Paksilasvamins Introduction To His Nyayabhasyam

Author(s): Gerhard Oberhammer
Publisher: Gerhard Oberhammer
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269261/1

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PAKSILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHASYAM*
G.R.F. OBERHAMMER
PAKŞILASVĀMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHASYAM' IS perhaps one of the most interesting texts of the older Nyaya indispensable to the understanding of the system. This is not because the ideas expressed therein were not to be surpassed at a later period, but because in it the development of the school appears fixed, as it were, in a "transitory moment" (transitorisches Moment), and we see there for the first time that line of thought, which historically took form in the Nyāya philosophy, becoming aware of itself in
*Abbreviations : NS Nyāyasūtram. Nbh. Nyāyabhāşyam (Poona Oriental Series edition). NV. Nyāyavārttikam (Kashi Sanskrit Series edition). YS Yogasūtram. Ybh. Yogabhāşyam (we quote the Patañjalayogasutrabhāsyavivaranam, Mad
ras Government Oriental Series, No. 94).
1 The Nyāyabhāsyam, a detailed commentary to all parts of the NS, was written by Paksilasvāmin Vatsyāyana about the 2d half of the 5th century A.D. The date of this work can be ascertained from the fact that no trace of the logic of syllogism of Dignāga (480-540 A.D.) can be found in it, while the Yogabhāsyam and the Samkhya teacher Vindhyavasin (1st half of the 5th cent. A.D.) seem to have been known to it. The importance of Paksilasvāmin's Nbh. as basic text of the old Nyāya is especially clear from the fact that it was repeatedly commented upon even up to the 9th century. Thus we know that Bhavivikta (about 520-580 A.D.) wrote a Tīkā to the Nbh., as did also Aviddhakarna. The Nyāyavārtikam of Uddyotakara is likewise a commentary to the Nbh. Probably the Rucițīkā of Adhyayana also dates from this period. Even in the later period there were commentaries on this work. Thus we hear of a Nyāyabhāsyatīkā of Viśvarupa and of a work of a similar name of Vacaspati Misra's teacher Trilocana (about 770-830 A.D.). From the large number of these commentaries, which spread over a period of about three centuries, it is plain, to what great extent the work of Paksilasvāmin was esteemed in the old Nyāya school. Such a work which occupied the best thinkers of the school for centuries could not have gone by without leaving its influence on the system and on the way in which the system determined its own nature. It must have acted as a catalyst for the development of the school, giving to it, at least in its fundamental concepts, its particular turn.
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a clear, though archaic, manner. Furthermore, if we bear in mind to what extent such an interpretation of a school (given by itself) determines its development, the importance of Pakşilasvamin's text for the history of Nyaya cannot be over-estimated.
1
The history of Nyaya begins with a relatively old Väda tradition' which consisted of a certain number of concepts and doctrines that were gathered from the practice of disputations. These topics of the Vada doctrine did not form a homogeneous system of concepts but were drawn up for practical purposes and on the basis of practical experience. Hence, this Vada doctrine cannot be considered as a consistent, theoretical science, and in no philosophical system.
It came to be a philosophical system only when an old school of philosophy of nature took up this Vada doctrine and handed it on further together with its doctrine of liberation. In my article on the Vāda traditions of India I have tried to show that the oldest Nyaya work, which might have been the oldest core of the Nyayasutras (Adhyayas I and V), must have already undergone an elabo ration, because from a philosophical point of view, the arrangement of topics, usual in a Vada exposition, were changed. Το this must be added another reason, namely, that the relatively detailed explanation of the cosmological doctrine of liberation in the first Adhyaya of the NS is unusual in a pure Vada exposition and,
2 Cf. G. Oberhammer: Ein Beitrag zu den Vada-Traditionen Indiens. WZKSO, Vol. 7 (1963), especially pp. 63-74. (Abbreviated in this paper as
"Vada-Traditionen").
3 This is clear from the choice of the 16 topics (padarthūḥ) of the NS or the collection of the Jatis and Nigrahasthānas, which show no systematic choice or order, but are obviously lists of faults met with in the practice of disputations. This can be seen from a detail, namely, from the category of fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsāḥ), which in their logical structure do not show a common principle of definition and are not found in contexts, where one would have expected them. For they are mentioned neither in connection with the logical reason (hetuḥ) nor in connection with the enumeration of the Nigrahasthānas (NS V, 2, 24).
4 This cosmological doctrine of liberation is already found in the earliest beginnings of the NS, namely, in NS I, 1, 1-2, and 1; 1, 9-22. Cp. Note 6. 5 Vada-Traditionen, p. 71 f.

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therefore, points to a philosophical elaboration of an old Väda exposition.
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If we compare this elaborated text, which must have been the first real text of the Nyaya school, with the version of the NS which Paksilasvamin comments on, we see that this oldest Nyaya work (=Adhyayas I and V of the NS) was enlarged according to the cosmological interest of the school. On the other hand, no essential enlargement was made in the sections on the real Vada. categories, except in the case of the philosophically important category of the Pramāņas. Thus, we see a clear trend of development from the Vada doctrine to a cosmological doctrine of liberation.
If we compare Caraka's Vada exposition with that of the NS, we find that the earlier Vada expositions might have had included as topic also a system of metaphysical concepts, appearing in the NS as Prameya. This system of concepts could vary from school to school and was, so to say, inserted in a special place of their Vada exposition, which, within the leading Vada traditions, must have been the same for different philosophical. systems. Thus we find in Caraka's exposition the six categories of the older Vaiseṣikam, while in the case of the Vada text, which forms the basis of Adhyayas 1 and 5 of the NS, a cosmological doctrine of liberation (NS I, 1, 9-22) was inserted. Through this insertion and the rearrangement of the topics (Cf. Note 5) must have come into being from a Vada exposition that oldest Nyaya work, which roughly corresponds to Adhyayas 1 and 5 of the NS (Cf. W. Ruben: Die Nyayasutren, Leipzig 1928, p. XV). Together with this adaptation of the Vāda text also NS I, 1, 1-2 must have been added, which must have been likewise absent in the old Vada text, since the problem of liberation was a philosophical problem and not proper to a Vada doctrine.
7 We are justified in assuming the cosmological interest of the school not only if we start from the hypothesis that Adhyayas 3-4 of the NS are amplifications made by the teachers of the school, but also if we start from the theory that the teachers of the Nyaya school at a particular stage had amalgamated the work of a cosmological school with the NS of Adhyāyas 1 and 5 (perhaps also 2). This last hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that Tucci has found Sutras of Adhyayas 3 and 4 of the NS not quoted as Nyayasutras even in the 4th century. Cf. G. Tucci: Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. XXVII ff.
NS II, 1, 8; II, 2, 12.

