Remarks On Sarvasarvatmakatvavada

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269547/1

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REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA 167 REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA' by Albrecht Wezler, llamburg 1. Scholars working in the field of the early history of Indian philosophy only too frequently feel handicapped by the deplorable fact that a large part of the once obviously much more extensive literature of the different schools of thought scenis to have been lost for ever. Thirst for knowledge, however, is not easily quenched. Therefore, though the losses have to be accepted, scholars are naturally enough on the look out for a way to bridge the gaps at least partially, that is to say, they search for fragments, quotations or references, preserved in other texts, which might light up, at Icast to some extent, the surrounding darkness. Within such testimonial transmission of philosophical ideas of ancient brahmanical thinkers, two groups of works prove cspecially rewarding, viz. those composed by Buddhists and the philosophical literature of the Jainas. As to the first, the situation is, however, complicated by the well known fact that many of the relevant texts have likewise not come down in their original language which was, of course, Sanskrit, but are preserved only in Tibetan translations which, although accurate on the whole, can, nevertheless, not be regarded as having the same rank as the originals. In the case of the philosophical works by Jaina authors no such difficulties arise : whatever has survived the casualties of time is in Sanskrit. Yct not all of them have been published, not to speak of critical editions, and not always can the state of preservation be considered satisfactory. 2. Among the Jaina texts published in the last decades, there is one that is of particular interest not only for those rather few scholars who have specialised in the field of Jaina philosophy itself, but also for the, of course, larger group of Indologists who are engaged in research on brahmanical systems : what I am referring to is the Dvadasaranayacakra of the Svetanbara Mallavadin, and the edition I have in view is that of the learned Muni Jambuvijayaji. The text of this work, too, is, however, not preserved; all that has come to light until now are several manuscripts of a commentary upon it, called Nyayagamanusarini, written by Simhasuri (probably 6th century A.D.), "and it is with its help that to a wide extent the reconstruction of Mallavadi's original is made possible". The attempt to reconstruct the mula-necessary also for a proper understanding of the Nyayagamanusarini itself-represents a task which has rightly been characterized by Frauwallner as "difficult and sometimes almost impossible, because as a rule Simhasuri quotes only the first and last words of the sentence to be explained", "allows wider space only to more difficult passages and passes quickly over others with the remark 'easily understood (sugamam). If, in spite of all these difficulties, Mallavadi's text, or at least his trends of thought are reconstructed, also Sinhasuri's text needs reconstruction, as it is faulty and demands numerous corrections. But even then, the comprehension of the text is not casy, as Mallavadi's work in itself is very difficult indeed." 2 Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Acarya Sri Mallavidl Ksamasramapa. With the commentary Nyayagamanusariol of Sri Simhasuri Gani Vadi Ksamasramaga. Ed. with critical notes by Muni Jambuvijayayi. Pl. I (1-4 Aras). Bhavnagar 1966, P. II (5-8 Aras), Bhavnagar 1976 (Sri Atmanand Jain Granthamala No. 92 and 94). I always quote from this edition (page and line) and without normalizing the orthography. Regarding the date of Mallavadin, I am not yet convinced that Jambuvijaya is right in accepting a Jaina tradition according to which in a dispute in 357 A.D. Mallavkin deleated Buddhist adversaries. I also hesitate to share his view that the dates of other philosophers whom Mallavadin clearly refers to like Bhari hari, Dignaga etc., can be reconciled with such an carly date for him (cf. "Prakkathanam", p. 15 f.). Quoted from E. Frauwallner's "Introduction" to Jambuvijaya's edition of the NC p. I. Frauwaliner's "Introduction", p. s. * This is usually done in the following way....iryadi yaval.... (ini). 1 This is essentially comprehensive English recast of my contribution to the "Studien Zum Jainismus and Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift fur L Alsdorf" published as No. 23 of the "Aland Neu-Indische Studien". Wiesbaden, 1981. With the discussion in "The Mahabhasya on Pap. 4.3.155 (cl. p. IPop I have dealt in the article,"Paralipomena Zum Sarvasarvilmakatvavada. (1): Mahabhasya zu Pan 4.3.155 und scine einheimischen Erklarer", published in WzKS, XXVI (1982). pp. 140-166. 72

