Mimansa Chapter Of Bhavyas Madhyamaka Hrdaya Karika

Author(s): Shinjo Kawasaki
Publisher: Shinjo Kawasaki
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269268/1

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The Mīmāmsā Chapter of Bhavya's
Madhyamaka-hydaya-kārikā —Text and Translation
(1) Pūrva-paksa
Shinjo KAWASAKI
For a study of the theories and practices of the Brahmanical, as well as the non-Brahmanical, religious schools in India around the fifth century, the Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kārikā (hereinafter referred to as MHK) of Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka (490–570 ca.) and his auto-commentary Tarkajvālā (abridged as T]) provide much valuable information. In the following, the Mimāņsaka ideas quoted and refuted in Chapter IX: Mimāmsā-tattva-nirnaya-avatāra of MHK will be discussed on the basis of the Sanskrit text in collation with the Tibetan version and with reference to the Tibetan Tarkajvālā.
The Sanskrit text of the chapter in question was offered to me by Prof. V. V. Gokhale of Poona". It is a copy by Prof. Gokhale's own hand-writing from what Rev. Rāhula Sāmkstyāyana copied at șha-lu monastery in Tibet. As to the state of matters when Rāhula made the copy, he described as follows: “From the 5th August to 15th August (1936) we were busy with taking photographs of the important Sanskrit Mss. in $ha-lu-ri-phug. ... In the meantime, I and Mr. Abhaya Singh were engaged in copying Manorathanandin's commentary (of Pramāņa-vārttika). I also wanted to copy the Tarkajvālā, Vigraha-vyāvartani and Kşaņa-bhangadhyāya. I needed more photographic materials for which I sent many letters and telegrams, but I was not sure about their arrival. It was already the middle of August and after one month winter was to begin, so I could not calmly wait. I was very thankful to the custodians of Șha-lu and specially to my friend Ri-sur-lama, who permitted me to take all the four manuscripts with me to Gyan-tse.
Șha-lu monastery is a little more than one mile away from the road Shi-gar
1) This study is based on the Sanskrit text of the Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā offered by Prof. V. V. Gokhale. The present writer remains thankful to Prof. Gokhale's kind guidance at Poona, Oct. 1969-May 1970, at Tokyo, Nov. 1971-Mar. 1972, and to his generous permission for the use and publication of this material.
2) The Sanskrit text that Rāhula mentioned here under the title "Tarkajvālā" is apparently the basic verses of the Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā, and not the commentary generally known as Tarkajvälā. So far as is known, there is no extant Sanskrit text of the commentary Tarkajväla. From the Tibetan translation, it is known to be in prose and quite big in amount (about 340 leaves in Tibetan).
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筑波大学 哲学・思想学系論集
tse-to-Gyan-tse. On the 16th August we started for Gyan-tse where we arrived by
the evening of the 17th....
After receiving the required materials we left Gyan-tse on the 8th September on our way to Shi-gar-tse. The copying of the three Mss. was finished, so we returned them to the custodians on our way back to Shi-gar-tse. The Ms. of the Kṣaṇabhangadhyāya was yet to be finished, so I kept it with me and after copying it, returned it through a Nepalese friend."1)
The Sanskrit text of the Tarkajvālā (Madhyamaka-hṛdaya) thus copied by Rev. Samkṛtyāyana was ascribed to "Bhagavadviveka", written in Ramjana script, with 5 or 6 lines on each leaf, consisting of 24 leaves of the size 22×2 inches, and considered "complete(?)"." He also mentioned that it is a "worn out Ms., the page numbers are gone."")
Its Ninth Chapter begins from p. 21b, and ends on p. 25a of Rev. Samkṛtyāyana's copy. Rev. Samkṛtyāyana copied the text (so Prof. Gokhale followed his style faithfully), one Śloka on one line with verse numbers No. 1-No. 148.
When compared with the Tibetan editions of MHK (sDe dge bstan hgyur Dsa 31a-40a, hereinafter referred to as D31a; sNar than bstan hgyur Dsa 31a-39b; Peking bstan hgyur Dsa 34a-43a), the Sanskrit text of the Ninth Chapter of MHK differs in the following points:
i) The Tibetan verses not found in the Sanskrit text:
Between Verses No. 7 and No. 8, the Tibetan text of MHK has one extra verse which cannot be found in the Sanskrit text. What is more, Chapter IX of the Sanskrit text of MHK brought by Rev. Samkṛtyāyana counts 148 verses as a whole, whereas the Tibetan text has more than 160(?) verses for this chapter, and there are some parts in the Tibetan text where the usual set-form of a vèrse with four padas is not strictly observed (e.g. D305a1-5). All the verses thus augmented in the Tibetan text of MHK are explained in TJ as quotations from some other works.
ii) The Sanskrit verses not found in the Tibetan text:
Verses Nos. 2 and 5 of the Sanskrit MHK are not found in the Tibetan MHK. In the Tibetan TJ, however, both of these two verses are translated, not in a verse style, but in prose, and some of their words as paroksa, adṛṣṭa-lingasambandha, svarga, apurva, and so on, are elucidated by paraphrases. It is very probable, therefore, that those two verses not found in the Tibetan translation of
1) Rahula Sänkrityāyana: "Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Mss. in Tibet (with plates)", in Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 1 (1937, Patna), pp. 1-57.