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Now the problem arises as to why this development did not finally lead to a total subordination of the logico-dialectical problems, as it happened, for example, in the case of the oldest Vaiseșika system, which had never integrated in its doctrines a Vada doctrine, though it must have known and possessed such expositions of the Vada-doctrine for the practice of school debates. This is all the more important since the logico-dialectical categories of the old Vada text were not necessarily topics of the cosmological doctrine of liberation of the oldest Nyāya school, and consequently could have easily been disposed of or subordinated as methodology to the system, as was done with the Tantrayuktis or Vada doctrine in Caraka. The reason why this was not the case seems to lie, among other reasons, mainly in the interpretation of the school as given to it by Paksilasvāmin.
II
Viewed historically, Paksilasvāmin's introduction to Nyāyabhāsyam marks the final stage of the attempts of the Nyāya to justify the objective value of knowledge, in general, and the sixteen categories of the school, in particular, against the criticism of cer
tain Buddhist schools. This justification is contained in the first · part (Nbh. 1, 1-2, 8) of the introductory chapter.
Starting from the fact of the ability to act (pravsttisāmarthyam), Pakșilasvāmin, on the supposition that knowledge of a
9 Though the Vāda exposition in Caraka, or more precisely the Vāda exposition which ought with the greatest probability to be assumed as its prototype, may not necessarily have been such an exposition, yet it shows that there were Vada expositions which were closely connected with the Vaiseșika school. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the presence of Vaiseșika categories in Caraka's Vāda exposition.
10 This idea reminds one of the "arthakriyū" of Dharmakirti (600660 A.D.) from which this thinker deduced the validity of he means of knowledge.

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thing must be acquired through the means of knowledge," concluded that the means of knowledge-contrary to the view of Nagarjuna and his school-convey an objective knowledge and hence are objectively valid: "The means of knowledge are objectively valid because they are capable of inducing activity (which, being a fact of experience, cannot be called into question) only when the knowledge of things is gained through them." This starting-point is further elaborated by Pakṣilasvamin. He divides the entire "truth about things" (arthatattvam) into four fundamental categories, namely pramnaam (means of knowledge), pramātā (the cognizing subject), prameyam (object of cognition) and pramitiḥ
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11 That this principle was not part of the original Vada text, but originated from the cosmological doctrine of liberation that was connected with it, and consequently could be rightly conceived as a doctrine of the oldest Nyaya, can be gathered from the fact that the importance of the Pramāņas expressed there stands in clear opposition to the real position of the Pramaņas in the available Vāda texts, where it usually has only a subordinate importance. Furthermore, the re-arrangement of the topics of the old Vada text, as we have shown (Cf. Vada-traditionen, p. 71 ff.) becomes clearly understandable, if one assumes that this principle was one of the fundamental ideas of the cosmology of the old Vada text; for if this cosmological doctrine of liberation maintained the view that everything will be or must be known through the Pramaņas, then the doctrine of the Pramāņas. ought to have been treated at the beginning of the exposition of the school doctrine. The view that the principle "pramāṇataś carthapratipattih," which Pakṣilasvamin emphatically brings forward at the beginning of his Nbh., belongs to the cosmological doctrine of the liberation, can be strengthened by the fact that this principle is a literal quotation from the later cosmological sections of the NS, where it occurs as NS IV, 2, 29.
In this connection it may be pointed out that this principle suggests the idea that the philosophical school which had fused its cosmological doctrine of liberation with a Vada text and thus had become the school of Nyaya, was identical with that school against which Nagarjuna polemizes in his Vigrahavyāvartani and which commonly is rightly considered to be the school of Nyaya (Cf. Vada-Traditionen, pp. 64-72). It is thus probable that the later cosmological parts of the NS did not originate in a schoci other than that old cosmological doctrine of liberation, which had been contained already in the oldest part of the NS (NS I, 1, 9-12).
Whether that school was always known as "Nyaya" or whether Paksilasvamin associated this name with the Sutras he commented upon, must remain an open question for the present. The fact that Sutras of the cosmological parts of the NS were quoted as Vaiśeṣika-sutras, testified to by Vasu in his commentary to Aryadeva's Sataśastram (Cf. Tucci: Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. XXVII ff.), as well as the fact that Pakṣilasvamin himself in his introduction to the Nbh. endeavors to determine his science as doctrine of nyaya and anvikṣiki, seem to point to the second possibility.
12 Nbh., p. 1, 5.

