Jaina Theory of Paroksha Jnana

Author(s): Goura Hajra
Publisher: USA Federation of JAINA
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250165/1

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JAINA THEORY OF PAROKSA-JNANA Dr. Gour Hajra, Visva-Bharati It is truly necessary to know what is pratyaksa or an immediate knowledge before going to discussion on mediate knowledge or a Proksajnana. Umasvati makes it clear that knowledge which depends exclusively upon atman alone is pratyaksa, while that which depends upon senseorgans and manas is paroksa, of course, even in the case of paroksa-jnana, the instrumentality of Atman is also accepted. Knowledge derived through the sense-organs and manas was thus considered paroksa-jnana by Jaina Philosopher and this was directly against the views held by the other schools of Indian Philosophy, which generally held the views that the sense-organs give us immediate knowledge (Pratyaksa-jnana) whereas all the other 'sources' lead to only mediate knowledge. But if we observe the stages of evolution in the Jaina canons, we find there are three stages. Among these three stages, third stage was influenced by the general tendency of Indian Philosophy that regards sensory knowledge as direct. (on this stage sensory knowledge has been placed in both categories, viz. direct and indirect. The sensory knowledge is direct in vyavahara or practice or in the secondary sense). Thus, according to early Jaina Philosophers, the knowledge which is derived from the self is pratyaksa and knowledge which does not arise from the self alone is called paroksa. But the later Jaina Philosophers came to accept the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also as pratyaksa. According to later Jaina logicians perception is the knowledge obtained through the operation of sense-organs and the manas. Hemacandra defines 'Visadam Pratyaksa as clear knowledge. Clarity is its special quality. Akalanka also held this definition, Now, we come to our specific discussion on the Jaina theory of mediate or non-perceptual knowledge. Non-perceptual is that which is not clear. The Jaina logician Akalarka says 'avisadam paroksam'. It is indistinct, unlike pratyaksa, dependent on others. It is devoid of

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37 Jaina Theory of paroksa-Jnana perceptual vividness. Akalarka classified paroksa-jnana into following types : (1) Smoti, (2) Pratyabhijna, (3) Tarka, (4) Anumana and (5) Agama. All these being indirect knowledge. Let us discuss these five types of mediate knowledge one by one and see which of them is very important. (1) Smoti (memory)--Memory is the knowledge of an object perceived in the past as 'that due to revival of its disposition (samskara) which is a particular power of the self. It is revived. It is an effect of the revival of the disposition of the previous perception of an object. The object remembered must have been known in the past and it is experienced at the time of recalling it, in the form of 'that'. There is a controversy among the philosophers, whether memory is a pramana or not. Some holds that memory is a pramana and some holds it is not a pramana. There are mainly two traditions on the point the Jaina and the non-Jaina. According to the Jainas memory is a sub-class of pramana. This is clearly a departure from the view usually held by other-schools of Indian Philosophy on the point. On the other hand, non-Jaina tradition, vedic as well as Buddhist Philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramana on the ground that it depends on the validity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva). On the other hand, the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of Smrti Pramana. Their main argument is that the Samskaras recall for any particular purpose; the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gained through senses. Therefore, memory is considered to be a pramana because it is true facts (samvadin) just as perception etc. are treated as pramanas, because they are true facts. The validity of pramana can't be ascertained merely by relation to its dependence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted, even pramana will cease to be a pramana, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emperical perception. (2) Pratyabhijnan (recognition)-Recognition is the synthetic cognition, caused by experience and recollection and cognising the simi

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Dr. Gour Hajra larity. It apprehends an object in the forms 'this is that', 'this is like that', 'this is different from that', 'this is correlated to that and the like. It knows relations, identity, similarity, dissiinilarity, relation of sign and signate, correlation and the like; between a present perceived object and object perceived in the past and remembered now. Recognition knows a present perceived object as known in the past, e.g. 'this is that Devadatta' perception knows 'this'. Recollection knows that. But recognition knows this is that'. In connection with the problem of recognition, philosophers have held divergent views on two points, viz as to whether it is pramana and as to its nature. The Buddhist tradition treats recognition as no pramana. They believe in the transitory nature of things and hold that Devadatta of to-day is not the same Devadatta as of yesterday. From their point of view, therefore, the recognition 'he is the same Devadatta' is wrong. For them, infact, there is no question of recognition. But the philosophers belonging to the two non-Buddhist traditions i.e. Jaina and Vedicist agree in treating recognition as pramana. The Jaina Philosophers believe in 'change in permanance'. According to them an object changes but does not loose its identity. The change is ore, partial and not absolute and thus recognition is possible. In fact, the very fact that we do recognise things in practice, has been used by the Jainas as well as Brahmanical Philosophers to refute the theory of transitory nature of things. (3) T arka (inductive reasoning)-Inductive reasoning is a know. ledge of universal concomitance of the probane with the probandum in the past, present and the future arising from the observation of their copresence and co-absence in the form of 'If this is present that is present and 'if this is absent that is absent'. Umasvati in his Tattvartha Bhasya has used the words tarka (reasoning) and uha (logic) as synonyms of second variety of sensuous knowledge, the speculation (Iha). It was Akalarka who first of all offered a logical definition of reasoning. Since then the Jaina logicians have been defining reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge for cognising all such concepts as an universal like that of the concomitance of probandum and probane.

