Jiv And Ajiv

Author(s): S S Barlinge
Publisher: Z_Kailashchandra_Shastri_Abhinandan_Granth_012048.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/210542/1

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Jiva and Ajiva Dr. S. S. Barlingey, Poona University D . Jiva. Jain philosophers talk of Jiva and Ajiva. Is it a division, a category distinction or an abstraction ? Do Jiva and Ajiva exclude each other? Or are they abstractions from experience, and so just the concepts and not existents ? Before we proceed further it may be pointed out that it was the custom in ancient India to give a list of concepts but the list was not necessarily exclusive and several concepts mentioned in the list were over-lapping. The Vaisesikas mention nine Dravyas-the Mahabhutas, the space and time and Manas and Atman. It is difficult to assume that space and time and the Bhutas exist independently of one another and that they are not overlapping. It is difficult to imagine Psthivi, Ap, Tejas, Vayu or Akasa without spatial or temporal dimension. I understand that when the Vaisesikas gave this list they treated Psthivi, Ap etc., as also their forms, space and time as belonging to one list of investigations. The Jains similarly could give a list of what is traditionally known as Jain padarthas (Jainas called them Dravyas) and amongst them could be Jiva and Ajiva. If we look at experience at a macroscopic level it will be clear that the world consists of Jiva or the animate and things different from Jiva or the inanimate. This is the case of a division of the world on a certain principle, fundamentum divisonis. Such division would not suggest that the life or Jiva has no spatiotemporal aspects, nor would it suggest that it has no material aspects. It would, e. g., be possible to imagine two kinds of matter one having life and the other without life. This is what is, for example, said in the Caraka-Samhita. But on such a division, the living and the non-living things or substances will both have some common properties which are spatio-temporal. For, whether something is living or non-living, it would primarily be material and located in space and would be just real, one that can be experienced. Sometimes, however, we may classify our experience into Life and otherwise and such a classification would easily be ambiguous; for, one could mean by it either the classification of real things or we could mean by it a classification of concepts, a case of mere abstraction. It is further possible that we might confuse between the division of things and classification of concepts and in that case we might be doing what is known as abstraction but thinking that we are dividing (or classifying) the things in the world. In this case the confusion would arise due to the fact that we would be treating concepts and things on par, the images of things and concepts succeeding each other in such a quick succesion that one is mistaken for the other. - 504 -

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When Descartes, e. g., thought of extention and consciousness as substances he was, as Spinoza later suggested, talking of attributes or was merely abstracting, i. e., distinguishing extentional and consciousness aspects of experience, but was thinking that he was dividing (or classifying) the substances, into two. But dividing substance having extension into living and non-living substances is quite different from classifying the concepts of extension and consciousness (without extension) and then thinking that consciousness without extension was one kind of substance and extension was another kind of substance. In experience we do come across the living beings and nonliving things. But however minute a living being may be our experience always tells us that it is always determined by extension. That we are not able to see the extension of it by our naked eyes, does not prove that there is no extension determining these substances. One has to admit that the language Anou Aniyan etc. is the language of extension or space. The problem which arises here is that how there can be a Sanyoga-external contact between something that is extensional and something that is extensionless. People of various schools including Jainism must have noticed this difficulty and that is why the concept of Linga-Deha or KaranaDeha must have been introduced. It goes without saying that Deha suggests that although consciousness was different from body, it still had extension. But if this is admitted it is a tacit admission of the fact that the division Jiva and Ajiva was a division of matter, i. e., existence having extension, into