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PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS It is precisely these difficulties which the previous editors, Muni Catur vijayaji and Lalcandra B. Gandhi on the one hand and Vijayalabdhisuri' on the other, could not overcome in a convincing manner. Besides, their editions were based on only a few manuscripts, whereas Jambuvijaya succeeded in collecting a total of 8 codices, among them an "atidurlabhativisista ca pratih" in which he says "avidyamana bahavo visuddhah patha asmabhir labdhah". 168 Anybody who goes through even the beginning or selected portions of the text in Jambuvijaya's edition will, I think, subscribe to the opinion expressed by Frauwallner in his "Preface" that by it "a stable basis is supplied for further research". For, Frauwallner goes on to say," "his reconstruction of the original makes it possible to follow Mallavadi's trends of thought also in passages where absolute certainty cannot be achieved. It has been carefully considered and deserves our full attention. At any rate, the text of the commentary is reliable and has been made legible by means of various corrections. Above all this text gains greatly by numerous notes and cross-references to related texts, thus aiding in the comprehension of the original itself". 10 3. Regarding the value of the Dvadasaranayacakra as a source for the history of non-Jaina philosophy-a value often pointed out by Jambuvijaya with particular emphasis-Frauwallner, too, scems. to be quite as positive, and it was mainly for this reason that he drew quite early the attention of scholars to this work which "dating back to a time which is extremely lacking in information as to philosophical systems, yields quite a number of news on * Dvadasaranayacakra of Srimallavadisuri, with the commentary of Sri Simhasuri. Pt. 1 of Four Arns. Ed. by Late Muni Caturvijayaji (pp. 1-232) and Lalacandra B. Gandhi (pp. 233-314). Baroda 1952 (GOS No. CXVI). I do not know whether further parts are to be published. 7 The Dvadasharanayachakram of Sri Mallavadi Kshamasramana with the Nyayagamanusarini Commentary by Sri Sinhasuragani Vadi Kshamasramana. Ed. with Critical Introduction, Index and Vishamapadavivechana by Acharya Vijaya Labdhi Suri. Pt. I-IV, Chhani 1948-1960 (Shri Labdhisurishwar Jain Granthamala No. 20, 26, 35 and 44). Jambuvijaya's "Prakkathanam", p. 9. Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 6. 10 One has to distinguish between the footnotes on the one hand and detailed and most useful annotations on the other (cf. the chapter. "Tippananami dvaividhyam" in Jambuvijaya's "Prakkathanam", p. 38). REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA authors and works of which we know very little indeed"." But on the other hand he characterizes Mallavadin not only as "a remarkable", but also as "a somewhat selfwilled thinker"; speaks of his "peculiar but also headstrong way of thinking", "his entirely new way to see things"; attests to him to have tried "to categorize the old doctrine of the Naya or the various ways of considering things in a new and more systematic order, so as to bring about a refutation of all contradicting arguments"; considers his method to be "often reckless, even on the verge of forcefulness" and uses even the expression "polemics (against other systems)".12 Under the influence of these rather critical remarks one wonders at first whether there is at all any objectivity to be expected from Mallavadin so as to render his work a reliable source in those parts, too, where he does not quote verbatim from other sources. The testimonial value of the [Dvadasara-] N[aya-] C[akra can of course, be finally judged only on the basis of a careful and comprehensive investigation, a task that has yet to be undertaken. Nevertheless it may be pointed out that Frauwallner's remarks, although open to misconstruction, were not intended to suggest that one ought to be rather sceptical as to Mallavadi's trustworthiness. For, as I have already stated above, Frauwallner, too emphasized the testimonial value of the NC, and it was with this in mind that he expressed the wish that "Mallavadi's work....should find the attention it deserves, and its rewarding contents should bear fruit in further research", 13 169 In following Frauwallner's suggestion I try to make a modest contribution to the breaking of this new and fascinating ground; and I hope that the results achieved will indeed prove rewarding. 4. In accordance with Mallavadin's systematic arrangement of the twelve world-views the 3rd chapter of the NC is entitled vidhyubhayara, i.c. "spoke [representing that world-view] which comprises both [affirmation as well as negation of the [ general.] affirmation". The contents of this chapter have been 11 Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 5. Cf. also Frauwallner's article "The Editions of Mallavadi's Dvadasara. nayacakram" in: WZKSOA I (1957). pp. 147-151. 12 Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 1 et passim. 18 Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 6.

