Note In Patanjali And The Buddhists

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269598/1

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A NOTE ON PATANJALI AND THE BUDDHISTS
JOHANNES BRONKHORST
Patañjali's Mahabhasya on P. 1.3.1 mentions "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end " (margaladini mangalamadhyāni mangalantani fāstrāņi). In my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhāşya ( Bronkhorst, 1987 1 esp. p. 12 )! have had occasion to draw attention to the diffculties of interpretation which, this phrase brings about. Mahabhäşya itself is not stated to have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. In the case of the värttikas, the "something auspicious in the beginning" is, according to Patanjali, the use of the word siddhe in one of the first of them. This vaatika does not, however, appear to be the first vārttika in the Mahabhasya, as I have pointed out. The "something auspicious in the beginning" in Papini's Aşpadhyayl is the word vddhi in P. 1.1.1 (veddhir ad alc). The "something auspicious in the middle" in this text is the presence of bhil. (instead of bhy.) in P. 1. 3.1 (bhūvādayo dhatavah ). But P. 1. 3. 1 is not, of course, anywhere picar the middle of the Aştādhyayl. The "something auspicious in the end." remains unspecified in the Mahabha sya. Some commentators propose the use of daya in P. 8. 4.67, which is not the very end of the Aştādhyayl. It is far from certain that Patañjali had anything specific in mind for the "somothing auspicious in the end". The question is therefore : whence did Patañjali get the notion of sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end "?
Later on in my Three Problems to the Mahabhasya ( Bronkhorst, 1987: 56.) I hid oscasion to draw attention to some close parallels between certain notions in the Mahabhāşya and some ideas current among the Buddhists of that period. I ventured the hypothesis, which could be supporo ted with various arguments, that Patañjali may have been indebted to Buddhism, and was perhaps acquainted with the Sarvāstivada school of this religion. This allows us to look at Buddhist texts for the possible source of Patañjali's notion of sciences which have something auspicious in the begin ning, in the middle and in the end ".
+ A. Wazier do not share this point of viow. For a discussion of his criticism, 300
the appendix below.

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Annals BORI, LXXV (1994)
The Buddhist texts that have come down to us do indeed contain a very similar notion. The Dharma, i.e. the truth preached by the Buddha, is here described as "auspicious in the beginnlog, in the middle and in the end ", in Pali: adikalyana, majjhekalyāna, pariyosanakalyana, in Sanskrit: adau kalyana, madhye kalyana, paryavasāne kalyana. We find this expression very frequently in the Pali Buddhist texts, especially in the Vinaya and Sutta Pițakas. The expression has been preserved in Sanskrit in the Mahaparinirvana sūtes, the Dasortarasgira, the Nidānasamyukta, and elsewhete, Soveral of these texts in Sanskrit belonged most probably to the Sarvästivadins.
It is of course not possible to prove that Patañjali adaptod tho Buddhist notion of the Dharma as "auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" to arrive at his notion of " sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". It constitutes however a possibility. As such it might be considered to add some weight, if ever so little, to the arguments produced earlier in support of Búddhist influence on Patañjali's Mahābhāsya.
In this connection it will be appropriate to draw once again attention ta another case, where Patañjali's Mahābhasya and early Buddhist literatura pantain very similar passages. Mbh II p. 120, 1.20-21 (on P. 3. 2. 115) contains the following sentences
" Alternatively, there are people who do not perceive the present. For oxample : Sakatyana from among the grammarians, while sitting at the sido of tho carriage-road, did not perceive a group of carts that passed by."
Buddhist literature contains a similar episode in the Mahaparinirvanasitra and its parallels. Here a certain Arāda Kalama is stated to have had such an experience, or rather non-experience. He described the event in the following words":
Even though conscious and awake I did not hear the sound of five hundred carts passing by."
"It is of course tempting to assume that Patanjali was acquainted with the Sarvästivāda Makāparinirvanasūtra. This aloae might then be held to account both for his story about $ākajāyana and for his mention of "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". This conclusion should not, however, be drawn rashly. The story of Sakațāyana in particular has some aspects which might be held to plead against direct borrowing from the Buddhist Mahāparinirvanasatra,
It is not impossible that the story of Arāļa Kalama is not a Buddhist invention. Arāda Kalama is presented as a non-Buddhist teacher, and this may very well be correct. It is therefore conceivable that similar stories were current in non-Buddhist circles, and Patañjali may therefore have heard somo such story from non-Buddhists.
