Lost Fragments Of Spitzer Manuscript

Author(s): Eli Franco
Publisher: Eli Franco
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269532/1

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Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript! ELI FRANCO, Vienna In summarizing previous scholarship on the so-called Spitzer Manuscript (=SHT 810) more than 30 years ago, Dieter SCHLINGLOFF rightly observed that part of the manu. script seems to have been lost during World War II. Indeed, two previous publications concerned with this manuscript by Heinrich LODERS' and Yosho MIYASAKA reproduce and transcribe fragments that cannot be found among the original fragments as previously preserved in the German Academy of Sciences at Berlin and recently transferred to the State Library, Berlin. However, in a "Korrektumachtrag" to his paper SCHLINGLOFF adds: "After extensive investigations, the whereabouts of Dr. Moritz SPITZER could be ascertained. Dr. SPITZER, who lives at present in Jerusalem, informed me to my great delight that he was able to save his transcriptions of the fragments so that the loss of part of the original caused by the war is alleviated." SPITZER's transcriptions, prepared in late 1927 and early 1928, have been graciously put at my disposal by SPITZER's son, Amitai. They are found on some 65 unnumbered pages of various size and were kept in an old paper folder. There is no evidence to suggest that the order of all the pages in the folder as a whole is meaningful, but certain pages can be recognized as belonging together. Recently I was able to compare SporZER's transcriptions with the original fragments and found transcriptions of some forty(t) fragments of various size that are no longer extant. Furthermore, I could deter 'I would like to express my deep gratitude to Karin Preisendenz and Lambert Schmithausen for most valuable suggestions and to Anne MacDonald for correcting my English ICE D. SCHLINGLOFT, "Fragmente einer Palmblatthandschrift philosophischen Inhalte aus Ostturkistan (Ms. Spitzer)." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 12-13, 1967-68 - Fruwallner Festschrif], 323-328, on p. 324, n. 5. POE HLODERS. "Das Zeichen fur 70 in den Inschriften von Mathuri aus der Saks- und KusinaZeit." Acta Orientalia 10, 1932, 118-135. ". Y. MIYASAKA, "Kyurybu no danpen" (Fragments of Sautrintika). Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 10, 1962, 673-679. Cf. SCHLINGLOFF, ibid. p. 328: "Korrekturnachtrag: Der Verbleib von Dr. Moritz SPITZER konnte nach langeren Nachforschungen ermittelt werden. Herr Dr. SPITZER, der heute in Jerusalem lebt, teilte mir zu meiner grossen Freude mit, dass er seine Transkriptionen der Fragmente retten konnte, so dass der kriegsbedingte Verlust einen Teiles des Originals verschmerzt werden kann." Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 77-110

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript Hara. Two of the fragments are transcribed also on p. 28", two also on p. 35," and one also on p. 64 of the Nachlass"; I point out the variants in the notes. Further, whenever available I note the variants in WATANABE's transcriptions as published by MIYASAKA. Note that I did not change SPITZER's transcriptions and that sometimes better readings appear in the notes rather than in the main text. In the discussion below I also suggest some conjectures in pointed brackets and add punctuation to facilitate the reading. Finally, I have prepared a concordance for MIYASAKA's transcriptions which I append to this paper. mine with the help of the transcriptions that some of the remaining fragments were broken into two or three pieces after SPITZER had transcribed them, presumably during or after WW II. Relying on SPITZER's transcriptions I was able to paste together the following fragments: 8 + 623; 30 + 74 + 140: 73 +64 + 76; 139b1[7] + 139a1(1): 767 + 780; 842 +847. Since SPITZER did not transcribe the entire manuscript, it is impossible to ascertain what portion of the fragments has been saved by his transcriptions. One can only hope that he transcribed the larger fragments and that those fragments that he did not transcribe were smaller and less significant. In this connection one has to mention that the great Japanese scholar Shoko WATANABE, who worked with Ernst LEUMANN in Berlin during the thirties, transcribed about 100 fragments. WATANABE handed over his transcriptions to Yosho MIYASAKA, and the latter passed them on to Junkichi IMANISHI, currently a professor at the IABS, Tokyo. A careful comparison between SPITZER's and WATANABE's transcriptions is an urgent desideratum. On the one hand, such a comparison will allow us to better determine how many of the fragments were lost during the war. On the other hand, as will be seen below, a comparison between two independent transcriptions is bound to eliminate some mistakes that occur in the one or the other." In what follows I reproduce and discuss the transcriptions of the first three pages of SPITZER's Nachlass as a token of my respect for and friendship with Professor Minoru [Page 1] Blatt 369 (1) khalv api kin vijanis.). ...(duh)kha[m] tathat parisistan(i) duhkham ca duhkh(a)tatpraptam parikistany api duhkhan tasmad" duhkhadarsankt paribistadarsa The pasting is done only virtually on the images of the digitalized fragments, of course; I did not actually remove the fragments from their glass frames. The numbers of the fragments refer to the numbering of glass frames preserved in the State Library in Berlin. Fragment No. 10, which has also been transcribed by Sprzen, was broken probably during the sixties because it appears unbroken on the black and white photos used by SCHLINGLOFF when he worked on the manuscript during the early sixties, which he has kindly put at my disposal. CEMIYASAKA, ibid., p. 673. Incidentally, some unpublished pages by WATANABE remain in LHUMANN's Nachlass, cf. Catalogue of the Papers of Ernst Lumann in the Institute for the Culture and History of Indian and Tibet, University of Hamburg. Compiled by Birte Plutat. Stuttgart 1998, entries 381, 387, 503. MIYASAKA states (ibid. p. 673) that the fragments amount to 110% leaves, but given that 854 glass frames containing fragments still remain, that some of the frames contain more than one fragment (27. I believe, is the highest number of fragments in a single frame), and that some fragments (certainly more than 40) were lost, the statement cannot be correct. If it were true, it would mean that on sverige each fragment would have been broken to nine or ten pieces, which seems highly improbable. My assumption is that WATANABE transcribed some 110 fragments and that MIYASAKA's statement refers to WATANABE's transcriptions, not to the original fragments. It is probable that MIYASAKA did not see the actual manuscript, at least not before writing his paper, because he also says that the fragments are made of birch-bark, while in fact they are made of Talipat palm leaves. I would like to thank Professor KYOMA for a translation of MIYASAKA's paper. "CE. c.g., a case of aberratio oculi pointed out in 372a2 below. P.28 contains the transcription of another small fragment which contains the word pariini and thus seems to belong to folio 369, but SPITZER did not include it there. Next to the transcription of these two fragments SPITZER refers to some inspecified location "6 unten". The pages are numbered by me in the order in which they were placed in the folder One of the most conspicuous phraseological characteristics of the SPITZER Manuscript is the frequent use of thaly api. It is interesting to note that G. VON SIMSON, who investigated the language of the wires of the Sarvistivada school, pointed out that the use of thalu is usually avoided in the Sarvistivada texts. CL. G. VON SIMSON, "Stil und Schulzugehorigkeit buddhistischer Texte." in H. Bechert (od.), Zur Schulzugehorigkeit von Werken der Hinayana-Literatur. Part 1 (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, II,1), Gottingen 1985, pp. 76-93, in p. 83: "Auf der anderen Seite scheint bei den Sa. der Wille zur Abkehr und Entfernung von der mittelindischen Vorlage starker ausgepragt zu sein als bei den MQ. Charakteristisch hierfur ist die weitgehende Vermeidung der Partikel khal im PrMoSD ( Anh. IL 1, Nr. 33-37), die ebenso wie die Partikel bho im Pali sonst in buddhistischen Sanskrittexten abersus gewohnlich ist. It seems therefore, that either the avoidance of thaly was not yet common in the 3 century, or that was limited to the satra literature and was not applied to Abhidharma commentaries. Further, there is no absolute certainty that the Spitzer manuscript belongs to the Sarvativ de school. The use of khalval rather than thalu slone seems to presuppose a different Innguage of reference than Pali. "MIYASAKA, p. 676, 2761, corrects: tarha (sa)parifistani. Note that MrYASAKA's transcription of this line begins with ... ... kham, i.e. without khalv apikin vijanif. MIYASAKA's transcription, p. 676, differs considerably; it omits duhkham ca and reads dukhal (sic.) praptam. Read:... duhtham tar praptam. "MIYASAKA, p. 676, reads tamanna. of this Vind ASAKA S Eduhubhom minna.

