Number Of Pramanas According To Bhartrhari

Author(s): Ashok Aklujkar
Publisher: Ashok Aklujkar
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269583/1

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THE NUMBER OF PRAMĀŅAS ACCORDING TO
BHARTRHARI*
By Ashok Aklujkar, Vancouver
1.1 In an article entitled "prāmānya in the philosophy of the Grammarians", expected to be published in the near future, I have tried to explain the distinctive nature of the view of prāmānya or 'validity of the means of cognition' which the Grammarians or Vaiyākaraṇas held. I have pointed out in that article that whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy, knowingly or unknowingly, emphasized the separability of the means of cognition (pratyakşa ‘perception', anumāna ‘inference', etc.), the Grammarian-philosophers like Bhartshari (“B” in abbreviation) played down the separability of the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly. In particular, pratyakşa and anumāna work on the backdrop of agama, and agama changes, usually gradually, in the light of the knowledge received through pratyakşa and
* The author is happy to acknowledge the financial assistance he received, at various times since 1969, from the University of B. C. Humanities and Social Sciences Research Committee, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung of the Federal Republic of Germany. The assistance enabled him to study many of the sources used in this publication. His thanks are due also to Mr. Gareth Sparham and Mr. David J. Fern for their comments on an earlier draft.
1 This is not to say that Indian philosophers of other persuasions are not aware of the mutual dependence or limitations of pramānas. They too would readily, concede that an anumāna is not valid if it is vitiated by a perception, that the perception of a rope as a snake should be rejected if one can infer at a later moment the real nature of the object, and that one cannot assert that fire does not burn simply because a reliable text or person says so. What I have in mind here is not invalidation or delimitation that obtains after the operation of a pramāna. My remark has rather to do with what takes place while a pramāna is in operation. The Grammarian school is unlike the other schools of Indian philosophy in accepting at that point the penetration of what is considered to be) the domain of one pramāna by (what is considered to be the domain of another pramāna. While the Buddhist thinkers like Dignäga avoid such overlapping of pramānas by restricting the object of pratyaksa (to svalaksana, i.e, by redefining pratyaksa), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) pramānas as basically complex.
WZKS 33 (1989) 151-158

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anumāna. This is so because the Grammarian's idea of agama was significantly different, which, in turn, was due mostly to his four-fold or multi-level concept of language and his awareness of the centrality of language in our experience of the world. 1.2 Even if one grants the Grammarian's view that the pramāṇas function 'hand-in-hand', one can ask the following question: Which pramāṇas does the Grammarian have in mind when he puts forward his view? His pramāṇas may not be as separable as those of others and he may not be interested in so defining them as to make their domains mutually exclusive, but how many common sense definitions precede his view or are presupposed when he takes his stance? In other words, what is the numer of the pramāṇas the Grammarian is willing to accept as a lower-level reality - as convenient fictions? There is some difference of opinion in this matter?, and hence I wish to examine it in the present paper. My remarks about it should, however, be understood as applicable only to B, although they may be true of other Grammarian-philosophers and although I shall occasionally speak of Grammarians in general. 2.1 It is implicit in the preceding remarks that, as far as I know, B makes no explicit statement on the number of pramāṇas he is willing to entertain. Were there to be such a statement, the difference of opinion would not have arisen. Now, given the situation as it is, we first need to ask ourselves: How shall we be able to find out what pramānas B presupposes? 3 I think all we need to do is to note the key terminology of those sections of his Trikāndī or Vākyapadīya and Tripādī or Mahābhāṣyatīkā in which he discusses the issue of prāmānya. These sections, specifically TK 1.30-43, 148–53 with the Vrtti thereto, 2.134-41, and TP pp. 8, 82-3, 98, 191-4, express their contents with pratyakşa*, anumāna", and āgama (from among the terminology commonly asso
2 If those students of B's thought who, like me, conclude that the pramānas are not really separable in B's view were to be disinterested in determining the number of pramānas precisely and hence were to mention various numbers, that would be something expected. However, the difference of opinion is noticed even among those scholars who have not realized the tentativeness of the pramāna distinctions set up by the Grammarian and whom one expects to be more committed to giving an account of each acceptable pramāna.
3 It will be noticed that the scholars whose views I modify below have not raised this crucial question about the method prior to their listing or delineation of the pramāņas acceptable to B.
* Related expression: pratyakşapramāna.
5 Related expressions: anumatr, anumita, anumīyamāna, anumānikaloniki, tarka, hetu-, tärkika
6 Related expressions: āgamika dharma, āgamacakşus.

