On the translation of the Basic Nyaya Terms Paksa Hetu and Drastanta

Author(s): D D Daye
Publisher: Z_Aspect_of_Jainology_Part_3_Pundit_Dalsukh_Malvaniya_012017.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250232/1

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ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC NYAYA TERMS : PAKSA, HETU AND DRSTĀNTA
D. D. Daye
A discussion of the problems of the translation of PA terms and AngloEuropean logical terms is always in order, for to translate the vocabulary of the former into the vocabulary of the latter is to presuppose some implicit theories of and assumptions about logic. In this light, I shall consider the three widely used Sanskrit PA terms, pakşa, hetu and drstānta.
Thesis (paksa') : this word is used interchangeably with pratijña, e. g., as in pratijñādosa, 'faults of the thesis statement. The word 'paksa' has been used in three senses; paksal is the statement of the thesis or conclusion of the PA schema, i. e., the whole statement "Sound ( sabda ) is impermanent (anitya ) 2, 2.1, 2.3-4, 3.1 ); paksa refers to property ( dharma ) of the thesis (pakşa') which is extensionally equivalent to the sādhya (the property-dharma-to-be-justified, 2.2, 2.4, 3.2.2 (5), 3.2.2 (4), e.2.2 (5); paksa has one occurrence in the NP ( 2.1. (1)) where it has been used to refer to the dharmin (“locus/property-possesser") of the dharma "property of the sādhya (“property-to-be justified" ) which is held to be concomitant with the sādhana dharma ("justifier-property,” (hetu?) of the justification ascription (hetul ) (2.2) :
Both words, "hetul.2" (below) and “paksa 1.2.3", have been much equivocated upon in this early period; sometimes a property was meant, paksaa; other times the whole proposition (or ascription ) paksal has been referred to by this word. The translation 'conclusion" for pakşal may suggest that "pakşa; is the sequential end of a true deductive or inductive inference-schema. I would hold that the PA is closer to a formalistic deductive explanation, rather than a clear deductive inference; hence the less restrictive “thesis" seems more appropriate for paksa. The awkwardness of translating paksa may be lessened by indicating the meaning of the paksadharmin in "thesis-locus." Other well-worn words of twentieth century nyāya studies, hardly to be called "standard," merely common, such as “subject ( and ) predicate", "probans" or, “minor terms", are misleading. First, the logician's use of the former two terms is significantly different from a grammarian's use; second, their metalogical assumptions are simply out of date.
"Justification” (hetu ) also exhibits an equivocation; hetu? is the whole ascription because of its being a ) causally generated thing (kştakatvāt )"; the usual transformation of the ascription into a statement is another etic but implicit transformation rule sometimes ignored by nyāya scholars. I hold that "justification" is a better translation of hetul; hetul is the ascriptive "statement" which indicates the

