Fragments Of Pramana Samuccaya

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269376/1

Page #1
Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya Masaaki Hattori 1. VA, p. 338, 17: indriyarthodbhave nasti vyapadesyadi-sambhavah. PS, I, k. 19 (3 a, 2, 97 b, 8): dban po las byun don blo las (=la) // tha snad la sogs srid ma yin/ (The cognition) caused by the contact of sense-organ with object is incapable of being expressible' etc. Dignaga's criticism of Nyaya theory of perception starts with this verse. NS, I, i, 4 states: -- Perception is that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate. According to Dignaga, the expressible is cognized by means of inference only, and perception can never be expressible. Hence, the term 'inexpressible' in the definition of perception is superfluous. 2. VA, p. 338, 14-15: nanv artham antarenendriya-matrad yad utpad. yate tasyapi vyabhicarita tat kim "mano bhranti-visayatvad" iti vacanam. cf. VA, p. 338, 10 : katham tarhi tad uktam "sa no (=mano) bhranti-visayatoad vyabhicarinah". PSV, I (98 a): yid kyi yul ni hkhrul pahi yul Yin pahi phyir ro / After removing the term 'inexpressible' in the Nyaya definition of perception (see above Frag. 1), Dignaga further says that the qualification 'non-erroneous' is also of no use. The sense-perception is free from being erroneous, because the error is to be attributed to mind (manas), which is not sense-organ. The Naiyayikas hold that mind, though being not comprised in the enumeration of sense-organs at NS, I, i, 12, is also to be regarded as a sense organ in accordance with the commonly accepted theo. ry (cf. NBh, ad. I, i, 4). This view is refuted by Dignaga (Randle, Frag. B=PS, I, k. 21), according to whose theory, mind functions as an apperception synthesizing present perception and past experiences. The object grasped - 330 -

Page #2
(67) Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) by mind, therefore, is mere conceptual and has no reality: "mind takes erroneous thing as its object". Dignaga's theory is again criticised by opponents on the ground that some kinds of erroneous cognition are caused by the defect of sense-organ. It is with this criticism in view that Dharmakirti includes indriyagata-vibhrama in his enumeration of erroneous perception (NB, NBT, I, 6). 3. Svavrtti, p. 165, 1: yad aha "adrstarthe hy artha-vikalpa-matram" iti. PSV, II (111 a, 2-3): ma mthon bahi don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi...... / In the portion where this passage is found, Dignaga discusses that the particular is never admitted as the object to be cognized by means of inference. Some hold that inference is the same as the cognition relying upon authoritative words, by which the particular as well as the universal are cognized. Opposing to this view, Dignaga says: -- Object to be cognized by the knowledge derived from words is twofold, visible and invisible. Regarding visible objects, words are the cause of apprehending their names, and "with regard to invisible objects, such as svarga etc., the apprehension is actually a mere imagination of object." In both cases, what is apprehended is not the particular but the universal. 4. VA, p. 580, 14: "dharma-visisto dharmy anumeya" iti vacanat. PSV, II (111 a, 6): rjes su dpag pa ni cho khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / cf. Vasudhararaksita : rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyis khyad par du byas pahi chos can no/ The object to be inferred is S qualified by P. On this point the detailed discussion is made in PS, II, kk. 8-11 (cf. HIL, p. 281). Kanakavarman wrongly rendered anumeya into rjes su dpag pa. See below Frag. 7. 5. VA, p. 468, 1: tatah "tri-r@pa-ligakhyanam pararthan manam" iti Pramanasamuccaya-vittir virudhyate. PSV, III (124 b, 3-4): tshul gsum rtags brjod pa ni gsan gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste / "Inference for others' consists in expressing in words the three aspects of the logical mark. In the first verse of PS, III (cf. HIL, p. 288, Randle, Frag. I), Dignaga says:- 'Inference for others' is to make explicit (for - 329

