Further References To Vaisesika Sutra In Patanjala Yogasastra Vivarana

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269472/1

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FURTHER REFERENCES TO THE VAISESIKASUTRA IN THE PATANJALAYOGASASTRAVIVARANA (Studies in the Patanjalayogasastravivarana III ) By ALBRECHT WEZLER 1. Elsewhere attention was drawn to a quotation from the Vaisesi kasutra (=VS) found in the Patanjalayogasastravivarana ( PYSV), which was not recognized as such by the editors of the latter text: while examining this quotation, it was also shown that the author of the PYSV - whose identity has to be regarded as not yet established? - was acquainted not only with the VS itself, but evidently also with an old commentary on it which seems not to be extant any longer, but is echoed, as it were, in Candrananda's Vitti,' at least to a certain degree. In what follows, two more instances are presented and discussed where the author of the PYSV, though not quoting in the strict sense of the word from the VS, nevertheless clearly refers to it; and these references, too, have apparently not been noticed by the editors of the PYSV. My present aim is a double one: Firstly and generally I wish to keep alive the discussion about the PYSV, as this highly interesting text has not yet found the attention it no doubt deserves by itself, i e. quite apart from the provocative intricacies of the authorship problem COCO Scobacco As for "Studies in the Patanjalayogasastravivarana I", entitled Philo. logical Observations on the so-called Patanjalayogasutrabhasyavivarana", cf. IIJ 25 (1983), pp. 17-40: "Studies, ... II", entitled "On the Quardruple Division of the Yogakastra, the Caturvyuhatva of the Cikitsasastra and the Four Noble Truths' of the Buddha", will be published in Indologien Taurinensia", most probably in 1984. The edition referred to is, of course : Patanjala-Yogasutra-Bhasya-Vivarana of Sankara Bhagavatpeda (MGOS No. 94). Madras 1952. 1. Viz. in my article " Remarks on the Definition of yoga' in the Vaisesikasutra". published in: Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. DE JONG on bis Sixtieth Birthday, ed, by L. A. HERCUS et al., Canberra 1982, pp. 643-686. 2. Cf. Studies in the PYSVI" as well as the Appendix Notes on the Yogasatrabhasyavivarana'" in W. HALBFASS' monograph: Studies in Kumarila and Sankara, Reinbek 1983. 3. Cf. my article mentioned in fn. 1. - The edition referred to is, of course, Muni Sri JAMHUVIJAYAJI'S Vaidesikasutra of Kanada with the Commentary of Candrananda (GOS No. 136 ), Baroda 1961. 4. This was, by the way, also the first aim of W. HALBFASS in uding the Appendix, mentioned above in fn. 2, to his Studies in Kumarlla and Sankara, --58

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WEZLER : Further references to VS in PygV 459 458 R. N. Dandekus Felicitation Volume it also poses. In addition what I wish is not merely to supplement the list of quotations from and references to other works found in the PYSV which was compiled by T. VETTER,' though apparently on the basis of the editors' observations only for regarding the undisputed, though limited importance of such a list, provided it is really exhaustive, for tackling the problem of dating this text, in terms of a relative chronology at least, hardly anything is gained by pointing out that a particular work, in the present case the VS, is quoted or referred to more than once. It is rather my intention to throw some light on the attitude shown by the author of the PYSV towards the VS in particular and the Valsesika school of thought in general, an attitude which is not, as might have been expected on account of the criticism directed by him against the Vai esika definition of yoga, determined by biassed opposition alone. In discussing the manner in which the author of the PYSV makes use of two more elements of the Vs, I also hope to offer a contribution, though a quite modest one, to our knowledge of the reception of the VS and to that of the history of Indian philosophy. 2. Almost right at the outset of the Yogahhasya ( - YBh) on Yogasutra (-YS) 1.1 the following statement is met with yogah samadhih e t sarvabhaumas cittasya dharmahl ksiptam, mudham, vikiptam, ekagram, niruddham ili cittabhimayah. As I have dealt with this passage and essential parts of the PYSV on it already elsewhere, albeit not yet with the necessary comprehensiveness, I need not go here into the details again nor pursue this topic any further, but can confine myself to a portion of the PYSV passed over in my earlier article. 2.1. The manner in which the author of the YBh expresses himself poses a problem : On the one hand he provisionally defines yoga as "the state of being attentively directed" and states this latter to form a property (dharma) of the mind-stuff present in all its different states (bhumi); in enumerating these states thereafter, on the other hand, he uses expressions, viz. ksiptam etc., which cannot but be taken as attributes of the term cillam to be supplemented;" that is to say, he does not give the actual names of the five states themselves, but instead those of the mind-stuff in so far as it is in one or the other state. It speaks clearly for the Vivaranakara's philological competence, the acuteness of his observation, that he fully recognizes this problem and deals explicitly with it. For, after having explained the attributes kriptop etc., as regards their grammatical formation (karmakarlari nisthal) as well as their meaning, he continues his interpretation by himself raising the objection (p. 5 1.17): nanu ca bha misu dharmenu rivaksiteste laimartham ksiplam ityadina dharmy