Number Of Pramanas According To Bhartrhari

Author(s): Ashok Aklujkar
Publisher: Ashok Aklujkar
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269583/1

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THE NUMBER OF PRAMANAS ACCORDING TO BHARTRHARI* By Ashok Aklujkar, Vancouver 1.1 In an article entitled "pramanya in the philosophy of the Grammarians", expected to be published in the near future, I have tried to explain the distinctive nature of the view of pramanya or 'validity of the means of cognition' which the Grammarians or Vaiyakaranas held. I have pointed out in that article that whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy, knowingly or unknowingly, emphasized the separability of the means of cognition (pratyaksa 'perception', anumana 'inference', etc.), the Grammarian-philosophers like Bhartshari ("B" in abbreviation) played down the separability of the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly. In particular, pratyaksa and anumana work on the backdrop of agama, and agama changes, usually gradually, in the light of the knowledge received through pratyaksa and * The author is happy to acknowledge the financial assistance he received, at various times since 1969, from the University of B. C. Humanities and Social Sciences Research Committee, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung of the Federal Republic of Germany. The assistance enabled him to study many of the sources used in this publication. His thanks are due also to Mr. Gareth Sparham and Mr. David J. Fern for their comments on an earlier draft. 1 This is not to say that Indian philosophers of other persuasions are not aware of the mutual dependence or limitations of pramanas. They too would readily, concede that an anumana is not valid if it is vitiated by a perception, that the perception of a rope as a snake should be rejected if one can infer at a later moment the real nature of the object, and that one cannot assert that fire does not burn simply because a reliable text or person says so. What I have in mind here is not invalidation or delimitation that obtains after the operation of a pramana. My remark has rather to do with what takes place while a pramana is in operation. The Grammarian school is unlike the other schools of Indian philosophy in accepting at that point the penetration of what is considered to be) the domain of one pramana by (what is considered to be the domain of another pramana. While the Buddhist thinkers like Dignaga avoid such overlapping of pramanas by restricting the object of pratyaksa (to svalaksana, i.e, by redefining pratyaksa), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) pramanas as basically complex. WZKS 33 (1989) 151-158

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152 A. AKLUJKAR anumana. This is so because the Grammarian's idea of agama was significantly different, which, in turn, was due mostly to his four-fold or multi-level concept of language and his awareness of the centrality of language in our experience of the world. 1.2 Even if one grants the Grammarian's view that the pramanas function 'hand-in-hand', one can ask the following question: Which pramanas does the Grammarian have in mind when he puts forward his view? His pramanas may not be as separable as those of others and he may not be interested in so defining them as to make their domains mutually exclusive, but how many common sense definitions precede his view or are presupposed when he takes his stance? In other words, what is the numer of the pramanas the Grammarian is willing to accept as a lower-level reality - as convenient fictions? There is some difference of opinion in this matter?, and hence I wish to examine it in the present paper. My remarks about it should, however, be understood as applicable only to B, although they may be true of other Grammarian-philosophers and although I shall occasionally speak of Grammarians in general. 2.1 It is implicit in the preceding remarks that, as far as I know, B makes no explicit statement on the number of pramanas he is willing to entertain. Were there to be such a statement, the difference of opinion would not have arisen. Now, given the situation as it is, we first need to ask ourselves: How shall we be able to find out what pramanas B presupposes? 3 I think all we need to do is to note the key terminology of those sections of his Trikandi or Vakyapadiya and Tripadi or Mahabhasyatika in which he discusses the issue of pramanya. These sections, specifically TK 1.30-43, 148-53 with the Vrtti thereto, 2.134-41, and TP pp. 8, 82-3, 98, 191-4, express their contents with pratyaksa*, anumana", and agama (from among the terminology commonly asso 2 If those students of B's thought who, like me, conclude that the pramanas are not really separable in B's view were to be disinterested in determining the number of pramanas precisely and hence were to mention various numbers, that would be something expected. However, the difference of opinion is noticed even among those scholars who have not realized the tentativeness of the pramana distinctions set up by the Grammarian and whom one expects to be more committed to giving an account of each acceptable pramana. 3 It will be noticed that the scholars whose views I modify below have not raised this crucial question about the method prior to their listing or delineation of the pramanas acceptable to B. * Related expression: pratyaksapramana. 5 Related expressions: anumatr, anumita, anumiyamana, anumanikaloniki, tarka, hetu-, tarkika 6 Related expressions: agamika dharma, agamacaksus.