2) Ibid., p. 48.
3) Ibid., p. 48, note.
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MHK are in the original Sanskrit MHK.
From the above-mentioned facts i) and ii), we can assume that originally there was the Tibetan translation of TJ only and not of MHK, and that the Tibetans of some later period extracted only verses from the Tibetan TJ and made an independent text of the Tibetan MHK out of it. For this reason, the verses quoted in the Tibetan TJ are mixed in the Tibetan MHK only because they are in verse style and the original verses in the Sanskrit MHK are not collected in the Tibetan MHK as they are translated in prose style in the Tibetan TJ.
Almost all the points that Bhavya quotes in this work as the assertion of the Mīmāmsakas are reiterated in a similar form and manner, in Santarakṣita's Tattvasamgraha (8th century) as the points of controversy between the Buddhist logicians and Kumārila of the Mīmāmsā School. None of the 17 verses in the Purvapakşa of MHK, however, can be actually found either in the Tattvasamgraha or Kumārila's Ślokavārtika.
The Mimāmsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kärikā
In Sabarasvamin's Bhasya on the Mīmāmsā-sūtra, "sabda-nityatva (ad MS. I, 1, 6-23)", "vākya-artha-prāmāṇya (ad MS. I, 1, 24-26)", and "veda-apauruşeyatva (ad MS. I, 1, 27-32)" are discussed, but few of its words or of its contexts are shared by Bhavya's 17 verses.
As it has been pointed by Prof. Hajime Nakamura, Verse No. 14 of MHK agrees with a few small changes with Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadiya I, 42. The Vakyapadiya (1, 30-42) where this verse is found is noteworthy as it is here that Bhartṛhari sets forth against the so-called logicians (hetu-vadin=tärkika) who put primary importance on reasoning, his traditionalist standpoint asserting the exclusive authority of the Vedas as the source of knowledge. This part of the Vakyapadiya shares in common many words and phrases with the Ninth Chapter of MHK, but . except for Verse No. 14 no other verses actually agree in these two works.
RS
VG
MHK
TJ
D
N
P
( )
[ ]
Abbreviations and marks
Rev. Rāhula Sāmkrtyāyana Prof. V. V. Gokhale
Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā
Tarkajvālā
sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka
sNar than edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka
Peking edition of Tibetan Tripitaka
Readings or additions by RS
Suggested readings or additions by the present writer
1) Hajime Nakamura: Kotoba-no Keijijō-gaku (Metaphysics of Language), in Japanese (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 159-162.
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(D31a7)
(N31a5)
(P34a7)
Verse No. 1:
navamaḥ paricchedaḥ mīmāmsã-tattva-nirṇayâvatāraḥ||
[dbu mahi sñin po las dpyod paḥi de kho na ñid gtan la dbab pa la ḥjug pa ste lehu dgu paho||]"
筑波大学 哲学・思想学系論集
Chapter IX: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts
eke 'pavarga-sanmärga-dhyāna-jñānâpavādinaḥ(|)
no tsha med pa kha cig ni| |(D31b)byan grol legs lam bsam gtan dan
Verse No. 2:
kriya-mātreņa tat-präpti[m] pratipadyânapatrapa[ḥ]||
ses la skur ḥdebs bya ba tsam| |bdag2) gis de ni hthob par sems]
śāstrôkta-vrihi-paśv-ajya-patnīsambandha-karmaṇaḥ|
nânyo margo 'pavargaya yukta ity ahur ägamat ||
Verse No. 3:
răgâdi-doşa-duşṭatvāt puruşasya vaco mṛṣā(1)
chags sogs skyon gyis ñams paḥi phyir skyes buḥi (P34b)tshig ni brdsun" ñid yin
vedo 'puruşa-kartṛtvä(t) pramāna [m iti gr]hyate||
rig byed skyes bus ma byas phyir| |des na tshad mar gzun bar bya
1) Supplied from D40a3.
2) N. P. dag
3) N. P. rdun
4) "The Mimämsakas, different from the Vedantins, are those who hold that what is revealed in the Vedas is self-existent and exclusively true, and who denounce all the right means of deliverance, that is, meditation and learning. By contradicting all the doctrinal expositions, they maintain that deliverance can be attained only by means of sacrificial rites; just like jugglers, they let their students dead to all sense of shame; by forty-eight Samskaras they qualify their followers for a Brahmaṇa. (TJ. D271a)" Then, TJ goes in details to an explanation of the forty-eight Samskaras: garbhadhāna (or ceremony to cause conception), pumsavana (or ceremony to cause the birth of a male child), simantonnayana (or arranging the parting of the pregnant wife's hair), jätakarman (or ceremony on the birth of the child), namakarana (or ceremony of naming the child), annaprāśana (or the first feeding), caula (or tonsure of the head of the child), and so forth. Among the extant Dharma-sastras, only the Gautama
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The Mimāmsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā
English Translation
Chapter IX: Introduction to the Examination of Truth of the Mimāmsā School
Verse No. 1: Some people are shameless, thinking little of the right means of deliverance, that is, meditation and learning, and asserting to attain it [=deliverance] only by means of sacrificial rites.
Verse No. 2: On the basis of the scriptual authority, they claim that except for the acts (of oblation] of grain, cattle and clarified butter, or the sexual union at the site of sacrifice as prescribed in the sacred literature, no other means is proper to lead people to deliverance.)
