History of Vegitarianism and Cow Veneration in India

Author(s): Willem B Bollee
Publisher: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006921/1

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The History of Vegetarianism and Cow-Veneration in India Ludwig Alsdorf Translated from German by Bal Patil Revised by Nichola Hayton Edited with additional notes, a bibliography and four appendices by Willem Bollee ROUTLEDGE Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies For Personal & Private Use Only

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THE HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM AND COW-VENERATION IN INDIA For the first time, this influential study by Ludwig Alsdorf is made available to an English speaking audience, translated by Bal Patil. It focuses on two of the most pertinent issues in Indian religion, the history of vegetarianism and cow-veneration, and its historical approach remains relevant to this day. With reference to significant brahminical texts, such as key chapters of the Book of Manu, the book centres on the author's analysis of the role of Jainism in the history of vegetarianism. The author explores the history of meat-eating in India and its relationship to religious thought and custom, and searches for solutions to the problem of cattle veneration. Besides a comprehensive translation of the original German manuscript 'Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien', four important articles directly related to Alsdorf's work by Kapadia, Heesterman and Schmidt are made available in this new edition. These additional contributions and careful notes by the editor Willem Bollee add a modern perspective to a study that remains a key reference for students and scholars of Religious Studies, Asian Studies and History Ludwig Alsdorf (1904-1978) was one of the most influential Indologists of his generation. He had wide range of interests and worked on Prakrit, Apabhramsha and Pali literature, in particular on Jaina universal history and prosody. His pioneering metrical analyses of ancient Indian literature prepared the ground for great advances in the dating of texts and the reconstruction of the history of Indian philosophy. One of his most influential studies is the present work. Willem Bollee is Professor Emeritus at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Bal Patil is an independent researcher, journalist and Chairman of the Jain Minority Status Committee, Dakshin Bharat Jain Sabha, a century old Jain organization in India. He is the co-author of Jainism (1974, with Colette Caillat and A.N. Upadhye), and his English translation of Ludwig Alsdorf's Les Etudes Jaina, Etat Present et Taches Futures, edited by Willem Bollee was published in 2006. His translation of Hiralal Jain's Jainism Through the Ages from Hindi into English is due for publication. For Personal & Private Use Only

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ROUTLEDGE ADVANCES IN JAINA STUDIES Series Editor: Peter Flugel School of Oriental and African Studies Jain Studies have become an accepted part of the Study of Religion. This series provides a medium for regular scholarly exchange across disciplinary boundaries. It will include edited collections and monographs on Jainism. STUDIES IN JAINA HISTORY AND CULTURE Disputes and Dialogues Edited by Peter Flugel HISTORY, SCRIPTURE AND CONTROVERSY IN A MEDIEVAL JAIN SECT Paul Dundas THE HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM AND COW-VENERATION IN INDIA Ludwig Alsdorf Edited by W. Bollee For Personal & Private Use Only

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THE HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM AND COW-VENERATION IN INDIA Ludwig Alsdorf Translated from German by Bal Patil Revised by Nichola Hayton Edited with additional notes, a bibliography and four appendices by Willem Bollee Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK For Personal & Private Use Only

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Title of the German original: Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang 1961 - Nr. 6. Published by: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH. - Wiesbaden, 1962. First published in German in 1962 as 'Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien' by the Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Germany First published in English in 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business (c) 2010 Willem Bollee Typeset in Taj by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon Printed in the UK by the MPG Books Group All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Alsdorf, Ludwig, 1904-1978. (Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien. English] The history of vegetarianism and cow-veneration in India/ Ludwig Alsdorf; translated by Bal Patil; revised by Nichola Hayton; edited by Willem Bollee. p. cm. - (Routledge advances in Jaina studies; 3) First published in German in 1962 as 'Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien' by Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Germany. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Vegetarianism - Religious aspects - Jainism. 2. Cows - Religious aspects - Jainism. 3. Jainism - History. 4. Vegetarianism - India - History. I. Patil, Bal, 1932II. Bollee, Willem B. III. Title. BL1375.V44A5813 2010 294.5'48693-dc22 2009031560 ISBN10: 0 415-54824-1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0 203-85959-6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-54824-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-85959-9 (ebk) For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTENTS Abbreviations Introduction viii Contributions to the History of Vegetarianism and Cow-veneration in India Bibliography Subject index Index locorum 5 Appendix I Reviews J. C. Heesterman 90 Appendix II The Origin of Ahimsa Hanns-Peter Schmidt 94 Appendix III Ahimsa and Rebirth Hanns-Peter Schmidt 128 Works cited and their abbreviations 160 Appendix IV Prohibition of Flesh-eating in Jainism H. R. Kapadia 163 For Personal & Private Use Only

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ABBREVIATIONS Amg. AT. Baudh. BKBh Dasav Mbh MW PE PSM PW Ardhamagadhi Apastamba Baudhayana Bshatkalpabhasya Dasaveyaliya Mahabharata Monier Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary Pillar Edict Paia-sadda-mahannavo Bohtlingk und Roth, Sanskrit-Worterbuch Rock Edict Sanskrit Vajasaneya Vasistha Yajnavalkya RE Sa. Vaj. Vas. Yajn. vii For Personal & Private Use Only

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INTRODUCTION The subjects of this essay, sparing living beings, which gradually led to vegetarianism, and the veneration of cattle, which has no direct relation to it, were not new to indologists when Alsdorf took them up, but no one had strictly applied the historical method to them. The fact that new publications with references to his study keep being published, such as Scherfe 1993 mm 164-168, amply shows its continuous actuality and justifies an English version at a time when the knowledge of German in our discipline is no longer obvious. Originally ahimsa - non-violence (to living beings) - had nothing to do with vegetarianism as it was, in Alsdorf's opinion, based on (but not explained by) a 'magico-ritualistic' dread of destroying life, this being part of an all-Indian religious development. In the Vedic period people ate meat of ritually killed animals, specially cattle, because killing to sacrifice was not discredited. Later, ahimsa more and more limited meat consumption. As early as Kautilya, before the Manusmoti that is, ahimsa was propagated as an ideal for all people, but at the time of the Manusmrti brahmanic renouncers still ate meat, for religions are conservative and the mendicants, brahmin as well as Jain and Buddhist, according to Alsdorf are still continuing the nomadic stage of the Indians when they entered the subcontinent. The greater part of the treatise is dedicated to an analysis of the three strata of the juridical literature, viz. Dharmasutras, Dharmasastras (beginning with Manu) and contemporary texts such as Yajnavalkya and relevant parts of the Mahabharata (stories of Tuladhara and Vicakhnu; connection between vegetarianism and Vaisnavism), and finally the independent commentaries to the old texts and the Krtyakalpataru and other Nibandhas. Alsdorf stresses the contradiction in the juxtaposition of old and new in Manu (after the example of the levirate). In an excursion the relation between viii For Personal & Private Use Only

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INTRODUCTION Vasistha and Manu is dealt with. Summarizing he states that there is little ground for Buhler's assumption of a lost ManavaDharmasutra as a source of Manu, and that Vasistha comes between the older Dharmasutras and the Manusmrti. The essential difference between brahmanism and the reformatory religions is that in the latter the new ideal of ahimsa did not clash with the great hindrance of the traditional sacrificial cult and other customs at which animals were killed. This is illustrated in the Uttarajjhaya 12 and 25 by the ancient story of the Jain monk asking at a brahmanical sacrifice for alms which is refused. In the following discussion the monk does not protest against the killing of the victim, but against mystified ritual practices in a language not understood by the common people, and brahmanical arrogance. The word ahimsa hardly plays a role in the ancient text. The opposition of the Jains to the brahmanical sacrifice was, at least in the beginning, only part of their opposition against brahmanic religion and haughtiness. Jainism (Jinism) and Buddhism participate in a pan-Indian spiritual movement which is to be taken into account for the interpretation of the famous historical testimonies for the ancient Indian vegetarianism in Asoka's inscriptions. In the emperor Asoka's edicts, too, ahimsa is evidenced as nonBuddhist. Asoka participates in a common Indian movement of thought and is a religiously tolerant monarch; his Buddhism only favours his ahimsa. A summary of views on ahimsa was given in the English Abstracts of the Tenth World Sanskrit Conference in Bangalore (1997: 374-76) by H.W. Bodewitz, who takes ahimsa to originally be an alternative to Vedic sacrificial ritual. Some later publications have been inserted into the Bibliography of the present translation of Alsdorf's text. The last quarter of Alsdorf's essay is dedicated to the problem of cattle veneration to which he does not know a solution. He ascribes it, first reluctantly - and aware of the fact that for Indologists "it is a most convenient catchall and a dignified academic way of saying "I don't know"' (Doniger O'Flaherty 1980:244) - to the Indus Valley Civilisation, but then, after discovering cattle bones, gave up the idea again, whereas Professor Doniger seems to seek a solution in a psychoanalytical direction. Regarding the appendices to Alsdorf's treatise, it was thought to be of interest to add J.C. Heesterman's review of it, as well as H.-P. Schmidt's articles 'The Origin of Ahimsa' and 'Ahimsa and Rebirth', with the kind permission of the authors and their publishers. ix For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Heesterman objects to Alsdorf's taking the contradictions in texts such as Manu as chronological successions and would rather parallel the monk, who can only lead a sinless life thanks to the layman's killing his food and water, to the yajamana, the person who pays for and profits from the sacrifice, enabled to partake of the meat by the Vedic priest who kills the victim. Thus the cycle of life and death can only be broken by renouncers who avoid death by ahimsa. This would explain the juxtaposition of contradictions and also point to the problem of the origin of ahimsa. As to this problem, Schmidt in his first paper 'Origin of ahimsa' (1962, reprinted here) thinks Alsdorf 'lost sight of the difference between ahimsa and vegetarianism' (last para but one of p. 626) and would himself imagine the latter to be a popularized version of the former doctrine. To that end he is searching 'for the specific motives on which the rule of ahimsa for the brahmanic renouncer is based' (last para of ch. I). He then establishes that in Vedic texts ahimsa is not expected of the common man, but a brahmin 'following the ahimsika vrtti accepts only food... killed by others' (last para but one of p. 635) and a Vedic student has to keep the vow of ahimsa which is a means of penance. Thus the idea of ahimsa may have 'originated among world renouncers, was adopted by the Brahmanas and finally considered to be a rule for the whole society' (first para of ch. III) for which the brahmins were the social example. From the Bhrgu-legend Schmidt deduces that the ritualists were animists who put plants and animals on a par with man and animals and thus wanted to eliminate the evil consequences of killing and hurting them. The verb 'to kill' is replaced by 'to appease'. Schmidt then emphasizes the similarity of the Vedic and Jain animistic Weltanschauung, and the connection of ahimsa and belief in reincarnation. Absolute renunciation: may lead to final release from transmigration, but 'the ethical motivation of non-violence is secondary: the original motive was fear resulting from the breakdown of magico-ritualistic world-conception' (last sentence of p. 655). In Schmidt's second appendix here he continues his study of ahimsa and reincarnation, the ideas the three Indian religions share and which thus in his view may also have a common source. Salvation from transmigration is only possible for renouncers, those that is, who strictly practise ahimsa, as against the loose ahimsa of the laity (which Svetambaras of course disagree with). Schmidt further argues with Wezler who thinks magico-ritual fear of destroying life in any form is not the only ground of ahimsa, but does not suggest other causes. For Personal & Private Use Only

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INTRODUCTION At the author's request the last paragraph of ch. VII, and ch. VIII were put at the end of ch. VI. In it he once more rejects the view of Alsdorf and Chapple who looked for the origin of ahimsa and vegetarianism in the Indus civilization in favour of a development inside the Vedic culture. For Schmidt vegetarianism has become the cornerstone of ahimsa, because one can abstain from meat but not from vegetal food. The article now ends with a refutation of Heesterman' theses, first, that the obsessive concern about ritual undoing of the injury (to victims) points to the impending collapse of the violent sacrifice. The replacement of the Rgvedic decapitation by strangulation does in Schmidt's opinion not mean a progressive decline of violence, but another attitude towards blood which is offered to the demons and therefore must stay outside the place of sacrifice. Schmidt also rejects Heesterman's opinion 'that the typical fusion of ahimsa and vegetarianism arose from brahminical ritual thought, while Buddhists and Jains originally had no particular use for vegetarianism' (second para of p. 227). On the contrary, the Jains have become the strictest vegetarians whereas not all believers in the brahmanical revelation (sruti) are vegetarians, nor even all brahmins. It is of course only fair to also give the Jains a chance to explain their view on vegetarianism and thus Kapadia's article 'Prohibition of Flesh-eating in Jainism' of 1933, because it contains a letter of Jacobi, which was inserted as representative of many others such as Upadhye or Malvania, the titles of some of whose articles can be found in the bibliography. The publication in the Routledge series required many notes and the addition of this Introduction; misprints have been silently corrected. References to Indian texts follow the way of quotation in Monier Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, the Critical Pali Dictionary and Schubring's Doctrine of the Jainas. Tantus labor non sit cassus. xi For Personal & Private Use Only The editor

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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM AND COW-VENERATION IN INDIA [3] *Two commandments which, also to the Hindus themselves, belong to the most characteristic features of Hinduism and rightly form the foundation of their religion, are: ahimsa, which literally means 'non-violence' (English in the original [WB]) and signifies the practical extension of 'you shall not kill' to the animal world; and the other, apparently inherent in the first, but factually to be treated as distinct, is the veneration of or, as the Indians prefer to say, 'the protection of cows'. To the modern observer both appear to be deeply embedded in the Indian soul. Both played a central role in the life and teaching of Mahatma Gandhi, appearing as the wellknown 'renunciation of violence', i.e. non-violence raised from the magical-ritual sphere to a mystic-ethical plane. Both have almost incalculable economic consequences which can only be alluded to in passing here. One may smile about the fact that around Cambay in Gujarat, the peasant folk disregard the official rules for getting rid of the strays, which are rampant; on the contrary, every household donates a roti on a daily basis for these useless curs. A minister of agriculture, however, was in no mood for smiling when he lamented in the press a few years ago that the Kathiawar peasants refused to kill the locusts and would rather transport them by cart to the next village and set them free there. The most conspicuous and economically far-reaching effect of ahimsa is, however, the widely practised renunciation of meat, fish The pages of the German original are inserted in square brackets. References in the text pertain to these pages. Editor's notes are indicated by (WB). 1 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA and frequently eggs. By no means are all Hindus vegetarians, indeed not even a majority are, but vegetarianism established by the religion of such a significant and influential section of people as in India has scarcely any parallel elsewhere in the world. We can again refer to Gandhi here. The extraordinary significance which vegetarianism had for him will have strongly impressed every reader of his autobiography, which appeared a few months ago, finally also in German.? [4] In addition to that, the sanctity of cattle (by no means only the cow!) precludes even most non-vegetarians from the consumption of beef, and this considering the fact that the prohibition of cattle killing has plainly made India, the country most abounding with cattle in the world. Millions of cattle which are no longer of service at all are robbing the others of their fodder: it is scientifically verifiable that the available supply of nourishment does not suffice for the rest of cows. This chronic crisis of nutrition could probably alone be solved if the cattle population of India were halved. It is the sacredness of the cattle which presents one of the toughest problems to the Indian economy. The frequent question about the origin or source of so characteristic and vital a feature of the Indian culture as ahimsa and 'cowveneration' has not been answered satisfactorily to this day. From the start, we should well exclude rationalistic responses such as the prohibition of cattle killing as a wise protection of an absolutely essential agricultural aid from destruction in times of famine, or vegetarianism as a climatic measure of hygienic precaution. On the other hand, the question of the origin of the veneration is even more taxing in view of the fact that in Indian antiquity the situation was quite different from today: the Aryans, whose immigration during the middle of the second millennium BCE is the crucial event in Indian history, are presented in their ancient literature as meateaters, who certainly did not shrink from slaughtering and consuming their numerous cattle. It is beyond the scope of the present investigation to conclusively answer the question, nor is it possible or intended to write a complete history of ahimsa and cattle protection based on a collection 1 About 1990, G.-D. Sontheimer reckoned 70% of Hindus to be non vegetarians (private communication (hereafter p.c.) to WB). 2 Gandhi 1960. 3 Alsdorf 1955: 132 - This is not the case any more, see e.g. Harris quoted in Chapple 1993: 137 (p.c. from Chapple) (WB). For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS of material widely scattered throughout the entire literature. It will merely be attempted to trace through observations, especially in the legal texts', the gradual emergence and assertion of vegetarianism and cattle-protection, and thus, perhaps, to approach an answer to our question. Two methodical remarks must be made in advance. Firstly, it should once more be stated clearly that vegetarianism and a cattle-taboo must be distinguished despite all relatedness: millions of Hindus, (5) it is true, eat fish, chicken and goats, but on no account beef. The ban on cattle-killing prevails also in places where, perhaps in the service of the goddess Kali, or in religious festivals especially in Nepal, streams of goat-and buffalo blood flow, and any tourist to India has experienced that even in English-run hotels they are served chicken or what is called mutton (which in reality is goat) at every meal, but very rarely beef. The cattle-taboo is, therefore, to be treated as distinct from vegetarianism, or in addition to it. Secondly, Indian vegetarianism is unequivocally based on ahimsa; this is clearly expressed in a stanza of the most famous and authoritative of the so-called Indian legal texts, the Manu-smrti: 'One cannot obtain meat without injuring living beings, but the killing of living beings does not lead to heaven; therefore, one must do without meat.' Yet so logical a conclusion: no flesh without animal slaughter, therefore, no ahimsa without renunciation of meat consumption - appears inevitable only to us and to the majority of modern Indians. By no means, however, is it drawn everywhere even today, as a quote from T. Hagen's book on Nepal, one of many examples, illustrates?: "For the Sherpas the [Buddhist] religion prohibits the killing of animals, but they love meat nevertheless. Therefore butchers are invited to come from Tibet every year in order to slaughter a few yaks.' 4 Much has been compiled in Om Prakash 1961. 5 Some, especially brahmins, are said to eat beef stealthily because it is cheaper than goatmeat bought by many people (p.c. Sontheimer to WB). 6 5,48: nakrtva praninam himsam mamsam utpadyate kvacit / na ca prani-vadhah svargyas, tasman mamsam vivarjayet. A Mahabharata stanza expresses the same thing more drastically (13, 115, 26): 'For flesh is certainly not produced from grass, wood or stone! Flesh comes from the killing of creatures, therefore it is a sin to eat it (na hi mamsam trnat kasthad upalad vapi jayate / hatva jantum tato mamsam, tasmad dosas tu bhaksane). - See also, e.g. Zimmerman 1987: ch. VII 'Vegetarianism and Nonviolence' (WB). 7 Hagen 1960: 76. For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The same 'moral principle', according to which it suffices not to do the killing oneself while one can unscrupulously profit from the killing done by others, held good originally and for a long time in ancient India. This is shown by an inquiry into the two great reform religions, Buddhism and Jainism, arising in the sixth century BCE. They have both played a role in the history of ahimsa and vegetarianism, a role which has usually been largely misunderstood. It is right that both particularly stress ahimsa. Nevertheless it is, to begin with, absolutely certain that the Buddha was not a vegetarian and did not forbid meat-eating to his monks either. As to this, it is quite irrelevant whether eating the sukara-maddava [6] which, according to the canonical report causes the Master's death, was 'juicy pork' (which appears fairly certain) or whatever else for there is no doubt that the Master and his disciples, as the texts report, ate also meat on numerous occasions when they were invited to the houses of the laity. The monks in Burma, who follow and guard the ancient injunctions and teachings with particular purity and austerity, nowadays also accept meat as alms from the laity without more ado and consume the same.10 They are thus in full accord with the oldest code of the rules of the Order, the Vinayapitaka of the Pali canon. In it, meat-eating by the monks and the Buddha is often mentioned and everywhere presumed," and meat and fish, along with rice boiled in milk, groats and barley flour, form the solemn and oft-repeated list of the 'five (basic) foodstuffs'.12 Not only that, but vegetarianism is explicitly discarded or declared unnecessary under certain conditions. It is related in Cullavagga 7, 3, 14f. (Vin II 197, 4ff.), how the wicked Devadatta planned to bring about a schism by proposing to 8 Probably rather in the fifth century, see Dundas 2002: 24 (WB). 9 Franke 1913: 222 note 4, and Waldschmidt 1939: 63ff. 10 According to the information passed on by word of mouth by leading Burmese monks, but a quotation from Tinker 1957:171 may be added: 'For instance, Buddhism abhors the taking of life and, with its ancient Hindu associations, particularly objects to the killing of cows for meat. Within recent years a vegetarian movement has gained ground among leading exponents of Buddhism in which U Nu is particularly prominent. The Prime Minister has disavowed any intention by those in power to prohibit the killing of animals for food, nevertheless this practice is definitely becoming increasingly restricted ... In Lower Burma the sale of beef has ceased entirely, owing to restrictions.' 11 Cf. the indexes to Horner 1949-66 under 'meat' and 'flesh'. 12 bhojaniyam nama panca bhojanani: odano kummaso sattu maccho mamsam. For Person Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS the Buddha five intensifications of the rules of the Order: the monks must live for life only in the forest and not go into the villages, live only on alms and not accept invitations, wear only rags from rubbish-heaps and not let themselves be presented with clothes, live only under trees and not under a roof, and finally, eat neither flesh nor fish; infringements of these injunctions would have to be counted as transgression.13 The rejection of these proposals, which [7] Devadatta expected, then followed quite promptly. The Buddha left it to the monks, whether to dwell in the forest or in the vicinity of a village, whether to beg for alms or to accept invitations, whether to wear rags or to accept donations of clothes, and he permitted an eight months' stay (outside the rainy season that is!) under a tree. As to the last proposal, however, he declared: 'Fish and meat are pure under three conditions: when (the monk) has not seen, nor heard and has no suspicion (that the animal was killed on purpose for him).'14 The bracketed supplement follows inter alia from a story narrated in the Mahavagga (76, 31, 12-14; Vin I 237, 24ff.). The general Siha in Vesali has obtained a lot of meat for the Buddha and his monks, who had accepted his invitation to a meal. While this is being consumed, the Jains run through the streets and shout: Today the general Siha killed a big animal and prepared therefrom a meal for the ascetic Gautama. The ascetic Gautama eats this meat although he knows that it was especially killed for him (uddissa katam), that the killing was (done) for his sake (paticca-kammam).15 13 sadhu, bhante, bhikkhu yavajivam arannaka assu, yo gam'-antam osareyya, vajjam nam phuseyya; yava jivam pinda-patika assu, yo nimantanam sadiyeyya, vajjam nam phuseyya; yavajivam pamsu-kulika assu, yo gahapati-civaram sadiyeyya, vajjam nam phuseyya; yavajivam rukkha-mulika assu, yo channam upagaccheyya, vajjam nam phuseyya; yavajivam maccha-mamsam na khadeyyum, yo maccha-mamsam khadeyya, vajjam nam phuseyya ti. - This would presuppose that many laypeople would inhabit the jungle (WB). 14 tikoti-parisuddham maccha-mamsam: a-dittham a-ssutam a-parisankitam ti. 15 ajja Sthena sena-patina thulam pasum vadhitva samanassa Gotamassa bhattam katam, tam samano Gotamo janam uddissa katam mamsam paribhunjati paticca-kammam (Horner: ... the recluse Gotama makes use of this meat, knowing that it was killed on purpose (for him), that the deed was (done) for his sake'). The expressions uddissa katam and paticcakammam, of which the first, as we shall see, has a parallel with the Jains, For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The general, to whom these reproaches are reported, rejects the same as a calumny and protests that he would not even for his life's sake deliberately deprive any living being of its life.16 In fact, he neither slaughtered the same nor let it be slaughtered, but had only sent out a servant with the customary formula: 'Go, my dear, and see, if there is meat.'17 At the end of the meal the Buddha announces to his monks: One should, monks, not eat meat when one knows that it has been killed especially for him (uddissa katam)... I permit you, monks, fish and [8] meat, which are pure in a threefold respect: (when namely the monk) has not seen, nor heard, nor cherished a suspicion ...18 For the Buddha and his monks, therefore, abstinence from meat and fish belonged to the nonsensical, and hence objectionable tightening and overstraining of the monastic rules. 19 The essential condition for eating meat is, however, that the consumer has neither killed the animal himself, nor had it killed especially for him, so that the responsibility for the killing does neither directly nor indirectly fall upon him. We shall see that a similar condition, but even more strictly conceived and hedged in, also holds good for the Jains. Today the Jains, laymen as well as monks, are the strictest of all vegetarians, and ahimsa represents to them as the highest command of their religion (ahimsa paramo dharmah): they extend it even to vermin; I have myself witnessed how a poisonous centipede (kankhajura), which had bitten a monk, was put in a brass pot and set free in a field. That Jain monks may have ever partaken of meat is inconceivable and unacceptable to modern orthodox Jains.20 in connection with 'flesh' could be euphemisms; as to this we can render them only with 'killed particularly for ...' and 'killed for his sake'. 16 na ca mayam jivita-hetu pi sancicca panam jivita voropeyyama. - This seems an odd utterance for a general (WB). 17 gaccha, bhane, pavatta-mamsam janahi! (Horner: 'Go, good fellow, find out if there is meat to hand'). 18 na, bhikkhave, janam uddissa katam mamsam paribhunjitabbam... anujanami, bhikkhave, tikoti-parisuddham maccha-mamsam: a-dittham a-ssutam aparisankitam. -Seyfort Ruegg 1980:240 refers with the wrong page number (53) to this passage in Alsdorf (WB). 19 As regards the later battle against meat-eating in some Mahayana books cf. Waldschmidt 1939: 80ff. 20 See Kapadia's article further down (WB). For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Nevertheless, it ensues incontestably, as Schubring points out (2000, SS 154) from passages in two of the oldest canonical texts. Here, in the long list of alms which the monk should not accept, also appear 'meat with many bones and fish with many fishbones'.21 The reason given for the prohibition, in a stanza [9] which recurs identically in both texts, is that more of such alms would be thrown - 21 Ayaranga II 1, 10, 5 bahu-y-atthiyam va mamsam maccham va bahu-kantagam; Dasaveyaliya 5, 1, 73 bahu- atthiyam poggalam animisam va bahu-kantagam. It is quite obvious that here, in the midst of the prose of the Ayara, an old sloka-line in its original form is contained, the metre of which, just in the metrical chapter of the Dasaveyaliya, was grossly violated by the secondary substitution of mamsa by poggala and of maccha by animisa. For animisa 'not blinking' in Sanskrit, too, the meaning 'fish' is attested, but for pudgala the meaning 'meat' is otherwise never and nowhere known. It is easy to show how it has come about in our passage through a misconception. In the continuation of the Ayara-passage to be quoted subsequently, poggala - literally 'mass, matter'- is used to indicate the quantity of meat and could be conceived as a designation of the sheer meat in contrast to the bones; on it the further generalizing substitution of mamsa through poggala in the Dasaveyaliya is based. - (Suyagada 2, 1, 16 se jaha namae kei purise mamsao atthim abhinivvattittanam uvadamsejja: ayam, auso, mamse, ayam atthi 'just as when someone draws a bone out of meat and shows (it with the words) "This, venerable Sir, is the meat, that, the bone"' and Samavaya 34 pacchanne ahara-nihare a-disse mamsa-cakkhuna '(the Jina's) eating and defecating is secret; no flesh (i.e. human) eye can see (it)' clearly show the normal meaning of mamsa in the canon. Later, as in Tiloyapannatti IV 899, Jinas seem not to eat at all: bhoyana-uvasaggaparihina - an attempt to stop the recollection of the opposite in some ancient texts? - See also Dundas 1985 and 1997: 12; Cottam Ellis 1991: 91; Jaini 1993 [WB]). That, however, even in this text, the normal words mamsa and maccha are at all substituted by poggala, which in fact has a quite different meaning, and by the far-fetched animisa, and that by a gross disregard for the metre, should be understood only as a kind of euphemism in which the later disapproval of meat and fish is suggested. Compare the subsequent exposition of the later reinterpretation of the words and the canonical references for the condemnation of meat-eating to be dealt with further down. - Cf. Deo 1956: 172 (> Jha 2004: 85 note 95). In PSM poggala is given the sense of mamsa in two places: Hemacandra, Prakrtavyakarana I 116 and Nemicandra II (until 1270 C.E.), Pravacanasaroddhara [Bombay, 1922] 421b 9 [dvara 268, vs 64] tiri-panc'indiya davve khette satthi-hattha poggalainnam, with the scholiast Siddhasena's explanation 421a 10 tairascena paudgalyena mamsena... The oldest meaning of Sa. pudgala seems to be 'body, a man's material appearance' from which the meaning 'flesh' would seem an easy development, cf. pinda 'body; meat' and medaskrt 'body, flesh' (MW) (WB). 7 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA away than could be eaten, hence the greater part would be refuse.22 Should now, Ayaranga II 1, 10,6 continues, someone offer the monk meat with many bones or fish with many fishbones, he should answer: Your Reverence, or Sister, I am not permitted to accept meat with many bones: give me as much (poggala, body, mass) as you like, but no bones.' If, however, he should have inadvertently accepted meat with many bones or fish with many fishbones (certainly that means: if he should find out after accepting the alms that it contains too many bones or fishbones), he should not offend the donor through a brusque return, but should go away with it and eat the meat and fish in a ritually pure (i.e. free from living beings) place, a garden or a lodging, and then deposit the bones or fishbones in a suitable place with the precautionary measures assigned for such cases.23 22 appe siya bhoyana-jjae, bahu ujjhiya-dhammie; literally: 'Little would belong to the category of edibles, much would have the characteristic of what has to be thrown away.' (In Ayara II 1, 10, 4 the same verse-line serves immediately before to substantiate the ban on accepting sugarcane; in the Dasaveyaliya, sugarcane, meat, fish and other things are combined into one sloka). Jacobi, Leumann (1892: 621) and Schubring incorrectly print bahu-ujjhiya-dhammie as one compound, and Schubring translates: 'would be an alms small in quantity, but a great prostitution of the dharma.' It seems certain to me that Jacobi's translation 'so that only a part of it can be eaten and the greater part must be rejected' has chosen the right meaning; it rests on Silanka's quite correct explanation of the Ayara passage: atraivam-bhute parigrhite 'py antariksv-adike 'lpam asaniyam bahu paritya-jana-dharmakam iti matva na parigrhniyat. 23 siya nam paro bahu-atthiena mamsena va macchena va uvanimantejja: ausanto samana, abhikankhasi bahu-atthiyam mamsam padigahettae? etappagaram nighosam socca nisamma se puvvam eva aloejja: auso ti va bhaini ti va, no khalu kappai me bahu-atthiyam mamsam padigahettae; abhikankhasi me daum javatiyam, tavatiyam poggalam dalayahi, ma atthiyaim ... se ya ahacca padigahie siya, tam no hi tti vaejja, no anaha [? read: ahaha?] tti vaejja. se ttam adaya egantam avakkamejja 2 tta ahe aramamsi va ahe uvassayamsi va app' ande java samtanae mamsagam macchagam bhocca atthiyaim kantage gahaya se ttam ayae egantam avakkamejja ahe jhama-thandilamsi va java pamajjiya 2 paritthavejja. (Jacobi's translation 'he should not say: "No, away, take it!"' conveys the expected sense, but is not to be reconciled with his text: tam no tti vaejja, no ha tti, no hamdaha tti vaejja. The above text is based on a collation by Schubring, according to whose kind information no handaha tti vaejja 'he must not say: "there, take it" is to be deleted as not being in the text, though in itself it would fit well. The Curni says: so ya puna saddho saddhi va pharusam na bhanejja, which can only signify: 'but he must not speak rudely to the layman or laysister (accusative!).' For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS In the Dasaveyaliya the same rule is found in a [10] somewhat later passage, thus separated from the ban to accept meat and fish with many bones and fishbones, and extended to indigestible foreign bodies in the food; 5, 1, 84ff: Thereby while eating it may happen that he hits on a bone, fishbone, a piece of straw or wood, a small stone or something similar, but he must not, after he has taken it out, throw it away, neither (should he) spit it out of his mouth; he must take it in his hand, go away, find a spot free of living beings, carefully put it down and then return.24 In his tika on the Ayaranga, finished in 872 CE, Silanka does not comment on the words mamsa and maccha, because, evidently, he held these completely unequivocal and normal words to need no explanation. That he understood these phrases in their ordinary sense one can very well conclude from the remark he added to his explanation of the above verses appe siya bhoyana-jjae: he gives this explanation where the verse appears for the first time, namely at the prohibition to accept sugarcane, and points to the following 'meatsutra' with the words evam mamsa-sutram api neyam - a designation. This could scarcely have been his choice if by mamsa he had wished a vegetable substance to be understood. It is different for the classical commentator of the Dasaveyaliya, Haribhadra (writing in the middle of the eighth century CE); the peculiar expressions poggala 24 tattha se bhunjamanassa atthiyam kantao siya / tana-kattha-sakkaram va vi annam va vi taha-viham // tam ukkhivittu na nikkhive, asaena na chaddae/ hatthena tam gaheunam egantam avakkame // egantam avakkametta a-cittam patilehiya / jayam paritthavejja, parithappa padikkame. Schubring translates: ... it might happen that he meets with a bone, a thorn, a bit of grass ...' It appears certain to me that atthiyam kantao signifies bones or fishbones' here, too. - Here also Ohanijjutti 482 may be mentioned where the monk is ordered to remove bones and fishbones, etc. from his alms: gara, visa, atthiya, kantaga ... vigincejja, cf. Mette 1974: 102 (text on p. 195); 126 (OhaBh 277). Abhayadeva's contemporary Drona gives no explanation in his commentary, thus showing that for him the words in question have their common meaning, but Bihatkalpabhasya 5870, which depends on ON 482, replaced atthi by (maya-)macchi (mata-maksika 'dead fly') and gave kantaga the sense of 'thorn'; see further Mette, op. cit., p. 102 note 97. A still later witness is Ksemakirti who finished his commentary on the Brhatkalpabhasya in 1275 CE. On BKBh 1239 mamsa-phala-puppha-bhogi he writes the scholion: 'mamsa' tti yatra durbhikse samapatite mamsena kalo 'tivahyate' (WB). For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA and aaimisa implicity required an explanation, and he renders them without prejudice as mamsa and matsya, adding that others thought them to be the names of two fruits with a consistency similar to that of meat and fish, because they stand in a section otherwise dealing with plants.25 This explanation as fruits with hard seeds or stalks, or the like, is the only generally recognized explanation today. In 1932 a new edition and translation of the Dasaveyaliya produced by Schubring was printed in Gluckstadt through the munificence of one of the Ahmedabad businessmen,26 (11) and then it was sent to India. When one found out there that in 5, 1,73 mamsa and maccha were translated by 'meat' and 'fish', the whole edition was shelved; up to this day it has not been delivered, and a Bombay solicitor explained to me that there could be no question of meat and fish in the text, as it would go against the preaching of ahimsa by the founder of the religion, Mahavira. The Jains lodged a protest with the editor of the 'Sacred Books of the East, Max Muller, against Jacobi's translation of the Ayara-passage, and the high priest of the Bombay Jain community sent Jacobi the following elucidation of the passage: 'A monk or a nun on a begging tour is prohibited from receiving a conserve of fruits containing a large portion of bark or an exterior covering of a fruit.'27 25 anye tv abhidadhati: vanaspaty-adhikarat tathavidha-phalabhidhane ete iti. 26 'Ahmedabad: The Managers of Sheth Anandji Kalianji' - in Schubring 1932: 210, the incriminated words meat and fish with many bones in vss 73 and 84 have been replaced by a series of crosses. This, and the reason for it, ought of course have been mentioned in the editor's Preface (WB). 27 Cf. Kapadia 1933: 232ff. In his long letter addressed to Motilal Ladhaji dt. 14/2/1924 and reproduced there, Jacobi, by virtue of two passages in the Mahabhasya and in Vacaspatimisra's Nyayasutra Commentary, meets the Jains halfway through the proposal to understand the phrases 'meat with many bones' and 'fish with many fishbones' as 'metaphorical designations, which became proverbial for 'an object containing the substance which is wanted in intimate connection with much that must be rejected': The meaning of the passage is, therefore, that a monk should not accept as alms any substance of which only a part can be eaten and a great part must be rejected.' It is needless to refute in detail Jacobi's argumentation (not completely cited here); an impartial reading of the Ayaranga section should be enough to convince the reader that the question is of real meat and fish. Should 'meat with many bones' metaphorically stand for all, of which only a small part is edible and the greater discardable, it would be inexplicable that the verse appe siya bhoyana-ijae in the Ayaranga would 10 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Now, in addition to the two passages discussed, there comes yet another famous canonical testimony for the use of meat by the founder28 of the religion himself. In Viyahapannatti, Sataka 15, (685b sutra 557; Suttagame 1731, 26 [WB]) the seriously sick Mahavira sends one of his disciples to tell the laywoman Revai in Mendhiyagama: You have prepared for me the bodies of two pigeons which I do not need; (but) besides, you have something else, a leftover from yesterday (pariyasiya) of cock-meat killed ('done') by a cat. Bring that; that is what I need. 29 The disciple carried out the instructions and after eating the cockmeat Mahavira soon recovered. [12] be adduced first as the basis of the prohibition of sugarcane and then once again for mamsa and maccha; even less could in the Dasaveyaliya meat ('poggala') and fish ('animisa') have been brought together with several vegetable objects into one list which then is followed by the substantiating appe siya ... - Moreover, such a metaphor sounds rather unexpected when used by vegetarians, but cf. amisa 'meat' > 'anything comestible' put before the Jina image as agra-puja (Williams 1963: 223) which seems to point to meat as a common dish (WB). Bothra's paraphrase in Amar Muni's Illustrated Dasavaikalika sutra 5, 1, 73f. runs: 'If an ascetic is offered fruits with many seeds, scales, thorns, asthik, tinduk and bilva fruits, sugar-cane slices, pods or other such fruits or vegetables with little to eat and much to throw, he should refuse and tell the donor that he is not allowed to accept such fruit' (1997: 144; p.c. Dr P. Flugel). Suzuko Ohira adopts Schubring's translation in her thesis 1994: 18f. (SS 56ff.), where also the other passages about meat-eating in the canon are dealt with, but appears not to have seen Alsdorf's present work. Bones, as in contrast to meat, are inauspicious (Thurston 1912:57; Abbott 1974: 419) (WB). 28 Meant is reformer, if the 23rd Fordmaker Pasa was a historical person (Dundas 2000: 19; Schubring 2000: 29 (8 16]) which is denied by Bhatt (Jaina Studies 4: 6; see also Bollee 2008a: 2). According to Bhatt, the caujjama doctrine ascribed to Pasa is not earlier than the first or second century BCE. Its unknown originator, whose father may have happened to be called Asvasena, then was made the son of the king of snakes of that name in the Mbh, because all Jinas are princes, and thus became a mythological character (WB). 29 tam gacchaha nam tumam, Siha, Mendhiyagamam nagaram Revaie gahavainie gihe, tattha nam Revaie gahavainie mamam atthae duve kavoya-sarira uvakkhadiya, tehim no attho. atthi se anne pariyasie majjara-kadae kukkudamamsae, tam aharahi, eenam attho. - The passage and Alsdorf's discussion of it is also dealt with by Wezler 1978: 101. Forest ascetics are allowed to eat of the rest of animals killed by predators (WB). 11 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The little story bears such ideosyncratic features that one cannot help considering it historical.30 Apart from that, it fits remarkably well with what we have learnt from the Buddhists. In it, too, the phrase 'meat done' in the sense of having been killed by somebody appears; and it agrees exactly with the rule the Buddha passed, that Mahavira declines to accept pigeons prepared for his sake (mama atthae) and instead requests a cock killed not by man but by an animal: there could not be a more certain guarantee, therefore, that the cock was not slaughtered for Mahavira, on his account - in this case even the lay sister is free from any responsibility for the killing 31 The commentator of the Viyahapannatti, Abhayadeva, lived in the second half of the eleventh century. On the 'pigeon bodies' and the meat of the cock 'done (in) by the cat he remarks: "For these expressions "some" assumed the normal meaning (sruyamanam evartham), "only the sense heard", but others explained the pigeon bodies to be pumpkins, called so after their pigeon colour'; the 'cat' would either be a certain (body) wind32 and marjara-krta would mean 'done in order to subside this (wind)', or marjara becomes a plant known as 'cat' and marjara-krta means 'mixed therewith' (? bhavita); finally, according to the opinion of the former 'some', kukkuta-mansa would mean something like bijapura-kataha ('lemon pot'?).33 30 Ohira 1994: 203 (8 546) thinks it is a fiction made up in relation to Gosala's prophecy; therefore its historicity can well be doubted'. Ibid., p. 18 (8 57) Ohira wonders that there is hardly any other direct reference (beside Acar and Suy II 2, 38 [WB]) forbidding monks receiving flesh in the earlier canonical texts' ... (8 58) 'It seems that Pujapada is the first author who criticized this point (viz. consumption of meat by monks [WB]) in his Sarvarthasiddhi VI 13... It is thus feasible to assume that the rigid vegetarianism of the present day Jainas commenced at such a later time, most probably after the mass exodus of the Jainas from Mathura ... (8 59) Receiving meat from the laity was thus understood not touching upon himsa on the part of the monks at that time' (WB). 31 Apart from this, the flesh of animals killed by beasts of prey (kravyada) is also pure according to the brahmanic doctrine, cf. Manu 5, 131; Yajn. 192 etc., but especially Vas. XIV 27: marjara-mukha-samsprstam suci eva hi tad bhavet. 32 Deo 1956: 172f. makes thereof a kind of gas'! 33 duve kavoya ity adeh sruyamanam evartham kecin manyante; anye tv ahuh: kapotakah paksi-visesas, tadvad dve phale varna-sadharmyat; te kapote kusmande, hrasve kapote kapotake te ca sarire ca vanaspati-jiva-dehatvat kapota-sarire. atha va kapota-sarire iva dhusara-varna-sadharmyad eva kapota-sarire kusmandaphale eva... majjara-kadae ity ader api kecic chruyamanam evartham manyante, 12 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Here, too, even in the eleventh century, the correct explanation has survived, in addition to the vegetarian reinterpretation, which - a fitting pendant to the attempt to turn the pork eaten by the Buddha into a mushroom dish, or something similar (see p. [6]) - has gained universal acceptance to this day,34 whereas the correct translation meets with fierce indignation. (13) Kapadia cites one such correct translation in Gujarati by G.J. Patel35 and observes: This translation was greatly resented by Jains, especially when Mr G.J. Patel's article 'Mahavir swami no mamsahar' (the meat-eating of the Lord Mahavira) was published ... Several articles were written as a rejoinder by some of the Jain sadhus and others. There they have pointed out that the words kavoya, majjara and kukkuda do not signify a pigeon, a cat and a cock, but stand for kusmanda, vayuvisesa or viralika (a kind of vanaspati) and bija-puraka, respectively. They have further supported their view by quoting Nighantus and Susrutasamhita. As little as we can agree with these vegetarianist reinterpretations (it is typical enough that for majjara-kadae two quite different ones were given!), as little can it be denied, on the other hand, that other canonical passages, at least for monks, disapprove of meat-eating, if not condemn it outright. Kapadia has collected these passages in his article of 1933. Although in a quotation from Thananga IV, Viyahapannatti VIII, 9 and Uvavaiya 56 (Leumann 1883: 62 last line) we should not translate kunimahara, which is threatened anye tv ahur: marjaro vayu-vibesas, tad-upasamanaya krtam samskrtam marjarakrtam; apare tv ahur: marjaro viralikabhidhano vanaspati-visesas, tena krtam bhavitam yat tat tatha. kim tad ity aha: kukkuta-mamsakam bijapura-kataham. - See Jha 2004: 86 note 102 and Deleu 2007: 106 with reference to Balbir 1984: 30f. (WB). 34 Cf. Deo 1956: 172f. 35 tu Mendhik nagar ma Revati grhapatni che, te ne tya ja, tene mare mate be kabutar randhine taiyar karya che, pan te ne kaheje ke mare tem nu kam nathi; paramtu gai kale biladae marela kukda nu mams tene taiyar karelu che, te mare mate lai av, 'In the town of M. is a housewife R., go to her. She has cooked and prepared two pigeons for me. But tell her that I do not need these. However, she has prepared the meat of a cock killed by a cat yesterday; bring me that (Kapadia 1941: 128). - No discussion about taking away the animal's legitimate food (WB). 13 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA with punishment in hell, as 'eating meat', we may be allowed to understand it literally as 'eating carrion'. But in Dasaveyaliya 12,7 it belongs to the proper qualities of the good monk that he is a-majja*mamsasi amacchari ya (Schubring: '[he should) not (drink] liquor nor eat meat, and she should] not [be] envious (of any one who does so]'), and in Suyagada II 2,72 in a similar context monks are called a-majjamamsasino. In Uttarajjhaya 5, 9 and 7,5-7 consuming alcohol and meat appear in two partly verbatim congruous lists of the gross sins of ignorant worldlings.36 Finally, in chapter 19 (14) of the same text, a youth justifies his resolution to renounce the world by depicting to his parents, who want to dissuade him from renouncing worldly life, the torments of hell which he had endured in former births for the sins of worldly life; thereby he says in vs 69f.: You like flesh in pieces and roasted: I was forced (in hell) to eat again and again my own fire-coloured (i.e. bloody raw) flesh. You like to drink brandy, rum, spirits and (like to eat) honey: I was forced (in hell) to drink blazing hot fat and blood.37 Here, too, the consumption of meat and alcohol are put together and repaid by infernal punishments accordingly. Jain tradition itself states that the editing and recording of the canon did not take place until a full millennium after the death of the founder of the religion, namely in the beginning of the sixth century, at the Council of Valabhi. It has long been known and In the German original wrongly: amaccha (WB). 36 5,9: himse bale musavai maille pisune sadhe / bhunjamane suram mamsam seyam eyam ti mannai (Jacobi: 'An ignorant man kills, lies, deceives, calumniates, dissembles, drinks liquor, and eats meat, thinking that this is the right thing to do'). 5, 9a-7, 52, 5, 90= 7,5EUR! 7, 7: aya-kakkara-bhoi ya tundille (so! Charpentier wrongly writes: tundille] ciya-lohie / auyam narae kankhe jahaesam va elae, (Jacobi: He eats crisp goat's meat, his belly grows, and his veins swell with blood - but he gains nothing but life in hell, just as the ram is only fed to be killed for the sake of a guest'). 37 tuham piyai mamsai khandaim sollagani ya / khavio mi sa-mamsai aggi-vannai 'negaso || tuham piya sura sihu merao ya mahuni ya / paio mi jalantio vasao ruhirani ya. Jacobi's translation 'poisoned meat' rests on the wrong reading visamamsaim. Charpentier prints khavio misamamsaim and gives in his commentary long elucidations on misa, which can be disposed of by correct word-separation. A glance at the parallel poio mi of vs 70 should have shown him that mi = asmi (and consequently samamsaim = sva-mamsani). 14 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS acknowledged that in the Jain canon ancient and very old sections stand side by side with young and very recent ones. Indeed, more than a few parts of the canon date far back to the time when, as we shall soon see, vegetarianism had to a large extent asserted itself also among the Hindus. The passages just presented which condemn meat-consumption can in no way shake the testimony of the three dealt with at the very beginning, in which we may rather see very important testimonies from the oldest period of the Jain tradition, - testimonies whose credibility is substantially supported by Buddhist parallels. Yet this is not all; indeed the consistency, reduced to absurdity, with which the Jain monk tries to practise ahimsa, allows us to understand particularly clear the apparent inconsistency of his flesh-eating. Jainism teaches what one could call a total animism: all of nature is animated; not only animals and plants, but also the elements earth, water, fire and air consist of countless elementary individual souls. 38 As for the monk ahimsa is extended to these, for example, the prohibitions on [15] splashing and heating water, handling fire, and using a fan, which would hurt the arial souls.39 It goes without saying that the acceptance and consumption of every animated (sa-citta) nourishment is prohibited to him. 'Someone else must therefore,' as Schubring strikingly puts it, 'have first taken away its life.'40 This Ids good even of water which the monk does not heat himself, but may only drink when it is made lifeless by boiling. 41 The rule observed even today makes it easier for the Indologist, for example, who visits lain monks in remote regions, to get boiled drinking water than elsewhere in India. The monk can thus eat or drink practically nothing, unless by its killing a layman has violated ahimsa, and then there is indeed no fundamental difference between the use of water boiled by others, plants cooked by others or the flesh of animals killed by others. In view of this, the above (p. [7f.)) cited condition of the Buddha concerning flesh and fish certainly holds good quite universally: the Jain monk may accept nothing at all as alms which has been purchased, fetched, prepared, etc. for him alone. The alms prepared 'for him personally who is expected42 is called uddesiya, which exactly corresponds to the Buddhist uddissa holds 38 Schubring 2000 & 104f. 39 Dasaveyaliya, ch. 3 and 4. 40 Schubring 2000 & 154. 41 It is called then udaga-viyada, i.e. 'water modification'. 42 Schubring 2000 & 154. 15 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA katam. Through an exhaustive casuistry of conditions, the nonobservance of which makes the offering unacceptable, the monk is thus safe-guarded against any ever so indirect and remote participation in the taking of life. At the same time, the essential nature of ahimsa becomes quite clear here: originally it has nothing to do with ethics, as we understand it, but is a magic-ritualistic taboo on life which should not be destroyed in any form whatsoever.43 That this is largely valid even nowadays also for Hinduism, as is shown in Katherine Mayo's famous book Mother India', where the modern practice (amply depicted and condemned by Gandhi in the sharpest of terms) in which strict vegetarianism and the outraged refusal to shorten the most horrible mortal agony of a cow can be mixed with abominable cruelty to animals on an everyday basis 44 and with the most miserable dairy farming. When a Jain monk lives sinlessly merely as a result of the transgression of the layman, it is after all the same egoism which in ancient Buddhism concentrates the whole energy of a monk on working on his own emancipation and makes the (16] behaviour of the monk towards his fellow human beings subordinate to the viewpoint of promoting his efforts towards his own deliverance, in other words, the egoism against which Mahayana Buddhism later sets its altruistic ideal of deliverance for all of mankind. The fact that it was only important for the Jain monk not to offend ahimsa himself, while profiting from the transgression by others without a second thought, has modern parallels too, not only those in the practice of Sherpas and Burmese Buddhist monks outlined above (p. (5f.)). So, we may not be outraged so easily or mock, when the pious Hindu, often without any scruples, sells his cow to the Muslim butcher. Now let us turn from Buddhists and Jains to the brahmins. With regard to them, the gradual rise of ahimsa and its vegetarian 43 Schmidt 1968: 627 remarks that Alsdorf does not explain this (WB). 44 For instance by overloading beasts of burden through greed of grain (Williams 1973. 674. (atibhararopana], [atibhara-vahana] and 288-90. Hemacandra, Trio X 3, 60 describes ascetics hitting with sticks cattle which eat the grass of their huts: tapasas te gas ta yastibhir atadayan; at X 3,89ff. villagers starve a bull, and at X 3,329 at a chariot race bulls are urged on with a goad with iron spikes: prajanarabhir irayan ... a-krpas tav avahayat. See also Mette 1991: 126f. = 2009: 141f.; Bruhn 2007: 64 and Bollee 2006: 59ff. 'In religious practice and scriptural sources, there was failure to prohibit outright abuse of animals' (Sridhar and Bilimoria 2007: 316); and Balbir 2009a: 812 et passim. As early as RV X 85, 43f. Surya is urged to love animals (WB). 16 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS consequence is particularly well illustrated in the pertinent section of the 'Lawbook of Manu'. In reading this, it is to be borne in mind that, in this most authoritative code of Indian customs and laws, a fundamental change of view and custom has found expressio the effect that the old and new are, not infrequently, simply placed in juxtaposition to, or rather after, each other, regardless of the flagrant contradictions resulting from it. A well-known example is perhaps that of the rules for conduct in the levirate,45 the custom familiar also outside India, attested to in the Indian epics, amongst other texts, according to which the brother of a man who died in childless wedlock begets by his sister-in-law the offspring which is so necessary for the sacrifices to the fathers. The changed view, whereby a wife is not permitted to have intercourse with a man after the death of her husband, from which came the well-known prohibition of widow-remarriage and, as extreme, the practice of widow-burning, to such a view the levirate became offensive in the highest degree. One dares not, however, simply do away with the old rule. It is faithfully imparted in Manu 9,59; then again follow four stanzas (60-63) which manifestly try to limit the custom and make it less offensive: it is determined that after the procreation of one son, intercourse with the sister-in-law has to be broken off and that, when it is pursued out of sensuality, both partners forfeit their caste. According to a later passage (9, 143f.) the second son begotten in this way is even disinherited. Then five stanzas follow abruptly (9, 64-68), which condemn the levirate in the sharpest of tones and bluntly prohibit it. It is a custom fit for cattle, [17] which does not find any support in the sacred texts, and had catastrophic consequences when practised by humans in ancient times. Considered critically and historically, the apparently juxtaposed and contradictory regulations become successive stages of historical development and exactly the same holds true of the section on meateating in Manu. The stanzas 5-25 in chapter 5 give the numerous and complex regulations regarding forbidden and permitted foods, which in every lawbook take a significant place. Vegetables, especially leek, garlic, onions and mushrooms, also belong to the dishes forbidden not only under specific circumstances (slightly sour or stale, mixed with impure substances, etc.), but forbidden at all. Above all there 45 Cf. Buhler's translation in 1886: xciv. 17 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA is a long list of animals which cannot be eaten; it varies considerably with the different authors. Such an enumeration naturally implies that other animals could indeed be eaten, and this is emphasized by the fact that general prohibitions are restricted by explicit permission to eat certain species of animals. The most important example is an old stanza which permits the consumption of five five-clawed animals. Heinrich Luders has followed it through the entire legal literature, the epics and the Buddhist Pali literature. 46 Here it is only about the distinction between 'kosher' and 'non-kosher' meat; the consumption of meat as such is presumed as self-evident. 47 Still there is no question of vegetarianism.48 [18] Just as with the levirate, a second stage of conflict follows this first stage of the still undisputed old views, one of compromises between old and new. Here, too, the newly arising opinions confront the strong powers of inertia of tradition; indeed they are, in this case, in actual fact wholly invincible, since in the brahmanic religion bloody animal sacrifices play a central role. To its fully correct and only thus magically effective execution belongs not only the killing of the sacrificial victim but also the ritual enjoyment of its flesh. 46 Luders 1940: 175ff. 47 A misconception occurring time and again up to this day is when, for example, Jolly 1896: 157, perceives in the determinations of kosher and non-kosher animals 'remnants of a laxer interpretation of ahimsa which declares certain animals to be edible'. Accordingly the triumphal procession of ahimsa had consisted in a gradual extension of the ban on killing from only some to more and more species of animals. With this the historical development is wholly misunderstood. For ahimsa there cannot be any fundamental distinction between particular species of animals. Conversely, we do find regulations regarding the purity and impurity of animals among many peoples (e.g. the Jews), who know nothing at all of ahimsa. The distinction between pure and impure animals and the ban on killing based on ahimsa have originally and historically nothing at all to do with each other. Inevitably, however, these were (and from that stems, in part, the misconception) later combined with one another by the Indians, whereby the old rules on pure and impure and the new ones totally banning killing, or restricting it to ritual occasions, as will be shown soon (p. (191), were brought into line with each other in such a way as to also restrict the consumption of meat still conditionally permitted to 'kosher' animals. - Hemacandra calls Manu's lawbook a himsa-sastra (Williams 1963: 70; WB). 48 Of ahimsa only indirectly in one passage (Manu 5, 22) which permits (or prescribes) the brahmins the killing of kosher animals and birds for offering and for the sustenance of relations; the passage will concern us later (p. [27]). 18 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS We note only provisionally that it was precisely cattle which were considered the most important traditional offering. Moreover, it was not only about the sacrifice, but also, for example, about the sacred ancient rule according to which an ox or goat is to be slaughtered for a brahmin or a noble guest:49 so familiar and solemn a rule that the expression go-ghna 'cow-killer' is transmitted to us as a synonym of the words for 'guest. 50 Therefore, because it was now impossible to question the ancient sacrifices, it only remained to postulate that the ban on killing and meat-eating did not hold true in all cases where the ritual requires both; this was made easier, as we shall see, by the ancient doctrine that killing for sacrifice is not killing. Exactly this is found in another section in Manu, of 18 stanzas (5,27-44), the unsystematic arrangement, repetitions and inconsistencies of which clearly characterizes it as a compilation of disparate materials. That this section cannot at all be actually (19) reconciled with the preceding is shown by the illogicality of a transitional verse (5, 26), patched in between, which announces that after the 'completely imparted' (!~) rules on permitted and forbidden dishes, now the ones on allowed and prohibited meat-eating will follow51 - as if meat had not also been a dish and as if it had not previously time and again been about forbidden meat. With varying shifts of accent in the new section, the fact of meateating being permitted at ritual occasions is again and again 49 SpBr. 3, 4, 1, 2: atithir va esa etasyagacchati yat somah kritas, tasma etad yatha rajne va brahmanaya va mahoksam va mahajam va pacet. Ait.Br. 3, 4, 6: ... atithyam kriyate. 'gnim manthanti some rajany agate. tad yathaivado manusyaraja agate 'nyasmin varhaty uksanam va vehatam va ksadanta, evam asma etat ksadante yad agnim manthanty; agnir hi devanam pasuh. Vasistha IV 8: athapi brahmanaya va rajanyaya vabhyagataya mahoksanam va mahajam va paced, evam asyatithyam kurvantiti. Sankh. grhyas. 2, 15, 1: sannam ced arghyanam anyatama agacched, go-pasum ajam annam va yat samanyatamam manyeta, tat kuryan; namamso 'rghah syat (!-). Yajnav. 1.109: mahoksam va mahajam va srotriya yopakalpayet. Cf. further Asv. glhyas.1, 24, 30ff.; Paraskaragshyas. 1, 3, 26f. - Both parallels cited from SpBr. and Ait.Br. can hold good as confirmation of Thieme's finding in 1957: 90, corroborated by other materials, that 'through all the essential particulars of its form and its process' the Vedic sacrifice is 'defined as a stylistic banquet'. (Cf. Schlerath 1960: 129ff.) Thus, historically considered, the slaughter of a cattle for the guest was the model for the cow sacrifice. 50 Panini 3, 4, 73. 51 etad uktam dvijatinam bhaksyabhaksyam a-besatah / mamsasyatah pravaksyami vidhim bhaksana-varjane. 19 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA confronted with its reprehensiveness under other circumstances.52 As to this, we read with special interest in vs 32 that meat-eating at sacrifices for deities and fathers is not a transgression, no matter whether the meat was bought, slaughtered by oneself or donated by someone:53 unmistakenly an argument with the Buddhist and Jain views about qualified permission to eat meat which we have come across above (p. [7]). The categorical contention that killing for sacrifice is not killing appears twice: 5, 44 'One should regard the injury to moving and immovable creatures, which the Veda has prescribed for certain occasions, as non-injury,'54 and vs 39: 'Svayambhu himself created the animals for the sake of sacrifice; the sacrifice serves the welfare of the whole world; therefore, killing for sacrifice is not killing."5 155 In order to ensure the correct execution of important ceremonies which are threatened by ahimsa, stanza 35 even threatens heavy punishment for the rejection of ritually prescribed flesh-eating: the concerned in question will be reborn twenty-one times as [20] a sacrificial animal.56 On the other hand, doubts are appeased by the doctrine that a high rebirth be ensured to the sacrificed animal as well as to the sacrificer.57 In one stanza (37) a substitute animal appears out of ghee or flour.58 52 Vs 31: Meat-eating for the purpose of sacrifice is divine custom, otherwise it is a demonic (raksasa) one; 33: except in times of emergency (apadi), flesheating is only permissible according to precept (vidhina); he who eats meat not in keeping with the regulations will after death be eaten by the animals killed by him; 34: extra-ritual flesh-eating is punished after death more severely than animal-killing out of greed; 36: a brahmin must and is allowed to eat only sacrificial animals consecrated with mantras; 38: whoever kills an animal other than for the purpose of sacrifice will be killed in future rebirths as many times as the animal had hair; 41: animalkilling is exclusively permissible when entertaining a guest (!) and at sacrifices for the gods and fathers; 43: in none of the three stages of life (student, householder, forest-dweller) nor in emergencies should one commit an injury not sanctioned by the Veda. 53 kritva svayam vapy utpadya paropahrtam eva va devan pitrms carcayitva khadan mamsam na dusyati. 54 ya veda vihita himsa niyatasmims caracare | ahimsam eva tam vidyat. 55 yajnartham pasavah srstah svayam eva Svayambhuva | yajno 'sya bhutyai sarvasya, tasmad yajne vadho 'vadhah. 56 niyuktas tu yathanyayam yo mamsam natti manavah sa pretya pasutam yati sambhavan ekavimsatim. 57 40: osadhyah pasavo vrksas tiryancah paksinas tatha | yajnartham nidhanam praptah prapnuvanty ucchritih punah; 42: esv arthesu pasun himsan vedatattvarthavid dvijah / atmanam ca pasums caiva gamayaty uttamam gatim. 20 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS In addition, just at the beginning of the section, the partaking of meat is permitted, apart from ritual occasions, when someone's life is endangered as well as in the case of feeding brahmins. 59 Then follow three stanzas, which proclaim, somewhat out of context, what we would call the natural right of mankind to partake of meat: the divine order of creation has destined all animate and unanimate nature to be nourishment for the breath of life (28); the inanimate is nourishment for the animate; animals without fangs are nourishment for those with fangs, as are those without hands for those with hands; the timorous for the brave (29).61 The eater who eats edible beings every day does not commit an offence, because the creator himself has created living beings to eat and be eaten (30).62 Then in complete contradiction, not only to these stanzas but also to everything preceding them, follows a third section of eleven stanzas (44-55), which explicitly appeals to the rule of ahimsa, and unconditionally brands any partaking of meat as immoral, and praises the merit of a total commitment to vegetarianism in the highest terms. Here is the stanza already cited in the beginning (p. [5]), which states that no flesh can be obtained without violence to living beings, wherefore meat is to be shunned; and - like a polemic against the above-mentioned vs 32 (flesh consumption in connection with a sacrifice to gods and fathers (21) is not an offence, no matter if the meat is purchased, slaughtered by oneself or given as a gift) - vs 51 reads "The one sanctioning (the killing), the carver, slaughterer, buyer, seller, cook, servant and consumer - they are all killers.'63 As if to weaken, at least to some extent, the all too glaring inconsistencies between these requirements of uncompromising 58 kuryad ghrta-pasum sange kuryat pista-pasum tatha /na tv eva tu vrtha hantum pasum icchet kadacana. - '(Images of) animal pairs out of flour' (mithunanam ca yathopapadam pistasya ...) Sankh. Gshyas. 4, 19; cf. Oldenberg 1878: 156. 59 proksitam bhaksayen mamsam brahmananam ca kamyaya / yatha-vidhi niyuktas tu prananam eva catyaye. 60 pranasyannam idam sarvam Prajapatir akalpayat / sthavaram jangamam caiva sarvam pranasya bhojanam. 61 caranam annam a-cara, damstrinam apy a-damstrinah /a-hastas ca sa-hastanam, suranam caiva bhiravah. 62 natta dusyaty adann adyan pranino 'hany ahany api / dhatraiva srsta hy adyas ca pranino 'ttara eva ca. 63 anumanta visasita nihanta kraya-vikrayi / samskarta copaharta ca khadakas ceti ghatakah. 21 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA ahimsa vegetarianism64 and the preceding discussion, there finally follows one last stanza (56), which testifies, alone through the inclusion of the themes of alcohol and sexuality, that, properly speaking, it belongs to another context: 'There is no offence in the consumption of flesh, intoxicating beverages and sexual intercourse; that is in fact the (natural) conduct of living beings; however, abstinence brings great rewards!'65 The Manusmoti is not only the most esteemed but also the oldest of the classical metrical lawbooks, the so-called Dharmasastras, which form the second layer of Indian law literature and whose origin is fixed approximately from the second century BCE until a few centuries CE. Prior to these legal textbooks is the oldest stratum of scriptures in prose with verse insertions, the so-called Dharmasutras and they are followed by the commentaries and the great medieval collections, the Nibandhas, whose number is occasionally augmented by the learned pandits even today. If we now first look back from Manu to the Dharmasutras, it becomes apparent that, in these branches of Vedic literature from the three stages which we ascertained in Manu, essentially only the first is represented. Everywhere in the context of the detailed and complicated rules for permitted and forbidden meals appear lists of edible and non-edible animals, and in many places, meat eating is clearly presumed to be normal.66 By contrast, not only is the third stage of the demand for uncompromising vegetarianism missing, but also even the second confrontation [22] between ahimsa and animal-sacrifice.67 This applies without restriction to the very probably pre-Buddhistic sutras of Baudhayana and Apastamba.68 64 Only vs 52 does strictly speaking not belong here, but to the previous section, because the assertion that there is no worse offender than the one who tries to augment his own flesh by means of that of someone else is weakened by the addition: 'without worshipping fathers (or) gods' (an abhyarcya pitsn devan), which, of course, again exempts the sacrifices. 65 Na mamsa-bhaksane doso... nivrttis tu maha-phala. The stanza is quoted by Hemacandra 141,58f. on Mallisena vs 23 and referred to by Balbir 2009. In Schmidt 1968: 628 this stanza is added to put the discussion into the proper context - that of the renunciatory way of life which is the ideal of the brahmin (WB). 66 Cf. Baudh. II 4,7;6, 2; 11, 15 (forest ascetics can live on flesh torn by beasts of prey, in addition III 3, 6); 12, 8; III 1, 13, and 4, 1 (no flesh in case of a special vow); Apast. I 17, 15 and 19; II 17, 26-18, 3; Vas. XIV 12. 67 See also Baudh. II 17, 29; 18, 2; III 3, 19 from which follows that ahimsa belongs to the special rules respectively to the vows for ascetics and forest hermits, and therefore is demanded only for them. For Person 22 Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Matters are somewhat but only apparently different in the case of Vasistha. Illustrating this requires a closer investigation of several passages in the text. Excursus: Vasistha and Manu In Vas, numerous stanzas are found which stand in similar or only slightly deviating form in our Manu text69 without being shown as citations from Manu.70 Alongside these, Manu' or 'the Manava' is again explicitly quoted eleven times and some of these citations, but by no means all, reappear in our Manu. As is well-known, Buhler took this as proof that the Manusmoti did, as Max Muller had mooted, originate from an old, not preserved Manavadharmasutra. The principal and essential proof of this is the passage Vas. IV 5-8. After in IV 4, truth, angerlessness, generosity, ahinsa and procreation have been enumerated as required by all the four Varnas (sarvesam satyam a-krodho danam ahimsa prajananam ca) the text continues: 5 6 7 pity-devatatithi-pujayam apy eva pasum himsyad iti Manavam. madhu-parke ca yajne ca pity-daivata-karmani atraiva ca pasum himsyan nanyathety abravin Manuh. nakrtva praninam himsam mamsam utpadyate kvacit, na ca prani-vadhah svargyas, tasmad yage vadho 'vadhah. athopi, brahmanaya va rajanyaya vabhyagataya mahoksanam va mahajam va paced; evam asma atithyam kurvantiti. 8 The Manava says: Only in the reverence of ancestors, gods and guests may one violate an animal. [23] At a madhu-parka (i.e. in hospitality), in sacrifices and during rites in honour of ancestors - only on such occasions may one violate an animal, otherwise not, so said Manu. 68 The same is true for Gautama's sutras, which indeed, provided Meyer 1927: VII and 253ff. is right, would be placed much later, long after Manu. 69 Buhler (SBE XIV, p. XX notes 1 and 2) counts 41 such stanzas; the list in note 1 (in which II 10 should read II 30, and XXV should be XXVI) could be completed by parts of stanzas. 70 On the whole, the majority are not recognisable as quotations, but a number of them is preceded by the customary remark athapy udaharanti, or they are at least followed by an iti which does not occur in the Manu text. 23 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA One does not obtain flesh without injuring living beings, but the killing of living beings does not lead to heaven; therefore, the killing for sacrifice is not killing. Moreover, one must cook a big ox or a big goat for a Brahman or Ksatriya coming (on a visit); in this way one shows hospitality to him. Buhler comments on this passage:71 All the four sutras must be taken as a quotation, because the particle iti, 'thus', occurs at the end of IV, 8, and because the identity of sutra 6 with Manu V, 41, as well as the close resemblance of sutra 7 to Manu V, 48, shows that the quotation is not finished with sutra 5. If we accept this explanation, we have in our passage the usual arrangement followed in the Dharma-sutras. First comes the prose rule, next the verses which confirm it, and finally a Vedic passage on which both the rule and the verses rest ... If it is thus necessary to admit that Vasistha's quotation is taken from a Manava Dharma-sutra, the agreement of the doctrine taught in the quotation and of a portion of the text with those of our Manu-smrti shows further that this Dharmasutra must have been the forerunner of our metrical law-book. To this it has to be said in the first place that the iti after sutra 8 cannot in any way prove that the Manu citation is complete up to there; indeed one must rather regard the iti Manavam of vs 5 as a distinct mark of the end of the quotation, and the ity abravin Manuh of vs 6 as the concluding mark of another quotation, while the iti of vs 8 marks the end of a third citation, whether it deals now (as I believe) with an inaccurate quotation of the passages mentioned above p. [18] note 1 from SpBr. and AiBr. or, as Buhler (SBE XIV, p. XIX) presumes, with a (more precise) citation from a 'hitherto unknown Brahmana'. There is no clue at all that Vasistha also quotes this citation from the Manava'. If one further holds the sutras 5 and 6 side by side, one cannot doubt that the second is a versification of the first; one may rather 71 SBE XXV, p. xxxi; cf. also SBE XVIII-XX, 26 note 5; SBE XXV, p. XXII; Jolly 1896: 12, 17; Winternitz III, 2 1965: 585f. 24 For Personal & Private Use Only

