Patanjali And Buddhists

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269546/1

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Patañjali and the Buddhists*
Johannes BRONKHORST
Medhätithi's commentary on Manu 1.5 cites the following proverb (janapravāda) (Jha, 1920–1939: I: 8. 1. 7): amran prstah kovidarān acaste. Wezler (1999: 139) translates: "Being questioned about mangoes he acquaints (one) with the kovidāra (trees)", and oberves in a note (p. 151, n. 9): "Note that this proverb does not belong to those dealt with by Hopkins 1887 and Pischel 1893." It is however mentioned in the Nyāyokti-kośa of Chhabinath Mishra (1978:22, s.v. amrān prstah ...), where it is pointed out that the proverb occurs in the Mahābhāsya (Maha-bh I, p. 219, 1. 16, on P. 1.2.45 vt. 8).
However, a closely similar expression occurs in the early Buddhist Śrāmanyaphala Sūtra. The different versions of this text can be most easily cited from Meisig's Das Srāmanyaphala-Sutra (1987). We find the proverb in Sanskrit in the Sanghabhedavastu: tad yatha bhadanta/purusah āmrāni prstah lakucāni vyakuryāt, lakucāni vā prstah amrāni vākuryāt, evam ..., in Pāli in the Digha Nikāya: seyyathāpi bhante ambam vā puttho labujam vyäkareya, labujam vā pusho ambam vyäkareyya, evam ... (Meisig, 1987: 130, 140, 148, 156, 162, (168)). The Chinese parallels translated by Meisig confirm that the translators used a similar text, even though the precise nature of the fruits mentioned may not have been preserved in translation.
In spite of the differences of detail, it is clear that Patañjali here uses essentially the same expression as certain Buddhist texts. This is interesting, for it suggests that Patañjali the author of the Mahabhāsya may have been influenced by Buddhist texts, and may therefore conceivably have undergone Buddhist influence. Influence in the opposite direction, from Patañjali to the Buddhist texts concerned, seems excluded, since the Srāmanyaphala Sūtra is a canonical text, which we may assume to be older than Patañjali, if not exactly in its surviving form than at least in some earlier form. Given that our
This article in honour of Professor Sodo Mori is in part based on two earlier studies by the present author (1987; 1995), which should be referred to for further details.
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proverb occurs in all the different versions of the Sutra, it seems safe to conclude that this earlier form already contained the proverb under consideration.
It goes without saying that the occurrence of a similar proverb both in a Buddhist canonical text and in the Mahabhaṣya does not, by itself, prove that Patanjali has here been influenced by that particular E ddhist text, or by Buddhists in general. It is conceivable that this proverb was in use in Patanjali's circles, as it was in use in the circles of those who composed (or redacted) the Śramanyaphala Sutra. However, this is not the only example of striking similarity between Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya and certain Buddhist
texts.
Patanjali speaks at one occasion about "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" (mangaladini mangalamadhyāni mangaläntäni śāstrāṇi; Maha-bh I, p. 253, 1. 5-6, on P. 1.3.1 vt. la). He uses this expression in connection with Panini's Aṣṭādhyāyi, but a closer inspection shows that it does not very well fit this text. The Aṣṭādhyāyi has, to be sure, "something auspicious" in the beginning: P. 1.1.1 (vṛddhir ad aic) begins with the word vṛddhi, which is auspicious. But this text does not have something auspicious in the middle; or rather, the presence of bhu in P. 1.3.1 which Patanjali mentions in this connection does not occur in the middle at all: it occurs at the beginning of the third Päda of a text which altogether has thirty-two of them. The "something auspicious" at the end remains unspecified in the Mahabhāṣya. Some commentators propose the use of udaya in P. 8.4.67, which is not the very end of the Aṣṭadhyayi.
It appears that Patanjali got the notion of "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" from elsewhere. Once again it is not very difficult to identify a possible source. A number of early Buddhist texts speak of the Dharma taught by the Buddha as being "auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". The Pāli expression is: adikalyāna, majjhekalyāna, pariyosanakalyana; the terms used in Sanskrit are: adau kalyāṇa, madhye kalyāna, paryavasane kalyāṇa. The Pali expression is frequent, especially in the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas (cf. PTC s.v. adikalyāna); the Sanskrit expression has been preserved in the Mahāparinirvana Sūtra, the Daśottara Sūtra, the Nidanasamyukta, and elsewhere (cf. SWTF s.v. adi).
For a third parallel consider the following passage from the Mahabhāṣya (Maha-bh II, p. 120, 1. 20-21):
athava bhavati vai kaścij jāgrad api vartamānakālam nopalabhate/ tad 486
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yathal
vaiyākaraṇānām sākaṭāyano rathamārga asinaḥ śakaṭasārtham yantam nopalebhe/
"Alternatively, there are people who, though awake, do not perceive the present. For example: Šākaṭāyana from among the grammarians, while sitting at [the side of] the carriage-road, did not perceive a group of carts that passed by."
A variant of this account occurs in the Buddhist Mahāparinirvana Sūtra and its parallels. Here the story is of course not told about the grammarian Śākaṭāyana, but about someone called Araḍa Kālāma. The Sanskrit version reads (MPS 28.18):
samjñi evāham ... samāno jāgran nāśrauṣam pañcānām śakaṭaśatānāṁ vyatikramamāṇānām sabdam
"Even though conscious and awake I did not hear the sound of five hundred carts passing by."
In this particular case Patanjali's story about a grammarian who did not hear a deafening noise sounds rather improbable. Les us not forget that early Indian literature shows little interest for or acquaintance with absent-minded professors. The story fits much better in an originally ascetic context, where practitioners were deeply concerned with suppressing the activities of the senses. Here too, the Buddhist milieu may be the source from which Patanjali drew this story. Once again, however, it must be admitted that without further evidence it may be difficult to prove this with certainty.
