Mimamsa Versus Vaisesika

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269531/1

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JOHANNES BRONKHORST, Lausanne
MIMAMSA VERSUS VAISEȘIKA Parthasarathi and Kumārila on the Creation and Dissolution of the World"
In a recent publication Peri Sarveswara Sharma (1994: 60) draws attention to a passage in Pärthasarathi Misra's commentary Nyayaratnakara on Kumarila Bhatta's Slokavärttika, where the former, so he claims, summarises the views of Prasastapāda, author of the Padarthadharmasangraha, better known as Prasastapädabhäṣya. Parthasarathi's passage occurs under verse 66 of the chapter called "Sambandhākṣepaparihara", and reads as follows1:
vaiseşikäs av ahuḥ: anadir ayam sṛṣṭipralayapravahaḥ, brahmamänena varşaśatante bhagavato maheśvarasya samastajagatsamharecchā bhavati, tadicchavadīśvaratmasamyogat paramäṇuşu vibhāgakarmāṇy utpadyante, tais ca sarveșu mitho vibhakteşu yavad dvynukam sarvävayavinasad paramänava eva kevalaḥ pārthiväpyataijasavāyaviya vyomakäladigätmamanāmsi cavatiṣṭhante, dharmadharmaś ca tavantam kalam ifvarecchāpratibaddhaḥ phalam aprayacchantas teṣu teşv atmasv avatisthante, punas tavati käle gate tasyaiva bhagavataḥ karmopabhogasünyan atmano dṛṣṭvā anukampäparavaśasya sisṛkṣa bhavati, tataḥ sisṛksavadisvaratmasamyogät paramäņuşu karmotpattes tadvasän mithaḥ samyuktais tair dvyanukadikramenņa pṛthivyadaya arabhyante, tatas tadicchavasad evapagatapratibandhair abhivyaktasämarthyair vividhaiḥ karmabhir vividhänekanarapaśvädibhedabhinnam bhutajätam ärabhyate, tataḥ sa eva maheśvaro dharmädharmapratipadanaya vedän srjati | tad evam pratisargam anye 'nye ca vedaḥ, pravahatas tu vedäḥ srstipralayas canadayaḥ, karta ca maheśvaro 'nädir eva, iha ca paramāṇūnām upādānatvän nänupädänatvam srster iti
*I thank Gerdi Gerschheimer for help and advice. NYR 5.15.66, pp. 465-466.
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Parthasārathi does not say that he here summarises the views of Prasastapāda. It is however true that the Padarthadharmasangraha contains a passage which in its contents is close to the above one. The relevant parts of it reada:
ihedānim caturnam mahābhūtānām srstisamhåravidhir ucyate I brdhmena mānena varşašatante [...) maheśvarasya samjihirsāsamakalam Sartrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakanām sarvātmagatanám adrstnam vrttinirodhe sati mahesvarecchātmānusamyogajakarmabhyah Sarfrendriyakaranānuvibhdgebhyas tatsamyoganivsttau teşām āparamanvanto vināšahtarha prthivyudakajvalanapavanandm api mahābhūtānam anenaiva kramenottarasminn uttarasmin sati pürvasya parvasya vind sah I tatah pravibhaktah paramänavo 'watisthante dharmadharmasamskårdnuviddhas catmānas tāvantam eva kälam tatah punah präninám bhogabhataye maheśvarasisykşdnantaram sarvdtmagatavsttilabdhadrspeksebhyas tarsamyogebhyah pawanaparamdnusu karmotpattau tepam parasparasamyogebhyo dvyanukadiprakramena mahant wdyuh samutpann an etc.