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doubt that the author or compiler of the Manava himself has let his own sutra be followed by a self-quoting versification. Altogether one sees that this stanza is not only accommodated in our Manusmrti but also in Sankh. grhyas. 2, 16, 1- there in similar connection to the one in Vasistha; thus one may hold it at least [24] much more probable that Vas. does not quote this stanza from the 'Manava', but, if not from either of the two already mentioned sources, then from the stock of popular dharma-stanzas. Even more informative is a comparison of Vas. IV 7 with Manu 5, 48. Not only Buhler (SBE XIV 27 note) but also Jolly (1896: 157) assume without any ado that the closing pada of Vas. 'therefore, killing for sacrifice is not killing' becomes substituted in Manu 5, 48 by the pada 'therefore, one must forgo flesh', 'to suit the ahimsa doctrines of the compilers of the metrical smrtis' [English in the original] as Buhler says. It is astonishing that neither he nor Jolly are scandalized by the crass illogicality of the Vas. verse: Certainly the second half of the stanza only lets itself be logically justified if at all provided one makes a quite essential addition to the text, which is not, in itself, foreseeable: 'killing of living beings does not lead to heaven - but, as is well-known, sacrifice does - hence, killing for sacrifice is not killing.' This somewhat entangled argumentation2 could apply if, in the first half of the verse, something about the necessity of the sacrifice, or even a mention of sacrifice were included; yet instead of that, the text says: 'No meat is obtained by one anywhere without injuring living beings.' It is very clear that after the interpolation but killing animals does not lead to heaven', the only logical conclusion is the one from Manu 5, 48: 'Therefore must one forgo meat.' It appears to me that Manu 5, 48 is undoubtedly the genuine, original form of the stanza - with the most radical, most advanced ahimsa standpoint! - whereas Vas. IV 7 - a vindication of animalsacrifice! - is a secondary, meaning inverting distortion. When one sees that the pada 'therefore killing for sacrifice is not killing' is likewise to be found in Manu, and as an indeed quite meaningful conclusion of the stanza 5, 39, discussed previously (p. [19]), the conjecture can hardly be dismissed that the Vas. stanza is taken directly from our Manu text, and represents a clumsy conglomerate 1 CONTRIBUTIONS 72 Meyer 1927: 46 'Yet indeed killing for sacrifice is not killing, because the killing does not lead the killer to heaven, but leads the sacrifice to heaven. Hence see, e.g. Vas. IV 7; Manu V 39-44... See also Doniger 1976: 96 quoting Raghavan 1962: 356; Hiltebeitel 2001: 203 (WB). 25 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA of 5, 48 and 5, 39. Citation from our Manu text is, therefore, not improbable for Vas. IV 6, too. The numerous common Vas. and Manu stanzas and stanza-parts should be once again examined in the light of these suppositions. Already now it may be shown at least in two cases, that our Manu text is clearly more correct or older than that of Vas. [25] 1. In Manu 8, 98, dealt with by Luders (1917 = 1940: 439), Vas. reads kanyanrte instead of pasv-anrte which, as Luders (1940: 444) confirms, is unoriginal against pasv-anrte. 2. Ibid., p. 441 Luders writes: Although it is certain in general that the versified text-books are later than those composed in prose, it appears to me to be certain that the authors of the sutras have often refashioned old memorial verses into prose ... In numerous cases, the original metrical character of the sutras still distinctly gleams through; in others it results from the content or by comparison with aphoristic literature.73 If, in recollection of these sentences, one reads in Vas. VIII 4f.: sayam agatam atithim naparundhyat/nasyan-asnan grhe vaset, then one can easily suppose that these two sutras are nothing more than one sloka, of which the third pada and the last four syllables of the second (perchance 'kadacana'?) have been omitted. This supposition is confirmed by the Manu verse (3, 105) corresponding to the content, in which the sutra Vas. VIII 5 appears as the last pada: a-pranodyo 'tithih sayam suryodho grha-medhina/kale praptas tv a-kale va nasyan-asnan grhe vaset. At the same time, we can with greatest probability take from this stanza the missing third pada between Vas. VIII 4 and 5, since a little later we read as sutra 8 the sloka: naikagramina atithir viprah samgatikas tatha/kale prapto a-kale va nasyanasnan grhe vaset. Buhler translates this thus: 73 'So gewiss im allgemeinen. die versifizierten Lehrbucher junger sind als die in Prosa abgefassten, so gewiss scheint es mir zu sein, dass die SutraVerfasser so und so oft alte Memorialverse in Prosa aufgelost haben... In zahlreichen Fallen schimmert der ursprunglich metrische Charakter von Sutras noch deutlich durch, in anderen ergibt er sich aus dem Inhalt oder durch Vergleich mit der Spruchliteratur' (WB). 26 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS A Brahmana who lives in the same village (with his host) and a visitor on business or pleasure (are) not (called) guests. (But a guest), whether he arrives at the moment (of dinner) or at an inopportune time, must not stay in the house of a (householder) without receiving food. But for the completion '(but a guest)' there is no occasion or justification at all; the only possible translation is rather: 'A fellow villager is not a guest, and neither is a samgatika brahmin. Whether he comes on time or untimely, he must not spend the night in his house without eating.' -- That two absolutely incompatible stanza-halves are brought together here is corroborated by the stanza Manu 3, 103: naikagraminam atithim vipram samgatikam tatha/upasthitam grhe vidyad bharya yatragnayo 'pi va,74 'One must not consider as a guest a fellow villager or a samgatika brahmin who has turned up in the house, or where(else) are wife and fires.' Thus we have in Vas. VIII 8 a sloka [26] whose two halves are not compatible with each other; however, they fit perfectly to the respective other halves of two Manu slokas, 3, 103 and 105, but the last pada of the Vas. sloka appears once again there where it is really pertinent - Vas. VIII 5 - and where also the third pada would be pertinent and can be found in Manu. (Moreover, one should note that in Vas. 8 the transposition of the accusative into the nominative has led to the false sandhi: gramina atithir, which therefore proves the originality of the Manu text, while reciprocally in Manu, the abnormal sandhi: prapto a-kale75 has evidently been smoothed out secondarily to praptas tv a-kale.) The circumstances here are not unlike those in the case of Vas. IV 7, only rather more complicated, and it is difficult not to believe in a rather awkward performance on the part of a Vas.-compiler or, more probably, an interpolator having worked with our Manu text. We observe a similar distortion as in Vas. VIII 8 again in stanza Vas. XI 34, concerning our theme: niyuktas tu yatih sraddhe daive va mamsam utsrjet yavanti pasu-romani tavan narakam rcchati. 74 The sloka appears again in Sarkh. grhyas. 2, 16, 3 with the variant viprosyagatam eva ca instead of vipram samgatikam tatha. 75 Fuhrer wrongly prints: prapte. 27 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA To begin with, the first line is no doubt corrupt. It is nonsensical that the determination of the penalty for the refusal to eat meat at an ancestor sacrifice or one to the deities ought to pertain precisely and only for a yati; and, above all, the first line must certainly be either a relative or conditional clause. As a matter of fact, it begins in Krtyakalpataru III 7 (GOS CXI p. 318), where the stanza from 'Yama' is cited, with the words: amantritas tu yah sraddhe. One can then confidently correct the Vas. text in niyuktas tu yadi sraddhe. We now find an equivalent of the first line in Manu 5, 35: niyuktas tu yathanyayam yo mamsam natti manavah sa pretya pasutam yati sambhavan ekavimsatim, but we read a counterpart of the second in Manu three stanzas later (5, 38): yavanti pasu-romani, tavat-krtvo ha maranam vrtha-pasu-ghnah prapnoti pretya janmani janmani.76 [27] Yajn. 1, 180 corresponds to it as regards the contents: vaset sa narake ghore dinani pasu-romabhih sammitani duracaro yo hanty a-vidhina pasun. Yajn. thus confirms that the punishment according to the number of animal hairs belongs to the animal-killing outside the sacrifice, not (as with Vas.) to the refusal to eat meat on ritual occasions. One may conclude, therefore, that the Vas.-stanza represents a later insertion, in any case does not fit to the present context, because in Vas. it appears in a long section which exclusively concerns itself with the sraddha, while in the stanza the text talks about the refusal to eat meat not only at the sacrifice offered to the dead but also at that to the deities (daive). There remains a last Vas. passage on the theme of meat which indeed gives no cause for doubt that it is the direct source of two stanzas of our Manu text. Chapter XIV begins its exposition about permitted and forbidden foods (bhojyabhojya) with numerous and 76 The Krtyakalpataru cites a contamination of this and the previous stanza from Harita: niyuktas tu yatha sraddhe yas tu mamsam na bhaksayet | yavanti pasu-romani tavan narakam rcchati. 28 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS involved rules as to from whom one may or may not accept food. It says: 14. na mtgayor isu-carinah parivarjyam annam. 15. vijnayate hi: Agastyo varsa-sahasrike sattre mtgayam cacara. tasyasams tara-samayah purodasa mrga-paksinam prasastanam: The food (given) by a hunter hunting with arrows is not to be refused for it is taught in the Veda): During a thousand years' Soma sacrifice, Agastya went on a hunt. He had sacrificial cakes consisting of the meat of kosher animals and birds. It is clear that Manu 5, 22f. is versification hereof: yajnartham brahmanair vadhyah prasasta muga-paksinah bhrtyanam caiva vrtty-artham, Agastyo hy acarat pura. babhuvur hi purodasa bhaksyanam mrga-paksinam puranesv api yajnesu brahma-ksatra-savesu ca. Brahmins are allowed to kill kosher animals and birds for sacrifice and for the subsistence of their dependents; indeed Agastya proceeded (thus) in the past. There were also sacrificial cakes prepared from edible animals and birds at the sacrifices of antiquity and those of brahmins and ksatriyas. The versification is exceedingly clumsy and not understandable at all without the Vas. text. The disappearance of Agastya's hunt could be connected with the fact that in Manu 4, 212 the mrgayu is explicitly listed among those people from whom one may not accept food. However, the strange and factually false insertion (28] of the pada: bhrtyanam caiva vrtty-artham is clarified with a glance at the sloka (XIV 13) immediately preceding in Vas.: gurv-artham daram ujjihirsann arcisyan devatatithin sarvatah pratigrhniyan, na tu trpyet tatah svayam. For the Guru (or) to support wife (and child) or to honour gods and guests, one may accept (something) from somebody, but one must not satiate oneself therefrom. This stanza appears in the correct context, namely, under the prescriptions as to from whom one may accept something, in Manu 29 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA 4, 251, to which the Vas. padas b-d literally correspond, but pada a has the following form: gurun bhrtyams cojihirsan. It is a two-fold improvement of the Vas. text: the metrical irregularity of the ninesyllabled pada is removed, and daram standing as pars pro toto is replaced by the more comprehensive bhrtyan. The appearance of the full stanza Manu 4, 251 emphasizes that the removal of 'for Guru, wife (and children)' from Vas. XIV 13, and the change of the stipulation granting permission to accept from any giver to the permission to slaughter kosher animals is secondary. For the rest it is to be noted that the Vas.-passage neither discusses on ahimsa - quite the contrary! - nor does it belong to the discussion on bloody sacrifice. Only in the two Manu stanzas does the new problematic gently emerge (yet without any polemic!); but significantly enough they are not found in the section on discussion of sacrifice (5, 27-44), but in that on kosher and non-kosher foods and especially on animals. To summarise: From Buhler's showpiece, there remains only the short beginning, the citation Vas. IV 5 above, as evidence of a lost ManavaDharmasutra as the source of our Manu, so that, in particular, the proof is lacking 'that the author of the Vasistha Dharma-sutra knew a treatise attributed to a teacher called Manu which, like all the other Dharma-sutras, was partly written in aphoristic prose and partly in verse'. Whether Buhler's hypothesis, which Jolly 1896: 17f. has already described as fundamentally questionable, can still be maintained after the removal of this vital support would have to be clarified through a new examination of the relation between Vas. and Manu. Uncompromising vegetarianism is nowhere mentioned in Vas.; the passages which point to an argument between ahimsa and sacrifice are nearly all suspicious of being later insertions. It remains as the only point [29] the commandment, in IV 4 (alongside others), of ahimsa for all four social classes; then, in the subsequent sutra of the Manava citation, the ahimsa keyword occurring here is followed by the justification of animal-killing through ritual motives - yet indeed without any polemical note; it is Manu 5, 41 which first introduces the intensifying atraiva-nanyatha. I certainly cannot give up the - naturally not strictly provable - suspicion that Vas. IV 4 could have originally been a sloka line; 30 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS something like: sarvesam satyam a-krodho danam prajananam tatha; ahimsa would then have been later inserted in a transposed prose form: the sutras 5-8 would then have followed this subsequently inserted keyword. The suspicion is further nourished by the fact that, on the one hand, of the four virtues remaining after the elimination of ahimsa, each is especially characteristic of one of the four varnas: satya for the brahmins, a-krodha for the warriors, dana for the Vaisyas, prajanana for the sudras, the 'proletarians'; while, on the other hand, ahimsa is rather conspicuous as a demand on all the four classes, at least in olden times as that. Above all, however, what best corresponds to this suspicion and confirms it further is that we have recognised the distorting citations above in IV 6 and 7 of our Manu text. However, even if we accept that ahimsa and the discussion of sacrifice, which are completely absent in Baudh. and Apast., are noticeable in first traces in Vas., then it supports well the common presumption which places Vas. between the oldest Dharmasutras and the Manusmrti;78 Meyer (1927: VII) dates Vas. in about the 4th century BCE. If we now turn again to Manu in order to direct the view ahead on the contemporary and later legal texts, we notice straight away a work that indeed does not properly belong to the law texts but can and must be nevertheless counted in a certain sense as belonging to it, and whose close connection with the Manusmrti is wellknown:29 the Mahabharata. To be sure, the particularly rich material which the epic offers us can only be used [30] chronologically to a very limited degree since, as is well-known, in it pre-Buddhist, later and very late works stand alongside each other and, strictly speaking, the age of each of the countless building stones of the monstrous, labyrinthine and gigantic construction, differing by many hundreds of years, must be determined separately. For our purposes, we may content ourselves with Oldenberg's statement80 that the Manusmrti apparently dates from approximately the same time as large sections of the Mahabharata. With 77 Cf. the rule cited by Luders 1951: 408 from the Mahabharata for the brahmin to always speak the truth (rta-vadi sada ca syat) and ibid., p. 410 making the sta and satya equal to the Brahman. 78 Cf. Jolly 1896: 6; Winternitz III 1963-5: 578f. 79 Cf. Buhler 1886: LXXIV-XC; Winternitz 1963-5: 587f. 80 Oldenberg (see 1903 entry) 1923: 187. 31 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA these considerations, we can state that in the didactic portions of the epic8l the debate between animal-sacrifice and ahimsa, between meat-eating and vegetarianism is at a peak, which testifies to its topicality. It is neither possible nor necessary to present the entire material: naturally, the same arguments and formulas known to us from Manu are repeated many times over. Hence a selection should suffice which, above all, takes into account what is suitable to supplement that which is already known to us.82 In Vanaparvan (III 199), the 'pious hunter' (dharma-vyadha), a professional wildgame dealer makes a 38 stanzas-long plea for animal-killing and meat-eating to a brahmin. He initially clarifies that his really awful (ghora) profession is karma-ordained fate; similarly predestined is the killing, the killer being only the executing instrument. 83 Moreover, the animals killed and sold in their turn acquire religious merit in that they feed gods, guests, fathers, etc. with their flesh. Thus King Sibi also earned his way to heaven through the gift of his own flesh, and King Rantideva (wellknown through Kalidasa's Meghaduta 45) who had 2,000 small livestock and 2,000 cows slaughtered daily attained matchless glory through his donations of meat-dishes. Beyond this, the Veda also lays down that plants, like animals, are designated to be food for the world84 - consequently, the appeal to natural law and the order of creation, [31] which we already know from Manu 5, 28-30. Only after that does the appeal to animal-killing for the sacrifice prescribed by the Veda appear, whereby the sacrificial animal gains entry to heaven. Without the animal sacrifice no one would ever have chanced upon meat-eating!85 Meat-eating in ritual is not only sinless, it is to be looked upon as non-meat-eating, just as sexual 81 That in the old parts, the epic legend proper, hunting and meat-eating by the heroes are a completely unproblematic matter hardly needs to be emphasized. On this and on meat-eating in the Mbh. in general see Hopkins 1901: 377ff. 82 In the following, passages from Mbh. III and XII are cited according to the critical Poona edition, from XIII and XIV, for which this has not yet come out, according to the Bombay edition, occasionally corrected with the help of the Calcutta edition. 83 Vs 3: vidhina vihite (v. I. hi hate) purvam nimitto ghatako bhavet. - Cf. Biardeau/Malamoud 1976: 136 (WB). 84 Vs 5: osadhyo virudhas capi pasavo mrga-paksinah / annadya-bhuta lokasya, ity api sruyate srutih. 85 Vs 10: yadi naivagnayo, brahman, mamsa-kamabhavan pura / bhaksyam naiva bhaven (v.l. naivabhavan) mamsam kasyacit. 32 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS intercourse with one's wife during the time of stu ('fertility') is not a breach of chastity.86 Once again, the dharma-vyadha returns to the fateful karmic conditionality of his profession: as a consequence of a curse, King Saudasa had devoured even men. Giving up a karmadetermined profession is sin, its continuance merit. Yet one can remove and mitigate bad karma through generosity, honesty, obedience and hospitality to brahmins (and the dharma-vyadha tries to do this). Then follow at last longer expositions which show the impossibility of consistent ahinsa. Cultivation is counted as 'good' (sadhu), but the plough destroys living beings to a great extent.87 Seeds are also alive, e.g. rice grains,88 as well as plants and trees, which one cuts without much ado - the whole world is filled with living beings, which feed on each other.89 Knowingly or unknowingly, everyone kills living beings at every step; no one can avoid himsa; the zealous ascetic even can only curtail it at most.90 These last stanzas really read like an attempt to make clear to the Jain monks the absurdity of their exaggerated efforts for ahimsa. What is, however, particularly worth noting, in this whole unsystematic, disorderly and not always logical sequence of arguments, is that no objection by the brahmin nor any refutation from the standpoint of ahimsa follows. One has the impression that the justification of the dharma-vyadha reflects a relatively early phase of the [32] ahimsa discussion and that agrees with the fact that we find 86 Vs 12: a-mamsasi bhavaty evam, ity api sruyate srutih / bharyam gacchan brahmacari rtau bhavati brahmanah. 87 Vs 19: krsim sadhv iti manyante, tatra himsa para smrta / karsanto langalaih pumso ghnanti bhumi-sayan bahun / jivan anyams ca bahusas, tatra kim pratibhati te? Just as XII 254, 44: bhumim bhumi-sayams caiva hanti kastham ayo-mukham. 88 Cf. on this below, p. [39f.). 89 Vs 23f.: sarvam vyaptam idam, brahman, pranibhih prani-jivanaih / matsya grasante matsyams caiva, tatra kim pratibhati te? // sattvaih sattvani jivanti bahudha, dvija-sattama, / pranino 'nyonya-bhaksas ca, tatra kim pratibhati te? 90 Vs 28f.: ke na himsanti jivan vai loke 'smin, dvija-sattama?/ bahu samcintya, iha vai nasti kascid ahimsakah // ahimsayam tu nirata yatayo, dvija-sattama, kurvanty eva hi himsam te, yatnad alpatara bhavet. - Schmidt 1968: 626 finds that in concentrating his attention on the history of vegetarianism Alsdorf has lost sight of the difference between ahimsa and vegetarianism and does not attempt to fix the point at which and the reason why vegetarianism became the main-stay of the ahimsa-doctrine, of which, according to Schmidt, vegetarianism is a popularized form (WB). 33 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA ourselves in the Vanaparvan on the whole in one of the older parts of the epic. Conversely, this corresponds to the fact that the most detailed treatment of the theme of ahimsa and vegetarianism is located in a notoriously very recent part of the Mbh., a tract of 157 stanzas in the Anusasanaparvan (XIII 113-116; cr. ed. 114-117 (WB]) is clearly more advanced in its development towards the absolute recognition of ahimsa. Certainly there is here still less of an orderly and systematic structure or inner logic of the whole than in the defence of the dharma-vyadha; the squalid text is an entangled mess with contradictions and, in part, multiple also literal repetitions (besides a few more or less literal agreements with Manu). Yet it champions almost always the standpoint of uncompromising vegetarianism which also rejects the use of sacrificial meat. At the beginning of ch. 115, Yudhisthira indeed explicitly requests clarification of the contradiction between the ahimsa doctrine and the command of meat-use in the sacrifice for the ancestors (sraddha), but in his answer thereon Bhisma does not at all respond, and instead begins an enthusiastic eulogy of complete renunciation of meat. There are not more then a scanty dozen stanzas scattered incoherently in different places which allow the generally restricted meat-eating on specific occasions.91 The Agastya story already known to us from Vas. and Manu appears twice here: in 115, 59f. it says: Out of consideration for the well-being of creatures, the high-minded Agastya has, through his tapas, consecrated the wild animals to all the gods; in this manner, the rites related to the gods and the fathers are not left out, and the fathers pleased by being downright saturated with meat. 92 In 116, 15ff., however, Agastya becomes like an Indian St Hubert in that his consecration of wild animals serves to vindicate hunting as the general custom of the ksatriyas, who do not, therefore, sin 91 In Mbh. XIII 115, 45 meat-eating is signified as a pardonable offence: proksitabhyuksitam mamsam tatha brahmana-kamyaya / alpa-dosam iha jneyam, viparite tu lipyate (cf. Manu 5, 27 ab; alpa-dosa, however, can really also mean 'sinless'. 92 prajanam hita-kamena tv Agastyena mahatmana / aranyah sarva-daivatyah proksitas tapasa mrgah // kriya hy evam na hiyante pitr-daivata-samsritah / priyante pitaras caiva nyayato mamsa-tarpitah. 34 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS through the consumption of flesh obtained through their valour; as a very characteristic further vindication is added that hunting is always connected with the risk of one's life, and that the animal also has a chance to kill the hunter.93 [33] This piece of genuine ksatriya-ethics operates as an extraneous body in the ever-new, exaggerated eulogy of ahimsa (the close of ch. 116 is really a hymn to it!); the threats of punishment for meat-eating, the promises of reward for meat-abstinence. Immediately after the vindication of the use of meat at the sraddha through Agastya's consecration of wild animals follows in 115, 61ff. a section on the reward of even temporally limited meat-renunciation beginning with the guarantee that one year of meat-abstinence equals a hundred years of hardest asceticism; the core is comprised by a list of forty-six pre-historic kings who gained heaven and stay in glittering splendour in Brahmaloka as a reward for meat-abstinence during the bright half of the month of Karttika. As a conclusion of the chapter, there follows a bombastic Sravanaphala ('benefit of hearing' (WB]). It is precisely this utterly arbitrary and senseless stringing together of names from mythology and legend - even Rantideva is again to be found here! - that is taken by the author of the Ketyakalpataru as worth quoting. 94 When we stated above (p. [15]) that ahimsa has essentially nothing to do with ethics in our sense of the word but is a magical-ritualistic taboo on life, it is naturally not contradictory that the Indians, nevertheless, soon attributed to it the ethical foundation valid 93 ksatriyanam tu yo drsto vidhis, tam api me srnu / viryenoparjitam mamsam yatha bhunjan na dusyati / aranyah sarva-daivatyah sarvasah proksita mtgah 1/16|| Agastyena pura, rajan, mtgaya yena pujyate / natmanam a-parityajya mrgaya nama vidyate //17// samatam upasamgamya bhutam hanyati hanti va / ato rajarsayah sarve mrgayam yanti, Bharata //18|| na hi lipyanti papena na caitat patakam viduh. The passage is cited in Krtyakalpataru III 313f. Thereby the offensive passive hanyati in 18a is eliminated through the meaning-impairing reading bhutam hanyeta manavah. 94 In III p. 324f. he cites, with numerous deviations from the concurrent text of the Bombay and Calcutta editions, the vss 62-79 inclusive of vs 71, which is not at all appropriate here and thus clearly interpolated, and 79 which again extols the life-long entire abstinence from meat and honey. - Because the citations from the Mbh. are not identified in the GOS edition, the occurrences unmentioned so far are here specified (they all originate from XIII 115f.): p. 317:115, 52f.; 45; 116, 22c, d; 14 a, b; p. 324, first vs quoted:115, 16. 35 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA even to this day. Little of it is to be sensed in Manu; it is all the more prominent in our Mbh. tract. Its chief guiding principle is atmaupamya, to-respect-others-as-oneself; this yields our 'what you don't want others to do to you', or as 113,8 expresses it: 'One should not do to others what one abhors oneself.'95 The greater part of Adhyaya 113 deals with this theme, while [34] we find it furthermore modified in that there is nothing in this world one loves more than one's life. Therefore, one must exercise compassion towards others as with oneself.96 But whoever exercises compassion towards all creatures, on him will be bestowed compassion from them also: consistent ahimsa guards against each and every hazard.97 The critically decisive point of the ahimsa problem and the real stone of contention, however, remains, viz. the animal sacrifice. The Moksadharma and the Anugita98 show us the discussion on this in a succession of examples which run through the entire gamut of possibilities, so to speak, from successful defence of the Vedic tradition to its reinterpretation and its daring explicit rejection. We find a full justification of the bloody offering, and one no longer refuted by its opponent, in Gokapiliya 'the story of Kapila and the cow'.99 On seeing a cow which is tethered to be slaughtered 100 for a guest doubts about the Veda dawn in the Rsi Kapila. In order to dispel these, the Rsi Syumarasmi possesses the cow and begins a debate with Kapila. On his question of whether, beyond the written 95 na tat parasya samdadhyat, pratikulam yad atmanah. 96 Mbh. XIII 116, 12: na hi pranat priyataram loke kimcana vidyate / tasmad dayam narah kuryad yathatmani tathapare. Similarly previously 115, 21: prana yathatmano 'bhista bhutanam api vai tatha; further 116, 26: prana-danat param danam na bhutam na bhavisyati | na hy atmanah priyataram kimcid astiha niscitam. 97 a-bhayam sarva-bhutebhyo yo dadati daya-parah | a-bhayam tasya bhutani dadatity anususruma || ksatam ca skhalitam caiva patitam klistam ahatam/ sarva-bhutani raksanti samesu visamesu ca // nainam vyala-mrga ghnanti na pisaca na raksasah / mucyate bhaya-kalesu moksayed yo bhaye paran. Just as previously 115, 28f.: kantaresv atha ghoresu durgesu gahanesu ca / ratrav ahani sandhyasu catvaresu sabhasu ca // udyatesu ca sastresu mrga-vyala-bhayesu ca | a-mamsa-bhaksane, rajan, bhayam anyair na gacchati. 98 The translation of both in Vier philosophische Texte des Mahabharatam' further quoted as Deussen'. 99 Mbh. XII 268 cr. ed. (WB]; Deussen 1922: 440ff. - See Schreiner (1979: 301 note 20) who does not fully agree with Alsdorf (WB). 100 Thus Nilakantha explains by quoting the passage Ait.Br. 3, 4, 6 repro duced above on p. [18] note. 36 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS tradition, there is something higher than ahimsa he extols the sacrifice and holds a discourse on its composition to which - just like daily nourishment (!) - all the animals and plants, beyond that, the entire world belong; everything is created for the sacrifice (29: yajnarthani hi srstani); but whoever sacrifices believing that the sacrifice must be brought about without desire for reward 'injures nothing, kills nothing and does not hurt any one'.101 It was stated in vs 24 before that: 'Animals and men, trees and herbs desire for [35] heaven and no heaven is to be gained except by sacrifice, which Nilakantha comments thus: "And thereby there is no sin in killing (himsa); on the contrary, (sacrifice) is for the sacrificial animals, etc. aspiring to heaven a support according to the text of the mantras (RV. 1, 162, 21): "Truly, thou diest not thereby, thou dost not come to grief. Thou goest to the gods by the wonted way." '102 We will examine the Rgveda stanza addressed to the sacrificed horse again below (p. [67]). The Rsi speaking out of the cow closes with a confident assertion that one should sacrifice and allow sacrifice without worry: on the basis of Vedic authority heaven will be bestowed on the sacrificer, neither this nor the other world to the non-sacrificer. The discussion then turns to another question. The same conclusion, in spite of its somewhat different course, has the concern of a conversation between a sacrificing priest (adhvaryu) and an ascetic (yati), who accuses him of hinsa in the sacrifice of a ram (Mbh. XIV 28, Deussen 1922: 927ff.). The adhvaryu retorts promptly that the ram is not ruined but, according to the Veda, participates in heavenly bliss;103 its component parts will enter into the corresponding elements, the sun, etc., its life into heaven (cf. note below). The yati asks sarcastically if the sacrifice takes place for the good of the ram, then what purpose might it still have for the adhvaryu? Moreover, he should first of all go to the brother, father, mother and friend of the ram and obtain their consent 101 na hinasti hy arabhate (v.l. narabhate) nabhidruhyati kimcana / yajno yastavya ity eva yo yajaty a-phalepsaya. 102 na catra himsa-doso 'sti, pratyuta svargarthinam pasv-adinam 'na va u etan mriyase na risyasi devam id esi pathibhih sugebhih' iti mantra-varnad ayam upakara eva. 103 Vs 8: nayam chago vinasyati / sreyasa yoksyate jantur yadi srutir iyam tatha. 37 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA for the killing. 104 Finally he will, after the killing, only have the soulless body, like firewood without fire. In contrast to this, the yati energetically advocates the principle of ahimsa towards all beings (bhuta) and the realization thereof [36] here on earth (pratyaksam), not in a life hereafter (paroksam). The answer of the adhvaryu could be directed to a Jain; it leads the ahimsa of the yati ad absurdum in that it employs the word used by him for 'being in its other common meaning, i.e. 'element': You eat the olfactory qualities of the earth; you drink the flavours made from water; you see the colours of light; you feel the properties emerging from the air; you hear the tones stemming from the ether; you think thoughts with the mind - and you have (to be sure, indeed) the notion that all these elements are life. You have renounced the taking of life (but) you live in himsa! There is no activity (no life) without himsa - don't you think so, brahmin?105 The yati counters with explanations on the intransitory-transitory double nature of the atman, which do not appear to fix as a rejoinder 104 Vs 12f.: atra tvam manyatam bhrata pita mata sakheti ca l... evam evanumanyerams, tan bhavan drastum arhati / tesam anumatam srutva ... This mocks the taking seriously the declared wish in the adhrigu-praisa ('call of the hotar upon the agnidhra and other priests to start the sacrifice' (WB]) before the killing in a sacrifice: 'His mother, his father, his full brother must agree with him (i.e. his killing), as likewise his friend belonging to the same herd' (Ait.Br. 2,6,7 among others: anv enam mata manyatam anu pitanu bhrata sa-garbhyo'nu sakha sa-yuthyah). Cf. Schwab 1886: 102; Kane II/2 1974: 1121f. The preceding contentions of the adhvaryu about the entrance of the components of the ram into the elements etc. were cited from the direct continuation of the adhrigu-praisa. 105 vs 19-21: bhumer gandha-gunan bhunkse, pibasy apomayan rasan / jyotisam pasyase rupam, sprsyasy anila-jan gunan // slnosy akasa-jan sabdan, manasa manyase matim sarvany etani bhutani prana iti ca manyase // pranadane nivrtto 'si, hinsayam vartate bhavan / nasti cesta vina himsam, kim va tvam manyase, dvija? - Deussen's translation of 20 c, d: 'All these beings are animated, as you know', fails to appreciate that the adhvaryu attributes only to the yati the notion of the animation of elements (not: beings'); he himself naturally does not share it! In 21a Deussen reads pranadane'nivrtto 'si ('and you never stop taking life from them'); but neither the Bombay, nor the Calcutta edition writes the avagraha which is otherwise always placed, and the point here is after all that the adhvaryu presents the yati with the contradiction between his vow of ahimsa and his actual, unavoidable himsa. 38 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS to the arguments of the adhvaryu, or are simply not intelligible.106 The adhvaryu in his turn replies definitively and very politely that one must only live with good people;107 cognisant of the view of the yati, he is confirmed in his own view even more and commits no sin when he follows the Vedic rule. The narrator of the story then remarks that the yati has remained silent on account of the argumentation (upapattya; or 'in an appropriate manner'?) but the adhvaryu went on with his sacrifice. Such a victory of the champion of the bloody sacrifices is, however, an exception; the rule is the triumph of ahimsa as, for example, in the episode Mbh. XII 246 (Deussen 1922: 473f.) straightforwardly entitled (37] 'Reprimand of the sacrifice' (yajna-ninda). A pious forest ascetic, who lives strictly according to ahimsa and makes an offering of only roots and fruits, is led into temptation by a god in that, at his request, another ascetic turns himself into a gazelle and proffers himself for sacrifice. The ascetic refuses but on being allowed to see with divine eyes the apsaras and the heavenly palaces to be expected as a reward, softens and wishes to attain heaven through the sacrifice of the gazelle. The gazelle saves him from doing this by turning itself into the god Dharma and explains that this is not the proper manner of sacrifice; but the mere wish to kill has sufficed to deprive the ascetic of his great tapas. In other words: killing is not appropriate to sacrifice (27: tasmad dhinsa na yajniya), ahimsa is total piety; himsa in sacrifice is not admissible (ahimsa sakalo dharmo, himsa yajne 'samahita). So just as the hero of this story makes his offering with roots and fruits, there are likewise frequent attempts to resolve the conflict between ahimsa and Vedic sacrifice through the promotion of exclusive vegetabilistic - or spiritual! - offerings. One must then either reinterpret or explain as misunderstood or forged the literal meaning of the Vedic precepts - if one does not dare in fact to discard it openly. 108 106 Even Deussen's alteration of sad-bhava in swa-bhava in 23 b does not help, and naturally Nilakantha's daring explanation of sva-bhava as su-abhava (sutaram a-bhavah, kala-traye 'py a-sattvam) even less so. 107 Vs 25: sadbhir eveha samvasah karyah. Deussen translates: 'Only with the (empirical) real do we have to live together in this world. To me, the polite commonplace is more probable than the philosophical profundity which does not fit at all in the context. 108 Dayanand Sarasvati, the founder of the Arya Samaj and the champion of the 'Return to the Veda', writes in Samullasa 12 of his chief work Satyarthaprakas concisely and conclusively: aur jo mams ka khana likha hai, 39 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The second possibility is chosen by the pious tradesman Tuladhara in his famous instruction of the ascetic Jajali.109 After he has delivered a long sermon on ahimsa, in which he condemns agriculture and cattle-breeding, culminating in the statement: 'There is no higher piety than non-violation of living beings,'110 Jajali raises in Mbh. XII 265, 1-3 the objection that all men, including Tuladhara, live from agriculture and cattle-breeding and, as without both no offering can be given, he is a nihilist (nastika). Tuladhara protests his high esteem for sacrifice - but of the 'brahmanic' kind, because the (present-day) brahmins have given up their' sacrifice and taken on the ksatriya sacrifice, which was developed by avaricious nihilists in ignorance of the true Veda teaching. 111 [38] The proper sacrifice is made 'with reverence as the sacrifical meal and Veda study as the herbal juices'. 112 According to vs 18, it is an 'offering of truth and self-restraint' (satya and dama). The offering potion poured into the fire ascends to the sun and comes back from there as rain, from which sustenance and progeny result;113 in this manner the ancestors attained all their wishes, whereby farming was unnecessary, because 'unploughed, the earth let her fruits ripen; through mere prayers, the plants flourished'. 114 In vs 24 it is said of the pious that they 'walk along the path of the righteous and present the ahimsa of all living beings as an offering`.115 Immediately after the story of Tuladhara and Jajali follows in Mbh. XII 257 (cr. ed.; Deussen 1922: 436f.) the Vicakhnugita, the protest of the king Vicakhnu against a cowslaughter on the place of the sacrifice. Here we read the daring words: The pious Manu has instructed ahimsa in all the rituals ... the ahimsa is to be regarded as the highest of all obligations. vah ved-bhag raksas ka banaya hai, and what is written there about meat eating, that part of the Veda is made by the devil'. 109 Mbh. XII 254ff., Deussen 1922: 423ff.; Winternitz I 1962: 365ff. 110 Mbh. XII 254, 29: na bhutanam ahimsaya jyayan dharmo 'sti kascana. 111 Vs 5f.: sva-yajnam brahmana hitva ksatram yajnam ihasthita) // lubdhair vitta parair, brahman, nastikaih sampravartitam / veda-vadan a-vijnaya satyabhasam ivanytam. 112 Vs 8: namaskarena havisa svadhyayair ausadhais tatha. 113 On these teachings cf. Luders 1951 ch. IX, on p. 314 our vs 11 is quoted which is almost identical with Manu 3,76. 114 Vs 12: a-krsta-pacya prthivi, asirbhir virudho 'bhavan. 115 satam vartmanuvartante yajante cavihimsaya. The critical edition reads ... yatha-balam a-himsaya, but the well attested yajante cavio (v.1. degte to avio, oti tv avio) appears to me to be preferred. 40 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Whoever has strengthened his vows through fasting has deviated from the precepts given in the Veda (and says:) the use is an abuse. 116 The next stanza explicitly turns against only shunning meat not originating from the sacrifice, 117 and vs 9 asserts: '(The enjoyment of) spirits, fish, honey, meat, rum and sesame rice - that has been introduced by unworthy people and not allowed in the Veda.'118 The key to the understanding of this radicalism is furnished in vs 10: [39] brahmins see in all offerings only the one Visnu, to whom only bloodless offerings, above all, milk libations and flowers, are made:119 We have here already the especially close connection between vegetarianism and Visnuism, which is so notorious and characteristic for modern India. Visnuist is also, as is narrated in Mbh. XII 324 (Deussen 1922: 764ff.), the story of King Vasu: the very first stanza praises him as a particularly ardent Vaisnava (bhagavato 'tyartham),120 whereupon Nilakantha remarks that the chapter beginning thus illustrates the rejection of the bloody sacrifice by the Vaisnavas. 121 The story is, so to speak, the classical example of the vegetarian reinterpretation of a Vedic word. Gods and rsis (seers) dispute among themselves whether in the precept ajena yastavyam the word aja signifies a he-goat, according to the gods, or rather corn, as the rsis maintain. 122 As they cannot agree, they call upon King Vasu, who is acknowledged to be pious and who just came flying near in the 116 Vs 5ff.: sarva-karmasv a-himsam hi dharmatma Manur abravit ... a-himsaiva hi sarvebhyo dharmebhyo jyayasi mata // uposya sambito bhutva hitva veda-kytah srutih / acara ity an-acarah. 117 yadi yajnams ca vrksams ca yupams coddisya manavah / vitha-mamsam na khadanti, naisa dharmah prasasyate. The reading vrtha-mamsani set in the text of the critical edition is at variance with the context. Cf. Mbh. XII 186, 13: yajusa samskrtam mamsam nivetto mamsa-bhaksanat / na bhaksayet (Deussen 1922: 176: ... should not eat flesh consecrated in sacrifice either'). 118 mamsam madhu sura matsya asavam krsa-raudanam / dhurtaih pravartitam hy etan, na tad vedesu kalpitam. 119 Visnum evabhijananti sarva-yajnesu brahmanah / payasaih su-manobhis ca tasyapi yajanam smrtam. 120 The critical edition reads yada bhakto bhagavata asid. 121 yada bhagavato 'tyartham ity-adir adhyayo vaisnavanam himsra-yajna varjanarthah. 122 The rsis take as a precedent in connection with their firm rejection of every animal-killing that one lives in Kitayuga, the golden age, in which 41 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA air, to act as an arbitrator. He inquires cautiously which view is supported by either party and then takes the side of the gods. Thereupon the rsis curse him to be swallowed up by the earth, but he is freed later from the curse through incessant devotion to VisnuNarayana. The story is narrated once again in Mbh. XIV 91 but differently: here the rsis protest against an animal sacrifice by Indra, which they characterise as sinful because himsa is not dharma.123 They call on Indra to offer three-year-old seeds. He declines and they dispute whether 'movable or immovable' (jangama or sthavara, whether animals [40] or plants) are to be sacrificed. Finally with the concurrence of Indra, Vasu is questioned. He gives the unreflected answer that one should offer whatever is available, and disappears into the underworld.124 This version, which is not Visnuist and with Indra in the main role gives the impression of being ancient, has forgotten the main point: namely that it is a question of a dispute about the meaning of the word aja. Instead of that, it has retained that which substantiates first of all the etymological interpretation of a-ja as 'non-germinating (seeds)' and what is missing in the Visnuist setting: the assertion that it is question of three-year-old seeds which are, therefore, no longer capable of germinating and hence are lifeless. 125 That this is the meaning of the triennial period is confirmed by the Jains, who have seized upon this legend as highly suitable for their ends, have inserted it into their universal history and have expanded it into the 'story of the genesis of the animal sacrifice'.126 The alterations which no animal is allowed to be slaughtered. Visnu himself proclaims this in Mbh. XII 327,73 (Deussen 1922: 791): The present age, known as the Krta, has dawned as the best age; in this age sacrificial animals are not allowed to be killed; and so it is' (idam krtayugam nama kalah srestah pravartitah / ahimsya yajna-pasavo yuge 'smin, na tad anyatha). Already in the next age, the Tretayuga, in which one quarter of the fourfold consummate dharma has disappeared, animals are consecrated and killed in sacrifice (not to mention then, what is not expressed, in our Kaliyuga, which has only one quarter of the dharma!). 123 Vs 14: nayam dharma-krto yajno, na himsa dharma ucyate. 124 Vs 22f.: yathopanitair yastavyam iti provaca parthivah // evam uktva sa nrpatih pravivesa rasatalam. 125 Agastya also offers triennial seeds in Mbh. XIV 92 when Indra withholds rain from him in connection with a twelve-year sacrifice. The ascetics gathered with him highly extol ahimsa and pray to him to propagate such ahimsa in sacrifice (vs 34: etam ahimsam yajnesu bruyas tvam satatam, prabho). Why the seeds offered are triennial is not expressed here either. 42 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS it sustained in the process need not be investigated here. The disputation on the meaning of the the word aja (respectively of the sruti: ajair yastavyam) has, however, remained a principal item in all Jain versions, and in Gunabhadra (67, 330) Narada expressly explains: vigatankura-saktikam/ yava-bijam trivarsa-stham ajam, 'aja is a three-year-old barley-corn deprived of its vitality'.12 The fact that the King Vasu, who had been called as an arbitrator, decided in favour of animal sacrifice is confirmed even by the Jains (according to them he passes a wrong verdict against better knowledge and against his vow of truth). This clear role certified by themselves has, however, not prevented the ardent Vaisnavas from maintaining in Mbh. XII 338 - immediately prior to the story of the verdict - that Vasu had, at a horse-sacrifice (!), insisted that no animal be slaughtered [41] and that only wild plants were offered - a piety which Visnu rewarded by revealing himself incarnate only to the king. - The material taken from the Mahabharata could be well-nigh arbitrarily multiplied by resorting to related and later literature, above all the Puranas; however, what concerns us here is not so much the completeness of the material (especially since the chronological order would be even more questionable), but rather is the aim of completion and rounding off of the picture obtained from Manu sufficiently reached through the most representative and, in general, almost contemporary source. With this aim, we only briefly turn towards the law-literature after Manu and ascertain that no other work of the second stage, viz. of the metrical Dharmasastras has dealt with our theme with such copiousness or offers similar possibilities for contrasting the successively following developmental stages of the textual layers. The work closest to Manu in time and significance, the Yajnavalkyasmrti, does indeed present the rules governing permitted and forbidden foods in a comparatively speaking detailed manner - the list of the edible and unedible animals alone spans five slokas 127 126 See the table of contents of the version in Gunabhadra's Uttarapurana through von Glasenapp 1926: 343ff. In Jinasena's Harivamsapurana, the story stands 17, 38-164. It is also found in the universal history of the Svetambaras, for example Hemacandra, Trisastisalakapurusacaritra VII, 2, 362-514. 127 In Jinasena, Harivamsapurana 17, 69 they are rice grains (tri-varsa vrihayo bija). - See also Handiqui 1949: 425 < Yasastilaka, Kavyamala II 354, 18ff. (WB). 43 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA but there are only three in it compared to thirty stanzas in Manu on the consumption of and abstinence from meat' (5, 27-56).128 Even if one takes into account the fact that there is three times more material on average (in Manu), that is still extraordinarily little. In the reconstruction of the Bihaspatismoti (GOS LXXXV) undertaken by K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, we likewise find only five pertinent stanzas. 129 There is of course no certainty that we therewith have everything that was in the lost text, but considering the total extent of the quotations gathered together by Aiyangar, five stanzas are in any case very few indeed. Narada can have nothing because, as is well-known, he treats law only in the narrow sense. By contrast, we come across two-thirds of the Manu-stanzas in Visnu - undoubtedly cited directly from our Manu text. Of its thirty stanzas (5, 27-56) [42] only ten are missing (27-33, 35, 37, 56). It is nevertheless worth noting that the passage 45-55, which is based on uncompromising vegetarianism, is cited in full, whereas it is precisely those which refer to natural law and order of creation (thereby claiming the right of unrestricted meat-eating [28-30]), which belong to the unquoted section vss 27-44. Similarly vs 35, which makes the avoidance of meat-eating commanded by ritual punishable, and vs 56, which, like 28-30, characterizes meateating as sinless normal human conduct. In these omissions, the advanced standpoint of the Visnusmrti is distinctly documented, whether, with J.J. Meyer, one regards the whole as a later work or count our passage to the recognized late additions. The unmistakable decrease of the discussion on meat and sacrifice in the earlier Smotis may be taken as one indication of what is in any case clear: that the problem of the incompatibility of ahimsa and sacrifice is increasingly declining in practical significance. If it is one of the most well-known features of the development of the old Aryan religion to Hinduism that the sacrifice, the yajna, has been replaced 128 1, 179 corresponds to Manu 5, 27 and 32; 180 corresponds to 5, 38; 181 corresponds to 5, 53f. In the text Yajn. is quite independent. 129 Acarakanda 81-85 (p. 321f.) 81 d = Manu 5, 50 b; e, f similar to Manu 5, 38 a, b. 82 corresponds to Manu 5, 36. 81 c-f is wrongly arranged: the stanza belongs, as the quotation in Ketyakalpataru (III p. 316) proves, between 84 and 85 c-f (84: meat-eating allowed in sickness, sraddha invitation, offering and brahmin feeding; 81 c-f: evil karmic consequences of meat-eating otherwise (ato 'nyatha); 85 c-f: whoever even in sickness and despite being urged to eat meat abstains, obtains the reward of a hundred horse sacrifices. 81 a,b and 85 a,b are likewise wrongly arranged; they do not belong here. 44 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS by the modern bloodless form of worship, the puja,130 it was the growing significance of ahimsa, above all, which increasingly diminished the (need for) sacrifice. With the inertia of the old beside the new, which is so characteristic of India, sacrifice has survived as a relic within narrow circles. It was never contested in theoretical weight and importance, but in practice is becoming a learned tour de force, by virtue of which one occasionally bypasses the actual offences of killing animals and meat consumption by means of substitutes, which on account of the old texts must make the whole sacrificial ritual simply invalid, respectively, ineffective. The report [43] of a German indologist (Sontheimer? [WB]) who, two years ago, attended a large sacrificial event in Poona lasting several days was not without a comic touch. The third stratum of the law literature constitutes, as noted above (p. [21]), the commentaries to the old texts, which are to be considered partly as self-supporting independent law-works only using the shape of commentaries, and the nibandhas, compendia which represent essentially more or less comprehensive and systematic compilations of statements of the ancient authors or texts and so can almost take on the character of collections of quotations. Thus the oldest preserved and, at the same time, most extensive and complete nibandha, the repeatedly mentioned Ketyakalpataru of Laksmidhara written at the beginning of the twelfth century, quotes, 130 It is a particularly striking example of the typically Indian juxtaposition of contrasts which, as we see it, are incompatible, viz. that even in modern Hinduism there are bloody, even very bloody sacrifices. The goat- and buffalo-sacrifices at the Kalighat in Calcutta are particularly well-known; there is evidence of past human sacrifices (purusa-medha) in Bhavabhuti's Malatimadhava (act 5 (WB]) which is certainly not a figment of a poet's imagination. On former (and perhaps even today's) human sacrifices in Nepal, and the orgy of blood at the Durga-festival there see FilchnerMarathe 1953: 132-37 and also the depiction of the Kali sacrifice in Darjeeling in Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1955: 180-84. It needs hardly be emphasized that these bloody sacrifices by no means continue the Vedic, Aryan sacrifice. No one will consider the goddess Kali-Durga, to whom they are made, to be an Aryan deity no more than one would derive tantrism from the Aryan religion. - See Mallebrein & von Stietencron 2008: 249 under: sacrifice. There is a trend in Orissa towards raising tribal deities up to the status of a superior, vegetarian god corresponding to recent attempts to abolish animal sacrifices, in which it marks the first step (ibid., p. 106 and Mallebrein 2007). On human sacrifices, see further the references in Tawney-Penzer, X 1928: 181 and Mallebrein and von Stietencron, 2008: 249. (WB). 45 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA in its two sections 'Rules pertaining to the eating and avoiding of meat 131 and 'Rules pertaining to the permitted and forbidden killing of animals',132 three prose passages and not less than 100 stanzas from as many as 13 authors or works; of the stanzas, 31 come from Manu,133 27 from the Mahabharata, 17 from Yama, 8 from Harita and 3 from Yajnavalkya. Much more modest and much more strongly focused on Manu is a selection of the Smoticandrika of Devanna Bhatta a little later, which is likewise considered to belong to the most important nibandhas. 134 His presentation of the meat problem be briefly sketched as an example of the diverse ways in which commentators and the nibandha authors try to harmonize contradictions in the traditional rules which are only intelligible to us through a historical perspective. Devana Bhatta begins, as we have just noted (previous note), with the most radical form of the meat-prohibition, Manu 5, 48f. He then interprets the end of vs 49 ('... people should renounce every kind of meat') in the way that 'every kind' becomes to mean: 'every kind procured with desire for it (or enjoyment of it)' (sarvasmad (44) raga-prapta-mansa-bhaksanan nivarteta), but the renunciation does not result out of fear of committing transgression through meat-eating, because Manu 5, 56 indeed says expressly: "There is no sin in meat-eating.' The conclusion of this stanza 131 mamsa-bhaksana-vartana-vidhi, GOS CXI, p. 311ff. 132 pasu-himsa-vidhi-pratisedhau, loc. cit., 326ff. 133 Cited are 5,22f. and the whole of section 5, 26-56, with the exception of 48f. On vs 48 cf. above p. [5]; of it, vs 49 is a repeated emphasis: 'Bearing in mind the origin of meat and the slaughtering and binding of the animals, people should renounce the consumption of every kind of meat' (samutpattim ca mamsasya vadha-bandhau ca dehinam / prasamiksya nivarteta sarva-mamsasya bhaksanat). It is difficult to understand why only these two stanzas have been left out. If the reason was that its extremely clear and unequivocal formulation of the requirement of unconditional and unrestricted vegetarianism too clearly contradicted the stanzas which allow or forbid conditional meat-eating, then this contradiction has not in any case disturbed the author of the about to be mentioned Smrticandrika, who indeed cites these two stanzas first. - On vadha and bandha (here with Werba (p.c.) in a votepov npotepov compound whose remarkable formation is in no dictionary or grammar, though Renou 1930 SS 86f. briefly deals with irregular dvandvas), see, e.g. Williams 1963: 67 and Bruhn 2007: 46f. and 64 (WB). 134 On this see Winternitz 1920:502, where Devannabhatta's work is thought to have been written about 1200 CE (WB). 46 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS emphasizes the general merit of meat-renunciation, but likewise whoever aspires to the reward of such renunciation may partake of meat on four occasions enumerated in Manu 5, 27: sacrifice, feeding brahmins, invitation to sraddha, or risk to one's life. If the reward for meat-renunciation is not aspired to, then restriction to these four occasions does not hold and likewise Manu 5, 36, according to which one should never (na kadacana) eat meat which is 'not consecrated', i.e. not used ritually, applies only to the one aspiring to the reward of renunciation. But just as the general permission to have sexual intercourse pronounced by Manu 5,56 is of course qualified through special prohibitions on intimacy with the wife of another and with prostitutes, so also is the general permission to eat meat restricted through specific prohibitions on the eating of certain species of animals. Inserted here is now the list of the animals placed in Manu before the section 5, 26-56, cited fully and comprehensively commented upon. After that, it is stated that even with the animals declared to be edible permission has a bearing only on eating but not on killing: expressis verbis is taught what we have learnt from the old Buddhists and Jains: Mere eating is no sin, but this does not apply when one has killed an animal with the aim of eating it, because one can indeed procure meat without (oneself) killing an animal.'135 Killing certainly is a sin according to Mann 5, 45 and Yajn. 1, 180. There remains then only the fatal stipulation of Mann 5, 51, according to which, just as the sanctioner, the butcher, the killer, the buyer, the seller, the cook and the servant, the eater, too, is considered to be a killer (ghataka). Here the author knows only to avail himself of the not particularly convincing explanation that the designation 'eater' had a bearing only on the one who somehow incited the killer (hantinam kathamcid preraka-bhutasya), but not on one completely uninvolved (udasina), who does not bring about the killing in any manner. We could also formulate, as we have already done above: the eater must neither directly nor indirectly be responsible for the killing. Regarding variation in particular details, above all, in the arrangement of the subject matter and [45] the logical linking together, most of the authors proceed, on the whole, alike. Besides, 135 bhaksaniyesu bhaksana-matrena pratyavayo, nastiti gamyate, na tu bhaksanaya prani-vadhe krte 'piti, prani-vadham a-kstva mamsarjana-sambhavat, 'na himsyat sarva-bhutani' iti himsa-pratisedhac ca. 47 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA it would indeed be sufficient for them and for the reader, to appeal to Manu rule 2, 14, according to which conflicting Vedic precepts are alternatively both valid;136 or one assumes that the last opinion expressed is valid as siddhanta, the preceding contradictory one, a purva-paksa. However, it does occur that one unequivocal rule is quite inconsistent with the view of the time: this is true, for example, of the command to slaughter a large cow or a large goat for the guest. Here Vijnanesvara, in his famous commentary to Yajnavalkya, the Mitaksara, makes good use of the rather vague expression of his basic text: he explains the words mahoksam va mahajam va srotriyopakalpayet (above p. [18] note 49) by saying that with upakalpayet ('he should prepare' or 'he should give to a person a person's share') is meant here: one should show an ox or a goat to a guest as meant for him symbolically but not give it to him, or slaughter it in reality, because one could not afford an ox for every single srotriya and, moreover, the rule holds good that one should not do anything which does not lead to heaven and is a vexation to men, even when it is right. 137 The author of the Krtyakalpataru solves the difficulty differently. He concedes that the text of Yajnavalkya demands the killing of a cow but establishes that this is no longer appropriate in the Kaliyuga and applies only to another age. 138 He thus arranges the old rule under the not insubstantial number of cases of the Kali-varjyas,139 the commands and prohibitions which were valid in the olden times but are no longer appropriate in our iron age: a doctrine of the Smotis which with its noteworthy acknowledgement of a change which occurred in customs and opinions can be regarded as a modest attempt to put it into historical perspective. It has been extraordinarily difficult to obtain a picture of the actual spread of vegetarianism up to the present day. No statistics document it; [46] literary testimonies which of course could be collected in large numbers, are not necessarily a reliable reflection 136 sruti-dvaidham tu yatra syat, tatra dharmav ubhau smrtau ubhav api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau manisibhih. 137 mahantam uksanam dhaureyam mahajam va srotriyayokta-laksanayopakalpayet, 'bhavad-artham ayam asmabhih parikalpita' iti tat-prity-artham, na tu danaya vyapadanaya va, yatha 'sarvam etad bhavadiyam' iti prati-srotriyam uksasambhavat, 'a-svargyam loka-vidvistam dharmyam apy acaren na tu' iti nisedhac ca. 138 III 190: atra yady api glhagata-srotriya-typty-artham go-vadhah kartavya iti pratiyate, tathapi kaliyuge nayam dharmah, kimtu yugantare. 139 Cf. perhaps Kane 1977 (VI) Index see under Kali Age. 48 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS of actual practice, particularly because they predominantly originate from brahmins: but it is not doubtful that vegetarianism is first of all and preeminently a brahmanic custom.140 The relativist ethics of Hinduism allots each caste its proper codex of obligations, so that what is prohibited for one can be permitted to another; thereby the ritual and customary demands are always the highest for the brahmins. Leaving aside the pariahs, there are many lower castes which are, therefore, not vegetarian; but even the warring nobility is by and large absolved from ahinsa - not only because, as we saw above (p. [32]), it was not inclined to renounce hunting, but also because its typical caste duty is bloody battle. As a chiefly brahmanic custom, vegetarianism had a strong tendency to ever increasing expansion because social distinction clings to all brahmanic customs and, therefore, adoption of brahmanic regulations or at least attempts to approximate them promises an improvement of the social classification of a caste; it is well-known how this tendency has created a hindrance to social reform in issues such as child-marriage (Bruhn 2008: 11; 102) or the prohibition on widows remarrying (Bruhn 2008: 101f. [WB]). A modern Indian expert, P.V. Kane, 141 comments on the modern state of affairs as follows: 'Gradually large sections of the population of India gave up flesh-eating and even those who did not regard it as forbidden to them rarely partook of it, or did so in an apologetic way. The spread of Vaisnavism tended to wean people away from flesh as required by the Bhagavatapurana (VII 15,7-8)142 [47] which 140 Yet, the assertion of Patil (1946: 214): Megasthenes and Strabo state that the caste of philosophers abstained from animal food' is quite wrong because the renunciation of meat-eating and sexual intercourse recorded by the brahmins (Breloer-Bohmer 1939: 28; McCrindle 1926: 99) ensued only during their state as a religious student, of brahmacarya; a few lines further on it is added then that when the brahmins commence worldly life after 37 years, they eat meat with the exception of the meat of animals used for work (which may have excluded cattle). Megasthenes thus explicitly testifies the converse of what Patil ascribes to him (see also Haussleiter 1935: 46; ibid., p. 44 and 53 in which all the ancient informa tion on Indian vegetarianism is collected). 141 Kane II/2: 780. Kane's very detailed description of the meat-eating problem is an exceedingly commendable collection of matter, but he does not succeed in sorting out historically the conflicting statements in the texts. 142 na dadyad amisam sraddhe na cadyad dharma-tattva-vit / muny-annaih syat para pritis tatha na pasu-himsaya // etadrsah paro dharmo nrnam sad-dharmam icchatam. 49 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA is to the Vaisnavas what the Bible is to the Christians. In medieval and modern times all brahmanas avoid flesh (except some brahmanas in northern and eastern India who hold that fish may be eaten); so also do many vaisyas, particularly those who are Vaisnavas, and even among sudras there are many who do not touch flesh and regard abstention from flesh as meritorious. From ancient times the ksatriyas have been meat-eaters. '143 What we have learnt about the significance of sacrifice for the evolution of ahimsa and vegetarianism enables us now to comprehend still more precisely the role of the reform religions of Buddhism and Jainism within this central Indian movement. The essential distinction between them and their Brahmanic adversaries is that, with them, thanks to their heterodoxy, the new ideal did not clash with the heavy impediment of the tradition as cult of sacrifice and further animal-killing customs. One of their most essential motivations was indeed resistance against and attack on the whole sacrifice system which had degenerated into an over-elaborate ritual science and the arrogance of its brahmanic supporters, whereby - as perhaps the above-discussed Vasu story (p. [39]) shows - ahimsa could indeed afterwards become the chief point of view, although to begin with this was not by any means apparent. This is illustrated by two precious creations of old ascetic poetry which are preserved for us in one of the oldest texts of the Jain canon, the Uttarajjhaya.144 Both describe the appearance of a Jain monk at a place of sacrifice and his argument with the brahmanic sacrificers. In both, the Jain monk does not come in order to protest against the bloody sacrifice; on his normal begging-tour he simply calls and requests a share of the sacrificial repast, which in both cases is denied to him as a non-brahmin. In the ensuing verbal skirmish, the Jain instructs the sacrificers in phrases, many of which can be found just so in Buddhism, on the perversity of their doings, on the true brahminhood and the true and proper sacrifice: [48] One becomes and is a brahmin not through birth but through right conduct; the true brahmin is the Jain monk, the proper sacrifice is his ascetic way 143 Buhler states in his Report of 1877: 23 that the Kashmir brahmins collectively eat not only fish but also lamb and goat's meat. 144 Chap. 12: Hariesijjam, and 25: Jannaijjam, translation by Jacobi in SBE XLV. In our context it is irrelevant that Chap. 12 has a parallel in a Jataka (treated by Charpentier 1908: 171ff. and in the commentary to his textual edition); here only the Jinistic frame of the narration matters. - For another parallel see Hemacandra, Parisistaparvan 5, 9f. (WB). 50 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS of life. To this naturally belongs also the ahimsa, but the polemic against brahmanic sacrifice is not at all concentrated on ahimsa. It appears in a sequence with all the other requirements of ascetic life and most of all in its characteristic extension or generalization of non-violence to all the elements (cf. above p. [14f.)) that is, without any special reference to the sacrificial victim. Therefore, in Uttar. 12,38f. it is said: Why do you brahmins kindle fire145 and seek external cleansing with water? The external purity which you seek is not looked upon by the wise as a good sacrifice! Kuca-gras, sacrificial pole, straw, wood, fire, touching water morning and evening (and thereby) injuring the animated elements 116 -- you fools commit ever more transgressions. 147 In the next stanza, to the question addressed to him, how then one should sacrifice properly, the Jain then answers in vs 41: Not violating (a-samarabhanta!) the six classes of souls,148 abstaining from falsehood, (not taking) that what is not given, property, women, pride, deceit - renouncing these, men under self-restraint are wandering.'149 Except for the passages reproduced here, there is nowhere in the entire chapter any reference to ahimsa. In the 45 stanzas of chapter 25, it appears likewise only twice. In the section comprising 14 stanzas on everything that constitutes the true brahmin, it says in vs 23: 'Whoever is fully cognizant of all moving as well as the immobile beings; whoever does no injury to them in the three-fold 145 An equally good or better translation could be: 'violating the fire'. In any case, the handling of fire here is signified as himsa, cf. above p. [15). 146 Jacobi translates: living beings' which may likewise be possible, but it appears clear to me that the Jain is sermonizing on non-violence to all the elements. 147 kim mahana joisam, arabhanta udaena sohim bahiya vimaggaha? / jam maggaha bahiriyam visohim, na tam suittham kusala vayanti || kusam ca juvam tanakattham aggim sayam ca payam udagam phusanta / panai bhuyai vihedayanta bhujjo vi manda pagareha pavam. 148 These are, as the fourth chapter of the Dasaveyaliya (Chajjivaniya) named after them ennumerates, those embodied in the four elements earth, water, fire and air just as the souls of plants and of moving beings. 149 Utt 12, 41: chajjiva-kae a-samarabhanta mosam a-dattam ca a-sevamana / pariggaham itthio mana-mayam eyam parinnaya caranti danta. For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA manner (in thought, word and deed), him we call a brahmin,'150 and in vs 30: "The tying of animals (to the sacrificial pole), all the Vedas and (49) performing sacrifices do not protect the wicked from the karma of sinful deeds,151 for the karmas are powerful.'152 Even in this unique direct mention of animal sacrifice this stands only as one piece of a more comprehensive whole. It can only be concluded from this that for the Jains, opposition to brahmanic sacrifice was, at least to begin with, only a part of the overall battle against brahmanic religion and brahmanic arrogance, in the course of which the main accent was by no means on ahimsa, and animal sacrifice as such was scarcely stressed. When then, later, a sharp attack especially on animal-sacrifice ensues, it occurs through the adoption of the brahmanic story of King Vasu, so that here too, the Jains only follow the example given by the brahmins themselves. This can indeed only signify that Jainism - and the same holds true a fortiori of Buddhism - was not the actual source of ahimsa, which, as often assumed, had spread from the reform religions to the brahmanic religion. Rather it is the case that Buddhism and Jainism are only a part of a common Indian spiritual movement (Geistesbewegung), to which they had a particularly favourable predisposition and which, therefore, caught on with them and was pursued with extraordinary zeal. This should be taken into consideration in the interpretation and evaluation of the justifiably most famous and frequently cited testimonies for ancient Indian vegetarianism in the inscriptions of the Emperor Asoka, the particular value of which lies in the fact that we finally have here, once and for all, quite a strong historical foothold. While we can only assign a fundamentally important work such as Manu's rather vaguely to the period between the second century BCE and the second century CE (and here we need to orient ourselves to the upper rather than the lower limit), Asoka can be clearly dated to the middle of the third century BCE - in some instances, to the very year. The inscriptions which the emperor had put on rocks and columns according to the Achaemenid prototype are, as is well-known, chiefly literally moral sermons to his people. Already in the first of the fourteen great Rock Edicts, we read the 150 tasa-pane viyanetta samgahena ya thavare / jo na himsai ti-vihena, tam vayam buma mahanam. 151 I have corrected -kammuna to -kammuno. 152 pasu-bandha savva-veya ya jattham ca pava-kammuno / na tam tayanti dussilam, kammani balavanti hi. 52 For Personat & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS fundamental sentence: 'There should not be any killing of a living being here for sacrifice.'153 A little later are seen the often quoted sentences: Formerly many hundreds of thousands of living beings were being killed to make curry in the kitchen of the godbeloved king Piyadassi; (50) now, after the decree of this religious edict not more than three living beings were killed, two peacocks and one gazelle, but later even these three living beings will not be killed any more.154 More than once non-violence to living beings 155 appears in a list of virtues recommended to the people and, in the eighth Rock Edict, the emperor contrasts his pilgrimage to the abode of Buddha's enlightenment to the hunting expeditions of earlier rulers. The inscription in the Greek language, found in Afghanistan in 1958, even asserts that hunting and fishing were discontinued in the realm of Asoka and, without further ado, makes him a vegetarian156 using the phrase antexetai Tov cuyuxov common in the Greek discussion about vegetarianism. Here at least the assertion about hunting and fishing should be taken no more literally than the 'many hundreds of thousands of animals slaughtered daily in the imperial kitchens. The passage of the fourth Rock Edict, where the emperor boasts that due to his moral teaching the non-killing and non-violation of living beings (mentioned first in a list of virtues) had increased to such an extent as had not been the case for many hundreds of years. That he would support a further increase and hoped that his descendants would act similarly, is quite an impressive proof of historical development. 157 153 hida no kimci jivam alabhitu pajohitaviye. 154 puluvam mahanasasi devanampiyasa Piyadasine lajine anudivasam bahuni pana-sata-sahasani alabhiyisu supathaye. se aja ada iyam dhamma-lipi likhita timni yeva panani alabhiyamti, duve majula eke mige, se pi cu mige no dhuvam; etani pi cu timni panani pacha no alabhiyisamti. 155 Rock Edict. III jivesu analambhe sadhu (Kalsi: pananam analambhe sadhu); IX panesu (pananam) samyame; XI pananam analambhe. 156 Journal Asiatique 1958: 3. 157 adise bahuhi vasa-satehi no huta-puluve, tadise aja vadhite devanampiyasa Piyadasine lajine dhammanusathiya an-alambhe pananam avihisa bhutanam natisu sampatipati samana-babhanesu sampatipati mati-pitu-sususa. esa amne ca bahuvidhe dhamma-calane vadhite, vadhayisati ceva devanampiye Piyadasi laja dhamma-calanam imam ... 53 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The fifth Pillar Edict is nearly entirely dedicated to the protection of animals. It begins with a long list of animals which the king prohibits from killing, followed by supplementary regulations regarding days on which there is not to be any slaughtering or castration, etc.; the end of the edict is a short sentence reporting the decree of twenty-five amnesties in twenty-six years of office. In the 1 list, we find a series of old acquaintances of inedible animals from the Smoti-lists. That Asoka's list historically belongs together with these lists of the law-books is shown by, among other things the regulation that also not be killed are chiefly 'all four-footed (51) animals which are not working animals and are not e ate n'158 - also in this Edict (first issued towards the conclusion of the reign) the relishing of other animals is presumed to be normal and not prohibited or even disapproved of. Further, Hultzsch (Inscriptions of Asoka p. 218 n.8) has detected in the Kautiliya Arthasastra an exact parallel to some regulations on forbidden slaughter days, etc. The decree of these edicts thus shows Asoka as only a normal Hindu sovereign; it has nothing to do with his Buddhism. That he - quite naturally - interprets his animal protection regulations, regardless of their traditional pre-vegetarian character, in the light of the new ahimsa thinking so strongly dominating him, is shown in a passage at the conclusion of the seventh ('separate') Pillar Edict only available in Delhi Topra: This increase of the piety of the people, I have brought about in a two-fold manner: through religious prescription and through (friendly) exhortations. Of these (two), however, the religious prescription is unimportant; through (friendly) exhortation much more can be attained. It was a religious prescription, for example, that I decreed: 'such and such (animal) species are not to be killed'. There are, however, many more religious prescriptions, which I have ordered. However, through (friendly) exhortations, a higher level of the growth of people's piety came to be reached with the objective of noninjury to beings and non-killing of animals. 159 158 save catupade ye patibhogam no eti na ca khadiyati. 159 munisanam cu ya iyam dhamma-vadhi vadhita duvehi yeva akalehi: dhamma niyamena ca nijhatiya ca. tata cu lahu se dhamma-niyame, nijhatiya va bhuye. dhamma-niyame cu kho esa ye me iyam kate: imani ca imani jatani avadhiyani. amnani pi cu bahukani dhamma-niyamani yani me katani. nijhatiya va cu bhuye munisanam dhamma-vadhi vadhita avihimsaye bhutanam. 54 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS To what extent are the sayings cited above an outpouring of Asoka's Buddhism? In his inscriptions the emperor attests more than once that he was a pious Buddhist; in the Small Rock Edict, he even relates his conversion and his initially very modest but, later, growing religious zeal. Apart from these personal avowals, however, in all the edicts intended for the people (as distinct from those directed to the Buddhist community) anything specifically Buddhist is missing; neither is the name of the Buddha found nor does a single one of the essentially Buddhist terms and items of doctrine appear. One has tried to explain this striking contrast with the doctrine of morals and customs preached here as being a kind of simplified [52] layman's Buddhism or Buddhism in statu nascendi;160 yet it appears to me quite certain that the removal of anything specifically Buddhist is a state-political act of the characteristic Indian religious tolerance, which the emperor announces in the famous twelfth Rock Edict in classical phrases. What he preaches to the entire population should be likewise acceptable to the followers of all religions (and actually is largely the people's normal popular religion of the time, as is reflected in the pre-Buddhist gathas of the Jatakas or of the Dhammapada). Thereby the possibility of considering the ahimsa of the edicts as specifically Buddhist - as is often the case - is ruled out. At only one place does the emperor reveal himself as a Buddhist: scarcely any Hindu monarch of his time would have written: 'No animal should be killed as a sacrifice here.' This sentence should by no means simply be seen as a general prohibition on sacrifice. If the emperor had wished to issue such a decree - which must be doubted in view of his former religious policy - he would probably have expressed himself much more decidedly. On the one hand, Hultzsch (1925: 2, note 3) wants to understand the use of 'here', with which the edict begins, as 'in my territory' and refers for that to two places of the Rock Edict 13 and one in Rupnath. The last is very doubtful: 160 See Hultzsch 1925: XLIXf., LIII. Compared to this, Lamotte 1958: 255 is right; cf. the present author, 1960: 66. In an essentially certainly pertinent manner K.V. Rangaswami's excellent introduction to the Edicts of Asoka, Adyar Library 1951 (p. XIX) expounds the non-Buddhist, 'brahmanic' character of Asoka's dharma: 'the background of life and belief in Asoka's time furnished by Dharmasastras has not received adequate attention.' 55 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA the 'here' is probably a simple mistake. 161 In RE 13 (Q) "here' stands in contrast to 'in the frontier regions', and in the next sentence (R) the 'here' is complemented by the statement 'in the king's empire'; this expression stands in contrast to the foreign kingdoms mentioned immediately before. When, on the other hand, one sees how RE 2 begins with the words Throughout in the empire of the king' (savata vijitasi devanam-piyasa Piyadasine lajine) and how, also in RE 3, the emperor defines the domain of his measures by 'throughout my empire' (savata vijitasi mama), the plain 'here', directly in the beginning of the first (53] of the fourteen edicts and for a well-nigh unheard-of measure like a general prohibition on sacrifice sounds much too weak: one rather has the impression that the sovereign is announcing a good example which he personally sets in his immediate circle. This exhortation of hida is confirmed by RE 5 (M), where the eastern (and northwestern) text speaks of hida ca bahilesu ca nagalesu 'here and in the outward cities', while Girnar certainly interprets the emperor's intention correctly by substituting hida with Patalipute. The interpretation of hida of RE 1 (B), too, in the sense of 'here in Pataliputra at the emperor's court' (which Rangaswami Aiyangar also advocates, loc. cit., p. XXI) is thus further supported in that the entire greater second part of the edict reports only one further good example at the imperial court, namely, the reduction of the daily slaughtering in the palace kitchen. For all that, it is nevertheless noteworthy that, even in the measures dealt with in this edict, a reference to the Buddha and his Doctrine, as could be commonly expected, is missing. So we may well say in conclusion that even Asoka's ahimsa and vegetarianism are not of Buddhist origin, but are part of the common Indian religious evolution, although they have been favoured and strengthened through his Buddhism. Now if the magical awe of extinguishing life was alien to the IndoAryans, and we cannot even regard the reform-religions as its source - from where does ahimsa really come? From where does it begin 161 Hultzsch (1925: 167 n. 9) says that the hadha of the text is in any case incorrect in this form: 'Buhler and Senart corrrect hidha. Instead of it, the context seems to require yata (= Skt. yatra); but this change would be so violent that it cannot be seriously entertained. The context appears to me to require so imperatively a relative 'where that the hypothesis of a mistake by the stone-mason or scribe cannot simply be ruled out. 56 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS the gradual but unceasing triumphal procession which makes it one of the dominant hallmarks of Indian culture?162 There remains hardly any answer but the one that belongs to those pre-Aryan, or so to speak 'arch-Indian' elements which were first suppressed through the Aryan conquest and for a long time remained buried, but which then gradually resurface and in their increasing persistance ultimately causing the transformation of the Aryan to the 'Hindu'. Ever since we have encountered in the preAryan Indus culture undoubted precursors of typical un-Aryan traits of Hinduism - as, for example, an earlier form of Siva; the veneration of the phallus, the Hinduist linga, abhorred by the Aryans, or the sanctity of the Pipal tree, worshipped to this day, under which, according to the legend, the Buddha reached enlightenment - ever since then the assumption of the origin from a pre-Aryan source can no longer be viewed merely as the convenient assignment to an unknown quantity. I am convinced that this assumption also turns out to be true for the belief in metempsychosis, for example, and for the [54) ritual formation of the caste system (as distinguished from the Aryan three- or four-tiered order of estates). Among these non- or preAryan, but all the more genuine, elements of Hinduism we must, in my opinion, also class the ahinsa, the magical life-taboo; - irrespective of the fact that, as pointed out above (p. [42] note), we are compelled to ascribe the same pre-Aryan origin to the direct opposite of ahimsa, viz. the bloody Kali sacrifices. The assumption that both manifestations have their roots in a pre-Aryan source (Urgrund) is in fact not stranger than their undeniable juxtaposition in modern Hinduism, which defies all consistency and logic. Finally, also the particular cattle-taboo that cannot be explained through ahimsa alone is - at least partly - attributable to a pre-Aryan origin. Here, though, things are even more complicated, and the present investigation can even less claim to treat the subject conclusively than in the case of the common ahimsa. 163 162 See, e.g. Mallebrein and von Stietencron 2008: 107 (WB). 163 However, in his note on p. [69] Alsdorf withdraws from this conclusion because of the find of cattle bones in Mohenjo-Daro, whereas Chapple 1993: 5 opines this must not mean that all inhabitants ate meat. For him a thematic continuity stretching from the Indus Valley into classical and 57 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Mahatma Gandhi, as a prominent representative of modern Hinduist sentiments may be asked to speak first:164 The real essence of Hinduism consists in the protection of the cow. The protection of the cow is for me one of the most wonderful manifestations in the evolution of mankind. It leads mankind beyond the limits of its own species. The cow signifies to me the entire sub-human world. Through the cow mankind is led to acknowledge his one-ness and equality with all living existence. Why exactly the cow was chosen for veneration is absolutely clear to me. The cow has always been the best companion of man in India. She was the dispenser of all wealth. Not only does she give milk but also made possible agriculture. The cow is a poem of pity. One sees compassion in these gentle animals. She is the mother of millions of Indians. Protection of the cow signifies protection of all the dumb creatures of God. Certainly already our most ancient prophets venerated the cow in this sense. The call of the deeper layers of our being is all the more compelling as it remains wordless. The protection of the cow signifies the gift of Hinduism to the world, and Hinduism will last as long as there are Hindus who protect the cow. With most respectful appreciation of the intensity and ethical height of the [55] religious sentiments expressed here, the western modern Jainism seems evident (p. 9). - Eliade 1954: 351ff. had given similar at first sight attractive views of the connections between the Indus civilisation and Hinduism which were then criticised by Gonda 1965: 20. Doniger O'Flaherty 1980: 244f. criticizing the Indus Valley Civilisation theory asks: Why does it seem more likely that a new idea came into India from another culture than that it developed in the head of some Indian raised within the Vedic tradition? More specifically, what is the basis for the hypothesis that the cow (as opposed to the bull) or cattle (as opposed to horses) were venerated in the Indus Valley?' and her reply is that there are neither cows on the Indus seals nor were there horses in the Indus Valley. "For the development of the cow imagery, we must turn to later Hinduism' (p. 246). - Seyffort Ruegg 1980: 236 thinks it improbable that vegetarianism in Buddhism, at least in the practice of very many Mahayanists, derives from a primitive pre-Aryan source, but rather in close connection with a specific religious and philosophical teaching: the tathagatagarbha doctrine. Finally, Houben 1999: 124 note 35 thinks Alsdorf's hypothesis on the source of ahimsa and vegetarianism is not quite convincing and seems to prefer a pan-Indian spiritual movement as expressed earlier by Alsdorf, p. [49] (WB). 164 Cited from Glasenapp 1943: 26. 58 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS scholar is nevertheless required to state that, in his critical view, Gandhi's explanation of the unique place of the cow in Hinduism remains quite inadequate; he must first of all contradict the belief that already the most ancient prophets had venerated cow in this sense' and he can only agree with von Glasenapp when he concludes his commentary on Gandhi's observations with the sentence: There is no doubt that cow-worship in India can be traced back to primitive perceptions but it is difficult to establish its origin; in older Vedic times, in any case, it does not appear to have existed.' The rules about the slaughter of an ox for the guest and the latter's designation as go-ghna 'cow-killer' has proved to us, just as King Rantideva's mass sacrifices of cattle have (without Kalidasa's expressing any surprise or poetically utilized disapproval) that a much more definite judgement can be passed on the conditions of the older times. Further evidence of cattle sacrifice and consumption of beef even in the late and post-Vedic period is not missing. 165 Schlerath (1960: 133) concludes that cattle sacrifice is well attested as a living custom to the Rgveda. In his description of the Brahmana period,166 Rau discusses the office at court of the go-vikarta 'cowcarver', whose 'position proves that his office was not disreputable in ancient times. Beef was regarded as a prized food during the Brahmana period'. Often cited but always misunderstood is the passage SatBr. 3, 1, 2, 21. On it, Weber (1885: 281) says: Revered Yajnavalkya, the celebrated prophet of the suklani yajumsi, roundly declared he would not want to miss the enjoyment (of the meat) of cow and ox (dhenv-anaduhayoh) 'if it only is fat': asnamy evaham amsalam ced bhavati.167 Oldenberg says (1919: 209 note): Here I would like to mention incidentally occurring typical expressions [56] which, in a tone with a certain freedom 165 Summaries by Weber 1885: 280f. and Hultzsch 1925: 127 n. 8. Particularly copious (also extra-Indian) material on the entire cow-problem is offered by Crooke 1912. 166 Rau 1957: 111. 167 Weber's subsequent assertion needs no longer be refuted: 'Only Buddhism has so precisely accomplished the inviolability of the cow as it specifically set a purpose for animal-sacrifice through its ahimsa-doctrine.' 59 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA from prejudice, make any ritual limitation out to be superfluous. After it has been said that one should not eat beef: Yajnavalkya, however, said: as for me, I eat it if only it is in order. Jacobi writes in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics s. v. Cow (Hindu): "The Satapatha Brahmana, when prohibiting the eating of the flesh of the cow (III 1, 2, 21), adds the interesting statement: "Yajnavalkya said: 'I, for one, eat it, provided that it is tender.' Hultzsch, loc. cit., merely states: 'According to the Satapatha Brahmana (3, 1, 2, 21) Yajnavalkya was fond of tender beef.'"' Similarly A.B. Keith in the Camb of India (1922) I 137: . 1.nado oridge But it was still the custom to slay a great ox or goat for the entertainment of a guest, and the great sage Yajnavalkya ate meat of milch cows and oxen, provided that the flesh was amsala, a word of doubtful import, rendered either 'firm' or 'tender' by various authorities. 168 From the wider context of the text, it is quite clear that the prohibition of eating beef is only one of the restricting observances of the dikna, the sacrificial consecration. Yajnavalkya, therefore, does not bypass a general food regulation, by acting as a freethinker but, on the contrary, the imposition of the restriction to the sacrificial consecration proves that, outside of it, consumption of beef was common and normal.169 168 See Mayrhofer 1992: 38 (WB). 169 Rau (1957: 64) notes of the Brahmanas generally: 'The passages where food prohibitions and instructions about mixing with impure people are given, hold true only for the priesthood or while sacrifices are being made; it is here originally a matter of ritual observances of a limited duration, as I hope to prove elsewhere.' - For the Sat.Br. passage discussed above it must be added that all the various translations of amsala (from which Keith distances himself with good reason) turn out to be simple. The meaning of the word is unknown; it appears to me extremely unlikely that it would mean 'tender', 'juicy', 'good', 'fat or something similar; it is more likely that it might signify a ritually relevant feature which, according to Yajnavalkya, makes the beef unobjectionable even during the diksa; thereby Weber's mocking, as well as Oldenberg's 'freedom from prejudice', would become superfluous. - Thus for Alsdorf a corruption (after aham haplography) of mamsala seems excluded (the vertical line of the a is easily omitted in the Devanagari script. Is it a synonym of medhya 'destined for sacrifice' (p. [60])? (WB]). 60 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS In the ritual of the Grhyasutras, cattle sacrifices play an important role. As to this Hillebrandt (1903: 73) remarks: Apastamba 3, 9 mentions as occasions for the sacrifice of a cow 'a guest, the fathers, weddings,... Accordingly we find cattle sacrifices at the argha-festival (P. 1, 3, 26, etc.), at the second astaka (P. 3, 3, 8, etc.), at weddings and at the sacrifice of a so-called "cow on the spit".'170 We have already seen that the cattle sacrifice for the guest was still adhered to in the entire law-literature as it also was in the metrical Smrtis, [57] but in it even the use of beef at the sacrifices for the dead can still be proven. In a number of legal texts, we find a long list of the foods to be offered to the fathers with instructions about how long each of these foods can satisfy the fathers. Manu 3, 266-273 contains this odd menu card for the fathers. It begins with seeds, roots and fruits satisfying only for one month. There follows fish meat which satisfies for two months, and then a list of eleven kinds of meat by which the duration of satisfaction increases from three to eleven months: '... boar and buffalo meat satisfy them for ten months, but that of hares and tortoises for eleven months.'171 Then vs 271 continues: One year gavyena payasa payasena va; through the flesh of an old he-goat a twelve-years' satisfaction takes place. (The vegetable) Kalasaka, (the fish) maha-salka, rhinoceros' and red goat's meat as well as honey satisfy indefinitely, and (likewise) all foods for ascetics.172 Buhler translates the words gavyena payasa payasena va as 'with cowmilk and milk-rice'. However, Medhatithi's commentary, which states 170 For more on this so-called sula-gava see Hillebrandt 1897: 83 (and Gonda 1980: 435ff. [with further literature in note 64], where the 'spit-ox sacrifice' is explained as 'a special animal sacrifice in honour of Rudra' (WB). 171 dasa masams tu trpyanti varaha-mahisamisaih sasa-kurmayor mamsena masan ekadasaiva tu. 172 samvatsaram tu gavyena payasa payasena va vardhrinasasya mamsena trptir dvadasa-varsiki || kalasakam mahasalkah khadga-lohamisam madhu / anantyayaiva, kalpante muny-annani ca sarvasah. 61 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA first that gavyena should be connected with payasa, not with the mamsena of the preceding line, afterwards quotes the different opinion of others who take up this rejected connection and in whose opinion one should interpret: Through beef or milk and milk-rice.'173 As a matter of fact it would be more than curious if, in the midst of this impressively long meat-list, in the case of the cow, suddenly only the milk and not the flesh would be mentioned, and we would probably even then prefer the view of the 'others' if it were not be confirmed by the Apastamba-Dharmasutra. For there (2, 16, 26-28) we read: samvatsaram gavyena pritih, bhuyamsam ato mahisena, etena gramyaranyanam pasunam mansam medhyam vyakhyatam. Buhler translates: Beef satisfies (the fathers) for a year, buffalo's (meat) for a longer (time) than that. By this (permission of the use of buffalo's meat) it has been declared that the meat of (other) tame and wild animals is fit to be offered. With this rendering of gavya as beef', he finds himself in agreement with the [58] commentary which explains on vs 26 (samvatsaram gavyena pritih) that since in the following the word 'meat is used, here too the issue is about meat (uttaratra mansa-grahanad ihapi mamsasyaiva grahanam). On examining the other legal treatises, we find in Baudhayana no menu card for the fathers at all; in Vasistha, only one stanza,174 in which nevertheless milk and milk-rice (payas and payasa) maintain a place of their own beside vegetables and meat, and that without gavya. When, in the face of Baudhayana's complete silence and the scantiest treatment in Vas. and Ap., Gautama (15, 15) offers an although summarising nevertheless considerably more detailed list which, with regard to gavya, payas and payasa, 175 seems to agree with Manu, this may perhaps be appreciated, as in terms 173 srutanumatayoh sruta-sambandhasya baliyastvad gavyena payaseti sambandhah, na mamsena prakaranikena. anye tu ca-sabdam samuccayartham pathi-tva vyakhyanayanti: mamsena gavyena payasa payasena va. 174 Vas. 11, 40: madhu-mamsais ca sakais ca payasa payasena ca / esa no dasyati sraddham varsasu ca maghasu ca. 175 I conclude this from Buhlers translation: The fathers are satisfied ..., for twelve years by cow's milk and messes made of milk.' In the text edition of L. Srinivasacharya, Mysore, 1917, the only one available to me, the Sutra containing the menu card for the fathers is entirely missing. 62 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS of Meyer (1927: VI), as an indication of Gautama's not belonging to the ancient authors, but 'at the end of our Smoti-series' (Differently Thieme 1971: 442 [WB]). With the remaining authors, the lists partly differ widely with regard to the kind and sequence of the animals ennumerated as well as to the specified periods of satisfaction, without showing a simple way to sort out this jumble or explain it meaningfully. As to beef, milk and milk-rice, Visnu (80, 12) has the formulation samvatsaram gavyena payasa tad-vikarair va,176 and quite similarly Katyayana cited in the Krtyakalpataru IV p. 43 expresses himself; but his wording: ... nava mesa-mamsena, dasa mahisena, ekadasa parsatena, samvatsaram gavyena payasena payasa va scarcely admits of a different interpretation than: '... by beef or through milk-rice and milk.' This is confirmed by him prescribing, as a preliminary, that the meat of he-goats, oxen and rams should only be used when it stems from sacrified animals, while for other kinds of meat this restriction does not apply.177 Completely unequivocal is finally the Paithinasi also cited in the Krtyakalpataru (VI 44) [59] who, in several instances before, has payasena altogether separate from gavyena. In his text: ... ajena mamsena panca, payasena san masan, sakunena sapta masan, astau masan aineyena, nava masan gavyena, ekadasa masan mahisena, one can translate gavyena only by 'beef'. In recapitulation, we may state that beef originally belongs to the most favoured kinds of meat prescribed for the sraddha-meal (and thus consumed by the brahmins invited to this meal). Several legal texts still convey this quite unequivocally; others completely omit beef; still others (just as Manu) apparently use the ambiguity of the expression gavya 'bovine' in order to avoid a clear declaration that possibly had become offensive then. Thus it is also significant that the older Manu commentary by Medhatithi, which today is recognised by us as the best one, still transmits the correct interpretation of gavyena alongside the wrong one, while Kulluka, who in India later came to the fore, only presents the incorrect one prevalent today. 176 Shortly before in the enumeration, Visnu (80,9) mentions the Gayal (dom esticated ox), and Jolly translates gavayena by beef'. This, however, is not exact because, as we know from the well-known typical example of the logicians for the analogism, the gavaya is only go-sadrsa, 'cow-like'. 177 chagosra-mesa alabdhah, sesani krtva labdhva va svayam mrtanam vahitya pacet. The author of the Krtyakalpataru subsequently explains usra by anadvan. 63 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA To the positive testimonies for cattle-sacrifice and beef-consumption enumerated so far, we may add a not unimportant negative one for cow-protection and veneration. When, as we noted above on p. (50), Asoka proclaims an animal-protection edict, we should expect the cow at the top of the list of animals not to be killed. This is not only not the case; indeed the list actually includes the sandaka, the released bull that is, and when the prohibition to kill this sacred object of a pious donation emerges as all too intelligible and in fact self-evident, it follows from the particularization of the prohibition that, for cattle other than the released bulls, a prohibition to kill did not exist in the middle of the third century BCE and was not proclaimed by the pious emperor. In accordance with this, the cow is completely missing in Manu, Yajnavalkya and Visnu from the list of the animals not to be eaten (above on p. [17]), and even in Baudhayana can at best be understood as included in the prohibition on eating any domesticated animal except goats and sheep. In Meyer's (1927:46) opinion, Manu, Yajn. and Visnu considered it 'certainly not worthwhile, even so much as to mention that the cow is not to be eaten'. That is even less credible when in the oldest Dharmasutras we find an explicit, although, as we shall see, restricted permit on eating cows and oxen. Vas. 14, 45f. reads: dhenv-anaduhav a-panna-dantas ca. bhaksyau tu dhenv-anaduhau medhyau [60] vajasaneyake vijnayate. Buhler translates this as: 'Not milch-cows, draught-oxen, and animals whose milk teeth have not dropped out. It is declared in the Vajasaneyaka that (the flesh of) milch-cows and oxen is fit for offerings.' Buhler has, no doubt inadvertently, left untranslated the word bhaksyau in the text. Except for this, Meyer (1927: 46) objects to the translation of medhya with 'fit for offerings'; it would be much more likely to mean: 'magical-ritually pure'. Accordingly he translates: 'However, in the Vajasaneyaka(-brahmana) the statement from the Scriptures is found that milch-cow and draught-oxen are kosher animals and thus edible.' Now this Sutra 46 of Vas. evidently corresponds exactly with the two sutras Ap. 1, 17, 30f.: dhenv-anaduhor bhaksyam. medhyam anaduham iti Vajasaneyakam, '(meat of) cow and ox is edible. According to the Vajasaneyaka, ox-meat suitable for sacrifice (is edible).' Here what Vas. has comprised into one sutra is simply spread over two. In view of the evident parallelism, there can be no question of correcting, as done by Meyer, Apastamba's bhaksyam to its opposite a-bhaksyam. Meyer substantiates his correction with the fact that in Ap. there is evidently the same contrast between the author's own 64 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS doctrine and that of the former (of Vaj.) as that with Vas. Now in fact in Vas. 14, 45 the consumption of beef and ox-meat is generally prohibited, but in 46 an apparently opposite doctrine of Vaj. is quoted. However, we have exactly the same contrast also according to the uncorrected text of Ap., where sutra 29 enumerates the cow as the last of a series of inedible animals,178 followed by the two sutras 30f. just discussed with Vaj.'s doctrine. I believe that everything will become clear when we understand the word medhya correctly in a very succinct sense in that we recall Katyayana's rule reproduced above (p. [58]), viz. that beef should be eaten at the Sraddha only when it originates from sacrified animals: medhya is in the Vaj. quotation, which is common to Ap. and Vas., not simply 'suitable for sacrifice', but 'destined for sacrifice', consecrated for sacrifice or, more freely expressed, 'originating from a sacrificial animal'. Accordingly I render Vas. 14, 45f.: 'cow and ox as well as animals whose milk-teeth have not yet fallen out (are prohibited), but according to Vajasaneyaka's doctrine cow and ox are edible, when it concerns sacrificial animals. Consequently, the concurrent doctrine of Ap., Vas. and Katy. is that beef should only be eaten if it originates from a sacrificial animal. This rule will naturally become superfluous as soon as the claim is raised that only sacrificed or consecrated meat should be eaten. Earlier we [61] noted that this claim is characteristic for the second layer of the legal literature, the metrical Smotis, yet is still alien to the first layer, the Dharmasutras. We see this again confirmed now by the fact that our ancient authors mention a special rule on beef ascribed by themselves to an ancient Vedic authority, which becomes superfluous through the later general limitation of meat consumption to sacrificial meat, and hence can also be omitted by later authors such as Manu and Yajn.179 178 eka-khurostra-gavaya-grama-sukara-sarabha-gavam. 179 If the interpretation presented here is correct, then at least in this respect it is clearly proven that Gautama is our latest Smrti for he teaches in 17, 30: dhenv-anaduhau ca, and 31: a-panna-dad-avasanna-vrtha-mamsani, (Buhler:) '(Nor) milk-cows and draught-oxen. Nor the flesh of animals whose milk-teeth have not fallen out, which are diseased, nor the meat of those (which have been killed) for no (sacred) purpose. Therefore, the prohibition on cow and ox is not followed here by permission to use the beef of sacrificial animals, thus limiting the prohibition but, on the contrary, by the general prohibition characteristic for the later Smrtis regarding non-ritual meat (vrtha-mamsa). 65 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA For the purpose of our investigation it follows that, at least in the theory of certain ritual directions, the cow already had a certain special position in the late-Vedic period, in as much as its killing and its consumption are only allowed at a sacrifice at which, however, they remain common and permitted. This does, on the one hand, accord with what we shall have yet to say on the position of the cow in the Veda and has, on the other hand, evidently still nothing to do with ahimsa and the cow-taboo in the modern sense. The Gahapatijataka (199) shows, for example, that the rule to consume only the beef of sacrificial animals was, however, by no means generally followed in that at a famine the inhabitants of a village let the patil give them an old cow, the meat of which (vs 2: mamsam jaraggavam) they eat and promise to pay back in rice two months after the new harvest. The account of the consumption of the old cow is all the more credible as this feature is only of secondary significance for the story, which is actually a story of adultery. It is of particular interest, however, as a striking refutation of the rationalist explanation or justification of the sanctification of the cow which reads into it the judicious protection of the indispensable working helper and milk-supplier before its destruction in times of hunger. A testimony to beef consumption which again admittedly cannot be accurately dated, but in any case is comparably late, is the most well-known medical text-book, the Susruta-Samhita. At this point, it goes without saying [62] that physicians are basically characterized by a remarkable unscrupulousness with regard to meat eating. In the important chapter on foodstuffs and their medical qualities and therapeutic value, meat plays a significant role; and a formal cookbook of meat dishes and broths, presented to us on that occasion, stresses that it is not a matter of grey scientific theory. Physicians, however, do not make any distinction at all between kosher and non-kosher animals: among the numerous animals they divide into a number of classes according to various principles and of which they specify the qualities of their meat, those permitted and those prohibited by the Dharma works stand indiscriminately side by side and mixed up. With Susruta (Sutrasthana, Chap. 46) the cow - after the horse and the mule, but before ass, camel, goat, sheep and fat-tailed sheep - belongs to the 'village animals' (gramya), and in vs 89 it is said: 'Beef is a good remedy for asthma, cough, catarrh, chronic fever, exhaustion and for quick digestion; it is purifying (pavitra) and alleviates wind.'180 Moreover, Susruta (Sarirasthana 3) deals with pregnancy whims. First he explains the well-known doctrine 66 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS according to which, in order to avoid disadvantageous consequences for the child, such cravings must be fulfilled; then for a series of cravings he lists what from them can be concluded for the nature of the expected child. In vs 25 he says: '(With a longing) to eat a monitor lizard's meat (she gives birth to) a sleepy and stubborn (dharanatmaka) son, (with a longing) for beef, by contrast, a strong one and one forbearing all hardships.'181 Now pregnancy whims, particularly also for impossible or offensive and forbidden things (for example, blood or human flesh), are certainly favourite fairytale motives; but when a medical textbook enumerates cravings which, according to its instructions, must be complied with, the objects of these cravings can only be 'possible' and 'proper', and if in this context beef is actually connected with an extremely favourable prognosis for the child, we can only deduce from this, just as from the treatment of beef in the chapter on foodstuffs, [63] that for Susruta beef is not only an inoffensive but even an esteemed food. In its original form Susruta's textbook belongs 'at the latest to the first century of our era'; but the text we have now has been completed and revised, and that either in the sixth or the tenth century,182 What we read in it can still be much older than 'Susruta'. but on the other hand the revisor (pratisamskartr) in the sixth or tenth century has still kept it. We can, therefore, formulate accordingly: in the special tradition of physicians, beef is an esteemed food, and a craving for it during pregnancy - which can and must be fulfilled - is a good omen; an important doctor of at least the sixth, perhaps even of the tenth century CE, did not see any occasion to suppress the passages teaching this. Accordingly we have ample evidence of cow slaughter - even non-sacral - and beef consumption in Indian antiquity and right up to the Middle Ages. Moreover, how significant a role is played by the cow already in the oldest period of the Vedic religion is so well 180 svasa-kasa-pratisyaya-visama-jvara-nasanam / sramatyagni-hitam gavyam pavitram anilapaham. Bhishagratna's translation (1907: I 487) runs: 'Beef is holy and refrigerant, proves curative in dyspnoea, catarrh, cough, chronic fever and in cases of a morbid craving for food (atyagni), and destroys the deranged vayu.' - See also Jha 2004: 99 where pavitra is rendered by 'holy' (WB). 181 godha-mamsasane putram su-supsam dharanatmakam / gavam mamse tu balinam sarva-klesa-saham tatha (sc. prasuyate). 182 See Renou-Filliozat II 1953 S 1635. 67 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA known that there is no need for a closer explanation; it was after all the most important possession of the Aryan, just as that of the Italic peoples, with whom pecunia, derived from pecus 'livestock', 183 became the term for money; gavisti, 'search for cows, need of cows' are familiar Rgvedic terms for the campaign or raid. 184 Thus the whole Rgveda is full of heavenly bulls and cows, of cow and milk symbolism, wherein poetic metaphor and mythological speculation reciprocally fructify and often blend inextricably. With the Iranian cousins things are, as is well-known, similar, although the Iranists' dispute about the significance of the cow, and its protection under Zarathustra makes it difficult for the Indologist to refer to the circumstances there comparatively. Nevertheless there is one feature in particular which appears to me as clear as it is characteristic. In the classical Hindu ritual, as it holds good still today, the five products of the cow, the pancagavya, to which urine and dung belong along with milk, sour milk and butter, are important purificatory and cleansing agents. The prescriptions of the law texts concerning the utilization of the first two, which are to be consumed for atonement too, have often excited the scorn and disgust of modern Europeans. It is less known that even with the Indian Zoroastrians, the Parsis, [64] cow urine actually plays an exceptional role. It is precisely the member of this small religious community, which is considered particularly progressive and open to modernity, who are, for example, still essentially bound to washing hands, feet and face with cow's urine as the first thing after getting up in the morning.185 183 Pecus~ Sa. pasu 'cattle, domestic animal' (MW) is, however, a general term, not 'cow' (WB). 184 Cf. Jha 2004: 38 (WB). 185 In his book Zoroastrian Theology from the earliest times to the present day, Dhalla, 'High priest of the Parsis of North-western India', writes (1914: 309): 'Bull's urine, or golden water, as it is now called, has been an indispensable article in the purificatory rites and ceremonial ablutions among the Zoroastrians from the earliest times... A most extravagant sanctity came to be attached to the drinking of it. Elaborate rituals are now performed over the liquid, and the drinking of this consecrated fluid forms an indissoluble part of certain Zoroastrian ceremonials ... this sanctified liquid is the very life of religion.' (p. 350) The very first thing that a Parsi is expected to do immediately after leaving his bed is to take a handful of bull's, or cow's or she-goat's urine and, upon reciting a spell composed in Pazand, to rub it over his face, hand and feet. The reformer declared that the filthy practice was highly objectionable, and should be done away with. This shocked the sentiment of righteousness in the orthodox believer. He retorted that the liquid had great purifying 68 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS As the rules on cow's urine, the gaomez, already appear in the Awesta, the conclusion is inevitable that in ancient Aryan time, before the Aryan immigration to India that is, the Aryans used the urine of the cow for ritual purification. With the Aryans, therefore, the cow was sacred - if one does not want to understand that word incorrectly - which, however, did not stand in the way of its slaughter and consumption: it is not particularly remarkable that a sacred animal is actually favoured for sacrifice, but it is crucial that 'cow protection' in the modern Hindu sense, which is characterized by a taboo on slaughter and a prohibition on consumption, is not yet the point. Or can after all perhaps a first sign of protest against cow slaughter be found, does one root of the ahimsa extend into the Rgveda? Wilhelm Schulze (1933: 207) wrote: Early on the protection of the obligation to humanity at least started to be extended early onto the animals. Even beginnings of a development which has been stringently brought to a conclusion in the Indian religions as ahimsa, are to be found already in ancient Hellas ... They will have continued the certainly age-old prohibition to sacrifice the workmate of man, the plough-bullock, [65] which, handed down in connection with the previously discussed burial obligation, certainly finds its proper place also in the dpai Bovsuyelot, and to which one must connect the fact that in aeg- and Atharvaveda aghnya (literally 'what should not be killed') confronts us as a familiar kenning of the cow, which was destined to become a sacred animal to the Indians. Referring to this, B. Schlerath recently used the word aghnya as the main argument for the thesis 'that there must have been an opposition (to the cow sacrifice) in the Rgveda'.186 He points out that qualities, and its use should be continued... Tracts and pamphlets were issued on both sides, and a heated controversy ensued in the Parsi press. The reformer today has given up the practice altogether, but the orthodox continues still most scrupulously to use it every morning.' 186 Schlerath 1960: 133. In any case it appears to me misleading to con clude from Atharvaveda 12, 4 and 5 'which threaten the violator of the brahmins' cow with punishment, 'that the rejection of slaughtering and the particular tending of dairy-farming belonged to the priestly circles'. 69 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA aghnya is an inherited word, because it agrees with the ancient Iranian ag@nya "cow' in Yast 38,5. It is not clearly expressed why the cow should not be killed, but most of the verses in which it is named aghnya speak of her as a producer of milk. After examining some references, he is finally of the opinion that: When we compare the Rigvedic proofs with the Iranian ones, it follows that, as early as the Aryan period, besides the sacrifice of cattle and soma, probably favoured by the martial class to which the war god Indra was invited as a guest, and the culmination of which was the roasting and pressing, existed a butter libation and perhaps even an independent soma sacrifice, in the context of which the cow was seen as inviolable, 'aghnya'. Here seem to lie the common roots of later Indian vegetarianism as well as of the Zoroastrian damnation of false priests and their practices. To begin with, general ahimsa-vegetarianism and cow taboo are thrown together here in an inadmissible manner, but we have no basis or indication for vegetarianism to have originated from cowveneration or started from abstinence from beef. Moreover, the attempt to parallel the rejection of traditional religion - particularly of the bloody cow sacrifice, by the solitary personality of a towering religious reformer, Zarathustra - with the Hindu [66] 'protection of the cow', which arose and prevailed gradually throughout centuries and was not clearly ascertainable at the beginning as well as in its various stages, seems very doubtful. Apart from this, Schlerath's explanation of the term aghnya as 'cow would rec proof a fundamental investigation of all references, especially of the three rgvedic ones not mentioned at all by him, where the word is masculine, or the four AV. passages where a sacrificial cow is spoken to as aghnye.187 Because such an investigation, which is being prepared elsewhere,188 must not be anticipated here, the following observations can only be of a provisional nature. re La In both AV. hymns the point is only to protect the cow entitled or belonging to the brahmin from any encroachment on the part of the Rajanya: only he should not violate or consume it, since he would, thereby, damage the property of the brahmin. 187 RV 10,9,3. 11. 24; 10, 10, 1. 188 I thank H.P. Schmidt for oral and epistolary suggestions and comments on which the following is partly based. 70 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS Repeated attempts to attribute to the word aghnya another meaning or etymology than just 'not to be killed'189 show that, in view of the bovine sacrifices and other attestations of cow slaughter in Indian antiquity, this Vedic term for 'cow' is a crux. Thus Weber (1885: 306f.) writes: I do not like to explain, either with the scholia and Lassen 1867 I 792, .aghnya 'cow', feminine of aghnya 'bull'... to mean 'not to be killed' or, with PW, 'not or, accurately, difficult to conquer, to cope with,' and would prefer to derive it from ahanya 'in broad daylight', cf. ahan ahana 'day', and that with the same meaning: bright coloured, as usra, usra, usriya, usriya 'bull, cow; ray, light of day, brightness' belong to vas 'to be bright', cf. also conversely gaura 'bright coloured' < go. Roth's quite implausible explanation of a-ghnya as 'difficult to conquer, to cope with' is already dropped in the small PW, where only 'm. bull, f. cow' appears as meaning; Grassmann says: 'm., the bull, as a rule f., the cow, as the one which is not to be hurt (han).' Weber's own explanation, as far as I can see, has found approval nowhere. In Mayrhofer's etymological dictionary it is not even mentioned; there, after equating it with 'Avestan ag@nya milk cow', it is only stated that: 'The interpretation "the one not to be killed" (: a-1, hanti) is made very plausible by Schulze 1933: 207. Finally Bartholomae states in the Altiranisches Worterbuch, col. 49 for ag@nya 'milk cow', but advances no opinion, either here or in Arische Forschungen 3, 39, on the etymology. Recently, however, Bailey has advanced quite a different etymology:190 For this word aganya- the etymological [67] connexion seems obviously to lie in the verb gan- 'abound, be exuberant', the Indo-European ghen- 'swell, overflow; fulness, well-being', leading to 'full of liquid' on the physical side and 'wanton' on the animal. This verbal base is frequent in Greek then-, phon-, phan- as in eutheneia 'fulness, flourishing 189 Thus it was - self-evidently-understood later as Mbh. 12, 263, 47: aghnya iti gavam nama, ka eta hantum arhati? | mahac cakarakusalam vrsam gam valabhet tu yah may show. 190 Bailey 1957: 40-49. - Now see Mayrhofer 1992: I 46f. (WB). 71 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA state', PSudevns 'prosperous'. For pov- and pav- are quoted poluphontes and phanan thelein. It is found in Baltic and Slavonic: Lit. gana 'enough', ganeti 'to suffice', Slav. goneti 'to suffice'. Bailey further connects ag@nyalaghnya with Skt. ghana, ahanya, ahana and ahanas. This new etymology would certainly remove all the difficulties with regard to the meaning; it is questionable, however, because of the initial a-. In it, Bailey is obliged to see a 'preverb a-"to"' which would go back to Indo-Eur. 0- and would occur in OKENXw, o karo and in Vedic abhvan. This meagre material, even with Bailey's further examples from Ossetic and Armenian, hardly suffices for a convincing interpretation of the a- as against the prevailing one of an a- privativum.191 There are, however, two possibilities to keep the prevailing explanation of aghnya without resort to Schlerath's theory of the Rgvedic opposition to animal sacrifice, both of which H.P. Schmidt referred me to. aghnya 'not to be killed' might not signify 'what may not be killed' but rather 'what is impossible to kill. We have seen before that, according to a Rgvedic interpretation and one still represented in the Dharmasastras, killing in a sacrifice is not killing, and one assured the sacrificial horse that it would go to the gods without having to die or coming to grief. The kenning a-ghnya could thus indicate the cow as the privileged sacrificial animal, the sacrificial animal cat' ccoxnv. Schmidt, however, has himself given up on this explanation (in a letter) because, as more precise examination would show, in the Rgveda the word would have nothing to do with the sacrificial animal. He believes now that only certain cattle might have been considered as a-ghnya 'not to be killed", viz., the breeding bulls, the mother-cows and the milch cows. Without wishing to anticipate a further discussion of the question, for the present I can only go so far as to say that, to me, the explanation of the euphemistic kenning for the sacrificial animal continues to be the more plausible. The designation of the sacrificial animal as 'what is not killed corresponds well to the otherwise meticulous avoidance of the word 'to kill' in connection with animal 191 Mayrhofer 1992: 94 abhava- n. 'Unding, Unwesen ... (absurdity, sinister doings, terrible state of affairs) (WB). 72 For Personal & Private Use Only