non-living and living, and from this it would follow that Jain philosophers were primarily concerned with dividing or classifying the world into extentional but conscious and extentional but nonconscious world, and not into extentional and nonextentional world. My contention is that in a physical analysis or division it is never possible to divide the world into something that is extensional and nonextensional. When we try to talk of extensional and non-extensional and also identify extensional with nonconscious or Ajiva and nonextentional with conscious or Jiva we are, as a matter of fact, abstracting, conceptualizing, logicizing and only mistaking a logical analysis for a physical division. Of course a problem would arise here : When we are talking of a Living being, we know that it is determined by birth and death. In a state after death consciousness or livingness disappears and it makes us think that it has gone away. We forget that 'has gone away' is a metaphor and if it is not used in a metaphorical way it would only belong to the language of space. But we simultaneously hold the belief that (a) it belongs to the language of space and (b) it does not belong to the language of space. We simply overlook that to hold two such beliefs together is a contradiction. But holding such beliefs becomes possible because they are held in two separate chambers of consciousness without any communication between them. Of course, one will have to explain the phenomenon of exit or vanishing of life. But saying that life is a separate substance and it goes away at the time of death is not offering a real explanation of the phenomenon, Space and a thing in space cannot be separated 64 - 505 -

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from each other. From this if someone suggests that they are two things and they only come together by some external contact, it would be incorrect. Similarly if there is green leaf and if later on it dries up, it would be incorrect to say that green itself has gone somewhere else. When a revolving wheel stops it does not mean that the movement is taking rest somewhere. Vanishing is not equivalent to going somewhere else just as existing together of space and a thing in space is not equivalent to external contact or Sarbyoga. A better explanation would be to say that (1) space and a thing in space are one phenomenon, (2) greeness and vanishing of greeness of leaf is another kind of phenomenon (3) revolution of wheel and stopping of its movement is a third kind of phenomenon and death of a living being is a fourth kind of phenomenon. One need not explain the one in terms of the other. But unconsciously one commits this mistake and fluctuates between the process of dividing (or classifying) and conceptualising. Perhaps a better explanation of Jain category would be possible if we understand Jiva and Ajiva as a division of existants, say matter, on the principle that one is animistic and the other is not. One has to remember that the process of dividing, enumerating, counting or sometimes even classifying things is of one kind and categorising of things is of another. You cannot divide, enumerate etc., unless things exist in their own right. Of course conceptually you can even give concepts the status of a thing and then count (as you do when you count categories). But primarily this process belongs to things which exist in their own right. On the other hand when you distinguish different qualities or characteristics, you are not seperating the independent things, you are abstracting them, and such abstractions are neither in space nor in time, they are not existing, nor living, they are just concepts. A problem, of course, would arise about the relationship of such concepts to reality. Concepts in logic does not require a bearer of substratum but if they are to be real then they can be real only in relation to some substratum which is real, i.e., these concepts should be such that they must be capable of having a form which is a form of existence, a form of life. This form of life or existence makes it possible for us to think that the concept has an existential relevance, Take, e.g., the case of sweetness. In order for sweetness to have significance in life it will have to go with some thing and to talk of a thing we will have to talk of space, time and substance. Space, time and substance, so to say provide a medium for the concept of sweetness to be real. The process by which we concretise a concept is the process in which we supply medium for the concept to exist. And this according to me is the Jain concept of Astikaya-a body for its existence, a form of existence. This form of existence will naturally vary accordingly as the concept in its concretized form is dynamic or not and accordingly the Astikaya concept also will be modified into Dharmastikaya and Adharmastikaya etc. But the point that I am making is that when a Jain philosopher tries to conceptualize and abstract, he rather talks of Dharma and Adharma, both of them being characteristics (Adharma is also a characteristic) and when he talks of concrete things, he talks of Jiva and Ajiva. One can easily see the distinction between Jiva and Ajiva on the one hand and 506