There can be no doubt that Pärthasarathi's account contains much that is also found in the Padarthadharmasangraha. It even looks as if Parthasärathi misinterpreted a compound used by Prasastapāda. The latter's passage contains the ambiguous expression mahesvarecchátmánusamyogajakarmabhyah. The part mahesvarecchätmanusamyoga means, according to the commentators: "the desire of God and contact (or: the contacts) between the souls and the atoms". The whole expression mahesvareccharmanusamyogajakarma must therefore mean:"movements arisen from the desire of God and contact between the souls and the atoms". Parthasärathi's passage, on the other hand, has the phrase tadicchawadiva ratmasamyogāt paramanusu vibhāgakarmány utpadyante: "movements of separation arise in the atoms as a result of contact between God characterised by that desire on the one hand and the souls on the other". It is hard to imagine that such a position was ever held by a Vaišeşika. But it is conceivable that this position was ascribed to the Vaišeşikas as a result of a careless reading of the ambiguous expression mahesvarecchätmapusamyoga. Grammatically this could mean "contact between the desire of
God, the souls, and the atoms". As stated above, such an interpretation does not easily fit into Vaiseșika doctrine.
Do we have to conclude from all this that Pärthasarathi here summarises, i.e. reformulates in his own words, the passage from the Padarthadharmasangraha? Or did he have another source, which he perhaps quotes verbatim? It is to be observed that, in spite of the similarities, there are also some important differences between Parthasarathi's passage and the Padarthadharmasangraha. It is known that the Vedāntin Sankara was acquainted with a Vaiśesika account of the creation of the world different from that in the Padarthadharmasarlgraha, and which most probably belonged to the earlier, but now lost, Karandi of Rāvana". Is it possible that Parthasarathi, too, used that text?
This possibility can be discarded. Rāvana's Katandi did, to be sure, contain an account of the creation of the world and probably one of its destruction), but one in which there was no place for a creator God. Indeed, Sankara criticises it for this very reason. Prasastapäda may have been the first Vai esika author to introduce the notion of a creator and destroyer) God.
What about Prasastapāda's Tikä on the katandi, which has not been preserved either? Is it possible that Parthasarathi used a Vaiseşika account of the creation and destruction of the world which he found in that text? Are the elements recorded by Parthasarathi that have no parallels in the Padārthadharmasangraha to be explained as borrowings from Prasastapāda's Tika?
We will see that this too is highly improbable. Parthasarathi attributes to the Vaišeşikas an idea which they are unlikely to have held. It is the idea that God interrupts the workings of karmic retribution at the time of cosmic dissolution, and ends this interruption at the time of renewed creation. We will discuss this point below.
First we consider the following. Pārthasārathi's presentation of the alleged Vaiseșika position introduces a passage in the Slokavārttika in which the notion of a creator God is criticised. It is therefore conceivable that it - or at least the parts that talk about God interrupting karmic retribution - has been composed to fit the verses of Kumārila's text. Soon after this account Pärthasărathi introduces a verse of the Slokavirttika with the words: "Concerning what has been said to the extent that deeds do not bear fruit because they are interrupted by the desire of God, (Kumarila) says". And
2 WI pp. 9-10,89 57-58.
> Vy I p. 98, 1. 3.4: mahervarecha nimittakaranam, dimanam anubhih samyogar ca asamadyikäranamki p. 62, 1. 8: mahefvarecchaya sahitd ye diminusāmyogik: Ny p. 130. 1. 9. mahesvarasyeccha cāmānusamyogaf ceti vigrahah..
Bronkhorst 1996. For information about the Katandi, see Bronkhorst 1993.
NyR p. 466, k 21: yar raktam ifvarecchápratibaddhardt karmani na phalantini, tatriha.
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the process of karmic retribution. Kumärila's text speaks about cosmie dissolution as an activity, most probably an activity of Prajapati, and there is no reason whatsoever to assume that God's desire played a special role in this event.
This impression is confirmed by the fact that God's desire does enter the picture in Kumarila's then following account of renewed creation. God's desire is here presented, hypothetically, as the cause of karmic retribution, and is indeed contrasted with activity. The verses concerned read:
karianam wapy abhivyaktau kim nimittam tada bhaver || 71 | iśvarecchd yadisyate saiva syal lokakaranam ! Isvarecchavafirve hi nisphala karmakalpanā || 72 11 na canimittaya yuktam utpattum hrsvarecchaya yad wd tasya nimittam yar tad bhutanam bhavisyati || 73 ||
after that same verse he resumes: "But there is no proof that all deeds, without giving results have been interrupted by the mere desire of God". May we conclude that already Kumārila ascribed to the Vaišeşikas the idea that God's mere desire interrupts the working of karma?
