Book Title: Note In Patanjali And The Buddhists
Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
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Page #1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ A NOTE ON PATANJALI AND THE BUDDHISTS JOHANNES BRONKHORST Patanjali's Mahabhasya on P. 1.3.1 mentions "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end " (margaladini mangalamadhyani mangalantani fastrani). In my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya ( Bronkhorst, 1987 1 esp. p. 12 )! have had occasion to draw attention to the diffculties of interpretation which, this phrase brings about. Mahabhasya itself is not stated to have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. In the case of the varttikas, the "something auspicious in the beginning" is, according to Patanjali, the use of the word siddhe in one of the first of them. This vaatika does not, however, appear to be the first varttika in the Mahabhasya, as I have pointed out. The "something auspicious in the beginning" in Papini's Aspadhyayl is the word vddhi in P. 1.1.1 (veddhir ad alc). The "something auspicious in the middle" in this text is the presence of bhil. (instead of bhy.) in P. 1. 3.1 (bhuvadayo dhatavah ). But P. 1. 3. 1 is not, of course, anywhere picar the middle of the Astadhyayl. The "something auspicious in the end." remains unspecified in the Mahabha sya. Some commentators propose the use of daya in P. 8. 4.67, which is not the very end of the Astadhyayl. It is far from certain that Patanjali had anything specific in mind for the "somothing auspicious in the end". The question is therefore : whence did Patanjali get the notion of sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end "? Later on in my Three Problems to the Mahabhasya ( Bronkhorst, 1987: 56.) I hid oscasion to draw attention to some close parallels between certain notions in the Mahabhasya and some ideas current among the Buddhists of that period. I ventured the hypothesis, which could be supporo ted with various arguments, that Patanjali may have been indebted to Buddhism, and was perhaps acquainted with the Sarvastivada school of this religion. This allows us to look at Buddhist texts for the possible source of Patanjali's notion of sciences which have something auspicious in the begin ning, in the middle and in the end ". + A. Wazier do not share this point of viow. For a discussion of his criticism, 300 the appendix below. Page #2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ BRONKHORST : A note on Patanjali and the Buddhists 249 Annals BORI, LXXV (1994) The Buddhist texts that have come down to us do indeed contain a very similar notion. The Dharma, i.e. the truth preached by the Buddha, is here described as "auspicious in the beginnlog, in the middle and in the end ", in Pali: adikalyana, majjhekalyana, pariyosanakalyana, in Sanskrit: adau kalyana, madhye kalyana, paryavasane kalyana. We find this expression very frequently in the Pali Buddhist texts, especially in the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas. The expression has been preserved in Sanskrit in the Mahaparinirvana sutes, the Dasortarasgira, the Nidanasamyukta, and elsewhete, Soveral of these texts in Sanskrit belonged most probably to the Sarvastivadins. It is of course not possible to prove that Patanjali adaptod tho Buddhist notion of the Dharma as "auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" to arrive at his notion of " sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". It constitutes however a possibility. As such it might be considered to add some weight, if ever so little, to the arguments produced earlier in support of Buddhist influence on Patanjali's Mahabhasya. In this connection it will be appropriate to draw once again attention ta another case, where Patanjali's Mahabhasya and early Buddhist literatura pantain very similar passages. Mbh II p. 120, 1.20-21 (on P. 3. 2. 115) contains the following sentences " Alternatively, there are people who do not perceive the present. For oxample : Sakatyana from among the grammarians, while sitting at the sido of tho carriage-road, did not perceive a group of carts that passed by." Buddhist literature contains a similar episode in the Mahaparinirvanasitra and its parallels. Here a certain Arada Kalama is stated to have had such an experience, or rather non-experience. He described the event in the following words": Even though conscious and awake I did not hear the sound of five hundred carts passing by." "It is of course tempting to assume that Patanjali was acquainted with the Sarvastivada Makaparinirvanasutra. This aloae might then be held to account both for his story about $akajayana and for his mention of "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". This conclusion should not, however, be drawn rashly. The story of Sakatayana in particular has some aspects which might be held to plead against direct borrowing from the Buddhist Mahaparinirvanasatra, It is not impossible that the story of Arala Kalama is not a Buddhist invention. Arada Kalama is presented as a non-Buddhist teacher, and this may very well be correct. It is therefore conceivable that similar stories were current in non-Buddhist circles, and Patanjali may therefore have heard somo such story from non-Buddhists. The name Sakajayana poses another problem. It means "descendant of Sakata " (by P. 4. 