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________________ Harsh Narain, Evolution of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Categoriology. Volume I: Early Nyaya-Vaisesika Categoriology. Varanasi, Bharati Prakashan, 1976. 256 pp. The Vaisesika was originally a system of nature-philosophy which sought to explain the world by enumerating the constituent elements. At a certain stage of the development of philosophical thinking, the doctrine of categories was introduced into this system, and the original theories were gradually remodelled on the basis of categorial analysis. The six categories which characterize the Vaisesika doctrine are found mentioned in the oldest extant Vaisesika literature, viz., the Vaisesikasutra (Abbrev. VS). It is supposed that VS took its present form after passing through a process of alteration and interpolation, but, because of the scarcity of material, it is difficult to trace the historical development of the Vaisesika system in its early stages. An attempt to describe the origin and development of the Vaisesika system was made by E. Frauwallner in his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. II (Salzburg 1956). He expounded the view that the following four stages were to be distinguished in the development of the classical Vaisesika: (1) the oldest enumerative nature-philosophy, (2) the formulation of new ideas, such as the atom-doctrine, causality-theory, etc. and the completion of an atomic-mechanic world-picture, (3) the emergence of the doctrine of categories, (4) the remodelling of the old nature-philosophy in the light of the doctrine of categories. Frauwallner was fully aware of the fact that his arguments were largely based on conjecture, but he said, "Aber der Versuch musste einmal gemacht werden. Denn erst so wird vieles, was im erhaltenen System zunachst seltsam
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________________ REVIEWS anmutet, verstandlich und begreiflich" (p. 316). The lines of development of the Vaisesika doctrines thus drawn by him seem to me basically quite acceptable. The book under review is intended to clarify the stages by which the classical Vaisesika doctrine of six categories was gradually formed. The subjects dealt with in the essential part of this book (Part III: Beginning of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Categoriology, p. 101ff.) are closely related to what was discussed by Frau wallner in his description of the third stage mentioned above. It is to be regretted that the author, H. Narain, has not referred to Frauwallner's work, which would have provided him with a clearer perspective in respect to the development of the doctrine of categories as can be shown by the following example. The author maintains the view that the early Vaisesikas propounded only three categories, viz., substance (dravya), attribute (guna) and motion (karman), and adduces in confirmation of his view evidence found in VS with such expressions as a stronger point in favour of our thesis is ...', 'the strongest point in favour of our thesis is ...' (pp. 122-123). However, his arguments are not so convincing. They may serve to prove that the said three categories are different in characteristic features from the others, but not that categories other than those three were not originally posited. The author could have made his view more plausible by accepting Frauwallner's assumption that there was a stage of enumeration of entities prior to the formulation of the doctrine of categories. Progress from the enumeration of entities to the classification of them into substance, attribute and motion may be regarded as a natural course, but the categorization of universal (samanya), differential (visesa) and inherence (samavaya) certainly presupposes advancement in philosophical reflection. In his explanation of the three original categories (p. 1 24ff.), the author criticizes the arguments put forward by K. Potter concerning the equation of dravya with 'substance' and of guna with 'quality'. The author's discussion of guna is most cogent. Potter is opposed to the identification of guna with 'quality for the reason that, while a quality is acknowledged as a characteristic which remains one and the same in many things, a guna is recognized as an entity related to one particular thing and not shared by many things. That is to say, he regarded a quality as repeatable and a guna as unrepeatable. Against this view the author argues that . there were in the Indian tradition two opposite views, one that a guna is repeatable and the other that it is unrepeatable. He cites sources which prove that the former and the latter views were held respectively by the Vaiyakaranas and Mimamsakas and by the Jainas and NyayaVaisesikas. As equivalent for guna, the author adopts 'attribute' rather than 'quality and gives some reasons which I consider to be adequate. A detailed examination of the relevant terms and concepts in the early Vyakarana texts constitutes a characteristic feature of the present book. The author supports the view set forth by H. Ui that the Jainas were precursory to the Vaisesikas, but criticizes him for his not taking into consideration the theories developed by the Vaiyakaranas. Some important observations on the formulation of the early Vaisesika doctrines have been made by the author through his investigation of Vyakarana texts. For example, with a view to clarifying the origin of the