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Un the Transiation of the Basic Nyāya Terms
165 specific property ( the hetuo dharma ) of the justification-member (hetu) ( for hetu: 2.1-4; hetu? : 2.2, 2.3 ); hetu” refers to a property (dharma).
I suggest 'justifier' for hetu? rather than ‘mark' or 'reason'. First, it is better because hetu' refers to the ascriptive statement, not the property (dharma ) which is either empirically observable ( rare in the NP ) or is mutually presupposed within the context of the competitive darśana(s) (philosophical schools ) context. If this property ( dharma ) ( hetu) is emically acceptable, by observation or, as is more likely, by finding no contradiction in it's assertion with one's darśana philosophy, and if the concomitance elicited in the warrant (drstānal ) is acceptable, then the acceptance of both (hetu' and hetu? ) is at least a necessary condition for concluding that the thesis-member (paksa') is legitimate. A rule of logical debate ( vāda ) is that both or all parties to the evaluation of the PA must accept the justifier-property (hetu). The metaphysical limitations presupposed by many of the opposing darśanas regarding the latter rule make such evaluation processes of PAs non-deductive but not nonformal.
Mr. Tachikawa translates the property, hetu” as 'mark', one-half of the concomitance of the two properties. I take it here that he is also alluding to the common term 'linga' (mark ), as found in the Nyāya Sūtra and also in the Nyāya Sūtra Bhāșya of the darśana. While it is true that in the orthodox (āstika) Nyāya darśana'consideration' or 'reflection (parāmarśa) on the mark ( linga) of the hetul may be the sufficient condition for noting the concomitance of the two properties postulated in the PA and thus the legitimacy of a paksal-pratijñā, no such discussion of parāmarsa is found in either the Nyāyapraveśa or the Nyāyamukha.
I would suggest “justification' for 'hetu?, (the ascription ) and justifier' for Chetu, the observable or assumed darśana-restricted property. Such translations reflect the important distinction between hetul and hetu”, whereas ‘mark,' reason,' predicate', 'middle term', or 'probans', do not so distinguish. Such words as ‘mark' obviously overemphasizes 'hetu?, 'while obscuring the ascriptive 'hetul.' In a modern context where many scholars have all-too readily supplied dummy subjects to make hetul into a proposition, which it is not (ityāha ), it is important to make this distinction explicit. : “Warrant" (drstānta', 2.1, 2.3). Although the word 'concomitance' or 'pervasion' ( vyāpti ) as is commonly found in the later tradition, is absent in the NP, clearly the concept of two concomitant properties is operative; this relation we find expressed in the dpstānta. There are three major components of the drstānta statement. First there is the “yat. . .tat," conditional proposition stating the concomitance of two properties, drstāntal; second there is dpstānta", the similar exemplification' (sapaksa ) and third, the dissimilar exemplification' ( vipaksa ). All three are referred to simply as the 'drstānta' in the text. The whole drstanta functions in this text as the expression of an exemplified warrant, which when juxtaposed with the protometalogical rule (trirūpahetu ) and when satisfied, serves as a necessary condition

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for legitimizing the thesis ( paksal ). The two exemplifications (sapaksa, and vipaksa-dřstānta?) of the warrant serve to satisfy : (1) the need for the loci or exemplification of the two necessary conditions of the three-fold trirūpa hetuo rule and, (2) the early Indian rhetorical tradition which has its historical roots in the Nyāya Sūtra. This tradition required the presence of (generally) “concrete" exemplifications, perhaps as a vestige of the earliest arguments by analogy. The drstānta", the sapaksa and vipaksa, and the great metalogical role they play in non-deductive mode of argumentation, leads one to suggest that the use of the term "drstānta"? is historically prior to "drstānta.”l
While my translations of paksal and hetul are not the more common ones, such as proposition/conclusion” and “reason” respectively, my translation of drstānta! as swarrant” is much more controversial and hence requires a more complex justification.
We shall now turn to a justification of the translation of drstāntal as “warrant". In the history of secondary scholarship about the Buddhist PA, "pstānta" has been usually translated as either "example" or "exemplification.” Emically, there are two metalogical types of drstānta(s): "concordant” (sādharmya) and "discordant" (vaidharmya). Sometimes, in the texts, the conditional "yat...tat" is referred to the word "drstänta" ; so sometimes the sapaksa and vipaksa exemplifications are meant, another equivocation.
Let us first dispose of two responses to my non-traditional translation of drstanta as "warrant," that it is neither a "standard" translation nor as etymological one. That is, “warrant” does not convey the metaphor of exemplification, as indicated in the etymology of dpstānta (vdrst, to see, to visually observe), the statement of the example in which the concomitant properties, or their joint absence, are illustrated.
To claim that one should translate etymologically, that "drstānta”] “means" example, illustration or exemplification, may be refuted by a counter-example concerning "paksa". If etymological translation is of primary importance in nyāya texts, then we should translate "pakşa” as "wing." Of course we should not do so, for the word "pakşa” has acquired a semi-technical meaning in nyāya kāda and a simple claim to translate in such a manner illustrates the methodological inappropriateness of trying to justify translating “drstānta"l solely on etymological grounds rather than on emic and etic logical grounds.
Since 1900, scholars have struggled with many difficult nyāya translation problems, but given the multiplicity of logics, syllogistics, propositional and predicate calculi, even the logic of relations, which have been used with and projected upon the PA, there is no more a “standard" translation than there is a standard source language logic. The comparisons and variations in the PA sources, in the target logics of formal translation and comparative metalogical interpretations, are the theoretical sources of the metalogical evidence for selecting a new translation of any PA term; it