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CONTRIBUTIONS sacrifice: sacrificing an animal is called, as is well-known, a-labh 'to seize, to lay hold of', and the real killing which the priests not directly executing it are not allowed to observe,192 [68] is described as 'put to rest (samayati). On the one hand, the fact that aghnya in the Veda 'has nothing to do with the sacrificial animal can simply be explained thus that the ancient kenning (which is attested only once: Avestan ag@nya) had long ago become a simple designation for cow when its literal sense was no longer felt, which is quite rare already in the Veda; Schmidt himself notes that it had become obsolete in the Brahmanas. On the other hand, the assumption that the breeding or gregarious bull, the mother-cow and the milch-cow would have been designated as excepted from sacrifice, appears doubtful, because it presupposes that one had systematically kept back the most valuable animals om the gods, whereas the contrary is not only to be expected but, occasionally, expressly demanded by the texts. A judgement is possible, as noted before, if at all, then only after a detailed examination of all the references; but either of the explanations and even Bailey's new etymology appear to me preferable to Schlerath's theory, which is far too incompatible with the other testimonies of the Vedic and post-Vedic literature. Now if it is the case that in Vedic, indeed even in pre-Vedic times, cattle played an extraordinary role in mythology and ritual, and then later the newly emerging ahimsa ideal amalgamated itself with its 'sanctity', this could have had one result which would explain the unique position of the cow and the taboos concerning it in Hinduism. Indeed for instance even Jacobi, in his contribution 'Cow (Hindu) in the Encyclopaedia of Relegion and Ethics, saw no problem in tracing the sacredness of the cow in Hinduism historically from Aryan ideas and customs.193 If I, nevertheless, prefer to acknowledge, apart from this Aryan, also a significant non-Aryan, i.e. autochthone-Indian component, I am led not only by the analogy of the typically non-Aryan features of Hinduism, listed above in the discussion of the origin of ahimsa, features to which one should like to add even the ever so unique position of the cow; there is perhaps 192 Schwab 1886: 106. 193 In Crooke's essay (1912, mentioned above p. [55]) the conclusive point of the transition from Aryan 'cow-veneration' with sacrifice and meat consumption to Hinduist killing and meat-taboo is not explained convincingly. 72 For Perso73& Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA even a direct indication that is certainly not strictly speaking proof, yet should by no means be overlooked. As is well-known, most of the hundreds of seals of the Indus culture, whose representations are nearly the only source of our modest knowledge of its religion, bear [69] the picture of an animal, and the overwhelming majority of the animal seals depicts a slightly mythical animal, ordinarily designated as a unicorn which, however, is unmistakably based on an essentially bovine animal. Moreover, apart from these, ordinary cows, zebus and others without a hump are found. From that we may in any case and at least conclude that even in the pre-Aryan (or in one pre-Aryan) Indian religion, which by the way showed typically un-Aryan features of later Hinduism, the cow played an important role. This assumption is corroborated by some rare seals from which we can deduce that people at the Indus conducted the same cultural bull games as at the court of Minos in Crete. 194 An answer to the question of the origin of vegetarianism and cowveneration in Hinduism, which, without concrete proof, refers to a past our sources may never be capable of elucidating, may seem rather unsatisfactory. Yet, if it at least shows us the limits of our knowledge more precisely and blocks off superficial rationalist answers, something may nevertheless have been already gained. For the Indologist, it is indeed not a new experience that the pursuit of pressing problems in the present leads him back into the dim and distant past. 194 Cf. Fabri 1934/5: 93-101. Admittedly, the bull-leapings or -sacrifices at the Indus, too, seem to have been connected with killing the animal; thus it is doubtful whether they can be used for our argument. In the same way bone finds may prove that the Indus valley people also ate beef (Marshall I 1931: 27; Mackay 1938: 139). 74 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA 1992 Mayrhofer, Manfred, Etymologisches Worterbuch des Altindoarischen I. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag. 1926 McCrindle, Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian. Calcutta. 1974 Mette, Adelheid, Pind'esana. Das Kapitel der Oha-nijjutti uber den Bettelgang ubersetzt und kommentiert. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Mainz. Abh. der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse 1973: 11. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner verlag. 1991 - Durch Entsagung zum Heil. Eine Anthologie aus der Literatur der Jaina. Zurich: Benziger (repr. as: Die Erlosungslehre der Jaina Legenden Parabeln Erzahlungen. Frankfurt-Main: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2009). 1927 Meyer, Johann J., Uber das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften. Leipzig: Harrassowitz. 1998 Michaels, Axel, Der Hinduismus. Geschichte und Gegenwart. Munchen: C.H. Beck. 1955 Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Rene de, Wo Berge Gotter sind. Drei Jahre bei unerforschten Volkern des Himalaya. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1980 O'Flaherty, see Doniger. 1994 Ohira, (Ms) Suzuko, A Study of the Bhagavatisutra. A Chronological Analysis. Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society 28. 1878 Oldenberg, Hermann, Das Sankhayanaglhyam. In: Weber 1878: 1-166. 1903 - Die Litteratur des alten Indien. Stuttgart: Cotta; 2nd edn. ibid. 1923. 1919 - Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft. Die Weltanschauung der Brahmana-Texte. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1961 Om Prakash, Food and Drinks in Ancient India. Delhi: Munshiram Manohar Lal. 1938 Patel, G.J., Mahavira-svamino mamsahara. In: Prasthana XXVI(1): 66-74. 1946 Patil, Devendra R., Cultural History from the Vayu Purana. Poona: Deccan College (reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973). 1933-36 Patwardhan, Madhao V., The Dasavaikalikasutra: A Study. 2 vols. Sangli. (2nd Edn. Revised and Enlarged by Kasinath V. Abhyankar. Available only in the British Library, shelfmark: 11856.de 63). non vidi (WB). 2007 Pfeffer, Georg (ed.), Periphery and the Centre. Groups, Categories and Values. Delhi: Manohar. 1962 Raghavan, Venkataraman, the Manu Samhita. In: De, S.K. et al., Cultural Heritage of India II: 335-363. 1951 Rangaswami Aiyangar, Kumbakonam V., Edicts of Asoka. Madras: Adyar Library. 1941 -- Brhaspatismrti. Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental Series 85. 1922 Rapson, Edward (ed.), The Cambridge History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1957 Rau, Wilhelm, Staat und Gesellschaft im alten Indien. Nach den Brahmana-Texten dargestellt. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 80 For Personal & Private Use Only