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ciated with pramānas in Sanskrit) as perimeters. It follows, therefore, that the pramānas presupposed by B are pratyakşa, anumāna, and āgama. This conclusion is supported by the following additional considerations: (a) B nowhere declares pratyakşa and anumāna to be unacceptable or always unreliable, and he clearly argues for the acceptance of agama in TK 1.30-43. (b) The author of the Yogasūtra (1.7), to whose thought B seems close?, acknowledges precisely the same three pramāņas. (c) B's guiding light in grammar, Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāsya, indicates awareness of only these three pramāņas. 2.2 Having thus established that B's thinking on prāmānya moves in the spheres of pratyakşa, anumāna, and āgama and that it makes historical sense to attribute initial or first-level acceptance of these three pramānas to him, I would like to examine whether those interpretations are justified in which additional pramānas have been mentioned as acceptable to him. 3.1 While introducing TK 1.35, B's commentator Vrşabha - who, on the whole, is a very perceptive scholar and the incomplete and faulty preservation of whose commentary saddens all serious students of Bremarks: pratyakşānumāne eva pramāņe ity avagamād ( ava ... [@]gamād?] anyapramāņapradarśanena vyabhicārayati. And again, while introducing TK 1.36, Vrşabha says: pratyakşānumānāgamavyatiriktām pratipattim āha. Although the text of the first remark is not beyond doubt, it is clear from Vrşabha's explanations of TK 1.35-6 and the V
7 I have discussed the relationship between the Yogasūtra and Yogabhāsya, on the one hand, and the TK, on the other, in a paper read at the 1970 annual meeting of the American Oriental Society. I hope to be able to prepare this paper for publication in the near future.
8. (a) See the Mahābhāşya passages in which anumāna, anumānagamya, āgama, pratyaksa, etc. occur according to PATHAK - CHITRAO 1927. (b) The remark sabdapramānakā vayam. yacchabda āha tad asmākam pramānam occurring in the Mahābhāsya (Paspasā vārttika 9; 2.1.1 värttika 5) should not be interpreted as meaning that the Grammarians accept only sabda or agama as a pramāna. TK 3.7.38dd, Helārāja 3.1.11, etc. rightly take it as indicating that the Grammarian, in his role as a linguist, can accept as existing anything that words express - that, while writing a grammar, he does not have to determine what actually exists. (c) See note 18 below for refutation of the view that Patañjali recognized arthāpatti as an additional means of cognition.
This does not mean that there could not have been talk of some other pramānas before or during the time of B. What we are attempting here is not a determination of the range of B's information, but a determination of what B was willing to view as initially or commonsensically) acceptable pramanas.

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thereto that he takes the two verses to mean that B accepted the possibility of knowledge through a means going beyond pratyakşa, anumāna, and āgama (cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969: 89, lines 23-30).
I consider it rather revealing that Vrşabha does not have a name for this additional means 10. He will probably be hard pressed to find one among the words employed by B. The purport he assigns to B's kārikās and V is not supported by the context or by the expressions constituting the passages in question. In fact, B's phrases pratyaksapramāņavişayam api (V 1.35)" and pratyakşam anumānam ca (TK 1.36; note the omission of agama) indicate that B's intention is not to state that something exceeding pratyakşa, anumāna, and āgama must be acknowledged. The purpose of TK 1.35-7 seems to be to point out cases of extraordinary perception in order to make two further contextually relevant observations: (a) Inferences cannot refute what extraordinary perception establishes (b) Since the dharmasādhanatva of sādhu expressions is/could be based on such extraordinary perception, one cannot reject it through inferential statements. TK 1.35–7 can thus be understood as implying that extraordinary perceptions resulting from abhyāsa constant practice', karman/adsstasakti 'a non-mundane or imperceptible force' possessed by spirits (rakṣaḥpitrpiśāca)12, and enlightenment (state of the āvirbhūtaprakāśa individuals) be admitted and further that, to account for such perceptions, the possibility of heightening of the capacities of senses (through abhyāsa, tapas, etc.) be admitted. It
10 TRIPATHI (1972: 319-20) initially follows Vrşabha's interpretation of TK 1.35 and 1.36 and takes the further step of specifying the so-called additional pramānas as abhyasa and adrsta, but then he turns around and, on the basis of a different reasoning, disposes of abhyāsa and adrsta by including them in pratyakşa. His procedure is unhistorical. It does not depend on indications in individual texts, but rather on what he and other authors consider logical. He does not even point out the weakness of his first reasoning that leads him to the hypothesis that B has additional pramānas (namely, abhyāsa and adreta) in mind.
11 Cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER (1969: 89): "What is specifically denied is that it is inferential knowledge".
12 SUBRAMANIA IYER's (1969: 89-90) perceptive comparison of the information gleaned from the Brahmakāņdavịtti and the Vākyakāndavṛtti establishes that the nature of the cognitions arising out of abhyāsa and adreta can be characterized as pratibhā in B's terminology. However, such a characterization does not in itself imply that the means leading to the cognitions must be other than pratyaksa, anumāna, and āgama. It is clearly stated in TK 2.117 that pratibha arises out of all kinds of linguistic expressions, which implies that it does not depend exclusively on means of any special kind. There are also several other indications in the TK to the effect that, in the philosophy of B, the domain of pratibha is not concommitant with the domain of the extraordinary.