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(cognition). These four categories are necessary elements for the knowledge of things (arthapratitih) without which there is no capacity to act. Hence, if the knowledge of things, as shown, is really obtained through the means of knowledge, then also the remaining three categories must have an objective value: "If the means of knowledge have an objective value, then also the categories like] cognizing subject, object of cognition and cognition have an objective value. Why? Because the knowledge of a thing is not possible, if one of these [categories] is missing... these four [categories] contain the entire 'truth about things' [arthatattvam]."'14 Hence, the "truth about the things" as a whole is proved to be objectively valid.
III • In order to show the objective value of the "truth about the things," Paksilasvāmin divided it into the four above-mentioned categories. As a next step, he determined from another startingpoint the content of this truth about the things: "What is this truth? The being of the existent and the non-being of the non-existent."'l5 In doing so Pakṣilasvāmin obtains an important starting-point, defined in its content, which enables him to prove the validity of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya. For, if one leaves aside the negation of being, the truth about things—fundamentally already proved to be valid consists in the being of the existent. The truth, apart from negation,
13 Nbh., p. 1, 14-16. The classification of reality into these four groups is not found in the NS, but Paksilasvāmin makes this classification on purpose in order to bring the existent in a necessary relation with cognition. This division might be traced back to an older doctrine of the school; for Paksilasvāmin mentions this classification in Nbh., p. 268, 1 as one of the possible classifications of reality and polemizes against its being taken absolutely. Besides, we meet with this same classification of reality in pramānam, pramātā, prameyam and pramitih also in the commentary of Kaundinya to the Pasupatasūtras, but increased by the category of pramāpa. yitū, which corresponds to God. The absence of this fifth category could be taken as a hint to the fact that Paksilasvāmin himself was probably no Pā. supata. This commentary knows of a doctrine of inference, which fundamentally agrees with a commentary of NS older than the commentary of Paksilasvāmin (Cp. "Vada-Traditionen" p. 97 ff.). Hence it is not probable that this commentary took over this classification of reality from Paksilasvāmin.
14 Nbh., p. 1, 12-16. Here I deviate from the translation of these lines of G. Jha, who seems to follow an interpretation of this passage by Uddyotakara, but does not do justice to the idea.
15 kim punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāvo 'satascāsadbhāvah. Nbh. p. 1, 17; 2, 1.

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is nothing else than the existent, correctly and objectively cognized as such.16 It is precisely this existent (sat) which is expounded in the sixteen topics of the Nyāya: means of knowledge (pramāņam), object of cognition (prameyam), doubt (samsayah), purpose (prayojanam), example (dņstāntaḥ), theory (siddhāntah), syllogism (avayavāḥ), methodical consideration (tarkah), decision (nirņayah), discussion (vādah), debate (jalpaḥ), wrangling (vitandā), fallacious reason (hetvābhāsaḥ), quibbling (chalah), false rejoinder (jātih) and reason of defeat (nigrahasthānam). Inasmuch as Paksilasvāmin had, therefore, proved the validity of those necessary conditions of the cognition of a thing, namely, pramānam, pramātā, prameyam and pramatiḥ, he had also shown that sixteen topics of the Nyāya were valid; for these were nothing else than the four conditions of possible cognition of a thing seen from the point of view of what they are.
IV
Through this interpretation of the sixteen topics of the school as classifications of the existent Paksilasvamin had furthermore claimed-at least in nuce and implicitly—that these sixteen purely accidental categories of the school are consciously deduced topics of one science and that this science was a philosophical system, and not a mere "organon" of logic and dialectics. This claim manifests itself clearly in the attempt of Paksilasvāmin to determine the doctrine of his school from a double point of view, on the one hand, as nyāyavidyā (doctrine of nyāyah) and, on the other, as adhyātmavidyā (philosophical doctrine of liberation), understanding this double determination in the sense that the Nyāya represents an Adhyatma-doctrine which is worked out with the help of rational method (nyāyaḥ).
For whatever reasons it might be Paksilasvamin identifies his science with the Anvīksiki mentioned by Kautilya in his Arthaśāstra.18 If he, therefore, makes statements about this Anvīksikī, they can safely be considered as applicable also to his own system. Now, he states expressly that the Anvīksiki is nyāyavidyā since it
16 sat sad iti gļhyamānam yathābhūtam aviparītam tattvam bhavati. Nbh., p. 2, 1-2.
17 sac ca khalu şodaśadhā vyūdham upadekşyate, tāsām khalv āsām sadvidhānām pramānapramevasamsayapravojanadrstānta siddhāntāvayavatarkanirnavavada jalpavitandahetvibhāsacchala=jūtinigrahasthānānām tattvajñanān niņśreyasādhigamah. Nbh., p. 2, 8-12.
18 Cf. P. Hacker: Anvīkșikī (WZKSO, Vol. II (1958) pp. 67 ff.

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works with anviksā, which he identifies with nyāyaḥ. Thus, the nyāyaḥ in the broadest sense of the term (both as pramāņair arthapariksanam and as syllogism which Paksilasvāmin characterizes as paramo nyāyaḥ) is the typical method and, as will be shown, an essential topic of his science. Primarily and basically, however, the Nyāya is an Adhyātma-doctrine: "Knowledge of the truth, (tattvajñanam)," writes Paksilasvāmin, “which serves as means for the attainment of the highest good, must be understood in accordance with the science in question. Here in the case of the Adhyātma doctrine, however, is the knowledge of the truth, knowledge of the truth about the Atmā etc.; by attainment of the highest good is (to be understood) the attainment of liberation."20 Thus, for Paksilasvāmin, his science is in a double sense the Anvīksiki: first, inasmuch as it works with the method of nyāyaḥ and teaches it; and secondly, inasmuch as the Anvikșiki is Adhyātma doctrine 21
Through this double identification, Paksilasvāmin could determine the specific nature of his science in such a way that the categories of the NS, gathered originally as accidental topics of a Vada manual, appears as a coherent system of philosophy: "These four sciences (transmitted by Kautilya), each of which has its own formal object, has been taught for the sake of living beings. The fourth of these is the Anvīksikī or the science of Nyāya (nyāyavidyā). Its specific objects are the topics "doubt," etc. Without their separate enumeration it would be, like the Upanişads,
19Apart from the explicit identification (Nbh., 3, 16, f.), this follows from the fact that he uses the definition of the method of the Anvīkșiki given by Kautilya in his Arthaśāstram, namely"...hetubhir arvikşamānā..." in order to determine the concept of nyāyah. According to Pakşila. svāmin this nyāyah is pramānair arthapariksanam. The new term pramāna is evidently a synonym for the term hetuh used by Kautilya. Caraka defines the concept of hetuh simply as upalabdhikūranam, which he explains as pratyaksam, anumānan, aitihyam and aupamyam, i.e., as means of knowledge (pramūnam). Caraka then continues: ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam. (Carakasamhitā, Vim. 8, 33). Hence we can be certain that in their early period the concepts 'pramānam' and 'hetuh' had identical significance. Thus Paksilasvāmin has not at all changed the content of the de. finition of nyāyah through the use of the term pramānam. I am therefore inclined to make precise P. Hacker's interpretation of anvīksā as "Untersuchen mit Grunden" (inquiry with reasons) in the sense that it is "an inquiry with the help of the means of knowledge" ("Untersuchen mit Hilfe der Erkenntnisgrunde). Cf. P. Hacker: Anvīksikī, p. 66.
20 Nbh., p. 7, 7 f. 21 On this aspect of Anvikșikī cf. P. Hacker: Anviksiki, p. 73 f.