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Dharma and Adharina on the other. * In the light of what has been said above, let me now try to understand the theory of Jiva and Ajiva as understood traditionally by the Jain thinkers. In doing this, it will be my object to remove the contradictions or inconsistencies in the theory and present the theory in a consistent form. Thereby I might be able to show that the theory of Jiva and Ajiva is, in fact, concerned with a division of certain matter which is divided on the basis of animate and inanimate only. First, Jain philosophers think that both Jiva and Ajiva are Dravyas.* Of course Dravya is that which has got certain characteristics. But they think that all Dravyas are spatial in character. Even time is spatial in character for them. Space seems to be the common characteristic of all Dravyas or things. They use the word Pradesa to denote spatiality of a thing. They also think that since there are two kinds of objects, Jiva and Ajiva, Jiva and Ajiva would be a division of the universe. They bring in an important notion here. The notion of Akasa. They divide Akasa into Loka-akasa and Aloka- kasa. Loka-Akasa is the space wherein the things exist and activity takes place. But the Loka-Akasa is encircled by a limiting line (may be imaginary) beyond which there cannot be any activity nor can there be any existence of things. It is on this line of demarcation that Jain philosophers imagine that there are Siddhasilas and think of them as abode of freed souls. The freed souls simply cannot go beyond this line because as soon as they are free their activity comes to an end. Beyond this line there is only empty space. It is empty space not because there in nothing in it but because there cannot be anything in it. All things of different kinds therefore exist only in Loka-Akasa. It may be remembered that the empty space in Loka-akasa is different in kind from the empty space in Aloka-Akasa. There is however, a difficulty which may be pointed out here. Everything which exists is Astikaya. However, Kala is not an Astikaya though it exists in Lok-Akasa only. How to conceive of Kala as not Astikaya and still in space is in fact a problem. Therefore, I think, it is necessary to think that the terin Astikaya does not simply indicate a thing but it means as Jain philosophers rightly assert, a medium introduced like Kant's schemata to make up for the relation between concepts and things. But if we think this way, Jiva and Jivastikaya would be two notions and not one. Jiva would be the concept of Jiva and Jivastikaya would be an actual Jiva having extension. This will not only be true of Jiva, but of all Dravyas. In ordinary language we do use the word Jiva in these two senses. This would also explain why Kala is not Astikaya, for the concept of time does not require any other medium in order to be significant. * At a later stage, however, he must have made a distinction between Jiva (as a concept) and Jiva (as Astikaya). Similarly he must have made a distinction between Dharina and Dharmastikaya etc. I am aware that the Jains use the word Dravya where a Vaisesika would use Padartha. - 507 -

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Time itself is such a medium, It is not bound to space in the manner material things are bound to space. Thus only those concepts which require spatiality, in order for them to be significant, and have a form of existence would alone be Astikaya. Astikaya would also thus mean the body or medium of a concept which makes the concepts exist and cease to be merely a concept. I feel that at some stage Jain philosophers must have confused between the concept of Jiva and the actual Jiva. It need not be added that the concept of Jiva is a logical notion whereas Jiva is an empirical existence. Let me now understand how the Jain philosophers think of Jiva which is a Dravya and so which eixsts its own right. And here comes a very significant notion of the Jains. First they think that the Jivas are Anantas-infinite. They also