Verse No. 3: As it is contaminated by the defilments of passions and so forth, the human speech is bound to be false. The Veda, which is not produced by the human hands, should be accepted as the authority [of knowledge).
dharma-sūtra has the forty-eight Samskäras. (See Kane, P. V.: History of Dharmasastra, Vol. II, Pt. 1, p. 193) But, when examined carefully, the explanation in TJ does not agree with what is in the Gautama-dharma-sutra VIII, 14-24 (Anss. Edition p. 54; SBE Vol. II, p. 213f).
5) This verse cannot be found in the Tibetan MHK. TJ (D271b5f), however, describes minutely the acts of oblation and sexual union, quoting scriptual authorities: e.g. oblation of grain (TJ. D271b6); oblation of cattle (pasu-bandhana, aśva-medha, TJ. D271b7; purusa-medha, TJ. D272a1-2, cf. Tait. Br. II, 4, 1); oblation of clarified butter (ājya TJ. D272a2); sexual union at the site of sacrifice (patnisambandha, TJ. D272a3f, cf. Chand. Up. V, 8, 1; Sat. Br. 14, 9, 1; Bth. Up. VI, 2).
6) "Because men are subjected to passion, (anger), and nescience. This statement tries to prove one thing on the basis of another unconnected thing. For instance, as for the statement: On the bank of this river, there grows fruit', in hundred cases this statement is valid, whereas in other hundred cases, this statement is invalid." (TJ. D274b5) Translated on the basis of Peking edition (P31002)
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筑波大学 哲学・思想学系論集
Verse No. 4:
karttur asmaraṇāc cêsto vedo 'puruşa-kartṛkaḥ(1)
byed po mi dran par hdod phyir| |rig byed skyes bus ma byas la
sampradayânupacchedad āgamo 'sau tad-atyaye||
brgyud nas hons pa ma chad phyir| |des na lun yin de med na
Verse No. 5:
atyantâkşa-parokşe hi pratipattiḥ katham bhavet
adṛṣṭa-linga-sambandhe svargâpūrvâdi-vastuni ||
Verse No. 6:
nitya[h] śabdo dhvani-vyangyaḥ sambandho 'rthena nityataḥ|
sgra rtag2 dbyans kyis gsal bar byed don dan ḥbrel pa rtag pa ñid]
pratipattur yato 'rtheşu(?) pratipattiḥ prajāyate||
don la rtogs pa dan Idan la] [rtogs pa rab tu skye bar hgyur
1)
P. lo
2) N. P. brtag
3) "By Manu, Yajnavalkya, Vyasa, Vasistha and so on, by those sages, the Veda has been taught, but not composed by them. The words and styles of the Veda have been reproduced again and again by a series of ancient sages, and this lineage of transmission has never been interrupted; for this reason it is called Agama or traditional teaching." (TJ. D275a1)
4) Again the verse cannot be found in the Tibetan MHK, and it is paraphrased and commented in TJ. "Even though they are beyond the ken of human perception (Ikog tu gyur pa yin na yan), on the authority of the Agama it is understood that there is the Svarga (mtho ris ni yod do) and that there is the Apavarga (thar pa ni yod do). As the matters like Apurva have no connection with the marks and they are beyond the ken of perception by human senses, they are not seen; but by the verbal testimony of the Veda, it is known that they exist. Except for the authority of the Veda, there is no understanding of their existence. For this reason, the Veda is the sole source of knowledge." (TJ. D275a1-4). The compound "adrsta-linga-sambandha" should be taken to mean "even if its connection with marks is not perceived." Cf. "anena linga-linginoḥ sambandha-darśanam, linga-darśanam
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The Mimämsä Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika
Verse No. 4: As there is no recollection of its author, the Veda is claimed to be not a human product. And as there is no interruption in its transmission, this Veda is the sacred word. In its absence, ...3)
Verse No. 5: ... how can there be any understanding about the matters like Svarga (or heavenly bliss) and Apūrva (or the consequence of the unforeseen cause) and so on, which are beyond the ken of perception by the human senses and of which the connection with the marks is unrecognizable?"
Verse No. 6: The sound, which is eternal, is manifested by syllables. Its connection with object stands eternal. From that connection of word and object), understanding with regard to the object arises for one who understands."
cabhisambadhyate, linga-linginoḥ sambaddhayor darśanena linga-smptir abhisambadhyate, smptyā lingadarśanena câpratyakso'rtho'numiyate", NBh ad NS I, 1, 5, (p. 291). also TJ ad MHK Verse No. 9 (TJ. D276a3); Vrttikära: pratyaksato drsta-sambandha, sämänyato'drstasambandha, Keith: The KarmaMimamsa, p. 29.
5) "The Buddhists and the Vaiseşikas claim that the sound is not eternal. But this assertion betrays their thorough ignorance". (TJ. D275a4) "The word (sabda) stands eternal, and it is distinguished by the sounds (dhvani) which are produced by the positions (sthāna), the articulatory organs (karana) and the efforts (prayatna), and it is wrong to say that the sound is produced anew. Although the sound disappears immediately after its pronunciation, yet it is connected with the object indissolubly. In that sense, the sound is eternal. Just as the sound 'bull' is always connected with the object with a hump (kakuda) and a dewlap (sāsnā) and so on, from the sound itself which is indissolubly connected with an object the definite grasp of the object is produced. So it is wrong to say that the sound disappears. The sound is eternal and, for this reason, the sound is knowledge itself and it is the authority". (TJ. D275a5-7) Cf. sthana-karana (Vrtti ad Väkyap. I, 46); karanebhyo vivsttena dhvanină so'nugrhyate (Vakyap. I, 47); kakuda-säsna-adi, Mahabhäsya I, 1; Väkyap. II, 329.