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 1930 Renou, Louis, Grammaire sanscrite. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve (repr. 1961). 1968 -- Melanges d'Indianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou. Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne 28. Paris: editions E. de Boccard. 1947-53 Renou, Louis et Filliozat, Jean, L'Inde classique. Manuel des Etudes Indiennes. Paris: Payot. 1960 Schlerath, Bernfried (ed.), Festschrift fur Herman Lommel. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 1968 Schmidt, Hanns-Peter, The Origin of Ahimsa. In: Renou 1968: 626655. 1997 -- Ahimsa and Rebirth. In: Witzel 1997: 207-234. 1979 Schreiner, Peter, Gewaltlosigkeit und Totungsverbot im Hinduismus. In: Stietencron 1979: 287-308. 1932 Schubring, Walther, The Dasaveyaliya Sutta. Ahmedabad: The Managers of Sheth Ananji Kalianji. 2000 -- The Doctrine of the Jains. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1933 Schulze, Wilhelm, Kleine Schriften zum 70. Gebutstag. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1886 Schwab, Julius, Das altindische Thieropfer. Erlangen: Andreas Deichert. 1975 Sen, Madhu, A Cultural Study of the Nisitha Curni. Amritsar: Sohanlal Jaindharma Pracharak Samiti (Parshvanath Vidyashram Series 21). 1980 Seyfort Ruegg, David, Ahimsa and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism. In: Balasooriya 1980: 234-241. 1993 Smet, Rudy and Kenji Watanabe (eds), Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu. Tokyo: Hon-no-Tomosha. 2007 Sridhar, M.K. and Purushottama Bilimoria, Animal ethica and ecology in classical India: reflections on a moral tradition. In: Bilimoria et al. 2007: 297-328. 1979 Stietencron, Heinrich von, Angst und Gewalt. Ihre Prasenz und ihre Bewaltigung in den Religionen. Dusseldorf: Patmos-Verlag. 1928 Tawney, Charles H. and Penzer, N.M., The Ocean of Story. X. Lo Chas. J. Sawyer Ltd. 1957 Thieme, Paul, Vorzarathustrisches bei den Zarathustriern und Zarathustra. In: ZDMG 107: 67-104. 1957 - Review of Allen 1953. In: ZDMG 107: 664-666. 1971 - Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 1912 Thurston, Edgar, Omens and Superstitions of Southern India. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1957 Tinker, Hugh, The Union of Burma. Oxford: OUP. 1957 Upadhye, Adinath N., Vegetarianism according to Jainism. In: Souvenir of the XV th World Vegetarian Congress, India. Bombay: All India Reception Committee, pp. 233-34 reprinted in: Voice of Ahimsa VIII, 1 (1958): 3-5. 1883 Uvavaiya, see Leumann 1993 Wagle, Narendra K. and Fumimaro Watanabe (eds), Studies on Buddhism in Honour of A.K. Warder. University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies. South Asian Studies Papers, No. 5. 81 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA 1939 Waldschmidt, Ernst, Beitrage zur Textgeschichte des Mahaparinirvanasutra. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1960 -- Indologen-Tagung 1959. Verhandlungen der Indologischen Arbeitstagung in Essen Bredeney, Villa Hugel 13-15 July 1959. Gottingen. 1878 Weber, Albrecht, Indische Studien: Beitrage fur die Kunde des indischen Alterthums XV. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus (repr. Hildesheim, 1973: Georg Olms Verlag). 1885 - do XVII. 1978 Wezler, Albrecht, Die wahren Speiseresteesser, Skt. vighasasin. Wiesbaden: Steiner. 1963 Williams, Robert, Jaina Yoga. London Oriental Series 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1920 Winternitz, Moritz, Geschichte der indischen Literatur III. Leipzig: C.F. Amelangs Verlag. 1962 -- , Maurice, History of Indian Literature I. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. 1963-7 -- History of Indian Literature III. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1997 Witzel, Michael (ed.), Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts. Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora 2. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 1987 Zimmerman, Francis, The Jungle and the Aroma of Meats. An ecological Theme in Hindu Medicine. Berkeley: UCLA. For Persoll- & Private Use Only