think that Jivas are Asankhya-Pradesas. Pradesa here means space and by the statement Jivas are Asatukhya-Pradesas-what is meant is that different Jivas can have different spatial dimensions. What is admitted here is that the existent Jivas are spatial in character. Again, if there is a living child then the Jiva of that child has the same extension as the extension of the body. If the child grows the Jiva also grows for there is no part of the living body which is unconscious, The Jivas is regarded as life-coat for the body. It is a cap or a gown which covers every part of the body and is coextensive with it. This Jiva is not ordinarily separable from the body. When it becomes Mukta then like the left-skin of the serpent and the serpent which can be separated, the Jiva and the body are separated. The Jiva in the context of the living body is continuously growing but a Mukta Jiva would not occupy that part of the body where there are empty spaces or hollowness. Thus in the case of a Mukta Jiva there may not be a oneto-one correspondence between the extension cf Jiva and the body, and the extension of the Mukta Jiva may be smaller than his body. The most important and common-sense element in the whole theory of Jains is this that they agree that consciousness of Jiva cannot exist without space. But this is possible only if Jiva and body are inseparable. But inconsistently with this belief they also believe that at the time of Mukti the Jiva and body can be separated. It is iike taking out a cap of a fountain-pen and keeping it away from the fountain pen. In the case of fountain-pen both the fountainpen and its cap are material. But can there be a spatial forin which exists and has no material characterization ? It is almost like thinking that there is a form of fragrance as a quality without any material bearer. It is like the Cheshire cat in Alice in the wonderland, which goes away leaving its grin behind. Can there be spatial layer of consciousness without a material body? To think of such layer is in fact to think that consciousness is also material though different from the material body which is non-living. It is holding two belief-systems together in two different chambers. Jain philosophers were toeing the common sense so long as they were thinking that the Jivas had pradesas. But to think of the Jivas along with pradesas without body, i.e., Deha, is to mistify and liquidate the common sense. It is the mistake of not distinguishing between vanishing of the phenomenon and separation - 508 -

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of the two independent phenomena. This paradox can be dissolved only if we regard that there are living spatial phenomena and non-living spatial phenomena such that both of them have some material substratum. While intepreting Jain theory it is the common sense, which we have to depend upon. The commonsense tells us that matter is to be divided into living and non-living and is not to be abstracted into matter and not-matter. But in such a case it is redundant to say that there are two bodies one living and the other non-living and that the living body is super-imposed on the nonliving one. Spatiality, it is insisted, is a property both of living and non-living. In the process of abstraction spatiality would also be abstracted. Perhaps for this reason people talked of Karmika Deha. Unless Karma has spatiality and material properties it could not be attached to Jiva at all. But this common sense stand of the Jains is given up when they bring in the Mukta Jiva, and like other systems of Indian philosophy add to confusion and become more or less like traditional Sa akhya or traditional Advaita. lekhasAra jIva aura ajIva ___ DA0 esa0 esa0 bAlige, pUnA vizvavidyAlaya jaina dArzanikoMne jIva aura ajIva tattvoMkI carcA kI hai| kyA yaha carcA padArthoke vargIkaraNase sambandhita hai athavA yaha mAtra eka dhAraNA hai| vargIkaraNake lie padArthakA astitva-vistAra Avazyaka hai jabaki dhAraNAke lie yaha anivArya nahIM hai / jaba sthUla jagatako jIva-ajIvake rUpameM vargIkRta karate haiM, taba sAmAnya dRSTise AkAza-kAlake guNa svataH samAhita ho jAte haiN| aisA pratIta hotA hai ki jainoMke lie jIva aura jIvAstikAya donoMkA bhinna artha hai / jainoMmeM zarIra aura jIvakA jo sambandha batAyA hai, vaha tarkasaMgata nahIM baitthtaa| inake sambandhake lie karmakA Azraya liyA gayA hai| yaha bhI vistAravAlA hai / jIvAstikAya bhI vistAravAn hai / yahA~ taka to bAta banatI hai, lekina jaba mukta jIvakI bAta AtI hai, taba sthiti bhinna hotI hai| yahA~ inake siddhAntoMmeM bhI sAMkhya aura advaitake samAna bhrAnti adhika utpanna hotI hai / phalataH jainoMke