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only on Adhyātma doctrine."22 If we bear in mind that Paksilasvāmin did characterize his system as Adhyātma doctrine, then here cannot be denied that the Nyāya is an Adhyatma doctrine, but only that it is a mere Adhyātma doctrine like the Upanişads. Just because it is an Adhyātma doctrine, it requires specific topics like the categories "doubt," etc. for being a science of its own. : Thus, Paksilasvāmin marks for us that stage in the history of the Nyāya where the trend of its development, starting from a pure Vada doctrine, is transformed into a clear and conscious form of Adhyātma doctrine. It is true that already, at the beginning of this development, when NS I, 1, 1 had introduced the oldest work of the school, the system of concepts handed down in the old Vada tradition had been changed into a philosophical system. Yet, in spite of this change, the topics of the Vada tradition still remained the most extensive and the most emphasized part of the system: "From the knowledge of the truth about the means of knowledge, object of recognition, doubt, purpose, example, theory, syllogism methodical consideration, decision, discussion, debate, wrangling, fallacious reason, quibbling false rejoinder and reason of defeat, proceeds the attainment of the highest good."23
In this introductory Sutram an attempt is in fact made to integrate the system of Vada topics into the liberation-doctrine of an old cosmological school, though in a most superficial and external manner; for it is only the second. Sūtram which brings this liberation-doctrine to the forefront. But in doing so, it neglects completely the topics of the Vada doctrine: "Liberation follows therefrom, that pain, birth, activity, defect and false knowledge cease, each (member of the series) ceasing at the cessation of that which immediately precedes it".24 Regarding the question on how the contents of these two Sūtras are to be combined, or what necessary role the Vada topics of NS I, 1, 1, have to play in this system of liberation, we are completely kept in the dark. Paksilasvamin, on the contrary, has with full consciousness emphasized the aspect and importance of the Nyāya philosophy, as liberation-doctrine restricting the basic thought of NS I, 1, 1 to the idea that it is only the knowledge of the Prameya like Atmā etc. which brings about liberation, and not that of the dialectical categories: "Happiness, indeed, is attained through the truth about the Prameya (objects
22 Nbh., 3, 5-8. 23 NS, I, 1, 1 24 NS, I, 1, 2.

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of cognition) like Atmā etc. ... ; for it is only when these four categories (padarthah) are completely known, namely heyam (that which is to be avoided), tasya nirvartakam (that which causes it), atyantikam hānam (absolute avoidance), tasyopāyaḥ (the means thereto) and adhigantavyah (that which ought to be attained), that one attains the highest happiness."
That Paksilasvāmin purposely restricted the liberating knowledge to the knowledge of the truth about Atmā etc. is seen, among other reasons, from the strange division of Prameya26 into these four Mokşa-categories, which are entirely foreign to the Nyāyasutras. Therefore, if Paksilasvāmin, nevertheless, applies them to the Nyāya category of Prameya, it can only mean that he intended to demonstrate and confirm the fact that his Nyāya system represented a real liberation-doctrine; for the division into these four categories is not restricted to this single passage, but occurs in a second one too, though somewhat less clearly expressed. This shows that their use was not a momentary fancy of Paksilasvāmin, but was indeed based on the idea he had himself formed about the philosophy of his school. In his commentary on the cosmological Sur tras dealing with knowledge and liberation, he writes: "... If the unhappiness (duḥkham) is known, it will be avoided (prahiņam) ... in the same way, one knows that the faults (dosah) and the deed (karma) are the causes of unhappiness (duḥkhahetuh)... Thus one comes to the view that the topics) like rebirth after death (pretyabhāvah), fruit (phalam) and unhappiness (duḥkham) are to be known, and deed (karma) and the faults (dosah) are to be avoided (praheyah), that the liberation (apavargah) is that which ought to be attained (adhigantavyah) and that the means to its attainment (adhigamopāyaḥ) is the knowledge of the truth (tattvajñanam). Thus, a person who constantly applies himself to, and studies and reflects over the objects of knowledge, which are divided in this fourfold manner,27 gains a complete knowledge (samyag
25 Nbh., p. 2, 16-3, 2.
26 This category comprises . soul (ātmā), body (sariram), sense organ (indriyam), sense object (arthah), thought (buddhih), inner organ (manas), action (pravrttiḥ) fault (doşah), life after death (pretyabhāvah), fruit of action (phalam), unhappiness (duhkham) and liberation (apavargan), Cf. Ns. I, 1 9-22. The key-words of this category contain the entire old cosmological doctrine of liberation.
27 By that is meant : 1) jñeyam (=pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkham); 2) praheyam (= karma and doşāh = duḥkhahetuh); 3) adhigantavyah (=apavargah); 4) tasyopāyaḥ (=tattajñanam).