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170 PIILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS REMARKS ON TIRE SARVASARVAIMAKATVAVADA 171 briclly analysed by Frauwallner, viz. as follows: "Against this viewpoint", viz. that of the various forms of advaitavada put forth in the preceding chapter, "stands a third which refutes the vehicle of becoming as the sole principle. It manifests itself in two doctrines: the Samkhya system and the doctrine of a godhcad as the creator of all things (Isvaravadah). And again Mallavadi allows the first of the two doctrines to be contradicted by the second. The viewpoint of the Sankhya system reasons in the following way: it differentiates two forms of being or becoming. being present (sannidhi-bhavanam) and coming about (apattibhavanam). Only an existent duplicity, however, makes them possible. As concerns being present someone who knows (at) presupposes something that is known (jneyam), someone who enjoys (bhokta) presupposes something that is cnjoyed (bhogyam) and vice versa. The coming about requires a manifold unity (anckam ekam) which by changing again and again (parinamah) adopts a new form. At the same time it requires a second principle on account of which the change is being brought about. Thus, the two principles of Samkhya, the soul (purusah) and original matter (pradhanam) are given. The doctrine of a godhead does away with the differentiation of being present and coming about....." When comparing this analysis with that given by Jambuvijaya," one is struck by a particular divergence regarding the dialectical structure of chapter 3. For according to Jambuvijaya the detailed refutation of central tencts of the Sankhya represents the argumentation of an opponent whom he calls "sarwasarvaImakarvavadint", who, he adds, is only thereafter in his turn criticized by the lsvaravadin. In addition to asking who this mysterious "sarvasarvatmakarvavadin" might be one cannot but wonder whose is the error or, at least, inaccuracy, Frauwallner's or Jambivijaya's. In order to solve these problems one has to re-examine the dialectical structure of this chapter of the NC. What Jambivijaya has in mind is a passage of the Nyaya - gamanusarini (NC 324.7-13) "" where after summing up the refutation of Samkhya metaphysics, the opponent concludes: tasmat sarvasarvatmakarvaparigraha eva nyayyah, "therefore (i.c. because your metaphysical positions are by and large unacceptable) the only remaining position logically to be accepted is that of the sarvasarvatmakalva". But he, in his turn, is immediately refuted by the Isvaravadin who starts his criticism by stating that, on the contrary, the acceptance of this vicw is logically not enablc (anyah punariyadi/ na sarvasarvatmakarvaparigraho nyayyah). This docs, indeed, allow of no other conclusion but that the opponent who proves Samkhya mctaphysics to be unsustainable cannot be identical with the isvaravadin. On the other hand, he must, of course, be different also from the cxponent of the Sankhya. Thus, the problem to be solved is: who is the person for whom out of the tenets of Sankhya no other view than the sarvasarvatmakarva seems acceptable; and what precisely is meant by this term ? 5. Fortunately, other passages can be found in the NC itself and its Vriti in which this doctrine is mentioned. A closer study of them should be of help in answering these questions. 5.1. To begin with Sirphasuri's comment on NC 38.3-4. It runs as follows (NC 38.20-23): sthavarajangamabhyavahrtanyonyarasarudhiradiripadiparinamapattivaisvariipyadarsanat sarvam sarvatmakam, tata eva sarvami sarvasya karanam karyam ceti kriva.... "the manifoldness of the phenomenal world ) is an empirical fact; it comes about by a process in which one thing through transformation changes into another like e.g. [in the case of vegetal and animal beings which feed on cach other whereby the consumed animal changes 1 into sap etc., and the consumed vegetal being changes into blood etc.. Because of this fact, casily to he observed everything consists of everything else 1: for this very reason everything is the material cause of everything else I. and (likewise the product of everything else )...." Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 3. 16 Ch. Jambuvijaya's "Prakkathanam", p. 27:.... kiitu simkhyena vidhvilhinayusdrigu odvaitadilesi ye dosd wide vitit tepdm prakrikdramawide 'p tadawasthydd Varsaganafaniramite simhyamate sarvasarvatmakarvavadind vistarena wiraste fatrwdrarydel Ilvaravali bhavya-bhaviebhedena tivarejitadvaltavadami upanyayail.... Satanawiwite wind vistarena 10 According to a cross-reference given in footnote 5 on p. 27 of his "Prakkathanam This is one of those passages where the superiority of Jambuvijaya's edition becomes obvious. wadi bhavya-bhavitchhe