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The Number of Pramanas according to Bharthari 153 ciated with pramanas in Sanskrit) as perimeters. It follows, therefore, that the pramanas presupposed by B are pratyaksa, anumana, and agama. This conclusion is supported by the following additional considerations: (a) B nowhere declares pratyaksa and anumana to be unacceptable or always unreliable, and he clearly argues for the acceptance of agama in TK 1.30-43. (b) The author of the Yogasutra (1.7), to whose thought B seems close?, acknowledges precisely the same three pramanas. (c) B's guiding light in grammar, Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, indicates awareness of only these three pramanas. 2.2 Having thus established that B's thinking on pramanya moves in the spheres of pratyaksa, anumana, and agama and that it makes historical sense to attribute initial or first-level acceptance of these three pramanas to him, I would like to examine whether those interpretations are justified in which additional pramanas have been mentioned as acceptable to him. 3.1 While introducing TK 1.35, B's commentator Vrsabha - who, on the whole, is a very perceptive scholar and the incomplete and faulty preservation of whose commentary saddens all serious students of Bremarks: pratyaksanumane eva pramane ity avagamad ( ava ... [@]gamad?] anyapramanapradarsanena vyabhicarayati. And again, while introducing TK 1.36, Vrsabha says: pratyaksanumanagamavyatiriktam pratipattim aha. Although the text of the first remark is not beyond doubt, it is clear from Vrsabha's explanations of TK 1.35-6 and the V 7 I have discussed the relationship between the Yogasutra and Yogabhasya, on the one hand, and the TK, on the other, in a paper read at the 1970 annual meeting of the American Oriental Society. I hope to be able to prepare this paper for publication in the near future. 8. (a) See the Mahabhasya passages in which anumana, anumanagamya, agama, pratyaksa, etc. occur according to PATHAK - CHITRAO 1927. (b) The remark sabdapramanaka vayam. yacchabda aha tad asmakam pramanam occurring in the Mahabhasya (Paspasa varttika 9; 2.1.1 varttika 5) should not be interpreted as meaning that the Grammarians accept only sabda or agama as a pramana. TK 3.7.38dd, Helaraja 3.1.11, etc. rightly take it as indicating that the Grammarian, in his role as a linguist, can accept as existing anything that words express - that, while writing a grammar, he does not have to determine what actually exists. (c) See note 18 below for refutation of the view that Patanjali recognized arthapatti as an additional means of cognition. This does not mean that there could not have been talk of some other pramanas before or during the time of B. What we are attempting here is not a determination of the range of B's information, but a determination of what B was willing to view as initially or commonsensically) acceptable pramanas.

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154 A. AKLUJKAR thereto that he takes the two verses to mean that B accepted the possibility of knowledge through a means going beyond pratyaksa, anumana, and agama (cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969: 89, lines 23-30). I consider it rather revealing that Vrsabha does not have a name for this additional means 10. He will probably be hard pressed to find one among the words employed by B. The purport he assigns to B's karikas and V is not supported by the context or by the expressions constituting the passages in question. In fact, B's phrases pratyaksapramanavisayam api (V 1.35)" and pratyaksam anumanam ca (TK 1.36; note the omission of agama) indicate that B's intention is not to state that something exceeding pratyaksa, anumana, and agama must be acknowledged. The purpose of TK 1.35-7 seems to be to point out cases of extraordinary perception in order to make two further contextually relevant observations: (a) Inferences cannot refute what extraordinary perception establishes (b) Since the dharmasadhanatva of sadhu expressions is/could be based on such extraordinary perception, one cannot reject it through inferential statements. TK 1.35-7 can thus be understood as implying that extraordinary perceptions resulting from abhyasa constant practice', karman/adsstasakti 'a non-mundane or imperceptible force' possessed by spirits (raksahpitrpisaca)12, and enlightenment (state of the avirbhutaprakasa individuals) be admitted and further that, to account for such perceptions, the possibility of heightening of the capacities of senses (through abhyasa, tapas, etc.) be admitted. It 10 TRIPATHI (1972: 319-20) initially follows Vrsabha's interpretation of TK 1.35 and 1.36 and takes the further step of specifying the so-called additional pramanas as abhyasa and adrsta, but then he turns around and, on the basis of a different reasoning, disposes of abhyasa and adrsta by including them in pratyaksa. His procedure is unhistorical. It does not depend on indications in individual texts, but rather on what he and other authors consider logical. He does not even point out the weakness of his first reasoning that leads him to the hypothesis that B has additional pramanas (namely, abhyasa and adreta) in mind. 11 Cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER (1969: 89): "What is specifically denied is that it is inferential knowledge". 12 SUBRAMANIA IYER's (1969: 89-90) perceptive comparison of the information gleaned from the Brahmakandavitti and the Vakyakandavrtti establishes that the nature of the cognitions arising out of abhyasa and adreta can be characterized as pratibha in B's terminology. However, such a characterization does not in itself imply that the means leading to the cognitions must be other than pratyaksa, anumana, and agama. It is clearly stated in TK 2.117 that pratibha arises out of all kinds of linguistic expressions, which implies that it does not depend exclusively on means of any special kind. There are also several other indications in the TK to the effect that, in the philosophy of B, the domain of pratibha is not concommitant with the domain of the extraordinary.