jIva-ajIva viSayaka pakSake sahI rUpa para gaMbhIra vicAra aura nirNaya Avazyaka hai / eka zodhadizA jApAnameM pracalita yena mata aura jainadharma paM0 jaganmohana lAla zAstrI, kaTanI 'dinamAna' ke 1-10-77 ke aMkameM 'dharma-darzana' khaMDameM prakAzita 'AtmAnukUla patha' nAmaka zIrSaka meM batAyA gayA hai ki jIna kArapeMtiyarane apane eka bhASaNameM yena matako bauddha dharmakI eka zAkhA batAyA hai / paraMtu, yaha kucha bAtoMmeM bauddha dharmase bilakula bhinna hai / ___ yena mata pUrNataH AtmAnubhUti para AdhArita hai| isameM guruke upadeza tathA pravacanako koI sthAna nahIM hai / ise sabhI apanA sakate haiM / yaha eka prakArakA sva-anuzAsana hai / isa matameM sabhI dharmoke mizraNakI abhUtapUrva saMbhAvanAyeM haiN| yoga-vijJAna tathA anuzAsanakA itanA sundara samanvaya anyatra dekhaneko nahIM milatA / yaha mata itanA vyApaka hai ki yaha rUr3hivAdI arthoM meM bauddha dharmakI zreNImeM nahIM aataa| yaha mukhyataH dhyAnamUlaka dharma hai| isameM dhyAnake kendrIkaraNako eka nizcita bindu taka pahu~cAnekI AvazyakatA hai / - 509

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yaha manovijJAnase jur3A huA hai aura rahasyamaya hai| yaha dharma aura samAjameM santulana lAtA hai| yaha mata upaniSad dharmake adhika samIpa lagatA hai / DA0 kAratiyarane aneka prAcIna dharma granthoMke AdhAra para yaha bhI pramANita kiyA hai ki bauddha dharma para hI yenamatakI chApa par3I hai| udAharaNArtha, yogameM cittavRtti nirodha, AtmAnubhUti, samaya aura dhArmika kriyAyeM yenamatakI hI vizeSatAyeM haiM, bauddha dharmakI nhiiN| mujhe pandraha varSa pUrva yenamatake viSayameM jAnakArI prApta huI thii| maiMne aneka videzagantAoMse isake viSayameM vizeSa jAnakArI cAhI thI, para unakA vizvAsa thA ki jApAna meM to bauddha dharma hI hai, yena-jaisA koI pRthak dharma nahIM hai / apane zodhakoMke pramAdase maiM isa viSaya para vistRta vicAra nahIM kara paayaa| lekina DA0 kAratiyarake vivaraNase isa viSayameM jo tathya sAmane Ate haiM / ve merI dRSTise nimna haiM : yenamata jainadharmakI zAkhA sambhAvita hai kyoMki isameM varNita svAnubhUti hI samyag darzana hai aura sva-anuzAsana hI nizcaya cAritra hai| ina donoMkA saMbaMdha AtmAzrayI hai, vAhyasrotI nhiiN| isameM aneka dharmoMke mizraNakI saMbhAvanAyeM isake anekAntavAdI dRSTikoNako vyakta karatI haiN| isakA dhyAna jainadharmameM mokSa yA nirvANa' yA AtmAnubhUtikA sAdhana batAyA gayA hai / jainadharma bhI AtmAko zuddha, buddha mAnatA hai aura nirvANako Izvara kRpA para nirbhara nahIM maantaa| yenake samAna hI jainadharma bhI darabArI dharma nahIM rhaa| yaha bauddhadharmase pUrvavartI bha0 pArzvanAthake samayameM bhI pracalita thaa| isameM vItarAgatA aura AtmAnubhUtiko ucca sthAna prApta hai / jainadharmameM saMyama para bhI bala diyA gayA hai / isa prakAra yena aura jainadharma meM na kevala nAma-sAmya hai, apitu usake siddhAnta bhI samAna haiN| kyA aisA mAnA jA sakatA hai ki sahasroM varSa pUrva jaba bauddha cintaka eziyAI dezoMmeM dharma pracAra hetu gaye the, taba jaina cintaka bhI gaye hoM ? usa samaya jahA~ jainadharmakA adhika prabhAva par3A ho, ve Aja bhI 'yena' kahalAte hoM ? yaha vicAra mAtra bhAvanAtmaka nahIM ho sakatA, isa viSayameM zodhakoM ko vicAra karanA caahiye| jainadharmAnuyAyI vANijyika rahe haiM aura Aja bhI unakA isI ora jhukAva hai| isaliye unase isa prakArakI khojakI kyA AzA kI jAve ? inakI aneka saMsthAoMko to apane dezameM hI apane dharma aura samAja para vAtsalya nahIM hai, phira videzoMkI to bAta hI kyA ? kyA sarAka jAti saMbaMdhI zodhase hamArI samAja yA saMsthAyeM prabhAvita huI haiM ? saMskRtajJa vidvAnoMko bhI pArasparika zAstrArtha meM hI vizvAsa hai| maiM isa lekha dvArA samAjake prabuddha varga tathA dhArmika vargakA dhyAna isa prakArakI zodhoMkI ora AkarSita karanA cAhatA hai| unheM AjakI AvazyakatAko samajhane tathA anudAra vRttiko chor3anekA Agraha karanA cAhatA hU~ / isake binA dharmakI unnati, prabhAvanA, pracAra-prasAra va kAlAntara sthAyitva-kucha bhI nahIM ho sktaa| mere dhyAnameM hamAre pramAdake aneka udAharaNa haiM / eka bAra eka prabhAvI rAjanItika netAne bhUtapUrva sindha prAntameM jainadharma aura usake tIrthaMkaroMke viSayameM eka lekha likhA thaa| vaha bar3A hI rocaka evaM aitihAsika viSaya thaa| lekina usapara bhI hamArA dhyAna nahIM gyaa| yahI nahIM, kabhI-kabhI to hama zodhakoMko hatotsAha bhI karate haiN| eka bAra ilAhAbAdake suprasiddha ajaina vidvAnne hukumacandra abhinandana granthake lie eka jaina itihAsase sambandhita gaveSaNApUrNa lekha bhejA thaa| vaha lekha prakAzita to nahIM hI kiyA gayA, use lauTAyA bhI nahIM gayA / isIliye eka bAra jaba maiMne unheM mahAvIra jayantI para kaTanI Amantrita kiyA, to unhoMne nakArAtmaka uttara dete hue likhA, "mujhe jainoMse jugupsA ho gaI hai|" ... -510