ucyate). "Since it is intended to state (i. e. define the (different states as properties of the mind-stuff ],'' to which purpose is the possessor of the property taught (thereafter) by employing the attributes] ksiplam etc., and not these properties themselves )?". Yet, as in other cases, too, when a sentence is introduced by m u ot, ised almost stereotypically in the PYSV," the objection raised is not accepted as justified. In the present case it is rejected thus (p. 5 1.18-20): nais dosah, dharmina dharma evopadisyate / dharmanam dharmivigatvat/atha gotue kim lingam iti / prste, visani kokudman prantavaladhir ili dharmina dharma evopadityate / tasmat ksepadayas cittasya bhumayo dharma ity arthah Il. This is not a fault; by what possesses the property (i. e. by the ex. pression denoting the dharmin) the property itself (eva) is pointed out because of the fact that the sphere of properties is by necessity ) what possesses them / is characterized by them. As e. g., when it is asked, What is the characteristic sign as regards the being an animal of the bovine species?', [by giving the answer An animal characterized by peculiar horns, by a hump and as one having a tail at the Chinder) part of its body, it is the property which is pointed out by the expressions denoting their possessor. Therefore, what is meant by the YBh statement under discussion ) is that the states of the mind. stuff forming its properties are the having thrown itself indeliberately, etc." 2.2. Anybody conversant with the VS will recall here sutra 2. 1. 813 which runs thus : visani kaludman prantevaladhih sasnavan ili gotue drstam 9. I give throughout my own translation, since the work done by T. LEGGETT Sankara on the Yoga-sutra-s (Vol. 1: Samadhi). The Vivarana sub-commentary to Vyasa-bhisya on the Yoga-sutra-s of Patanjali: Samadhi-pada, London 1981) can only be styled pseudo-translation: I have never come across a comparably careless translation of any Sanskrit text: it abounds in incredible misconstructions of the original to such an extent that those interested in the text itself can only be strongly warned from consulting this would be translation, unless they are fond of shaking their heads in utter disbelief. 10. This is true in so far as according to the author of the YBh as well as to the Vivaranakira samadhi is a permanent dharma of the mind-stuff, whereas the different bhms are temporary properties of it. 11. Cf. Studies in the PYSV I. p. 36. - In passing it may be pointed out that on in juxtaposition with name has only in quite vague a manner its normal conjunc. tive adversative function so that it seems even advisable to transcribe it as one word: 5. CI. bis book: Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Sahkaras (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, ed. by G. OBERHAMMER, Vol. VI), Wien 1971, p. 22. 6. This proviso results from general methodological considerations as well as from what W. HALBFASS says in his Appendix (cf. fn. 2) on the authorship problem, 7. Viz. in the Studies in the PYSVI" (cf. in.). 8. This is made clear by the author of the YBh bimself in that he introduces the immediately following sentence by : fare il ple cetasi... 12 lo gumbering sutras of the VS I follow MUNI JAMBOVIJAYAJI's edition (cf. fn, 3).

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460 R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume WEZLER : Further references to V8 in Py8V 461 lingam /. Of course, the formulation of the relevant passage in the PYSV differs to such a degree that it cannot by any means be regarded as a quotation in the strict sense of the word: The attributo sasnavan is absent, drstam is likewise left out, etc.; on the other hand, it is, I think, equally patent that what we have to do with is not simply another reading i.e. a variant to VS 2. 1. 8. The manner in which the author of the PYSV takes recourse to this sutra has rather to be called a complex mixture of a partial quotation and a reference which at the same time contains elements of an explanation of VS 2. 1. 8, which latter, as it stands, is not easily intelligible; the explanatory aspect is, however, confined to what really matters to the author of the PYSV in the context of his commentary on the YBh; hence the attribute of the key word lingam in the VS, viz. drstam, which is of particular importance in the context of this ahnika of the 2. adhyaya of the VS, 14 is simply left out, and the sutra is reformulated in such a way as to derive two sentences, viz. a question and its answer and by this a specific peculiarity of the sutra is brought out into distinct relief, namely, that in it dharmin-expressions are used instead of expressions denoting properties (dharmas) though this is what one actually expects. It is noteworthy that Candrananda on his part likewise does not even look this peculiarity of the wording of VS 2.1. 8; for he concludes his commen tary on it by stating : visanyadibhih sabdais taduatpralipadakair apy arthavyaparad dharma eud ipadisyante). "What is indicated by the words characterized by peculiar horns, etc., are, although these words literally) convey the meaning of that which is characterized by it', nothing but the corresponding properties, because they are employed here precisely) for [ this ) purpose /[ to denote this meaning." Inspite of the fact that Candrananda's introductory remark dratantartham sitrum refers to the contextual importance of VS 2. 1. 