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript nam' duhkhadars..... [2] nat parisis(ta). ...Il pi kin vijani. ///... h (3) yatha khalv api duhkham tathat" parisistani tat pra(ptam) Cyatha parisistani tatha duhkham parisistani ca na du(hkha).... Ill tatra yad ukta I (3) duhkham ....... (duh) khadarsanat parisistadarsanam it[i] ....... (da)ranatatpraptam dushkha) II...duhkhadarsanama..Il... [th ........il/ khalv api (du)hkhamduhkhato) (hi)sama gacchat)(i) na ca bhavati duh khadarsanat parisista...ll..parisistani. III (3) ath(a)n(u)tpalt(te)h ev(a) /// (bha) "vati duhhadarsanat parisistadarsanam" na hi nirodhamarggalaksan"X" satkayadrstis tasmad anupurvvabhisamaya...)" Blatt 37? [= 370 [1] darsanakt parisista...) ... (duhkhada]rsanam tasman na duhkhadars(an)..... (du)hkhadarsanat pari(sista)...III (i)ti tan nah (!)(1)./11... Khalv apy ekas.m.y." [1] S x x aryya(r(a)vakah idam duhkham iti Ill. [duhkha sajmudayah ayam duhkhanirodhah iya(!) "duhkha[ni]rodha(gamana (m?) prat(i) x x d x ti(e)" na ca duhkhadarsanam parisiste" ayathabhutam:" na hi parisi [2] sani duhkham tasmad annyathannyathabhi(samayah?) III ... (anupu)rvvabhi [2] katvan tasman na ... II (par)isistanan darsanam III. kabhisamayah yadi MIYASAKA's transcription of this line ends here. paricistani) corrected to parisista). 20 The sign / in the middle of the line is used by SPITZER, I assume, to point out gaps in the reconstructed leaf where the remaining fragments did not fit together. I also suspect that double dandas, as used here before pi kin, bave exactly the same function, but I respected the number of dandas as it appears in SPITZER'S transcriptions. I have also reproduced faithfully the number of dots in the transcription, but did not go so far as to distinguish between dots and what appear more like short hyphens. It should be noted that in all probability Spitzer did not use dots to refer to a number of missing or illegible aksaras, but in a rough way to cover a certain space. It should also be noted that the separation into words is mine and that I do not reproduce SPITZER's hyphens between words. 21 Although SPITZER has bracketed the number, this does not mean that it is his addition. The numbering of sections is typical of the Spitzer Manuscript "MIYASAKA: duhkhabh)(isamayam) s(a)m(a)g(acchati. "a corrected to a? Not transcribed by MIYASAKA. MIYASAKA'S transcription of this line (p. 676, 2703) begins here. Note that he inserts his transcriptions of 28a3, 27b1 and 28b1-2 between that of 27a1-2 and 27a3. "A negation should probably be conjectured for this sentence, perhaps na before bhavati. r corrected to >> MIYASAKA reads:-Alamband instead of-alaksand. The correction of ton by SPITZER tends to support MIYASAKA's reading 16 A small fragment (1x3 cm) which probably belongs to this folio or to the next is preserved in frame 518: a Sic. 2 This part is missing in MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 27al) which runs as follows: dushkhadarsanan taman na dukhadarsan...)..duykhadarfandt...... pari....... ...an na...... Relying on the transcription of this line by MIYASAKA, I concluded that the sign il/ in SPITZER's transcription does not always represent the final break-off point of a fragment; by today's conventions such a case would be represented by a number of corresponding to the estimated number of missing aksaras. The scribe ofen adds a visarga to the negation at the end of the phrase iti dan na, probably for emphasis 13 Above the line SPITZER suggests: samaye 36 The nasalisation of a vowel befor a nasal is typical for the manuscript "a corrected to a MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676, 272) begins here Wilduhikha7)[da]rsanad abhisamay.XI/ MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 676,2861-2) begins here. "MIYASAKA: Iyam. "MIYASAKA: -gamini. * MIYASAKA: pratifpad (1) SPITZER on p. 28: W (dafte. + MIYASAKA: parifista... His transcription of this line ends bere. " Note that on p 28 SPITZER transcribesparifisteya yashabhutam. *d corrected to a

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript samayah (4) "pida"laksanam khalv api duhkham naiva parisistani" yatha ca duhkham tatha te jeyam na hi yathanatma tatha duhkham ma bhut parisi [3] [stanam ana imatvaduhkhat(v)an na pi yatha duhkh... lll (a)nitmata vinivarttate III bhavati duhkhena[tmadarsanar" parisistank(!) darsanam iti (5) [3] ....... m utpannam tan nabhisamagatam abhisamagatam ca vigatatva nastic!) tasma duhkhabhisam(ayas)...... (1) .............. atraha jatigrahana tad apy abhisamagatam bhavati (6) atra brumah sad asat khalv api s... [2] ........... klesabhasva] I..... "yaprakarane Anupurvvabhisamayapariksi // oll yad ueyate prakstiprabhas varam [3] ........"* xox nyatropalabhyatet. . III.... opaklesah tadubhayaprat(yu)(pan)n(a)tve" agantukatvan na bhavati .............. [1] XXXXXX (kha)lv api [du](hkha)jiane duhkham adrsta. JII..... (na) ca duhkhe jaanotpattau...III.... yah parisistani (na hly(e)k(a)(m) (a)nekes anckadha bhavati [2] tasmat tesam darsanan na bhavati na... lll...."y(a)b "na by anutpanne duhkhajnane duhkhabhisamayas tasmad anupurvvabhisamayah duhkhe khalv api darsanam duhkhadarsanam duhkhadarsanac ca ni (Page 2) [3] rodhadarsanam iti bhavan(!) aha ay...ll.. (nam) tasman na bhavati duhkhadarsanat parisisadarsanamiti (2) anyatha khalv api duhkhadhisthanaklelih pravarttante anyatha parisistes[u] Blatt (3727) (= 372) ...................'yx dh x yu ....dhva "prabhasvaratvam upalabdham yad ucyate prabhasvaram upaklisyata iti yady xxyx tr xnnx (p)rastlyustpann) ........ ................ bhava (2).......... klistam prabha(svara)"........ khalv api nopapadyate prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti kim karanam yada hibuddhya prabhasvaram upalabhyate na Blatt (371?) [= 371) [1] ...... III (parisistilnim darsanam iti (3) duh(kh ).... Ill... khalv apy anatmatvan na tv anatma x x x x duhkhatvam tad yadi sarvvatra pidi XXXXXYXXXY [2] ......llt prahisna) III.......III... ttx ko marggas tasman na duhkhadarsanit parisistadarsanam (4) pratyutpannamatram khalv api duhkha..... 53 The transcription is certainly correct; the fluctuation of and a (and to lesser extent of trand 4, ) is another typical characteristic of the manuscript. * With a different pen SPITZER suggests here Dharmanand, which he considered as a possible title of the work; cf. frg 700, MIYASAKA's transcription of 29b (p. 673) begins here. Both SPITZER And WATANABE MIYASAKA consistently transcribe prabharvara rather than prabharvara. * This part does not appear in MIYASAKA's transcription which reads prabharvaram.... (apakiefah "MIYASAKA: tad ubhayaprati(patti?). *This fragment is transcribed also on p. 35 of the Nachlass. MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 677, 1811) begins here and stops after yadi in this line. * MIYASAKA's transcription of this line (p. 676,2862) begins here. "dis transcribed on p. 28 ass! is most probably the correct transcription becaused between vowels is hardly ever used in the SPITZER Manuscript "MIYASAKA: naivam: on p. 28 SPITZER also transcribes naivam. "MIYASAKA's trancription of this line ends here. On p. 28: duhbham abhat Onp.28 SPITZER seems to have understood dufthena - doma *Read dome * Above the line and with a different pen SPITZER suggests tentatively: anuprabhirama. * MIYASAKA's transcription (p. 676, 2803) begins here and ends in line 3 with dha aya. "On p. 35: prabha Osvar.). MIYASAKA transcribes (p. 677, 1862): khalv api nopapadyate prabhavanam palabhyate na tado. This is obviously due to an aberratio oculi from prabhavaram to prabhaswaram in this line. On p. 35: yad api 5* On p. 35: spaklifyate.