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172 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA 173 hrfavarasparydder jargamasariraparinamapannasya, jangamasyapi sthavaratani gatasya sthavardbhyavahistasya far parinatasya, evan sthavarasya sthavaratri gatasya jangamasya jangamatan gatasya smat sarvam sarvatmakam/ As this is said in the context of a critical discussion of the sarkarya- and the asarkdrya-vada, and the peculiar terminology too, points in this direction, one feels inclined to assume that the sarvasarvatmakarvavada cannot but form an integral and specific part of Samkhya. 5.2. This assumption is confirmed by another passage in the Nyayagamanusarini where in commenting on NC 107.2-108.2 Simhasuri cxplains (NC 107.20-23):....evant hi laksanadisontidesah-sarvami sarvatmakam' ity avisesam iccharah sinkhyasyapi sarvatmakasyaikasya vastuto riparasidibhedena srotrddibhedena ca vikalpayitum arak yalvad visesaikdntavddina iva hirvikalpapardmarthaparamanusidharmyad avikalpakafvam/. ..." .. for the (above) criticism directed against (Dignaga's ] definition of the promana 'direct perception is extended in the following manner [ by Mallavadin to be valid also for the definition given by that philosopher who, claiming its absolute validity, holds the view that phenomena are not different from cach other avisesaikantavadin) : for the exponent of the Samkhya, too, who regards (the phenomenal world ) insofar as non-differentiated as cverything consists of everything else), a single thing consisting of everything I clse cannot be differentiated by the differentiation of colour, flavour etc., (on the one hand ), and by that of the organ of hearing etc., on the other ; therefore [for him, too, a single thing is without differentiation just as for Dignaga ] who, claiming its absolute validity, holds the view that all things are non-different because they have the common peculiarity that they consist of nothing clse but atoms which form the undillerentiated ultimate reality...." Since Simhasuri explicity refers the sarvasarvatmakarva to the cxponent of Samkhya there is hardly room for doubt that it does, indeed, belong to that school of thought. 5.3. And further prool, if still necessary, may be adduced from the NC and its Vrtti. For Simhasuri again explicitly mentions the cxponent of Samkhya (cf. NC 11.23.) before outlining the Tollowing view (NC 11.24-30): sarvan ekam ekam ca sarvam, kasmat? karanasya vaisrariipyat/yathaha-farvam sarvatmakam/ yady evam kasmat sarvam ekarra nopalabhyate sarvatra caikam ili ? licyate idesakalakaranimittavabandhut til na samanakalam almabhivyaktih/temanyamalie jalabhlimyor any elad parindmikant rasddivaisvarupyam sthavarasya jangamatam gatasya jangamabhyava "All things are one and one, all. Why? Because of the manifoldness of the cause, as, indeed, it has been said: Everything consists of everything else 1.- If this is true, for what reason are not all things perceived in one, nor one particular thing in all ? The answer to this (objection ) is that individual things do not manifest themselves simultaneously since their manifestation is bound by place, time, shape and condition. Therefore we take the view that this (observable) manifoldness of flavour(s) etc., is the result of processes of change which (the elements ) water and carth undergo. In the case of a vegetal being that has become an animal, (what has happened is this ] : a plant etc., e.g., consumed by an animal, has transformed itself into the body of that very ! animal; or in case of an animal that has become a vegetal being. (what has happened is this ) : after having been consumed by vegetal being it has transformed itself into it; (this holds good likewise) for a vegetal being that has become another vegetal being. and for an animal that has become (another) animal. Therefore everything consists of everything else". 5.4. There are close parallels to this argumentation not only in the Nyayagamanusarin (cf. NC 320.1-7), but also in the Yogabhasya on YS 3.14" as well as in the anonymous commentary on Isvarakrspa's Samkhyasaptati (called "V," by its editor, E. A. Solomon)" on karika 15. Neither these parallel passages themselves nor the problems they pose, especially regarding their mutual historical dependence, can be taken up for discussion within the framework of the present article." 11 C. niso Sankara's very interesting explanations, Patanjala-Yogasitra Bhagya Vivarapnm of Sankara-Bhagavatpida, critically ed. with Intro duction by Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurtai Sastri. Madras, 1952 (Madras GOS No. XCIV), p. 257 1. 18 Samkhya-Saptati. Vrtti (VI). Ed. by Esther A. Solomon, Ahmedabad 1973. 10 Thin I have done in the nbove (fn. 1) mentioned article on n. 374 ff. Cl. also the "Sumhriaty" added to it.' .