8 in so far as it illustrates a basic element of the VS's epistemology, i. e. although he is fully aware that this sutra was introduced as an example of something quite different, he does not fail to point out also a linguistic peculiarity though this forms but a side issue for him. Therefore, one wonders whether what the author of the PYSV had in mind was this sutra alone or whether he, in this case too, was acquainted with an older commentary on the VS in which this linguistic peculiarity had already been explained in a similar manner and which was drawn upon by Candrananda also in his turn. The similarities between the latter's Vrtti and the passage of the PYSV, quoted above, are in any case remarkable, and, to be sure to such an extent that one may even reckon with the possibility that the Vivaranakara know also, albeit probably from another source, the explanation of the word golve as given by Candrananda, viz. : gatve' iti goluautechinna taktih). For in the context of the YBh passage under discussion as well as of the PYSV on it, it is Likewise not a jali that is spoken of, but a vyakli, i.e. the mind-stuff as an individual, so that one would in fact expect the question lim lingam similarly to refer to an individual of the bovine species, and not to the species itself - if the examplo adduced by the author of the PYSV is really intended to fully correspond to the upameya / darstantika. 2.3. At first sight it might seem a deviation when in addition to what has been said in paragraph 2,2 attention is now drawn to another and, to be sure, diverging interpretation of VS 2.1. 8. However, it will become clear that in view of the close similarity between the interpretation common to both, Candra. nanda and the author of the PYSV, and in view of the above assumption based on this close similarity, it is, no doubt, useful to take into account other interpretations also. What I mean is that the anonymous author of the Vyakhyal gives a significantly different interpretation of the expressions visani etc., in that he takes them to stand for the corresponding abstract nouns: serve caile bhavapradhana nirdedah / tenayam gaur visanavisesavaltvat kakudmattrad ityadi ll. That is to say, according to him it is not the properties that are intended, but the fact of something being characterized by them. This interpretation was, however, evidently suggested to the author of the Vyakhya by the epistemological context of VS 2. 1. 8, viz. that of inference, and a particular, more exact manner of formulating an anumana, which had become usual in his times, the standard example of such a prayoga being paralo vahnimar dhimavattral (and not any longer : dhulmat). In its substance, his interpretation is hence most probably later than that offered both by Candrananda and the author of the PYSV; both these interpretations, though different, have, on the other hand, equally the advantage of grouping rather well in a widely known picture, i.e. that the authors of certain) Sutra works and other ancient writers sometimes tend to express them. selves in a way which definitely lacks precision. These shortcomings were evidently not observed for the first time by Western philologists, but already much earlier by Indian commentators who 13. On this term cf. my article "A Note on the Concept adrs. As used in the Vallesikasutra", to be published in the Felicitation Volume for Professor A. N. LANI. 14. CE, the article mentioned in fn. 13. 15. The quotation is from the edition (cf. fa, 3), p. 12 1. 10-11, 16. C. Vaisen kadarsana of Kanada with an Anonymous Commentary, ed. by Anantalal THAKUR, Darbhanga 1957. 17. The quotation is from p. 201. 9-10.

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R. N. Dandelar Felicitation Volume WEZLER : Further references to V8 in Py8V 463 this is not by any means a unique case, but that this peculiar manner of expres. sing oneself is, on the contrary, attested elsewhere also. not only tried their very best to solve individual cases of such inaccuracies, but also seem to have gathered the impression that the Sutrakaras took quite somo liberties in expressing themselves and in ordering their material. At least, one cannot but recall in this connection the dictum of the author of the Kasikivitti on Pan. 1.2.35: vicitra hi sutrasya krish Panineh, or the remark found in the Yuktidlpika on Samkhyakarika 3 : 18 vicitrah sutrakaranam abhiprayagatayah, or similar statements, although they do not exactly refer to this lack of precision. The modern philologist, on the other hand, will, of course, start with no more than noticing the unevenness of the construction of VS 2.1.8 as it stands formulated, and in terms of its syntactical analysis he will then arrive at the con clusion that it forms an anacoluthon in that an answer to refer now to the Vivaranakara's rewording for the sake of clarity - is given not to the question What are the characteristic properties of an animal of the bovine species?', but as it were to the question, What does an animal of the bovine species look like as regards its characteristic properties?'. In addition the modern philologist will most probably recall a relevant passage from the Paspakahnika of the Mahabhasya, viz. I. 1. 6-7: atha gaur ity atra kah sabdah/ kim yat tat sandlanglakakudakhuravisany artharupam s sabdah/ nety aha/ draryam nama tat II, and contemplate the likelihood that the peculiar construction of VS 2.1.8 is due to the fact that there existed from of old a question and answer pattern, viz. . What is an animal of the bovine species?', . It is an animal characterized by a dew lap, etc.'; and that this pattern was more or less stereo typically used whenever the problem of the characteristic sign(s) of something was discussed. Candrananda and the Vivaranakara, not to mention the author of the Vyakhya, however, clearly go a step further : Obviously unable or, at least, unwilling to accept the anacoluthon, both of them do away with it by contending that the expressions visani etc., though literally denoting the charmin, are in the context of VS 2.1. 