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SUBJECT INDEX (pages in (refer to German original) a-bhaksya 64 [60] Abhayadeva note 24 (10 note] abuse of animals note 44 Agastya 29 [27] (with sacrificial cakes consisting of kosher meat at a Soma scarifice), note 125 [40] (offers lifeless seeds in twelve year sacrifice) ag@nya 70 [65] ('cow' in Avestan) aghnya 69f. [65ff.] (for Alsdorf is the euphemistic designation of the sacrificial animal) ahimsa 52 [49] (Jainism not source of -), 56 [53] (-of Asoka not of Buddhist origin) ahimsa paramo dharmah 6 [8] ahimsa problem 36 [34] (the animal sacrifice as real obstacle in-) Aiyangar 44 [41] aja 43 [40] (meaning of - in ajair yastavyam) a-majja-mamsasino 14 [13] amsala 59 (55] ('firm' or 'tender'? For Alsdorf: 'unobjectionable even during the diksa') animal sacrifice 42 [40] (genesis of -) animisa note 21 [8 note] ('fish'), 10 [10] (= 'fish' in Haribhadra's scholion on Dasav 5, 1, 73) Apastamba 22 [22] (probably pre-Buddhist) atexetai TOV Euyoxov 53 [50] ('vegetarian') Asoka 52ff. [49ff.) (inscriptions), 55 [51] (as a pious Buddhist) avagraha note 105 (36 note] Bailey 71f. [67] (on aghnya) Baudhayana 22 [22] (probably pre-Buddhist) beef-eating 66 [62] (medicinal use of - purifying; in pregnancy whims), 67 [63] (esteemed) bhaksya 64 [60] bijapura-kataha 12 [12] ('lemon-pot'?) bones, see meat; note 27 (11 note] (inauspicious) Bothra note 27 [11] (paraphrase of Dasav) brahmins note 52 (19 note] (must and ought to eat only sacrificial animals), 29 [27] (allowed to kill kosher animals), note 143 [47 note) (Kashmir - eat fish and lamb) Bihaspatismrti 44 [41] (reconstruction of -) Buddha 4 [6] (not a vegetarian) Buddhism 52 [49] (part of common Indian spiritual movement) Buhler 24f. [23f.] (on Manu), 30 [28] (summary of 's views), 61 [57] (on gavyena payasa payasena va), 64 [60] (oversees bhaksyau) amsan Alsdorf: the diksa') caste system 57 [54] (ritual formation of -) cat kills cock note 29 (11 note 12] (marjara) Chapple note 163 [53 note] Charpentier note 36f. [13 note 36; 14 note 37] cock-meat 11 (11] (- of cock killed by a cat) 83 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA compromises between old and new views 18 (18] cow protection 58 [54] (-essence of Hinduism according to Gandhi), 68 [63f.] (under Zarathustra), 70 [66] cow sanctification 66 [61] (rationalist explanation of - refuted) [68] (for Alsdorf a blend of Aryan and autochthone components) cow-taboo 58 [54] (not to be explained by ahimsa alone) cow-urine, see gaomez cruelty to animals 16 [15] Girnar 56 (53] (substitutes hida with Patalipute) Glasenapp 59 [55] (cow-worship to be traced back to primitive perceptions) go-vikarta 59 [55] ('cow-carver' at Vedic court not disreputable) guest 27 [25] Deussen 37 (35f.] Devadatta 4f. [6] Devana Bhatta 46 [43] Dhalla note 185 164 note) (on use of cow's urine as golden water by Zoroastrians) Dharmasastras 22 [21] (second level of lawbooks), 43 [41] Dharmasutras 22 [21] (oldest level of prose lawbooks) dharma-vyadha 32f. [30ff.) ('pious hunter') dohada, see: pregnancy whims *hadha note 161 (52 note] Haussleiter note 140 (46 note] hida 56 [53] (in Rock Edict V: here, in Pataliputra) Hillebrandt note 170 (56 note] himsa is not dharma 42 (39) Hinduism 57 [54] (un- or pre-Aryan elements of -) Hindus not all vegetarians 2 [3] horse sacrifice 37 [35] (in Rgveda), note 129 [41] (in Krtyakalpataru) Hultzsch 55, 60 (52,56] human sacrifice note 130 [42 note] Indus culture influence on cow veneration 74 [69] Indus people not vegetarians note 162 (53 note), note 194 [69] inertia of the old beside the new 45 [42] fish with many fishbones 7 [8], 9 [10] five basic foodstuffs 4 [6] five-clawed animals 18 [17] (consumption of -) flour 20 (20 note] (animals made of -) forest ascetics note 67 (21 note) (can live on meat torn by beasts of prey) four virtues (satya, a-krodha, dana, prajanana) 31 [29] (characteristic of the four varnas) Jacobi note 22, note 27 [9 note], [11 note], [56], [68] (on the sacredness of the cow as Aryan idea) Jainism 52 [49] (not source of ahimsa; part of common Indian spiritual movement) Jains 52 [49] (oppose brahmanic sacrifice as part of battle against br. religion) Jajali 40 (37] (ascetic taught by tradesman Jajali) Jolly note 47 (17 note) (on kosher animals), 25 [24] (on Vasistha), 30 (28] (against Buhler) Gahapati-jataka 66 [61] Gandhi 58 [54] gaomez 69 [64] (urine of cows used by Zarathustrians) Gautama note 79 [61 note] (our latest Smrti) gavisti 68 [63] (in RV 'campaign, raid') gavyena payasa payasena va 61f. (571.), 63 [59] (Medhatithi on gavyena) Kalighat note 130 (42 note] (goat and buffalo sacrifices at -) Kali sacrifices note 130,57 [42 note] (in Darjeeling) Kali-varjyas 48 [45] Kane 49 [46] Kapadia note 27 (11 note], 13 [13] 84 For Personal & Private Use Only

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SUBJECT INDEX Kapila 36 [34] (discussion of - with Syumarasmi in Mahabharata) killing animals does not lead to heaven 25 (24) killing for sacrifice is not killing 25 (24] (Vasistha quotation) kosher meat 18 (171, 66 [62] Krtyakalpataru des Laksmidhara 28 [26], 35 (33), note 129 (41), 48 (45), 63 [58] ksatriyas as traditional meat-eaters 50 (471 kukkuta-mamsa 12 [12] (see also: cock-meat) kunimahara 13 (13] 'destined for sacrifice, originating from a sacrificial animal (Alsdorf]) metaphorical designations note 27 (11 note] metempsychosis 57 (53) Meyer 44 [42] (on Visnusmrti as a late work), 64 (59f.] (on medhya) Mitaksara of Vijnanesvara 48 [45] mrgayu 29 (27) mutton in India actually is goat meat 3 [5] Nibandhas 22 [21] (medieval commentaries), 45 [43] non-ritual meat note 179 [61 note] (vitha-mamsa) Leumann 22 [9 note] levirate 17 (16) living beings created to be eaten 21 (20) lizard's meat 67 [62] (~ eaten in pregnancy whims produces sleepy and stubborn son) Luders 18 [17] (on five-clawed animals), 26 [25] (on Manu) Ohanijjutti note 24 (10) Ohira (Mrs Suzuko - ) note 27 (11 note], note 30 (12 note] Oldenberg 59 [55] onions, see vegetables d) maccha note 21 [8 note] madhu-parka 23 [23] ('hospitality') majjara-kadae note 29 [13] mamsa note 21 [8 note] Manu 17 (16] et passim Manu-smrti 22 [21] (oldest metrical lawbook); - see below in Index locorum marjara 12 (12] ('cat', cf. note 29 (11 notel) matsya, see maccha Mayo 16 [15] (author of Mother India) meat with many bones 7 [8], 9 [10] meat-eating 19 [19] (Buddhist and Jain views on qualified permission of -), 32 [31] (in ritual is not meat-eating), note 129 [41 note] (allowed in case of illness; karmic consequences of -), 47 [44] (when allowed by Manu), 50 [47] (traditional - by ksatriyas) Medhatithi 63 [59] (two interpretations of gavyena) medhya 65 [60] (not simply 'suitable for sacrifice', but succinctly Paithinasi 63 [58] panca-gavya 68 [63] Patel 13 (13) paticca-kammam 5 [7] (Pali: 'killing done for someone's sake') Patil note 140 [46 note] pigeons 11f. [11f.] (prepared for sick Mahavira) Pillar Edict of Asoka 54 [50] (fifth -), 54 [51] (seventh -) poggala note 21 (8 note] ('mass; matter'), note 21 (8] (body, mass'), 9 (10] (= mamsa in Haribhadra's scholion on Dasaveyaliya 5, 1, 73) pregnancy whims 66 [62] (Susruta on ) paja 44 [42] (yajna replaced by ) purusa-medha note 130 [42] ('human sacrifice') ram sacrifice in Rgveda 37 (35) Rangaswami note 160 (52 note] Rantideva 32 [30] (a king), 35 [33] Rau 59 [55] (on the go-vikarta at court), note 169 [56] (on the Brahmanas) Revati 11, note 35 [11], [13 note] 85 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Rock Edicts of Asoka 52f. (49ff.), 55 [51] (Small -) Rupnath 55 (52] (meaning of *hadha in Rock Edict) uddesiya (Amg. = Pali uddissa) 15 (15) uddissa katam 5 (71 (Pali: 'meat of animal especially killed for monk'), 15 [15] U Nu note 10 [6] (note; leading exponent of Buddhism in Burma) urine of cow 68 [64] (used by Zarathustrians) sacrifice 19 [18] (see Thieme), 37 [35] (of ram in RV), note 130 [42 note] (goat-, buffalo- and human ) sanctification of the cow 66 [61] (rationalist explanation refuted) sandaka 64 [59] ('released bull') Saudasa 33 [31] (a king) Schlerath 59 [55] (on cattle sacrifice in the Rgveda), 69 [65] and 72 [67] (on aghnya) Schmidt 72 [67] (on a-ghnya) Schreiner note 99 [34 note] (against Alsdorf) Schubring note 21 [9 notel, 14 [13] seeds 43 [40] (triennial - lifeless) Seyffort Ruegg note 163 (54 note] (on vegetarianism in Buddhism) Sherpas 3 [5] (call Tibetan butchers) Sibi 32 [30] (a king) Siha 5 [7] (Buddhist general), note 29 (11 note] (devotee of Mahavira) Silanka 9 (10) sraddha 28 (26), 34 [32], note 129, (41 note], 47 [44], 63 (59] (favoured meats prescribed for) sravana-phala 36 (33] (benefit of hearing') sukara-maddava 4 [5f.] (juicy pork as cause of Buddha's death) Sula-gava note 170 [56] ('spit-ox sacrifice') Susruta 66 [62] (medicinal use of meat) Vasu 42 [39] (a king cursed by seers), 42 [40] (disappears into underworld), 50 (471, 52 [49] (his story adopted by Jains) vegetables 17 [17] (forbidden : leek, garlic, onions, mushrooms) vegetarian interpretation of Veda text 41 [39] vegetarianism 3 [4] (~ and beef taboo to be distinguished), 3 [5] (based on ahimsa), 41 [39] (connected with Visnuism), 56 [53] (- of Asoka not of Buddhist origin; in Mahayana Buddhism connected with tathagatagarbha doctrine according to Seyffort Ruegg) Vicakhnu 40 [38] (a king protesting against cow-slaughter at sacrifice) Viyahapannatti 11 [11] (15 sutra 557 on the sick Mahavira) vrtha-mamsa note 179 [61 note] (non-ritual meat) Weber 59 (55 note], 71 [66] (on aghnya) Thieme note 49 [18 note] (on Vedic sacrifice as a stylistic banquet) three 5 [7] (- conditions of meat consumption for monks), 42f. [39f.] (-year old lifeless seeds) tolerance 55 [52] (religious - in Asoka's Edicts) Tuladhara 40 [37] (tradesman) yajna 44 [42] (replaced by puja) yajna-ninda 39 [37] ('reprimand of the sacrifice') Yajnavalkya note 169 [56] (eating only amsala beef) Yajnavalkya-smrti 43 [41] yati 28 [26] Zarathustra 68 [63] 86 For Personal & Private Use Only

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INDEX LOCORUM (pages in refer to German original) Acarakanda (of Bphaspatismrti) 81-5 (S. 321f.) [41 note] Baudhayana II 4,7; 6, 2; 11, 15; 12, 8 [21 note] II 17, 29; 18, 2 [22 note] III 1, 13; 3, 6; 4, 1 (21 note] III 3, 19 [22 note] Aitareya Brahmana 3,4,6 [18 note; 34 note] Bhagavatapurana VII 15, 7f. [47] Apastamba I 17, 15 and 19 (21 note] I 17, 30f. [60] II 16, 26-28 [57] II 17, 26-18, 3 [21 note] III 9 [56] Dasaveyaliya Ch. 3 and 4 (15) 5, 1, 73 [8 note, 11] 5,1, 84ff. [10] Gahapatijataka vs 2 [61] Asoka PE V [50f.] PE VII [51] RE I [49], [53] RE III [52] RE III; IX and XI (50 note] RE IV [50] RE V [53] RE VIII [50] RE XIII [52] Small RE [51] Gautamasmrti 17, 30f. (61 note] Harivamsapurana (of Jinasena) 17,69 (40 note] Asvalayana Gshyasutra 1, 24, 30ff. (18 note] Krtyakalpataru III 7 [26] III 190 (45 note] III p. 313f. [33 note] III p. 316 [41 note] IV p. 43f. [58] Atharvaveda 10,9,3; 11; 24 [66] 10, 10, 1 [66] 12, 4f. [65 note] Mahabharata III 199, 3 and 5 [30 note] III 199, 10; 12; 19; 23f.; 28f. [31 note] XII 186, 3 (38 note] XII 246, 27 [37] XII 254ff. [37] Ayaranga II 1, 10,5 [8 note] II 1, 10,6 [9] 87 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA 5, 48f. [5], [24], [43 note] 5,50 (41 note] 5,51 [21], [44] 5, 52 [21 note] 5, 53f. (41 note] 5,56 (21], [42] 5, 131 (12 note] 9, 143f. [16] Panini 3, 4, 73 (18 note] XII 254, 29 (37 note] XII 254, 44 [31 note] XII 257, 5ff. [38] XII 265, 1-3 (37] XII 265, 5ff. [38] XII 268 [34] XII 324, 1 (39 note] XII 327,73 [39 note] XIII 113, 8 [33] XIII 113-116, 15ff. [32f.] XIII 115, 16 (33 note] XIII 115, 26 [5 note] XIII 115, 45 (32 note] XIII 115, 52f. [33 note] XIII 115, 59f. [32] XIII 115, 61ff. [33] XIII 116, 12 and 23-25 (34 note] XIII 116, 22 (33 note] XIV 28, 8 and 12f. [35] XIV 28, 19-21 (36 note] XIV 28, 23b and 25 (36 note] XIV 91, 14 (39 note] XIV 91, 22f. (40 note] XIV 92, 34 [40 note] Paraskara Gshyasutra 1,3,26f. (18 note], [56] 3, 3,8 [56] RV 1, 162, 21 [35] Sankhayana Gshyasutra 2, 15, 1 (18 note] 2, 16, 1 [23] 2, 16, 3 [25 note] 4, 19 (20 note] Satapatha Brahmana 3,1,2,21 (55f.] 3,4,1,2 (18 note] Susruta Sarirasthana 3,25 (62) Sutrasthana 46,89 [62] Suyagada II 2,72 [13] Manusmrti 2, 14 [45] 3, 103 [25f.] 3, 105 [26] 3, 266-73 [57] 4,5-8 [23] 4, 212 [27] 4, 251 [28] 5,5-25 [17] 5, 22f. [27], [43 note] 5, 26 (19) 5, 26,56 [43 note] 5, 27 (32 note], [41 note] 5, 27-44 (18], [28], [42] 5, 27-56 [41] 5, 28; 29; 30; 32 [20], [31] 5, 28-30 [42] 5, 31; 33; 34; 38; 41: 43 (19 note] 5,32; 39; 44 (19) 5,32 [20], [41 note] 5, 35 [26] 5,36 (41 note] 5,38 (26] and [41 note] 5, 39 (19], [24] 5, 39-44 [24 note] 5, 44-55 [20] 5, 45 [44] Trisastisalakapurusacaritra (of Hemacandra) VII 2, 362-514 (40 note] Uttarajjhaya 5,9 (13) 7,5-7 (13] 12 and 25 (47 note] 12,38f. [48] 12.41 [48] 19,69f. [14] 25, 23 [48] 25, 30 (48f. note] Uttarapurana (of Gunabhadra) 67,330 (40) 88 For Personal & Private Use Only

