyakam iti /) Cf. PSV[V] D60b3-5); Kitagawa (19). 32 PSV[K] 149a3-4: 'dir / gal te yang gtan tshigs nges par gzung ba'i phyir don gzhan med par 'gyur ba , de ita na brjod pa po'i bsam pa'i dbang gis nges par bzung ba'i phyir Dignaga on Example - 19

Page #20
Another objection: Just as non-eternity is inferred from the absence of a property of being produced by a human effort (i.e., a reason) in eternal things (i.e., a set of dissimilar instances), similarly a property of not being produced by a human effort can be inferred from the absence of eternity in those which are produced by a human effort, which is absurd because the uninteded proposition would be proved as a result. Dingaga points out that in order to avoid such a confusion we should formulate a dissimilar example in the form of absense of a reason only (eva) in the absence of a property to be proved (hetor eva sadhyabhave 'bhavah).33 4. Enough for the proper formulation of example statements. Now Dignaga discusses an important topic of whether we really need both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof. A question arises: If a dissimilar example is formulated by means of the absolute absence of a reason in the absence of a property to be porved (sadhyabhave hetor abhava eva), then there is no error at all in a similar example, such as "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal" (anityam eva prayatnanantariyakam), which implies that there is no need to formulate a similar example, as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated. To this Dignaga answers: If so, the notorious erroneous reason called 'unique and inconclusive' (asadharananaikantika) would become a valid reason. For example, the following is an example of a proof based on the unique and incoclusive reason: rtsol ba las byung ba nyid la rtag pa nyid med par brjod do zhe na/(atra yady api hetvavadharanat hetvantarabhavah praptah / tathapi vaktrabhiprayavasadavadharanam tasmat prayatnanantariyakatvasyaiva nitye 'bhava ucyate ). No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...). 33 PSV[K] 149a4-6: mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te / de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byung ba med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid rjes su dpog pa de bzhin du rtsol ba las byung ba rtag pa nyid med pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' ba bsgrub pa de nyid yin no // de'i phyir gtan tshigs tho na bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o // (visamopanyasah / tatha hi yutha nitye prayatnanantariyakatvabhavad anityatvanumanam evam prayatnanantariyake nityatvabhavad aprayatnanantariyakatvanumanam iti tad evapratijnatarthasadhanam / tasmad dhetor eva sadhyabhave 'bhava upadarsyah / No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...). Dignaga on Example - 20

Page #21
[proposition] "nityah sabdah" (Sound is eternal) [reason] "sravanatvat" (Because it is audible) [Proof 11] Since the reason 'audibility' is the unique property of sound, topic of the proposition, it is regarded as 'unique' to or being not shared by both eternal and non-eternal things in the world with the exception of sound. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (anvaya), it certainly possesses the third charcteristic (vyatireka), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible and there are many instances which are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, "Whatever is not eternal is not audible as e.g. a pot" (yad anityam tad akravanam yatha ghatah), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, "Whatever is audible is etemal" (yac chravanam tan nityam), with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimialr example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; namely, the unique and inconclusive reason, such as 'audibility', should be a valid reason, which is absurd.34 In other words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should formulate both similar and dissimlar examples properly. The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (arthapatti); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by a human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-etemal." However, it is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world which is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support. Dignaga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (arthapatti) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by 34 PSV[K] 149a6-7: 'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na /mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na/dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te/mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gran tshigs su gyur ro // (atheha sadhyabhave 'bhava evopadarsitahanityam eva prayatnanatariyakam iti atra hi na kascid dosa iti cet /yatha nityam eva sravanam, vinasvare 'bhavad asadharanam api nityatve hetuh sydt/) No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...). Dignaga on Example - 21