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is so with drstāntal and my point is that most scholars have discounted the metalogical function of the dpstānta' (conditional) and have emphasized the dộstanta? function of referring to the descriptive exemplifications (sapaksa, vipaksa) of concomitance. This latter emphasis is quite in accord with the emic PA process of the justification of the legitimacy of a specific PA; however, while such scholars so emphasize in the drstānta, they usually project other non-emic assumptions onto the PA, for example, formal deductive validity. We shall examine ten textual sources of evidence in the NP regarding my case for “warrant."
The text employs drstānta? in only six cases among ten in the fallacies of the concordant drstānta (sādharmya) (3.3.3.1-3) and the discordant dņstānta (vaidharmya) (3.3.2.1-3). The remaining four cases of drstāntal (3.3.1.4,5 and 3.3.2.4,5) explicitly require both the conditional statement, dřstāntal with the conditional expression of drstānta' in the proper order (3.3.1.5 and 3.3.2.5). This completes the distribution of drstāntal-2 in the ten sādharmya and vaidharmya fallacies. The discordant drstanta (vaidharmya, 3.3.2.1-3) and drstānta', the conditional (yat... tat) as in the last two fallacies (3.3.2.4, 5) is repeated as in the concordant section (3.3.1.1-5). Thus for a PA drstānta not to be fallacious, one must explicitly state the drstanta in correct conditional form.
Now we shall turn first to the drstānta? because this side of the equivocation is the usual referent when the term “drstānta" is employed emically. The following is a translation of drstānta? where the focus is upon the similar exemplification (sapaksa) rather than on the conditional dņstāntal, thus it is an example of dņstānta.
Sadhana-dharma-asiddha. “A fallacious warrant is one in which the property (dharma (=hetu?) of the means of proof (sādhana) is not established (asiddha)” as in the following:
“The property-to-be-proved, permanence, resides in the exemplification, atom, but the property of the means of proof, corporeality, does not exist in the exemplification, atoms, because atoms are corporeal" (3.3.1(1)).
This instance of the fallacy of the drstāntadoes not focus on the conditional warrant but focuses on 1) the exemplification sapaksa as the dual loci (dharmin) of two properties and 2) the presence of the sādhya-dharma and the absence of the sādhana-dharma in the exemplification. Tachikwa notes this, but he fails to recognize the (fallacious) significance of the explicit informal fallacy of equivocation which has occurred here with the concordant (sādharmya) "dřstanta".
The first three fallacies (ābhāsa(s)) (in 3.3.1.1-3) are about drstānta-as-sapaksa; the last two (3.3.1.4, 5) are about the conditional statements (yat.. tat) drstānta, the pattern of three drstāntais repeated with discordant drstanta (vaidharmya, 3.3.2.1-3 and 3.3.2.4, 5). Drstāntal denotes the conditional warrant; dộstanta denotes the exemplifications as dharmins. However, it is well to note that to omit drstāntal is to violate a necessary condition of a legitimate PA; that is, it is fallacious to so omit

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drstāntal regardless of what the recipient "understands" about the “understood" concomitance of a particular PA (3.3.1.4, 5 and 3.3.2.4, 5).
I now offer two translations and comments regarding drstāntal about which shall argue in my discussion of the justification of dņstāntal as “warrant”. The fallacy of the absence of a conditional formulation of concomitance (3.3.1. (4)) “Ananvaya" is the name of the fallacy of a statement of (positive) concomitance which lacks the conditional form.
“A fallacious warrant (dsstāntal) is where a statement of (positive) concomitance (which expresses) the co-existence of both the property-to-be-proved and the property of the means of proof, lacks explicit illustration; hence, it is well-known that (the properties of) being causally generated and impermanence reside in a pot." Note that this fallacy ("resemblance” (ābhāsa) of a legitimate PA) is an extension of a legitimate PA, as in Model I. However the explicit statement of the conditional warrant is missing, "whatever is causally, that is impermanent generated.” Thus the explicit presence of the conditional warrant, not just the statement of the similar exemplification nor merely the juxtaposition of the properties, is a necessary condition for a legitimate PA. If the statement of the drstanta! is necessary, what then, is its metalogical function, its logical role? My emic conclusion is that it may be described as an implicit emic rule disguised as an alleged universally quantified law of concomitance.
In the other three fallacies of the drstānta (3.3.1.1-3), excluding the fifth fallacy of an improperly) reversed warrant, the justification of fallaciousness focusses not upon the conditional warrant (drstāntal) but upon the presence and/or absence of the justifier (hetu) and thesis properties (pakşa=sādhya) in the similar exemplification (sapaksa). Thus the fallaciousness of the conditional warrant (drstāntal) is quite different than the fallaciousness of the first three fallacious uses of the term “drstānta?." This emphasis upon the presence or absence of the alleged concomitant properties in the exemplifications and the metalogical procedures of ignoring the etic potential role of the drstānta', is a particular feature of the (metalogical) mode of argumentation in this text. Hence, this focus upon the specific exemplification(s) and not on the warrant constitutes more evidence for the non-deductive nature of the PA and its emic metalogical theories and procedures. Consider the contrary: a) if there were an emphasis on the warrant and b) if the PA were asserted with the thesis last, preceded by the justification and the warrant, and c) if there were replacement or transformational rules for the rearrangement of the latter two (hetul and drstānta) and d) if there were explicit valid inference rules to which the nyāya logician could then appeal, to check, and against which to justify the PA at issue as in true deductive validity rules, then and only then, would we be able to make the case for and deductively argue that the PA is deductive, and in specific cases sound and vaild.