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 85 tado[pa](k)[!](isy...)...... Il cetasi. Il .... da prabhasvaram [3] ..... upalabhyeta vitam (1)" dvisvabhav[a!] m syad buddhis ca dvivyasayad anistam caita tasmat prarupan[a?]bhavah" (3) na khalv apy upakligam upaklistam grhnati praru (panabhav)"...IlI..upaklistan na tada upampdyate cittam iti tan na bhavati (1) yadi khalv ap(i)"....... ll (prabha)svaratvam...ll..... ekibhavanti [3] ....oxrxi....... ...... (pra)[ky]tisthah katham upaklesayanti (2) yadi khalv apy xxx paklesah praxxa....... b. Blatt 373 [1].... (ap)y upaklistanupakliste yugapad upalabhyate" tat katham etac chakyate jatum prabhasvaram upaklisyata iti (4) yadi caprakstir upaklefair upam dyate prabha(svar)"....II... (upa)m(t)dyate prabhasva (page 3] [2] ...ity ay ..... [ya)" khalv api yasya praktih sa tasya svabhavah sk yady [1] ........ .....syad atha prabhas(var)....ll.... yasyanyacittatvam" ayam prabha(sv..) [2] cittann.....ll... (kha)lv apy upakiesah...../ (pra)bhasvaram apy upaklesam anupraptam kli.... [3] $(tam.a....ll... (pra)bhasvaram tasmad. x // (pra)bhasvaram asid idam asid iti na bh... [1] (a)ny(e)n(a)ny(a)(sy)(a)...ll.... [m] upaklefasya py any ...Il... (a)vastha bhavati athavati thate (ny). (21 ()di canye(na). . . // (upakliyyate tasmi d[u]chkh ....//...syanyenopaklistasyopaklesatvam..... [3] .......... samyoga.... /I. (u)paklistam syad iti (5)..... Blatt ? [= 374) 65 Strangely enough, fragment 395 (SHT-810) rends as follows. Side e a Illavaravam api na ../// ; side b: a II.. citacetaxilll. This cannot be a mere coincidence as the text on both sides of this fragment coincides with the transcriptions of this fragmentary portion of leaf 372, but it is strange that SPITZER did not transcribe apina on one side and cinta on the other. a corrected to c. The text seems corrupt. The exclamation mark added by SPITZER must mean that he rechecked his transcription, but I cannot makes sense of it. MIYASAKA reads (p. 677, 1823): palabhyetapi tam dvisvabhavam. However, I think that dvirvabhayam is a bahurthi refering to citta, tam could be explained as a prakritism cf. BDGERTON, BHSG 21.11. Perhaps witam sbould be emended to citam. "However, on p. 35: -swabh/a)wam. "However, on p. 35: divyawadydd. MIYASAKA reads: dwivyowasydna nisam perhaps one should read dviyyawadyat. The use of form is not typical for the manuscript, but praranam appears also in 393b. Op. 35: Caltar asma randhavah, but the reading above is certainly better. The redue tion of double consonants to single ones (herer instead of ) occurs repeatedly in the manuscript, and one should understand here caltarlasmar 72 The number does not appear in MIYASAKA's transcription p. 677.1823. "MIYASAKA: prarapand... Relying on the two transcriptions Iconjecture prosipanbhave MIYASAKA was able to decipher slightly more in the damaged portion towards the end of line . ..daprabhasaram ............ pakistan na fada......().......x bh ........ si...... A negation should be added for this sentence, perhaps nopy. cf. below. * SPITZER on p. 35 reads 5 here whereas MIYASAKA (p. 677, 1861) reads 6. Ton 35 SPITZER completes: prabhaswaram. The rest of this line is not reproduced by MIYASAKA. "On p. 35 Sprzer completos:itya Oy(wk/e(a)m. MIYASAKA (p. 677, 1862): ity ayukta) Onp. 35: (sa?). # MIYASAKA seems to have read a danda here; graphically, it is impossible to distinguish between the number and a danda. The rest of this line is not reproduced by MIYASAKA. On p. 35: prop[7]4/8..ni...). MIYASAKA (p. 677, 1863) reads here: prapas. Considering the large number of double dandar on this leaf one may assume that this section was versified, but I could not discern any metrical pattern. It is not impossible that SPITZER USE "here in the same function as above, ie, for juxtaposing different fragments that apparently belong to the same leaf Read yarnya cittavam or perhaps, in view of the subsequent anys prabhaswaram (?). assuming a prakritic influence on the pronominally declined adjective one may also read yaydayam The same fragment is transcribed (and b. in reversed order) also on p. 64 and by MIYASAKA as frg. 20a (p. 677) and 206 (p. 673).

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript [1] ..... [y] x [t] (c) * (p[r]abha)svaran tad upaklistam ity etad ayuktam vaktum (1)" yadi khalvasya prakstir upakl.... [2] .....na by asyavayavopaklistos vayavo nopaklista iti (3) anyam khalv apy upaklistad anupaklista.... (3) ...... pi prabhasyaram evam syat (4) yadi khalv api grhyate prabhasvaram ity anupallista' bhavaty a numbers, SPITZER must have considered the fragments to be parts of consecutive folios, and his assumption can now be confirmed with greater certainty. The discussion preserved in the fragments ranges over three topics: The first, titled anupurvabhisamayapariksa, ends in 371b2; the second, titled (prakti)prabhasvarapratijnopalambhika continues up to 374b1; of the third only two and a half lines remain (374b1-3), but at the end of the paper I will reproduce some more fragments which deal with the same subject and which must have belonged to folio 375. All three topics constitute points of debate among various schools of Conservative Buddhism. [1]..... "(Pra)bbasvarapratijnopalambhika(m) samaptam - // O Il ye acaryyagunasamanyavisesayuktah samghe".... [2] ..... sayuktah atah" pasyamah bhagavan api samghe" iti //atra brumah sati khalv apy aryya[Srav]........ [3].....xxx.xi...... (a)dis api sandehah (1) yat khalv api samghopalabdhau karana ...... The transcriptions reproduced above cover fragments belonging to six consecutive folios (369-374). Although not all fragments bear folio numbers, or complete folio 1) The first topic concerns the question whether the four noble truths are fully comprehended successively or at once. The debate centers on the so-called abhisamayavada. In his classification of the points of controversy, Bareau has pointed out that according to the Andhakas, the late Mahasanghikas, the Sarvastivadins, the Sammatiyas and the Bhadrayaniyas the full comprehension of the four noble truths is gradual, whereas according to the Theravadins, the Vibhajyavadins, the Mahisasakas and the Mahasanghikas it occurs at once, that is, in a single cognitive act." This discussion is of particular importance for us because it clearly presupposes Dharmasri's or Dharmasresthin's *Abhidharmahrdayasastra and thus determines a terminus a quo for the work. B. WATANABE, K. MIZUNO and S. WATANABE, who translated the Abhidharmahrdaya into Japanese, argued that "Dharmasri composed the Abhidharmahrdaya sastra in about 200 A.D.*. This could allow us to determine both the manuscript and the work contained in it as belonging to the third century, because * vaktam corrected to vakuum; MIYASAKA: waktum. "MIYASAKA seems to have read a danda here. "On p. 64: khalv apy, but api is omitted on p. 3 and by MIYASAKA. "Read asuvayava mpaklisto. According to MIYASAKA a number of aksaras are missing between aryavayave and paklisto, I assume that a hyper-sandhi has occurred between awayana and upallisto. On p. 64 the transcription begins with (ava)yavo. On p. 64: nupallista; read wayavo nupaklista "On p. 64: anupaklista. MIYASAKA reads, anupallista(w). * MIYASAKA: 0(th). "MIYASAKA suggests (p. 373, 2001): (cittapraktiprabhaswara.... On p. 64: -diambhaka(); MIYASAKA: -palambhakam. Apparently neither updlambhaka nor upalambhika are recorded by the dictionaries; MIYASAKA's upalambhaka is recorded, but this reading seems less probable here. Cf. also fragment 1396/1/3 (representing the end of the section criticizing the Kasyaplya theory of karma): kafyaplyopdlambhi .. On p. 64 samgha corrected to samghe: MIYASAKA (p. 373, 2011) reads samgha. * ata om. by MIYASAKA. *MIYASAKA: samgha. * On p. 64:1 1. For instance, the 3 and the 4 folio that I consider to be folios 371 and 372. 100 For instance, the second folio reads "377", but its placement after fol. 369 makes clear that SPITZER considered it to be fol. 370. 101 We can confirm that "Blatt" - 374 by going backwards from folio 376 which is preserved as fragment 137; parts of folio 375 are reproduced below. The rest follows easily. The term abhisamawadda was coined by FRAUWALLNER in his remarkable study of this doctrine in Dharmasri's Abhidharmahrdaya or Abluldharmasdra; cf. E. FRAUWALLNER, "AbhidharmaStudien. III. Der Abhisamayavadah". Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sadasiens 15, 1971, 69-102, esp. p. 102. With all respect due to FRAUWALLNER, the name he chose has at least one considerable disadvantage, namely, it is too general and can be applied to Dharmadit's theory as well as to its contrary (ekabhisamaya(vida) or yugapadabhisamayawada)). In what follows I retain the longer, but emic terms anupurabhisamayavada/in) and ekabhisamaya(vadalin). Cf. A. BARBAU, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule. Saigon 1955, p. 270; cf. also p. 90 (thesis 4), p. 72 (th. 1), p. 138 (th. 9).p. 124 (th. 6). p. 129 (th. 2).p. 216 (th. 19), p. 174 (th. 17). p. 183 (th. 2), and p. 62 (th. 23) respectively. 104 Reported in H. NAKAMURA, Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Norer. Delhi 1987, p. 108.