Page #3
Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) (68) others) what has been apprehended by oneself. The above cited passage is found in his commentary on this verse, and is adopted by Dharmakirti as the definition of 'inference for others' at NB, III, 1. Dharmottara distinctly states at NBT ad. II, 1 that the essence of 'inference for others' is words, i. e., propositions (sabdatmaka), while that of 'inference for oneself' is cognition (jnanatmaka). 6. VA, p. 580,1: paksa-dharmo yato hetus tad-abhasas ca bhuyasa, tasmat tad vistarah purvam hetv-ady-arthat pradarsyate. PS, III, k. 7 6 b, 8-7 a, 1, 127 b, 1-2): gan phyir gtan tshigs bsgrub byahi chos // phal cher der snan ba yin te // de phyir de rgyas pa ni snar // brtag bya rtag (=rtags) sogs sugs kyis so / NM, lb, 4-5 is almost identical with this verse, though it is written in prose. The first half is quoted in NVT, as indicated by Tucci (NMD, p. 11, cf. his transl.).. : 7. VA, p. 580, 16, 29: samudayartha-sadhyatvad dharma-matre'tha dharmini, amukhe'py eka-desatvat sadhyatvam upacaryate. PS, III, k. 9 (7a, 2, 127 b, 4): bsdus pahi don ni bsgrub byahi phyir // chos sam yan na chos can la/ Igtso bo min yan phyogs gcig phyir // bsgrub bya nid du btags pa yin/ The object to be inferred being the thing (S) combined (with P), mere P or S is not (to be regarded as) the essece (of it). However, both P and S are metaphorically called the object to be inferred because of their being a part of it. That the object to be inferred is S qualified by P is established in PS, II (see above, Frag. 4), where both views that S is inferred from M and that the connection (sambandha) between P and S is inferred from M are rejected. In the preceding verse to the above (Randle, Frag. J, 1-2= PS, II, k. 8), the middle term is expressed by the term 'paksadharma', i. e., the attribute of S; thus what is meant there by the term paksa sadhya' (the object to be inferred) is mere S and is not S combined with P. The above verse is meant for explaining a reason for this different usage of the same teim. (cf. NM, 1b, 8-10) 8. VA, p. 647, 9: dvayoh siddhena dharmena vyavaharad viparyaye, dvayor ekasya casiddhau dhrmy-asiddhau ca nesyate. PS, III, k. 10 (7 a, 3, 127 b, 7): - 328 -

Page #4
(69) Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) gni ga la grub chos kyis ni // tha snad bya phyir gni ga dan // gcig la ldog dan the tshom dan || gsi ma grub la mi hdod do / (The valid reason is to be) expressed by the medium of an attribute (M) which is equally recognized (as residing in S) by both (the disputant and the opponent). When (a) both or (b) either of them oppose to or (c) are dubious of the residence of M in S, or (d) when (the existence of) s is not proved, the reason) cannot be accepted as valid. Four varieties of asiddha are enumerated here, namely, (a) ubhayasiddha, (b) anyatarasiddha, (c) sandigdhasiddha and (d) asrayasiddha. (cf. NM, 1 b, 17-23) In stanza c, casiddhau may be incorrect because both Tibetan translators render it to the tshom (samdeha, samdigdha). Vasudhararaksita perhaps erroneously renders dharmyasiddha to chos grub. 9. Svavrtti, p. 350, 1: yathaha "pramana-visayajnanad" iti. cf. Karnakagomin: yathahety acarya-Dignagah. asti pradhanam ity anena pradhanasvalaksanam eva sadhyata iti yat Samkhyenoktam tat pramanasyanuma. nasya visayajnanat samanya-visayan hy anumanam svalaksana-visayam (=avisayam ?). PSV, III (141 b, 4-5): (de la re sig gtso bo ni yod pa yin te ......hdi gal te gtso bo yod pa nid bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te / tshad mahi yul ni mi ses phyir / (spyini mtshan nid kyi yul can ma yin pahi rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no ses bstan zin to ) The Samkhyas maintain that the primodial matter does exist, thereby giving five kinds of reason. If, however, the primodial matter, which is sadhya of their inference, is the particular, then there is no possibility of their inference being valid, because "the particular can never be cognized as the object of inference". According to Dignaga, perception apprehends the particular only, inference apprehends the universal exclusively (PSV, ad. I, k. 1), and besides these two there is no other source of knowledge which may apprehend both the particular and the universal. 10. VA, p. 487, 33 : sva-niscaya-vad anyesam niscayotpadanecchaya, paksadharmatva-sambandha-sadhyokter anya-varjanam. PS, IV, k. 6 (9 a, 2-3, 150 b, 7): ran la nes bsin gsan dag la // nes pa bskyed par hdod pa yis // phyogs chos nid dan hbrel ba dan / bsgrub bya brjod bya gsan dag span/ - 327 -