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But we do not find a, b, c, and d exhibited in the PA and its metalogical theories and procedures or modes of argumentation. To pursue these questions further, iet us consider the last fallacious warrant, the illicitly reversed expression of concomitance (viparitanvaya).
Also relevant to our discussion is the fallacy of a reversed warrant (Viparitanvaya): An example of a fallaciously reversed warrant (3.3.1.(5)) follows : “A fallacious warrant (drstānta) which is illicitly reversed is, for example, where one states "whatever is impermanent, that is well known to be causa lly generated” when one should say (vāktavye) "whatever is causally generated, that is well known to be impermanent.”
Note that the preferred warrant here is the reversed order of the missing warrant of the last fallacious warrant 3.3.11(4); the latter fallacious warrant lacked “whatever if impermanent, that is causally generated” which is the fallacious instance quoted in this fifth of the fallacious warrants through similarity (sādharmya). Thus the PA model implicit here is different than the only other fallacious warrant (drstānta').
It is also clear that in neither "reversed" (viparita) fallacy (3.3.1.(5) or 3.3.2.(5)) is there any justification or evidence explicitly offered in the NP text as to why the warrant must be explicitly expressed. The reader is reminded that normative recommendation concerning the correct order of the conditional warrant does not constitute evidence for the issue of why the warrant is needed. While the text then offers no explicit evidence for the answer to this extremely important metalogical question, the reasons are not difficult for supply; it is the necessary requirement of the explicit expression of the relation of concomitance (vyāpti).
Given the textual evidence just cited we now turn to make the case for the translation of “warrant” for drstānta. First, there is the implicit but obvious and simple normative rule that one should not utilize fallacious PA expressions; to omit the proper expression of the conditional drstāntal is to commit a fallacy (as in 3.3.1.4, 5). Thus one should not omit the conditional dņstāntal regardless of how deceptively "clear" the PA seems without it. To do so is to commit an explicit emic fallacy; and to merely mention or simply conjoin the two properties in exposition is also to commit an emic fallacy (3.3.1.4).
Second, the correct order of the conditional drstāntal can be accurately described as the naming of the justifier (hetu?-dharma) as the antecedent of the conditional drstānta' and the property-to-be-justified (sādhya=paksa'-dharma) as the consequent. This is found in the legitimate PA (Model 1) where "causal generation” (krtakatva) is the name of the antecedent property and "impermanence" (anitya) is the name of the consequent of the conditional. The antecedent property “causal generation" is the justifier (hetu°). This is purportedly concomitant with the consequent property named . in the drstānta'; this property (anitya) is the thesis-property (paksa) which is the property-to-be-justified (sādhya). This asymetrical relation of causally generated things and impermanent things is expressed in the conditional drstänta?, the absence