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Eli Franco * Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript the palacographical evidence presumably does not allow us to date the manuscript later than that period". Unfortunately, however, the above dating of the Abhidharmahrdaya did not find acceptance among Abhidharma scholars. While everybody seems to agree that it was written before 220 A.D. there seems to be no decisive evidence that could help us to determine even approximately how much earlier. To come back to our fragments, folio 369 begins somewhere in the middle of the third section of the chapter Anupurvabhisamayapariksa. The purvapaksin (369al) seems to argue that the last three noble truths are similar to the first noble truth of suffering." And (the apprehension or the object of the noble truth of) suffering is suffering. Thus, the following obtains: The rest, i.c., the other three noble truths, are also suffering, Therefore, by seeing the noble truth of) suffering one sees the rest. (I read: (duh)kham) tatha iparifistan(i) duhkham ca duhkh[a], tar praptam pariSistany api duhkhan. Tasmad dunkhadarsanat parifistadarsanam). The next line (369a2) appears to contain the reply of the siddhantin, who derives the opposite conclusion from the alleged similarity among the truths: (If it is said that the second, third and fourth truths are like the first truth, (then) the following obtains: the first truth is like the other three. But the other three truths are not suffering. (Thus, the first truth would also not be suffering) (yatha khalv api duhkham tatha iparisistani. tat praptam: yatha parifisfani tatha duhkham, na ca duhkha...). The reason why the siddhantin rejects the identity between the first and the other truths is not clear here. I assume that it is because the first truth is itself suffering whereas the others, or at least the third and fourth truths, are not considered to be suffering, but this is not stated explicitly in the fragment and I was also unable to identify the exact Sarvastivada position on this point. According to the Sarvastivadin the third truth is asamiskota, but the other three are not. If one considers that everything which is produced (samsksta) is duhkha, one could say that the third truth is not suffering, but the other three are. If this is the Sarvastivada position, then our text would seem to be incompatible with it.' The discussion continues on the verso side of the leaf (369b). In the first line there could be a statement to the effect that the apprehension of the four truths does not occur at once, "on one occasion" (ekasamaye). In the second line it is argued that it can be admitted that one fully understands suffering as suffering, but that this does not imply that by seeing suffering one sees the other truths too (yadi khalv api (dukha duhkhat[o] ('bhi)(samdgacchar]() na ca bhavati duhkhadarsanat parisista ...). In the third line the siddhantin continues to argue that by seeing suffering one does not see the other truths because the false view of the skandhas as the Self (sarkayadysti) does not have as its object the suppression of suffering and the way that leads to the suppression of suffering ( bhavati duhkhadarsanat parisistadarsanam. na hl nirodhamargd 10 Another reference that may prove useful for the dating of the work is found in fragment 157b: 1 II punar vrkjaniti vibhasayam apica na hetul. gomaynill 2 III.. patatami waram garulam dhur udadhisu samudrami tamam sasthill However, I was not able to identify the quotation or to determine to which Vibhdsd (presumably one of the commentaries on the Jaanaprasthana) the author refers. The second line seems to contain a subhasita ("Garuda is the best of birds, the ocean is the best of seas, sixty..."), but I could not identify its source either. . Note that vrkra is usually a masculine noun. 1 According to ARMHLIN the Abhidharmapdaya is contemporary with the kidnaprasthana; cf. LARMELIN, Le Coeur de la Lol Suprime. Traite de Fa-Cheng Abhidharmahrdaya dstra de Dharmart Paris 1978, p. 12 (expressing disagreement with R. YAMADA who situated the Jianaprasthan before the Abhidharmahndaya). FRAUWALLNER considered the Abhidharmahrdaya to be earler than the Janaprasthana (cf. "Der Abhisamayawadah". p. 72), and WILLEMEN scems to endorse this opinion in The Essence of Metaphysics. Abhidharmahrdaya. Bruxelles 1975, p. VIII, or at least to rely on it while claiming that "200 A.D. does not seem acceptable." Cf. also WILLEMEN's introduction in K.H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Delhi 1996, p. 451. The title of this volume, and the place of the summary of the Abhidharmahrdaya in it would imply that the Abhidhamah daya must be considerably earlier than 150 A.D., but I suppose that in this case the title should not be taken too literally. For the most recent discussion cf. B. DESSEIN, Samtukadbhldharmahrdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions. Delhi 1999, vol. I. p. xxxiii, and further references in vol. II p. 13, nn. 150-151. DESSEIN also considers the work to be probably earlier than the Manaprasthana. As far as I can see there is no cogeat argument allowing for a decision one way or the other. 197 The reason for the statement is missing. Note also that the discrepancy between the transcriptions of SPITZER and of WATANABE/MIYASAKA is considerable. 10 follow here SPITZER's transcription. Note that WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcribe fasmda na instead of tasmid. If the WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcription is correct, then we obviously deal with a siddhanta statement. Indeed, in the discussion that follows the words tasman na duhkhadarande parifistadardanam occur repeatedly, and this in itself would make the WATANABE/MIYASAKA tran scription more probable. However, the immediately preceding statement that the rest are also suffering" (parisisany api duhkham) is clearly the purvapaksa in the discussion. CE BARRAU,Op.cit, p. 138 (th. 8); cf. also p. 197 (th. 32) for the Saripurabhidharma, p. 100 (th. 10) for the Parvasnila, and p. 221 (th. 56) for the Theravada. 110 According to BAREAU, op. cit., the Hetuvadins (p. 246, th. 3) considered all asamisktar except marga to be suffering, whereas the Theravadins (p. 233, th. 166) seem to argue that all noble truths are not suffering. The position of the Sarvastivada is unknown to me. Ill interpret padi bhalv apl as yadinama ("let it be admitted") and the enclitic ca of the next sentence in an adversative sense. Otherwise the next phrase would be part of a conditional clause intro duced with yadi bhalv api and be connected with ca in its conjunctive sense. It is also possible that the apodosis (i.c., the phrase that ends with-kabhisamaydh) preceded the protasis introduced with yadi khalv api.