Page #5
Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) (70) In order to produce in the mind of others the ascertainment in the same way as it is produced in one's own mind, one should state (a) that M is resident in S (hetu), (b) the connection between M and P (drstanta) and (c) the proposition to be proved (pratijna). Other (members of syllogism, i. e., upanaya and nigamana) are to be excluded (because they are no other than the repetation of hetu and pratijna). This verse exactly coincides, as indicated by Miyasaka (Journal of Ind. & Bud. Studies, VI, 1, p. 31), with NM, 3 a, 7-8, and Tucci seems to have misread it (NMD, p. 44, XIII). The latter half of the verse is cited in NV (cf. Frauwallner, WZKM, 40 Bd., p. 304). 11. TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 13-15: yat tuktam anyapohena bhasata iti tatra bhasanam dyotanam jnapanam iti yavat. tatha casya vivaranam "tat krtakatvadi-vad arthantara-samband hena vyavacchedena dyotayati" iti. PSV, V, ad. k. 1 (156 a, 5-6): de byas pa nid la sogs pa bsin du don gsan rnam par bcad pas gsal bar byed pa (dehi phyir rjes su dpag pa las tha dad pa 'ma yin no 1) * It (=knowledge derived from words) indicates its own object) through a contact with or by excluding other things, as for instance the words 'being a product' (desinate their own meaning by excluding other things which are not product or are eternal. Therefore, this means of knowledge does not differ from inference). 'Anyapohena bhasate' is the stanza d of PS, V, k. 1, which is wholly quoted in TSP (cf. Ihara, Annals of Phil. Studies, Kyushu Univ., XIV, p. 114). 12. PKM, p. 436, 15-16: Dignagena visesana-visesya-bhava-samarthanar. tham"nilotpaladi-sabda arthantara-nivstti-vicistan arthan ahuh" ity uktam. cf. Karnakagomin ad. Svavrtti, p. 248, 26-27: katham tarhy acarya-Dignagena " sabdo 'rthantara-vyavrtti-visistan eva bhavan aha" ity ady uktam. PSV, V (159 a, 6-7): u tpa la snon po ses bya ba la sogs pahi sgra ni gsan sel bahi tha dad pa yod kyan hgren ba dan.... / Words, e. g., 'blue lotus' etc., (cannot express the object itself directly, but they) designate the object (indirectly) as qualified by the exclusion of other things, (e. g., white lotus, a blue piece of cloth etc.) 13. VA, p. 44, 29--30: karyatvanyatva-lesena yat sadhyasiddhi-darsanam, tat -326 -

Page #6
(71) Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) karyasamam etat tu tridha vaktr-abhisandhitah. PS, VI, k. 7 (12 a, 4, 171 b, 1): hbras nid gsan gyi cha yis ni // bsgrub bya ma grub par mthon gan // de ni hbras mtshuns hdi yan na // smra pohi bsam pas rnam gsum mo/ This verse gives the definition of karyasama and further states that it is classified into three in accordance with the intention of the disputant. The part of definition (stanzas a-c) is identical with NM, 5 b, 1-2 and is cited in NVT and TSP (cf. NMD, p. 66) and also at PKM, p. 275, 6-7. Three kinds of karyasama, i. e., asiddha, viruddha and anaikantika or drstantabhasa are referred to at NM, 5 b, 27-5 C, 1. Prajnakaragupta quotes the first verse of Alambanapariksa at VA, p. 336, 5. The verse cited by Kamalasila at TSP, p. 582 (cf. Poussin, JA, 1930), slightly differs from the Tibetan version, with which the following qoted in VA is exactly coincident. yady apindriya-vijnapteh karanan paramanavah, atad-abhataya nasya aksa-vad vinayo'navah |dban poui rnam par rig pahi rgyu // phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyil. | der mi snan phyir deni yul ni // rdul phran ma yin dban po bsin/ Note: (Abbrev.) NM, Nyayamukha (Chin.), Taisho, XXXII; PKM, Prameyakamalamartanda, Bombay, 1941; Svavrtti, Acarya-Dharmakirteh Pra. manavarttikam, Svarthanumanaparicchedah, Allahabad, 1943; VA, Prama. navarttikabhasyam or Varttikalamkarah of Prajnakaragupta, Patna, 1953; others are as commonly used. Folio number of PS (V) shows that of Pek. Ed. No. 97 (Ce). Kanakavarman's transl. is referred to in principle, while Vasudhararaksita's transl. is touched upon only in case of necessity. Besides the concerned studies so far published both in Japanese and in foreign languages, I, thanks to the kindness of Jain Muni Jambuvijaya, could refer to the proof of his PS (V), Pratyaksapariccheda, Appendix to Nayacakravrtti, which will soon be published. PS (V), I, kk, 1-13deg is almost perfectly reconstructed by him, who extensively refers to sources in which passages of PS (V) are quoted. - 325 --