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174 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA 175 5.5. The concept of sarvasarvatmakatva was associated with the Sankhya also by Prajnakaragupta. For in his Pramanavarttikabhasya he reinarks (180.21): Sanklyamatam avalambya sarvam sarvatra vidyate. "if one takes as support the doctrine of the Sankhya, everything is found in everything else (or : everywhere)"; and according to Yamari's (alias Jamari's) undoubtedly correct explanation Prajnakaragupta has this very school of thought in mind also when he says in a verse on PV 2.331 : vipramosah smrter istah kaifit tu viparitacit/ asarkhydrih parair anyaih sarvan sarvatra vidyate//. Interestingly cnough, he refers to this doctrine in the context of different theories of error. It is, of course, possible to follow up his indication and reconstruct tentatively a theory of crror developed on the basis of the sarvasarvatmakarvavada: so-called crror consists in cognizing in one thing something else, and this is possible precisely because it contains all things : taking a pearl-oyster for silver is possible because a fukti does in fact also contain rajata : and this cognition would have to be explained by taking recourse to the concept of similarity. The lack of even allusions to this theory of error in older texts, however, suggests rather that it does neither represent the specific theory of crror the exponents of Sanikhya adhered to, nor a further development to be attributed to Samkhya philosophers themselves. Onc fccls induced to assume that it originated in theistic circles, perhaps influenced by tenets of the Samkhya (cf. Prajnakaragupta's expression "sankhyamatam avalambya...."). This assumption is corroborated by Ramanuja who-again in connection with the problem of crror-starts the exposition of a theory. he himself apparently looks upon as a plausible alternative ; he says athayo yathartham sarvavijnanam iti vedavidam matam/ srutismptibhyah sarvasya sarvatmat vapratititah// 'bahu syam' iti sankalpapirvaststyadyupakrame/ 'lasam trivslam ekaikam' iti srutyaiva coditam// trivrtkaranam evam hi pratyaksenopalabhyate/ yad agneh rohitam ripam tejasas tad apam api/ suklar krsnar prthivyas cety agnay eva trirupata/ Srutyaiva darsita tasmat sarve sarvatra samgatah// Since a mere fortuitous coincidence is highly improbable in this case, one would decide in favour of the alternative that Ramanuja, too, refers to the same theistic circles as Prajnakaragupta, viz. those which on the basis of the doctrine that everything is contained in everything else have made a very peculiar and interesting contribution to the discussion on the nature of crror. For according to them there is no error at all, cvery cognition being a right cognition. 6. To sum up: the sarvasarvatmakarvavada is time and again spoken of in the relevant portions as belonging to the Simkhya. At the same time, however, one must also take into account certain circumstances which point to its not forming an element of the Sankhya only. Yet, in order to be able to answer the initial question of the dialectical structure of chapter 3 of the NC, i.e. the now even more puzzling question of the identity of him who has been named "sarvasarvatmakatvavadin" by Jambuvijaya, one has to look a bit closer at this vada and to analyse it both as to its essential philosophical 22 Rhagavad Badarayana's Brahma Sutra or Sariraka with Sri Bhashya by Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja and its commentary named Bhashyartha Darpana by Sri Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Pt. I. Madras 1963, p. 132 1. The first pada strongly reminds one of the beginning of the third Prakarapa (called "Nayavithi") in Salikanatha's Prakaranapancika (yatharthani sarvam eveha vijndnam Il siddhaye/prabhakaraguror bhavah samicinah prakaryate//). Although most probably not a mere coinci dence, this correspondence does by no means permit the conclusion that Ramanuja by "vedavidam" refers to Prabhakara or his disciples. For there are neither indications nor is there even any probability that Prabhakara has made use of the ontological position stated in the sarvasarudimakatwavida in order to prove his view that every cognition is right cognition. 20 Pramapavartikabhashyam or Varttikalankarab of Prajnakaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramoavartika), deciphered and ed. by R. Sankrtyayana ( Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. I), Palna 1953. 11 Cl. Tibetan Tripitaka (Peking) B 132-170-3.5 : dron pa briod (recte: bred) pa nl dran pa nams paste/'od byed pa rhams kyllo/log par rig pa ni gzon nu ma len pa rhams kyo/med pa snan ba nl rigs pe con la sogo pa mnams kyi'o/thams cad thamis cad la yod 'dod ces bya ba ni grans can pa rams kyrol,