This is far from obvious. Kumarila does not mention God's desire, nor indeed anyone else's, in the context of the destruction of the world (which he does not accept). Quite on the contrary, he speaks of a deed (karman) of Prajāpati. The verses concerned read as follows':
pralaye 'pi pramanam nah sarvocchedatmake na hil na ca prayojanam tena syat prajapatikarmana || 68 II na ca karmavatam yukta sthitis tadbhogavarjital karmäntaraniruddham hi phalam na sydr kriyantardt 1169 1 sarvesdm tu phalapetam na sthanam upapadyate! na cdpy anupabhogo 'saw kasyacit karmanah phalam |70 | aśeşakarmanāse va punah srstir na yujyate! This means: 68. For we have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal destruction. And that activity (karman) on the part of Prajapati would serve no purpose. 69. Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity (karmavat) would stop without experiencing (the results of] those (activities); for the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by another activity (karman). 70. The coming to a stop of all [beings without [experiencing the fruits (of their activities) is not possible. And nor is that absence of experience itself the fruit of any activity (karman). 71ab. Alternatively, in case all activities (karman) have been destroyed, no new creation is possible.
This passage repeatedly uses the word karman, a notoriously difficult term to translate. It means primarily activity, but can also refer to the mechanism that brings about karmic retribution. In the case of Vaišeşika this means that dharma and adharma, or adrsta, might conceivably be referred to by this term. It certainly never refers to the desire of God, especially not if, as Pärthasarathi maintains, God's desire interferes with
71cd. Or if you maintain that) activities manifest themselves (anew at the occasion of a new creation], what would cause this? 72. If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. For it would be pointless to imagine the efficacy of actions (karman) if (the creation of the world] is controlled by God's desire. 73. Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having itself a cause, or rather, the cause of that (desire) will be the cause of the creation of living beings.
God's desire, then, is introduced in the discussion of the creation of the world, but plays no role in its dissolution. Kumärila's opponents rather looked upon the destruction of the world as due to the activity of Prajapati. There is nothing typically Vaišeșika in this part of the discussion.
Parthasarathi, on the other hand, uses this passage as a pretext to ascribe a certain position to the Vaišesikas. To understand what is at stake, some general reflections are called for.
The notion of a creator God had been introduced into Vaišeşika (perhaps by Prasastapāda) for a special reason. It solved a problem which had occupied the thinkers of that school. It answered the question how deeds of living beings can bring about situations that punish or reward them. In other words, it helped to understand the mechanism of karmic retribution. Earlier Vaišeşikas had tried to solve this problem differently. They had claimed that deeds and their retributions are linked through the
NyR p. 466. 1. 24-25: sarvakarmanăm tu phalam adadatam Ifwarecchâmātrena pratibaddhānām avasthanam apramanakam iri.
7 SIV 5.15.68-71ab.
Śiv 5.15. 7cd-73.
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intermediary of two qualities of the soul, dharma and adharma. The soul of each living creature being omnipresent and eternal, these qualities could be thought of as acting at a distance, and at a moment of time far removed from the deed that had caused them. However, foresight and conscious design could not be attributed to these qualities. These were rather linked to other qualities of the soul - such as buddhi 'knowledge' - that are not involved in the mechanism of karmic retribution. How then can these unconscious qualities act as if guided by foresight and conscious design?
The answer proposed by Prasastapāda is simple. They are guided by foresight and conscious design. There is an all-powerful creator God who arranges things in such a way that dharma and adharma bring about the desired results. The following passage from the Padarthadharmasangraha shows this:
When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg (mahad andam) is formed, caused solely by God's (maheśvara) meditation / volition (abhidhydna), out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth". In it (God) creates Brahma, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all worlds (sarvalokapitāmaham brahmanam), and all worlds; he then enjoins him with the duty of creating living things. That Brahma, thus enjoined by God, and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and absolute power, knows the effects of the deeds of living beings, he creates the Prajapatis, his mind-created (manasa) sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life in accordance with their (past) deeds; she also creates) the Manus, Devas, Rşis and groups of Pitrs (pitrgana), the four varnas out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet (mukhabahurupddatal) (respectively), and the other living beings, high and low (wccdvacáni bhärdni); he then connects them with Dharma,
knowledge, absence of passion and power in accordance with their residue of past deeds.