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INDEX LOCORUM Uvavaiya (ed. Leumann) 56 p. 62 [13] Vinaya I 237f. [7] II 197 [6] Viyahapannatti 8, 9 [13] 15 sutra 557 (Fol. 685b) (11] Vasistha IV 4-7 [29] IV 4 and 5-8 [22] IV 6 and 7 [24] IV 7 [24 note; 26] IV 8 (18 note] VIII 4f. [25] VIII 5 [26] VIII 8 [25] XI 34 [26] XIV 12 [21 note] XIV 13 [28] XIV 14f. [27] XIV 27 (12 note] XIV 45f. [60] Yajnavalkayasmrti 1, 109 (18 notel 1, 179 (41 note] 1, 180 [27], [44] 1, 181 [41 note] 1, 192 [12 note] 89 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Appendix I REVIEWS by J.C. Heesterman Ludwig Alsdorf, Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien (= Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhn. der Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Klasse, Jahrg. 1961, Nr. 6). Wiesbaden, in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH., 1962. 69 pp. Vegetarianism, or rather ahimsa, and sanctity of bovine animals (not only the cow, as the author rightly stresses), although never general or even valid for the majority of Hindus, have come to be recognized as the hallmark of Hinduism. Patriots in search of national identity have invoked these doctrines. They can be said to be part of the national ideology of modern India. For all that, they put baffling problems to the administrator and the economic planner. An inquiry into origin and cause of the twin doctrines does not only present an academic interest, it has a bearing on India's present-day reality as well. It is therefore to be welcomed that Professor Alsdorf compressed his findings in an eminently readable essay, that should appeal also to the non-sanskritist. In accordance with the title the author's viewpoint is purely historical. The problem he has set himself concerns the historical development of the twin doctrines, not their meaning. Paraphrases like 'magisch-ritualistisches Tabu auf das Leben', p. 15, will not be intended as an explanation. Accordingly the author seeks an answer to the question when and in what form the twin doctrines arose and developed; or rather, when and how they manifested thernselves in the texts. The Vedic texts do not know the ahimsa doctrine and enjoin the killing of cow and bull at certain occasions (e.g. at the ceremonial reception of a guest). It is only in the later dharma literature that the ahimsa doctrine and the inviolability of the cow find full expression. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the dharma texts contradictorily contain both the Vedic injunctions and the rigorous 90 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX I demands of ahimsa and vegetarianism. The historical approach seems to impose itself. In the author's view the contradictions of the texts can mean only one thing: a chronological succession. The demonstration centres on the relevant part of Manu (V,5-55), where three successive layers are recognized. The first layer is represented by the discussion on pure and impure food (5-25); there is no question of ahinsa. This stage is also represented by the Dharmasutras. The next stage comes with the verses 27-44, where ahimsa is the rule, except the case of Vedic injunctions when meat is allowed or even obligatory. The last stage is reached in 44-55, where ahimsa and vegetarianism are absolute. The sanctity of the cow-rightly kept separate from ahimsa - shows a roughly parallel development. The special position of the bovine is abundantly attested in the Vedic texts. This did not preclude the consumption of beef (not much of an argument, however, for an otherwise unassailable case can be derived from the absence of the cow in the old lists of non-consumable meat, p. 59. The criterion is here, as the author has pointed out previously, impurity. One would hardly expect to find the cow among the impure animals). The next stage is found in some of the older smatis, where eating beef is restricted to sacrificial occasions. This restriction is then, in the later smrtis, subsumed under the one regarding all meat. (Alsdorf's second layer in the development of ahimsa, above). Thus the sanctity of the cow has become intimately linked with the ahinsa doctrine. This clear-cut chronological frame has much to recommend itself to the Western scholar. I doubt, however, whether it can do justice to the Indian facts, even if we should limit ourselves to the texts. The limitations of the chronological perspective stand out clearly when the author, in his search for historical origins, is forced back away from the texts into the limbo of pre-Aryan civilization and the ruins of Harappa. Although the hypothesis of pre-Aryan origins of Hindu ideas and institutions is far from impossible, this reasoning also means that, because of lack of documentation, the problem is shifted out of sight and rendered all but meaningless. The author further surmises - quite consistently - that not only ahimsa and sanctity of the bovine, but also their opposite, (ritual) bloodshed, finds its roots in pre-Aryan civilization. Indeed, as the author observes, the juxtaposition of these opposites in pre-Aryan times is no more illogical than their existence side by side in Hinduism until the present day. Even if, in some cases, we can feel confident that 'kritischhistorischer Betrachtung lost sich also das scheinbare Nebeneinander 91 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA widersprechender Vorschriften auf in das Nacheinander geschichtlicher Entwicklungsstufen' (p. 17), we must nevertheless admit 'das so typisch indische Nebeneinander nach unserem Empfinden unvereinbarer Gegensatze' (p. 42 n. 1; cf. p. 54). One wonders how, in the Indian view, these opposites are reconciled. Are we forced to consider Indian culture as a meaningless jumble? Here a different line of inquiry can no longer be avoided. Having exhausted the historical question we are faced with the problem of meaning. Here only the beginning of an answer can be indicated. One could start with the apparent persistence of the two opposites. It would seem that, far from presenting an inconsistency, there is a link between them. The link can be illustrated by one of the author's own observations, namely that the monk (who does not kill) can lead a sinless life thanks to the sin of the layman (who does the killing for him). Going further along this line we note that a similar situation seems to obtain in the Vedic ritual: the sacrificer has to abstain, among other things, from meat; the rtvij on the other hand is obliged to consume the meat. The sacrificer eats afterwards. The rtvij who would refuse to eat the sacrificial meat is threatened by Manu with dire consequences. It has been pointed out by Thieme that the basic pattern of the Vedic sacrifice is that of a banquet offered to both divine and human guests. Now the ceremonial reception of the guest (the sacrificial priest is expressly mentioned as such) involves the offering of a cow to the guest. The guest has to give the order for the killing (or he may order to set the animal free), that is, he takes the onus of the killing upon himself, thus enabling the host to partake of the meat. This is probably the reason why Buddhist and Jain monks, though practising ahimsa, originally could accept meat, on the condition that it was not expressly prepared for them (cf. p. 5ff.). The ritual texts show a marked aversion to killing. Nevertheless the sacrifice is essential to the maintenance of life. Time and again life has to be rewon out of death. Therefore one party (stvij, guest) has to take upon himself the onus of death so that the other may win life. Thus the sacrifice involves the participants in the ever recurring alternation of life and death. The decisive point in the development is the breakthrough, out of the vicious life-death circle, that is, the rise of the renunciatory way of life, where death is no longer periodically conquered, but permanently eliminated. It would seem that it is in this direction that we have to look for the meaning of ahimsa, the avoidance of death, 92 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX I death being otherwise inextricably connected with life. Ahimsa therefore is proper to the renouncer of the world, its opposite belongs to the sphere of the man-in-the-world. The interaction, as L. Dumont has pointed out, between these two spheres (in Indian terms nivetti and pravrtti) seems to be central to Hinduism (past as well as present) (cf. L. Dumont, 'Le renoncement dans les religions de l'Inde', Arch. de Sociologie des Rel., no. 7 (1959) 45-69). If I am right this may explain the persistent juxtaposition of the irreconcilable opposites. At the same time it would seem that the search for meaning may deliver a clue to the problem of origin as well. These few and necessarily sketchy reflections cannot possibly do justice to the author's many interesting and detailed observations (e.g. on the supposed Buddhist and Jain origins of ahimsa; Buddhism and Jainism are shown, together with brahmanism, to participate in a common movement). The reviewer's reflections are meant as a tribute to the stimulating quality of this interesting study. Professor Alsdorf has given us a most welcome contribution to our knowledge of Indian religious concepts and practices. J.C. Heesterman, Leiden 93 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Appendix II THE ORIGIN OF AHIMSA by Hanns-Peter Schmidt* Ahimsa is one of the central ideas of Indian religions, and though the doctrine of 'non-violence' - literally 'non-injury (to living beings) - is not universally followed in India, there will be only few who do not at least pay lip-service to it. Inspite of its great importance for the religious attitude of the Indians, the history of the idea of ahimsa has rarely been investigated, and the handbooks on Indian religions generally devote little space to it. In modern India ahimsa is inseparably connected with vegetarianism, but it is known since long ago and has recently been thrown into relief by L. Alsdorf in his contributions to the history of vegetarianism and cow-worship in India 195 that neither the Buddha nor the Jina were vegetarians though they propagated ahimsa. The Buddhist and Jaina monks or ascetics subsisted on begged food, and the main condition was that the food was neither prepared by the monk himself nor prepared especially for him. This applied to any kind of food if it contained meat or not. That originally ahinsa had nothing to do with vegetarianism becomes obviously if one considers the strict animism of the Jaina doctrine according to which the whole world is animated - not only animals The numbers given in square brackets in Schmidt's present article relate to the original page numbers. Melanges d'Indianisme a la Memoire de Louis Renou. Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne 28. Paris: Editions E. de Boccard, 1968. 195 'Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien' (Akad. d. Wiss. u.d. Lit. Abh. d. geistes- u. sozialwiss. Kl. 1961. Nr. 6. Wiesbaden 1962), 5 sqq. (J.C. Heesterman's review of Alsdorf's work in IIJ 9, 1966, 147-149, appeared after this paper had been submitted to the editors). 94 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II and plants but also the elements earth, fire, water and air consist in atomic individual souls. This involves that the Jaina monk is to avoid beating and heating water, handling fire and using a fan since he would thereby injure water-, fire- and air-souls. He is to accept only food which has been prepared, i.e. killed, by others, including water [626] which must be boiled. Only in this way he is safeguarded against any complicity in depriving an animate being of its life.196 Alsdorf (loc. cit., 15) has rightly stressed the fact that the concept of ahimsa as we meet it with the Jainas is not based on ethical ideas but on a magico-ritualistic dread of destroying life in any form. He has also realized that the emergence of the 'non-violence' movement is part of the All-Indian religious development and cannot be credited to the reform-religions of the Buddha and the Jina (loc. cit., 49). In his treatment of the Brahmanic sources he begins with Manu's rules on meat-eating. He has convincingly demonstrated (loc. cit., 17 sqq.) that they contain three layers which constitute three successive stages of historical development. In the first layer the eating of kosher animals is taken for granted; in the second meateating is prohibited in daily life, but allowed and even compulsory in the ritual; and in the third we find a strict vegetarianism which advises against animal sacrifices. 197 In the earlier juridical texts only the first stage is attested. Manu's rules against meat-eating are based on the ahimsa-doctrine, and this doctrine goes - in Manu's view, too - beyond vegetarianism, since at least plants are included in the category of animate beings. When the most recent layer of Manu's rules proclaims rigid vegetarianism, it would seem that vegetarianism is either a special development of the ahimsa-doctrine or is grafted on it. Concentrating his attention on the history of vegetarianism, Alsdorf has lost sight of the difference between ahimsa and vegetarianism. Though, in the discussion of the epic material (loc. cit., 29 sqq.), he does not fail to notice the fact that in these texts the consumption of seeds capable of germination is considered as himsa 'injury', too, he does not attempt to fix the point at which and the reason why vegetarianism became the main-stay of the ahimsa-doctrine. I must admit that I do not know the solution of this problem either. One might think that vegetarianism is the popularized form of the 196 Cf. W. SCHUBRING, Die Lehre der Jainas (Berlin 1935), S 104.105.154. ALSDORF, loc. cit. 14 sq. 197 Manu does not openly condemn the Vedic sacrifice, but rather propagates the superiority of strict vegetarianism. 95 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA ahimsa-doctrine which was originally restricted to the ascetic. But this suggestion is a mere guess and remains rather unsatisfactory all the more since I am not able to substantiate it on the basis of our sources. [627] Alsdorf (loc. cit., 53 sq.) conjectures that the origin of ahimsa and vegetarianism is to be sought in the pre-Aryan Indus-civilization. This is contradicted by the finds of animal bones at the sites of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, which rather show that the Indus people were non-vegetarians. 198 Moreover, there are, as far as I see, no traces of similar ideas to be found among the non-Aryan population of India - not influenced by the Brahmanical culture - which could justify the assumption that ahimsa and vegetarianism did not originate from conceptions evolved among the Aryans. It has long been realized that the vows of the Buddhist and Jaina monks, among which the vow of ahimsa stands first, closely agree with those of the Brahmanic renouncer. 199 Alsdorf does not enter into a discussion of this matter, obviously, because it does not furnish any material for the history of vegetarianism. If, however, we want to find out the origin of the more comprehensive idea of ahimsa and to understand its magico-ritualistic background - which has been recognized but not explained by Alsdorf - we must search for the specific motives on which the rule of ahimsa for the Brahmanic renouncer is based. This I propose to do in the present paper. I take as a starting point all the contexts in which the injunction of ahimsa is given by the Manu-Smrti200 - which reflects a fully developed ahimsadoctrine - and try to trace them back to earlier sources. Among these the Dharmasutras of Apastamba, Baudhayana, Vasistha and 198 Cf. the sources quoted by Alsdorf himself, 1. c., 69 n. 1. 199 Cf. H. JACOBI, Jaina Sutras I (Sacred Books of the East XXII, Oxford 1884), XXII sqq., and the earlier authorities quoted there. 200 For the sake of brevity I have refrained from discussing the parallels from the Mahabharata. Much material from this source is found in 0. STRAUSS, 'Ethische Probleme aus dem Mahabharata', Gior. d. Soc. As. Ital. 24, 1912, 194-335, and ALSDORF, loc. cit., 29 sqq. 201 The chronology, absolute and relative, of the Dharmasutras is a matter of controversy. It cannot even be asserted that in their present form they are pre-Buddhistic. There is, however, no evidence that they either 96 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II Gautama201 provide the bulk of the material and help to pave the way back to the original source in which the idea of ahimsa was conceived. [628] 1. According to Manu ahimsa is the duty of all the four classes (varna): 'Non injury, truth, non-stealing, purity, control of the senses - this Manu has declared to be the comprehensive law for the four classes. 202 A similar rule is known to the Kautiliya Arthasastra, which is certainly older than the Manu-Smrti: '(The svadharma) of all (classes and orders of life, asrama) are non-injury, truth, purity, freedom from envy, freedom from malice, and indulgence.'203 Non-injury as a duty of all is mentioned by Vasistha,204 too, but here the sutra may be either an interpolation or, as Alsdorf (I. c., 29) surmises, a secondary modification of an old sloka which did not contain the word ahimsa. At any rate, comparable injunctions do not occur elsewhere in the older law-books.205 2. Ahimsa-vegetarianism: Animals are not be killed and eaten at all. This is advocated in the third layer of Manu's rules on meateating (5, 45-56).206 The gist of the whole is not so much a condemnation of the Vedic ritual and its animal sacrifices, but rather the propagation of a renouncer-like conduct. This appears in 5, 56: "There is no sin in eating meat, in (drinking) spirituous liquor and presuppose or oppose Buddhist or Jaina teachings. As to their relative chronology, recent research points to the conclusion that Apastamba and Baudhayana are considerably older than Vasistha and Gautama. Cf. B.K. GHOSH, Indian Historical Quarterly 3, 1927, 607 sqq. J.J. MEYER, Uber das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften (Leipzig 1927), passim. W. GAMPERT, Die Suhnezeremonien in der altindischen Rechtsliteratur (Prag 1939), 6 sqq. S.C. BANERJEA, The Dharma-Sutras. A study in their origin and development (Calcutta 1962), 37 sqq. 202 M 10, 63 ahimsa satyam asteyam saucam indriyanigrahah, etam samasikam dharmam caturvarnye 'bravin manuh. 203 Kaut 1, 3, 13(ed. KANGLE, Bombay 1960) sarvesam ahimsa satyam saucam anasuyantsamsyam ksama ca. 204 Vas 4, 4 sarvesam satyam akrodho danam ahimsa prajananam ca. 205 BUHLER, The Laws of Manu (SBE XXV. 1886), 416, compares Gaut 8, 23, but this rule refers to a bahusruta and is to be grouped with the ahimsa rules for Brahmanas (below II 4 B). 206 With the exception of 52, which rather belongs to the layer 5, 31-44. 97 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA in sexual intercourse; this is the natural way of living beings, but abstention bears great fruits. 207 Alsdorf (loc. cit., 21) thinks that this sloka has been taken from some other context in order to soften down the glaring contradiction between the demands of strict vegetarianism and the milder opinions of the preceding passages. But it is more probable that it has been added in order to put the whole discussion into its proper context - that of the renunciatory way of life which is the ideal of the Brahmana. An attack on the Vedic sacrifice is contained in 5, 53: 'He who for a hundred years annually sacrifices a horse-sacrifice, and he who [629] does not eat meat (at all) - for both of these the fruit of their meritorious deeds is the same.'208 The author concedes that the sacrifice has its merits, but he insinuates its practical inefficiency and implies that by avoiding meat one attains without effort everything one desires.209 In the next sloka we read: 'By eating (only) kosher fruits and roots and by eating (only) the food of silent ascetics, one does not gain the same fruit as by complete avoidance of meat.'210 If the food of the muni consisted only of vegetarian diet, this injunction would be senseless. Presumably munis were, at Manu's time, still accepting meat and also living on the flesh of animals killed by beasts of prey (cf. below II 5 B). In 55, a pseudo-etymology of the word mamsa 'meat is given which reflects the primitive belief that the animal whose meat is eaten in this world will eat, in return, the eater in the next world: 'Me eat will in the next world whose meat I eat in this world; the wise ones proclaim this to be the meatness of meat (= this is why meat is called meat).'211 In the earlier sources no trace of strict vegetarianism is found. In modern times vegetarianism has led to substituting effigies of animals made of flour for the sacrificial victim. But this sacrifice 207 M 5, 56 na mamsabhaksane doso na madye na ca maithune, pravrttir esa bhutanam nivrttis tu mahaphala. 208 M. 5,53 varse-varse 'svamedhena yo yajeta satam samah, mamsani ca na khaded yas tayoh punyaphalam samam. 209 Cf. M 5, 47 yad dhyayati yat kurute dhrtim badhnati yatra ca, tad avapnoty ayatnena yo hinasti na kimcana. 210 M5, 54 phalamulasanair medhyair munyannanam ca bhojanaih, na tat phalam avapnoti yan mamsaparivarjanat. 211 M5, 55 mam sa bhaksayita 'mutra yasya mamsam ihadmy aham, etan mamsasya mamsatvam pravadanti manisinah. The adaptation of the pun is that of C.R. LANMAN, A Sanskrit Reader (Boston 1884), 350. 98 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II of pistapasu is unknown even to Manu. He does, however, mention pistapasu in a different context (v. below II 3). The earlier occurrences of pistapasu have no connection with ahimsa or vegetarianism. In the Sarkhayana-Grhyasutra an offering of pairs of animals made of flour is prescribed for the full moon of the month Caitra.212 This sacrifice is completely isolated, and we have no means to tell why the animals were made of flour. A similar substitute for animals is already known to the Srautaritual. In the Varunapraghasa a ram and a ewe are made of barley, and they are called anttapasu 'untrue animals'.213 In the context of the Varunapraghasa there is no allusion to the prohibition (630) of animal-slaughter, and the reason why the animals are made of barley is obviously that barley is the grain belonging to Varuna. 3. Ahimsa-vegetarianism with the exception of sacrificial victims. Manu 5, 31-44 teaches the duty of eating meat in the sacrifice, but prohibits it on all other occasions: ' "The eating of meat (is ordained) for sacrifice": this is transmitted as a divine rule. But practising (it) on other (occasions) is said to be a demoniac rule.'214 One does not do wrong by eating meat while honouring the gods, the fathers and guests, irrespective of the way in which the meat was procured.215 In 33, use is made of the same idea as in 55 (v. above II 2), but the lawful eating of meat is excepted from the evil consequences: A twice-born man who knows the rules must not eat meat against the rules unless he is in distress. For, having eaten meat against the rules, he is, when dead, eaten by these (animals) without fail.216 In 43, however, himsa is prohibited also if one is in distress, unless it is prescribed in the Veda, and this applies to every Brahmana, in 212 SGS 4, 19 mithunanam ca yathopapadam pistasya krtva. The later Vaikhanasa Smartasutra 4,8 has a Caitra-offering with totally different offerings. 213 Maitrayani-Samhita 1, 10, 12. Kathaka 36, 6. 214 M 5, 31 yajnaya jagdhir mamsasyety esa daivo vidhih smrtah, ato 'nyatha pravrttis tu raksaso vidhir ucyate. 215 M 5, 32 kritva svayam vapy utpadya paropahrtam eva va, devan pityms carcayitva khadan mamsam na dusyati. 41 madhuparke ca yajne ca pitrdaivatakarmani, atraiva pasavo himsya nanyatrety abravin manuh. 216 M5,33 nadyad avidhina mansam vidhijno 'napadi dvijah, jagdhva hy avidhina mamsam pretas tair adyate 'vasah. 99 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA whichever stage of life (asrama) he may live.217 This shows that the rules given in 5, 31-44 are not all of the same origin but contain different views. It is obvious that these rules are only meant for Brahmanas since only they could partake of the sacrificial victim. That the other classes did eat meat and that there was no objection to it, appears from 34 where the sin of a hunter who kills deer for gain is considered to be less grave than that of one-we have to add: Brahmana - who eats meat at random 218 If a Brahmana has the desire for meat he is allowed to make an animal of ghee or flour, but he shall never wish to kill an animal at random.219 In 39, it is stated that killing (vadha) on ritual occasions is to be considered as non-killing (avadha) since animals were created for the sake of sacrifice by Svayambhu, and since the sacrifice is [631] meant for the welfare of the whole world.220 And injury (hinsa) to moving and immovable creatures which is enjoined by the Veda is to be known as non-injury (ahimsa).221 The inclusion of immovable beings goes beyond the intentions of the context which is only concerned with meat-eating, but it represents an old conception mentioned also in 40: Plants, cattle, trees, (other animals) moving horizontally (like tortoises, etc.), and birds, which have met their death for the sake of sacrifice, attain again higher existences.222 The highest bliss is assured to sacrificer and victim alike: 'A twice-born man who knows the true meaning of the Veda and injures animals for these purposes (viz. guest-reception, sacrifice to gods and fathers) makes himself and the animal go to the highest state of existence (in heaven).223 The sloka Manu 5, 41 also occurs in Vasistha 4,6 at the beginning of the chapter on impurity. Alsdorf (loc. cit., 24) reasonably suggests inadi. 217 M 5,43 glhe gurav aranye va nivasann atmavan dvijah, navedavihitam himsam apady api samacaret. 218 M 5, 34 na tadriam bhavaty eno mrgahantur dhanarthinah, yadrsam bhavati pretya vsthamamsani khadatah. 219 M 5,37 kuryad ghrtapasum sange kuryat pistapasum tatha, na tv eva tu vrtha hantum pasum icchet kadacana. 220 M 5, 39 yajnartham pasavah systah svayam eva svayambhuva, yajno 'sya bhutyai sarvasya tasmad yajne vadho 'vadhah. 221 M 5, 44 ya vedavihita himsa niyatasmims caracare, ahimsam eva tam vidyad vedad dharmo hi nirbabhau. 222 M5, 40 osadhyah pasavo vrksas tiryancah paksinas tatha, yajnartham nidhanam praptah prapnuvanty ucchritih punah. 223 M 5,42 esv arthesu pasun himsan vedatattvarthavid dvijah, atmanam ca pasum caiva gamayaty uttamam gatim. Cf. 41. 100 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II that it is an interpolation. The same holds good, in my opinion, for the occurrence of the sloka in Sankhayana-Grhyasutra 2, 16, 1, where it is quoted in the context of the madhuparka, the guest-reception. This (as well as the following) paragraph interrupts the rules referring to the persons to be considered as guests or not. The older law-books do not mention the restriction of meat-eating to ritual occasions. But we read in the last section of the ChandogyaUpanisad: This Brahma said to Prajapati, Prajapati to Manu, Manu to his progeny: He, who having returned from the household of his teacher after having learned the Veda and after having done in addition (to the study of the Veda) the work for the teacher according to the rules, and having established himself in a household (of his own) studies (the Veda) for himself in a pure place, raises law-abiding (students); who, having concentrated all his senses on the Self (soul), does not injure any living being except at the right place and time (i.e. in sacrifice); he, indeed, who conducts himself thus as long as he lives enters the world of Brahma and does not return (i.e., is not reborn).224 This restriction of (632) injuring any being to the sacrifice agrees with the idea expressed in Manu 5,40 and 44. And the passage shows that the Brahmana had to practise ahimsa in daily life already in fairly early times. 4. Special injunctions of ahimsa are given for the Brahmana. A. A Brahmana must, unless he is in distress, follow a means of livelihood which does not cause injury to living beings, or at least causes only little injury.225 Actually he shall as far as possible not follow the ways of the world at all for the sake of livelihood.226 224 ChU 8, 15 tad dhaitad brahma prajapataya uvaca, prajapatir manave, manuh prajabhyah: acaryakulad vedam adhitya yathavidhanam guroh karma skrtva] atisesenabhisamavstya kutumbe sthitva sucau dece svadhyayam adhiyano dharmikan vidadhad atmani sarvendriyani sampratisthapyahissant sarvabhutany anyatra tirthebhyah sa khalv evam vartayan yavad ayusam brahmalokam abhisampadyate na ca punar avartate - [krtva] is BOHTLINGK's emendation. 225 M 4, 2 adrohenaiva bhutanam alpadrohena va punah, ya vrttis tam samasthaya vipro jived anapadi. 226 M 4, 11 na lokavrttam varteta vrttihetoh kathamcana. 101 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Thus a Brahmana must avoid agriculture since it involves doing injury to living beings: 'But a Brahmana or a Ksatriya, living by a Vaiaya's occupation, shall avoid with care agriculture which consists mainly in doing injury and depends on others. People think that agriculture is good, (but) this occupation is blamed by the virtuous: (for) the wooden (implement) with iron point injures the earth and the (creatures) living in the earth."227 The fact that the Ksatriya is here mentioned along with the Brahmana can hardly be interpreted in that way that the Ksatriya, too, must abstain from agriculture because it involves himsa. Most probably the Ksatriya is to avoid agriculture since it depends on others (paradhina). According to Gautama a srotriya, a Brahmana well-versed in the Veda, is the final authority in doubtful law-suits 'since he is incapable of injuring or favouring living beings'.228 In older times agriculture was not forbidden for Brahmanas, and this rule is preserved by Manu 10, 82. But Gautama gives a restriction: 'agriculture and trade (are allowed to the Brahmana) if he does not do the work himself.129 The motivation for this rule is presumably that being engaged in worldly affairs would impede his proper occupation, the study of the Veda. But the idea of ahimsa comes in when Gautama mentions cattle for slaughter among the goods not to be sold by a Brahmana living by the Vaisya's mode of subsistence.230 16331 Baudhayana declares that, if a Brahmana is unable to attend to both, the study of the Veda and agriculture, the latter must be given up.231 For the Brahmana it is preferable to be poor in worldly possessions but rich in the knowledge of the Veda, and a verse praising ascetic ideals is added: A fat roaring humped bull who does not restrain himself, who strikes moving beings, is violent, speaks as he likes, does not attain (the world of) the gods; but those who are emaciated and (small like) atoms, go there.232 227 M 10,83 vaisyapravrttyapi jivams tu brahmanah ksatriyo'pi va, himsaprayam paradhinam klsim yatnena varjayet. 84 krsim sadhv iti manyante sa vsttih sadvigarhita, bhumim bhumisayams caiva hanti kastham ayomukham. 228 Gaut 28, 51 yato 'yam aprabhavo bhutanam himsanugrahayogesu. 229 Gaut 10,5 krsivanijye casvayamkyte. 230 Gaut 7, 13 pasavas ca himsasamyoge. 231 Baudh 1, 5, 10, 30. 232 Baudh 1, 5, 10, 31 na vai devan pivaro 'samyatatma roruymanah kakudi samasnute, calattundi rabhasah kamavadi kysasa ity anavas tatra yanti. 102 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II If a Brahmana lives by agriculture, he shall plough with two bulls whose noses are not pierced and who are not castrated, and he shall not strike them with a goad but only coax them again and again.233 Baudhayana gives the generally accepted rule that a Brahmana who cannot live by the means proper for his class may live like a Ksatriya; but he adds that according to Gautama the duties of a Ksatriya are too cruel for him.234 The text transmitted under the name of Gautama does not contain this rule, but agrees with Baudhayana's own view 235 Baudhayana's rule about the way in which a Brahmana should plough and the view attributed to Gautama show that there was a strong movement which tried to prevent the Brahmana from becoming involved in any kind of violence. Under the same aspect an injunction given by Apastamba may be viewed. In the chapter on murder and homicide he says that 'a Brahmana shall not take a weapon, not even if he only wants to inspect it'.236 Presumably this rule is given for the purpose to keep the Brahmana off from the remotest contact with the means of violence. B. A Brahmana who is a snataka can attain heaven by ahimsa and other vows: 'He who is persevering, gentle, controlled, does not associate with people of cruel conduct, does not injure (living beings), shall, if he follows these vows, win heaven by control (of the senses) and by liberality.'237 [634] Ahimsa belongs to the means by which supernatural faculties are acquired: 'By continuous study of the Veda, by purity, austerities, and non-injury to living beings he remembers his former births.'238 From these passages it appears that ahimsa is a vow which is treated on the same level as other specifically Brahmanic vows which are, as a rule, not expected of the common man. 233 Baudh 2, 2, 4, 21 asyutanasikabhyam samuskabhyam atudann araya muhur muhur abhyucchandayan. Cf. Vas 2, 32. 234 Baudh 2, 2, 4, 17 neti gautamo 'tyugro hi ksatradharmo brahmanasya. 235 Gaut 7, 6. 236 Ap 1, 10, 29, 6 pariksartho 'pi brahmana ayudham nadadita. 237 M 4, 246 drdhakari mrdur dantah kruracarair asamvasan, ahimsro damadanabhyam jaget svargam tathavratah. The other way round the same is formulated in 4, 170: A snataka, who enjoys doing injury (himsarata) does not gain happiness in this world. 238 M 4, 148 vedabhyasena satatam saucena tapasaiva ca, adrohena ca bhutanam jatim smarati paurvikim. 103 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Ahimsa is also one of the vows by which the Brahmana can attain highest bliss, nihsreyasa, lit. 'the state beyond which there is nothing better': The study of the Veda, austerities, knowledge, control of the senses, non-injury, and service for the teacher are the best means to attain highest bliss.239 The best means, however, is the knowledge of the universal Self (atman), and the highest bliss is the union with the Self and the cessation of rebirths. The ritual acts prescribed in the karmakanda of the Veda cause the continuation of rebirths, they are pravrtta, those prescribed in the jnanakanda cause the cessation of rebirths, they are nivrtta.240 Therefore a Brahmana should give up the ritual acts and concentrate himself on the knowledge of the Self.241 This is virtually identical with renunciation (sannyasa), which was considered to be the ideal conduct of the Brahmana. After enumerating the forty sacraments (samskara) - that are the ritual duties of the Brahmana well-versed in the Veda (bahusruta), Gautama defines the eight qualities of the soul: 'Compassion on all living beings, forbearance, freedom from envy, purity, freedom from exertion (in worldly occupations), auspiciousness, freedom from avarice, and freedom from covetousness.'242 He who is devoid of these qualities will not be united with Brahman, even if he possesses all the forty sacraments, but he who possesses all the eight qualities of the soul, though only a few of the sacraments, will attain the union with Brahman.243 Here ahimsa is not mentioned but the word daya 'compassion' expresses a similar idea and can be looked upon as one of the positive aspects of ahimsa with which it is occasionally used side by side. [635] 239 M 12, 83 vedabhyasas tapo jnanam indriyanam ca samyamah, ahimsa guruseva ca nihsreyasakaram param. 240 M 12, 85-93. The Atman-theory is defined in 91, 118, 125. 241 M 12,92 yathoktany api karmani parihaya dvijottamah, atmajnane same ca syad vedabhyase ca yatnavan. 242 Gaut 8, 22-23 athastav atmagunah: daya sarvabhutesu ksantir anasuya saucam anayaso mangalam akarpanyam asprheti. 243 Gaut 8, 24-25 yasyaite catvarimsat samskara na castav atmaguna na sa brahmanah sayujyam salokyam ca gacchati. yasya tu khalu catvarimsat samskaranam ekadeso py astav atmaguna atha sa brahmanah sayujyam salokyam ca gacchati. 104 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II Apastamba recommends the snataka to avoid all the mistakes like anger, etc. which tend to burn (= hurt) animate beings.244 This rule is repeated from the introduction to the chapter on penances where it is given in full. It is based on the Atmantheory and can be compared with Manu's opinion regarding the knowledge of the Self. We shall return to it in the context of the penances (below II 7). C. Baudhayana gives special rules for Brahmana-householders who are called salina living in a hut, yayavara 'wanderer', and cakracara 'circle-goer',245 and who subject themselves to certain restrictions with regard to their means of subsistence. These modes of life might be looked upon as preliminary stages which finally end in vanaprastha, the life of a hermit in the forest; the tenth mode of life is actually called vanya vrtti. For a man who has chosen any of these modes of life all worldly duties cease, such as teaching, sacrificing for others, accepting gifts, and performing sacrifices other than those specifically prescribed. In the context of the rules of purification obligatory for these householders, two verses are quoted which state that the internal purification or that of the self (soul) of creatures consists in ahimsa (or ahimsana) 246 This shows that they had to abstain from injuring living beings. There is, however, one particular vitti called palani protecting%247 or ahimsika 'not injuring'. It consists in seeking to obtain from virtuous people husked rice or seeds.248 Husked rice and seeds are devoid of 244 Ap 1, 11, 31, 25 krodhadims ca bhutadahiyan dosan varjayet. - Cf. also 2, 2, 5, 13 sarva-bhutaparivadakrosams ca (varjayet). 245 Baudh 3, 1-2. That the salinas and yayavaras are grhasthas, and not 'Ermites' and 'Vagants', as J. VARENNE, Maha Narayana Upanisad (Paris 1960), II, 82, erroneously translates, appears from Vaikh 8,5. There the salina is a householder who attends only to his own ritual duties, the yayavara one who also sacrifices for others and teaches the Veda. yayavara presumably means 'moving frequently about (in performing sacrifices for others)'. What Baudh is giving are the rules for householders who wish to follow certain ascetic ways of life. Cf. also Baudh 2, 10, 17, 3. 246 Baudh 3, 1, 26 sruyate dvividham saucam yac chistaih paryupasitam, bahyam nirlepanirgandham antahsaucam ahimsanam. 27 adbhih sudhyanti gatrani buddhir jnanena sudhyati, ahimsaya ca bhutatma manah satyena sudhyati. The latter verse also occurs among the general rules for purification (v. below II 7). 247 HULTZSCH, in his second edition of the text, reads phalani. 248 Baudh 3, 2, 13 tusavihinams tandulan icchati sajjanebhyo bijani va. tusavihina refers probably to bijani, too. 105 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA life - thus the Brahmana following the ahimsika vytti accepts only food that has been killed by others. These salinas and yayavaras are sacrificing in the self (atmayajin) by offerings to the vital breaths (pranahuti).249 This mental sacrifice is characteristic for the renouncer. [636] 5. A. The sannyasin 'renouncer' or parivrajaka (pravrajaka) 'wandering ascetic' is subjected to the most rigid rules of ahimsa. When entering the Order (asrama) of the sannyasin, a Brahmana offers a last sacrifice: Having the (sacred) fires in himself, a Brahmana shall go forth from his house. 250 He then gives a promise of safety to all the creatures: "The Brahmana, who having given fearlessness (= safety) to all the beings goes forth from this house, participates in worlds made of radiance.251 This promise will result in his own safety: 'For the twice-born man who has not even caused the slightest fear to living beings there will be no fear from anywhere after he is freed from his body.'252 In this context, abhaya and bhaya are quasi-synonyms of ahimsa and himsa. For, following his promise of abhaya, the sannyasin has to take special safeguards: He shall put down his foot purified by sight (i.e. after having made sure that he does not step on any creature), he shall drink water purified (= strained) by a piece of cloth, he shall utter speech purified by truth, his behaviour shall be purified by his mind.253 The essence of the sannyasin's behaviour is described as follows: 'By the restraint of his senses, by the destruction of love and hatred, and by non-injury to living beings he becomes fit for immortality: 254 The aim of the sannyasin is the liberation from 249 Baudh 2, 7, 12. This and the related texts on the manasa yajna or pranagnihotra are collected and commented upon by Varenne, 1. c., II, 69 sqq. 53 sqq. 250 M 6, 38 prajapatyam nirupyesim sarvavedasadaksinam, atmany agnin samaropya brahmanah pravrajet grhat. 251 M6, 39 yo dattva sarvabhutebhyah pravrajaty abhayam grhat, tasya tejomaya loka bhavanti brahma-vadinah. 252 M 6, 40 yasmad anv api bhutanam dvijan notpadyate bhayam, tasya dehad vimuktasya bhayam nasti kutascana. 253 M 6, 46 drstiputam nyaset padam vastraputam jalam pibet, satyaputam vaded vacam manahputam samacaret. Cf. 68. 106 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II transmigration, from the samsara, and the union with the highest Self (paramatman) which is present in all creatures: 'By concentration he shall recognize the subtleness of the highest Self and (its) presence in the highest and lowest bodies (= creatures). 255 This is the same idea we already met with in the context of the ahimsa-injunctions for the Brahmana in general (above II 4 B). Among the Dharmasutras, the rules for the sannyasin are given in great detail by Baudhayana. According to him the vows of true renouncer are non-injury, truth, non-stealing, abstention from (637) sexual intercourse and abandoning (of all possessions). These vows are supplemented by five minor vows, viz. freedom from anger, obedience to the teacher, freedom from negligence, purity and cleanliness in eating.256 The ascetic shall not hurt living beings with the weapons (lit. sticks) speech, thought and act.257 He has to carry with him a piece of cloth for straining water for the purpose of purification.258 The rites with which a man enters the order of ascetics are given more fully than in the Manu-Smrti.259 They culminate in the promise of safety to all creatures.260 While Manu (6,40 v. above) says that the sannyasin does not experience fear after death, Baudhayana quotes the following verse: 'The silent ascetic who wanders about after having given fearlessness to all beings - for him no fear arises here on this earth from all the beings either.'261 254 M 6, 60 indriyanam nirodhena ragadvesaksayena ca, ahimsaya ca bhutanam amrtatvaya kalpate. Cf. 75. 255 M6,65 suksmatam canvavekseta yogena paramatmanah, dehesu ca samutpattim uttamesu adhamesu ca. 256 Baudh 2, 10, 18, 2-3 athemani vratani bhavanti: ahimsa satyam astainyam maithunasya ca varjanam tyaga ity eva. pancaivopavratani bhavanti: akrodho gurususrusapramadah saucam aharasuddhis ceti. 257 Baudh 2, 6, 11, 23 vanmanahkarmadandair bhutanam adrohi, danda has here hardly the connotation 'means of punishment', as BUHLER, The Sacred Laws of the Aryas II (SBE XIV.1882), 260, translates. 258 Baudh 2, 6, 11, 24 pavitram bibhryac chaucartham. Cf. jalapavitram 2, 10, 17, 12.33.43. 259 Baudh 2, 10, 17 The details can be passed over here. The mantras used for repositing the fires in the self are taken from TS 3, 4, 10,5; TB 2. 5. 8. 8. where they refer to the Agnyupasthana; the sannyasic rite is a reinterpretation of the older ritual, where the sacrificer makes the fire mount himself so that he may not loose it. 260 Baudh 2, 10, 17, 29 abhayam sarvabhutebhyo mattah. 261 Baudh 2, 10, 17,30 abhayam sarvabhutebhyo dattva yas carate munih, na tasya sarvabhutebhyo bhayam capiha jayate. 107 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The sannyasin does not sacrifice anymore as the grhastha does since he has himself become identical with the sacrificial fires which consist in his vital breaths (prana). His sacrifice is an atmayajna, a sacrifice in his self,262 and it consists of the food he has begged. His detachment from all sensual pleasure requires that he eats his food like a medicine, i.e. without tasting it, after having given portions to the creatures out of compassion.263 Vasistha and Gautama teach that the ascetic has to be indifferent towards the creatures by avoiding injury as well as favour.264 Of great importance are Gautama's rules that the ascetic shall not take any limb of plants and trees if it is not (already) separated [638] and that he shall avoid the destruction of seeds.265 This means that he has to subsist on food devoid of life. The idea that the sannyasin must live only on food that is abandoned voluntarily and spontaneously is already present in the Isopanisad: All this that moves on earth (= all living beings) is to be dwelled in by (= is the abode of) the Lord. Therefore you should nourish yourself with what is abandoned (voluntarily ceded to you); you should not covet anybody's property. 266 At the same time this verse is another instance for the conception that the Self (Atman) - here identified with the Lord - dwells in all living beings. This conception is, moreover, again connected with the idea of ahimsa: ""Demoniac" are called those worlds, they are covered with blind darkness - to them those people go after death who are killers of souls (or: "a soul").' - 'Who however sees all beings in his own self, and his self in all beings - from him it (the one) does not strive to protect (hide) itself (= to him it reveals itself readily). 267 262 Baudh 2, 10, 18, 8-9. 263 Baudh 2, 10, 18, 10 bhutebhyo dayapurvam samvibhajya sesam adbhih samsprsyausadhavat prasniyat. 264 Vas 10, 29 upeksakah sarvabhutsu himsanugrahapariharena. Gaut 3, 24 samo bhutesu himsanugrahayoh. 265 Gaut 3, 20 naviprayuktam osadhivanaspatinam angam upadadita. 23 varjayed bijavadham. 266 Isop 1 isavasyam idam sarvam yat kim ca jagatyam jagat, tena tyaktena bhunjitha ma grdhah kasya svid dhanam. The translations from Isop are those of P. THIEME, JAOS 85, 1965, 89 sqq. 108 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II B. The vanaprastha, the hermit living in a hut in the forest,268 is also subjected to a number of restrictions which presuppose ahimsa though Manu does not use the term in this context. 'The hermit is to give up all food coming from the village269 and everything grown on ploughed land.270 He may eat what is either cooked with fire or ripened by time.'271 Or, following the rule of the Vaikhanasas, he shall always subsist on flowers, roots and fruits alone which are ripened by time and fallen spontaneously.272 The hermit shall be compassionate towards all living beings.273 Gautama teaches that the vanaprastha has to live on forest (639) produce alone which includes the meat of animals killed by beasts of prey.274 Baudhayana divides the vanaprasthas into two categories -- those who cook and those who do not. Among those who cook are those who eat what is generated from semen, viz. the flesh of animals killed by tigers, wolves, falcons and other beasts of prey.275 The general rule for all Brahma-Vaikhanasas is as follows: 'He shall not injure gnats and flies, he shall endure cold and heat, staying in the forest, contented, enjoying bark and skin (as dress), and water (alone as drink)."276 Apastamba does not explicitly refer to ahimsa, but he possibly implies it when he says that the hermit shall enter water slowly and bathe without beating it.277 This reminds one of the rule for the Jaina monk who is not to beat water either. 267 Isop 3 asurya nama te loka andhena tamasavrtah, tams te pretyabhigacchanti ye ke catmahano janah. 6 yas tu sarvani bhutany atmann evanupasyati, sarvabhutesu catmanam tato na vijigupsate. 268 I leave aside the hermit living without hut (M 6,25 sqq.), who is called aranyanityah by Vas 10, 15, and who is a special type of sannyasin whose rules apply to him mutatis mutandis. 269 M6, 3 samtyajya gramyam aharam. 270 M 6, 16 phalakrstam. 271 M6, 17 agnipakvasano va syal kalapakvabhug eva va. 272 M 6, 21 puspamulaphalair vapi kevalair vartayet sada, kalapakvaih svayam sirnair vaikhanasamate sthitah. 273 M6, 8 saruabhiitnnukampalea. 274 Gaut 3, 31 baiska. 275 Baudh 3,3,6 retovasikta nama mamsam vyaghravskasyenadibhir anyatamena va hatam. Cf. 2, 6, 11, 15 baiskam apy upayunjita. 276 Baudh 3, 3, 18-19 sastraparigrahah sarvesam brahmavaikhanasanam: na druhyed damsamasakan himavams tapaso bhavet, vanapratisthah samtustas ciracarmajalapriyah, tapasa is here to be taken as opposite of himavant, not in the sense of performing austerities' as BUHLER (SBE XIV, 293) has it. 277 Ap 2,9, 22, 13 sanair apo 'bhyaveyad anabhighnan. 109 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA 6. Among other vows the brahmacarin, the Vedic student has to keep that of ahimsa: He is to avoid honey, meat, perfumes, garlands, spices, women, everything turned sour and injury to animate beings. 278 Himsa is mentioned in the same context by Gautama: The student has to abstain from gambling, low service, taking something not offered to him, and injury.279 Though ahimsa is not referred to by the older Dharmasutras in connection with the rules for the brahmacarin, it is presupposed in Paraskara-Gshyasutra where the student is to fetch fire-wood from the woods without injuring trees.280 The condition that the firewood must not be cut off from living trees but must have fallen spontaneously is not mentioned elsewhere, but it can be assumed that the vow of ahimsa is implied by the initiation ceremony. On this occasion the teacher commits the pupil to all the gods and to all the beings so that he may not be hurt.281 These formulas [640] occur already in the Satapatha-Brahmana, where the sentence is added: "Thus his disciple does not suffer any harm. 282 It is true that in these passages the brahmacarin's practising ahimsa is not explicitly stated; they only say that the student himself is to be protected from injury. But from Paraskara's rule it can be inferred that the student, in his turn, had to avoid injuring any animate being. 7. Ahimsa is one of the means to remove sins, one of the austerities (tapas) or penances to be performed by the penitent: An oblation in the fire together with the 'great utterances' (bhur bhuvah svah) must daily be made by (the penitent) himself. He must practise non-injury, truth, freedom from anger, and uprightness.283 Baudhayana, too, mentions ahimsa as one of the means of penance: 278 M 2,177 varjayen madhu mamsam ca gandham malyam rasan striyah, suktani yani sarvani praninam caiva himsanam. 279 Gaut 2, 17 dyutam hinasevam adattadanam hissam. Cf. M 2, 179. 280 PGS 2, 5, 9 ahimsann aranyat samidha ahrtya. 281 PGS 2, 2, 21 athainam bhutebhyah paridadati ... visvebhyas tva devebhyah paridadami sarvebhyas tva bhutebhyah paridadami aristya iti. 282 SB 11, 5, 4,344 tatha hasya brahmacari na kancanartim arcchati. 283 M 11, 223 mahavyahitibhir homah kartavyah svayam anvaham, ahimsam satyam akrodham arjavam ca samacaret. 110 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II Non-injury, truth, non-stealing, ablutions in water in the morning, at noon, and in the evening, obedience towards the teacher, continence, sleeping on the ground, wearing one garment only, and fasting-that are the austerities (penances).284 This rule closely agrees with the vows of the sannyasin (v. above II 5A), and Baudhayana and Manu obviously presuppose that following some of the sannyasin's vows for a limited time can free from minor sins. Entering the order of sannyasa after going through the other three asramas is, according to Manu, the means to remove all sins. 285 Apastamba inserts before the chapter on penances a passage on the knowledge of the atman, and the means by which this knowledge is attained, imply ahimsa, though the term is not used: He shall attend to the methods of concentration which lead to the Self, are accompanied by the abandoning (of passions) and instrumental in not bringing (the passions) forth (again). There is found nothing higher than the attainment of the Self. Therefore we shall quote as examples verses which refer to the attainment of the Self: 'All animate beings are the castle of the (Self), who is lying in concealment, who is not killed, who is spotless; those who attend to the immovable (Self) who lives in a movable dwelling (become) immortal.' [641] 'Despising all what is called an object (of the senses) in this world, the wise man shall attend to that one who is lying in concealment.'286 'The wise one who sees all beings in the Self, who reflecting (upon this) does not become perplexed, and who sees the Self everywhere, that Brahman, in truth, shines in heaven ... From him (the Self), the highest, who divides himself, spring all the bodies; he is the root, permanent, eternal.'287 'But, the extinction 284 Baudh 3, 10, 13 ahimsa satyam astainyam savanesudakopasparsanam gurusu srusa brahmacaryam adhahsayanam ekavastratanasaka iti tapamsi. Cf. also the sloka on purification 1,5,8,2 (the soul is purified by ahimsa) which recurs in the chapter on ascetic householders 3, 2, 27 (v. above II 4 C). 285 Cf. M 6,85.96. 286 Ap 1, 8, 22, 1 adhyatmikan yogan anutisthen nyasasamhitan anaiscarikan. 2 atmalabhan na param vidyate. 3 tatratmalabhiyan cchlokan udaharisyamah. 4 puh praninah sarva eva guhasayasyahanyamanasya, vikalmasasyacalam calaniketam ye 'nutisthanti te 'mrtah.5 yad idam id ihed iha loke visayam ucyate, vidhuya kavir etad anutisthed guhasayam. 287 Ap 1,8, 23,1 atman pasyan sarvabhutani na muhyec cintayan kavih, atmanam caiva sarvatra pasyet sa vai brahma nakaprsthe virajati. 2... paramesthi vibhajah, tasmat kayah prabhavanti sarve sa malam sasvatikah sa nityah. 111 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA of the faults in this life has its root in concentration. Having removed the faults which tend to burn (= injure) the animate beings, a wise man goes to (final) peace. Now we shall exemplify the faults which tend to burn the animate beings: Anger, delight, wrath, greed, perplexity, perfidy, deceit (or: injury), lying, gluttony, slander, envy, lust and rage, disinterest in the Self, non-concentration: the extinction of these (faults) has its root in concentration. Freedom from anger, from delight, from wrath, from greed, from perplexity, from perfidy, from deceit (or injury), speaking the truth, moderate eating, freedom from slander, from envy, sharing with others, abandoning (all possessions), uprightness, affability, tranquillity, self-control, freedom from conflict with all the animate beings, concentration, honourable conduct, freedom from malice, contentedness - these (virtues) have been agreed upon for all the asramas; attending to them according to the rules one becomes possessed of that one who is going everywhere (=one becomes united with the universal Self). 288 The description of the universal Self closely corresponds to that given in the Isopanisad quoted above (II 5 A). The passages cited are presumably taken from an Upanisad, which is not preserved (642). This Upanisad was related to or even partly dependent on the Isopanisad.289 We have seen above (II 4 B), that Apastamba refers to this section in the context of the duties of the snataka. In general the attainment of the atman is a prerogative of the sannyasin,290 but it is the aim of every Brahmana whose whole conduct is guided by sannyasic ideals. Apastamba has put the passage on the knowledge of the atman at the head of the chapter on penances, obviously because he 288 Ap 1,8, 23, 3 dosanam tu nirghato yogamula iha jivite, nirhrtya bhutadahiyan ksemam gacchati panditah. 4 atha bhutadahiyan dosan udaharisyamah. 5 krodho harso roso lobho moho dambho droho masodyam atyasaparivadav asiya kamamanyu anatmyam ayogas tesam yogamulo nirghatah. 6 akrodho 'harso'roso 'lobho 'moho 'dambho 'drohah satyavacanam anatyaso 'paisunam anasuya samvibhagas tyaga arjavam mardavam samo damah sarvabhutair avirodho yoga aryam antsamsam tustir iti sarvasramanam samayapadani tany anutisthan vidhina sarvagami bhavati. 289 Cf. Ap. 1,8, 23, 1 atman pasyan sarvabhutani na muhyet with Isop 7: yasmint sarvani bhutany atmaivabhud vijanatah, tatra ko mohah kah soka ekatvam anupasyatah. Cf. also Yajnavalkya's na va are 'ham mohah bravimi BAU 2, 4, 13. 4,5, 14. 290 Cf. Ap 2, 9, 21, 13 sqq. 112 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II was of the firm conviction that the sannyasin-like conduct is the highest penance and safeguards the Brahmana against committing sins and crimes. III From a casual survey of the material collected in the preceding paragraphs it might appear that the idea of ahimsa originated among the world-renouncers, was gradually adopted by the Brahmanas and was finally considered to be a rule for the whole society whose values were determined by the precedent of the Brahmanas. In the Dharmasutras as well as in the Manu-Smrti the prohibition of injuring animate beings is mainly based on the atman-theory. This theory which is first connected with the ahimsa-idea in the Isopanisad, goes - in the fully developed form we are concerned with - back to Yajnavalkya. In the Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad he says of the man who has desires: Having obtained the end of his action, whatever he does in this world, he comes again from that world to this world for (further) action. 291 This means that acts, be they good or bad, lead to a new birth in this world. The man however who has no desires anymore (akama) except that for the Self (atmakama) becomes united with the Brahman (brahmapyeti) and is not reborn. This (atman = Brahman) the Brahmanas wish to know by recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice, by liberality, by austerities, by fasting. Knowing this (atman) one becomes a silent ascetic. Seeking him as their world the wandering ascetics wander forth. ... These two (thoughts) do not overcome him: 'Therefore I did something bad' and 'therefore I did something good' - he overcomes them both; both what he has [643] done and what he has not done do not burn him.... Therefore one who knows thus - after becoming appeased, self-controlled, enduring, indifferent, concentrated - sees the Self in (his) self, sees the Self as everything ... becomes a Brahmana (in the real sense, viz. a knower 291 BAU 4,4,6 prapyantam karmanas tasya yat kim ceha karoty ayam, tasmat lokat punar aity asmai lokaya karmane. 113 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA of Brahman = atman) who has no doubt (anymore): He is one whose world is Brahman.292 Yajnavalkya does not mention ahimsa as one of the virtues of the ascetic, but the knowledge of the Self is inseparably connected with renunciation. Renunciation is for him the result of the knowledge that every deed done in this world bears its fruits in the next world and in future births. This fate can be overcome only by realizing the unity of all beings in the universal Self. It would be easily conceivable that the idea of ahimsa sprang from the conception that the same Self which dwells in oneself also dwells in all the other beings and that by injuring other beings one would injure oneself. Nevertheless this conclusion would be a fallacy since it does not explain the significance of ahimsa in the animistic and pluralistic religion of the Jainas. The Jainas however know a karman-doctrine which is similar to that of Yajnavalkya, and so do the Buddhists who do not recognize a universal Self either. The Manu-Smrti adduces besides the atman-theory another motivation for the ahimsa-doctrine - the popular belief that the eater of the meat of an animal will be eaten by this animal in the next world (5,33.55). This conception could easily be connected with the karmandoctrine. But it is older than this theory, and we must consider the attitude taken to it by the theoreticians of the Vedic ritual. IV In the sankhayana-Brahmana the tristubh meter used in the morninglitany of the Soma-sacrifice is identified with force (bala) and strength (virya), the bihati and usnih with large and small cattle, respectively. By using the tristubh before and after, the bihati and usnih cattle is encircled by strength and force: In the middle are cattle connected with the bihati and the usnih; having encircled cattle from both sides with force and 292 BAU 4, 4, 22-23 ... tam etam vedanuvacanena brahmana vividisanti yajnena danena tapasanasakenaitam eva viditva munir bhavati, etam eva pravrajino lokam icchantah pravrajanti ... etam u haivaite na tarata ity atah papam akaravam ity atah kalyanam akaravam ity ubhe u haivaisa ete tarati nainam krtaklte tapatah ... tasmad evamvic chanto danta uparatas titiksuh samahito bhutvatmany evatmanam pasyati sarvam atmanam pasyati ... avicikitso brahmano bhavaty esa brahmalokah. Cf. also BAU 3, 4 and 5. 114 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II strength, he (the hots) puts (cattle) into the sacrificer. Thus cattle do not run away 1644) from the sacrificer. lust as men eat cattle in this world, partake of them, so cattle eat men in yonder world, partake of them. He (the sacrificer) seizes them in this world through the morning-litany; they, seized in this world, do not eat him in yonder world, do not partake of him; just as he eats them in this world, partakes of them, so he eats them in yonder world, partakes of them.293 Being eaten in yonder world is considered as common fate. But one can evade this fate by magical means, in this case by the morninglitany of the Soma-sacrifice. Generally the magical power consists in the knowledge of an equivalence or correspondence between the object and the means. The correspondence Sankhayana establishes refers to the 'seizing' of cattle and has no immediate connection with the eating of cattle, but it is implied that 'seizing' means winning power over cattle in this and the next world. Another example is furnished by the Satapatha-Brahmana: From this sacrifice, in truth, the man (= the sacrificer) is born. What food a man consumes in this world, that consumes him, in return, in yonder world. This sacrifice is, in truth, performed as one of fermenting (= intoxicating) drink, and fermenting drink is not to be consumed by a Brahmana. He is born from what is not to be consumed, and the food does not, in return, consume him in yonder world. Therefore the Sautramani is the sacrifice of a Brahmana.294 Here the author argues that being born from something unconsumable guarantees that the sacrificer cannot be consumed either in yonder world. 293 SankhB 11, 3 madhye barhatas causnihas ca pasavo balenaiva tad viryeno bhayatah pasun parigrhya yajamane dadhati tatha ha yajamanat pasavo 'nutkramuka bhavanti tad yatha ha va asmiml loke manusyah pasun asnanti yathaibhir bhunjata evam evamusmin1 loke pasavo manusyan asnanty evam ebhir bhunjate sa enan iha prataranuvakenavarunddhe tam ihavaruddha amusmiml loke nasnanti nainena pratibhunjate yathaivainan asmim loke 'snati yathaibhir bhunkta evam evainan amusmil loke 'snaty evam ebhir bhunkte. 294 SB 12,9,1, 1 etasmad vai yajnat puruso jayate, sa yad dha va asmirl loke puruso 'nnam atti tad enam amusmil loke pratyatti sa va esa parisruto yajnas tayate 'nadya vai brahmanena parisrut sa etasmad anadyaj jayate tam hamusmil loke 'nnam na pratyatti tasmad esa brahmanayajna eva yat sautramani. 115 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The fullest account of this conception is found in the story of Bhrgu's visit to yonder world.295 Bhrgu considered himself superior in knowledge to his father Varuna. To teach him a lesson, Varuna sends him to yonder world. There Bhsgu sees: (1) a man cutting a man apiece; (2) a man eating a man who is crying aloud; and (3) a man eating a man who is silent. Asking for the reason [645] of these horrible happenings, Bhrgu is told to ask his father. Varuna gives him the following explanations: The first man is a tree which was cut in this world and is now doing the same to the wood-cutter, the remedy (niskyti JB, prayascitta SB) for this is to put fire-wood on the fire in the daily Agnihotra, thus one evades being cut by trees in yonder world. The second man is an animal which was slaughtered and eaten and is now eating the eater; the remedy is the offering of milk in the Agnihotra - milk being an equivalent of the cow and of cattle in general - (SB) or offering the first offering with loud recitation (JB). The third man is a plant which was eaten and is now eating the eater; the remedy is the illumination of the Agnihotra milk with a straw in order to see in the dark of the early morning or late evening and to be able to prevent the milk from boiling over - (SB) or to offer the last offering with silent recitation (JB). H. Lommel296 has shown that the legend is based on the conception of yonder world as an inverted world where everything of this world is turned into its opposite. He has further drawn the convincing conclusion that originally this conception has nothing to do with ethical ideas and that the fate man undergoes in yonder world is not to be considered as a punishment. The idea of the inverted world is a simple and naive conception of the inevitable course of the world, for which Lommel has adduced a great number of ethnological and folkloristic parallels. Viewed from this standpoint, the remedies given in the Brahmanas appear to be arbitrary and unsatisfactory. But they are in perfect consonance with the magical theory of the Vedic ritualists. That man suffers in the next world the same fate he has caused to his victims in this world was probably common belief. In the ritual texts it is only rarely mentioned presumably because it was of little consequence for the ritualist who, by establishing symbolical equivalences for all the ritual acts, was able to secure any end for the sacrificer in this and the next world. 295 SB 11, 6, 1. JB 1, 42-44. I confine myself to giving a short description of the points essential for my purpose. 296 Paideuma 4, 1950, 93-109. 116 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II The ritualists were however deeply concerned with the killing and injuring of animate beings which occurs in the sacrifice itself. It appears from the Bhrgu-legend that they were animists who treated trees, plants and the elements (water is mentioned in the legend) na par with men and animals. Killing and hurting creatures had undesirable consequences which must be eliminated. [646] The most general theory for eliminating the killing in the sacrifice is the conception that the victim or the offering is reborn from the fire in which it is offered: They kill, in truth, this sacrifice when they perform it; and when they press out the King (Soma), then they kill him; and when they make an animal consent and cut it up, then they kill it; by pestle and mortar and by the two millstones they kill the haviryajna. After having killed the sacrifice he (the adhvaryu) pours it which has become seed into the fire as its womb, for the womb of the sacrifice is, in truth, the fire; from that (the fire) it (the sacrifice) is reborn.297 In general the words 'to kill' and 'to die' are not used. For leading the animal up for sacrifice and killing it a labhate'"he takes hold of" is substituted, for killing alone sam jnapayati "he makes consent"' 298 The slaughterer is called samitr 'appeaser'.299 And where the killing and dying is explicitly stated - as in the passage just cited, it is done only in order to nullify or to deny it on the spot. The idea that the animal does not die, but goes to the gods whose herd it joins, is attested already in the Kgveda.300 And a Brahmana says: "Not to 297 SB 11, 1, 2, 1-2 ghnanti va etad yajnam, yad enam tanvate yan nv eva rajanam abhisunvanti tat tam ghnanti yat pasum samjnapayanti visasati tat tam ghnanty ulukhalamusalabhyam drsadupalabhyam haviryajnam ghnanti. tam hatva yajnam, agnav eva yonau reto bhutam sincaty agnir vai yonir yajnasya sa tatah prajayate. 298 Cf. H. OERTEL, 'Euphemismen in der vedischen Prosa', Sitzungsber. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. Phil.-hist. Abt. 1942. 8,6 sqq. Add a sthapayati 'to make stop' and gamayati 'to make go'. 299 samayati in the connotation 'to kill' is not used for the killing of the victim in the Brahrnana-texts: cf. OERTEL, loc. cit., 8 sq.; it occurs in this context first in Vaitana Sutra 10, 18. 300 RV 1, 162, 21. 117 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA death, in truth, do they lead (the animal) which they lead to the sacrifice.'301 But apart from these more general conceptions the whole ritual is pervaded by acts meant for immediately eliminating any killing and injury - the acts of appeasing (santi).302 They do not refer only to the offerings but to any kind of injury committed in the course of the sacrifice. These rites are of special interest for the problem under discussion since in their and similar contexts we meet with the earliest occurrences of the word ahimsa (attested only in the final dative ahimsayai). A few examples will suffice to illustrate the working of these rites. [647] When the tree that is to serve as the sacrificial post in the animalsacrifice is felled, precautionary measures are taken to prevent it from being injured: 'O plant, protect it, he (the adhvaryu) says in order to protect it. 'O axe, do not injure it' - with these words he puts this (blade of darbha 303 - grass) between it (the tree) and the thunderbolt - the axe is, in truth, a thunderbolt - so that there be no injury.304 In a parallel text santyai is given in place of ahimsayai. 305 Here the injury done to the tree is diverted to the blade of grass. The tree itself, when falling down, is liable to injure the worlds: The sacrificial post is, in truth, a thunderbolt; these worlds are afraid of it when it is being hurled down since being hurled down unappeased it is capable of injuring these worlds. When he says: 'With your top do not injure the sky, with your middle (do not injure) the intermediate world, become united with the earth, go to radiance', he thus 301 $B 3, 8, 1, 10 na va etam mrtyave nayanti yam yajnaya nayanti. 302 The material has been collected and discussed in detail by D. J. HOENS, Santi I (Thesis Utrecht 1951). 303 Read: kusa- (WB). 304 MS 3,9, 3 osadhe trayasvainam, ity aha tratya eva svadhite mainam himsir iti vajro vai svadhitir vajrad vavasma etad antardadhaty ahimsayai. 305 TS 6,3,3, 2. 118 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II appeases it; thus appeased, it is hurled down so that it does not do injury to these worlds.306 When the victim has been killed by suffocation, the apertures of its body are sprinkled with water: Burning pain hits the vital breaths of the animal being killed. When he says: 'Do not injure its voice, do not injure its breath', he thus frees its vital breaths by water from burning pain. With the words: 'Whatever of you is wounded, whatever of you is stopped (= killed), of that become purified, beautify yourself for the gods', he has made unwounded whatever they have wounded by making it go (= by killing it), that he appeases.307 The rest of the water used for this purpose is poured on the earth. Since the burning pain has been transferred from the vital breaths of the animal to the water, the pain now enters the earth: 'When he says: 'Hail to the waters', he thus appeases (them). They thus hit this (earth) appeased so that they do not do injury (to the earth)."308 [648] When the victim is cut open, the same procedure is followed as in the case of felling the tree: The knife is not to injure the animal. 309 After the offering of the omentum the sacrificer, his wife, and the priests have to cleanse themselves with water: 'That, in truth, they wound what they make consent, what they cut up. Water is (a means of) appeasing, they appease it by water as (a means of) appeasing, they put it together (= heal it) by water.'310 306 MS 3,9,3 vajro vai yupas tasmad va ime loka niryamanad bibhyatisvaro hy eso 'santo niryamana imarl lokan himsitor yad aha divam agrena ma himsir antariksam madhyena prthivyah sambhava bhrajam gaccheti samayaty eva santa eva niryata esam, lokanam ahimsayai. 307 MS 3, 10, 1 pasor vai maryamanasya pranan sug rcchati yad aha vacam asya ma himsih pranam asya ma himsir ity adbhir vavasyaitat pranan suco muncati yat te kruram yad asthitam tad etena sundhasva devebhyah sumbahasveti yad evasya gamayantah kruram akrams tad akruram akas tac samayati. 308 MS 3, 10, 1 yad aha sam adbhya iti samayaty eva santa evemam rcchanty ahimsayai. 309 MS ibid. 310 SB 3, 8, 2, 30 kruri va etat kurvanti yat samjnapayanti yad visasati santir apas tad adbhih santya samayante tad adbhih samdadhate. 119 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Water is the most common means of appeasing (santi) or healing (bhesaja, niskrti), and the same or similar formulations are used in other contexts too, for example, when the grain for the sacrificial cakes is threshed and ground and thereby injured or killed,311 and when the earth is dug up for the construction of the vedi312 or for the erection of the sacrificial post. 313 Another way of avoiding injury is found in the symbolical identifications. To prevent the fire-pan from being injured by the fire, the adhvaryu fumigates it with horse-dung so that it is not injured, for the horse, in truth, belongs to Prajapati, (and) Agni is Prajapati, (and) oneself does not, in truth, injure oneself. That (he does) with dung since that is what was eaten (and therefore) useless. Thus he does not injure the horse nor the other animals. 314 A pit is dug for depositing the fire-pan while a yajus is recited for which the following motivation is given: Prajapati thought: 'He who will dig her (the earth) up first, will suffer harm.' He saw this yajus: 'Aditi ... shall dig you in the lap of the earth, o pit'; Aditi ... is, in truth, this (earth); with her, in truth, he dug that (pit) in her so as to do no injury (to her), for oneself does not injure oneself.315 From the last passage it appears that the precautionary measure is taken in order to prevent the being injured from taking revenge on the sacrificer. In a number of instances ahimsayai refers to the prevention of injury to the sacrificer, his progeny and cattle. [649] Preventing or healing every possible injury to any being is 311 SB 1, 2, 2, 11.14. 312 MS 3, 2, 3. 313 TS 6, 3, 4, 1. KS 26,5. 314 SB 6,5, 3, 9 asvasakair dhupayati, prajapatyo va asvah prajapatir agnir na va atmatmanam hinasty ahimsayai tad vai saknaiva tad dhi jagdham yatayama tatho ha naivasvam hinasti netaran pasun. 315 MS 3, 1,8 prajapatir amanyata: yo va asya agre vikhanisyaty artim, sa arisyatiti. sa etad yajur apasyad: aditis tva... prthivyah sadhasthe ... khanatv avatetiyam va aditis ... anaya vai sa tad asyam akhanad ahimsayai na hi svah svam hinasti. 120 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II one of the principles of the ritualistic theory of the Brahmanas. The sacrificer, being instrumental - mostly through the agency of his priests - in every ritual act and therefore responsible, must be safeguarded against any conceivable retaliation. One might even speak of a ritual ahimsa-theory. Though ahinsa is not used as a terminus technicus in the Brahmana-texts, the verb hims is the most general expression for 'to injure'. Occasionally ahimsayai is used in more general contexts without any reference to the injury done by the sacrificer in the ritual. In a passage relating to the verses addressed to Pusan in the Agnyupasthana, 'the worship of the fires', which follows the Agnihotra, we read: "Pusan, the Lord of the paths, protect me', (this is equivalent to) this (earth); "Pusan, the lord of cattle, protect me', (this is equivalent to) the intermediate world; Pusan, the overlord, protect me', (this is equivalent to) yonder (world): Thus he approached these worlds, he commits himself to these worlds so as not to be injured.316 I have selected this passage since its wording closely agrees with the formula used by the teacher when he commits the pupil to all the gods and all the beings 'for not being hurt (aristyai, v. above II 6).317 Considering the fact that in a Gshyasutra the student is to avoid injuring trees, it was suggested above that the student, who was to be protected from getting hurt by the beings, had in his turn to avoid hurting the beings. That this is not explicitly stated in the Satapatha-Brahmana, is mere coincidence. It was certainly presupposed since it is a logical consequence of the ritual ahimsatheory: The student who did not yet sacrifice and did not yet know how to eliminate by magical means the evil consequences of injuring animate beings had to practise ahimsa. 316 MS 1, 5, 1 I pusa ma pathipah patv itiyam eva pusa ma pasupah patv ity antariksam eva puka madhipah patu ity asa eveman eva lokan upasarad ebhyo lokebhyo atmanam paridhatte 'himsayai. paridhatte stands for paridatte - a confusion which already occurs in the Rgveda. 317 For aristyai used in similar contexts as ahimsayai cf. SB 13, 4, 15. PB 8,5, 16. 16, 10, 10. 121 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA VI The animistic world-conception of the Vedic ritualists resembles that of the Jainas, and the ahimsa-rules for the Jaina monk apply to the same objects to which the ritual ahimsa-theory is applied. The conclusion suggests itself that the ritual ahimsa-theory is the ultimate source of the later renunciatory ahimsa-[650]doctrine. 318 It is the Vedic ritual which makes us understand the magico-ritualistic background of the ahimsa-movement. But it is still a far cry from the theory of the ritualists who believed in being able to compensate for every injury by magical means to that of the renouncer who did not share this belief. The ahimsa-doctrine of the renouncer is, in fact, a complete reversal of the ritual theory. Since the reform-religions of the Jina and the Buddha cannot have initiated this development, it is necessary to look for other factors which could have brought it about. Since its earliest occurrence the ahimsa-doctrine is connected with the belief in metempsychosis. The conception of transmigration was gradually developed in the time of the Brahmana texts. There we meet with the problem of recurring death (punarmetyu):319 One began to wonder if the life in yonder world was permanent or if it ended with a new death which resulted in a rebirth in this world. First one tried to solve this problem with the usual magical means; by specific sacrifices it was possible to escape punarmstyu. But once doubts were raised they persisted and led to the further question if the effect of ritual acts was permanent and final or if the fruits of these acts could be used up. This idea has certainly contributed to the development of the karman-doctrine which applied the same argument not only to ritual acts, but to every action. The future births 318 This was first hinted at by me in Ztschr. f. vgl. Sprachf. 78, 1963,46 n. 1. - M. BLOOMFIELD, The New World. A Quarterly Review of Religion, Ethics and Theology 1, 1892, 262 (cf. ZDMG 48, 1894,556 n. 3) connected the formula svadhite mainam himsth with the idea of ahimsa. He was, however, biased by the opinion that Buddhist ahimsa was identical with vegetarianism and thus stopped short of the correct solution of the problem. 319 Cf. H. OLDENBERG, Die Lehre der Upanishaden (Gottingen 1915), 28 sqq. With regard to the development of the transmigration doctrine I agree in principle with E. FRAUWALLNER, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie I (Salzburg 1953), 50 sq. 65 sq. It is not possible to go into details here, but it can be maintained that the attempts to derive the idea of metemphychosis from pre-Aryan sources neglect the evidence available in the ritual texts. 122 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II depend on the good and bad actions done in this life. Since the fruits of good deeds are being used up and since even sacrifices, by which one attains a blissfull existence in heaven, are only of temporary effect, the conclusion is finally drawn that solely by renouncing all actions, be they good or bad, release from transmigration is possible. Among the actions which produce the most undesirable consequences, the injury done to living beings, quite naturally, stood first, and ahimsa became one of the foremost duties of the renouncer. In the Dharmasutras the life of a man is divided into four successive stages [651]: those of the student, the householder, the hermit in the forest, and the wandering ascetic or renouncer. It has often been suggested that this asrama-system was an attempt of the orthodox Brahmanas to assimilate and to bring under their control ascetic movements which originated outside their fold and threatened to undermine the social order.320 There are, however, as pointed out by J.C. Heesterman,321 in the Vedic ritual some significant details to be found which can be regarded as precursors of the later vanaprastha and parivrajaka. At the abhijit and visvajit sacrifices the sacrificer gives all his possessions as daksinas, retires with his wife to the forest to live on roots and fruits, then procedes to various people to be entertained as a guest in order to regain what he has spent, and finally returns home. In the sarvamedha the sacrificer spends all he has conquered in daksinas, resumes the sacred fires in himself, goes to the forest and does not return anymore. The brahmacarin corresponds to the diksita whose observances and dress are similar. Thus the three modes outside the world correspond, according to Heesterman, to the stages through which the sacrificer has to pass. The similarity between brahmacarin and sannyasin is, I think, equally significant.322 The student and the renouncer are celibates, live on begged food, carry a staff, recite the Veda,323 do not perform 320 On the asrama-system cf. M. WINTERNITZ, Festgabe H. Jacobi (Bonn 1926), 215-227. F. WEINRICH, Arch. f. Religionswiss. 27, 1929, 77-92. B. LIEBICH, Die vier indischen asramas (Breslau 1936). On asceticism cf. L. SKURZAK, 'Etudes sur l'origine de l'ascetisme indien', Travaux de la Societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Wroclaw. A 15. 1948, who tries to prove the pre-Aryan origin of the wandering ascetics. 321 Wiener Ztschr. f. d. Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens 8, 1964, 24 sqq. 322 The parallelism has been recognized since long ago. Cf. e.g. the survey by S.B. DEO, llistory of Jain Monachism (Poona 1956), 40 sqq. 323 The recitation of the Veda is compulsory for the sannyasin: Ap 2, 9, 21, 10. Baudh 2, 10, 18, 24. Vas 10,4-5. M 6,83. 123 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA sacrifices and practise ahimsa. Probably the vows of the sannyasin were partly modelled after those of the brahmacarin. It is striking that Baudhayana mentions obedience towards the teacher among the duties of the ascetic (v. above II 5 A). Attention must also be drawn to the correspondence between the initiation of the student and the rites with which the ascetic renounces the world: The teacher commits the student to the beings so that they do not hurt him (v. above II 6); the renouncer gives the promise of fearlessness to the beings. Both involve reciprocity. The student is not to hurt the beings, and the renouncer will not experience fear. It was suggested above (V end) that the student had, originally, to avoid injuring beings because he did not yet know how to compensate for injuries. The sannyasin avoids injury for the [652] opposite reason. He does not apply magical means anymore since he knows that their effect is not permanent. Both modes of life are preparatory stages; their main aim is the acquisition of knowledge. The student strives for the knowledge of the Veda, the renouncer for the knowledge of the atman. In the course of development both stages could even coalesce. It is possible to remain a lifelong student in the teacher's house,324 and according to Manu this permanent student will be united with Brahman and will not be reborn, i.e. he attains the same aim as the renouncer. Sannyasa can thus be regarded as a return to brahmacarya. In the Satapatha-Brahmana the brahmacarin's life is equated to a long sacrificial session (sattra).325 The student does not perform sacrifices, but his duties are identified with the ritual acts. The sannyasin is an atmayajin, who sacrifices, while taking his food, in his self, the sacred fires being identified with his vital breaths (v. above II 5 A). The whole ritual is resumed in and absorbed by the individual. This process of individualization and interiorization of the sacrifice is already clearly discernible in the development of the ritual theory itself.326 The meta-ritualism - to use a term coined by L. Renou327 - of the Upanisads works with the same means as the older ritualism, viz. the knowledge of equivalences. While the ritual makes the sacrificer dependent not only on other men, the officiants, but also on other beings, the victim, offerings, etc., and thus liable to retribution, the meta-ritual eliminates all these factors. 324 Ap 2, 9, 21, 6. Vas 7,4-6. Gaut 3,4-9. M 2,242-244. 247,249 325 SB 11, 3, 3, 2. 326 Cf. HEESTERMAN, loc. cit., 14 sqq. 22 sq. 327 RENOU-FILLIOZAT, L'Inde classique I (Paris 1947), S 578. 124 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II The step from external to internal sacrifice certainly preceded the emergence of absolute renunciation. An example for the internal sacrifice is the daily self-study of the Veda (svadhyaya), which is a great sacrificial session (mahasattra) called the sacrifice to the brahman, the totality of Vedic knowledge and as such the universal principle.328 He who attends to the daily self-study of the Veda and knows the equivalences with the ritual acts of the sattra 'is, in truth, freed from recurring death, goes to the union with (lit.: to the state of having the self of) brahman'. 329 By depending solely on himself the sacrificer is able to overcome recurring death. Against the same background must be judged the teaching of Ghora Angirasa in the Chandogya-Upanisad in which the word [653] ahimsa occurs for the first time in the sense of the new doctrine. Ghora equates the whole life of a man to the Soma-sacrifice, and he assigns to pleasures and progeneration their proper place without depreciating them. But he has a kind of moral code: the daksinas, the gifts to the priests, are identified with austerity, giving (alms), uprightness, non-injury and speaking the truth.330 Since also the other identifications are based on similarities, there is no reason to suppose that this particular one is arbitrary. The similarity between giving alms and daksina is obvious. But what have the other virtues in common with the gift? I think that Ghora interpreted them as varieties of self-denial. By austerity one becomes emasciated, gives of one's own substance; thus the offerings of the diksita who is practising tapas consist in that which is growing less of his body.331 Speaking the truth is not a matter of course: one speaks lies in anger, in drunkenness, and even while dreaming 332 Therefore the Vedic sacrificer has to enter on the vow of truth since men speak untruth, the gods truth, and in the sacrifice a man goes from the world of men to the world of the gods.333 Continuously speaking the truth is thus a severe kind of self-restraint. Ahimsa is not the rule in daily life either; by practising it one saves the life of creatures and denies oneself the natural tendency to live on the other beings. According to the ritual ahimsa-theory the creature injured or killed is healed 328 SB 11, 5, 6, 3-9. (cf. 7,3-9). 329 SB 11, 5, 6, 9 ati ha vai mucyate gacchati brahmanah satmatam. 330 ChU 3, 17, 4 atha yat tapo danam arjavam ahimsa satyavacanam iti ta asya daksinah. 331 MS 3, 6, 6. 332 Cf. RV 7, 86, 6. 333 Cf. SB 1,1,1. 125 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA and restored to life by magical means. By interiorizing the sacrifice in order to become independent from the other beings such external acts are excluded, and this leads to the logical conclusion that injury to living beings had to be avoided altogether. It is not possible to determine the exact place of Ghora's teaching in the development of Upanisadic thought. From his words it seems to appear that he did not yet know the karman-doctrine and the atman-theory. He seems to have believed in the rebirth of the father in the son,334 and at the same time in a personal release after death which was the result of the dying man's last wish.335 [654] Ghora imagined the state of release to be in the realm of the light of the primeval seed (pratnasya retaso jyotis) which is kindled beyond the sky and the sun; the primeval seed is truth.336 We do not know if he believed in the survival of the individual soul in after-life or its complete mergence in the light of truth. If the first is the case, he would approximately belong to the period which preceded that of the precursors of the Jina who taught that the released souls rise to the summit of the cosmos and stay there for ever. Ghora did not yet teach complete renunciation as Yajnavalkya did whose doctrine has become the basis of the renunciatory ideology prevalent among the Brahmanas (v. above III). The austerities Ghora 334 ChU3, 17,5... sosyaty asosteti punarutpadanam evasya'"He will press Soma (= his wife will bear); he has pressed Soma (= his wife has born)" - that is his rebirth.' I am, however, not certain if this is the correct interpretation. - J. NARTEN, Die sigmatischen Aoriste im Veda (Wiesbaden, 1964), 268, doubts the ambiguous use of sosyaty asosta. - Senart, Ganganath Jha and Swami Swahananda translate his mother has born' (WB). 335 ChU 3, 17, 6 ... apipasa eva sa babhuva so'ntavelayam etat trayam pratipadyetaksitam asi acyutam asi pranasansitam asiti 'A man has become really without thirst (desire); he shall, in the hour of death, take refuge to this triad: "You are imperishable, you are immovable, you are the peak of breath (=life)."'On the decisive importance of the last wish for a man's future fate, a notion which was combined with the karman-doctrine by the Buddhists, cf. F. EDGERTON, Ann. Bhandarkar Or. Inst. 8, 1927, 219-249. 336 Ghora's idea is derived from RV 8,6,30 and 1,50, 10 (both originally referring to the rising of the sun) which are quoted in the Upanisad. For pratnasya retas = sta cf. H. LUDERS, Varuna (Gottingen 1951-59), 620 sq., whose decisive argument is the verse BAU 5, 15, 1 = Isop 15 hiranmayena patrena satyasyapihitam mukham The face of truth is covered by a golden bowl (=the sun).' This verse, too, occurs in the context of a dying man's prayer. 337 Cf. e.g. the legend of Agastya and Lopamudra (RV 1, 179) and the frog hymn (7, 103). 126 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX II practised were probably of a temporary nature, just as the austerities already practised by the Vedic poets in order to attain higher knowledge.337 At the close of his life he became without thirst (apipasa: v. p. 653, n. 6), i.e. had renounced all desires and, in the hour of death, took refuge to the truth he had recognized in order not to be reborn. It would seem that his attitude agreed, in essence, with that of the later asrama-system in which renunciation is the last stage of life. There is, however, one difference: Ghora regarded the whole life as an internal sacrifice, did apparently not perform real sacrifices, while the later doctrine restricted the internal sacrifice to the sannyasin. The conclusion that only absolute renunciation can lead to final release from transmigration was presumably drawn soon afterwards. In theory this conclusion was generally accepted, and renunciation became the ideal mode of life for the Brahmana. In practice many compromises were made. For a long time the old ritual held its position; it was considered to be of limited and relative effect only, but it had its merits for the man who was not yet prepared to recognize the ultimate truth. Ahimsa was one of the most prominent values established by the meta-ritualists, and (655) it was adopted as a general rule of conduct for the Brahmana. Avoiding during the whole life all the faults which hurt living beings is the best means to attain the union with the universal Self, as Apastamba teaches (v. above II 7). These faults and the virtues opposed to them are moral qualities which predominantly refer to social intercourse, and one can perhaps see here the transition of the idea of ahimsa (Apastamba does not use the term), which was mainly concerned with bodily injury, to that of a general fellow feeling for all living beings as it is often understood in modern India. This also appears from Gautama's putting daya 'compassion' at the head of the eight qualities of the soul (v. above II 4B).338 The primitive idea of the inverted world (IV), where one suffers the same fate one has caused to other beings, and the transmigration doctrine, both of which Manu adduces in order to justify the injunction of ahimsa, will however have contributed more to the spread of 'non-violence' than any ethical motive. The ethical motivation is secondary, the original motive was fear, a fear that resulted from the breakdown of the magico-ritualistic world-conception, but paved the way for establishing higher values. Tubingen. 338 Cf. also Baudh 2, 10, 18, 10 (above p. 637, n. 8). 127 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Appendix III AHIMSA AND REBIRTH Hanns-Peter Schmidt [207] Ahimsa 'non-violence', or, more literally, 'non-injury', and the doctrine of metempsychosis are two ideas common to the three Indian religions, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. It is reasonable to assume that these ideas go back to a common source. Whether ahimsa and metempsychosis depend on each other, are causally related, is an important problem. In an article published in 1968 I have attempted to answer the question of the origin of ahimsa and its connection with metempsychosis on the basis of the earliest literary evidence. The relation of ahimsa to vegetarianism, which is considered its most important expression, was not investigated by me at that time. I only offered the suggestion that vegetarianism may be a popularized form of ahimsa. Originally strict ahimsa was probably restricted to the ascetic since it encompasses the abstention from injuring any living creature, be it animal or plant, and with the Jainas even of the elements water, fire and air. In a way my suggestion is corroborated by the view of the Jainas according to which there are two kinds of ahinsa, viz., the gross (sthula) and the subtle (suksma) one. Sthulaahinsa is that of the layman who must refrain from injuring beings with two to five sense-organs, suksma-ahimsa that of the monk who must avoid injuring any being (cf. Williams 54.64ff. Tahtinen 113). Also in Buddhism injuring lower beings is a lesser sin than injuring higher beings (Tahtinen 113. McDermott 272). In Hindu sources this is not explicitly stated, at least not in connection with the rule of ahimsa. But Manu 11.109ff. offers a hierarchy of beings which implicitly says the same thing. It comes out most clearly in 141ff.: the killing of small animals with bones requires more severe penance than that of animals without bones; these are followed by the cutting of fruit-trees, etc., living creatures in food, spices, fruits and flowers. 128 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III A few words about the meaning and derivation of the word himsa are called for since there is still some difference of opinions. In the last century the word was generally explained as an abstract noun derived from the verb himsati which was analyzed as a truncated desiderative of han 'to strike, slay, kill'. This interpretation is still upheld by some scholars (e.g. Biardeau, Malamoud, Dumont, Zimmermann, Schreiner). It is even assumed that the desiderative meaning is still present in the abstract himsa as 'wish to kill or hurt'. This attempt at literal precision is however ill-advised: the verb himsati does not show desiderative meaning anywhere. The grammarians who proposed the derivation had to assume that the verb had already lost the desiderative force. The derivation from the [208] desiderative of han was first rejected by Wackernagel nearly a hundred years ago and definitively demolished by Liiders (775ff.). The main objection against deriving hims from han is the fact that the loss of the root syllable is simply inexplicable. Other truncated desideratives do not offer any analogy: They are all due to the loss of the initial of the zero-grade root due to reduction of an unpronouncable consonant cluster (dipsati < dabh, siksati < sak, siksati < sah, lipsati < labh, ripsati < rabh, pitsati < pad, dhiksati < dah). A zerograde desiderative from han could only have resulted in *jighasati; moreover, we have already in the Rgveda the vrddhi desiderative of jighamsati. Bartholomae believed that a perfect analogy was found in Avestan jihat (Nyayisn 1.1) which he explained as a desiderative of gam, but this should rather have been *jijahat, *jijayhat; it is therefore preferable to adopt the variant reading jahat which is regular sigmatic aorist (Kellens 398 n. 2). Wackernagel and Luders derive himsati from a root his 'to injure'. Although the present stem-form himsa occurs earlier than the expected older form hinas, it is the latter which is almost exclusively used in the rest of Vedic literature. The objection - still raised by some linguists - that from a root his one should expect *hinasti and *himsanti (cf. pinasti, pimsanti), has plausibly been countered by Luders: in the case of hinasti, the assimilation has worked in the opposite direction. The shift of accent in the RV form himsanti has parallels in invanti, jinvanti, and pinvanti, from which secondary present stems were formed just as from himsanti. In the following I am giving a shortened version of my earlier paper with some changes and additions (in particular III); in VI-VIII I discuss some of the work published on the subject since 1968 and advance some arguments which may support my original thesis. 129 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA I In order to find out how and in which context the uncompromising absolute value of ahimsa emerged, I adopted the same method Alsdorf (17ff.) had applied in separating the three historical layers to be distinguished in Manu's rules on meat-eating. In the first stage there is no prohibition, in the second, prohibition in daily life but obligation in the ritual, and in the third, absolute prohibition and advocacy of pure vegetarianism. Regarding ahimsa we come to the following result: 1. The rule that ahimsa belongs to the duties of all four classes (M 10.63) is not known to sources older than Kautalya (1.3.13); on Vasistha 4.4 cf. Alsdorf 29. 2. Vegetarianism as expression of ahinsa (M 5.45-56). This may be less a rejection of the Vedic animal sacrifice than rather the recommendation of sannyasin-like conduct. In the older sources there is no mention of consistent vegetarianism. 