Page #22
means of implication." Dignaga is still holding his position that the two examples are necessary, though they are not necessarily explicitly stated; either one of them can imply the other or both. So far Dignaga insisted on the necessity of a similar example beside a dissimilar example; now he argues for the necessity of a dissimilar example. An opponent points out: if 'pervasion' (vyapti) is expressed in the form of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (hetoh sadhyanugamah), then it is not necessary to state its absence in the absence of a property to be proved (sadhyabhave nastita); hence there is no necessity to formulate a dissimilar example. Please note very well that Dignaga uses the word 'pervasion' for the first time in a technical sense in this particular portion of PSV.36 The opponent further remarks that it may be meaningful to formulate a dissimilar example, provided that a mere existence of a reason in a set of similar instances (sapakse hetoh sadbhavamatram) is intended by Dignaga in the formulation of a similar example; in that case, however, it is meaning less to refer to an external object as an actual example; consequently, 'pervasion' shoulde be expressed in a similar example. 37 35 PSV[K] 149a7-b1: gal te nyes pa 'di med de dper na mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'dir shugs kyis bsgrub byami> rtag pa la sgrub pa rnyed pa nyid yin pa de Itar rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya'o zhes rtag pa la mnyan par bya ba nyid bstan par ni nus pa ma yin no zhe na /gal te shugs kyis gnyi ga rnyed pa yin na de kho bo cag mngon par 'dod pa nyid yin te shugs kyis sam gang yang rung bas gnyi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro // (naisa dosah / yathanityam eva prayatnanantariyakam ity atra arthapattya sadhye 'nitye sadhanam labdham bhavati, evam nityam eva sravanam iti nitye sravanatvam darsayitum na sakyata iti cet /yadi tarhy arthapattyobhayam labdham tad asmabhir anujnatam eva, arthapattya va anyatarenobhayapradarsanat /)) The last phrase corresponds to NMukh (Katsura 19xx: ) # -WEAR, which is quoted in Pramanavarttika-Svavrtti (ed. by Gnoli, Rome, 19xx): 18. No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...). 36 PSV[K] 149b1-2: gal te gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba khyab pa rab tu bstan par bya ba yin na / de ni mi rtag pa las gzhan la med pa'i phyir bsgrub bya med na med do zhes brjod par mi bya ba dang / (yadi tu heto h sadhyanugama vyaptih darsitah, tasyanityad anyatrabhavat, sadhyabhave ca nastiteti na vaktavyam) Cf. PSV[V] D60b5-6: Kitagawa (19...). 37 PSV[K] 149b2-4:ci ste yod pa tsam yin na rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyang med na bum pa'i rtag pa nyid kyang med pa'i phyir phyi rol gyi don la blots pa 'di ni dpe yin no // zhes brjod par mi bya'o zhes bya ba'i nyes pa 'di ni yod do (zhe na)* / khyab pa nyid kyi gtang tshigs ni bsgrub bya'i rjes su gro bar brjod par byaste / (atha sadbhavamatram, prayatnanarariyakatvenapi ghate nityatvasyapy avinabhavitvat, bahyarthapeksam idam nidarsanam iti na vaktavyam ity asty esa dosa iti / vyaptir eva hetoh sadhyanugamena vaktavya 1 * zhe na should be deleted by following PST. Cf. PSV[V] D60b6; Kitagawa (19...). Dignaga on Example - 22