Other authors of the Nyaya and Vaibesika schools confirm the importance of this side of God's activity. They came to admit that they could not make sense of karmic retribution without assuming an omnipotent God supervising the process."
Unfortunately for the Mimamsakas this solution was not open to them. They were indissolubly linked to the idea that the Veda is without beginning (not uttered by God, as the Vaišeşikas had it), having been continuously handed down in a world which, too, is without beginning, and without periodic destructions and recreations. They did however accept the principle of karmic retribution. But unlike the Vaišeşikas they had to maintain that karmic retribution can work, and can be understood, without assuming that it is guided by foresight and conscious design.
We now understand why Parthasārathi, instead of presenting the notion of God as a means to explain karmic retribution, depicts it as interfering with it. The period of dissolution of the world, in particular, is described as one in which "dharma and adharma, not producing an effect because interrupted by the desire of God, remain in their respective souls" (dharmadharmas ca... Efvarecchāpratibaddhah phalam aprayacchantas teşu teşv atmasv avaristhante). And the subsequent renewed creation of living beings is made possible by the removal of those restraints: "Then many different living beings, such as humans, animals, etc., are produced by the various deeds (karman) whose potencies have become manifest once the interruptions have disappeared due to the power of God's) desire [to create)" (tatas tadicchávasad evāpagatapratibandhair abhivyaktasdmarthyair vividhaih karmabhir vividhänekanarapaśyddibhedabhinnam bhūtajātam drabhyate). In other words, if only God did not interfere, karmic retribution would pursue its normal course, and there would be no destruction and new creation of the world. This position is attributed to the Vaišeşikas. The Mimamsk position is closely related to this: There is no creator God who interferes, and karmic retribution does pursue its course, not interrupted by destructions and renewed creations of the world.
Do we have to conclude that Pārthasarathi made up the position he ascribes to the Vaišeşikas? The answer must be negative. Jayanta Bhatta's Nydyamafjarl (ca. 900 C.E.)" contains some passages that are of interest.
WIP. II, 59. vam samutpannew cars mahabhiesu mahefarardhidlydnamätndt taijasebhyo rubhyah perthivaparamdrusahiteblyo (variants: pdrthiddiparamdnusahitebhyo, pdrthivarusahliebhyo) mahad andam drabhyate (some editions read tpadyale) lasmim caturvadanakamalam sarvalokapildmaham (variant: caturvadanakamalasakalalokapitámaham) brahmam sakalabhuvanasahitam wtpdidya prajdarje viniyukte (variant: nyunkte) i sa ca mahevarmna viniyakto (variant nikto) brahmd 'bifayajina vairdgyalvaryasamparnah prapinam (variant: sarvaprindm) karmavipdam vidited karmánurapainabhogayusah sud prajapatin manasan manunvarsipitreann (variant: manan dewa) mukhabaharupddatas caluro varndn anydni coccavacdni bhdtdnl (variants: bharanicaarini coccdvadnica srstva) srud, daydnurlpair dharmajidnavalrd. gyai varyai santyojayari II
Atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth constitute, in Vaiseşika, gold.
"See Bronkhorst 2000 12 On the date of Jayanta Bhatta, see Hacker 1951: 162 (112)
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First there is a passage that presents a view that is rejected by the critic of the idea of a creator God, and which may therefore represent Jayanta's own position":
atha brahmena manena samvatsarasatanistham adhitisthati paramesthini mahesvarasya sajihirsd jayate Itaya tirohitasvaphalarambhafaktini karmāni sambhavantiti sampadyate sakalabhuvanapralayah punas ca tavaty eva rätripriye kale vyarfte sisyksd bhavati bhagavatah tayd 'bhivyakta aktini karmani karyam drabhante iti Then, when Brahman supervises the conclusion of hundred Brahmanyears, a desire to destroy arises in the Supreme Lord. On account of that [desire) the activities (karman) loose the power to bring about their results, and so the dissolution of all worlds comes about. And again, when the same amount of time, which is like the night, has passed, a desire to create arises in the Lord. On account of that (desire to create] the power of the activities manifests itself, and the activities bring about their effect.