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 91 lamband satkayadrstih). In other words, seeing the third and fourth truth does not involve the false view about the Self. This clearly implies that seeing suffering (ie, the first truth) does involve the false view about the Self. Thus, these two (which involve and do not involve the false view about the Self) cannot occur at the same time. Therefore, the full comprehension of the four noble truths occurs gradually (tasmdd anupurvabhisamaya). If this is a correct interpretation of the fragment, then the Spitzer manuscript expresses a point of view that seems to be incompatible with the established doctrine of the Sarvastivada. For it is stated in the Abhidharmakosa that the satkayadrsti is abandoned or eliminated by seeing the first truth." I do not know how to resolve this contradiction. Perhaps the author of the Spitzer manuscript means that the elimination of the satkayadrsti by seeing the first truth involves its apprehension as something false; however, it no longer finds support in the seeing of the third and fourth truth. Thus, it cannot appear again, not even as something that has to be discarded. Perhaps this suggestion slightly stretches the common usage of the word alambana (objective support of the cognition), but the only other alternative I could think of, namely, that our manuscript provides an unknown variant to the anupurvabhisamayavada seems even less probable. Of course, as long as the text is fragmentary, there is no certainty as to how the argument has to be interpreted. "cessation of suffering," etc., because the other truths are not (or are different from) suffering." Section 4 of the discussion concludes that the full comprehension of the different truths occurs in respectively different modes or manners (anyathanyathabhisamayah)); thus the four truths are fully apprehended in succession. The expression anyathanyatha probably refers to the sixteen aspects or forms (akara) through which the truths are apprehended, e.g., those of the first truth are anityata, duhkhata, anatmata and Sanyatd." Thus, the four truths are fully comprehended in succession. In section 5 (370a2-3) the siddhantin points out that suffering (duhkha) is character ized by pain (plda), but that the other truths are not so characterized (pidalaksanam khalv api duhkharri naivam parisistani). Next the siddhantin admonishes the opponent: You have to understand suffering the way it is (i.e., you have to grasp suffering in its specific nature of being painful and not as anatman). For it is not the case that suffering is painful because it is not the Self,"lest the other truths too would be suffering because they are not the Self. Nor is it the case that the apprehension of?) Selflessness ceases in the same manner as the apprehension of suffering (ceases?) (yatha ca duhkham fatha te jeyam na hiyathandtmd tatha duhkham md bhut parisilstandm and)tmatva duhkhat(v)an na pi yatha duhkha ... (a)natmata vinivartate). Section 5 concludes with a statement that one does not see the other three truths just because one sees the non-Self in respect to suffering ( bhavati duhkhel <>natmadarsandt parifistana darsanam iti). The next folio (370) begins with a formulation, or perhaps a quotation of the four noble truths (duhkha, duhkhasamudaya, duhkhanirodha and duhkhanirodhagamint pratipat). The siddhantin probably uses this formulation to emphasize the differences among the truths and to argue thereby that they cannot be apprehended at the same time. The first argument after this formulation has been transcribed by SPITZER in two different manners. If we accept the reading parisistesu yathabhutam, the argument says that the seeing of suffering is not a correct apprehension in respect to the rest, because the rest are not suffering (na ca duhkhadarsanam parisistesu yathabhitar. na hi parisistani duhkham.). In other words, an apprehension in which suffering appears is correct in respect to the object "suffering," but not correct in respect to the object 11 If on the other hand, the reading ayathabhatam is correct, one would have to assume that this argument is stated by the purvapaksin. According to my understanding of the Nachlass the transcription parisistes yathabhatam is earlier than parisiste ayathabharam. This could mean that SPITZER has corrected his first reading (-su yathabhutam) to ayathabhatam. 114 CE. AKBA 400.28. on VII.13a. 11 For a different formulation of the same argument cf. AKBh 351.16-17 (on VI.27be): tad yadi satyandm darsandhisamayan praty ekabhisamayam brilydt, ayuktam brayad akarabhedat. DE CE also AKBH 400.2: pidatmakarydd duhkham. 119 The argument probably responds to a purapaksin who argues that one can see all the truths together in the form of andman, E. AKBH 351.17: athapy and makiarena sarvesdm satydnim dardanam in brayat. 120 This last statement is suggested very tentatively for it is not clear how many akaras are missing between dukha and andmata. It is also not quite clear in what sense vinivartate is used here. Perhaps one should understand: Nor is it the case that anatmata does not apply to the other truths just as suffering does not apply to them. 171 Note also that one could rend duhithena atma-, but this reading seems improbable to me. 112 CE Abhidharmakofabhasyam of Vasubandhu (ed. A. Thakur, Patna 1975), p. 280.10 on 5.5a: Aad evam sarkayadrstir ekaprakard bhavati dukkhadar Sanay 11 Both the arupurwabhisamayavadin and the ekabhisamayadin use canonical passages in support of their views; examples are translated by BAREAU, op. cit., pp. 90 and 138 for the ampurvabhisamayavadin, and pp. 62 and 216 for the ekabhisamayavadir; cf. also p. 183. Cf. Satyasiddhifastra (Sanskrit translation by AIYASWAMI SASTRI, Baroda 1975), p. 79.6: yogi ca cittam samddhaya idam dubham ayam dunkhanirodha ya dukhani(rodha)gamint pratipad iti vikalpayet. yady ekasmimi citte syor katham evam anupurvena samadhivikalpo bhavet.

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92 Eli Franco In section 6 (370b) the siddhantin points out further differences among the truths. One such difference adduced may have been that the cognitions of the truths differ in content, e.g., suffering appears in the cognition of suffering and it is not seen (in the cognition of the other truths) and when the cognition in respect to suffering occurs, the remaining truths are not (apprehended). This is at least a possible interpretation of ... (kha)lv api [du](hkha)jnane duhkham adrsta... [na] ca duhkhe jnanotpattau... -yah parisistani. Such an interpretation seems to be corroborated by the following statement that one and the same thing (i.e., cognition) does not arise with regard to many (objects) in many different forms ([na hly (e)k(a)[m] (a)nekesv anekadha bhavati). Further, when the cognition of suffering does not arise there is no full comprehension of suffering (and the same holds good for the apprehension of the other truths). Therefore, the full comprehension of the four truths happens gradually (na hy anutpanne duhkhajnane duhkhabhisamayah, tasmad anuparvabhisamayah). According to the siddhantin (the Buddha?) formulated (the four truths?) considering that seeing the truth of suffering leads or gives rise to (or enables122) the seeing of the cessation of suffering (duhkhe khalv api darsanam duhkhadarsanam duhkhadarsanac ca nirodhadarsanam iti bhavan aha...). This does not imply that by seeing suffering one sees all noble truths in one cognition. 123 Yet another argument brought up by the siddhantin is that the defilements that rest on suffering "operate" differently than those in relation to the other truths (anyatha khalv api duhkhadhisthanaklesah pravartante anyatha parisistes[u]). I assume that this refers to the Sarvastivada doctrine according to which different types of klesas are destroyed gradually as one apprehends the different truths in their different forms. Folio 371a1 seems to continue the discussion by pointing out differences between duhkha and anatman (na tv anatma xxxx duhkhatvam) and arguing that if the characteristic of duhkha, namely, pain (pida), were found everywhere, i.e., in all truths (tad 112 Cf. AKBh 352.1: athapy ekasya dartanac chesesu vafitvalabhad ekabhisamayam brayat, na dosal syst 123 This interpretation and conjecture are very tentative. Both SPITZER and WATANABB/ MIYASAKA transcribe bhavan dha which does not seem to make sense unless one assumes that this could be an irregular (and untypical for the scribe of the Spitzer manuscript) sandhi form for bhavam; in this case one could speculate that a participant in the discussion formulates (aha) what is said in the preceeding in clause as the intention (bhava) of a specific statement of the Buddha. Alternatively, under both conjectures, one could assume that the implied subject of aha is the author of a text upon which our present text comments. It is also not impossible that the scribe has once again mixed up his short and long vowels and that one should read bhavan. In this case one would have to interpret the statement ending with iti as reflecting the ekabhisamaya point of view: The opponent addressed as bhavan is quoted in this way because by fully comprehending ("seeing") suffering one has in fact also fully comprehended the cessation of suffering. Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 93 yadi sarvatra pida...), this would lead to an unacceptable consequence (any reference to this is, however, missing in 'the fragment). The past participle prahina in the next line could perhaps refer to the same process as the one referred to by Vasubandhu in the concise formulation in AKBh 351.15-16: prahanasaksatkaranabhavanat, namely, when duhkha is seen, three kinds of karyabhisamaya arise in respect to the other three truths: the cause of the arising is abandoned, the suppression is experienced directly and the path is being practiced. A further characteristic that could distinguish suffering from other factors involved in the other truths is that suffering is (fully comprehended) as soon as it has arisen, whereas the other factors are not understood at the moment they arise and when they are fully comprehended they have already departed (pratyutpannamatram khalv api duhkha ...). Perhaps the proponent argues that suffering is only experienced as it arises in the present, and that the object of full comprehension cannot be something which has just arisen. By the time it is fully comprehended it is no longer present because it has already departed (i.e., is already destroyed) (... utpannam tan nabhisamagatam abhisamagatam ca vigatatva nasti.) The numbering in this section is confusing. It is possible that a new sequence of enumeration started somewhere after (5) in 370a2 and that (6) in 371b2 is part of this new enumeration rather than being subsequent to this (5). I cannot discern any change in topic though, or a change in the identity of the speakers. The possibility that we have here a numbered sub-division of (5) cannot be excluded either. Note that (6) seems to appear at the end of a purvapaksa statement, whereas (4) and (5) conclude siddhanta statements (the identity of the speaker in the two statements marked by (3) is not clear to me). The last argument of the opponent appears on 371b1: "As regards this [statement of ours the opponent) says: Because one apprehends jati, that too becomes fully comprehended" (atraha jatigrahana tad apy abhisamagatam bhavati (6)). I assume that jati here refers to a universal, i.e., is equivalent to a samanyalaksana that is common to all truths. One may recall Vasubandhu's statement that the samanyalaksanas are impermanence (anityata) for conditioned things (samskrta), duhkhata for all defiled (sasrava) dharmas, sunyata and anatmata for all dharmas. 125 Vasubandhu, as we saw above, 124 On the difference between darfanabhisamaya, alambanabhisamaya and karyabhisamaya cf. AKBh 351.13f. 125 Cf. AKBh 341.12-13 on VI.14cd.