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PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS content as also the relation it bears to other central tenets of the Samkhya. But before doing so I should like to emphasize that the passages in which this vada is mentioned, and that some of the terms used, are not explicit enough to allow by themselves to draw a distinct and complete picture, and that the exegete is, therefore, thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavour to think along the lines of the Samkhya. Thus, the result cannot but be hypothetical in part. 6.1. Starting from the observation that the sentence sarvan sarvatmakam is paraphrased in the texts by the sentences sarvam ekam ekam ca sarvam and sarvant sarvatra [vidyate/asti.], this ontological statement can be shown to mean that every necessarily material phenomenon contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of things. Yet it should not be overlooked that this vada is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'. The fact, easily to be observed, that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependent, has obviously been interpreted by Samkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in itself the matter of all those other animals and/or plants it consumes. The peculiarity of this their conception consists in that they sup pose that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement sarvam sarvatmakam does not imply that every. phenomenon consists only of all the others, i.e. is not at the same time also this very thing by itself. Likewise it is conspicuous that the validity of this vada extends to the inanimate evolutes of the prakrti, too. 176 In connection with this latter question a fragment, assigned to the Varsaganah by the author of the Yuktidipika and dealt with among others also by Frauwallner, should be taken up for reexamination. It runs thus (YD, ed. R. C. Pandey, 57.6-7): tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti na sattvad, apetam apy asti vinasapratisedhat/ asamsargac casya sauksmyam, sauksmyac canupalabdhis tasmad vyaktyapagamo vinasah/ sa tu dvividhah asargapralayat tattvanam, kimcitkalantaravasthanad itaresam....... 24 Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 352 and fn. 195. 177 REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA The first part of this quotation has been rendered by Frauwallner as follows: "These three worlds pass out of being visible, because it has been taught that they are not eternal. But they do not exist also after disappearing, because it has been taught that they are not annihilated. Because of their dissolution a subtle state results and because of this subtle state they are not visible. What is called annihilation is therefore nothing but a passing out of being visible". That is to say, Frauwallner inadvertently contaminates the version of the fragment as given in the YD with that attested to by Paksilasvamin Vatsyayana in his Bhasya on NS 1.2.6.2 where we read nityatvapratisedhat in the place of na sattvad; and he reads samsargac with the editio princeps of the YD This reading can in fact be shown to be the only one acceptable,but Frauwallner has nevertheless misunderstood this term. For with the help of some pas sages of Sankara's Yogasutrabhasyavivarapa" it can be conclusively demonstrated that the expression samsarga as a specific element of Sankhya-Yoga terminology is used here to denote the rejoining of a phenomenon with its cause(s) after having been manifest for some time, whereas the opposite process is called visarga. The remaining part of the fragment quoted above cannot but be interpreted as follows: "This [passing out of being visible ]. however, is of two kinds: the [23] principles [have passed out of being visible before the evolution [ of the phenomenal world ] and after [its] dissolution; the other [minor evolutes, i.e. the individual, animate as well as inanimate things, have passed out of being visible] before they subsist for some time and after having subsisted for a [more or less limited] period of time." The sarvasarvatmakatvavada was obviously attacked quite early, and the argument was that if it were true, everything would then be visible everywhere or in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Samikhya, some of the relevant passages say that they took recourse to their peculiar concept of abhivyakti, i.e. they 25 Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. 1, Salzburg 1953, p. 352.-The English translation is mine. 20 This passage together with others has been discussed by O. Strauss in his contribution to: Festgabe H. Jacobi, Bonn 1926, pp. 358-368. 27 Yuktidipika. Critically ed. for the first time from Original Manuscripts by P. Chakravarti, Calcutta 1938 (=The Calcutta SS. No. XXIII). 28 Cf. p. 248 of the edition mentioned in fn. 17. 12