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筑波大学
哲学・思想学系論集
Verse No. 7:
advi[h]pravṛtter abhyāsāt pratyabhijñāna (ta)s tatha()
lan cig hjug phyir goms pahi phyir| |phyis kyań śes phyir de bshin du
śabdavac" chrāvaṇatvād dhi nityaḥ śabdo 'vasiyate||
mñan bya yin phyir sgra ñid bshin| |sgra ni rtag par ses par bya|
Verse No. 7':
mnon sum rjes su dpag pa dan| |sgra las byun dan ñer hjal bcas
don gyis go dan dños (N31b)med paḥi gtan tshigs bsgrub bya sgrub par byed|2
Verse No. 8:
anumānāt prthak câsau pramāṇatvāt [t]ad-anyavat
ḥdi ni rjes dpag las tha dad| |tshad ma yin phyir gshan de bshin
ekânekârtha-vişaya-pratipattir athâpi vā||
yan na gcig dan du mahi yul| |rtogs par gyur pa ji bshin no
1) RS. śabdavic, corrected on the basis of Tib.
2) N. P. sgra dan byun dañ ñer hjal dan don gyi go daň dños med paḥi gtan tshigs sgrub bya sgrub par byed]
3) "(1) When the word 'bull' is articulated, immediately a conviction about an object with dewlap, tail, hemp, hoofs and horns is produced, and there is no need for its articulation for a second time. (2) By constant repetition, the Vedas are so well known that, even if not articulated, by association [the word] stays in mind in indissoluble connection with the object. (3) When in the past one is well known in association with a name [like Devadatta], and when that one appears in sight on a later occasion, then there is produced a recognition: 'That Devadatta is this'. (4) As it [the word] is always grasped by the auditory organ and never by other organs.
Here, 'sabda' is the subject (dharmin), 'nityatva' is the predicate (dharma), and the combination of the subject and the predicate is the proposition (paksa). 'Adviḥpravṛtter', 'abhyāsāt', 'pratyabhijñānatāḥ', and 'śrāvaṇatvāt' are four reasons. Sabdatvavat' is an example. Although bulls born and living in various places have a variety of color like 'dark-colored ox' or 'yellow ox', bull-ness [gotva] is observed in common in all those objects which are different one from another. Sabdatva or the common nature found in all words is the nature of eternality (nityatva). As it [=eternality] stands always in combination with the words, in this sense the word is called eternal. This can be known from the verbal testimony of the Vedas." (TJ. D275b1-6)
As to sabda and sabdatva, cf. "By word is meant the universal (äkṛti) of the word." Vrtti ad VakyaP. I, 23: Mahabhäşya I, p. 13. As to gauḥ: gotva, Cf. Sabara-bhasya ad MS. I, 1, 5 (tr. pp.
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The Mimamsa Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā
Verse No. 7: The word is ascertained to be eternal. Because of the reasons that it (=the word] should work only once, that it is repeated again and again, that it is recognized as such, and that it is in the realm of the auditory organ. Like wordness (sabdatvavat).)
Verse No. 7': Direct perception, inference, verbal testimony, together with resemblance, persumption, and non-existence—these [six] means of knowledge demonstrate what should be demonstrated."
Verse No. 8: This [Āgama) is different from inference. As it is another source of knowledge. Like other [Pramāņas) different from this [Āgama). Further, it produces an understanding about one [specific] object as well as many objects [in aggregation]."
18-22); ad MS. I, 3, 30-35 (tr. pp. 118-124); VākyaP. II, 365 (Abhyankar-Limaye ed); SDS pp. 307-308.
4) This verse is found in the Tibetan MHK only, and not in the Sanskrit MHK. TJ has this verse after the following sentence: "Again by Buddhists, it is claimed that Agama or the traditional teaching should be included in the category of inference, but this assertion is not right. Why?" (TJ. D275b5)
The Yukti-dipikā has this verse as an assertion of some who hold six Pramāņas: "tathā şad ity anye
pratyakşam anumanam ca sabdam côpamaya sahal
arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavah sādhya-sadhakāh" (Pandeya ed., p. 81) 5) "Āgama or verbal testimony is different from inference. As it is an independent source of knowledge. Like direct perception. Further, direct perception which is concerned in a particular (svalaksana) produces an understaning about one specific object while inference which is concerned in the universal (sāmānya-lakşaņa) produces an understanding about many objects in aggregation. In the same manner, Agama produces an understanding about one specific object like Apavarga as well as many objects like Svarga and others. For this reason, Agama has its sphere of activity different from that of inference. Like direct perception, it produces an understanding about one specific object, and at the same time, like inference it produces an understanding about many objects in aggregation." (TJ. D275b7-276a3) Here, TJ's allocation of eka for a pavarga, and aneka for svarga and others is not clear. We cannot find any similar idea in other works so far. About what is denoted by Agama, universals and individuals, cf. Tantravārtika ad MS. I, 1, 33 (tr. pp. 363-365).