1.99). But sakata is also the word for cart' used in Patanjali's remark. This may not be coincidence. A more or less floating story about carts may have been attributed to Sakatayana because of his name. If that is true, it is harder to believe that Patanjali was here influenced by the episode about Arada kalama in the Mahaparinir vanasutra. Unless, of course we assume that Patanjali made up the story about Sakarayana under the influence of the Buddhist texts with which he supposedly was acquainted. A third case to be considered is constituted by the following two phrases in the Mahabhasya : gunasamdravo dravyam (Mbh II p. 336 1.26) and gunasamudayo dravyam (Mbh II p. 200 1. 137.), which do not appear to express the opinion of Patanjali. The notion of material objects as collections of qualities existed both in Sarvastivada and in Samkhya. Since there are no indications whatsoever that Patanjali was acquainted with the Samkhya philosophy, we are, once again, confronted with an indication that he may have been influenced by the Servastivadins. If the cases just discussed cannot prove beyond doubt that Patanjali himself know this or that Buddhist text, or any Buddhist text for that matter, they do lend support to the view that Patanjali underwent, perhaps indirectly, Buddhist influence. Together with the evidence presented in my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya, they allow us, as it seems to me, to consider Buddhist influence on Patanjali a probable proposition. # See the Pau Tipitakam Concordancs, part VI, by F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hue. . London: Pili Text Society, 1954, p. 316, $. v. adikalyana, for references to the PAU canon. See the Sanskrit Worterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfen-Funden (ed. Heinz Bechert), 4. Lieferung, Gottingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1981, D. 249-50, S. v. adi. Hinaber, 1985: 69-70, 71-73 (Nidanasamyukta; Mahaparinirvanasura): Pisidika, 1985: 185, with reference to an article by J. W. de Jong (Dasottarasitra) Sec Bronkhorst, 1993 : 79, with n. 3. 6 Mb II p. 120, 1. 20-23 : athava bhavati vai kasold api wartawinkan nopalabhata / tad yatha / vaiyakarannan sakayano rathamargo alinah sakatasartham yandans nopalebhe 4P8 28. 18: manji dhans. Sasino jogram ninaujais pancanan kawa aanai Pyatilramamanar Mahlam |. ! Bronkhorst, 1994: esp. p. 317f. 32 Annak IRORTI. Page #3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Annals BORI, LXXV (1994) BRONKHORST : A note on Patanjali and the Buddhists 251 I do not believe anyone could possibly disagree with this observation! Kielhorn was careful enough to inform us in his notes of what exactly he found in his manuscripts, thus giving us an insight into his working proce dure. Explicit reflections in his preface furthermore discuss and try to justify it. Nor do I in any way disagree with this procedure. I am a great admirer of Kielhorn, and when I refer to him as one of our illustrious predecessors," I truly mean it. Appendix In my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya I mentioned the traditional tendency in our discipline, which sometimes leads to the result that theories formulated in the 19th century have come to be accepted as facts, whereas equally strong but more recently formulated theories may be looked upon as reproachable speculation (P.1). Now it appears that Professor Albrecht Wezler has taken it upon himself to illustrate this observatlon (Wezler, 1994: 174-175 n. 3). As is well known, Kielhorn had proposed a criterion for identifying prose varttikas, sentences which are accompanied by an explanation which usually repeats their words, are varttikas. In this connection I made the following observation (p. 3-4): "Of... interest in this context is Kielhorn's habit of adding an explanation (which in these cases is identical with the virttikas) wbere he thought that a certain phrase was a virttika, thus staying in agreement with his own criterion... (follow some instances )... In all these cases Kielborn has himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based! Of course, Kielborn has a theory to explain why many of his manuscripts do not treat presumed varttikas as such: since the comment in the Bhasya is in these cases identical with the varttika, scribes did not bother to repeat this, they added a figure 2, in which place later a stop came, which in its turn disappeared altogether from many manuscripts. This example shows, I think, very clearly the way of working of one of our illustrious predecessors in the last century. Kielhorn did not just report what he found in his manuscripts. On the contrary, he formulated a