3. Vegetarianism with the exception of sacrificial animals (M 5.31-44). Killing in sacrifice was considered as non-killing since the creator has created the animals for sacrifice and the sacrifice serves the whole world (39). Himsa in ritual is considered to be ahimsa (44). Plants and animals (209] killed in sacrifice attain higher existences (40). The older legal texts do not mention the restriction of meateating to the sacrifice (on Vas 4.6 cf. Alsdorf 23f.). But in the last section of the Chandogya-Upanisad (8.15) - which is probably a very late addition - we read: He who has returned from the house of his teacher, established himself in his own household, raised lawabiding students, concentrated his senses on the self (atman), did not injure any living being except on ritual occasions, enters the world of brahman and is not reborn. This passage appears to be a polemic against the doctrine according to which rebirth can only be overcome by the renouncer who has given up the material sacrifice which yields only transitory fruits. Since repeatedly meat-eating in the ritual is opposed to the illegal or random meat-eating (cf. M 5.33; 36; 38), the question arises whether in ancient India animals were slaughtered for food without consecration. According to the interpretation of Keith and Heesterman (1962: 19) the different ways of tying the animal to the sacrificial pole (TS 6.3.6.3) reflect the difference of sacral and profane 130 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III killing. I do not think that this is cogent since it is also possible to assume a difference between grhya- and srauta-ritual. Misgivings regarding the assumption that random killing was common arise also from the fact that in hunting the idea of sacrifice is involved. In Mbh 1.109.13 the Rsi Agastya, who is on a hunt in connection with a great sacrificial session (sattra), sprinkles the wild animals and dedicates them to the gods. In Mbh 3.37.41 the Pandavas go hunting with pure arrows and sacrifice to the fathers, gods and brahmins; in 3.79.8 they kill many kinds of wild animals for the sake of the brahmins. The opinion of Zimmermann (180ff.) that on the whole meat was consecrated seems to be justified. It could of course be objected that in a Buddhist Jataka (no. 199; cf. Alsdorf 61) and in Kautalya's Arthasastra (2.26) the slaughter of animals is mentioned without any reference to consecration. Furthermore, also Asoka, in the first rock edict, does not say anything about the consecration of the animals slaughtered for the imperial kitchen. He even explicitly prohibits the sacrifice of animals in the residence. Since, however, the three animals (two peacocks and one antelope), which were still slaughtered at the time of the edict, were probably connected with a dynastic cult (cf. Schmidt 1980: 48), a consecration of some kind probably took place. After all, it would be surprising if in India unceremonial slaughter had been widespread while it was taboo in related cultures. In classical Greece meat sold on the market had to come from animals sacrificed to a deity (Detienne-Vernant 11. Barthiaume 65). The Zoroastrians have similar rules. He who eats unconsecrated meat will be delivered to the demons (Pahlavi Texts p. 126 32-33); the hairs of an unlawfully slaughtered animal become tips of arrows killing the slaughterer (Sayast-ne-sayast 10.8); if the head of the animal is not consecrated, the god Hom will not allow the soul to pass the bridge of the judge to paradise (Persian Rivayats of Hormazyar Framarz, trsl. Dhabhar, 264). Boyce (150) mentions that certain religious rites were prescribed at the killing even of wild animals without, however, giving the source of this rule. [210] I think it is improbable that we can deduce a general toleration of random slaughter from the lack of reference to the consecration of the victim in certain Indian sources. Unlawful slaughter will certainly have occurred, but the reaction will have been similar to what we know from the African Nuer: bad conscience and shame (Evans-Pritchard 263f.). 4. For the brahmin there are many rules which depend on ahimsa. Thus he is to earn his living only in professions which do not or do 131 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA only little himsa (M 4.2). The brahmin and the warrior should avoid agriculture because by ploughing one injures living beings and is made dependent on others (M 10.83-84). In older times agriculture was not prohibited to the brahmin (cf. M 10.82), but Gautama 10.5 gives a restriction: agriculture and trade are allowed only if the brahmin does not do the work himself. He is also prohibited from selling animals for slaughter (Gaut 7.13), which may include sacrificial animals. Ahimsa is one of the means to attain heaven (M 4.246), eternal bliss (M 12.83). The best means, however, is to give up the sacrifices prescribed in the karmakanda of the Veda, since they lead to rebirth, and to follow the spiritual practices of the jnanakanda which lead to knowledge of the atman and union with it and thus overcome rebirth (M 12.85-93; 118; 125). This agrees in essence with renunciation considered as the ideal conduct for the brahmin. 5. The renouncer (sannyasin) or wandering ascetic (pravrajaka, parivrajaka) is subjected to the strictest rules of ahimsa. Upon entering this stage of life one performs a sacrifice whose daksinas are one's whole possessions, and one reposits the sacred fires in oneself. One gives the promise of fearlessness (abhaya) to all beings which guarantees one's own fearlessness (M 6.38-40). Here abhaya is a quasi-synonym of ahimsa. The sannyasin prepares himself for immortality by ahimsa (M 6.60; cf. 75). His aim is union with the highest self (paramatman) which is present in all beings (M 6.65). Ahimsa as a vow of the renouncer occurs in Baudh (2.10.18.2). The ascetic is to avoid injuring beings by word, thought and deed (2.6.11.23). The consecration culminates in the giving of abhaya to all beings (2.10.17.29-30). The renouncer should subsist only on food offered voluntarily and spontaneously, an idea attested already in Isopanisad 1, probably the oldest metrical Upanisad. Rules similar to those for the sannyasin apply to the vanaprastha, the hermit in the forest. He should live on flowers, roots and fruits which are ripe and fallen spontaneously (M 6.21) and show compassion towards all beings (M 6.8). Some hermits live on the meat of animals killed by beasts of prey (Baudh 3.3.6;2.6.11.15; Gaut 3.31). The hermit shall enter water slowly and bathe without beating it (Ap 2.9.22.13). This reminds one of the rule for the Jaina monk, who is not to beat water either. 6. The brahmacarin, the Veda student has to avoid honey, meat, perfumes, garlands, spices, women, everything turned sour and injury to living beings (M 2.177). In an earlier text he has to abstain from gambling, low service, taking something not offered to him and 132 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III injury (Gaut 2.17; cf. M 2.179). Ahimsa is also presupposed in a domestic sutra where the student is to fetch fire-wood without injuring trees (PGS 2.5.9). The student's vow (211) of ahimsa may be implied by the initiation ceremony where the teacher commits the pupil to all the gods and all the beings so that he may not be hurt (PGS 2.2.21). The same formula occurs already in SB 11.5.4.3-4. It seems obvious that the student in his turn had to avoid hurting beings. 7. Ahinsa is one of the means to remove sins, one of the austerities or penances (tapas) to be performed by the penitent (M 11.223). Baudhayana knows this rule, too (3.10.13; cf. 1.5.8.2 which recurs in the chapter on ascetic householders 3.2.27). This actually agrees closely with the vows of the renouncer. Following some of the renouncer's vows for a limited time was obviously considered a means to free oneself from minor sins. Entering the order of sannyasa is the means to remove all sins (M 6.85; 96). Apastamba inserts before the chapter on penances a passage on the knowledge of the atman (1.8.22-23), implying that ahimsa is one of the preconditions for attaining final peace in the universal atman. The description of the atman is similar to that in the Isopanisad (cf. especially Isop 7 with Ap 1.8.23.1). Apastamba refers to this section in the context of the duties of the snataka (1.11.31.25; cf. 2.2.5.13). In general the attainment of the atman is considered a prerogative of the sannyasin (cf. Ap 2.9.21.13ff.), but it is the aim of every brahmin whose whole conduct is guided by sannyasic ideals. III Forerunners of vegetarianism have been assumed in certain substitutions mentioned in the Brahmanas. 1. In the new-and full-moon sacrifice a cake made of barley and rice is identified with the animal victim. The reason given is that when the five standard victims - man, horse, cow, sheep, goat - were offered, the sacrificial sap (medha) left them and entered the next in line while the victims themselves became different animals: kimpurusa (mostly interpreted as monkey, but cf. now Parpola apud Staal II 62ff. who identifies him as an aboriginal who, like the other animals unfit for sacrifice, belongs to the wilderness), bos gaurus, gayal, camel and sarabha (four-horned gazelle). When the sap leaves the goat, the last in line, it enters barley and rice which, since they contain the sap of all the victims, equal them, and their offering 133 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA accordingly equals an animal sacrifice (AB 2.8-9. SB 1.2.3.6-9. MS 3.10.2). The Vadhula-Sutra (IV 19a, cf. Heesterman 1985: 62) explicitly connects this with the creation of agriculture. It is of course tempting to see here at least the beginning of an abolition of animal sacrifices, and this conclusion was drawn by Max Muller (cf. Eggeling's note on SB: Levi 136ff.). In my opinion it is, however, more than doubtful that the general replacement of animal sacrifice by vegetal sacrifice was intended. The fact that the kimpurusa, etc. are declared unfit for sacrifice and therefore also inedible implies that the original victims remained edible in principle, fit for sacrifice. Also the use of the cake in the real animal sacrifice militates against the vegetarian interpretation; the cake here serves to put the sacrificial sap into the animals (SB 3.8.3.1-2. KB 10.5. AB 2.8-9. MS 3.10.2). I should [212] infer from the story only an upgrading of the vegetal sacrifice, caused probably by economic changes. The farmer will have kept only a few cattle, mainly as draught animals and milk-producers. When the solemn sacrifice was no longer the privilege of the rich magnates, and also the less affluent brahmin wanted to make his contribution and obtain the merit of the sacrifice, an upgrading of the more modest sacrifices had to follow. The Vadhula version, in which two fishes bring the agricultural implements and warn the gods not to sacrifice before rice and barley have multiplied, gives an ecological argument. Ecological concern is also attested in Mbh 3.244 where the Pandavas move from a forest whose herds have been reduced by hunting to another one where there is plentiful game. Economic and ecological considerations may later have favoured vegetarianism, but were hardly its ultimate cause. 2. Vadhula IV 74 teaches the equivalence of the soma with barley and rice and of the agnistoma with the brahmaudana; at the end Vadhula says that he prefers twelve rice-mess bowls to the somasacrifice and the daksinas. It is difficult to guess Vadhula's motives, but possibly he advocates a more modest sacrifice. 3. Vadhula IV 108 (cf. Witzel 391f.) reports that formerly one offered a human victim at the agnicayana; it was successively substituted by a horse and a hornless goat. The original five victims - man, horse, bull, ram, goat - whose heads had to be built into the fire-altar were released and substituted by effigies made of rice and barley (or in case of a long diksa of clay or gravel: Vadhula III 59). Since the human head is talked about at length in III 59, one wonders where it comes from. Actually, the systematizers of the ritual were in a dilemma as the many contradictory versions in the other texts show, on which we have the illuminating exposition of Heesterman 134 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III (1985: 51f. with n. 41 and 42). The use of the head had been outlawed because it was asuric practice (SB 3.8.3.28-29), and the original beheading of the victim was replaced by strangulation. For whatever reason, the heads for the altar were not eliminated, but it became difficult to produce them. Originally they probably came from outside the sacrifice proper. According to BaudhsS 10.9 the human head and that of the horse were to be taken from battle victims. Heesterman persuasively argues that the heads of the bull, the ram and the goat came from the dicing and banquet revelry mentioned immediately following. The variants are then attempts to fit the killings of the victims into the standardized form of the animal sacrifice, by necessity resulting in equations which always leave a remainder. Heesterman suggests that the freeing of the animals in Vadhula IV 108 means being let out of the sacrificial context and beheaded. If this is correct, the substitutes are only a face-saving device to keep the decapitation out of the reformed ritual (in Vadhula III 59 the effigies are set free, according to Caland thrown away, not offered). Then the Vadhula passage cannot be considered as evidence for the progress on the way to ahimsa as Witzel seems to think. However, the evidence about the agnicayana heads, contradictory as it is, can be considered 'humanization' of the sacrifice inasmuch as it rejects human sacrifice. 4. In the ritual of the purchase of soma the somakrayini cow was, as Heesterman (1989: 352ff.) argues, originally the victim for the guest (213) reception of King Soma and, as can be concluded from the identification with the goddess Vac and Ida, Manu's wife who was sacrificed, substitute for the sacrificer's wife. In BaudhsS (6.17 end) the offering of the madhuparka and the cow are mentioned, followed by the words tam adhvaryur visasti 'the adhvaryu gives the various directions concerning her (the cow)', which could however also mean 'the adhvaryu cuts her up'. In 21.13 we read that according to Bodhayana there should be a cake and a cow, according to Saliki only a cake. Since no further details about the treatment of the cow are given, we do not know for certain whether Bodhayana still practised the sacrifice of the cow. Heesterman thinks that the mysterious associations of the somakrayini were too horrible to be acted out ritually. There may be another reason for the release of the cow. In the myth told in the gonamika (MS 4.2.3; cf. Heesterman 355) it is the female of the opposing party whose head is to be cut off. I should therefore consider it possible that the somakrayini was let go because she was the sacrificer's own, and the cow sacrifice had to be dropped because 135 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA the rival's cow had been eliminated together with the rival himself. In APSS 10.27.5 the somakrayini is ransomed by another cow and sent to the sacrificer's cow-pen. Apparently the soma-seller is to keep the substitute cow. Whether here a trace of the original two cows set against each other is preserved remains doubtful since the older sources are silent. At any rate, the atithyesti, a vegetal substitute for an original animal sacrifice, cannot be counted as evidence for the progress of vegetarianism since the motives are specific and unrelated to the reluctance to kill animals. The animal offering is, after all, made up for by the agnisomiya pasu the next day. 5. The anztapasu untrue, false animals in the Varunapraghasa of the caturmasyas consist of effigies of a ram and a ewe made of barley and are offered respectively to Varuna and the Maruts (MS 1.10.12. KS 36.6). The myth connected with the offerings relates that the creatures treated Prajapati with contempt and left him after he had created them. Prajapati became Varuna and seized them (TB 1.6.4.1; cf. MS 1.10.10. KS 36.5); it is also said that the creatures or Prajapati's sacrifice were attacked by the Maruts (TB 1.6.4.2; cf. MS 1.10.6;10. KS 36.5). While the contempt and the infidelity of the creatures can be considered as ansta 'untruth', this does not give a satisfactory reason for the anstapasu even if we interpret the word as animals (destined to atone) for untruth' since the substitution by effigies made of barley would remain unexplained. A concrete reason for the barley is given in the White Yajurveda: Varuna is winter, and barley, the winter corn, belongs to him; the creatures ate the barley and were therefore seized by Varuna (SB 2.5.2.15-16). Thus it becomes clear why the offerings consist of barley - the stolen goods are returned. However, also here the question why the offerings are animal effigies remains unanswered. One is reminded of the Greek Bovcovia where a bull eats the grain sacrifice on the altar and is consequently slaughtered (Burkert 137f.). It cannot be excluded that in the Varunapraghasa an original animal sacrifice was replaced by the effigies because of some reinterpretation. The offerings for Varuna and the Maruts, the ram and the ewe, represent the relationship between king and people (vis), and the pairing (mithuna) is their reconciliation [214]. For further aspects of this episode I refer to the remarks of Heesterman (1985: 135ff.). In general the caturmasyas do not contain animal sacrifices, but occasionally they are combined with them (cf. Bhide 172ff.), which shows that no vegetarian reform was connected with the anstapasu. 6. The animals made of flour in the caitra-sacrifice (SGS 4.19) are supposed to be birds (cakravakas, etc.) according to the native 136 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III commentary. Something similar is mentioned at the Phalgunikarman (MGS 2.10.1ff. KGS 70). Motives for the substitution cannot be ascertained, and it would be rash to assume a vegetarian tendency. Figures made of flour (pista) and other material as substitutes for animal victims occur in the Veda only in very specific cases, which can hardly be considered to be at the root of an incipient vegetarian movement. To judge from the known evidence, vegetal substitutes for animals became current only rather late when a vegetarian movement unrelated to the old ritual had emerged. IV At the time of the Brahmana-texts it was believed that the animal whose meat one eats will eat the eater in the other world (KB 11.3); the same idea is even applied to every kind of food (SB 12.9.1.1). In order to escape this fate ritual, magical means are applied which usually consist of equivalences or analogies between object and means. The most impressive example is found in the Bhrgu legend (SB 11.6.1. JB 1.42-44); here it is assumed that one can escape from being cut up by trees, eaten by animals and plants by correctly performing the daily agnihotra. The means for forestalling are called expiation (prayascitta or niskrti); accordingly the killing and destroying of creatures by which man lives was considered a sin. Every injury occurring in the ritual must be eliminated or nullified. A very general solution was the assumption that something of the offering, animal or vegetal, that has become 'semen' is poured into the fire, the 'womb' of the sacrifice, so that the sacrifice is reborn from this fire (SB 11.1.2.1-2). The sacrifice is full of rites meant to eliminate death and injury, viz., the appeasement rites (santi). In this context we also meet for the first time the word ahimsa: this or that action is performed so that there may be no injury (ahinsayai). By putting a dry blade of grass between the axe and the tree one averts the injury from the living tree to the dead blade (MS 3.9.3). Not enough, the falling tree may injure the worlds and must therefore be appeased (M 3.9.3). When the animal has been suffocated, the body orifices are sprinkled with water while an ahimsa formula is recited; thereby the vital breaths of the victim are freed from burning pain (MS 3.10.1). The rest of the water is poured on the earth which would be injured if the waters were not appeased before (MS 3.10.1). Of the pain arising during the killing it is also said that it concentrates in the heart and passes from there into the spit for roasting the heart; 137 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA the spit is not thrown on the ground or into the water, but buried in wet ground with ahimsa formulas. In this way one is [215] delivered from Varuna who is here the guardian over the sin of killing (SB 3.8.5.8-10). Similar feelings are today still expressed by those who sacrifice goats to Durga (E. Dimock apud O'Flaherty 176): One does not usually eat meat because the animal does not want to be killed; it struggles and becomes angry, and so its body becomes full of tempestuous poisons that infect the meat so that it poisons anyone who eats it. But one can eat the meat of a goat sacrificed to Durga, for the priest pacifies the goat until it is willing to die; and so its meat has none of the poison of hate. This modern example can also be considered a good illustration of the motivation for the use of the root sam 'to appease' as a euphemism for 'to kill. Frequently we hear that the sacrifices and creatures in general shall not be injured (e.g. TS 5.2.8.7; SB 2.5.1.14). Particular rites are meant to save the sacrificer's cattle from injury (KapKS 31.1: this passage does not refer to ahimsa in the later sense, viz., the prohibition of killing animals, as Tahtinen 3 thinks). In the agnyupasthana the sacrificer commits himself to the three worlds in order not to be injured (MS 1.5.11). This is probably the most general form of precautionary measures to protect oneself in all circumstances. The passage is of special interest since also the teacher commits the student to all beings so that he is not harmed (SB 11.5.4.3-4). The student is in need of this protection, especially since he cannot yet prevent possible consequences by ritual means. In the constant reference to prevention of and atonement for death and destruction a principle is recognizable which runs through the whole ritual: the sacrifice with all the destruction it involves is meant to create an intact world. Everything hurt, everything killed is either reborn or healed or sent to the gods alive. The idea that the eater is eaten by the eaten in the other world presupposes that he suffers a second death in the beyond. The texts do not tell us whether one visualized this as an eternal cycle or as a single process. It is not clear either where the person killed in the 138 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III CD other world goes. The closest idea we find in the sources is that of recurrent death (punarmstyu) which occurs rather late in the Brahmana period and soon disappears again since it is replaced by the doctrine of reincarnation whose precursor it can be understood to be (for a detailed discussion cf. Horsch 1971: 136ff.). Also in this context the sources usually do not tell us whereto the recurrent death leads, whether to a new birth on earth or in yonder world. Probably it is the latter since in one instance (SE .3.8) it is said that he who enters yonder world without having freed himself from death, dies again and again in yonder world. Only in the latest text which mentions punarmetyu is it equated with punarajati, rebirth (GB 1.1.15; 1.3.22). All instances have in common that recurrent death should be struck off, destroyed by ritual acts, especially by the knowledge of such acts. In the end the ritual is pushed aside altogether. Recurrent death is averted when one knows that death is the self (BAU 1.2.7), the sacrifices are meant for the self [216] (BAU 1.5.2), when one knows the water that extinguishes the fire of death (BAU 3.2.20), or the secret of the wind (BAU 3.3.2). At the same time we find the idea that the fruits of the sacrificial work are transitory, are consumed in yonder world. Their destruction can be prevented by faith (sraddha: JB 2.53-54). He who goes into the wilderness and worships with the words 'faith is our asceticism' reaches the brahman, the highest principle and fundament of the world, on the path of the gods. But he who worships in the village with the words 'sacrifice and donations are our gift' reaches, on the path of the fathers, the moon, King Soma, who is the food of the gods; he remains there up to the dregs, i.e. the new moon, and then returns on the same way to earth, is reborn as a plant, an existence he can escape only if he is eaten by somebody and is reborn from that person's semen, according to his conduct as a brahmin, ksatriya or vaisya, or even as a dog, a pig or a candala. The worst sinners go to a third place and become minute beings of whom it is said 'be born and die', and who return incessantly, with no chance of salvation (ChU5.3-10. BAU 6.2). [Similar ideas are attested in Borneo (Hertz 60f.)]. This passage is of special interest since it combines several ideas which are of importance in our context. It contrasts the ascetic in the wilderness with the sacrificer in the village; only the former attains salvation, the latter faces a doubtful future which does not depend only on his sacrificial work, but also on his conduct and even on chance. Thus salvation from transmigration is possible only for him who renounces the world. 139 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA The karman-theory is also implied here. It was first suggested (BAU 3.2.13) and then further developed by Yajnavalkya. In the discussion with King Janaka he says that the atman is the ruler of the universe who does not increase by the good (sadhu) and does not decrease by the non-good (asadhu); he who knows this is not affected by good or bad work (BAU 4.4.22-23). The following shows that Yajnavalkya considers the striving for the atman as the highest goal for the brahmin. The wandering ascetics (pravrajaka) go to the atman as their own world. The ancient wise men knew this and did not desire progeny, nor property, nor the world. At the end of the passage we meet the term abhaya 'fearlessness', known from the consecration of the sannyasin. According to Yajnavalkya the brahman is abhaya, the state of salvation in which one need not fear any longer (cf. BAU 4.2.4). In BAU 1.4.2 we hear that fear is there where there is a second. This statement is probably to be ascribed to Yajnavalkya who thereby gives a clear formulation of his brahman-atman monism. When Yajnavalkya decided to become a wandering ascetic himself, he wanted to divide his possessions between his two wives. Maitreyi, who was a brahmavadini, a woman learned in the Veda, asked whether the whole world with all its riches would make her immortal. When Yajnavalkya denied this, she asked him to tell her all he knew, and he taught her his atman-theory (BAU 4.5). At the end of his life Yajnavalkya goes into the wilderness. Here we can recognize a first step towards the later doctrine of the four stages of life [217] (asrama), pravrajya later being the fourth and last stage. Since he mentions indifference to progeny as characteristic for the pravrajaka, he probably considered renunciation permissible at every period of life, although he himself took this step only in old age. From the reference to earlier wise men we can conclude that there were already outsiders who had withdrawn from the world. Although we do not know what their ideas were, it is probable that they were among those thinkers who sought to overcome recurrent death by knowledge. Yajnavalkya's thoughts move already on a higher level of philosophical abstraction. The devaluation of the traditional ritual started already earlier as we have seen in the context of the doctrine of recurrent death. More examples for this are found among those passages which imply the interiorization of the ritual. Without questioning the authority of the Veda, the ritual is interiorized by substituting the practical performance by pure knowledge. For 140 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III instance, he who applies himself to the private recitation of the Veda (svadhyaya), performs a great sacrificial session (mahasattra), the sacrifice for the brahman, the totality of Vedic knowledge and as such the universal principle; he is freed from recurrent death, becomes of the same self as the brahman if he knows the equivalences of the ritual acts of the sattra (SB 11.5.6.3-9). The life of the brahmacarin is also identified with a long sacrificial session; the brahmacarin does not sacrifice, but his duties are identified with the ritual acts (SB 11.3.3.2). The renouncer is an atmayajin who, when he eats, sacrifices in himself, and the sacred fires are identified with the vital breaths (Baudh 2.10.18.8-9). The teacher commits his pupil to all beings in order to protect him from harm ($B 11.5.4.3-4); in turn the pupil has to abstain from harming the beings (cf. above II 6). The sannyasin gives the beings the promise of fearlessness, and thus has nothing to fear from the beings. In the same sense of the interiorization of the ritual we must understand the source in which the term ahimsa occurs for the first time in the sense of the new doctrine (ChU 3.17.4-6). Ghora Angirasa equates the whole life with a soma-sacrifice. He assigns to pleasures and progeneration their proper place without depreciating them. He identifies the daksinas with asceticism, alms-giving, uprightness, non-injury and speaking the truth. The common denominator of these virtues is self-denial. By asceticism one gives of one's own substance; thus the offerings of the diksita are what is growing less of his body (MS 3.6.6). By alms-giving one gives of one's property. Uprightness and speaking the truth are not matters of course either. To cheat and lie, be it consciously or unconsciously, belongs to everyday life; one lies in anger, in drunkenness and while dreaming (RV 7.86.6). Therefore man, who (by nature) speaks untruth, has to take the vow of truth in the ritual since he thereby enters the world of the gods, who (by nature) speak the truth (SB 1.1.1). Non-injury is not the rule in daily life either; by practising it one denies oneself the natural tendency to live on other beings. Apparently Ghora did not perform real sacrifices. In the end he (actually: Ghora's addressee, Krsna Devakiputra; WB) became without thirst and wished for release by entering the realm of the light of the primeval seed, truth, which lies beyond the sky and the sun. It [218] is not clear whether complete mergence in the light of truth or the survival of the individual soul is meant. On the whole it seems that Ghora's attitude agrees with the last stage of life inasmuch as he renounces all desires. By conducting his life as an 141 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA interiorized sacrifice he actually anticipates the way of the later householder who follows the sannyasic ideal according to the possibilities of worldly life. Later doctrine, however, restricted the internal sacrifice to the sannyasin, a doctrine which did of course not go unchallenged. The idea that only renunciation and withdrawal from the world can lead to salvation from transmigration was already conceived by Yajnavalkya or the munis he refers to as his predecessors. Although he does not mention ahimsa, it can be inferred that it went as a matter of course with his identification of the brahman-atman with abhaya 'fearlessness' which is also the gift or promise the sannyasin gives to the creatures when undergoing his dikna. Every karman, every deed produces a fruit, a result, which must be consumed. The good ritual work which was once believed to lead to heaven and immortality was now viewed to be transitory. Once the merit had been used up, a rebirth in this world resulted which was more and more considered to be undesirable because it was unpleasant, full of pain and grief. The generalization of the ritual karman-doctrine to one which included all deeds of man intensified the pressure and thus the desire to evade one's fate. If the sacrifice could secure only a temporary stay in heaven, it was devalued, became meaningless for the truly knowing one, and with it also the magical means by which one had believed it possible to annul death and injury. Ahimsa became by necessity one of the main demands of the thinkers who transcended the ritual. Once one has lost confidence in the magical manipulations, the fear of the revenge of the victim which is repeatedly adduced as a reason for ahimsa comes to the fore again (cf. M 5.55). Especially for the brahmins ahimsa became a general rule. To avoid during the whole life all those mistakes which hurt living beings is the best means to attain the union with the universal atman (ApDhS 1.8.23.4). The mistakes and the opposing virtues which are mentioned in this context refer especially to social intercourse, and here one can perhaps see the transition of the idea of ahimsa which was mainly concerned with physical injury to an ethical idea in a broader sense, to compassion with all beings. Gautama (8.22-23) puts compassion (daya) at the head of the eight qualities of the soul. For Vasistha (10.5) compassion counts more than giving. The sannyasin does not eat before having given a share to the beings out of compassion (Baudh 2.10.18.10). Ahimsa, non-injury, abhaya, fearlessness and daya, compassion, are ideals which the brahmin in general is to follow, probably after the model of the sannyasin. 142 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III VI Two monographs on ahimsa, both rich in material, appeared in the 1970s; the work of Alsdorf and myself remained unknown to them. The book of Walli does not offer any historical perspectives. Tahtinen discusses [219] the question of origins in an appendix (132ff.). Although he has recognized the ritual ahimsa-theory, he wants to separate it from that of the sramanas, the ascetics. Following earlier scholars he assumes that there were non-Vedic and non-brahmanic sages (muni) and ascetics (yati). The older Upanisads are supposed to represent a partial fusion of sacrificial culture and ascetic culture, of ritual thought and moral thought. Jainism is considered as an old non-brahmanic tradition which historically goes back at least to Parsva, the 23rd Tirthankara (ca. 9th-8th century BC). Also the eightfold path of the Buddha is called the old path which has been followed by previous Buddhas; ahimsa is one of the virtues included in it. Some authors look for pre-Aryan origins of, or at least influences in, Buddhism and Jainism although concrete proof for this assumption is lacking. Jaini (169) argues that the Jainas have no memory of a time when they fell within the Vedic fold and could accordingly not have started as an ahimsa oriented sect within the Vedic tradition. Even if one concedes the rather vague possibility that Buddhism and Jainism originated in a completely different milieu than Vedism, the question remains against which practices the ascetic movements were directed. The Buddhists and the Jainas stress the ksatriya descent of their founders and the opposition to the brahmins. Their followers came mainly from the upper classes (Oldenberg 74; Gombrich 56ff.). The motives which induced especially ksatriyas to renounce the world are not yet known (see, however, Dundas 2002: 153ff.; WB). Urbanization has been made responsible, and also plagues have been considered as an inducement to withdrawal from the world (Gombrich). Since our sources are silent about this, such guesses should not be taken too seriously. But we can assume with some plausibility that in ksatriya circles an independent world view was developed which was opposed to many brahmanic ideas rooted in ritualistic thinking. As is well-known, in the Upanisads new ideas, especially the doctrine of transmigration, were introduced by ksatriyas, and brahmins became their willing students. The problem was last summarized by Horsch (1966: 427-448). It will not be too far from the truth if one assumes that the Buddha and the Jina belonged to the same line of tradition, but went beyond the royal sages of the Upanisads by rejecting the Veda and the ritual based 143 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA on it. That Buddhism was a reaction against late Vedic ideas would appear from the anatman-doctrine which can hardly be anything but a criticism of the atman-doctrine. In the brahmanic sources we can follow the evolution of the ideas of ahimsa and renunciation, in Buddhism and Jainism they are there right from the beginning, it is true, in opposition to Vedic ritualism, but a ritualism which had already been superseded by the meta-ritualists who interiorized the sacrifice. The Buddhists and Jainas could do what the meta-ritualists could not: they could deny the validity of the Veda whose rituals were kept alive by the representatives of the karmakanda. My article has partly found approval, partly been received with reserve. Della Casa follows my interpretation nearly to the letter. Schreiner (302 n. 23) thinks that Della Casa differs from me in assuming that ahimsa was practised not because one gave up atonement, but because one doubted the possibility of atonement; this is wrong since I had stated exactly the [220] latter view (650; 652). Spera, who deals mainly with ahimsa in the Mahabharata, the Puranas, and in Jainism, refers to my work without criticism. But he thinks that the way of the Jainas is parallel to that of the Hindus, but different. The Jainas are supposed to be pre-Aryan, animistic and sedentary, the Hindus polytheistic (with magical tendencies) and nomadic. This view is without foundation just as similar ones already mentioned. I have shown that there are animistic ideas in the Veda; moreover, animism and polytheism do not exclude each other. At the time when the ideas we are concerned with arose, the Vedic people were not nomadic any longer. Wezler (87 n. 252), who seems to agree with my main arguments, doubts that the 'magico-ritual fear of destroying life in any form' was the only root of strict ahimsa and the asceticism resulting from it. He especially objects to the 'monocausal interpretation. Such an interpretation was not intended, and I have not claimed that asceticism is derived from ahimsa. After all, ahimsa is only part of the ascetic practices, and asceticism existed long before the development of the strict ahimsa-doctrine. My work had the aim to follow the development of the idea of ahimsa in the sources extant and to abstain from general hypotheses as far as possible. I do not at all exclude the possibility that the further investigation of the complex of renunciation and asceticism can uncover other aspects which contributed to the spread of ahimsa. So general a criticism as that of Wezler is not very helpful since there is not even a suggestion where the other causes might be sought. 144 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III Incidentally it should be mentioned that Wezler (110f.) has misrepresented my position regarding the genesis of the asramas. I explicitly stated (651) that I do not share the opinion that the asramas were created by the brahmins in order to bring ascetic movements under their control. Schmithausen concedes (116) that my hypothesis shows at least one of the roots of ahimsa in the whole ascetic tradition of India. He repeats Wezler's objection to 'monocausal explanations (n. 95). He points out that archaic hunting societies often restrict the killing of animals to a minimum or pacify the lords of the animals, for which he refers to an example from South America. Not only the fear of the animal's revenge is a motive, but also the awe of taking life and the respect for life, and furthermore the realization of the relationship of all living creatures and an ecological instinct. But he immediately concedes that these notions were not necessarily differentiated by those people. With these remarks nothing new is added to my thesis. The behaviour of the hunting societies agrees closely with that of the Vedic ritualists as will be shown below (VIII). Schmithausen thinks that the close connection of ahimsa with compassion cannot be derived from the fear of revenge, but it can be derived from awe which can also be considered as evidence for an explicit ethicization of ahimsa. I cannot see such a difference between fear and awe since awe is sublimated fear, and compassion in its most literal sense causes fear. Schmithausen deals with Buddhism in which ahimsa and compassion tend to coalesce, but he should have mentioned that also in Hinduism and Jainism both concepts [221] are closely linked. The central importance of fearlessness for the sannyasin must be stressed since it brings out the close connection of fear with himsa. Halbfass (87-129), to whom we owe a valuable exposition of the Purvamimamsa view of the ritual himsa, doubts that the Vedic ritualists' fear of committing himsa was the ultimate source of the later renunciatory ahimsa-doctrine (113). He thinks the concern about the harming and killing was not intrinsic to, or inseparable from, their ritualism. He rather wants to make external factors responsible for the development which led to the sharp antagonism between Vedic ritualism and ahimsa. The ritualists 'may have been concerned that certain means employed in the ritual might violate rules that were not those of the rituals themselves, and unleash forces that might turn against the ritualists'. But he adds that we do not know the nature and origin of such fears. These remarks can hardly be accepted as a refutation of my hypothesis. 145 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA That the magico-ritual elimination of killing and injury was an integral part of the world-view of the ritualists cannot be denied unless one denies the ritualists' credibility. It is obvious that the emancipation from the magical approach has to be sought in the ritualists' own circle. This appears clearly from the ethicization of the karman-concept in the Upanisads which reflect the views of the meta-ritualists. Halbfass's position is all the more surprising since in the course of his investigation of the Purvamimamsa standpoint (92) he quotes the Upanisad doctrine of the way of the fathers, which leads to rebirth, and the way of the gods, which leads to the liberation from transmigration. This doctrine was developed in ritualistic circles. For the Upanisadic thinkers the way of the ritual was the lesser one, that of the knowledge of the unity of the world in atman-brahman the higher one. The brahmins themselves were divided into the conservative ritualist party and the renunciatory philosopher party. This division has survived to this day, whichever concessions many or most ritualists may have made to vegetarianism. Proudfoot discusses Alsdorf's and my work in his Canberra dissertation of 1977 which was published in 1987. He rejects Alsdorf's interpretation of Manu 5.5-56. He thinks (8f.) that Alsdorf conjures up the image of a collision between the newly emerging values of vegetarianism-cum-ahimsa and the conservative inertia of tradition. Alsdorf makes nothing of the fact that the author of Manu saw all the rules as having an element in common: all are concerned with governing the consumption of food. If nothing else, this is suggestive of how practice may be instrumental in creating linkages between ideologically unrelated institutions. However because of his commitment to a simple causal relationship between vegetarianism and ahimsa, Alsdorf is precluded from exploring more subtle patterns of multiple causation. Since the author does not reveal how he views the linkages and multiple causation, nothing can be gained from this criticism. It is certainly legitimate to ask why Manu composed the section on food in the way he did, but whatever the answer may be, it will not change anything in Alsdorf's demonstration of historical layers. While Proudfoot calls Alsdorf's work an "a priori interpretation' of causality, he labels mine as an 'unstructured description'. By this 146 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III characterization he means that in contrast to Alsdorf I do not set out to organize the material around a consistent theme or portray a pattern which [222] will account for the evolution of the ahimsa ideal or any aspect of its practice'. When he continues by stating that I rather submit to the judgement of Manu, this is a patent error, since I took Manu's list only as a convenient starting-point for the historical investigation. Accordingly it goes without saying that soon questions arise to which Manu has no answer. My conclusions are therefore not drawn from Manu's material, but from older sources. Proudfoot also objects to my inclination to attribute to ethical motives less influence on the spread of ahimsa than to the fear of revenge or punishment in the hereafter or a future birth. He tries to marginalize the retribution mentioned in M 5.55 - the eater is eaten by the food in the hereafter - but since it is also mentioned in 5.33, it will have played a role which cannot be neglected all the more since it goes back to old models. The fact that Manu prefers the ethical motivation does not speak against this: it is not surprising that the learned brahmin makes use of the more sublime interpretation. Proudfoot suggests that the idea of rebirth 'arose as a new social philosophy rationalizing disparities of wealth or a crystallizing social structure since transmigration has ethical implications. This would turn my conclusions on its head. By letting Manu's guiding hand slip I am supposed to lack the basis for refuting it. I do not understand how anyone can get the idea that I intended to refute Manu. My concern was historical and accordingly different from Manu's summary of views existing at his time. Proudfoot does not make any suggestion how the new social philosophy is supposed to have looked. Just as in the criticism of Alsdorf he leaves it at pseudo-theoretical remarks. The lack of substantiation makes a discussion impossible. In his summary (151) Proudfoot states that in Mbh 12.255: ahimsa is identified with a fundamental conception of the life-process and of the relationship between life in this world and the next, which controverted the view that life is dynamically sustained through a circulatory exchange between this world and the hereafter in which sacrifice was an essential link. He maintains that this 'puts a new complexion upon the reaction' I proposed between transmigration and the devaluation of the 147 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA sacrifice in favour of renunciatory ahimsa, because in the episode the intermediation of ascetic values is not involved. I wonder how this late source can be used for the purpose to refute or change conclusions drawn from earlier material. Moreover, the episode does contain references to renunciatory values as Proudfoot himself has noted (128). His summary does not properly reflect the results of his own analysis. Brian K. Smith (1990, 196 n. 33, repeated in Doniger and Smith 1990: XXXII n. 39) objects to my opinion on the ground that concern for the victim is universal and that therefore there is no 'ritual ahimsa'. In the ritual texts ahimsa also refers to the prevention of injury to the sacrificer, his progeny and cattle. Smith remarks: 'such a self-interested ahimsa in relation to oneself and one's possessions is of course a desideratum in Vedism, but that is certainly not the ahimsa of post-Vedism.' The later conception of ahimsa, it is true, differs from the Vedic one, but this does not exclude that the one is derived from the other. I have argued that the ritual ahimsa [223] was turned on its head by the later thinkers. Hindu, Jain and Buddhist ahimsa also remained self-interested, though the motivation changed. Chapple (4ff.) has the impression that Alsdorf and myself minimize the importance of Jainism in the development of ahimsa and vegetarianism. He also states that both of us 'claim that Mahavira was not a vegetarian, a claim that has been contradicted by the Jaina scholar H. R. Kapadia'. He does not attempt to refute Alsdorf's (8ff.) demonstration that two of the oldest canonical Jaina texts unambigously show that Jaina monks did eat meat and fish when they received it as alms, and that in another canonical text the sick Mahavira refuses to accept two pidgeons prepared especially for himself, but asks for meat of a chicken killed by a cat. Thus Mahavira's attitude towards meat-eating agreed with that of the Buddha who did allow it if the animal was not killed specifically for the monk. Alsdorf (53f.) looked for the origins of ahimsa and vegetarianism in the pre-Aryan Indus civilization. I disagreed (627). It is true that the presence of animal bones in the refuse of Mohenjo-daro is by itself not a cogent argument for the absence of vegetarianism in that culture. My main argument was and is that the Vedic sources do allow us to reconstruct a development within the Vedic culture. Chapple is of the opinion that recent scholarly investigations tend to refute my conclusions. The evidence he quotes is far from cogent. Even if one assumes that the animals on the Indus civilization seals and amulets were 148 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III worshipped, this does not imply that all of them were inviolable and not sacrificed. The possible links between the figures in postures similar to those of yoga in [229] Jainism and Hinduism have no bearing on the ahinsa problem since yoga is not inseparably connected with ahimsa. VII The diksita, the brahmacarin and the sannyasin all undergo a consecration (dikna), subject themselves to severe restrictions which to a large extent are the same for all of them. In order to determine to which of the three the vegetarianism of the brahmin can be traced back, we must consider the differences. I myself stated (1968: 651) that the vows of the sannyasin are probably modelled after those of the brahmacarin and that sannyasa can be considered as a return to brahmacarya. The difference between the two is essentially that the brahmacarin strives for the knowledge of the Veda, the sannuasin for the knowledge of the atman. The prohibition of meat for the brahmacarin and the diksita had originally nothing to do with vegetarianism and the later ahinsa-doctrine. Avoidance of meat and sex belongs to the preparation for sacrifice also elsewhere (e.g. Greece Burkert 60f. Rome: Ovid, Fasti IV 657-658). For the brahmacarin and the diksita the restrictions are temporary, for the sannyasin permanent. The diksita prepares himself for the sacrifice which he must perform once he has entered upon this road. The sannyasin divests himself of his ritual utensils before he undergoes the dikna for the new asrama. The strictly vegetarian brahmin will originally have hardly undergone the diksa for the soma sacrifice, but will, as far as possible, have followed the rules for the sannyasin for whom the private recitation of the Veda (svadhyaya) remains a duty (Baudh 2.10.18.22; 24. Ap 2.9.21.10). The brahmacarin acquires the knowledge of the Veda by repetition, the sannyasin preserves it for himself by repetition. Vegetarianism has become the cornerstone of ahimsa because abstaining from meat is possible, from vegetal food not. That the himsa, which cannot be avoided even in the vegetarian mode of life, was a deep concern for the brahmin appears from Manu 3.68: The householder has five butcheries, viz., hearth, grinding stone, broom, mortar and pestle, water vessel. Atonements for the himsa caused by these implements are the five daily 'great sacrifices' for the gods, fathers, creatures, men and the brahman (the Veda in form of the private recitation). 149 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA These sacrifices are first mentioned in SB 11.5.6.1ff., a passage already mentioned above in Section V. Kane (II 697) says they are morally and spiritually more progressive than the srauta sacrifices; he also thinks that they were introduced because everybody could afford them. I leave it open whether these sacrifices are a late development or rather an ancient custom. That they occur in the sources in contexts which presuppose the interiorization of the ritual is probably due to the fact that they had no place in the srauta ritual and could gain their importance only in those circles that devalued the sacrifice on a grand scale. [230] A more detailed version of the last and most eminent of the 'great sacrifices', the svadhyaya, is found in TA 2.10ff. As in SB it is said that by the svadhyaya one gains an imperishable world, the liberation from recurring death and becomes united with the brahman (2.14.3; cf. 2.19.4). In 2.15.5 we read: when the fire was born, evil (papman) took hold of it, by the oblations the gods warded the evil off, by the sacrifice the evil of the oblations, by the daksinas the evil of the sacrifice, by the brahmin the evil of the daksinas, by the metres the evil of the brahmin, by the svadhyaya the evil of the metres; the svad hyaya is free from evil, it is a divine purifier. According to 2.16-17, officiating at the sacrifice and accepting daksinas leaves the brahmin empty, and he must fill himself again by thrice reciting the Veda. By officiating one milks the metres, and by svadhyaya of the words of the ceremonies concerned on a pure place in the wilderness the metres are filled up again. Then follow the identifications which make the svadhyaya an interiorized sacrifice. In this text there is not yet any mention of renunciation, but the pre-eminence of the svadhyaya, which outweighs the whole sacrificial ritual, is clearly expressed. The evil the brahmin takes upon himself by the priestly office can be atoned by the svadhyaya. A further step will lead to rejecting the priestly office and also to giving up own sacrifices. One may ask why then still sannyasa was needed if one could attain the liberation from recurring death already by the svadhyaya. This question was asked already in early times. We can infer this from a Dharmasutra (Ap 2.9.21.2) where it is stated that one can attain peace (ksema) if one lives in all stages of life according to the laws; that ksema refers here to salvation appears from th that shortly afterwards (14) the word is used of the goal of the 150 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III sannyasin. Also Vasistha 8.17 is of the opinion that by doing one's duties (among them that to sacrifice) one never forfeits the world of brahman. Repeatedly the Dharmasutras polemize against sannyasa; the Vedic sacrifices, including animal sacrifices, are obligatory, and only one asrama, that of the householder, is recognized because the others do not produce progeny (Ap 2.9.23.9-10. Baudh 2.6.11.27ff. Gaut 3.36). Implicitly the view of some teachers that one can renounce immediately after brahmacarya is rejected; renunciation is restricted to childless persons, widowers and generally to septuagenarians whose children are independent (Baudh 2.10.17.2-5). The resistance is not so much directed against renunciation as such, but against withdrawal from the world before one has done one's social duties. Since not everybody could hope to live long enough to qualify for sannyasa, it was nearly unavoidable for the teachers of dharma to hold out the prospect of salvation to everybody, in whichever stage of life he may be. The attitude of the Dharmasutras is also represented in the epic story of the young forest hermits and Indra in the form of a golden bird (Mbh 12.11), which Wezler (95ff.) has dealt with. Indra teaches the boys that it is not they who are the true eaters of food remnants, but rather the householder who offers the five 'great sacrifices' and eats the remnants. The story has a parallel in the Buddhist Vighasajataka (393) in which the ascetics live on remnants of flesh which beasts of prey have left. This (231] corresponds to the rule of the Dharmasutras according to which the vanaprasthas, or certain vanaprasthas, live on such remnants of prey, even though the Jataka, by using the word kunapa 'carrion', views the conduct of the ascetics not only as foolish, but also as reprehensible or at least disgusting. Wezler has aptly characterized the conduct of the grhastha, the true eater of food remnants, as innerworldly asceticism whose propagation is a criticism of the asceticism of those who withdraw from the world. The true eaters of food remnants were not all vegetarians; at least Yudhisthira and the Pandavas were not, and probably not the brahmins either who followed them (Mbh 3.2.2; 8; 55ff.). The Pandavas were not vanaprasthas in the sense of the asrama doctrine; vanaprastha as asrama involves ahimsa, but not in principle vegetarianism. In contradistinction to the vanaprastha, who must live on food he has gathered himself, the sannyasin is allowed to beg. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the brahmanic literature is anything said about the question of whether the sannyasin is allowed to accept 151 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA meat or not. Remembering the agreements between the rules for the sannyasin and those for the brahmacarin we may conclude that the sannyasin had to avoid meat. In an article first published in 1964 (reprinted 1985: 41ff.) Heesterman has pointed out that the ideal brahmin is a renouncer. Among the five categories of brahmins mentioned in Mbh 12.77.2-6 the first, the brahmasama, is concerned only with learning and the preservation of the tradition. The devasama, who possesses the knowledge of the three Vedas, is also engaged in his own sacrificial work. The ksatrasama serves princes as sacrificial priest and as housepriest and is probably also officiating at animal sacrifices. Heesterman correctly states that the brahmasama follows the jnanamarga, the devasama the karmamarga; but it must be added that also the ksatrasama follows the karmamarga, and takes on himself more evil or defilement because he does not only carry his own, but also that of his patron. To keep free from evil and defilement to a large extent is possible only for the brahmasama. He follows the path inaugurated by the Upanisads, contemplates the brahman, the totality of the Veda which is identical with the absolute. The interiorization of the ritual was the achievement of an intellectual elite that absolutized ahimsa which finally resulted in vegetarianism. The prestige of the renouncing sage has certainly contributed to the spread of vegetarianism; the aspiration towards higher spiritual and social status has played a role alongside the hope for a better rebirth and eventual salvation. Although the respect for life is attested with many peoples and the inhibition to kill is universal, outside India fundamental vegetarianism was not common in antiquity nor is it at present. In Greece animal sacrifice was rejected and vegetarianism advocated by the Orphics and Pythagoreans; other philosophers criticized animal sacrifice, but vegetarianism has found only isolated following. It is remarkable that, just like in India, it appears in philosophical circles, and especially in those which also teach metempsychosis. Empedocles (fragment 115) mentions bloodshed among the causes of irksome rebirths. VIII The only critic who has offered a counter-thesis to my thesis is Heesterman (1984). He concedes that bloody sacrifices were performed and even required the world over in spite of the universal awe and fear of killing (122). But he continues: 'It would seem, 152 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III however, that it is only in India that we find an overwhelming concern with the technical-ritualistic means to take away the sting of sacrificial death and to undo the injury.' This is manifestly erroneous. On the contrary it could be said that the consciousness of guilt and the tendency to shift the blame from one's shoulders was greater in ancient Greece since there we hear even of the stoning - symbolic or not - of the actual performers (Burkert 165f.). The magical means by which one tried to neutralize and annul the actual killing are attested with many peoples, and the agreements with details of the Vedic animal sacrifice are striking. Therefore it cannot be said with Heesterman (123) that the obsessive concern about the ritual undoing of the injury points to the impending collapse of the violent sacrifice. It will be useful and instructive to quote here the main similarities which exist between the hunting and sacrificial customs of North Asiatic and other peoples collected by Meuli and the Vedic animal sacrifice. Quite generally it is said that in previous times men and animals lived in peace (Meuli 225). This has a parallel in the Indian legend of the ages of the world: in the kytayuga, the golden age, animals were inviolable (ahimsya), only in the tretayuga the animal sacrifice was introduced (Mbh 12.137.73-74). From India Meuli only quoted the victim's agreement to its own sacrifice (267 n. 2). 'Causing to agree' (samjnapana) is used in the Brahmanas as a euphemism for 'killing'; also the consent of the parents, brother and companion of the victim is required (SB 3.7.4.5). The victim's shivering and shuddering, caused by the sprinkling with water, is taken as consent (Meuli 264f.); this is also known in Greece (266f.). Although the animal is sprinkled with water in Vedic India, this particular interpretation is not attested in the sources, but we know it in recent times from Nepal (Witzel 391 n.54). With Hindukush tribes shaking the head three times counts as consent of the goat (Jettmar 212); here the additional question is asked whether the offering is welcome to the gods, and the victim's shuddering is interpreted as a positive sign of the gods (cf. 254). With the Cheremis the orifices of the horse's body are closed at the killing so that the soul is kept inside (Meuli 259). This can be compared to the purification of the vital breaths (prana), i.e. the body orifices, of the victim by the sacrificer's wife; here the pranas are identified with the waters, and thus the food of the gods goes to them alive (SB 3.8.2.4; cf. Schwab 110f.). While dismembering the animal the bones must be kept undamaged (Meuli 259). The same is the case in the Vedic animal sacrifice and of course also in the asvamedha (Schwab 105); for the asvamedha the earliest 153 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA reference is found in RV 1.162.18-20. With the North Asiatic peoples animals (and men) have several souls of which one remains with the bones and dies only when the [224] bones disintegrate. In the sacrifice the bones must remain undamaged; a god or spirit collects them; with the two other souls the animals join the herd of the gods (Friedrich 193). This reminds us of RV 1.162.2 and 7 where the horse joins the herd of the gods and many other, also post-Vedic, instances which state that the animal goes to the gods in heaven. Certain parts of the animal - they vary from place to place - are considered to be the seat of life (Meuli 246f.). These parts are either preserved and buried with the bones or offered to the spirit; swallowed raw or cooked; partly offered to the spirits and partly eaten by elect people or the whole community (256f.). The ida of the Vedic animal sacrifice (Schwab 128; 138ff.; 148f.) is a perfect parallel: it consists of parts of the heart, the tongue, the liver and the kidneys (some sources add other pieces of meat). Meuli (248) quotes as general motives for the relation of the hunter to the animal fear of the animal, compassion with and concern for it. This agrees with what Schmithausen has adduced from South America. Heesterman is of the opinion that the classical ritual of the brahmins has replaced an agonal ritual which was permeated by violence. The adversary or rival, who was an integral participant in the pre-classical ritual, is supposed to have been eliminated, the sacrificer to have united in himself the roles of the two rivals and thereby created a non-violent, private and transcendent universe, isolated from the reality of society. Heesterman believes that in the course of the elimination of violence from the ritual the death of the victim came to be regarded as a ritual mistake. The original method of killing by beheading was replaced by suffocation, strangulation. I think it is rather questionable to view killing by suffocation as a step towards a less violent and cruel sacrifice, and thereby towards ahimsa. The passage which Heesterman (1962:23f.) adduces in order to show that the killing was a ritual mistake cannot carry the burden of proof (KS 29.4. MS 4.8.6). For the mistake - the cutting of the victim's head - would have to be corrected by the sacrifice of another victim, the cow for Mitra and Varuna - a rather unbelievable procedure. There is no reason to assume that here killing is redeemed by killing since in the context an opposition between the two victims is not recognizable. It is not demonstrable that the head of the sacrifice' refers to the head of the animal victim. Before I pursue this question, it may be noted that Heesterman's thesis of the progressing reduction of violence might suit the 154 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III competing sacrifice in TS 2.2.9.7. Somebody whose rival performs a soma-sacrifice in order to harm him should offer a counter sacrifice in which a sacrificial cake is substituted for the cow to Mitra and Varuna. Here an animal sacrifice is replaced by a vegetal one. But we should not draw any far-reaching conclusions from this passage. It does not amount to a step towards ahimsa since the agnisomiya pasu is not eliminated. It is rather an attempt to foil an expensive sacrifice by a less expensive one. In the passage quoted by Heesterman we read that the head of the sacrifice was cut off and the sacrificial essence had flowed into the cow (KS 29.4). With the sacrifice of the cow one provides the sacrificer with sacrificial essence. Mitra took what was sacrificed well, and Varuna what was sacrificed badly. Thereby the sacrificer is freed from Mitra and Varuna, and the cow serves to pacify the sacrifice. The text does not identify the head, [225] MS and TS 6.6.7 do not mention it at all. MS ends with the statement that with the sacrifice of the cow the sacrificer puts right everything done incorrectly in the ritual. From this Heesterman concludes that here the idea of killing has been replaced by the concept of the mistake. But there is no indication that what is incorrectly done refers to the animal sacrifice Possibly TS can lead us to the identification of the head of the sacrifice in this instance. Here the passage ends with the statement that the metres of the sacrificer were exhausted and that the cow is the essence of the metres by whose sacrifice the metres regain their essence. A comparison with TS 2.1.7 (cf. KS 13.8. MS 2.5.7) would seem to confirm the conclusion that the metres are the head of the sacrifice. We read that the vasat-call split the head of the Gayatri. Bihaspati seized the sap which flowed out first, and it became a white-backed cow; Mitra and Varuna seized the second part of the sap, and it became a two-coloured cow; the All-gods seized the third part, and it became a many-coloured cow; the fourth part fell on the earth, Behaspati seized it, and it became a bull-calf; Rudra seized the blood, it became a fierce red cow. Here we have several bovines which are the sap of the metres; each of them is to gain specific favours from the gods concerned. The general sense seems to be that by sacrificing the cows one brings the sap of the metres in circulation again. Although I agree with Heesterman insofar as the original decapitation of the victim at the pole - as presupposed by RV 1.162.9 - was replaced by strangulation, I think that the reason for this was not the progressing elimination of violence, but rather a change in 155 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA the relation to blood. It is well-known that the blood is offered to the demons (raksasa) and at different occasions also to Rudra and his cohorts (asvamedha TS 1.4.36. SB 13.3.4.2ff. sulagava PGS 3.8.11). The blood must remain outside the place of sacrifice, quite in contrast to ancient Greek ritual where the altar is swimming in blood. The cause for this change cannot be deduced from our sources, but one can surmise that it is based on a reaction against the customs of inimical neighbours, be they Aryan or non-Aryan. Decapitation is still today the rule in non-Vedic Hindu ritual. Even if we concede that the use of the head in the sacrifice was abandoned and, as Heesterman (1967, reprinted 1985: 45-58) has argued, procuring the head of the victim posed difficulties for the later ritualists in specific cases, this does not account for the metaphoric use of the 'head of the sacrifice' in the context of the cow for Mitra and Varuna. This cow is killed in atonement for cutting off the 'head of the sacrifice' identifiable as the metres. There is no indication that here the ritualists replaced the agnisomiya pasu by the metres, and thus took a step toward non-violence. It should not be overlooked that the Vedic ritualists were quite aware of the violence and cruelty involved in strangulation. Amends had to be made when the victim uttered a cry or beat its breast with its feet (TS 3.1.4.3; 3.1.5.2). The fact that the possibility of long suffering was greater in the case of strangulation than in case of decapitation certainly did not escape the notice of the ritualists. Heesterman proceeds from his rather shaky basis to turn the development of the ahimsa idea I had reconstructed on its head. He thinks that it started from an originally violent pattern of sacrifice of the ksatriyas [226] which was replaced by a ritualistic system of the brahmins which reduced violence to a minimum. For this purpose he wants to take the argument further back than the ritual ahimsa-theory. It is not Heesterman's aim to prove that the ritual ahimsa-theory is young, but rather to determine the source in which ahimsa and vegetarianism have united. He believes to have found it in the diksita, the person consecrated for the sacrifice. The state of the diksita lasts 'till ... the sacrificer empties himself of his accumulated power in gifts (daksina) and sacrificial offerings'. In the stereotyped animal and soma sacrifices the dikna period is rather short and does not allow extensive activities. Furthermore the diksita must stay in his hut, but he can send out others to beg or rob goods for him which he later distributes as daksinas (cf. Heesterman 1959: 248). In the more complicated rituals of the rajasuya and the asvamedha the time of the 156 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III diksa lasts a whole year and thus allows extensive raids. If the king stayed at home in the classical ritual, this does not mean that he did not lead the raids himself in the pre-classical ritual. In his article on the vratyas (1962: 11ff.) Heesterman has adduced plausible reasons for this development: the vratya is in certain respects the precursor of the diksita (Falk 49ff. discusses other aspects of the vratya problem). The vratyas give everything they have gained. Also the diksita divests himself of at least part of his property. The descriptions of the diksita are ambivalent: partly they are positive by emphasizing his purity and his power accumulated by asceticism (tapas) which prepares him for a new birth; partly they are negative, emphasizing his impurity and the fact that he can be considered dead - he has, after all, entered the world of the gods. As far as the embryonal state is concerned it should be noted that the food of the diksita consists exclusively of milk. Another plausible proposal of Heesterman is that what appears to be a violent raid is connected with the annual transhumance which naturally occurred when one's own land was fully grazed and one had to look for fatter pastures to feed one's cattle and to increase the flock. If, then, the diksita or his forerunner, the vratya, left 'this world' of home for 'that world of the wilderness, he had to adopt a different lifestyle. When he took his herd out with the purpose of increasing it, be it by natural propagation, be it by raiding the neighbours, he had to abstain from slaughtering his own animals for food. Heesterman (1984: 126) views the classical ritual as an attempt to create a peaceful and orderly world of its own, isolated from the social world. The ritual thus became a rudiment, was no longer in the centre of religious life and was pushed into a rather shadowy marginal existence precariously preserved by learned brahmins on the fringe of the spreading later forms of Hinduism. The tortuous attempts to preserve the 'authority of the Veda' would attest to that. The performance of the great Vedic sacrifices was certainly a prerogative of men of affluence and influence. In a way the ritual became a mere merit feast. While originally depending on loot and conquest, it was later continued by the wealthy who distributed the wealth acquired by other means and either knew how to make new fortunes or would withdraw from [227] the world. The privatization of the sacrifices, which from the soma-sacrifice upwards were originally reserved to kings and chieftains, was probably introduced by the brahmins when the economic conditions for the pre-classical ritual had disappeared. 157 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Heesterman thinks that as soon as the alternation of warlike and peaceful phases was not given any longer the consecrated warrior changed into the harmless diksita who was at the same time to be the completely peaceful grhastha. From now on the vegetarian rule was valid not only for the diksita, but also for the grhastha. The first requirement to become a diksita and sacrificer is to be a married householder. In this way we can, in Heesterman's opinion, understand how the merger of ahimsa and vegetarianism occurred, and also that the combined rule became a universal one which bound both, the worldly grhastha and the other-worldly sannyasin. Heesterman takes this a step further by maintaining that the typical fusion of ahimsa and vegetarianism arose from brahmanic ritual thought, while Buddhists and Jainas, though stressing non-violence, originally had no particular use for vegetarianism'. This is an obvious fallacy. The brahmanic forest hermit, vanaprastha, followed the same principle as the early Buddhists and Jainas: meat was acceptable for him when the animal had not been killed by himself or for him. Heesterman overlooks the fact that the Jainas have become the strictest vegetarians while certainly not all believers in the revelation, the sruti, as interpreted by the brahmins, are vegetarians, nor even all brahmins. Heesterman's conclusions result in a veritable dilemma: while on the one hand he recognizes the similarity of the diksita and the sannyasin and even sees the diksita as the forerunner of the sannyasin, he at the same time assumes the fusion of diksita and grhastha. We must take into consideration that the emergence of renunciation falls into a time when the classical ritual was already developed and the old ritual order was remembered only in semi-historical stories which were hardly understood. We have to reconstruct the older stages with considerable ingenuity and difficulties. Especially since vegetarianism spread among the brahmins only slowly, at least in that form which also prohibits animal sacrifices, it seems improbable that the temporary vegetarianism of the diksita in the sense of the old ritual order was the model for the vegetarian brahmin. Strict vegetarianism applied originally only to a special category of brahmins to which I shall return later. For the orthodox brahmin there was the rule that killing in sacrifice is no killing just as intercourse with one's wife during the period most favourable for conception (rtu) is no breach of celibacy (M 3.50). The vegetarian tendency spread only slowly, and orthodox scholars resisted for a long time, even to the present, the abolition of the animal sacrifice. In spite of all the evidence the Mahabharata provides for the 158 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III opposition against the animal sacrifice, this institution has not been completely suppressed until the present day. The logician Visvanatha (seventeenth century) accused those who prohibited meat-eating to be Buddhists (after Kane III 946). In this he was probably depending on older sources. In the [228] Visnupurana 3.18 we find a story about the fight between gods and demons. First the demons win because they perform the Vedic ritual. Finally Visnu makes them become heretics (Buddhists and Jainas) by deception. They are being convinced of the absurdity of the opinion that the victim goes to heaven by the objection that then one should also sacrifice one's own father. It is noteworthy that this story occurs in a Vaisnava source, considering that the Vaisnavas have been the champions of vegetarianism among the Hindus for a long time. Also in the Bhagavatapurana 4.26.6 the killing of game for the ancestor worship is still mentioned as permitted or required, significantly enough in a context which condemns the excesses of hunting. The guilty King Puranjara is chopped up in yonder world by the murdered animals (4.28.26). The Vedanta philosopher Sankara (on Brahmasutra 3.1.25 and 3.4.28) rejects the opinion that the animal sacrifice is sinful. The Vaisnava philosopher Madhva (twelfth century) is often credited with the introduction of the pistapasu, the substitute animal made of flour, but in his commentary on Brahmasutra 3.1.27 he does not consider the Vedic animal sacrifice as sinful. Substitute animals were only introduced by his followers as is apparent from an interpolation in the Kumbakona edition of the Mahabharata (i crit. ed. 806* after 12.123.15). Borrowing from the Jainas is improbable since they reject the offering of substitutes because it involves the wish to kill (cf. von Glasenapp 84 and *27). In the first quarter of this century there was a dispute between orthodox ritualists and Madhvas (Parpola and Kashikar in Staal II 247). The poet Sriharsa (twelfth century) devoted a whole canto of his Naisadhiyacarita to the praise and defence of orthodox brahmanic values, among them the animal sacrifice, even the sacrifice of a cow (17.177; 200). [232] 159 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA WORKS CITED AND THEIR ABRREVIATIONS Ks Sources AB Aitareya-Brahmana Ap Apastamba Dharmasutra APSS Apastamba Srautasutra Baudh Baudhayana Dharmasutra BaudhsS Baudhayana Srautasutra BAU Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad Bhagavatapurana Chu Chandogya-Upanisad Gaut Gautama Dharmasutra GB Gopatha-Brahmana Kautalya, Arthasastra KB Kausitaki-Brahmana KapKS Kapisthala-Katha-Samhita KGS Kathaka Gshyasutra Kathaka-Samhita M Manusmrti Mbh Mahabharata MGS Manava Gshyasutra MS Maitrayani Samhita Pahlavi Texts, ed. J.M. Jamasp-Asana. Bombay, 1897-1913 PGS Paraskara Grhyasutra RV Rgveda Sayast-ne-sayast, ed. and trsl. J.C. Tavadia. Hamburg, 1930 SB Satapatha-Brahmana SGS Sankhayana Gshyasutra Sriharsa, Naisadhiyacarita Taittiriya-Aranyaka TB Taittiriya-Brahmana Taittiriya-Samhita Vadh Vadhulasutra, Ed. Caland, Acta Orientalia 4 (1926), 6 (1928) Vasistha Dharmasutra Visnupurana TA TS Vas Secondary Literature of the Appendices Alsdorf, Ludwig. 1962. Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse 1961 Nr. 6. Wiesbaden. [233] 160 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX III le. laris. Barthiaume, Guy. 1982. Les roles du mageiros. Etude sur la boucherie, la cuisine et le sacrifice dans la Grece ancienne. Leiden. Bhide, V.V. 1979. The Caturmasya Sacrifices. Pune. Biardeau, Madeleine and Charles Malamoud. 1976. Le sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne. Paris. Boyce, Mary. 1975. A History of Zoroastrianism I. Leiden. Burkert, Walter. 1983. Homo necans. Berkeley-Los Angeles. Chapple, Christopher Key. 1993. Nonviolence to Animals, Earth and Self in Asian Traditions. Albany. Della Casa, Carlo. 1976. Ahinsa: Significato e ambito originari della non violenza. Indologica Taurinensia 3/4.187-196. Detienne, M. et J.-P. Vernant. 1979. La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec. Paris. Dhabhar, B.N. 1932. The Persian Rivayats of Hormazyar Framarz. Bombay. Doniger, Wendy and Brian K. Smith. 1990. The Laws of Manu. Harmonds worth: Penguin. Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo hierarchicus. Chicago-London. Dundas, Paul. 2002. The Jains. London-New York. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1956. Nuer Religion. Oxford. Falk, Harry. 1986. Bruderschaft und Wurfelspiel. Freiburg/Breisgau. Friedrich, Adolf. 1943. Knochen und Skelett in der Vorstellungswelt Nordasiens. Wiener Beitrage zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik 5.189-247. Glasenapp, Helmuth von. 1923. Madhva's Philosophie des Visnuglaubens. Bonn. Gombrich, Richard. 1988. Theravada Buddhism. A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. London-New York. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1991. Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian Thought. Albany. Heesterman, J.C. 1959. Reflections on the Significance of the daksina. Indo Iranian Journal. 3.241-258. - 1962. Vratya and Sacrifice. Indo-Iranian Journal. 6.1-37. - 1984. Non-violence and Sacrifice. Indologica Taurinensia. 12.119-127. - 1985. The Inner Conflict of Tradition. Chicago. - 1989. Somakuh und Danaergabe. XIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag. Ausgewahlte Vortrage. Hsg. v. Einar von Schuler. Stuttgart. Hertz, Robert. 1960. Death and the Right Hand. London. Horsch, Paul. 1966. Die vedische Gatha- und Sloka-Literatur. Bern. 1971. Vorstufen der indischen Seelenwanderungslehre. Asiatische Studien. 25.99-157. Jaini, Padmanabh S. 1979. The Jaina Path of Purification. Berkeley-Los Angeles. Jettmar, Karl. 1975. Die Religionen des Hindukush. Stuttgart. Kane, V.P. 1930-1966. History of Dharmasastra I-V. Poona. Kellens, Jean. 1984. Le verbe avestique. Wiesbaden. (234) Levi, Sylvain. 1899. La doctrine du sacrifice selon les Brahmanas. Paris. Liiders, Heinrich. 1940. Philologica Indica. Gottingen. 161 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA McDermott, James F. 1989. Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism. Indo Iranian Journal. 32: 269-280. Meuli, Karl. 1946. Griechische Opferbrauche. Philobolia. Fur Peter von der Muhll, 185-288. Basel. O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger. 1987. The Good and Evil Shepherd. Gilgul. Essays ... dedicated to R.J. Zwi Werblowsku, 169-191. Leiden. Oldenberg, Hermann. 1923. Buddha. Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde. Stuttgart-Berlin. Proudfoot, lan. 1987. Ahimsa and a Mahabharata Story. Canberra. Schmidt, Hanns-Peter. 1968. The Origin of Ahimsa. Melanges d'Indianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou. 625-655. Paris. - 1980. The Senmurw. Of birds and dogs and bats. Persica 9.1-85. Schmithausen, Lambert. 1985. Buddhismus und Natur. Die Verantwortung des Menschen fur eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Hsg. v. Raimondo Panikkar und Walter Strolz, 100-133. Freiburg/Breisgau. Schreiner, Peter. 1979. Gewaltlosigkeit und Totungsverbot im Hinduismus. Angst und Gewalt, ihre Prasenz und ihre Bewaltigung in den Religionen. Hsg. v. Heinrich von Stietencron, 287-308. Dusseldorf. Schwab, Julius. 1886. Das altindische Thieropfer. Erlangen. Smith, Brian K. 1990. Eaters, food and social hierarchy in ancient India. Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 58.177-208. Spera, Giuseppe. 1982. Notes on Ahimsa. Torino. Staal, Frits. 1983. Agni. The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar I-II. Berkeley. Tahtinen, Unto. 1976. Ahimsa. Non-Violence in Indian Tradition. London. Walli, Koshelya. 1974. The Conception of Ahimsa in Indian Thought (According to Sanskrit Sources). Varanasi. Wezler, Albrecht. 1978. Die wahren 'Speiseresteesser' (Skt. vighasasin). Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse 1978 Nr. 5. Wiesbaden. Williams, R. 1963. Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Medieval Sravakacaras. London. Witzel, Michael. 1987. The case of the shattered head. Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik. 13-14.363-415. Zimmermann, Francis. 1987. The Jungle and the Aroma of Meats. An Ecological Theme in Hindu Medicine. Berkeley-Los Angeles. 162 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Appendix IV PROHIBITION OF FLESH EATING IN JAINISM By H.R. Kapadia Diet plays an important part in human life; for, not only does the physical constitution depend on it but even the mental equanimity and moral achievements are practically governed by it. This seems to be the reason why Indian philosophers in particular have pronounced their judgement in favour of or against some of the eatables339 and drinks. Side by side, the time 340 when one should take one's meals and the quantity341 to be taken at the time are also specifically mentioned in Jainism. But this is not the place to deal with Jaina diet in all its details. The main object of writing this article is (1) to point out that the verdict of Jainism goes emphatically against flesh-eating and (2) to answer the question whether it is permitted under any special circumstances. According to Jainism penance (tapas) is of two types: (1) the external and (2) the internal, the former being considered useful in preparing the ground for the latter. 342 The external penance like the 339 In Pravacanasaroddhara (v. 1411-1412, p. 411), its author Nemicandra Suri II mentions 18 articles of food (bhaksya bhojana) current in the world. 340 Jainism advises us to refrain from taking meals after sunset. This rule is to be scrupulously observed by Jaina saints for whom this is looked upon as the sixth vow, in addition to the five mahavratas they are bound to observe. See Dasavaikalikasutra (IV, 8). 341 32 morsels are considered sufficient for a man and 28 for a woman, each morsel being in size equal to that of the egg of a hen. See Haribhadra Suri's comm. (p. 27) to Dasavaikalikasutraniryukti (v. 47). -No one so far seems to have stumbled over the fact that the Jains, who allegedly never ate meat or eggs, express a mouthful of food just by means of a hen's egg, of all things, instead of a fruit, as could rather be expected. The same holds true for Jacobi's compromise of mamsa and maccha as a metaphorical expression (see below; WB). 342 Compare the views of Mahatma Gandhi on the observance of a fast leading to atmasuddhi. 163 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA internal one is of six kinds,343 one of them being rasaparityaga which means that whatever article is likely to lead the senses astray when consumed should be given up. Accordingly liquor (madya), flesh (mansa), honey, butter etc.344 are to be discarded. From this it will be easily inferred that flesh-eating [233] is against the very spirit of Jainism, especially when it lays stress on ahimsa, samyama and tapas as its three essential features. It will not be amiss to mention in this connection what are called vikrtis. A student conversant with Jainism needs hardly to be reminded that out of the 10 vikytis viz. milk, curds, ghee, oil of sesamum etc., treacle, pakvanna, honey, liquor, flesh and butter, the last four are styled as abhaksya or those that are unfit for consumption. The first six are called bhaksya; but after all, they, too, are vikytis, although less harmful, and should therefore be avoided as far as possible. Before I actually refer to passages in the Jaina canon and point out how they denounce flesh-eating, I shall have to define the term Taina'. A true 'Jaina' is he who firmly believes that: (1) true God (Paramatman) is one who is completely free from attachment and aversion; (2) that the real guru is he who strictly observes celibacy; and (3) that the real dharma is that which has ahimsa as its chief characteristic. It is a truth generally admitted that conviction is not always immediately followed by action. Hence a Jaina though a firm believer in the principles of Jainism may not be seen actually following them in practice. There is a possibility of such a person being a slave of passions, and hence being addicted even to the worst types of the seven vyasanas345 viz., (1) gambling, (2) flesh, (3) wine, (4) a prostitute, (5) hunting, (6) theft; and (7) debauchery. It may be remarked that so long as such a person considers this conduct to be contrary to the holy precepts of Jainism and sincerely repents for it, that person does not cease to be a Jaina, though such a person may be actually seen taking flesh. But, this does not mean that flesheating goes uncondemned in Jainism. For, there is a higher stage than this for a Jaina layman who takes a vow of refraining from the abhaksyas. 346 The question of a Jaina saint taking flesh never arises, since he is spiritually on a higher plane than even this type of Jaina 343 Cf. the Niryukti (v. 47) to Dasavaikalikasutra (1, 1). 344 See Vacakavarya Umasvati's Bhasya (p. 238) to Tattvarthadhigamasutra (IX, 19) and Siddhasena Gani's comm. (p. 238) to it. 345 'dyutam ca mamsam ca sura ca vesya paparddhi-caurye paradara-seva 1 etani sapta vyasanani loke ghoratighoram narakam nayanti 'l' 346 They are 22 in number. See Pravacanasaroddhara (v. 245, 246; p. 58). 164 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX IV layman. That is why we find in Sutrakstanga (II, 2; p. 96), the second anga of the Jainas, Jaina saints styled as 'amajjamamsasino' or those who do not take madya and mamsa. The seventh verse of the second culika347 of Dasavaikalikasutra too, supports this statement for it says: not taking [234] madya and mamsa, free from jealousy, and frequently desisting even from pure (nirvikyti) food, and observing kayotsarga from time to time, a Jaina saint should be always exerting for svadhyaya. It may be mentioned en passant that svadhyaya is prohibited in a place where there is flesh. 348 From these remarks it must have been realized by the reader that Jainism differs from other religions in its view about flesh-eating. This is further borne out by the fact that it has pointed out in unequivocal terms the penalty one has to pay for eating flesh. For instance, in Sthananga (IV), the third anga, it is said: an individual amalgamates naraka-nama-karman, i.e. becomes doomed to be born in hell, for four reasons, viz.: (1) maharambha; (2) mahaparigraha; (3) killing a five-organed being; and (4) kunimahara or flesh-eating. This very fact is mentioned in Bhagavatisutra (VIII, 9, p. 80), the fifth anga, and in Aupapatikasutra, (sutra 56), generally referred to as the upanga of Acaranga. Uttaradhyayanasutra, too, looked upon as one of the four Mulasutras, denounces flesh-eating, as could be seen from its ch. V, v. 9-10; ch. VII, v. 6-7 and ch. XIX v. 70-71. These verses are translated in S.B.E. Series (vol. XLV) as under: 'An ignorant man kills, lies, deceives, calumniates, dissembles, drinks liquor and eats meat, thinking that this is the right thing to do. (9) 'Overbearing in acts and words, desirous for wealth and women, he accumulates sins in two ways, just as a young snake gathers dust (both on and in its body). (10) He is desirous of women and pleasures, he enters on undertakings and business, drinks liquor, eats meat, becomes strong, a subduer of foes. (6)' 'He eats crisp goat's meat, his belly grows, and his veins swell with blood - but he gained nothing but life in hell, just as the ram is only fed to be killed for the sake of a guest. (7) 347 The authorship of this culika is traditionally attributed to Siman dharasvamin, a Tirthankara existing in Mahavideha. 348 Cf. Sthananga (X). 165 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA You like wine, liquor, spirits, and honey; I have been made to drink burning fat and blood. (70) 'Always frightened, trembling, distressed, and suffering, I have experienced the most exquisite pain and misery. (71) I believe these agamika citations will suffice to convince a reader that Jainism prohibits flesh-eating. All the same, I shall refer to two incidents connected with the life of Hemacandra Suri, an encyclopaedic author. When he accompanied Siddharaja Jayasimha (235), a Calukya king, to Somanatha, he advised the king to give up for the time being wine and meat as a practice of brahmacarya and not on the Jaina ground of its offending against the grand human principle of ahimsa.349 Under the influence of this powerful Suri, 'a latitudinarian in religious views', Kumarapala not only gave up meat-eating but promulgated the principle of ahimsa throughout his kingdom. Furthermore, Kumarapala according to his advice abstained from taking a certain unobjectionable article of food which reminded him of flesh, and in expiation of this sin, he built thirtytwo viharas. 350 This will show how reprehensible is the idea of flesheating to Jainism. Reasons for the abstaining from eating flesh: 1 2 3 4 Flesh-eating is inconsistent with the life, a saint is expected to lead. Flesh is very bad vikrti. To eat flesh leads to a birth in hell. Flesh-eating is to be given up as it otherwise interferes with the practice of celibacy.351 Over and above these causes already referred to, a few more, are noted in the Jaina literature e.g.: (i) in Siddhasena Gani's comm. (pp. 238-239) to Tattvarthadhigamasutra (IX, 19); (ii) in Silanka Suri's comm. to Sutrakrtanga (II, 6, 38-39); and (iii) in Siddhasena Suri's comm. to Pravacanasaroddhara (p. 58). 349 See Syadvadamanjari (B.S. Series LXXXIII, p. XVI). 350 See Prabandhacintamani (pp. 147-148) published by the Forbes Gujarati Sabha. 351 This view is emphasized in Prasnavyakarana (sutra 27, p. 132), the 10th anga, as well as in the Bhasya (p. 47) of Tattvarthadhigamasutra (VII, 3) and ist comm. (p. 47). Furthermore, in the 10th anga, (sutra 29, p. 150), flesh-eating is prohibited, while recommending control over the sense of taste, and thus cultivating samyama. 166 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX IV The dispassionate examination of the above remarks, I am sure will lead us to declare that Jainism does prohibit flesh-eating. Consequently, it remains to be seen, if it allows it as an apad-dharma, i.e. to say under circumstances when no other food is available to sustain life. I have not come across any passage or quotation in the sacred works of the Jainas which supports this view in an unchallengeable manner. Let us see if it is quite safe to infer from Haribhadra Suri's commentary to Dasavaikalikasutra (V. 1, 73-74) that 'the monks in the days of the Sutras did not have any objection to eat flesh and fish which were given to them by the house-holders'. Firstly, it should be borne in mind that Haribhadra remarks [236] that the monks in times of famine, etc. had to take flesh and fish, in order to live; but he does not mention the name of a single monk of that type. On the contrary we come across a passage in Titthogaliya painna, one of the Jain agamas, which runs as under: when the Madhyadesa was affected by famine, some saints went away to another province (visaya) and some who were afraid of violating their holy vows willingly gave up food and drink (and died). Secondly, other commentators referred to by Haribhadra himself do not interpret the words poggala and aaimisa as meaning flesh and fish but they consider them to signify varieties of fruits. Thirdly, if flesh-eating were permissible as apad-dharma will there be any place for samlekhana,352 recommended in Jainism? Has not Samantabhadra defined sallekhana as giving up body for the sake of dharma, when it is not possible to abide by dharma in cases like a calamity, a famine, an old age and an incurable disease? Does not Jainism proclaim that body is to be cared for so far as it helps us in observing dharma? What is the earthly use of supporting body by auctioning dharma? Does not a country when its honour is at stake, expect its citizens to preserve it even at the cost of their life? Lastly in this connection, it may be mentioned that even Prof. Jacobi who had formerly translated mansa and maccha occurring in Acaranga as flesh and fish has now modified his opinion. As his letter353 is likely to throw much light on this burning question, it is being fully reproduced as under: 352 For its explanation see the Bhasya (p. 95) of Tattvarthadhigamasutra (VII, 17). In the Digambara works we have sallekhana in place of samlekhana, which should not be confounded with suicide as the latter is denounced in Jainism. 353 I have to thank Mr Motilal Ladhaji for the permission he has given me to utilize this letter addressed to him. 167 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA Dear Sir,354 Your letter dated 10-1-28 duly at hand. I have carefully gone over the passage of the Acharanga Sutra II 1.10.6 which refers to the eating of 'meat' and 'fish' by Jaina monks or nuns. The result at which I arrived forms the subject of this letter. Let me begin with the origin of the controversy in about AD 1900. In my translation of the Acharanga Sutra (S.B.E., vol. XXII, Oxford, 1884) I have rendered in the passage under consideration, mamsa and maccha by 'meat and 'fish'; for, such is the original [237] or primary meaning (mukhyartha) of mamsa and matsya. The Jainas took offence at this rendering and complained about it to Professor Max Muller, the editor of the S.B.E. Series. In order to justify my translation, I tried to make it probable that in ancient times the prohibition of animal food may not have been so rigorous as it notoriously was in more modern times. But my suggestion has not been accepted, and Mr Khimji Hirji Kayani communicated to me the following explanation of the passage in question by the high priest of the Jain community of Bombay: 'A monk or a nun on a begging tour is prohibited from receiving conserve of fruits containing a large portion of bark or an exterior covering of a fruit, and if inadvertently received then the monk or nun should bury underground the remaining portion of such conserve which cannot be eaten,' etc. A similar explanation was given to me by several yatis on my visit to India in the cold season of 1913-14. I duly took notice of their interpretation which I promised to publish when a second edition of my translation of the Acharanga Sutra should be issued, but I refrained from further discussing or disputing the point, and there the matter rested. Now the point to be decided is whether mamsa and matsya can be proved to have the meaning conserve of fruits assigned to them by the orthodox interpreters of the 354 See also the article by munis Nemivijaya and Anandasagara 2007: 12ff. with a Sanskrit letter by Jacobi on p. 20f. and their reply to Jacobi on p. 22f. On my request for a copy of this letter of Jacobi Muni Silacandravijaya answered me that the letter could not be found (WB). 168 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX IV passage under consideration. In proof of this assertion no evidence has been brought forward either from Sanskrit Literature or from glossaries (kosas).355 It is true that matsyaphala and mamsa-phala are names of certain plants, but not the words matsya and mamsa by themselves, and even that meaning would not suit the requirement of our case. Mamsa and maccha occur only once more in the Pindesana (1,9,3) and there they must be taken in their primary sense of 'meat' and 'fish.' That passage has reference to a meal which is being prepared for a guest or a sick person. After the usual opening words we read massam va maccham va majjijjamanam pehae. The attribute majjijjamanam being fried or roasted shows that by mamsa and maccha 'conserve of fruits' cannot be meant. [238] The householder who makes those preparations for the reception of a guest, need not be a Jaina layman; it is, therefore, not to be wondered at that he has meat or fish roasted for the guest. It will thus be seen that the exegetical rules of philology oblige us to attribute to the words mamsa and maccha, in the doubtful passage, their primary meaning 'meat' and 'fish.' But how are we to reconcile this result with the prohibition of animal-food? Even if it be granted that this prohibition had not been as strictly observed of old as in historical times, still we cannot suppose that at any time a Jaina monk should explicitly admit that under certain conditions he was ready to accept as alms 'meat' and 'fish'; for, that would be the meaning of the passage if understood in its literal sense. I think I can suggest a way out of the dilemma, without either putting an inadmissible practice to the ancient Jaina monks. For, two Sanskrit passages, one in the Mahabhasya of Patanjali and the other in the Tatparya-tika of Vacaspatimisra seem to me to throw some light on the quotation in 355 In order that a learned reader may argue out this case, I may state the following particulars: (i) In Susrutasamhita (p. 642) we have: 'cuta-phale 'paripakve kesara mamsasthi-majja na prthag drsyante.' (ii) Carakasamhita (p. 1028) remarks: 'kharjura-mamsanyatha narikelam.' (iii) Hemacandra Suri observes in his Anekarthasamgraha: 'tiktarista katur-matsya cakrangi sakuladani.' (iv) Prajnapana declares that thereare several plants, etc. which bear the names of animals. 169 For Personal & Private Use Only