8, nevertheless, used to convey the meaning of the corresponding dharmas. 2.4. There cannot, hence, be the least doubt that it is precisely this interpretation which made the Vivaranakara adduce VS 2.1.8 as an example which by its syntactical and semantic parallelism at the same time illustrates and justifies the peculiar construction of the YB observed by him. His motive is, therefore, perfectly clear: Evidently he thought it necessary or, in any case, advisable to safeguard against any criticism with which one might come up against his interpretation of this passage of the YBh by explicitly stating that Yet, there remains one question still to be answered, viz. why the author of the PYSV did opt precisely in favour of VS 2.1. 8. Were there no parallels to be found in everyday speech? And, if he thought it preferable to adduce an example from a Sastra, why did he select of all others this sutra of the basic -text of the Vaisesikas? Of course, one might raise the following counter objection : Since it is evidently not the doctrinary content of VS 2.1.8 which the Vivaranakara is interested in, but only its linguistic form, i.e. since philosophical theoremata of the Vaisosika are of no importance at all to him here, why should he have hesitated to refer his readers to just this parallel? But as there is apparently no circumstantial evidence whatsoever to warrant the assumption that VS 2.1.8 functioned as a well-known murdhabhisiktam udaharanam for dharmin-terms being used to denote the corresponding dharmas, this objection, if it is justified, would only mean that the problem boils down to asking why it was precisely VS 2.1. 8 that came first to the author's mind when about to account for the peculiar mode of expression of the YBh. One possible answer that suggests itself is that he thought first of the VS since he intended to deal shortly afterwards (viz. p. 6 1.8 ff) with the definition of Yoga as given there. Yet, I think, this solution is not absolutely convincing: it is by far more likely that this sutra came (first) to his mind simply because he was generally quite familiar with the VS as such and most probably also with a commentary or commentaries thereon: at least, this familiarity is a fact which can be demon strated also with the help of other passages of the PYSV, among them the second example referred to at the beginning of the present paper and to be discussed in what now follows. 3. This second instance is from the long utsitra portion of the PYSV to which as such attention has already been drawn by P. HACKER and which, starting from YS 1.25 and the Bhasya on it, is wholly devoted to the topic of the isvaravoda, i.e. to adducing an extensive list of proofs for the existence of Isvara, to refuting the inferences brought forward by an opponent against this view, and to maintaining the position of theistic Yoga. It is in this latter part that the discussion centres around the (Yoga ) concept of Isvara being (even) simultaneously sa sarira and asarin. For the opponent both these ideas seem to imply many and serious difficulties, particularly as regards the central Yoga tenet 18. In the edition by R, C, PANDEY, Delhi 1967, p. 281. 15-16. 19. The reference is to F. KIEL HORN's edition, Poona 19628. 20. Cl. his article "Sankara der Yogin und Sankara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen" in: Beitrage zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift for Erich Frauwallner, ... Wien 1968 ( WZKSO 12-13. 1968-59 ). p. 124 - Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von, L., SCHMITHAUSEN, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 218,

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464 R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume of Isvara's omniscience (sarvajnatva) taught in YS 1.25: If I'vara is sasarira, so he makes the upholder of the Yoga position consider, his cognitive capacity should be limited like that of us and the like of us, and if he is, on the other hand, asarira, he shouldn't be able to have any cognition at all. The defendant is convinced that he has proved Isvara's omniscience even if God is taken to lack a body and organs of sense (... ity akayanindriyatva. pakse 'pisvarasarvajnatvasiddhih: p. 69 1. 6); and the counter-argument of the opponent that the capacity of the mind-stuff to perceive anything visible necessarily depends on organs of sense like the eye, etc., is refuted by repeating what had alrealy been stated earlier by the defendant, viz. that I'vara possesses aisvarya and is free of dharma and adharma. 3.1. The discussion is continued as follows: api ca caksurgrahyasyapi caksusagrahanam loke drsyate caksurgrahyam sat santamah sannimilita locanair api svasthantahkaranair upalabhyate/ tad evandhatamasam vispharitanayanair apy anyagatacittair naiva grhyate yatha grhyamana evakase prakasah ||. "And, besides, it is an empirical fact that [an object which], though it could [by its nature] be perceived by the eye, is [ nevertheless] not perceived by the eye; [e.g.] complete darkness which forms [an object] that [by its nature] can be perceived by the eye, is [ in fact] perceived [by people] whose internal organs are healthy, even though they have their eyes fully closed; but this same intensive darkness is actually not perceived [ by people] whose mind is fixed on something else even though they have their eyes wide open, contrary to the light in sky which is in fact [ in any case] apprehended [ even if one's mind is fixed on some. thing else ]." athapi prakasabhavamatram eva tamo na vastu iti bruyat-tac ca naabhavasya vastutirodhanasamarthyabhavat ||. "If [the opponent ] would say that darkness is, nevertheless, nothing but the [absence of light [and] not a [really existing] thing, this, too, would not [be acceptable], because the absence [of something, viz. light] could not conceal really existing] things, [whereas darkness is patently able to do so ]." atha grahannimittasya prakasasyabhavad eva ghatadyagrahanam, na vastu. tirodhayakam tama iti bruvita-na-caksusah prakasakatvat prakasasahaya. kapeksanupapattih asati bhinnajaliye vastuni vastunam tirodhatrni talra ya ca yavati ca matra prakasakatvac caksusa prakasyeta / na hi pradipah pradipantaradvaittyakapeksah prakasayati ||. m 21. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS (cf. "Studies,... I"). WEZLER Further references to VS in PYSV : 465 " If [the opponent] would, on the other hand, maintain that [really existing things] like a jar etc. are [sometimes] not perceived simply because of the absence of light, a necessary precondition / cause of perception, and that [it is hence not necessary at all to assume that] darkness conceals [really existing] things, [then this objection] would not be correct; since the eye [itself] illuminates [its object], it is not correct [to assume] that [in order to be able to perceive an object] it depends on an accompanying factor in the form of [ another, i. e, extraneous ] light assisting it [in its function]. If there were no [other] thing of a different kind to conceal things (i. e. the potential objects of the perception by the eye), the eye because of its being something which [itself] illuminates would [by necessity] throw its light on whatever and how vast soever [object(s)] there are in the particular [place covered by darkness]. For a lamp does not in lighting up [things] depend on a second factor, i. e. another lamp. " kimcanyat - caksusah prakalantarasahayatrapeksatayam ca nisayam api taradhipati - prakatadvitiyena caksusa divasa iva rupadigrahanaprasangas tirodhanasyasati nimitte II. "And further, [there is ] something else [ to be pointed out in this connection]: And if the eye would [ indeed] depend [for its functioning ] on the assistance of another [source of] light, [then] something visible etc. would necessarily be perceived by the eye even at night just as at day-time (i.e. equally clearly and distinctly) as it is [then] seconded by the light of the moon, since there would be no cause for the [partial] concealment [of its object ]." kimcanyat-abhavas cet tamah, candrabhasu nisayam bhavantigu tamasa mandena na pravartitavyam | sarvatmanaiva hi tena vinasaniyam bhasam bhavat | bhasam tu vastutvan mandatvapatavadiviseso ghatate na bhabhavasya nirvisesatvat //. "And further [there is still] something else [to be considered here]: If darkness were [nothing but ] the absence [of light ], [ then ] darkness could not obtain faintly when the rays of the moon shine at night; for it (i. e. darkness if it were merely absence of light) ought to vanish completely because of the presence of the [moon-] rays. But since the rays [as in fact any light] belongs to the category of [really existing] things, the distinctions between faintness and intensity etc. 22. Note that the Lahore MS, (cf. " Studies... I") reads tarataradhipati", which might be the original reading. 23. The editors of the PYSV propose the emendation bhantisu; but bhavantinu is attested in all the MSS. consulted by me so far and need not be emended if bh is taken to mean to arise, to function." 24. Read thus with the Lahore MS, ...59

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466 R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume [of darkness] are possible, not [however] if [ darkness] is [nothing but] the absence of light, for [such an absence ] does not possess any distinctions." kimca sahayabhavac caksusa upalabdhisamarthyabhavad agrahanam ity etad api vyabhicarati / yatha saty api vidyullataprakase titratare vidyullatavilasena cakitadrstir's nopalabhate na hi vidyutah sahayatves drsta. calitatvenagrahanam virodhabhavad yuktam . "Nor does it correspond [ to empirical fact] to contend that the eye [in certain cases] does not preceive [its object] because without assistance it lacks the capacity of apprehension. For instance, [a person] whose vision is frightened (i.e. who is dazzled) by the appearance of a flash of lightning does not perceive [anything at all at that moment] although there is the highly intensive light of the flash of lightning. For, as there is an assisting factor [in this case], viz. the lightning, the non-apprehension cannot [ as it should] be correctly accounted for by the fact that the vision is frightened (i. e. the person dazzled), because [the light of the flash of lightning] is not opposed [to the rays of the eye]." kimca-cikitsasastre chaya madhurasitalety ucyate na hy avastuno madhu rasitalatvam tatha caksipathyapathyatvam nabhavasya pathyapathyatvam bruyuk }}. "And, again, in the science of medicine20 shadow is said to be pleasant and cool. [Yet] it is patent that what is not a [really existing] thing [cannot] be pleasant and cool; and, similarly [the science of medicine speaks] of the fact that [shadow] is [sometimes] healthy for the eye and [sometimes] unhealthy. [The authors] would [of course] not teach [shadow] as being healthy and/or unhealthy, were it [merely] an absence [of light, and not a really existing thing]." 25. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS. and ef, dratacakitatvena in the immediately following sentence. 26. This is a conjecture; all MSS, read sahiyake. 