Later in the same discussion about God, the Nyayamanjarf refers back to this passage and states:
nanu ca yugapadeva sakalajagatpralayakaranam anupapannam, avinafinám karmand phalopabhogapraribandhasambhawid iti coditam i na yuktam etar Svarecchápratibaddhand karmandm stimitaSakrinam avasthanar tadicchapreridni karmani phalam adadharita dicchåpratibaddhani ca tatroddsate I kasmad evam iti cer acetandnam cetandnadhisthirdnam svakaryakarananupalabdheh It has been objected that the simultaneous dissolution of the entire universe is not possible, because it is not possible to obstruct the experiences of their results of the activities (karman) which are undestructable. This is not correct. Because the activities are obstructed by God's desire, and their power to bring about results] is paralysed. Activities that are impelled by His desire bring about results, and those that are obstructed by His desire remain inactive. If you ask) why it is like this, (the answer is:) because it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their effects
The final argument - unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, cannot bring about their effects - is not new, as we have seen. To bring about their effects, activities have to be guided by a conscious being, in other words, they have to be impelled by His desire. This idea may be behind the very introduction of God in the Vaisesika system. The present passage expands the idea by adding that God's desire can also obstruct activities; this explains the simultaneous destruction of the entire universe. But this passage does not say that God only obstructs activities, and that without God's interference they would bring about their results just as well. The final remark "it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their effects" proves the opposite. It had to be a Mimämsaka, viz. Parthasarathi, who turned the argument on its head. For him God interferes with the working of karma, and nothing else.
Not all Vaišeşikas looked upon God's role as that of interrupting the process of karmic retribution. Prasastapāda, as we have seen, states the opposite. And Udayana's Kiranavall, while commenting Prasastapāda's phrase "when the adrstas have stopped their activity" (adrstānām vrttinirodhe sati), explains's pralayahetunddrstena pratibandhe sati "when there is interruption of the adestas) on account of the adrsta which is the cause of the destruction (of the world)". Adrsta, singular or plural, is synonymous with dharma and adharma, the two qualities that are responsible for karmic retribution. The destruction of the world itself, according to Udayana, is due to dharma and adharma, and not to the interruption of their activity caused by the desire of God,
But even Parthasarathi himself describes, in his Sastradīpikā, the Vaiseșika position in a way which does not differ so blatantly from the texts of that school. (It may here be recalled that the Sastradīpika was composed before the Nyd yaratnakara). We read here (p. 115):
na hi pralaye paramarānām pralayo 'smakam (.e., vai esikandm) asti samkhyadivarl karyadravyani tu dvyarukadini sarvany evefvarecchaya vislistavayavani prallyante, paramanavas tu mitho 'samyuktas tisthanti vyomádayas ca kşetrajñaś catmiyadharmadharmayukta evdvaristhantel sargakäle punar tvareccham kşetraffidrstam ca nimittam asadya paramāņusu karmány utpadyante tadvaśāc ca mithah samyuktās catutaye 'pi paramdnavo dvyanukādikramena yarhasvam pythivyadikam bhūtacatusfayam drabhantel nimittabhatakşetrajfddrstavaici
NM p. 490/177. NM p. 510/186.
1 ki p. 62, 1. 6-7. 1 See Ramaswami Sastri 1937.