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The Number of Pramanas according to Bhartrhari 155 does not seem justifiable to understand the passage as implying that additional means of cognition need to be postulated 13. One should also note that the extraordinary perceptions mentioned above are due to extraordinary qualities acquired by the perceivers, that is, are due to purusadharma. In TK 1.30 B declares that all such special purusadharmas are ultimately dependent on agama (cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969: 93). It would, therefore, be inconsistent with his statement to postulate a pramana beyond pratyaksa, anumana, and agama to account for extraordinary perceptions 14. 3.2 Since pratibha occupies an important place in B's thought and since pratibha is discussed as a possible pramana in some Sanskrit philosophical works, one may get the impression that pratibha is an additional pramana even in B's philosophy. This impression may be strengthened by discussions such as SUBRAMANIA IYER'S (1969: 86-93) in which a prominent place is given to the explication of the concept of pratibha in a chapter entitled "Bhartrhari and the pramanas" 15. However, it can be shown rather easily that, although pratibha is pramanabhuta ('something people generally rely on') in B's philosophy, it is not a pramana in it, at least not in the sense in which pratyaksa, anumana, and agama are pramanas. The reasons suggested in 2.1 and 3.1 above go against its acceptance as a pramana. Furthermore, pratibha is knowledge itself looked at from a specific point of view (TK 2.143-51). A remark like. pramanatvena tam lokah sarvah samanupaiyati (TK 2.147) simply means that the knowledge that pratibha is, is viewed as reliable and becomes a basis or means for action, as the immediately preceding line (itikartavyatayam tam na kascid ativartate) and the immediately next. 13 See TRIPATHI 1972: 319-21 for another kind of reasoning leading to the same conclusion. 14 (a) It is perhaps significant that a modern scholar, MURALIDHARA PANDEYA (1969: 150-2), while interpreting, without reference to Vrsabha, the section of verses with which we are concerned here, takes the section as establishing only that sabda or agama must be acknowledged as a pramana in addition to pratyaksa and anumana. (b) One can possibly save Vrsabha's explanation by taking it to mean that the extraordinary perceptions mentioned by B transcend pratyaksa, anumana, and agama as they ordinarily apply. Vrsabha's intention then is not to say that an additional means must be acknowledged, but that the ordinary operations of pratyaksa, etc. do not cover all cases of knowledge. One should, however, note that Vrsabha's words, as available, are inadequate to convey this meaning. They do not indicate that he makes a distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary operations of the acceptable pramanas. 15 It should, however, be noted that SUBRAMANIA IYER does not state in this discussion that pratibha is a pramana in the sense 'means of knowledge'. He discusses pratibha as knowledge and probably does so in a chapter on pramanas because the concepts pramana and prama are related.

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156 A. AKLUJKAR line (samarambhah pratayante tirascam api tadvasat) indicate 16. Finally, B specifies agama, one of the pramanas undoubtedly acceptable to him, as the principal cause of pratibha, making it impossible thereby that pratibha could be a pramana for him in the same sense 17. 3.3 TRIPATHI (1972: 10) attributes acceptance of four pramanas (pratyaksa, anumana, arthapatti, and sabda) to those followers of Panini who know the philosophy of the Grammarians (vyakaranadarsanavid paniniya). Presumably, he includes B in this group. But I do not see any strong evidence to attribute acceptance of arthapatti to B18. In fact, statements such as pararthyasyavicistatvan na sabdac chabdasamnidhih Inarthac chabdasya samnidhyam na sabdad arthasamnidhih // (TK 2.338) rule out the acceptance of arthapatti by B, except maybe as a fiction of hermeneutics. I also think that sabda, in the sense of 'testimony , its usual meaning in the context of pramanas, would be a weak substitute for what B means by agama (AKLUJKAR 1971: 169-70, 1988: 2.2-9) and hence should not replace agama. 4.1 Finally, I would like to turn to the view of a scholar who ascribes to the Grammarians acceptance of fewer pramanas than I do. Moksakaragupta remarks in his Tarkabhasa (p.5): vaiyakarano brute pratyaksam sabdam ceti pramanadvayam. In one sense Moksakaragupta is correct. As clarified in my "pramanya" article, which is summarized in 1.1, B views man as moving through life on the basis of previously acquired knowledge and new experiences; the former shapes the latter, and is also shaped by the 16 Even if pratibha were viewed as a means of a further knowledge having the form "This is reliable', it would be so as a part of the process of inference, not independently. 17 TRIPATHI (1972: 321) too concludes that pratibha is not an additional pramana in the philosophy of the Grammarians (including B), but he does so by merging pratibha with a kind of pratyaksa (the manasa pratyaksa) on the basis of Nyaya reasoning acceptable to him, not on the basis of textual evidence from B. 18 All the evidence that TRIPATHI (1972: 297-300) adduces in favor of his view comes from other authors in the field of grammar. What he considers to be adequate evidence for attributing acceptance of arthapatti to B's predecessors amounts to this: Panini and Patanjali were aware of the phenomenon of implied meaning (hardly a surprising conclusion, since implication is so frequently noticed and required in linguistic communication). Whether they considered implication to be a means of knowledge in the same way as pratyaksa, etc., whether they used the term arthapatti, whether they attempted to define artha patti or something essentially similar to it, and whether they could not have included implication in some other means of cognition are the questions that TRIPATHT should have considered prior to reaching his conclusion