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or the improper formulation of which necessitates the legitimate charge of asserting a fallacious PA.
The fifth fallacy (3.3.1.5) of concordance (drstāntābhāsa sādharmyanena) also illustrates the antecedent/consequent relation of the conditional described in the preceding sentences. Again, rules of fallaciousness are normative; hence the conditional form of drstânta' is the implicit expression of a normative rule, as was the rule stating the fallaciousness concerning the omission as the improper form of the conditional drstānta? (3.3.1.4); the warrant states the concomitance as a generic relation, a law. My translation of "warrant" conveys its normative rule-like metalogical function; "example" or "exemplification" do not convey this normative function of drstānta.
Thus I have established two bases for normative rules with the drstanta fallacies (3.3.1.4, 5), its absence and improper form. Does "warrant" better express these normative factors than “example" or "exemplification" ? I think it clearly does. Both "example" and "exemplification” are usually taken as purely descriptive terms, whereas "warrant” explicitly conveys the metalogical normative function of dřstā ata'. That is, the function of drstāntal is to serve as an explicit license or authorization rule, the appeal to which not only reminds the recipient ( psychologically ) of the concomitance of justifier (hetu) and thesis property (sādhya-dharma), but the dsstāntal serves as the basis of a universally quantified law utilized as a normative standard; it is a rule which authorizes and thus justifies the cɔncomitance (vyāpti) of the alleged concomitant properties of thesis-property and the justifier (pakşa’=sādhya).
This specific normative function of the rule in drstāntal occurs at the metalogical level; additionally, dřstāntal as a metalogical rule instansitates the general tendency in early Buddhist nyāya (and of course, in Jaina and ästika darśanas) to develop greater degrees of such general metalogical qualities as precision, clirity, formalism, freedom from error and formal explicitness. These metalògical qualities are repeatedly exhibited in nyāya texts in epistemology, ontology and in formal logic.
Other instances of these qualities in the Buddhist PA are found in the development of the explicit metalogical content-free "wheel of justifier" (Hetu-cakra), the explicit metalogical rule of the three characteristics of the justifier "(trirūpahetu”), the generation of such explicit metalogical terms as sādhya, sādhana, višesa, anumeya, prameya, the generalized property/possessor descriptive relation (dharma-dharmin), and the whole varigated metalogical theory of error (ābhāsa). The latter theory of error is clearly normative and constitutes a rich fund of implicit metalogical rules and illustrations not all of which have been made explicit in the few explicit metalogical rules such as the three characteristics of the justifier (trirūpahetu) or in the few non-fallacious PA models.
The paucity of non-fallacious models and the varigated complexity of the fallacies (abhāsa) is necessary, for while it is easy to give an example of how a good

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On the Translatton of the Basic Nyaya Terms
PA should appear, complete knowledge of the almost infinite string of possible PA's that people could possibly generate is impossible to anticipate. Thus the most efficient device for helping one evaluate this near infinite series of generated strings of PAs, is to codify an inclusive range and type of possible errors regarding the construction and justification of PAs. These PA models, metalogically explicit rules, and illustrations of errors constitute the normative base of evaluating PAs.
The two normative characteristics of the last two fallacies of the dṛṣṭānta1 with concordance (3.3.1.4, 5) are captured in the explicitly normative term "warrant," whereas, this normative quality is absent, or, at best, only very vaguely implicit in the translations "example" or "exemplification." As noted, the latter two candidates are primarily descriptive in meaning. It is the clear conveyance of the crucial normative meaning and rule of drṣntata as a universally quantified law used as a rule that provides the crucial evidence of the superior translation of "warrant" over "example" or exemplification." The term "exemplification" is exactly right for the sapakṣa and vipaksa, for both, descriptively do exemplify, illustrate or exhibit the alleged concomitance of the properties, the justifier (hetu) and of the thesis (paksa). The roles of the sapaksa and vipaksa are illustrative but not primarily normative, whereas the role of the dṛṣṭanta' is primarily normative. My translations of dṛṣṭanta and dṛṣṭānta2 conveys these descriptive and normative aspects more explicitly and accurately than other translations.
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In summary, four important points are now established; first, that, the absence of an explicit statement of either positively or negatively expressed concomitance (vyapti, although this word is not used in the NP) is fallacious. Second, it is clear that the mere juxtaposition, however accurately named, of the two properties of the thesis (paksa) and the justifier (hetu") is also fallacious. Third, the correct warrant (dṛṣṭanta1) must express accurately in a conditional statement, the legitimate concomitant properties of the thesis (pakṣa-sadhya) as necessary condition, the conse quent, and justifier (hetu") as sufficient condition of the antecedent. These relations. are to be expressed in an appropriate conditional statement such as "where there is causally generatedness, there is impermanence". Fourth, the characteristic of the discussion of the dṛstanta supports my claim (argued elsewhere that the PA and its theories are neither deductive nor is validity an appropriate metalogical concept
here.
Given my analysis of these two types of metalogical errors (abhāsa), the absence. of the conditional statement and the illicitly reversed order, I would hold that the implicit normative rule-like functions of the drstänta (both sadharmya or vaidharmya) are explicitly expressed in "warrant" and significantly less (if at all) in either. "example" or "exemplification."
Thus I conclude that, by appeal to the implicit methodological rule that one. should choose the more accurate technical translation, my case for translating "drstanta" as "warrant" has been stated and so stands justified.