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Bli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript raises the possibility of someone claiming that one can see all truths with the form of andiman, and Yafomitra explains that someone belonging to a different Buddhist school (nikdyantartya) could argue for ekabhisamaya on the basis of the two general characteristics funyata and anatmata. * Of the proponent's reply to this objection, unfortunately, nothing is preserved in our manuscript except the disconnected words sat, asar and klefabhava. The section concludes with ...yaparakarane anuparvabhisamayaparked which can be understood in two ways. One could assume that prakarara refers to the name of the work, e.g., the Abhidharmaprakarana of Vasumitra. Or one may assume that prakarana refers to a chapter in the work and that this chapter was subdivided into partksds. In spite of this and similar passages the major schools of Conservative Buddhism. especially the Theravada and the Sarvastivada, reject this doctrine. Consciousness is not luminous or pure by nature; it is defiled by passions and actions, and the connection with them has to be severed. If consciousness were luminous by nature, it could not become defiled by the defilements. Further, the dharmas perish at every moment. Therefore, it is not the defiled luminous consciousness which is liberated. Rather, when the connection with the defilements is severed, a future consciousness is liberated, i.e., the cognition in the next moment which is a cognition of the Arhat (afaikoya-cinta) arises free from defilements. In accordance with this opinion the siddhantin (371b3) states that the upaklesas are not adventitious to consciousness as long as both (consciousness and defilements) exist at present... Mpaklesah, tadubhayapraf(yu)(pan)n(a)tve agantukatvam na bhavati 2) The second topic (371b2f.) begins with a reference to a parvapaksa statement that consciousness (citta) is luminous by nature (yad ucyate praktiprabhasvaram ...). This is a clear reference to a doctrine propagated by some schools of Conservative Buddhism, notably, the Mahasanghikas, the Vibhajyavadins and the Sariputrabhidharma," that consciousness is luminous by nature (cintam praktiprabhdsvaram), but can be defiled (klista, upaklista) by the defilements (klesa, upaklesa) or liberated (vipramukta) from them. In this sense it is said that "consciousness accompanied by desire is liberated" (sardgam cittam vimuccati)." This doctrine is based on a passage in Arguttara Nikdya 161, pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittar tar ca kho agantukchi upakkilesehi upakkilihan. "This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is defiled by adventitious defilements." In 372a1 the siddhantin could perhaps argue that the luminosity of consciousness is not perceived (... prabhasvaratvam upalabdham). If the purvapak in replies that the luminous consciousness is defiled (yad ucyate prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti yadi ...) (and this is the reason why its natural luminosity is not perceived in its present state; cf. pratyutpanna), the siddhantin answers that what is luminous cannot be defiled (... klistam prabha/svara)........ khalv api nopapadyate). Further, he asks for the cause or reason for the opponent's statement that a luminous consciousness is defiled, implying that no such cause or reason can be given, because at the time when the luminous consciousness is apprehended by a cognition consciousness is not defiled (prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti kim karanam? yada hi buddhyd prabhasvaram upalabhyate na rado[pa)(k)[(ify)). If the purvapaksin would retort that the luminous consciousness could be perceived at another time ... da prabhasyaram..... upalabhyeta), then he would have to 136 CL AKV 926.11-12: "athapy and makarena sarvesdom satydnim dar fanamiti bryd" nikdydntariyah nyatanatmate sarvaratydndomsmdayam lakonan kytd. 117 In the following discussion I use "consciousness" for eitta and "cognition for buddhi. It seems that the two terms are not used synonymously here, in 372s it is said that the luminous (CODsciousness -I assume that prabharyara qualifies cinta) is apprehended by buddhi: buddhyd prabhasve. Tome upalabhyate CL. BAREAU, op. cit., pp. 67-68 (th. 44). 175 (th. 28). 194 (th. 6); cf. also pp. 90 (th. 9), 147 (th. 80), 161 (th. 14), 217 (th. 24) and further references there to the Vibhard, Sariputrdbhidharma Kaththatha, Mydymusdra, etc. > Cr the informative presentation in E. LAMOTTE, L'Enseignement de Vimalaktit. LouvainLeuven 1962, pp. 51-54. For prabhavara cittain Yogic and Madhyamaka cf. also D. SEYFORT RUEOG, La Theorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra Paris 1969, esp. pp. 425-428. 19 PTS d. vol. Lp. 10. 131 One of the reasons for this rejection probably lays in the fact that the implied canonical notion of cinta as a lasting subtle element was incompatible with the doctrine of momentariness and the denial of the substance. * C. LAMOTTE, op. cit. p. 54 and n. 37. In the entire discussion, with a single exception, paklefa rather than lela is used; this is probably due to the canonical formulation in Anguftaranikdy 1.6 (PTS ed. vol. I, p. 10) quoted above. However, I do not think that the distinction beween kleda and paklesais relevant to the present context and there is nothing to indicate that the author has only the minor defilements in mind. 11 asume that there was a negation in the first part of the statement 1991 would like to conjecture anyada here.

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Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript _97 accept that consciousness has) two own-beings (i.c., luminousness and non-luminous ness) and the cognition too (would have two own beings) because of the double nation (of consciousness as luminous and as non-luminous). But this is not acceptable to the opponent. Therefore, there is no determination (that luminous consciousness is defiled) (tam(?) dvisvabhavam syad buddhis ca dvictva?>vyavasayat. anistam cal. ta). Tasmat prarupan[abhavah.) This concludes section 3. Section 4 considers further alternatives. First, a defiled consciousness does not apprehend a defiled consciousness; there is no determination i.e., it could not be determined that luminous consciousness is defiled (na khalv apy upaklistam upaklistam grhnati prarupanbhava ...). (If the opponent suggests that the defiled consciousness apprehends the luminous consciousness, this is also impossible.) At the time when it is defiled it is not luminous (... upaklistam na tada ...). Nor are the defiled and the nondefiled apprehended at the same time ((aply upallistanupakliste yugapad upalabhyate!"). Therefore, how could it be known that a luminous consciousness is defiled (tar katham etac chakyate jflatum prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti)? Section 5 seems to begin with a presentation of the opponent's position in the form of a hypothesis: If the luminous nature of consciousness is destroyed by the defilements ... (yadi ca prakytir upaklefair upam dyate, prabha(svar)...). A possible reply or consequence could be that in this case consciousness too would be destroyed together with its luminous nature (... (upa)m(r)dyate prabhasva ...). The opponent must have attempted to justify his position by claiming that consciousness and luminosity are two different things and that only luminosity is destroyed. This argument is rejected as incorrect (ity ayu)[k]t(a)m). The proponent gives the reason for the fault in the opponent's view: The nature (prakrti) of a thing is its own-being (svabhava). If that own-being is destroyed, the thing called "consciousness" would not be any longer (fya) khalv api yasya praktih sa tasya svabhavah. sa yady upamrdyate cittam iti tan na bhavati). Luminosity (and consciousness itself) become one (... prabhasvaratvam ... ekibhavanti). Further, how could (properties?) that rest on the nature of consciousness defile (consciousness itself) ((pra)[kr]tisthah katham upakle ayanti)? 373al refers again to the opponent for whom being consciousness and being luminous are different things yasyanya cittatvam anyam prabha(sv) ...). The proponent must have rejected the construed difference between consciousness and luminosity. Further, he could have argued that under the assumption of such a difference a defilement, if it comes into contact with a luminous consciousness, would become luminous itself, clearly an inadmissible consequence, just as that the luminous consciousness too, inasmuch as it comes into contact with a defilement, is supposedly defiled ((pra)bhasvaram apy upaklefam anupraptam kli...). This interpretation is based on a parallel passage in the Vibhasa, as summarized by Lamotte. In 373a3 the opponent possibly attempts to establish the difference between luminosity and consciousness by taking recourse to the factor of time. Consciousness could have been luminous in the past (pra)bhasvaram asirl) and have become defiled later on. The opponent may have understood this difference as a difference in state (cf. avastha in 37361). I assume that the proponent now repeats his previous argument in his reply, namely, that if a state of consciousness is not something different from consciousness itself, then when the state is that of being defiled, consciousness is defiled. If, on the other hand, the state would be different from consciousness itself, defiling is due to an interaction between two different entities (cf. ... anyenanyasya...). Thus, the relationship between consciousness and the defiled state is the same as that between consciousness and the defilement, for the defilement is also different from consciousness (upaklesasya py any...), and thus consciousness itself would not be affected by the defiled state. The argument must have been more complicated and must have also taken into account whether a state lasts for some time (... (a)vastha bhavati. athavatishate ...). The opponent may have argued that the proponent does not understand what it means to be defiled. Because consciousness is defiled by the defilements, it is suffering, and being defiled by something else it becomes itself a defilement ((upakli)yate tasma d[u](hkh)... Syanyenopaklistasyopaklefarvam...). The defilement occurs by way of a contact or conjunction (samyoga) between the two. Section 5 ends with a prasariga in which the consequence must have been that consciousness itself would be de 199 CE LAMOTTE, op. cit., p. 54 (paraphrasing Vibhagd T. 1545, k. 27, p. 140b-c): "Polerniquant avec les Vibhajyavidin, les SarvistivAdin-Vaibhaisika remarquent qu'une pensee originellement lumineuse ne peut pas etre suillee par les ordures des passions adventices. Dans cette hypothese, les passions adventices, naturellement suillees, une fois associees avec la pensee originellement et naturellement lumineuse deviendraient pures. Ou, si elles restaient impures, la pensee lumineuse ne serait pas suillee par leur fait." 1 I do not understand the relationship between prabhaswaram Astr and idam dsid iti na bh.: perhaps idam dsat begins a new sentence. 14? It is possible, of course, that one has to read anawasth. In this case athavaristhate means: if there is no infinite regress. 116 I am tempted to conjecture wpaklistam anupaklistam, but that would be a lectio facilior. 19? As pointed above a negation should be added for this sentence, probably napy. 1* For the phenomenon of a singular verb with a dual subject cf. EDGERTON, BHSG 25.3.