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darśanam), knowledge (of things) just as they are (yathābhūtāvabodhah), knowledge of the truth (tattvajñānam)."28
VI In both the above-quoted passages we have the same division into four categories. Yet this division cannot be considered as "proper to the system of Nyāya. For, firstly, it is nowhere to be met with in the Nyāyasūtras; and secondly, it cannot be easily applied to the content of the category mentioned as "prameyam." The last difficulty seems to have been felt by Paksilasvamin himself, because in the passage last quoted there is no category of hānam to be found, so that the division consists only of praheyam, adhigantavyaḥ and upāyaḥ, while in the first passage282 there are, really speaking, five categories, and not four, as Paksilasvamin pretends : heyam, tasya nirvartakam, hānam, upāyaḥ and adhigantavyaḥ. This is clear from the fact that in the second passage, adhigantavyaḥ is to be taken as a category of its own, namely apavargaḥ. Thus, in order to obtain the fourfold division, heyam and tasya nirvartakam had obviously to be taken as one, which it was not, according to the original conception. Paksilasvāmin seems therefore, to have taken over this division from a liberation-doctrine, where only the fourfold division was used. This doctrine of liberation, which made use of these four categories, can really be traced back: it is the Yoga of Patañjali. The source whence Paksilasvāmin took over this division seems to have been the Yogabhāsyam. There we read: "Just as the medical science is divided into four (parts), namely sickness, cause of sickness, health and means of health, sò also is this system (the Yoga of Patañjali) divided into four, namely, transmigration (samsāraḥ), cause of transmigration (samsārabijaḥ, liberation (mokşah) and the means of liberation (moksopāyah). Of these, transmigration, which is full of pain, is the Heya, the union of prime matter and spirit, the Heyahetu, the complete cessation of this union the Hana, and the right knowledge (samyagdarśanam), the Hānopāya.''29
A comparison of this passage, with the division of Paksilasvamin, shows a clear dependence. Both are acquainted with the category of heyam—in the first passage of Paksilasvamin as heyam, while in the second, it appears as praheyam, by which is
28 Nbh., p. 288, 10; 289, 4. 28a See footnote 25. 29 Ybh., p. 168, 3-7.

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meant the heyahetuh (=dosah and karma). In the same way, the category of heyahetuḥ is found in both the texts. In the first passage of the Nyāyabhāsyam Paksilasvāmin explains it as tasya (=heyasya) nirvartakam, while in the second passage it appears as duḥkhahetuḥ (=praheyam). He mentions the concept of hānam only in the first passage of his Nyāyabhāṇyam, while in both passages, he mentions the category of upāyaḥ.
Though there is a fundamental agreement between Yogabhāsyam and Nyāyabhāṇyam, there are differences which are important for the understanding of the relation of both the texts.30 First of all, it is worthy of note that in the series of concepts in Paksilasvāmin the concept of adhigantavyan appears, while it is absent in that of the Yogabhäsyam. Secondly, the concept of hānam appears in Paksilasvāmin only in the first passage (Nbh. 2, 17.) but it is absent in the second. Finally, on close study, one finds a certain disagreement in the interpretation of the concept of upāyaḥ. In the first passage, it appears as means for the hānam, while in the second, where the concept of hanam is absent, as means for the attainment of apavargah, i.e., as means for the adhigantavyah (Nbh. 289, 2). All these disagreements seem to be connected with the concept of hānam, which puts Paksilasvāmin into difficulties while applying it to the Nyāya category of Prameya.
VII What is the interpretation given to this concept in the Yoga of Patañjali, from where Paksilasvāmin took the concepts heyam, heyahetuḥ, hānam and tasyopāyaḥ? In the Yogabhāsyam, the concept of hānam is defined as "complete cessation of the union (be
30 The disagreement that results from the application of these four categories within the Nyaya doctrine will be still clearer, if we consider the interpretation given to them by Uddyotakara, who attempts to bring them in agreement with the Nyāya doctrine: "By 'heyam' is meant unhappiness (dunkham); tasya nirvartakam' is ignorance and longing (avidyātrsne), dharma and adharma; 'hunam' is knowledge of the truth; "tasyopayah' is the Sastra and 'adhigantavyan' is liberation (moksah)" (NV. p. 12, 5-6). This interpretation testifies that Paksilasvāmin really enumerated five, and not four, categories. Further it shows how problematic the classification of the category of Prameya in these four Yoga-categories was: for firstly, Sastram is no prameyam according to the NS; and secondly Uddyotakara's interpretation of these categories differs from that of Paksilasvamin. In the second passage (Nbh., p. 289, 1-2), where Paksilasvāmin speaks of these categories, tattvajñānam is not at all to be equated with 'hānam,' but with 'upāyah,' which Uddyotakara had interpreted as Sastra, though Pa. ksilasvāmin makes no mention at all of it in this connection.

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tween spirit and prime matter)."31 In a second passage, this idea is more clearly expressed: "hānam is the absence of the union (of spirit and prime matter) on account of the absence of this [ignorance). This [hanam) is the emancipation of the spirit [drşeh kaivalyam]. [With this Sūtram is meant that] on account of the absence of ignorance [adarśanam] the union of the intellectual organ [buddhiḥ] and spirit [puruṣaḥ] is absent. [In other words ] there is absolute cessation of bondage. This is the hānam, this the emancipation of the spirit."32 From this definition of hānam, in terms of the Samkhya metaphysics of the Patañjala-Yoga, it is clear that this concept signifies nothing else than liberation (moksah). Thus it is easy to understand, why in the Yoga series of these four concepts there is no other term for liberation. Consequently the Patañjala-Yoga defines the means to attain liberation as "right knowledge" (samyagdarśanam), i.e., "unshakable knowledge of the difference (between spirit and prime matter]."* Such an interpretation of the concepts hānam and hānopāyaḥ, however, was not possible within the framework of the Nyaya philosophy, and thus Paksilasvāmin must have had to give a new interpretation to these concepts. And this he did. He could keep the term upāyaḥ, but giving it the Nyāya sense of means for the attainment of apavargaḥ (= adhigantavyah). In doing so, he also gave a new interpretation to the term samyagdarśanam by changing its original sense of "knowledge of the difference between spirit and prime matter" into that of tattvajñānam, that is to say, “knowledge of the truth about the objects of cognition (prameyāņi, not padārthāh!]."
There was, however, no equivalent for the concept of hānam. Hence Paksilasvāmin avoided it when he expressed his own thoughts (Nbh. 288 ff.) and let it remain only in that place where
31 'Hanam' is the absolute cessation of the union (between prime matter and spirit). Ybh., p. 168, 8.
32 Ibid., p. 203, 5-8. 33 Ibid., p. 168, 8. 34 vive kakhyātir aviplavā hānopūyaḥ, YS., II, 26.