The name Śākajāyana poses another problem. It means "descendant of Sakata " (by P. 4. 1.99). But sakata is also the word for cart' used in Patañjali's remark. This may not be coincidence. A more or less floating story about carts may have been attributed to Sakatāyana because of his name. If that is true, it is harder to believe that Patañjali was here influenced by the episode about Arāda kālāma in the Mahaparinir vānasūtra. Unless, of course we assume that Patañjali made up the story about Sakarāyana under the influence of the Buddhist texts with which he supposedly was acquainted.
A third case to be considered is constituted by the following two phrases in the Mahābhāsya : gunasamdrāvo dravyam (Mbh II p. 336 1.26) and gunasamudāyo dravyam (Mbh II p. 200 1. 137.), which do not appear to express the opinion of Patañjali. The notion of material objects as collections of qualities existed both in Sarvāstivada and in Samkhya. Since there are no indications whatsoever that Patañjali was acquainted with the Samkhya philosophy, we are, once again, confronted with an indication that he may have been influenced by the Servāstivādins.
If the cases just discussed cannot prove beyond doubt that Patañjali himself know this or that Buddhist text, or any Buddhist text for that matter, they do lend support to the view that Patañjali underwent, perhaps indirectly, Buddhist influence. Together with the evidence presented in my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya, they allow us, as it seems to me, to consider Buddhist influence on Patañjali a probable proposition.
# See the Pau Tipitakam Concordancs, part VI, by F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hue. . London: Pili Text Society, 1954, p. 316, $. v. adikalyana, for references to the PAU
canon. See the Sanskrit Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfen-Funden (ed. Heinz Bechert), 4. Lieferung, Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1981, D. 249-50, S. v. adi. Hinaber, 1985: 69-70, 71-73 (Nidānasamyukta; Mahaparinirvanasura): Pisidika, 1985: 185, with reference to an article by J. W. de Jong (Dasottarasitra)
Sec Bronkhorst, 1993 : 79, with n. 3. 6 Mb II p. 120, 1. 20-23 : athava bhavati vai kasold api wartawinkan
nopalabhata / tad yatha / vaiyakarannan sakayano rathamargo alinah sakatasartham yandans nopalebhe 4P8 28. 18: manji dhans. Sasino jogram ninaujais pancanan kawa aanai Pyatilramamanar Mahlam |.
! Bronkhorst, 1994: esp. p. 317f.
32 Annak IRORTI.

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I do not believe anyone could possibly disagree with this observation! Kielhorn was careful enough to inform us in his notes of what exactly he found in his manuscripts, thus giving us an insight into his working proce dure. Explicit reflections in his preface furthermore discuss and try to justify it. Nor do I in any way disagree with this procedure. I am a great admirer of Kielhorn, and when I refer to him as one of our illustrious predecessors," I truly mean it.
Appendix In my Three Problems pertaining to the Mahābhasya I mentioned the traditional tendency in our discipline, which sometimes leads to the result that theories formulated in the 19th century have come to be accepted as facts, whereas equally strong but more recently formulated theories may be looked upon as reproachable speculation (P.1). Now it appears that Professor Albrecht Wezler has taken it upon himself to illustrate this observatlon (Wezler, 1994: 174-175 n. 3).
As is well known, Kielhorn had proposed a criterion for identifying prose vārttikas, sentences which are accompanied by an explanation which usually repeats their words, are vārttikas. In this connection I made the following observation (p. 3-4): "Of... interest in this context is Kielhorn's habit of adding an explanation (which in these cases is identical with the virttikas) wbere he thought that a certain phrase was a virttika, thus staying in agreement with his own criterion... (follow some instances )... In all these cases Kielborn has himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based! Of course, Kielborn has a theory to explain why many of his manuscripts do not treat presumed vårttikas as such: since the comment in the Bhasya is in these cases identical with the vārttika, scribes did not bother to repeat this, they added a figure 2, in which place later a stop came, which in its turn disappeared altogether from many manuscripts. This example shows, I think, very clearly the way of working of one of our illustrious predecessors in the last century. Kielhorn did not just report what he found in his manuscripts. On the contrary, he formulated a theory about the authorship of the different parts of his text, and on the basis of this theory he subsequently felt entitled to go to the extent of deviating from bis manuscriprs in some cases."