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Jaina Theory of paroksa-jnana 39 Mimamsakas do not accept Tarka as a separate pramana. The Buddhists also deny its validity on the ground that tarka can only help one to know further an object which is already known through perception. The Naiyayikas maintain that reasoning is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge. The Jaina logicians Akalanka recognised reasoning (tarka) as an independent organ of knowledge, since concomitance can not be known without reasoning. If we do not accept the validity of reasoning, we will not be able to accept either, as they both (influence and reasoning) depend on the same basis for their validity as pramanas. (4) Anumana (inference)--The most important method of knowledge is anumana or inference. The Sanskrit word anumana is usually translated as inference. Anumana means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception. The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of anumana and their definition influenced the the Jainas. Jainas hold that anumana is the method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign (Hetu) recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object. The Nyaya view is that anumana is a type of secondary knowledge deduced from a prior knowledge. A knowledge of the invariability of concomitance between two things helps to deduce existence of one of them when the other is perceived. Vatsyayana in his book Nyayabhasya uses the term (Trata) 'anviksa' as synonyms for the word 'anumana'. 'Anviksa' literally means knowledge which follows from other knowledge. It is always indirect or mediate knowledge. It is a complex process of knowledge is accepted by all schools of Indian thought except Carvaka who denies it altogether. Akalanka presents a comprehensive definition of anumana as follows---congnition of sadhya produced by the sadhana is called Anumana, which follows linga-grahana and Vyapti-Smarana. Hemachandra defines anumana thus : sAdhanA sAdhya vijJAnam-anumAnam Anumana is the knowledge of Sadhya from sadhana. Fire is inferred from smoke. Here 'smoke' is the sadhana and 'Fire' is the Sadhya. Anumana is based on the universal accompaniment of the probane (Sadhana) by the probandum (sadhya) in simultaneity or succession,

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40 Dr. Gour Hajra It is based on Vyapti derived from induction (tarka), which is the logical ground of inference. In the early Jaina literature, the term 'avinabhava' is frequently used as the equivalent of Vyapti. In Jaina philosophy there are two kinds of Anumana : (1) Svarthanumana (inference for one's own self) and (2) Pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others) or syllogistic inference. (1) Svarthanumana consists in the knowledge of the probandum from/probane ascertained by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. The organs of Svarthanumana are said to be three in number, viz Sadhya, Sadhana and Paksa. (2) Pararthanumana is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the statement of the probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance. Philosophers of different schools hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism The Samkhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts : Thesis (paksa), reason (Hetu) and kample (drstanta). The Buddhist philosopher Acarya Dignaga also hold these three. The Mimamsakas assert four parts with the addition of application (upanaya). The Naiyayikas assert flve part with the addition of conclusion (nigamana). The Jaina holds that the thesis and reason constitute syllogism adequate for an intelligent person. Inference for less-intelligent persons, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises. To teach such persons, the Jainas accept not only are all the five premises of the Nyaya but they go even further than this and accept ten-limbed syllogism for such persons. As regards the aspects of the nature of a hetu (reason), the Buddhists like the Vaisesikas and Sarkhyas assert that there are three aspects of a hetu viz Paksadharmata (presence in the subject), Sapaksatva (presence in a homologues) and Vipaksatva (absence from hetrologues). The Naiyayikas accept in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of hetu, viz Abadhita-visayatva (absence of counterbalancing hetu) and Asat-Pratipaksatva. The Jainas criticise all these views of Naiyayikas and Buddhists. They admit that only the anyathanupopa .

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Jaina Theory of paroksa-jnana nntva, also called avinabhava or Vyapti is the only characteristic of a Valid hetu. (5) Agama (verbal testimony) is the fifth type of paroksa prama. nas. It is knowledge of objects derived from the words of a reliable person. A reliable person is one, who knows the object as it is and states it as he knows it. Such a person can never tell a lie. He is free from attachment and aversion. His words are in harmony with their objects. They do not contradict the nature of their object. He is called Apta. The words of an Apta are called Agama. The Jainas believe that their prophets were Aptas and therefore they accepted Agamas as an independent pramana. They did not restrict the definition of Apta to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An apta may according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject. All Indian Philosophers except the Carvakas have recognised it as a source of valid knowledge. But there has raged a controversy as to whether it is an independent source of knowledge or merely a case of inference while the rest consider it to be an independent source of knowledge. As a matter of fact it should not be considered as a part of anumana, since, unlike anumana it arises without having perceived signs and their concomitance. According to the Jaina logicians verbal testimony is of two kinds (1) Secular (Laukika) and (2) non-Secular (Lokottara). The Testimony of Janaka and others is secular. Testimony of Tirtharkaras is nonsecular. Conclusion : Let us now put down in short the points that emerge from this whole discussion. According to the early Jaina Literature, knowledge is divided into pratyaksa and Paroksa. Although knowledge is divided as pratyaksa and paraksa, yet the words pratyaksa and paroksa are used in different sense. The later Jaina logicians also divided knowledge as pratyaksa and paroksa. According to them pratyaksa is of two kinds, while paroksa is

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Dr. Gour Hajra of five kinds : Smoti, pratyabhijna, tarka, anumana and agama. They accepted each of these five kinds of knowledge as separate pramana. But according to Naiyayikas tarka is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge. They are not ready to accept memory as an independent pramana. But the Jainas considered both memory and Tarka as a separate pramana. Therein lies the novelty of Jainism. References ; 1. Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara-by Vadi Devasuri. Jaina Tarka Bhasa--by Yasovijaja. 3. Jainism in Buddhist literature--by Bhagchndra Jain Bhaskar. 4. A Primer of Indian Logic-by Kuppuswami Sastri. 5. Jaina Theory of Perception--by Pushpa Bothra.