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Footnotes : 1. This article is an excerpt from an almost completed monograph on comparisons
of formalism in Anglo-European and early Buddhist formal logics. However here, my textual for the parārthānumāna (cited hereafter as the PA) sources are Nyāyapraveśa and the Nyāyamukha.
Sanskrit editions of the Nyāyapraveśa (cited hereafter as NP) may be found in : Dhruva, A. B. The Nyāyapraveśa, Part I, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1930; Ui, H. Bukkyo Ronrigaku (Buddhist Logic), Tokyo, 1944; Mironov, N.D., "Nyāyapravesa, 1, Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed,” in Tạoung Pao, Leiden, 1931, pp. 1-24; Tachikawa, M., "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic,” in Journai of Indian Philosophy, I (1971) p. 111-145, Toronto. A Chinese translation of this text may be found in the Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo, Buddhist Tripitaka, Vol. 32, no 1630, 11-13. The Tibetan translation has been edited by V. Bhattacharya in The Nyāyapraveśa, Part II, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1927 and in the Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, Reprint, edited by D.T. Suzuki, Tokyo, 1962, No. 5706, 130, 74-76. The other text, the NM, is the Chinese translation of Dignāga's Nyāyamukha, Taisho, Vol, 32, 1628. Textual examples could have been taken from a wide variety of Sanskrit texts, but I picked this one for four reasons: 1) I have worked with these texts in Chinese and Sanskrit most often; 2) Tibetan and Japanese editions are available : 3) it is available in all four languages thus being at hand for more scholars; and 4) it seems to me to be representative of many of the interesting but messy problems common to a formal lineage slowly emerging out of an ordinary-language tradition of debate and reliance on concrete examples.
There follows my paradigmadic example, model 1, of the PA. The following is a representative example of a PA reconstructed from the Nyāyapraveśa. "An Introduction to Logical Analysis." This may be taken as a general paradigm of the Buddhist PA schemas; the old chestnut "the mountain has fire because it has somke" is not typical, for it is empirically contingent, whereas many Indian schemas are not directly empirically contingent at all. Thesis. “SOUND (IS) IMPERMANENT" (paksa') sabdo'nityaḥ Justification : BECAUSE (IT POSSESSES THE PROPERTY OF) CAUSAL
GENERATEDNESS (hetu?) kptakatvāt Warrant : WHATEVER (IS A) CAUSALLY GENERATED (THING), THAT
(IS) WELL KNOWN (AS AN) IMPERMANENT (THING) (drstānta) yat krtakam tad anityam drstam Similar Exemplification ......AS (IN THE CASE OF SPACE, ETC. (sapakşa) yāthā ghata-adis

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On the Translation of the Basic Nyaya Terms Terme - 173 Dissimilar Exemplification .....AS NOT (IN THE CASE OF SPACE, ETC. (vipaksa) na yatha akasa-adis 2. The translation "concordant" and "discordant" were kindly suggested to me on April 15, 1980 at the University of California at Berkeley, by Dr. Alex Wayman, Professor of Sanskrit, Columbia University. 3. Staal, J. F., "Formal Structures in Indian Logic", in Synthese, Vol. 12, September, 1960, 279-286. 4. Tachikawa, op. cit. 5. Ibid., also relevant are the remarks of R.S.Y. Chi in his Buddhist Formal Logic, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1967, 105. 6. Sanghavi, S., Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, Indian Studies : Past and Present, Calcutta, 1961, 109.