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Verse No. 9: adssta-linga-sambandha-padārtha-mati-hetutaḥ(1)" |rtagsa) dan ḥbrel pa ma mthon bahi||dňos don blo yi rgyu phyir ram
bhinna-gocara-dhi-janma-kāraṇatvād athậpi vā|| Iyan na tha dad blo skye bahi||rgyur gyur pa ñid yin phyir rol
Verse No. 10: apūrvo 'pi kriya-vyamg(?ya)h” kriya-mokse 'pi sādhanam Isňon med pa yan bya bas gsal thar pahan bya bas sgrub par byed
soma-pänâdikā vidvā[n] nirj[ayed a]"ntakam yayā|| mkhas gan zla bahi btun sogs kyis Imthar byed pa las nes par rgyal|
Verse No. 11: deva-rşi-juşta[m] śiştêştam purāņam vartma sobhanam dran sron lhas bsten dam pas ḥdod llam rñin bzan po rig don ḥdit
vedârtha-bāhyaiḥ strī-śūdrai[r] yuktam yat tyajyate trayill [phyi rol dmans rigs bud med gzugs| |hdsin pas rigs Idan gsum ḥdi spans
1) Tib. "deủi rgyuḥi no bor gyur pa yin pahi phyir" (TJ. D276a5) suggests "-hetutvāt" instead of "-hetutah".
2) N. P. rtag 3) RS. -vyamga4) RS. nirjäya...ntakam yayā 5) RS. śiştêştām 6) Tib. MHK and TJ suggests a reading: "vedarthah bāhyaiḥ...". 7) Added on the basis of "mtho ris la sogs pahi dños pohi don gyiņo (TJ. D276a4)"
8) Although TJ gives no explanation about "bhinna-gocara-dhi", it is presumable that it refers, just as Verse No. 8, to both of the particular (svalaksana) and the universal (sāmānyalaksaņa). Cf. "tha dad paņi spyod yul can gyi blo dag skye baủi rgyur gyur pa yin". (TJ. D276a6)
9) "Apurva bears a meaning of Dharma. It is manifested through the acts of sacrifice and others.
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The Mimämsä Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā
Verse No. 9: As it is the cause of cognition about the matter (like Svarga]", of which the connection with the marks is not perceived, and as it is the cause of emergence of the cognitions which have different spheres of activity, [Agama is another source of knowledge different from inference.8)
Verse No. 10: Even Apūrva is materialized by the acts of sacrifice. Even for deliverance, the means of achievement is the sacrificial rites like Soma-taking and so on, by which a wise man wins a victory over death."
Verse No. 11: This good, old, and reasonable way, which is favored by gods and sages and pursued by the wise—this three-folded way—is discarted by those outsiders of the Veda-content, by those in shape of women, slaves, and Buddhists. 10)
Through this act materializing Apūrva, even deliverance (Mokşa) is achieved. What is the reason? By means of the sacrificial rites which are marked by the act of Soma-taking and others, the Yogin wins a victory over death and becomes immortal. It is just as said [in the Veda): 'Having taken Soma, [we) become immortal. [We are embodied in the unborn wisdom. Thus [we) become the knower of the Veda'." (TJ. D276a7-276b2) Cf. "apāma somam amstă abhüma," RV. VIII, 48, 3.
10) "This way) was favored by Brahma and other gods and by sages like Gärgya, Vasiştha and others, and pursued by the wise, intelligent people as it is authentic. It is old as it has been in existence for a long span of time. It is a way as it leads people. It is good as it gives pleasure. It is reasonable as it agrees with logical reasoning. The content of the Veda--this three-folded way -is discarted by those outsiders in shape of women, slaves, and Buddhists. The Sáma-, Yajur., and Atharva-Vedas form the three-folded way (trayi), in which the benefits of all living beings are accumulated and which is the basis of all the philosophical doctrines." (TJ. D276b3)
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Verse No. 11: yad ihâsti tad anyatra yan néhâsti na tat kvacit(1) |ḥdi la gan yod gshan la yod|lḥdi la gan med hgah lahan min
catusţaye'pi dharmâdau ta[n nai])vânyatra dřśyate chos la sogs pa bshi po yaň| |de ñid gshan naħań mthon ba min|
Verse No. 13: düşayitvā trayi[-]märgam hetubhir hetuvādinaḥ(1) Igtan tshigs smra bas gtan tshigs kyis| lam gsum po ni sun ḥbyin tel
anumāna-pradhānatvāt [sva]-nayam” dyotayanti ye|| Irjes su dpag pa gtsor gyur phyir| |ran gi lugs ni gsal byed gan
.