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he made a more or less explicit reference to the Yogabhāsyam.35 Since the Yoga term hanam was not suited for characterizing the Nyaya concept of apavargah, Paksilasvāmin endeavored to increase the concept-series of the Yoga (heyam, heyahetuḥ, hānam and hānopāyaḥ) by one more concept, adhigantavyaḥ, which, on the testimony of Paksilasvāmin himself, has to be taken in the sense of apavargaḥ.
From the foregoing inquiry, we come to an important result: Paksilasvāmin makes a conscious effort to apply to the Nyāya category of Prameya, the categories of liberation of the Yoga of Patanjali. This he does in connection with the claim that the Nyaya as Adhyātma doctrine leads to liberation through the "knowledge of the truth about the Prameyas such as Atmā, etc." Why does he do so? The only sensible answer is, that the Yoga of Patañjali was at that time held to be the model doctrine of liberation, and hence allusion to its terminology seemed best suited to strengthen Paksilasvamin's claim that his school represented a real liberationdoctrine (adhyātmavidyā). ! In this way, Paksilasvämin had certainly shown that the Nyaya as an Adhyātma doctrine, was a genuine philosophical system and not a school of mere dialectical techniques. Yet, he did not succeed in determining his science from the philosophical point of view in such a way that its difference from other philosophical systems was made clear.
35 This is textually attested to through the use of the term samyagdarsanam in this connection: etāni catvāry arthapaduni samyagbuddhvā nih. śreyasam adhigacchati. Here the agreement of the word samyagbuddhva with the world samyagdarśanam is not fully convincing, though very probable, when taken with the foregoing enumeration of the four categories from Ybh., p. 168, 4 ff., which is evidently an inexact quotation. (In Nbh., 289, 4, on the contrary, samyagdarśanam is expressly identified with tattvajñānam:
prameyam ... bhāvayatah samyagdarśanam yathābhūtāvabodhas tattva. jñānam utpadyate). To show that Paksilasvāmin (Nbh., p. 2, 17; 3, 1) really gives an inexact quotation, I would like to put forward the parallelism of hanam ātyantikam (Nbh., p. 3, 1) and samyogasyatyantiki nivrttit hanam (Ybh., p. 168, 8) as also the use of samyagbuddhvā (Nbh., 3, 1) which reminds one of hūno pāyaḥ samyagdarśanam in Ybh., 168, 8. Another important reason for it seems to be the fact that Paksilasvāmin speaks of four categories, but he really enumerates five, though by omitting hānam, which in fact did not fit properly in the Nyāya context, he would have easily got the four categories. It is true, in doing so, these four categories would no more have been the same as in the Yoga. Thus we can conclude that Paksilasvāmin did want to mention the Yoga categories and that he therefore quoted the Yogabāsyam.

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The starting point for such a determination can be found in two remarks which Paksilasvāmin makes while he identifies his science with the Anvīksikī. There, he observes that the Anvīkșiki, and consequently also his science, is a nyāyavidyā6 and explains this idea in the second passage, where the Anvikșiki is said to be ānviksiki or nyāyavidyā because it operates with anviksā (=nyayah). In other words, the starting point for the determination of the nature of his science is for Paksilasvāmin, the idea already mentioned that the Nyāya represents an Adhyātma-doctrine, which operates essentially with the method of nyāyaḥ,38 ' i.e., a rationally worked out Adhyatma-doctrine. This idea is, after all, not new. It was already implicitly contained in the attitude of the oldest Nyāya tradition, as we find it in NS I, 1, 1 and 2, and this must have been one of the reasons why this old cosmologically oriented doctrine of liberation integrated into its system an exposition of Väda doctrine. Besides, this attitude is not even typical for the oldest Nyāya; it is already found in a developed form in the still older system of Samkhya, which was a genuine Adhyātmadoctrine and operating so much with rational method, that its followers could be characterized as tārkikâh. What is new is the fact that Paksilasvāmin, starting from this determination of his science, endeavors to show the old categories of the Vada doctrine as an integral part of the Nyāya. In doing so, he therefore preserves these categories in the tradition of his school, in as far as he shows them as necessary topics of the system.
The starting point of this demonstration is, as mentioned already, the determination of Nyāya as a rationally worked out liberation-doctrine. The dominating idea of this doctrine is the "knowledge of the truth” (tattvajñānam). By this is meant not only the topics (padārthah) of the Nyāya being the knowledge of the truth as determined in its content, but also the knowledge of the truth in as far as it is movement of thought, as spiritual event obeying objective norms. Hence, those topics of Nyāya explaining and analyzing the knowledge of truth as movement of thought are also to be considered as necessarily belonging to the topics of Nyāya, and not only the categories of Pramāna and Prameya which needed no further justification.
36 Nbh., 3, 6. 37 Ibid., 3, 6-4, 1. 38 Cf. P. Hacker: Anvikșiki p. 70 ff.