27. Should one perhaps read instead drsti"? 28. The Trivandrum MS. reads caksipathyapathyatvam; my conjecture is strikingly confirmed by pathyapathyatvam in the immediately following sentence. 29. My colleague Prof. Dr. Ronald E. EMMERICK has kindly checked these references and I am most grateful for the information given by him, viz. (as regards the first one) cf. Rajanighantu, varga 21. 38 (p. 418): tapah katuko ruksas chaya madhurasitala tridosasamani jyotsna sarvavyadhikaram tamah | and Kaiyadevanighantu, ed. P. V. SHARMA and G. P. SHARMA, Varaaasi-Delhi 1979, p. 549: tapah pittaraktignisvedamirechitrsiwahah || (418) dahavaivarnajanano raksah katurasas ca sah atapoktagunan hanti chaya madhurasitala (419). As for the second reference of the PYSV, however, a literally identical passage could not be found in any of the medical texts; nevertheless, there is at least the following statement in Bhoja Raja's Carucarya (ed. by B. RAMA RAS, IIyderabad 1974, p. 101): chatran tu vitutapa varzadahanivaranam netrahitam ca, which should be noted here. WEZLER: Further references to VS in PYSV pradipac chayopalabdhes ca abhavas cet tama, pradipaprabhamandale pradipac chaya katham bhavet / vastutve 'pi virodhad ayuktam iti cet-na -visasarpayor iva sambhavat yatha pranaviyogakaram api risam panna. gapranaviyogaya na paryapnoti tatha pradipalacchayayor api //. 467 "[Shadow as a particular form of darkness is in fact a really existing thing] also because shadow is perceived due to [the presence of] the light of a lamp: If darkness were [nothing but ] absence [ of light], how could there be within the circle on which the light of a lamp falls a shadow due to [the presence of] the light of the lamp? If [the objection is raised] that [this fact] cannot be correctly accounted for even if shadow ] is a [really existing] thing because [shadow] is the opposite [of light and vice versa ], [ then this ] couldn't [ be accepted ], because [both of them, i. e. the shadow and the light of a lamp] co-occur [in a given space] just as a snake and its poison: As poison, though causing death [of other living beings if bitten by a venomous snake ] is not able to kill the snake [ itself], so it is the case also with the light of a lamp and its shadow." tasmad vastu tamah, prakarsapakarsavaltvat prabhavat virodhidravyapane. yalvac ca ghajavat / upalabdhrvyavadhanakaratvac ca bhittivad iti // "Therefore, [to sum up ], darkness is a [ really existing ] thing [1] because it is characterized by faintness and intensity like light, [2] because it can be removed by [another] substance which is opposed [ to it ] (i. e. by light) like a jar, and [3] because it causes a separation of the perceiving subject [ from an object] like a wall." 3.2. This rather detailed discussion about the nature of darkness, remark. able in itself and also in the context of the history of Indian philosophy, has been given here in full primarily with the aim of examining the relation in which it stands to the VS. Now, the relevant sutra, viz. 5.2.21, poses some text-critical problems. In the Sutra text as constituted by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI it runs thus: dravyagunakarmavaidharmyad bhavabhavamatram tamah || One of the MSS. used by MUNI reads... bhavabhavas tamah, as does Siddhasena in his commentary on Tattvartha-sutra 5.2430 (only that in the former part of the sutra he reads karmanispattivaidharmyad), whereas in the anonymous Vyakhya the variant dravyagunakarmanispattivaidharmyad abharas tamah is attested to, as also in Sankaramisra's Upaskara. According to the secondary transmission pa 30. Viz. in Hiralal Rasikdas KAPADIA's edition of the Tattvarthadhigamasutra with Umasvati's auto-commentary and Siddhasena Gani's Tika, (Sheth Devchand Lalbhal Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series) Vol. I, Bombay 1926, p. 363,

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468 R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume (listed by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI) as found in the Nyayakandali," the Kiranavali, the Nyayavarttika and the Nyayaratnakara, however, the sutra runs thus: dravyagunakarmanispattivaidharmyad bhabhavas tamah. But it is further to be noted that already MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI states in a footnote: atra vrttyanusarena Nyayakandalyanusarena Mi. anusarena ca 'bha'bhavas tamah' iti patho 'numato bhats /; and he adds in another footnote37 by way of correcting himself: pr' 43 pan 28 ity atra "vrttyanusarena" ity atah param "bhabhavamatram tamah iti patho 'numato bhati" iti puraniyam. He is perfectly right in pointing out that both the commentators, Candra. nanda as well as the anonymous author of the Vyakhya, cannot have known any other reading but bhabhava"; for, the former concludes his explanation of VS 5.2.21 with the words; tasmat prakasasyabhavamatram tamah, while the latter in the body of his (obviously partially corrupt) commentary on this sutra uses a similar wording, viz. tasma[d] bhasas tejaso 'bhavas tamah, and, besides, gives the pratijna of the subsequent inference as bhabhavas tamah. Thus there is, in fact, sufficient evidence to assume that both of them refer to a reading bhabhava". Much less convincing, however, is the MUNI's conclusion that Candrananda actually read bhabhavama tram; for 'matram is clearly an explicative and has for this very reason in any case to be regarded as secondary when we compare the reading transmitted in the Nyayakandali etc. and indirectly attested by the author of the Vyakhya with that of the MS. O of those used by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI. There is, hence, a much higher degree of probability that "matram slipped into the sutra only out of Candrananda's paraphrase who added it to bhabhava, for the sake of clarity. As regards the second half of VS 5.2.21, the choice is, therefore, between three readings only, viz. a) abhavas tamah, b) bhavabhavas tamah, and finally c) bhabhavas tamah. 