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98 Eli Franco filed ((u)paklistam syad iti). Our text, however, is too fragmentary to serve as a basis for reconstructing an argument. In 374a1 the siddhanta position is being reiterated, namely, it is not correct to say that luminous consciousness is defiled (... [y] x [1] x [c] x (p[r]abha)svaram tad upaklistam ity etad ayuktam vaktum). It can also not be said that luminous consciousness is only partly defiled, namely, in its non-essential part because it does not have a defiled part and a non-defiled part (na hy asyavayava upaklisto 'vayavo 'nupaklista iti) because consciousness does not have parts. This ends section 3. Even if we take 374al as the end of section 1 (which is not at all certain since the figure for 1 is indistinguishable from a simple danda), it is hard to see where section 2 may have ended and section 3 began in such a small space. Of section 4 only the beginning and the end remain. It begins with the assertion that the non-defiled is different from the defiled (anyam khalv apy upaklistad anupaklista...) and ends with a reductio ad absurdum that in this manner (the defiled) too would be luminous (pi prabhasvaram evam sya(t)). In-between the proponent may have argued again for a symmetry between defiling and purifying or becoming luminous. Finally, section 5 refers to the opponent's position that consciousness itself is not defiled because it is perceived to be luminous (yadi khalv api grhyate prabhasvaram ity anupaklista bhavati). The proponent's reply is unfortunately not preserved. As mentioned above, 374b1 preserves the name of the chapter: prabhasvarapratijnopalambhika "[the chapter that] criticizes the thesis [that consciousness is] luminous [by nature]." 3) The final topic in our fragments deals with the question whether the Buddha too is included in the sangha. Unfortunately, SPITZER was unable to continue his work. I was able to identify at least six, probably seven, more fragments which clearly deal with the same topic: 51, 59, 80, part of 130, 242(uncertain), 548 and 854. At least four of these fragments probably belong to folio 375; the others could either belong to 375 or to 376 where the discussion continues. 142 Possible conjectures on the basis of these remnants would be yac cittam (or perhaps yat kim cat?) 143 Cf. n. 65 above on the possible prakritic pronominal adjective. 5la (2.1x2.8) Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript a ///(?)ryyagunasamanya/// b.. [ply?) aryyaguna(samanyavisesa?)/// 59a (3.4x4.9) 2///[ya]tharyyah evam [bu)(d)dh(as) t. .J 3 ///ry[y]a e[v]am [buddha a]panna ../// 51b a ///(saman)y(a)[v](i)[](e)sanupra/// b///samghe tasman (n)./// 59b Hag 99 1. i[ti] tan nah 4 Il ya[d]./// 2. s tasman na bhagavam samghe../// 3.. [tatra yad uktam)... ++///

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100 80a; fol. 37 verso (3.5x7.8) 1)[t]y ukta[m] sutresu tatsv(a)(a)bh(a)vagrahane viru[ddhya]/// 2) (pradu?)rbhavas tasman na svabhave O varttate b. ./// 3) tam istam karanam asti tasma(t) tata eva i/// 80b; fol. 37* recto 27272 Eli Franco masala JAWA HA 1) karyyam tasmad buddhah samghe nopalabhya(te)/// 2) (sam)gheti 3 sati kha O lv api vi[se](sa)/// 3) (sadha/vaidha?)rmy [at ta]smat samghe nopalabhyate/// the recto side. 144 In the early Turfan manuscripts, roughly up to the 7 century, the numbers were written on 130a part (3.5x3.9) 1 ///t[v]at sa(m)ghe iti tan na/// 2///++iti tan nah 3 y 3 ///+++ (sa)manyavi[s]e(sa)/// 242a (1.8x2.2) a ///h sa(m?)gha/// b ///..yatha../// 548a (0.9x3.8) Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript a ///.. [pa]desasy[u]pa../// 130b part 1 ///(sama)nyavisesa.JII 2 ///(acary?)y(ag)[u]pasamanyavise(sa)/// 3/[ca] samghah sa ca ..m/// 242b a ///(acary?)y(a)[g]unas[a](manyavisesa?)/// b///na ca sam(gha?)/// 548b a ///(ar?)[yya]gunasam(an)ya(visesa)/// 101

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9 102 Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 854a (3.7x3.4) 854b 375 verso 375 recto SO 19032 1 Il/m aryyah.. + + Ill 2 WW.. ti yatha [b]uddha)II 38/4+ [s] tasmad bhavaty a.// XII+yatharyya eval 2 ///[buddhanam Sravaka +/// 3 Il/aryyas&(man)y(visesa?)+/// As for a possible arrangement of these fragments I suggest the following. Since number 4 is likely to come after 3, and 4 (in 595) appears in line 1 while the two figures for 3 in 80b and 130a) appear in line 2,59b must belong to the verso, and 806 and 130a to the recto of folio 375. I suggest also that 130 be placed to the right of 59 because 3 in 130a concludes the siddhanta reply to the parvapaksa numbered 3 and concluded in 80b, and thus enough space should separate the two fragments to allow for the siddhanta statement or argument 854 seems closely related to 59 and I tentatively place it to its left (yatha buddha (evam arryah?)... yatharryah evam buddhah). There is no way to determine where 51, 242 and 548 may belong and, therefore, I do not include them. The probable arrangement of 80, 59, 130 and 854 can be represented as follows. Note, however, that the spaces between the fragments are misleading the original leaf was some 40 cm wide,

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2 376v Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 1) ttir api n(a)s[t]iti (51 (p]r[a]tibaviruddha[m] khalv (apy u] .. + + + + + + + +/I! 2) salmll'ecaryyagunsalsa O m(A)nyavisesayogas tasmat (addhyasadhakajbhav, .ll 3) (animah In jas(i niskara(na).i.i+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + III What looks like an anusara is perhaps just a small indentation in the loal (almost a hole as can be seen on the other side of the leaf between yw in line 2 andri in line 3). In any case, s eedrya (to be walked upon, brought about or produced) does not seem to make sense here; further there would be no reason for the doubling of c. I understand saccarya as true or good conduct, l.e., as equivalent to saccaryd. It may be reminded that the distinction between a and is often ignored in the manuscript 376r (part of frame 137) Eli Franco 1) smalt) (ar) y(a)[bh/s)... ta(t)r(a) + + ... + +.y. ++++.y. ++ ++// 2) yuktatvad vyatirikta(in) O sarvvasya cla)(a)sarvvena sadharmmyavaidha(r)myam ast(i II 3) riktam nanv a vylatirikt[t]air api samanya[li[S]e(sa) + + + + + + + + + ///