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does not seem justifiable to understand the passage as implying that additional means of cognition need to be postulated 13.
One should also note that the extraordinary perceptions mentioned above are due to extraordinary qualities acquired by the perceivers, that is, are due to purusadharma. In TK 1.30 B declares that all such special purusadharmas are ultimately dependent on agama (cf. SUBRAMANIA IYER 1969: 93). It would, therefore, be inconsistent with his statement to postulate a pramāna beyond pratyakṣa, anumāna, and agama to account for extraordinary perceptions 14.
3.2 Since pratibha occupies an important place in B's thought and since pratibha is discussed as a possible pramāņa in some Sanskrit philosophical works, one may get the impression that pratibha is an additional pramana even in B's philosophy. This impression may be strengthened by discussions such as SUBRAMANIA IYER'S (1969: 86-93) in which a prominent place is given to the explication of the concept of pratibhā in a chapter entitled "Bhartṛhari and the pramāņas" 15. However, it can be shown rather easily that, although pratibha is pramāṇabhūta ('something people generally rely on') in B's philosophy, it is not a pramāņa in it, at least not in the sense in which pratyakṣa, anumāna, and agama are pramānas. The reasons suggested in 2.1 and 3.1 above go against its acceptance as a pramana. Furthermore, pratibha is knowledge itself looked at from a specific point of view (TK 2.143-51). A remark like. pramāṇatvena tām lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanupaiyati (TK 2.147) simply means that the knowledge that pratibha is, is viewed as reliable and becomes a basis or means for action, as the immediately preceding line (itikartavyatäyäm tam na kaścid ativartate) and the immediately next.
13 See TRIPATHI 1972: 319-21 for another kind of reasoning leading to the same conclusion.
14 (a) It is perhaps significant that a modern scholar, MURALĪDHARA PANDEYA (1969: 150-2), while interpreting, without reference to Vṛṣabha, the section of verses with which we are concerned here, takes the section as establishing only that sabda or agama must be acknowledged as a pramāņa in addition to pratyakṣa and anumana. (b) One can possibly save Vṛṣabha's explanation by taking it to mean that the extraordinary perceptions mentioned by B transcend pratyakşa, anumāna, and agama as they ordinarily apply. Vṛṣabha's intention then is not to say that an additional means must be acknowledged, but that the ordinary operations of pratyakṣa, etc. do not cover all cases of knowledge. One should, however, note that Vrṣabha's words, as available, are inadequate to convey this meaning. They do not indicate that he makes a distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary operations of the acceptable pramāņas.
15 It should, however, be noted that SUBRAMANIA IYER does not state in this discussion that pratibha is a pramāņa in the sense 'means of knowledge'. He discusses pratibha as knowledge and probably does so in a chapter on pramāņas because the concepts pramāna and prama are related.

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line (samārambhāḥ pratāyante tiraścām api tadvaśāt) indicate 16. Finally, B specifies āgama, one of the pramāņas undoubtedly acceptable to him, as the principal cause of pratibhā, making it impossible thereby that pratibhā could be a pramāņa for him in the same sense 17. 3.3 TRIPĀȚHI (1972: 10) attributes acceptance of four pramānas (pratyakşa, anumāna, arthāpatti, and sabda) to those followers of Pāṇini who know the philosophy of the Grammarians (vyākaraṇadarśanavid pāņinīya). Presumably, he includes B in this group. But I do not see any strong evidence to attribute acceptance of arthāpatti to B18. In fact, statements such as pārārthyasyāvićiştatvān na sabdāc chabdasamnidhiḥ Inārthāc chabdasya sāmnidhyam na sabdād arthasamnidhiḥ // (TK 2.338) rule out the acceptance of arthāpatti by B, except maybe as a fiction of hermeneutics. I also think that śabda, in the sense of 'testimony , its usual meaning in the context of pramānas, would be a weak substitute for what B means by agama (AKLUJKAR 1971: 169-70, 1988: 2.2-9) and hence should not replace āgama. 4.1 Finally, I would like to turn to the view of a scholar who ascribes to the Grammarians acceptance of fewer pramānas than I do. Mokşākaragupta remarks in his Tarkabhāşā (p.5): vaiyākarano brūte pratyakşam sābdam ceti pramāṇadvayam.
In one sense Mokşākaragupta is correct. As clarified in my "prāmānya” article, which is summarized in 1.1, B views man as moving through life on the basis of previously acquired knowledge and new experiences; the former shapes the latter, and is also shaped by the
16 Even if pratibhā were viewed as a means of a further knowledge having the form "This is reliable', it would be so as a part of the process of inference, not independently.
17 TRIPATHI (1972: 321) too concludes that pratibha is not an additional pramāna in the philosophy of the Grammarians (including B), but he does so by merging pratibha with a kind of pratyakşa (the mānasa pratyaksa) on the basis of Nyāya reasoning acceptable to him, not on the basis of textual evidence from B.
18 All the evidence that TRIPATHI (1972: 297-300) adduces in favor of his view comes from other authors in the field of grammar. What he considers to be adequate evidence for attributing acceptance of arthāpatti to B's predecessors amounts to this: Pānini and Patañjali were aware of the phenomenon of implied meaning (hardly a surprising conclusion, since implication is so frequently noticed and required in linguistic communication). Whether they considered implication to be a means of knowledge in the same way as pratyakşa, etc., whether they used the term arthāpatti, whether they attempted to define arthā patti or something essentially similar to it, and whether they could not have included implication in some other means of cognition are the questions that TRIPATHT should have considered prior to reaching his conclusion