Consider now the following two expressions used by Patañjali: gunasamdravo dravyam (Maha-bh II, p. 366, 1. 26, on P. 5.1.119 vt. 5) and gunasamudayo dravyam (Maha-bh II, p. 200, 1. 13-14), to which attention has been drawn by Albrecht Wezler (1985). Both state that material objects are collections of qualities; the context makes clear that the qualities concerned are sound (sabda), touch (sparsa), colour (rupa), taste (rasa) and smell (gandha). There is no reason to believe that Patanjali himself accepted this position, yet its very mention proves that there were thinkers at the time of Patanjali who did. Who were they?
It is known that the Samkhya philosophy accepted the position that material objects are collections of qualities during a part of its history (Bronkhorst, 1994). There is however no reason to think that Sämkhya as a
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developed philosophy existed already at the time of Patañjali. His Mahābhāṣya, at any rate, contains no clear indication that he was acquainted with this school of thought. But Samkhya was not the only philosophy that accepted this position. Buddhist Sarvästivada accepted it well before Sämkhya (see, e.g., Bronkhorst, 2000: 113-114). Patañjali's remarks are most easily explained by the assumption that he was, whether directly or indirectly, acquainted with Sarvästivada Buddhism.
Patanjali's last considered remarks have taken us out of the domain of literary themes into that of philosophical ideas. They suggest that Patanjali may have undergone Buddhist influence (perhaps indirectly) in both these domains. This raises the question whether further Buddhist-like features of a philosophical nature can be found in the Mahabhāṣya.
This is indeed the case. The Mahabhäṣya does not contain many philosophical ideas, but some of them are noteworthy. Particularly important are Patanjali's ideas about the nature of words and sounds. Nothing in the grammatical discussions dealt with requires him to take a position in this matter, yet he does.
Patanjali distinguishes the individual speech sound as an entity, which he sometimes calls sphota, from the noise (dhvani) that expresses it. The sphota, as he puts it, is the sound itself, whereas the dhvani is a quality of the sound (Maha-bh I, p. 181, 1. 19-20, on P. 1.1.70 vt. 5: evam tarhi sphotah sabdo dhvaniḥ śabdagunah). Elsewhere it becomes clear that he considers words and their speech sounds eternal and unchanging. He does, for example, call the speech sounds fixed (Maha-bh I, p. 181, 1. 14, on P. 1.1.70 vt. 5: avasthita varnä[h]). The following passage is particularly clear (Maha-bh I, p. 18, 1. 14-15, on Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12):
nityaś ca sabdaḥ/ nityeşu ca śabdeṣu kütasthair avicälibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapayopajanavikäribhiḥ/
"And words are eternal. And the speech sounds in the eternal words must be permanent, unchanging, free from diminution, augmentation and modification."
This last passage suggests that also words, and not only their constituent sounds, are eternal. Patanjali's discussion of the first part of what is presented in Kielhorn's edition as the very first värttika of the Mahabhäṣya (siddhe sabdarthasambandhe; there are reasons to think that this is not the first värttika, set Bronkhorst 1987a) confirms this in a long discussion. It is hard to think that a mere collection of speech sounds can be eternal.
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It is clear from other passages that Patanjali considers words to be more than just collections of speech sounds. Indeed, he postulates the word as being one single entity (Maha-bh I, p. 31, 1. 10, on Śivasutra 5 vt. 13: samghātasyaikatvam). He explains that the sounds of words do not occur simultaneously. He states this in the following passage (Maha-bh I, p. 356, 1. 5-8, on P. 1.4.109 vt. 10):
gaur iti yāvad gakāre vāg vartate naukāre na visarjaniye/ yāvad aukāre na gakāre na visarjaniye yavad visarjaniye na gakāre naukare/ uccaritapradhvamsitvat/ uccaritapradhvamsinah khalv api varṇaḥ/ "In the case of gauḥ, as long as speech is concerned with the sound g, [it is] not [concerned] with the sounds au and h. As long as [it is concerned] with au, [it is] not [concerned] with g and h. As long as [it is concerned] with ḥ, [it is] not [concerned] with g and au. Because they disappear as soon as they are pronounced. Sounds indeed disappear as soon as they have been pronounced."
Patanjali is not particularly prolix about the nature of words, but a relatively clear picture is obtained by piecing together various remarks which he makes in different contexts. It seems clear, for example, that the single entity which is the word according to Patanjali, has an objective existence, not a merely mental one. The word, as he states somewhere, is situated in ether, where it can be heard by the ear and grasped by the mind (Maha-bh I, p. 18, 1. 19-20, on Śivasutra 1 vt. 12: śrotropalabdhir buddhinirgrahyah prayogenābhijvalita ākāśadeśaḥ śabda[h]).
I have dwelt a bit on Patanjali's ideas about words and sounds (without being exhaustive), since these ideas are remarkably similar to ideas developed in Sarvästiväda Buddhism. The classical enumerations of dharmas of the Sarvästivadins contain, as is well known, the following three linguistic dharmas: nämakaya, padakaya and vyañjanakaya. These dharmas already occur in the lists of cittaviprayukta samskaras found in several canonical Abhidharma texts of this school, viz., the Dharmaskandha, the Prakaraṇapada and the Jñanaprasthāna, as well as in the so-called Pañcavastuka.
This is not the place to discuss the original meaning of these three terms in detail. It may be significant that the earliest translation of the Pañcavastuka into Chinese knows only two linguistic dharmas; perhaps there were only two of them in the beginning. However that may be, it seems clear that these linguistic dharmas covered, right from the beginning, words and sounds. Words and sounds, being dharmas, were conceived of as being independent
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