31. Cf. his edition of the VS (fn. 3), p. 230. 32. Cf. Prasastapadabhasya (Padarthadharmasangraha) with Commentary Nyayakandali of Sridharabhatta (Ganganatha-Jha-Granthamala, Vol. 1), Varanasi 1963, p. 26. 33. Cf. Prasastapadabhasya with the Commentary Kiranavall of Udayanacarya, ed, by J. S. JETLY (GOS, No. 154), Baroda 1971, p. 13. 34. Viz. on Nyayasutra 3. 1. 1. 35. Viz. in Ramasastri TAILANGA's edition of the Slokavarttika with Parthasarathi Misra's Commentary (ChSS 11, 1898-99), p. 740, 1. 13.. 36. Viz. on p. 43 of his edition, 37, Viz. on p. 230 of his edition. WEZLER: Further references to VS in PYSV 469 Of these, variant a could mean either "darkness is a non-positive entity", i. e. " is not a positive entity" or else "darkness is (an) absence." As to the first alternative, one cannot but think of Udayana who in his Kiranavali rejects Sridhara's view according to which darkeess is a particular colour (ripavisesa) and is, therefore, a bhava; the reading has, then, to be discarded. The second alternative interpretation is by no means preferable since in its case the entity the absence of which is darkness would not be stated. One might, of course, voice the opinion that there is also no need to state it explicitly; for, what else if not the absence of light could be the definiens in the present case ? Variant c would, then, have to be regarded as secondary since it would contain an explicative addition. But in view of the obvious posteriority of the only real testimony for variant a, viz. the Upaskara, and its notorious unreliability, the balance is clearly weighted on the other witnesses' side, i. e. the side of those commentaries and secondary sources who attest variant c. And that this is the reading which has also to be accepted as the original one, follows from the fact that variant b is most naturally and convincingly explained as due to dittography (just as variant a might be simply a kind of haplography). As for the first half of VS 5.2.21, the situation is different: It is only Candrananda who testifies to the reading dravyagunakarmavaidharmyad, whereas in all the other sources the reading is "karma ni spatts vaidharmyad. As the expression nispatti can hardly be used here in a sense different from the one it has in other sutras (cf. VS 2.2.36; 3.2.15; 8.3 and 4. 10.4), viz. "arising, origin", the latter reading implies a considerable narrowing down of the argument; for, the reason given for the conclusion that darkness is but the absence of light is confined to the difference obtaining in the manner in which dravyas, gunas and karmas, on the one hand, and darkness, on the other, arise. Within the framework of Vaisesika categoriology this argument is not only plausible, but also sufficient to prove what it is adduced for. In terms of logic of proof there is indeed no need to point out other differences also to be observed between darkness and substances, qualities and movements. Yet, in the course of the discussion about the nature of darkness, which was evidently continued by later philosophers, it might have seemed useful, if not even necessary, to at least some of the Vaisesikas to argue out their traditional position with a 11 the elements of vaidharmya between the three first padarthas and darkness, which latter could but belong to one of these very three categories and not, of course, to any of others. There is, 38. In the edition mentioned in fn, 33, p. 11 ff. 39. Expounded in the edition mentioned in fn. 32 on p. 21 ff. 40. It should, however, be noted that even in the PYSV a wording like abhovas (cet) tamah is used only later, i. e. after it has been stated at the very beginning of the discussion about the nature of darkness that prakasabhavamitrans eva tamah,

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470 R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume WEZLER : Further references to VS in PYSV 471 hence, a greater likelihood that nispalti was secondarily eliminated than that it was a later addition. 3.3. Be that as it may, this part of VS 5.2.21 is in any case not referred to in the PYSV, at least not directly, rather, it is the second part, i.e. the statement of the actual view of the VS as regards the nature of darkness, which the Vivaranakara vigorously attacks. But again he does not really quote this part of VS 5. 2. 21; instead what he gives is a paraphrase, viz. prakadabhauxmalram e tamo na rasi (p. 69 1. 13), thus reformulating, as it were, the relevant Vaisesika tenet more explicitly and indicating at the same time his own view, vix, that darkness is, on the contrary, a really existing thing (vastu), obviously regarded by him as a substance. This paraphrase, except for the final na rastu, is of particular interest in that it, too, in its turn exhibits a striking similarity with a remark of Candrananda's, viz. the concluding one on VS 5. 2. 21, already quoted above, viz. ( tasmal) prakasasyabharamalrum tamah. Therefore, there is hardly room for doubting that the opponent in the passage of the PYSV under discussion is a Vai esika, and this is true inspite of the fact that the arguments implied in VS 5. 