Verse No. 14: pāda-sparsād iv[ândhānām visame]” pathi dhāvatām(1) llon ba rkan" paḥi tshod dpags kyis |ñam nahi lam du rgyug pa Itar|
anumāna-pradhānānām pātaḥ teşām na durlabhaḥ|| Irjes su dpag(D32a) pa gtsor ḥdsin rnams||ltun bar dkah ba ma yin no
1) RS. tad evânyatra, corrected on the basis of Tib. 2) RS. praghătatvāt sa(? sva)nayam 3) RS. päda-sparśad ivaddha...vişaye 4) P. lon ba rgad paņi
5) "Whatever is here, in the Veda, for instance, the group of four, Dharma-kama-artha-mokşa is in all other philosophical doctrines, too. What is not found in Veda, on the other hand, is not in any other heretical teachings, either. So, the foundation for the group of four, Dharma-kamaartha-mokşa, is supplied only by the Veda." (TJ. D27666)
A set formula similar to this verse can be found in the opening part of the Mahabharata: "What we find in this book relating to morals, relating to practical life, relating to sensual pleasure and relating to salvation, can be found elsewhere; but what is not written therein, can be found nowhere else in the world.
dharme cârthe ca kāme ca mokşe ca bharatarsabha
yad ihästi tad anyatra yan néhästi na tat kvacit (MBh. I, 56, 83) W. S. Sukthankar ed., Vol. 1, Adiparvan Pt. I (Poona, 1933), p. 244; Cf. M. Winternitz: History of Indian Literature, Vol. 1 (2nd ed. Delhi, 1972), p. 326.
6) "What is known as the Three-folded Way cannot be set aside through logical reasoning. As it is said as follows: As the Dharma of those endowed with love and learning,
with its auxilaries, gives nourishments to reasoning, The completion of the Four (dharma-kama-artha-mokşa)
could not be pursued by logical reasoning.' Some people, logicians, go too far in this direction. Those people, who try to establish their own theories by means of refutation of the Three-folded Way, do not believe what they have before their
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Page #13

The Mimämsä Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā
Verse No. 12: What is here is in others and what is not here cannot be found in any other, either. The group of four, beginning with the Dharma, could not be found in any other."
Verse No. 13: Logicians, who put primary importance on inference, explain their standpoint, by setting aside the Three-folded Way through logical reasoning.)
Verse No. 14: Falling is not unlikely in the case of those who put primary importance on reasoning, as in the case of blind men who walk along a precipice by groping the way with their feet."
eye." (TJ. D277a1-3)
We cannot trace the source of the verse quoted here in TJ. However, a severe criticism on the logicians (tarkika) who put primary importance on inference (anumāna-pradhāna) or logical reasoning (hetuvāda) and who think little of the tradition (agama) can be found in VākyaP. I, 32; 34; 35; 38; 41; 42. E.g. "Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones."
yatnenanumito 'py arthaḥ kušalair anumatybhiḥ|
abhiyuktataraįr anyair anyathaivôpapadyatel (VākyaP. I, 34); Iyer tr. p. 45. "One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the I-consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning."
caitanyam iva yaś câyam avicchedena vartate
āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyatel (VakyaP. I, 41); Iyer tr. p. 50. 7) "Just as blind men who with the touch of their feet grope the way out of a precipice, logicians (hetu-vādin) who rely on inferencial reasoning only are difficult to defend themselves from falling down. For this reason we do not accept the logicians as the authority of knowledge." (TJ. D277a3-4).
This verse, with a slightest change, can be found in VākyaP. I, 42, where the logicians are severely criticized. See Note (5) for Verse No. 13.
hasta-sparśād ivândhena visame pathi dhāvatā|
anumāna-pradhänena vinipāto na durlabhah| VäkyaP. I, 42. This verse in the form "pāda-sparśad..." can be found in Bhavya's Prajñā-pradipa (tsha, P153bl). See Y. Ejima: "Idea of Āgama by Bhāvaviveka" (in Japanese), IBK Vol. XVII, No. 2, (March 1969), P. 893.
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Verse No. 15: na câsti kaścit sarvajño nêdānim drśyate yatah(1) |hdi na" hgaḥ yan kun mkhyen med Igan phyir ḥdi ni ma mthon phyir
sarvajñatā hi buddhasya kalpitā loka-paktaye" || thams cad mkhyen par sans rgyas lal |brtags pa hjig rten gus byahi phyir|
Verse No. 16: apramāņam vaco bauddham kệtakatvät tad-anyavat(1) sans rgyas gsun yan tshad ma min byas pahi phyir na gshan bshin nol
asarvajñaś ca sambuddhaḥ puruşatvāt tad-anyavat |rdsogs paņi(P35a) sans rgyas kun mkhyen min skyes bu yin phyir gshan bshin no
Verse No. 17: apramānam vaco bauddham trayi-düşana-darśanāt| sans rgyas gsun ni tshad ma min||lta ba gsum po sun hbyin phyir
.
yad yathôktam [tjathôktam (tad ya]thā nagnâd[i] darśanam" | lji ltar gan smra de de ltar! Igcer bur rgyu baḥi Ita ba bshin|
1) N. P. ḥdi ni 2) bhaktaye? 3) D. yin, changed on the basis of N. P. 4) RS. yad yathoktam yathoktam...thā nagnādadarśanam
5) "If the logicians are claimed as the source of knowledge by introducing the idea of an omniscient being (sarvajñatva), (such an assertion should be refuted by Verse No. 15.) ... At present, there is no omniscient being. As it is not empirically perceived. Like a son of a barren woman. And a theory which advocates the omniscience of the Buddha is not right. As such a theory is taught for a purpose of winning public confidence. As it is taught with an intention: 'When people hear that the Buddha is an omniscient being, they will place their trust in us-Buddhists.'" (TJ. D277a4-7).