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Thus in the last part (Nbh. 3, 3; 7, 6) of his introduction to the Nyayabhäṣyam Pakṣilasvamin shows why the old dialectical categories, whose quality as necessary topics is called into question, are yet to be considered as constitutive topics of the Nyaya; for even if they are not necessary topics of Nyaya as Adhyatma doctrine, they all stand in a necessary, or at least proportionate, relation to the knowledge of truth as movement of thought, which is a necessary aspect of Nyaya as Anvīkṣiki. This relation is inferred either as a method of this knowledge of the truth taken as nyayah and its conditions of possibility," or as form of this knowledge so far as it is result, namely, theory (siddhantah) and deci sion (nirnayaḥ), or as means of dealing with the knowledge of the truth within or between the schools, namely as vadah and its conditions of possibility."
VIII
Viewed systematically and historically, the group of topics containing the nyayah and its conditions of possibility is the most important. According to its general structure, the nyayah as method is the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge (pramäṇair arthaparikṣaṇam). Syllogism, the highest form of nyayah, also is such an inquiry with the means of knowledge." Thus the nyayaḥ is the only and indispensable method which corresponds to the basic view of the Nyaya, that a cogni
39 These are the topics: doubt, purpose, example, syllogism and methodical consideration.
40 These are the topics: discussion, debate wrangling, theory, fallacious reasons, quibbling, false rejoinder, and reason of defeat.
41 For Pakṣilasvamin syllogism was not yet, as it was for the logic after Dignaga, formalization of inference (anumanam), but a fixed schema for the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge. I hope to elaborate this idea in another context. Here I shall only refer to the remark of Pakṣilasvamin in which he expresses the nature of syllogism succinctly: "In the verbal formulation consisting of the totality of the members of syllogism, the Pramaņas (!) prove the objects because they (correspond to the respective members of the syllogism and, corresponding to them) depend on each other" avayavasamudaye ca vakye sambhuyetaretarabhisambandhāt pramanany artham sadhayanti (Nbh. 50, 10-11). In this short remark the expression itaretarabhisambandhat (because they depend upon each other) points to the fact that the syllogism is to be considered as a formal schema while the expression sambhuya (corresponding to them) shows that the nature of syllogism consists in the inquiry with the help of Pramaņas, because the pratijña corresponds to sabdaḥ, the hetuḥ to anumanam, the udaharanam to pratyakşam and the upanayah to upamanam (Nbh. 50, 11-51, 4).

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tion can be had only with the help of the means of knowledge (pramānataś carthapratipatteḥ) and thus enables the school to be Anvīksikī, rational Adhyātma-doctrine.42 In as far as certain topics (padārthāh) of the Nyāya are conditions of possibility of the method proper to the school, they too should be considered as necessary topics of the school doctrine. Paksilasvāmin offers such a demonstration in connection with the nyāyaḥ with regard to doubt (samsayah), purpose (prayojanam), example (drstāntah) and syllogism (avayavāḥ): on principle, the nyāyaḥ can be applied only to something which is cognized in a preliminary cognition as existing, but which is not yet conceptually determined in its "what" : "the nyāyaḥ is applied neither to an unknown thing nor to a thing known for certain, but to a doubtful thing."43 Hence, doubt (samsayaḥ), "that knowledge, which consists in a mere consideration of an object ... without determining it,"44 is a necessary condition of the nyāyaḥ as its occasion and should therefore be considered as a necessary topic of the system. In the same way is purpose (prayojanam) a necessary condition of the nyāyaḥ, since as motive inducing a person to act, it extends to every activity. Therefore, "the nyāyah takes place in dependence upon it."'45 While both the hitherto discussed topics of the Nyāyasūtras were conditions of the nyāyaḥ as an existential philosophical act, the category of example (drstāntah) is necessary condition of the nyāyah as a logical structure. "(Only) in dependence upon it is the
42 In addition to the method of nyāyah is a second method, namely, methodical consideration (tarkah) which is, according to the NS, I, 1, 40 "the examination (ühah) of an object, whose truth is not yet known by means of the given reasons with a view to know the truth." Paksilasvāmin justi. fies it as topic of the Nyāya as follows: "The methodical consideration does not belong to the means of knowledge, nor is it an additional means of knowledge. It is a help for the means of knowledge and it is meant for the knowledge of the truth (tattvajñānāya kalpate) (Nbh., 5, 15). It is thus clear that the tarkah stands in close relation to inquiry with the help of the means of knowledge, and hence it is to be considered necessary for the nyāyavidyā as methodical scheme of inquiry. Cf. also Paksilasvamin's implicit identification of nyāyaḥ with tarkaḥ, when he says: "The nyāyaḥ is applied to something doubtful; as has been said: 'Decision (nirnayah) is the ascertainment of the object by means of statement and counter-statement consequent upon a doubt'." (Nbh., 3, 9 f.). Decision is, however, the result of tarkaḥ; for the result of nyāyaḥ in the strict sense of syllogism (=avayavāḥ) is the nigamanam.
43 Nbh., 3, 9. 44 Ibid., 3, 12. 45 Ibid., 3, 14-16.

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PAKŞILASVĀMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHAṢYAM 319
process of nyayaḥ possible." This becomes plain, if we bear in mind, that Pakşilasvamin takes his stand on the logic of analogy, in which the conclusiveness of an argument can be known only by its example. For only if "(an example) is given, are inference and verbal cognition (anumānāgamau) possible; if it is missing, they are not possible."" Finally, the syllogism (avayavaḥ) requires no further justification as necessary topic of the Nyaya doctrine, since it is the highest form of nyayaḥ itself". Pakṣilasvamin connects it in a double manner with the topics of his school: "It is only through (syllogism) that discussion (vādaḥ) debate (jalpaḥ) and wrangling (vitanda) take place, and in no other way. In dependence on it is the ascertainment of truth." Thus, the nyayaḥ is not only constitutive method of the Nyaya to ascertain the truth, and consequently necessary condition of the Nyaya as Anvīkṣiki, but likewise a means of dealing with the truth in philosophical exchange of ideas.
Thus, a group of topics (padarthah) must be subjected to inquiry, which, though of minor importance from the systematic point of view, yet is not less typical from the historical point of view due to its broad treatment in the Nyayasutras, namely, the vadaḥ and those categories which Pakṣilasvamin deduces from it as necessary topics of the Nyaya. Pakṣilasvamin had deduced the nyayaḥ, and through it the categories subordinated to it, from the knowledge of truth (tattvajñānam) as movement of thought, and. thus justified their necessity. In the same way, he deduced also the necessity to deal with the topic of vadaḥ, the philosophical exchange of ideas. For while nyayah was the method of the knowledge of the truth, vadah was for Pakṣilasvamin the very movement of thought itself, which leads to the knowledge of truth: "Deci
46 Ibid., 5, 1.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 5, 12. It may be observed in this context that Paksilasvamin in several places endeavors to bring the concept of nyayaḥ in relation with certain categories of the NS, not only to show that they are necessary topics of the system, but especially to interpret the concept of the nyayaḥ into the categories of the NS, where it does not occur at all. For this purpose he had to identify the avayavāḥ through an appropriate interpretation (namely, through the relation he established between the members of syllogism and the means of knowledge) with the nyayaḥ of the Anviksiki and to declare the avayavah to be the highest nyayah. It seems, therefore, possible to assume Pakṣilasvamin's school could be designated as "Nyaya" only because of his interpretation of it as nyayavidyā (=ānvīkṣiki).
49 Nbh., p. 6, 8.