2.21 for the view that darkness is but the absence of light, are not discussed by the Vivaranakara.41 Space does not permit to elaborate on this point, as this would entail examining the entire history of the discussion about the nature of darkness - and shadow - in Indian philosophy, nor to inspect the defendant's arguments more closely as regards their importance for the Yoga theory of perception. There fore, I have to confine myself to a few concluding remarks which are in part even of the nature of mere impressions. 3.4. Compared with the first instance ($ 2), the reference to the VS is in the second case, though almost equally unambiguous, of quite a different kind; for, regarding VS 5.2.21 the author of the PYSV is evidently and exclusively interested in its doctrinary content. It is, therefore, perfectly understandable that his attitude in this case is that of a severe critic, as the positions of the Vaisesika and that of Samkhya-Yoga are in fact mutually incompatible, nay plainly contrary to each other. The Vivaranakara's arguments, though wholly unconvincing to the modern mind, are nevertheless evidence of a remarkable intelligence, if viewed against the background of the physical) Weltbild of his time ( whatever it may be) in general and of Samkhya-Yoga in particular, And when we view them against their proper background, i.e. the old nature philosophy (as tentatively reconstructed and outlined by FRAUWALLNER") as well as the later development of the discussion about the nature of darkness, we ceive that the discussion found in the PYSV forms a most welcome and not unimportant additional piece of information in that it clearly enlarges our knowledge of the history of this discussion; for the Vivaranakara's arguments are different both from those of the old nature-philosophy as well as those refuted by Nyaya and Vaisesika authors. While the latter difference suggests the conclusion (which cannot, however, be regarded as absolutely cogent that the Vivarana. kara's arguments are of a marked antiquity or, at least, archaic, the former makes one realize that what we ultimately have to do with is a phenomenon, only too well-known in the history of Indian philosophy, viz. the substantial preservation of a traditional theorem, while introducing a palpable change or perhaps, a con. siderable progress as regards the manner in which the traditional view is defended by arguments. This becomes even more clear when we take into account what is said in an anonymous verse quoted by Sridhara :" Apart from the fact that the whole topic, i.e. the nature of darkness, forms in the context of this utsulre section of the PYSV but a side-issue, although tamas as such occupies a central and prominent position in Samkhya. Yoga metaphysics, it is rather difficult to judge to what extent the arguments of the opponent reflect genuine Vaisesika thought. They might well be fictitious in the sense that they were devised by the author of the PYSV himself, thinking along the lines of the Vaisesi ka. As for his own counter arguments, one cannot but notice that they are by and large substantially different from those which Vaisesika and, to a lesser degree, also Nyaya authors feel prompted to refute; there is, however, one important exception: The shadow argument though according to E. FRAUWALLNER an ancient one, continues to engross the attention of later Vaisesika thinkers. na a bhasam abhavasya tamastatin Urddhasim malam/ chayayah karenyam ity exam purane bhugunasruteh // darasannapradesads mahadalpicalacala / dehanuvartini chaya na vastutuad ina bhavet | 41. A possible reason being that such a discussion would have necessarily led to a rather long digression, i. e, critical examination and finally, of course, rejection of, at least, the first three categories of Valsesika. 42. The relevant passages for both of them can be easily and, so I hope, exhaus tively, located with the help of the Index in: Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The tradition of Nyaya-Valsesika up to Galgosa, ed. by K. H. POTTER, Delhi 1977. 13. Cf. the quotation below. 44. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. II. Bd, Salzburg, p. 15 ff - History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, tr. by V. M. BEDEKAR, Delhi 1973, p 3, 45. Cf. the edition mentioned in in. 32, p. 25.

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R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume For, regarding the shadow argument' as attested in this verse, one cannot but refer to what FRAUWALLNER has said about the difficulties the old nature philosophers were faced with, 48 viz. : "One could not, in a natural manner, explain shadow to be a form of one of the known elements. Such an explanation was also excluded because of the old popular view that shadow is something substantial." Instead of popular" or, perhaps in addition to it, FRAUWALLNER might have said "magical". In contradistinction to this archaic view, the shadow argument' as brought forward in the PYSV gives the impression of being quite rationalistic; and this not so much because in this connection, too, the author refers to empirical facts only, i.e. natural phenomena, known to everybody or at least easily verifiable, but rather because his argument is distinctly different from that adduced in the anonymous verse in that the Vivaranakara (just as the Jaina Gunaratna )*? does not seem to have thought any longer, at least not primarily, of the shadow of man as forming an essential part of any human being. 46. As Bedekar's translation (p. 20) is in this case (too) not faithful to the original (p. 38), I give my own English rendering here. 47. Cf. Tarkarahasyadi pika on Saddarsanasamuccaya, verse 49 (ed. Dr. Mahendra Kumar Jain ( Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jainagranthamala : Sanskrit Grantha No. 36 ) Benares 1969, p. 267 f.).