theory about the authorship of the different parts of his text, and on the basis of this theory he subsequently felt entitled to go to the extent of deviating from bis manuscriprs in some cases." In spite of this, Wezler comments on this passage in the following manner: "As for Bronkhorst..., the manner he treats Kielhorn is quite unfair, to say the least. To accuse him of having, in certain cases of determining varttikas, "himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based ..., stands the facts on their heads. Anybody who has worked with, or even himself prepared the critical edition of a text in which varttikas are embedded (no matter whether formulated by the author himself or representing the work of another author ) is familiar with the problem whether at particular places one is to assume a varttika inspite of the absence of the usual subsequent paraphrase commentary explanation or not. And Kielborn, in the cases referred to by Bronkhorst, quite clearly states what the readings of the mss, are, i.e. that he thought an emendation necessary." A major misunderstanding must underlie these remarks. To begin with, how can I treat Kielhorn unfairly, even accuse him, in a passage in which 1 praiso him? I have no difficulty whatever with Kielhoro's method, and find it rather an example of good and thorough scholarship. But apparently Wezler looks upon the use of theory as a weakness, which one should try to avoid. The result is that he tries to hide the theoretical aspect of philological work, and present the outcome as fact. Yet his own words betray that even the most painstaking editor of a text in which varttikas are embedded, some times has to assume a varttika. Assuming is not fact, but theory. And a good assumption is still not fact, but is good theory. Modifying the quip one some times hears, to the extent that nothing is more practical than a good theory, one might say that nothing is as factual as a good theory. But a theory is a theory. And there is no way to change a phrase which Kielhora did not find in his manuscripts but yet added in his edition, into a fact as far as the manuscript evidence is concrned. Such phrases were added, created, by Kielhorn, whether one likes it or not. And theories always go beyond the evidence, because such is their nature. When, therefore, Wezler thinks that, in general, only new or more evidence calls for a new theory, he seems to imply that the same amount of evidence can accommodate only one theory, which is contrary to the very nature of theories, * Kielborn, 1876. 10 I use this occasion to express my regrets about the numerous misprints which mar Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya; no proofs were ever sent to me. I also would like to express my agreement with Wezler's observation (1994: 182 n. 32) concerning my work on Khoika 1 of Bharthari's Mahabhasyadipika, which the title page describes as critically edited by Johannes Bronkhorst". Wezler raises the question; Would not critically reconstructed have been a more precise and honest-designation of the work actually done?" Unfortunately I had no voice in the sbaping of the title page. I have tried to somewhat rectify the wrong impression thus created in the first lines of my preface to this work: This so-called 'critical edition'... is no more, and can be no more, than an attempt to make sense of an often unistelligible text, handed down in one incomplete manuscript". I regret to see that these words have gone unnoticed. Page #4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Annals BORI, LXXV (1994) BRONKHORST : A note on Patanjali and the Buddhists 253 The reason for this doubt is simple : Patanjali refers in a similar context to the "middle" and the "end" of the Astadhyayl, and we have seen that this presumed middle is far removed from the real middle, and that the so-called end is not at the very end. It may here be added, that atha (in atha sabdanusasanam ) is a perfectly respectable beginning fo any work Let me repeat once more here, to avoid any misunderstanding which this discussion might create, that I have no problems with Kielborn's criterion for identifying varttikas. In this respect I am therefore in full agreement with Wezler. Our disagreement concerns the application of this criterion. As it so happens, Kielhorn's criterion would identify as Varttikas three statements that precede what is traditionally held to be the first varttika." There is, moreover, independent evidence that two of these three statements were not composed by Patanjali: one of thein he did not correctly understand, the other one he attributes to an (or the ) Acarya. Wezler does not, if I understand him correctly, contest these observations. He concludes from them, that these last two varttika-like statements may have been composed by one or more persons different from both Patanjali and Katyayana. With regard to the third statement which is treated like a varrtika -and which happens to be the very first line of the Mahabhasya: atha sabdanusasanam-Wezler (P. 