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157 The Number of Pramanas according to Bhartrhari latter if the new element contained in the latter does not agree with what it has and yet cannot be denied; in other words, while there is no pure sense experience, the primacy of sense experience as a generally reliable guide to what is 'out there' is not set aside in B's philosophy. When pratyaksa produces enough evidence that is at variance with one's agama, the composition of agama changes to the necessary extent. Thus, man navigates through the stream of life with pratyakca and agama (assuming this is what Moksakaragupta means by sabda) as his oars. Inference, as one cognition leading to another, may be deemed part of sabda in B's view, since B considers all cognitions to be infused with language. While Moksakaragupta's statement can thus be defended, we should note that we do not know if this is the sense he had in mind. Secondly, the statement goes against the evidence collected in 2.119. If one must attribute acceptance of only two pramanas to B, it may perhaps be more defensible to maintain that pratyaksa and anumana, working in contact with agama, are the pramanas that B accepts. Bibliography and Abbreviations. AKLUJKAR, ASHOK, 1971: Nakamura on Bhartrhari. IIJ 13.161-175. -, 1988: Pramaanya in the philosophy of the Grammarians. Expected to be published in a felicitation volume. New Delhi. B = Bhartrhari. Moksakaragupta. Tarkabhasa. (a) Ed. EMBAR KRISHNAMACHARYYA. [Gaekwad Oriental Series 94]. Baroda 1942. (b) Ed. H. R. RANGASWAMI IYENGAR. Mysore 1952. PANDEYA, MURALIDHARA, 1969: pramanesu sabdasya sthanam. In: Samskrti (Da. Aditya Natha Jha Abhinandanagrantha). Delhi. 145-154. PATHAK, SHRIDHARSHASTRI - CHITRAO, SIDDHESHVARSHASTRI, 1927: Word Index to Patanjali's Vyakarana-Mahabhasya. [Government Oriental Series - Class C, no. 3]. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. SUBRAMANIA IYER, K. A., 1969: Bhartrhari. A Study of the Vakyapadiya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries. [Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 68]. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute. 19 Note particularly that B does not speak of sabda. Even if his agama is understood as an equivalent of sabda, it is clearly not an equivalent of sabda in the narrow sense 'testimony, what the reliable texts or persons convey' that is found in the writings of other thinkers making sharp distinctions between various pramanas.

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158 A. AKLUJKAR TK = Trikandi or Vakyapadiya. Ed. WILHELM RAU, Bhartpharis Vakyapa diya. (AKM XLII,4]. Wiesbaden 1977 (My enumeration of karikas is according to this edition and the text of the karikas and the Vstti is according to the new edition I hope to be able to publish in the near future. The passages I have utilized in this article can be located also in K. A. SUBRAMA NIA IYER's editions at approximately the same places as I have specified). TP = Tripadi. Eds. K. V. ABHYANKAR -- V.P. LIMAYE, Mahabhasyadipika of Bhartphari. [Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Post-graduate and Research Department Series, no. 8]. Poona 1970.: TRIPATHI, RAMAPRASADA, 1972: paniniyavyakarane pramanasamikna. [Saras vatibhavanagranthamala, no. 20]. Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishva vidyalaya. V = Vitti (s. TK and Vrsabha). Vrsabha: Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari with the Vstti (of Bhartphari] and the Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva, ed. K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER. [Deccan College Monograph Series 32). Poona 1966.