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Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta. Nyayakandali of Sridhara. Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi Misra (for the edition see Slokavarttika of Kumarila Bhatta, with the commentary Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi Misra. Vyomavati of Vyomasiva. Word Index to the Prasastapadabhasya, see Bronkhorst and Ramseier 1994. BIBLIOGRAPHY tryac ca jarayujandajodbhijjasvedajabhinnam sarirabhedam isvarecchakaritasamyogavisesat paramanava arabhante! For according to us Vaisesikas, unlike the Samkhyas, atoms do not dissolve in the dissolution (of the world). Composite substances (karyadravya), on the other hand, that is to say all dyads and [larger objects), dissolve, their parts having been separated by God's desire; but the atoms, without mutual connection, remain, and so do (the omnipresent substances] such as ether, and the souls, the latter accompanied each by their own dharma and adharma. At the time of a new creation movements arise in the atoms, the cause of which is God's desire as well as the dharma and adharma (adrsta) of the souls; the four kinds of atoms, which by virtue of these (movements) are (now) joined together, form the four elements earth etc., each their own, in the sequence which begins with the dyad. And on account of the variety of dharma and adharma in the souls, which cause (the process), the atoms, because of the special connections brought about by God's desire, form a variety of bodies, viz. born from the womb, born from an egg, sprouting, and born from perspiration. Texts Jayanta Bhatta, Nyayamanjari: 1) edited by K.S. Varadacharya, Oriental Research Institute Series 116, Mysore 1969; 2) edited by Surya Narayana Sukla, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Varanasi 1971. Kumarila Bhatta, Slokavarttika with the commentary Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi Misra, edited by Dvarikadasa Sastri, Ratnabharati Series 3, Varanasi 1978. Parthasarathi Misra, Sastradipika, edited with the commentary Yuktisnehaprapurani with Gudharthavivarana by Dharmadatta Jha. First Tarkapada, Varanasi 1988. Parthasarathi Misra, Nyayaratnakara, see Kumarila Bhatta, Slokavarttika. Prasastapada, Prasastapadabhasya with the commentary Kiranavali of Udayana, edited by Jitendra S. Jetly, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 154, Baroda 1971. Sridhara, Nyayakandali of Sridhara, edited by J.S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh, Vadodara, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 174, Baroda 1991. Vyomasiva, Vyomavati of Vyomasiva, edited by Gaurinath Sastri. M.M. Sivakumarasastri granthamala 6, Varanasi 1983-84. *** Studies We can conclude that Parthasarathi in his Nyayaratnakara (but not yet in his Sastradipika) brings to light a fundamental difference in attitude between Mimamsa and Vaisesika with regard to the mechanism of karmic retribution. The Vaisesikas had come to admit that this mechanism is hard to explain in non-teleological terms, and without assuming a conscious agent in the process. They introduced the notion of a creator God in order to avoid this difficulty. The Mimamsa thinkers were basically confronted with the same problem, but could not accept the Vaisesika solution without fundamentally changing their system. All they could do was ignore the problem, and criticise the notion of a creator God on other grounds. This is what Kumarila does. His commentator Parthasarathi goes one step further. He depicts the Vaisesika system as not really needing the idea of a creator God. We have seen that in so doing he painted an incorrect picture of that system. DIS T RO Bronkhorst, J. (1993) "The Vaisesika vakya and bhasya". Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 72-73 (1991 & 1992 [1993]): 145-169. Bronkhorst, J. (1996) "God's arrival in the Vaisesika System". Journal of Indian * Philosophy 24: 281-294. Bronkhorst, J. (2000), Karma and Teleology. A problem and its solutions in Indian philosophy. Tokyo. Bronkhorst, J. and Ramseier, Y. (1994) Word index to the Prasastapadabhasya. Delhi. Hacker, P. (1951) "Jayantabhatta and Vacaspatimisra". In: Festschrift Walther Schubring. Beitrage zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde. Hamburg 1951, pp. 160-69. Reprinted Kleine Schriften (in the series of the Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, pp. 110-119. Peri, Sarveswara Sharma (1994) "Kumarila Bhatta's denial of creation and dissolution of . the world". In: Dwivedi, R.C. (Ed.) Studies in Mimamsa. Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Delhi, pp. 53-77. Ramaswami Sastri, K.S. (1937) "Date of Parthasarathimisra and sequence of his works". Indian Historical Quarterly 13: 488-497. ABBREVIATIONS Ki KISchr Prasastapadabhasya with the commentary Kiranavali of Udayana. Kleine Schriften in the series of the Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart. . 181 180