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106 Eli Franco Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript 107 employed here in this sense, but even so it is impossible to determine what is contradictory to the thesis." Now let us have a look at the content of these fragments. The discussion begins on the fragment preserved in SPITZER's transcription with the statement of the opponent's position, namely, that the disciples are endowed with the general and specific qualities of the teacher, and thus the general and specific qualities of the Buddha are present in his disciples, the Bravakas, and therefore "we" see that he too is in the sangha (ye dcdryyagunasamanyavisesayuktah samghe... sayuktah, atah pasyamah bhagavan api samghe iti). The siddhantin's rejection of this position, which was divided into at least five sections, cannot be reconstructed in detail. In folio 375 only one argument seems relatively clear. The siddhantin denies that an enlightened disciple (Arhat, which I assume is referred to with the word arya) is similar to the Buddha (vatharyyah evam buddhah ...)." His reason, or one of his reasons, for the rejection of the similarity is that if this were the case the Arhat too would be a Buddha ((a)rylyla e[v]am (buddha a]panna..). In folio 376 the siddhantin must have argued that the mere fact that the Buddha and the Arhats share some general and specific qualities or properties does not prove that the Buddha can be seen in the sangha. Everything has similarities and dissimilarities with everything (sarvvasya c sarvvena sadharminyawaidhaft)myam asti)). The opponent may have replied that the similarities adduced are not mere accidental properties, and that there is an essential similarity between the Buddha and the Arhats which consists in their connection with the same general and specific qualities of moral conduct (cf. 376v2: saccaryagun[a]samnyavisesayogah"). The siddhantin's reply is largely lost, but one can see that he used two types of argument in this connection. The one (376v1) charges the opponent with committing the fallacy of pratijnaviruddha. This word is certainly used here as a technical term, but the context does not allow us to determine which of the various meanings that appear in the early manuals of debate is intended here. Moreover, it has to be noted that viruddha can be used in the sense of "contradictory," that is, pratijnaviruddha does not necessarily mean "contradicted by the thesis"; it can also mean "contradictory to the thesis," and my guess is that the term is The other argument refers to the opponent's proof (or inference? *sadhana) and points out the absence of the property to be proved and the proving property (s(a)dhyasddha/kabhava). Unfortunately the proof itself does not appear in the fragment, or more precisely, only part of it appears in the initial statement (ye acaryaguna- ctc.). I am not quite sure yet how to interpret this passage. The same topic is probably mentioned by Barcau, namely, "[Le) Buddha est inclus dans la Communaute". Among the schools which endorse the thesis that the Buddha is included in the community Bareau mentions the Sarvastivada without, however, specification of thesis number, and I could not find this thesis in his presentation of the Sarvastivada. Further, according to the materials presented by Bareau the question whether the Buddha is included in the sangha seems to have arisen in the context of donation (i.e., whether a donation made to the sangha is also eo ipso a donation to the Buddha), and in the present fragments there is no trace of such a discussion, although, of course, not enough fragments remain to justify an argument ex silentio with any certainty. I BAREAU's attribution of this thesis to the Sarvastivada is correct, this would be a reason to reject the identification of the present discussion as a treatment of this topic because what should accordingly be endorsed by the Sarvastivada appears here as a purvapaka. A possible solution to this problem would be to distinguish between the thesis "the Buddha is in i.e. part of the sangha" and the thesis "the Buddha is perceived in (i.e., through?) the sangha" discussed here. Alternatively, one may assume that the Spitzer Manuscript docs not represent a text of the Sarvastivada school. However, I would hesitate to take such a step without further substantiation because practically all the Sanskrit manuscripts in the Turfan collection are assumed to belong to the Sarvastivada school. In this connection one is reminded of MIYASAKA's suggestion that the work preserved in the Spitzer Manuscript belongs to the Sautrantika school. MIYASAKA'S assumption, however, is problematic. If I understand him correctly, he attributes the text to the Sautrantika school because he sees certain similarities between it and the Satyasiddhifastra of Harivarman. Yet the attribution of the Satyasiddhifdstra to the 145 I assume that the statement as it now stands was negated either by a preceding na or by subsequent in tanna, etc. 14 The statement here certainly represents the siddhanta opinion, but it must refer to a preceding pdrapaksa statement which uses the same terms. I assume that this statement here was denied either by a preceding na orasiddha, etc. As mentioned above, I tentatively interpretaccarya saccaryd. CI.K. PREISENDANZ, Studien zu Myllyastra III.1. Stuttgart 1994. Vol. 2, pp. 320-321. . 1* According to the Nytynsdtra definition of the nigrahasthana pratavirodha, the contradiction referred to obtains between the reason (hetu) and the thesis. However, het is a masculine noun and therefore it is probably not referred to by-viruddham which is probably a nominative. W CE. BARBAU, op. cit., p. 260 and further references therein to pp. 83 (thesis 4 of the Babusrutlyas), 185 (th. 21 of the MahiSasakns) and 192 (th. 1 of the Dharmaguptakas),

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108 Eli Franco Sautrantika is itself problematic. DEMIEVILLE and BAREAU, for instance, consider this text to belong to the Bahusrutiya school.150 Furthermore, our understanding of the very term Sautrantika has radically changed since MIYASAKA wrote his paper. It is now believed that this term does not apply to any specific school, but that it rather stands for various Abhidharmikas who accept only the Buddha's sermons as authoritative. As such the term can be applied to practically any school except the Sarvastivada.151 Whatever the case may be, the above materials amply demonstrate how important SPITZER's transcriptions of the lost fragments are for our understanding of the text. Next to the fragments of folio 375 and 376 (reproduced above) I was able to identify further fragments belonging to folios 379-387. Thus, combining SPITZER's transcription and the surviving fragments we can gain a relatively good understanding of the structure and content of folios 369-387. I hope to publish these additional fragments soon. 150 Cf. BAREAU, Les Sectes, p. 81 and further references in n. 1. 151 Cf. FRANCO, Dharmakirti on Compassion and Rebirth, Wien 1997, p. 85, n. 51 (containing a summary of a personal communication by Professor SCHMITHAUSEN). Page Nr in Miyasaka 1962 673 GC 675 44 44 44 44 0 676 # #4 44 44 K EL C 677 44 Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript Fragment Nr in Miyasaka 1962 untransliterated reproduction 29b 2061-3 5363 48a3 23a1-2 23b1-3 17b1-2 59a2 5962 58b3 27a1-2 28a3 27b1 28b1-2 27a3 51a1-51b3 9(a or b?)2-3 31,al-3 36,al-3 36,b1-3 36,b1-3 Page Nr in Spitzer's Nachlass' 46, a 2, fol. 371 62-3 3, fol. 374 b1-3 - 22, 63 - 52, al-2 1, fol. 369, b1-2 1, fol. 370, b2-3! 1, fol. 369, al 1, fol. 370, al-2 1, fol. 369, b3 33 (a and b in reversed order) Fragment/Frame Nr of SHT-810 112a2 11262 109 11a3(?) (upamanat instead of abhavar) 98b2-3 138a/9.1-3 138b/2.1-3 138b/1.1-3 138a/10.1-3 Only lost fragments are noted here; i.e. if a fragment exists in SHT-810, a reference to the Nachlass is not given even if the fragment has been transcribed by SPITZER.

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110 Eli Franco 36,61-2 1386/7.1-2. 18a1-18b3 - 2, fol. 372 3, fol 374, al-3 20a1-3 52,61 662a2-3! (buddhihestu) is missing there 678 26, al-3 80a. 1-3 2624x-* 2632xx 130a1-3 26%%% 59a 26,61-3 80b1-3 596b and 5162 262bxX 26,6xx 130b (right frg) 26 bxos 59b 212 13752 (left frg) 679 (notes) 10b 111a3 96 98613 9.a part of 98b1? 62a1-2 761 " 40b1-2 - 9, a2 ? MIYASAKA transcribes four lines as if they belonged to the same fragment; however, this seems unlikely to me. However, buddhir bodhavya instead of buddhibauddhavya; om. prakaranam which seems to appear in 92a.)