category 'existence', which is termed bhava or satta in VS, the author carefully examines the term bhava in the Ninukta and in the early Vyakarana texts, and on the basis of this examination describes the genesis of 'existence as follows. The term bhava originally denoted the action which was thought to be at the root of all existing things; the early Vaiyakaranas soon derived the notion of existence (satta) from that of action, which notion gave rise to the Vaisesika concept of 'existence' (pp. 163-166; 170-171). It seems likely that, as held by the author, 'existence' was first added to the original list of categories before the concept of 'universal' was formed. Very elaborate is the discussion of the genesis of the category 'universal' (samanya) (p. 181 ff.). The author makes reference to Nyaya, Vyakarana and Mimamsa treatises and examines the usage of such terms as samanya, jati and akrti, which are employed to mean the universal in later times. It is clearly shown by the author that neither in the Nyayasutra (Abbrev, NS) nor in the early Vyakarana works the term jati was used to denote a category. The term jati occurs in NS, 2.2.69: samanaprasavatmika jatih, which is usually construed in accordance
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________________ 56 REVIEWS with Vatsyayana's interpretation as meaning that the universal (jati-samanya) is of the nature of producing similar cognition (samana-=samana buddhih). According to the author, this sutra originally intended to define jati as 'procreative of the like'. This interpretation seems quite acceptable. Thus the term jati in NS is to be taken to mean 'species' in the biological sense, and not the universal as a Vaisesika category. On the other hand, in the early Vyakarana texts it stands for a natural class. This is shown by the author through his examination of Patanjali's definition of jati. In the course of his explanation of Patanjali's usage of the words samanya and visesa, the author calls our attention to a passage in which Patanjali states that a thing may be regarded sometimes as samanya and sometimes as visesa in accordance with the intention of the speaker (vivaksa). We may consider, as suggested by the author, this passage to be a possible source for VS, 1.2.3: samanyam visesa iti buddhyapeksam. The author further points out that the word samanya is used by Patanjali sometimes in the sense of commonness or generality, but he states that samanya as an entity over and above its substrata was not known to Patanjali. The word akrti is used in the early Vyakarana texts primarily in the sense of form or configuration and secondarily in the sense of jati. In conclusion the author makes the remark that the germ of the category 'universal' is noticeable in the Vaiyakarana concept of jati and akrti. As mentioned above the book is commendable in many respects. However, it is to be deplored that the author often wearies the reader with useless or inappropriate arguments and explanations. In Chapter IV (The Vaisesika Concept of Category), the author gives a ? panoramic sketch of different theories of category by Western philosophers (pp. 64-83). This is of no use. If a comparison was intended for a clearer elucidation of the main subject, the author should have explained in detail only one theory which is akin to or in sharp contrast to the Vaisesika doctrine. Again, in the section dealing with the Vaiyakaranas' concept of bhava, the views held by Western philosophers are shown panoramically (pp. 166-170). When treating the genesis of the category 'existence' (satta), the author refers to the Rgvedic and Upanisadic speculations on sat and asat, and states, "... there is every reason to believe that it is sat and asat which came gradually to develop into the categorial notions of existence and nonexistence" (p. 163). It is, however, difficult to believe that the Nasadasitya hymn or Uddalaka Aruni's teaching has any thing to do with the Vaisesika category of 'existence'. At the end of the section dealing with the genesis of the category 'universal', the author explains Dharmakirti's view on the origin of the concept of universal (pp. 201-204). As a matter of course Dharmakirti never discussed the 'origin of the universal from a historical point of view, and it is irrelevant to the main subject to refer to Dharmakirti who lived several centuries after the period of the systematization of the Vaisesika doctrine of six categories. On pp. 233-241 the author lists one hundred and sixteen abbreviations for the books utilized. Some of them are not found in other books and are seldom used by the author. For example, CMNV (Umesh Mishra, Conception of Matter According to Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics), PSAH (B. N. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus), SNVM (S. Bhaduri, Studies in the Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics) and some others are found only once or twice in the Introduction. It would have been better to give the full title or a simplified title in a footnote, so that the reader is not obliged to consult the list of abbreviations. This book constitutes the first half of the author's work on the evolution of the NyayaVaisesika doctrine of categories. The subjects to be treated in the forthcoming Vol. II: Development of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Categoriology are briefly mentioned by the author on pp. 29-30. Kyoto University MASAAKI HATTORI