In spite of this, Wezler comments on this passage in the following manner: "As for Bronkhorst..., the manner he treats Kielhorn is quite unfair, to say the least. To accuse him of having, in certain cases of determining värttikas, "himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based ..., stands the facts on their heads. Anybody who has worked with, or even himself prepared the critical edition of a text in which vårttikas are embedded (no matter whether formulated by the author himself or representing the work of another author ) is familiar with the problem whether at particular places one is to assume a vārttika inspite of the absence of the usual subsequent paraphrase commentary explanation or not. And Kielborn, in the cases referred to by Bronkhorst, quite clearly states what the readings of the mss, are, i.e. that he thought an emendation necessary."
A major misunderstanding must underlie these remarks. To begin with, how can I treat Kielhorn unfairly, even accuse him, in a passage in which 1 praiso him? I have no difficulty whatever with Kielhoro's method, and find it rather an example of good and thorough scholarship. But apparently Wezler looks upon the use of theory as a weakness, which one should try to avoid. The result is that he tries to hide the theoretical aspect of philological work, and present the outcome as fact. Yet his own words betray that even the most painstaking editor of a text in which varttikas are embedded, some times has to assume a vārttika. Assuming is not fact, but theory. And a good assumption is still not fact, but is good theory. Modifying the quip one some times hears, to the extent that nothing is more practical than a good theory, one might say that nothing is as factual as a good theory. But a theory is a theory. And there is no way to change a phrase which Kielhora did not find in his manuscripts but yet added in his edition, into a fact as far as the manuscript evidence is concrned. Such phrases were added, created, by Kielhorn, whether one likes it or not. And theories always go beyond the evidence, because such is their nature. When, therefore, Wezler thinks that, in general, only new or more evidence calls for a new theory, he seems to imply that the same amount of evidence can accommodate only one theory, which is contrary to the very nature of theories,
• Kielborn, 1876. 10 I use this occasion to express my regrets about the numerous misprints which mar
Three Problems pertaining to the Mahābhasya; no proofs were ever sent to me. I also would like to express my agreement with Wezler's observation (1994: 182 n. 32) concerning my work on Khoika 1 of Bharthari's Mahabhasyadipika, which the title page describes as critically edited by Johannes Bronkhorst". Wezler raises the question; Would not critically reconstructed have been a more precise and honest-designation of the work actually done?" Unfortunately I had no voice in the sbaping of the title page. I have tried to somewhat rectify the wrong impression thus created in the first lines of my preface to this work: This so-called 'critical edition'... is no more, and can be no more, than an attempt to make sense of an often unistelligible text, handed down in one incomplete manuscript". I regret to see that these words have gone unnoticed.

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The reason for this doubt is simple : Patañjali refers in a similar context to the "middle" and the "end" of the Aştādhyāyl, and we have seen that this presumed middle is far removed from the real middle, and that the so-called end is not at the very end. It may here be added, that atha (in atha sabdanusasanam ) is a perfectly respectable beginning fo any work
Let me repeat once more here, to avoid any misunderstanding which this discussion might create, that I have no problems with Kielborn's criterion for identifying varttikas. In this respect I am therefore in full agreement with Wezler. Our disagreement concerns the application of this criterion. As it so happens, Kielhorn's criterion would identify as Värttikas three statements that precede what is traditionally held to be the first vārttika." There is, moreover, independent evidence that two of these three statements were not composed by Patañjali: one of thein he did not correctly understand, the other one he attributes to an (or the ) Acārya. Wezler does not, if I understand him correctly, contest these observations. He concludes from them, that these last two varttika-like statements may have been composed by one or more persons different from both Patañjali and Katyāyana. With regard to the third statement which is treated like a vārrtika -and which happens to be the very first line of the Mahabhasya: atha sabdanusasanam-Wezler (P. 173-174 n. 2) admits that there is a problem, then offers a solution which is "as simple as plausible": "Patañjali starts his critical examination and explanation of Paņini's rules and of Katyāyana's Värttika on them by repeating or quoting ... the very first words by which the study of grammar had much earlier been announced as a subject of instruction to those students whom Patañjali himself really or fictitiously) turns to now that they have gained a good grounding, i. e. know the Astādbyāyi and the Värttika by heart and understand much of what is said in the two works."