Refutation of the Buddhist Jain idea of Sarvajña was made in a thorough-going way by Kumarila of the Mimämsä School. Controvertial discussion between him and the Buddhist logicians are recorded in Säntarakṣita's Tattvasamgraha and much later in Ratnakirti's Sarvajñasiddhi. See K. B. Pathak: "Kumärila's Verses Attacking the Jain Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient Being", ABORI, Vol. XII, Pt. II (1931, Poona), pp. 123-131; B. Frauwallner: “Kumärila's Bșhațţika," WZKSO. Vol. VI, (Wien, 1963), pp. 78-90; E. A. Solomon: "The Problem of Omniscience (Sarvajñatva)." The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XXVI, Pts. 1-2, (May 1962, Madras), pp. 36-77; N. J. Shah: Akalanka's Criticism
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Page #15

The Mimāmsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikā
Verse No. 15: And there is no omniscient being. As such a person is not perceived at present. The omniscience of the Buddha is advocated with an intention of winning public confidence.)
Verse No. 16: The words of the Buddha is not a right source of cognition. As they are what is produced. Like those other than [the words of the Buddha). The Enlightened One is not an omniscient being. As he is a human being. Like those other than [the Enlightened One].
Verse No. 17: The words of the Buddha are not a right source of cognition. As they hold a view of setting aside the Three-folded [Veda). Anything which is like the abovementioned [view setting aside the Three-folded] is like the above-mentioned (=not a right source of cognition]. Like the view of the Naked (Jains]."
End of the Purva-paksa or the Opponent's View in . the Ninth Chapter of the Madhyamaka-hựdaya-kārikā
.
of Dharmakirti's Philosophy: A Study, (Ahmedabad, 1967); S. Kawasaki: "Is There a Man Who Can Know the Dharma?", in Japanese), Essays on Buddhist Dharma Dedicated to Dr. Akira Hirakawa, (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 267-289.
6) "As both are common in being what is produced, like the words of the nihilists (Uccheda-vädin), the words of the Buddha cannot be accepted as a right source of cognition. As they are common in being a human being, like any other princes, the Buddha cannot be accepted as an omniscient being. This is what is meant by the verse." (TJ. D277b1-2)
7) ""The words of the Buddha' is the subject (dharmin). "Being not a right source of cognition is the predicate (dharma). The combination of the subject and the predicate is the proposition (pakşa). As they set aside the Three-folded' is the reason. 'The view about the Three-folded' is the meaning of 'trayi-darśana' or the 'Three Theories (siddhānta)'. As they set aside these three theories, they are called 'trayi-darśana-dūşaņāt. Any one in which the three-folded view is set aside is not a right source of cognition. "Like the view of the Jains' is an example. ..." (TJ. D277b2-4). Here in TJ. the compound "trayi-düşana-darśanat" is explained to mean "trayi-darśana düşanāt", and "trayi-darsana" to mean "Three Siddhāntas". But, this explanation is not acceptable. "Trayi" here should mean the "Three Vedas” as in Verse No. 13.
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*
* .
*
*
P. S.: The present writer would like to express his gratitude to Prof. J. W. de Jong and Prof. Masaaki Hattori for their valuable suggestions and comments on his readings and decipherment of the MHK. in his article "Bhavya no tsutaeru Mimāmsā Shiso (Some Mimämsä Ideas Known to Bhavya)", (in Japanese), Essays on Indian Thoughts and Buddhism Dedicated to Dr. Hajime Nakamura, (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 71-86.
There is a project to make a joint study of the Tarkajvālā on the basis of its Tibetan versions and the Sanskrit MHK. under the supervision of Prof. V. V. Gokhale and Prof. Hajime Nakamura. The present writer, informed of this project from Prof. Nakamura this spring, is most willing to take a part.
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Some Problems of John Dewey's Theory of History
Hideyo YAMADA
The writer tries to analyse Dewey's theory of history under the following four aspects: 1. temporal and spacial phases of existence (text: "Logic-The Theory of Inquiry", Chap.
XII.), 2. self-objectification of human existence (text: "Experience and Nature", Chap. III.), 3. nature and history (text: same as above), 4. history and individuality (text: Dewey's article, 'Time and Individuality').
And the writer's main aim is to show that Dewey's theory of history is to be understood to have the following four features:
1. he employs a pluralistic and indeterminate theory of history instead of the monistic his.
torical theory of developmental stages, 2. the agent of historical development is not nations as in Hegel, but the individual who
is existentially free and the story of whose development means history in itself, 3. his theory may be called an evolution theory of history, and furthermore it might be,
probably, said to have the nuances of an Existentialist theory, and finally, 4. some criticisms of Dewey that have been presented to assume that he has a pragmatic
view of history seem not to be entirely correct, because his problem is not confined to why we learn history but is chiefly concerned with the ontological structure of history itself.