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sion (nirnayah) is the knowledge of the truth, the fruit of the means of knowledge. With it ends the Vada (tadavasāno vādah)”.50
Here the school of Nyāya clearly appears as intimately connected with the Vāda tradition. The knowledge of the "truth about the things," which was considered as leading to liberation, needed from the systematic point of view, in no way to be connected with the vādah, the philosophic exchange of ideas. Yet the philosophic exchange of ideas is a historical fact in the school of Nyāya. It characterizes that type of striving after truth which, from the beginning, had been a habitus of the school, and was as such 'not only typical, but also necessary for the manner in which the Nyāya sought for truth. The philosophical exchange of ideas was for the which ended with the knowledge of the truth. Vada is fundamentally that macro-structure of dealing with the truth, in which nyāyaḥ has its proper place.
The nyāyaḥ, as understood by Paksilasvamin, is primarily the inquiry of an object with the help of the Pramanas, and hence it is not quite clear, why it should have an essential relation to the Vada, and why the Vada, in its turn, should be that superposed whole, in which the nyāyaḥ had its original and proper place. Yet, if one bears in mind that Paksilasvāmin designates the inquiry with the help of the Pramāṇas as nyāyaḥ, as did Kautilya, and that he considers syllogism (avayavah) as the highest and the most proper form of nyāyaḥ, a closer relation between the nyāyaḥ as method and the phenomenon of Vada reveals itself. According to Paksilasvāmin, syllogism is an assemblage of verbal expression, by which the proof of a thing is accomplished, and as such it belongs essentially to the reality of Vada. This relatedness extends itself also to a more essential aspect; for Paksilasvāmin defines Vāda as an assemblage of verbal expressions of several speakers (nānāpravaktskah ...väkyasamūhah) requiring a proof (=syllogism) with regard to each object (pratyadhikaranasādhanaḥ), in as far as it should terminate in a decision, i.e., in the ascertainment of the truth.52 Thus, Vada and nyāyaḥ (=syllogism) stand in a necessa
50 Ibid., p. 6, 8. 51 Ibid., p. 5, 9 and p. 50, 10.
52 Ibid., p. 6, 11-12. It is not surprising that for Paksilasvāmin, the scientific method of nyāyah is so closely related to the Vada, since knowledge of truth was striven after to a great extent in oral discussions, rather than through the help of books as is the case with the procedure of modern science.

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PAKŞILASVĀMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYĀYABHĀŞYAM 321 ry relation to each other it is nyayah which makes Vada to be that movement of thought which leads to the knowledge of the truth, while the nyāyaḥ as verbal expression belongs essentially and originally to the Vada, without which it would not be possible. If, therefore, nyāyah is that method which constitutes the Nyāya philosophy, and further, if the Vada is that historically given milieu for the search of truth, in which the method of the nyāyaḥ must be applied, then it will be absolutely clear that all those categories of the Nyāyasūtras,53 which define and explain the phenomenon of Vada and give it its norm, could not only not be suppressed in the Nyāya philosophy as understood by Pakşilasvamin, but, historically speaking, are constitutive and necessary elements of the system.
. In this paper, whose aim is to ascertain the idea Pakșilasvāmin had regarding the nature of Nyāya as a philosophy, it is not necessary to show in detail how he brings each of these categories in relation with the Vada. It is enough to sum up the main results of this study:
1. Paksilasvamin considers the Nyāya as a rationally worked out and rationally working doctrine of liberation (adhyatmavidya), and hence he identifies it with the Anvīksikī of Kautilya. In doing so, he makes explicit the conception which the school of Nyaya had regarding its own nature, namely, the conception of the school as a philosophical system, and not merely as logic or dialectical doctrine. . 2. The element that constitutes this philosophy is the rational method of nyāyaḥ, and as such, it had not only to be applied, but also to be taught and studied as topic of the system. The Nyaya is, therefore, also doctrine of nyāyaḥ and of the logical and dialectical categories conditioning this nyāyaḥ.
3. In accordance with the old school tradition, the method of nyāyaḥ, for Paksilasvämin, is primarily the syllogism, namely syllogism as verbally expressed in discussion, and not as formalized inference; for inference is itself a Pramāņa, and not an inquiry with the help of Pramana. Therefore, the process which leads to the attainment of truth is, really speaking, the Vada working with syllogism. From this historically given situation follows that the Nyāya, in as far as it is the doctrine of nyāyaḥ, is necessarily to be considered also as a doctrine of Vada and its conditioning categories.
53 Ct. Note 40.

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322 ASIAN STUDIES Through this threefold unfolding of the nature of nyayah, as Paksilasvamin carries out in his introduction to the Nyayabhasyam at the occasion of the justification of the categories of the Nyayasutras, he has not only definitively formulated an old development of idea within the school, but through the explanation of this nature, he has also determined the further development of the Nyaya, whose aspect of Adhyatma-doctrine began to fade more and more into the background, 54 while the specific and formal aspect of Nyaya as science of nyayah and of vadah comes more and more into the foreground, until in the Navyanyaya this is the only important aspect. Thus Paksilasvamin can be considered, in a somewhat inaccurate generalization, to have been the most important thinker of the old Nyaya, perhaps even of the Nyaya in general, not because his theories were not surpassed in later times, but because it was he, who -- as far as we know - brought the Nyaya to its self-knowledge and thereby to the knowledge of itself as a real science. - 54 This aspect slowly disappeared through the gradual fusion of the Nyaya with Vaisesika from about the 17th century A.D. when there existed practically only the combined school of Nyaya-Vaibesikam.