173-174 n. 2) admits that there is a problem, then offers a solution which is "as simple as plausible": "Patanjali starts his critical examination and explanation of Panini's rules and of Katyayana's Varttika on them by repeating or quoting ... the very first words by which the study of grammar had much earlier been announced as a subject of instruction to those students whom Patanjali himself really or fictitiously) turns to now that they have gained a good grounding, i. e. know the Astadbyayi and the Varttika by heart and understand much of what is said in the two works." Summing up, Wezler makes some proposals which I would be the last to claim cannot be right. I do insist, however, that these proposals constitute just a theory, and not a particularly convincing one at that. When, then, Wezler asks th: rhetorical question "what is the use of formulating alleged new theories ?," all he does is illustrate my observation, repeated at the beginning of this appendix, to the extent that for some contemporary scholars theories formulated in the 19th century have come to be accepted as facts, whereas equally strong, but more recently formulated theories are looked upon as reproachable speculation. These justifications for not ascribing the statements concerned to Katyayana may look a bit ad hoc to those who have not already decided beforehand to agree with Wezler's position. The real reason, I believe, why Wezler looked so hard for alternative explanations, is that the first varttika recognised by him begins with the word siddhe, and that Patanjali explains the purpose of this word as margalartham "for the sake of something auspicious". Patanjali then adds that sciences that have something auspicious in the beginning (margaladini $astrani) prosper. Pace Wezler, I do think that Patanjali is to be taken seriously as regards his contention that siddhe is marigalartha. What I am less convinced of, is that Patanjali's beginning refers necessarily to the very first word, in this case of Katyayana's Varttika. Reference Bronkhorst, Johannes (1987): Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya, Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. (Post-graduate and Research Departinent Series no. 30; "Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures" (Third series ).) Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993): The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. Second, revised edition. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass.. . Bronkhorst, Johannes (1994): "The qualities of Sankhya." Wiener Zeits: chrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 38 (Orbis Indicus; Festschrifit G. Oberhammer), 309-322. Hinuber, Oskar von (1985): "Die Bestimmung der Schulzugehorigkeit buddhistischer Texte nach sprachlichen Kriterien." In: Zur Schulzugehorigkeit von Werken der Hinayana-Literatur, Erster Teil, hrsg. Heinz Bechert. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 149.) Pp. 57-75. Kielhorn, Franz (1876): Katyayana and Patailjali: Their relationship to each other, and to Panini. Bombay. Reprinted : Kleine Schriften I (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1969), pp. 1-64. Mahaparinirvanasutra Das Mahaparinirvanasutra, Text in Sanskrit und Tibetisch, veglichen mit dem Pali nebst einer Ubersetzung der chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Malasarvastivadins, auf Grund 11 Cp. Kiclhorn, 1876 : 26:"... Wherever in the Mahabhashya we meet with a paraphras ed statement, of which Patanjali does not tell us explicitly that it belongs to another or to others, or of which the context does not prove clearly and beyond doubt that it is a quotation from the work of another, we shall regard ourselves as bound to assume that such statement is Katyayana's, or in other words, that it is a Varttika or part of one." Page #5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________ Annals BORI, LXXV ( 1994) . von Turfan-Handschriften herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Enrst Waldschmidt. (Originally published in 1950-51.) Reprint : Rinsen Book, Kyoto, 1986. Pasadika, Bhikkhu (1985): "Ober die Schulzugehorigkeit der Kanon-Zitate im Abhidharmakosabhasya." In: Zur Schulzugehorigkeit von * Werken der. Hinayana-Literatur, Erster Teil, hrsg. Heinz Bechert. Gottingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Abhandlungen der Wissen. schaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 149.) Pp. 180-190. Patanjali: Vyakarana-Mahabhasya. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Third edition by K. V. Abhyankar. Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Insti tute. 1962-1972. Wezler, Albrecht (1994): "Once again on Patanjali's definition of a word (Studies in Patanjali's Mahabhasya )." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 38 (Festschrift G. Oberhammer), 173-189. Woodward, F.L., and Hare, E. M. (1954), Pali Tipitakam Concordance, part VI. London: Pali Text Society. Abbreviations Mbh Mahabhasya of Patanjali MPS Mahaparinirvanasutra Bi Raninian satra