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178 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA 179 accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this, and not everywhere, by referring to place, time, shape clc., as conditioning its manifestation. 6.2. But there are still more fundamental problems connected with this vadla. Frauwallner has made the interesting and important observation that the origination of a given doctrine lies else. where than in the reasons adduced for it, and that the reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only later in order to prove the doctrine, of which the origin lies in immediate observation and perception of things. From this it would follow that the sarvasarvatmakarvavada is posterior in relation to the doctrine of prakrti, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justify, both according to the testimony of Simhasorio as well as of lsvarakrsna. Since it cannot have heen solely deduced from empirical facts nor have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, it is more likely that it is Tater merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of praksti. In quest of the origin of this vada ono has, therefore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to the satkaryavada, i.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Samkhyas adhere to and propound: according to the latter vada, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former it is all the same still existent after it has disappeared! And both these vadas cannot be delinked from the peculiar Samkhya concept of being which was formulated by the Varsaganyah, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakosabhasya : yad astiasty era fad/ yan nasti nasty eva fad/ asalo ndsti sambhaval/ sufo nasti vindahl. Now, regarding the sarkaryavada Frauwallner seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against the reasons brought for: ward by Sankhya authors who wanted to prove the existence of primary miatter. Thus, it Frauwallner were right, it would mean that the peculiar Sankhya concept of being, too, is of later origin. a consequence altogether improbable! Against Frauwallner, as also against the implications his ideas about this part of the historical development of the Samkhya school of thought have, I should like to state that the whole problem stands in need of a thorough and critical reconsideration which may well lead to quite different results. The resulting new picture would, to be sure, likewise have the character of a hypothesis ; yet, I think it would be a stronger one. It has, of course, yet to be drawn in full detail; my own attempt given in what follows is but a rough sketch. It starts from the assumption that the Samkhya concept of being has arisen, among other sruti passages, out of Chand. Up. 6.2.1 f.: sad eva somyedam agra asid ekam evadvitiyam/ tad dhaika dhur asad everam agra asid ekam evadviti yam/ fasmad asalah saj jayata// kutas tu khalu somyaivam sydd iti hovaca/ katham asalah saj idyeteti/ sat tv eva somyedam agra dsid ekam evadvi tiyam// "This universe, friend, was, indeed, in the beginning something existent (and neither something non-existent nor something that neither existed nor did not exist ), something all alone and hence] something that was without another. As to this some say: 'This universe was, indeed, in the beginning something non-existent, something all alone and hence something that was without another. Then from this that was non-existent something existent was born But how, friend, could that be so, he (i.e. Uddalaka Aruni) said. Ilow could something existent be born from something non-existent? Rather this universe, friend, was, indeed, in the beginning something existent (and neither something non-existent nor something that neither existed nor did not exist ). something all alone (and hence something that was without another." Though still in terms of rather cosmological than ontological thought, as has been rightly observed by P. Hacker. Uddalaka Aruni clearly states that a sat can only have originated out of a sal. And it was this very idea of the ur-sat that led to the peculiar 2 Cf. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 385. an CE. NC 320. 1-7. 31 Cf. Karika 15 of the Samkhyasaptati. 12 Abhidharma-Kosa-Bhasya of Vasubandhu, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1967, p. 301.2. 13 Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I. Salzburg 1953, p. 385. 34 Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 293.