Summing up, Wezler makes some proposals which I would be the last to claim cannot be right. I do insist, however, that these proposals constitute just a theory, and not a particularly convincing one at that. When, then, Wezler asks th: rhetorical question "what is the use of formulating alleged new theories ?," all he does is illustrate my observation, repeated at the beginning of this appendix, to the extent that for some contemporary scholars theories formulated in the 19th century have come to be accepted as facts, whereas equally strong, but more recently formulated theories are looked upon as reproachable speculation.
These justifications for not ascribing the statements concerned to Katyāyana may look a bit ad hoc to those who have not already decided beforehand to agree with Wezler's position. The real reason, I believe, why Wezler looked so hard for alternative explanations, is that the first vārttika recognised by him begins with the word siddhe, and that Patañjali explains the purpose of this word as margalärtham "for the sake of something auspicious". Patañjali then adds that sciences that have something auspicious in the beginning (margaladini $ästräni) prosper. Pace Wezler, I do think that Patañjali is to be taken seriously as regards his contention that siddhe is marigalartha. What I am less convinced of, is that Patañjali's beginning refers necessarily to the very first word, in this case of Katyāyana's Värttika.
Reference Bronkhorst, Johannes (1987): Three Problems pertaining to the Mahabhasya,
Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. (Post-graduate and Research Departinent Series no. 30; "Pandit Shripad Shastri
Deodhar Memorial Lectures" (Third series ).) Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993): The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient
India. Second, revised edition. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass.. . Bronkhorst, Johannes (1994): "The qualities of Sankhya." Wiener Zeits:
chrift für die Kunde Südasiens 38 (Orbis Indicus; Festschrifit G.
Oberhammer), 309-322. Hinüber, Oskar von (1985): "Die Bestimmung der Schulzugehörigkeit
buddhistischer Texte nach sprachlichen Kriterien." In: Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur, Erster Teil, hrsg. Heinz Bechert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch
historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 149.) Pp. 57-75. Kielhorn, Franz (1876): Katyāyana and Patailjali: Their relationship to each
other, and to Panini. Bombay. Reprinted : Kleine Schriften I
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1969), pp. 1-64. Mahaparinirvanasūtra Das Mahaparinirvänasutra, Text in Sanskrit und
Tibetisch, veglichen mit dem Pāli nebst einer Übersetzung der chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Malasarvästivādins, auf Grund
11 Cp. Kiclhorn, 1876 : 26:"... Wherever in the Mahabhashya we meet with a paraphras
ed statement, of which Patanjali does not tell us explicitly that it belongs to another or to others, or of which the context does not prove clearly and beyond doubt that it is a quotation from the work of another, we shall regard ourselves as bound to assume that such statement is Katyayana's, or in other words, that it is a Värttika or part of one."

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Annals BORI, LXXV ( 1994) . von Turfan-Handschriften herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Enrst Waldschmidt. (Originally published in 1950-51.) Reprint : Rinsen Book, Kyoto, 1986. Pasadika, Bhikkhu (1985): "Ober die Schulzugehorigkeit der Kanon-Zitate im Abhidharmakosabhasya." In: Zur Schulzugehorigkeit von * Werken der. Hinayana-Literatur, Erster Teil, hrsg. Heinz Bechert. Gottingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Abhandlungen der Wissen. schaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 149.) Pp. 180-190. Patanjali: Vyakarana-Mahabhasya. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Third edition by K. V. Abhyankar. Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Insti tute. 1962-1972. Wezler, Albrecht (1994): "Once again on Patanjali's definition of a word (Studies in Patanjali's Mahabhasya )." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 38 (Festschrift G. Oberhammer), 173-189. Woodward, F.L., and Hare, E. M. (1954), Pali Tipitakam Concordance, part VI. London: Pali Text Society. Abbreviations Mbh Mahabhasya of Patanjali MPS Mahaparinirvanasutra Bi Raninian satra