Page #23
In this conection, Dignaga seems to accept the opponent's criticism. Namely, he admits that when a pervasion is explicitly expressed in a similar example, a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved is shown by implication (arthapattya), which makes it unnecessary to formulate a dissimilar example. However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (vyapti) in the form of a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved." In any case, Dignaga seems to be conceding that it is not absolutely necessary to formulate both examples as long as the pervasion is expressed in one ot the two examples. An objection arises: If it is enough for a similar example to state a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, then there is no need to define it in terms of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (sadhyenanugamo hetoh) as in PS IV-2a. It is to be noted that 'anugama' is equivalent of vyapti' in this context. To this Dignaga replies: The purpose of formulating a similar example in that way is to reject the reversed formulation, namely, a property to be proved being followed by a reason (sadhyasya hetunanugamah).99 In order to justify the rejection of the reversed formulation, Dignaga presents a rather complicated argument. First he refers back to PS III.22 where he defined a valid reason (hetu). "Of the [nine reasons mentioned in PS III.21=NMukh v.6]" the valid reason is that which is either present [wholly) or in two ways [i.e., present and 38 PSV[K] 149b4-5: gnas skabs 'di la shugs nyid kyis bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med par bstan pa'i phyir chos mi mthun pa'i dpe sbyar bar mi bya'o Il gang gi tshe dpe gnyi ga sbyar bar bya (14965) ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la / khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no // (asyam cavasthayam arthapattya sadhyabhave hetor abhavah pradarsita iti vaidharmyadrstanto na prayoktavyah / yada tu drstantadvauam prayoktavyam tada sapakse sanmatram pradarsyam, vyapteh sadhyabhave 'bhavena pradarsitatvat ) Cf. PSV[V] D60b6-61al; Kitagawa (19...). 39 PSV[K] 14965-6: 'on te de ltar na gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba ni chos mthun pas rab tu stan to zhes bya ba 'di brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na/ 'di yang bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du gyur ro // (na tarhi vaktavyam idam hetoh sadhyanugamah sadharmyena pradarsita iti / etat punah sadhyasya hetunanugamapratisedhartham syat ) Cf. PSV[V] D61al; Kitagawa (19...). 40 prameyakstakanityakrtasravanayatnajah / anityayatnajasparsa nityatvadisu te nava // (=### ## # # I .) Quoted in Nyayavarttika-Tatparyatika, loc. cit. Dignaga on Example - 23

Page #24
absent) in the similar instances (sajatiya) and which is absent in the absence of the (similar instances]; the reversed is 'incompatible' (viruddha) (reason] and the rest is 'indeterminate' (aniscita) [reason)."41 . As is well known, of the nine types of reasons in his Hetucakra, Dignaga accepts only two as valid reasons, namely, No. 2 "a property of being produced' (krtakatva) and No. 8 'a property of being produced by a human effort' (yatnaja). The difference between the two valid reasons lies in the fact that the former pervades the whole domain of similar instances (sapaksa), while the latter is present only in part of it. He then points out that in order to include the latter under the valid reason, the second characteritic of a valid reason shoulde be restricted in the following manner: "It is present only in the similar instances" (sajatiya eva san). He also notes that the two example statements present the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (anvaya & vyatireka), while the reason statement present the first characterisitic, i.e., a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (paksadharmatva). 42 Now by rejecting the reversed formulation of a similar example, Dingaga seems to think that a reason is properly restricted to the domain of a property to be proved and, consequently, that the second characteristic of a valid reason is shown by a similar example. Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate a similar example. The above remark has been made in order to include Hetucakra No. 8 as a valid reason, for the reversed formulation of a similar example is possible at least theoretically in the case of Hetucakra No. 2. Dignaga admits that by restricting a reason to the similar instances (sajatiya eva san), one can assume the negation of its presence in the dissimilar instances (vijatiye sattvam), which may suggest that it is unnecesary to formulate a dissimilar . 41 tatra yah san sajatiye dvedha(Idvidha) casams tadatyaye /sa hetur viparito 'smad viruddho 'nyas tv aniscitah 77=NMukh v. 7(AWBERRE. DE ZA PTI TE) Quoted in Nyayavarttika-Tatparyatika (ed. by A. Thakur, New Delhi, 1996): 247. do 42 PSV[K] 149b6-8: 'on te bkag pa ni don med pa yin te mthun pa'i phyogs la yang rnam pa gnyis zhes brjod pa'i phyir ro // phyogs kyi chos ni gtan tshigs kyis brjod pa'i phyir 'dir ni gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba yin te / de la gdon mi za bar rigs mthun pa kho na la yod zhes nges par gzung bar bya'o ( zhe na) / (atha narthas tatpratisedhe, na, san dvidha ceti vacanat / hetusesas catra pradarsitavyah paksadharmatvasya hetunaivoktatvat / tatravasyam sajatiya eva sann ity avadharyam eva ) Cf. PSV[V] D61a1-2; Kitagawa (19...). Dignaga on Example - 24