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HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IN INDIA hand. In discussing a Varttika ad Panini (III, 3, 9) Patanjali illustrates the meaning of nantariyakatva by the following example: kascit mamsarthi matsyan sa-sakalan sa-kansakan aharati nantariyakatvat. sa yavad adeyam tavad adaya sakalakantakany utsrjati. evam ihapi', etc. (The same passage is repeated verbatim in the Mahabhasya ad IV. 1, 92). Vacaspatimisra in commenting on Nyayasutra IV 1, 54 says: 'tasman mamsarthiva kantakan uddhrtya mamsam asnann anartham kantaka-janyam apnotity evam prajnavan duhkham uddhrtyendriyadi-sadhanam sukham moksyate. Patanjali and Vacaspatimisra are separated by nine centuries: during all this time (and probably much longer) the standard example of an object containing the substance which is wanted in intimate connection (nantariyaka) with much that must be rejected, was 'fish' of which the flesh may be eaten, but the scales and bones must be taken out. By being generally understood in this way, and having become proverbial, as it were, the expression 'fish with many bones' came to be properly used, I assume, to denote metaphorically any substance similarly constituted. In this metaphorical sense, I believe, bahu-atthiyena mamsena va macchena va bahukanthaena has been used in the passage of Acharanga Sutra under consideration. A close examination of that passage is very much in favour of my supposition. It runs thus: se bhikkhu va java samane siya nam paro bahu-atthiena mamsena macchena va bahu-kanthaena uvanimantejja Tausanto samana abhikankhasi bahu-atthiyam mamsam padigahettae | etappagaram nighosam socca [239] nisamma se puvvam-eva aloejja lauso ti va bhaini ti va no khalu kappai me bahu-atthiyam massam padigahettae | abhikankhasi me daum javatiyam tavatiyam poggalam dalayahi, ma atlhiyaim 1 etc. The layman asks the monk whether he will accept 'meat with many bones'. Now if the alms-giver had actually offered meat, the answer of the monk would of a certainty have been: No, I am no flesh-eater. Instead of this refusal he says: 'It is against our rules to accept "meat with many bones": "if you desire to make me a gift, give me as much of the substance as you like, but not the bones." It is worthy of remark that the monk makes use of the (popular) phrase 'meat with many bones' when declining 170 For Personal & Private Use Only

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APPENDIX IV the offer, but not when he states that he will accept; there he uses not a metaphorical expression, but the direct designation poggala, substance. This change of appellation is due to the consciousness that the first expression is metaphorical and open to misunderstanding. This meaning of the passage is, therefore, that a monk should not accept as alms any substance of which only a part can be eaten and a great part must be rejected. The same principle governs the preceding paragraphs of the 10th uddesao. In 4 some such substances are mentioned by name viz. different parts of sugarcane, etc. and in 5 we find mamsa and maccha which expression, if I am right, comprises all the remaining substances of a similar description which have not been mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Bonn, Yours faithfully, 14 February 1928. H. JACOBI 171 For Personal & Private Use Only

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