Plato's Magnesian State: an interpretation of the Laws
Mie IKEDA
• The Laws is not an appendix to Plato's thinking, but the culmination of his entire philosophy, especially his philosophy of state, of education, of morals and of religion. It is not an imaginative theory of a failed politician, but a practical program of social reform by a philosopher whose eyes penetrated deeply the morbidity of his time. Historical Greek city-states have disappeared, but his criticism of Athenian democracy and his principles of the reconstruction of the state are still of much importance even to us Japanese. His problems are our prob. lems. Was Plato, as a true disciple of Socrates, a defender of political freedom, and was his perennial attack on democracy his desperate endeavour to save freedom from utter ruin, or was he, as some critics say, an enemy of democracy, and did he sacrifice freedom to the altar of morals and state? Concerning his political philosophy very few of his interpreters are impartial. They are either passionately favourable to him or passionately hostile to him. In this article I tried as much as I can to let Plato speak for himself. I examined in detail his proposals of administrative and judicial reforms, what elaborate devices he made to protect his state against the unbridled sovereignty of the people on the one hand, and against the abuse by the magistrates of their executive and judicial powers on the other the procedures of election, the scrutiny and the audit, the reciprocal check of the magistrates, the functions of the guardians of the laws and the nocturnal council.
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Blaise Pascal et Port-Royal (I)
Katsuhisa IZUKA
Depuis sa première conversion en 1646, Pascal s'était mis en rapport avec le milieu de PortRoyal. C'est pourquoi ceux qui s'intéressent à sa pensée, surtout religieuse, sont invités à tenir le plus grand compte de l'histoire de Port-Royal et du jansenisme. Ayant déjà fait une brève étude sur la situation historique du jansenisme (Voir: Le jansenisme et l'Abbaye de Port-RoyalLeur rôle dans la pensée moderne-, La Pensée, janvier 1976), nous traitons dans le présent article des solitaires de Port-Royal et de leur attitude à l'égard du cartesianisme.
En premier lieu, nous considérons la présence des solitaires à Port-Royal comme très importante non seulement dans l'histoire de cette fameuse Abbaye, mais aussi dans celle de la pensée moderne. La plupart d'entre eux étaient, avant de quitter le monde, des personnes relativement haut placées, c'est-à-dire des ecclésiastiques, des théologiens, des avocats, des médecins ou des gentilshommes etc. Ils abandonnèrent leur fonction sociale sous l'influence de l'abbé de SaintCyran, directeur des religieuses de Port-Royal, et là se consacrèrent à la lecture ou à la traduction de la Sainte Bible, à la méditation, à la prière, au travail manuel et aussi à l'enseignement dans les petites écoles de Port-Royal. Selon Augustin Gazier, auteur de l'Histoire générale du mouvement janseniste, «c'était une association de personnes de piété, groupées en petit nombre pour travailler simultanément, chacun dans sa sphère, à la grande affaire de leur salut. Point de chef auquel on dut obéir, point de voeux, pas même de résidence obligatoire.»
Il nous semble que cette tendance, pour ainsi dire individualiste, dans leur attitude devant Dieu et le monde, leur a permis de se rapprocher du cartesianisme. C'est le deuxième point dont nous voulons traiter dans le présent article. Bien que la prospérité du cartesianisme à PortRoyal pendant la dernière moitié du 17° siècle, dont parlent Antoine Adam et d'autres auteurs, puisse signifier «le changement de qualité de Port-Royal», nous croyons qu'il ne faut pas nécessairement considérer ce phénomène sous l'aspect négatif. Dans le cas contraire, est-il possible d'expliquer suffisamment comment le cartesianisme a gagné une si rapide victoire sur Port-Royal qui se montrait pourtant résolu dans la lutte contre les jésuites ?
Enfin, ce que nous venons de dire nous conduira à une autre question: comment doit-on considérer le rapport entre la pensée de Pascal et le cartesianisme ? D'une part, on pourrait répondre tout de suite que leur opposition est radicale, en se souvenant des controverses avec le Père Noël en 1647, du «Mémorial» au temps de sa soi-disant conversion définitive ou de quelques fragments hostiles à Descartes dans les Pensées. D'autre part, on sait que la tentative de les rapprocher jusqu'à un certain point n'est pas impossible, comme l'a fait Michel Le Guern dans son livre si intéressant Pascal et Descartes. Quant aux Pensées par exemple, on constatera assez facilement que les fragments critiquant Descartes (frs. 84, 553, 887, 1001 etc.) sont dans les papiers non classés excepté le fragment 84. De plus, ce qui importe le plus dans ce cas, c'est que le fragment 84 ait été rayé par Pascal. Au contraire, dans les papiers classés se retrouvent presque tous les fragments qui font de la pensée l'attribut essentiel de l'homme, qui insistent sur la dignité de la pensée humaine, ou qui suggèrent que les animaux sont de pures machines (frs. 105, 111, 118, 200, 759 etc.). Ces remarques ne sont évidemment qu'une simple allusion au problème, mais celle-ci nous obligerait à examiner le rapport entre Descartes et Pascal sous divers aspects.
En nous fondant sur ce que nous avons résumé ci-dessus, nous voudrions examiner plus en détail la pensée de Pascal par rapport à Port-Royal.
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Page #19
A Study on the Historical Character of the Ippen () Teachings (1) Kiyoshi HIROKAMI At the end of the Kamakura period, the Ippen Teachings were formed under the influence of Zen-Buddhism, Esoteric Buddhism, Shintoism, especially of the Honji-Suijaku (* ) Theory. In the Honji-Suijaku Theory, the native Japanese gods (Jingi, WT) are considered to be manifestations (Suijaku) of the true nature (Honji) of various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The purpose of this study is to trace historically the formation of the Ippen Teachings, in particular the Honji-Suijaku Theory. - 19 -