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REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVATMAKATVAVADA 181 :180 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS concept of being, developed in the Sarpkhya and cchocd, lo be sure. also in the well known verse Bhagavadgita 2.16 ab : . nasalo vidyate bhavo nabhavo vidyate salah/. Indeed, Ramanuja, too, refers to the very same Chand. Up. passage as the central sruti proof for the sarvasarvatmakalva, though for obvious reasons he quotes only the beginning of 6.2.3. But since he in doing so cannot have intended the exponents of Sankhya (cf. his expression "vedavidam"), what seems plausible is that this peculiar concept of being was also shared by the forerunners of that specific theistic school which later used it in its surprising theory of crror. Both schools could have had this concept of being in common, but should have greatly differed from each other as regards their respective "Weltanschauung", a dualistic and non-theistic one in the case of (Proto-) Samkhya and a theistic and perhaps also monistic one in the case of the others. That is to say. we should assume that the tradition going back to this teaching of Uddalaka Aruni's evolved into two views when some thinkers interpreted the concept of sat in Chand Up. 6.2. 1 f. as unintelligent materia prima and basis (prakrti) of the phenomenal world, and others took it to mean a personal god out of whom this world emanates. :. In other words, there were theistic thinkers for whom the sarvasarvatmakalvavada was also characteristic, only that thcy did not, of course, accept the metaphysical "superstructure" the Samkhyas had crccled upon it. * And the evidence suggests that it is thesc thinkers whom Mallavadin has in view as resuting central tencts of the Samkhya. Thus Mallavadin leaves us in no doubt whatsoever as to the actual existence of this peculiar theistic school, an exponent of which may rightly be called sarva.sarvatmakatvavadin. And, again. he reveals remarkable empathy when he subsequently makes a thinker appear on the stage whose philosophical positions are likewise to a certain extent similar to those of the adversary he attacks ; the lisvaravadin who believes in a godhead, too, but conccives it as crcating the world out of matter. . 6.3. Regarding the antiquity of the sarvasarvatmakatvavadn and the plausibility of its having developed out of Chand. Up. 6.2., a passage of the Mahabhasya proves extraordinarily. instructive, one that seems to have eluded scholars' attention until now. What I am referring to 'is the final sentence of the discussion on Pan. 4.3.155 (Mahabhasya ed. F. Kielhorn II 325.18): alha malam etat prakriyanvaya vikara bhavantitihapi na doso bhavati/l. This is meant to answer the question preceding (II 325.16-17): atha yo'sav adyah kapotah salomakah sapakso na ca saniprati praniti kathan falra pranisabdo vartala itil. "the feathered, winged pigcon that was at the beginning, now (i.e. after having been killed) does not breathe anymore. How is it that with reference to it (i.e. the plucked dcad bird) a word is, nevertheless, used that (primarily ) denotes a breathing being (i.e. a living pigeon)?" Although Kaiyata and Nagojibhaffa36 understand Patanjali's answer as referring to words denoting the product of a process of transformation, one cannot fail to observe that Patanjali, on the contrary, aims at explaining a linguistic fact by taking recourse to a philosophical view he knew and considered apt to solve the ques tion under discussion. It was simply their unawareness of this phi.. losophical view that led Kaiyata and Nagojibhafta to misunderstand this passage which, to be sure, refers to extralinguistic facts. What Patanjali in fact says is this : "If one takes the view that the original (which undergoes a process of change ) is existent in its transformation(s), there is no room for any objection in this case, too, (i.e. as regards the use e.g. of the word kapota to denote a dead pigeon as it is a vikara of the original living bird)." Patanjali does not refer here, as H. Scharfens has asserted, to the satkaryavada, but obviously to a teaching that is intended to mcet the question as to what happens to the prakrti when a vikara has manifested itself. And this teaching cannot but be the sarvasarvatmakatvavada, according to which everything that represents a praksti, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain, does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of being visible : *The individual pigeon as a living being does, indeed, still exist when it has been killed ; and it is precisely this ontological "fact" that accounts for the linguistic observation that a pranisabda can also be used to denote that very animal, even when deprived of breathing! Thus the sarvasarvalmakarvavada can be traced back to the '2nd century B.C. 86 Patanjali's Vyakarapa-Mahabhasya with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nagesa's Uddyota, Vol. IV, ed. by Pt. Bh. Joshi Sastracarya, Bombay 1942, 227 a 1 ff. :36 Die Logik im Mahabhasya, Berlin 1961, p. 155.