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latter if the new element contained in the latter does not agree with what it has and yet cannot be denied; in other words, while there is no pure sense experience, the primacy of sense experience as a generally reliable guide to what is 'out there' is not set aside in B's philosophy. When pratyakṣa produces enough evidence that is at variance with one's agama, the composition of agama changes to the necessary extent. Thus, man navigates through the stream of life with pratyakça and agama (assuming this is what Mokṣäkaragupta means by sabda) as his oars. Inference, as one cognition leading to another, may be deemed part of sabda in B's view, since B considers all cognitions to be infused with language.
While Mokṣākaragupta's statement can thus be defended, we should note that we do not know if this is the sense he had in mind. Secondly, the statement goes against the evidence collected in 2.119. If one must attribute acceptance of only two pramānas to B, it may perhaps be more defensible to maintain that pratyaksa and anumana, working in contact with agama, are the pramāņas that B accepts.
Bibliography and Abbreviations.
AKLUJKAR, ASHOK, 1971: Nakamura on Bhartṛhari. IIJ 13.161-175.
-, 1988: Prāmāanya in the philosophy of the Grammarians. Expected to be published in a felicitation volume. New Delhi.
B = Bhartṛhari.
Mokṣakaragupta. Tarkabhāṣā. (a) Ed. EMBAR KRISHNAMACHARYYA. [Gaekwad Oriental Series 94]. Baroda 1942. (b) Ed. H. R. RANGASWAMI IYENGAR. Mysore 1952.
PANDEYA, MURALIDHARA, 1969: pramāneṣu sabdasya sthānam. In: Samskṛti (Da. Aditya Natha Jha Abhinandanagrantha). Delhi. 145-154. PATHAK, SHRIDHARSHASTRI - CHITRAO, SIDDHESHVARSHASTRI, 1927: Word Index to Patanjali's Vyakarana-Mahabhäṣya. [Government Oriental Series - Class C, no. 3]. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. SUBRAMANIA IYER, K. A., 1969: Bhartṛhari. A Study of the Vakyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries. [Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 68]. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.
19 Note particularly that B does not speak of sabda. Even if his agama is understood as an equivalent of sabda, it is clearly not an equivalent of sabda in the narrow sense 'testimony, what the reliable texts or persons convey' that is found in the writings of other thinkers making sharp distinctions between various pramāņas.

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158 A. AKLUJKAR TK = Trikandi or Vakyapadiya. Ed. WILHELM RAU, Bhartpharis Vakyapa diya. (AKM XLII,4]. Wiesbaden 1977 (My enumeration of karikas is according to this edition and the text of the karikas and the Vstti is according to the new edition I hope to be able to publish in the near future. The passages I have utilized in this article can be located also in K. A. SUBRAMA NIA IYER's editions at approximately the same places as I have specified). TP = Tripadi. Eds. K. V. ABHYANKAR -- V.P. LIMAYE, Mahabhasyadipika of Bhartphari. [Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Post-graduate and Research Department Series, no. 8]. Poona 1970.: TRIPATHI, RAMAPRASADA, 1972: paniniyavyakarane pramanasamikna. [Saras vatibhavanagranthamala, no. 20]. Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishva vidyalaya. V = Vitti (s. TK and Vrsabha). Vrsabha: Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari with the Vstti (of Bhartphari] and the Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva, ed. K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER. [Deccan College Monograph Series 32). Poona 1966.