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Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya
Masaaki Hattori
1. VA, p. 338, 17: indriyârthôdbhave nâsti vyapadeśyadi-sambhavaḥ. PS, I, k. 19 (3 a, 2, 97 b, 8): dban po las byun don blo las (=la) // tha sñad la sogs srid ma yin/
(The cognition) caused by the contact of sense-organ with object is incapable of being expressible' etc. Dignāga's criticism of Nyāya theory of perception starts with this verse. NS, I, i, 4 states: -- Perception is that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous and determinate. According to Dignāga, the expressible is cognized by means of inference only, and perception can never be expressible. Hence, the term 'inexpressible' in the definition of perception is superfluous.
2. VA, p. 338, 14–15: nanv artham antareņêndriya-mātrād yad utpad. yate tasyâpi vyabhicāritā tat kim “mano bhrānti-visayatvad” iti vacanam. cf. VA, p. 338, 10 : katham tarhi tad uktam “sa no (=mano) bhrānti-visayatoad vyabhicārinah”. PSV, I (98 a): yid kyi yul ni hkhrul pahi yul Yin paḥi phyir ro /
After removing the term 'inexpressible' in the Nyāya definition of perception (see above Frag. 1), Dignāga further says that the qualification ‘non-erroneous' is also of no use. The sense-perception is free from being erroneous, because the error is to be attributed to mind (manas), which is not sense-organ. The Naiyāyikas hold that mind, though being not comprised in the enumeration of sense-organs at NS, I, i, 12, is also to be regarded as a sense organ in accordance with the commonly accepted theo. ry (cf. NBh, ad. I, i, 4). This view is refuted by Dignāga (Randle, Frag. B=PS, I, k. 21), according to whose theory, mind functions as an apperception synthesizing present perception and past experiences. The object grasped
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Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya (M. Hattori) by mind, therefore, is mere conceptual and has no reality: “mind takes erroneous thing as its object”. Dignāga's theory is again criticised by opponents on the ground that some kinds of erroneous cognition are caused by the defect of sense-organ. It is with this criticism in view that Dharmakīrti includes indriyagata-vibhrama in his enumeration of erroneous perception (NB, NBT, I, 6).
3. Svavrtti, p. 165, 1: yad āha "adrstârthe hy artha-vikalpa-mätram” iti. PSV, II (111 a, 2–3): ma mthon baḥi don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi...... /
In the portion where this passage is found, Dignāga discusses that the particular is never admitted as the object to be cognized by means of inference. Some hold that inference is the same as the cognition relying upon authoritative words, by which the particular as well as the universal are cognized. Opposing to this view, Dignāga says: -- Object to be cognized by the knowledge derived from words is twofold, visible and invisible. Regarding visible objects, words are the cause of apprehending their names, and “with regard to invisible objects, such as svarga etc., the apprehension is actually a mere imagination of object.” In both cases, what is apprehended is not the particular but the universal.
4. VA, p. 580, 14: “dharma-viśisto dharmy anumeya” iti vacanāt. PSV, II (111 a, 6): rjes su dpag pa ni cho khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / cf. Vasudhararakṣita : rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyis khyad par du byas paḥi chos can no/
The object to be inferred is S qualified by P. On this point the detailed discussion is made in PS, II, kk. 8–11 (cf. HIL, p. 281). Kanakavarman wrongly rendered anumeya into rjes su dpag pa. See below Frag. 7.
5. VA, p. 468, 1: tatah “tri-r@pa-ligakhyānam pararthân mẫnam” iti Pramāṇasamuccaya-vịttir virudhyate. PSV, III (124 b, 3-4): tshul gsum rtags brjod pa ni gşan gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste /
“Inference for others' consists in expressing in words the three aspects of the logical mark. In the first verse of PS, III (cf. HIL, p. 288, Randle, Frag. I), Dignāga says:- 'Inference for others' is to make explicit (for
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Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya (M. Hattori)
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others) what has been apprehended by oneself. The above cited passage is found in his commentary on this verse, and is adopted by Dharmakīrti as the definition of 'inference for others’ at NB, III, 1. Dharmottara distinctly states at NBT ad. II, 1 that the essence of 'inference for others' is words, i. e., propositions (sabdātmaka), while that of 'inference for oneself' is cognition (jñānātmaka).
6. VA, p. 580,1: pakşa-dharmo yato hetus tad-abhāsāś ca bhūyasă, tasmat tad vistaraḥ pūrvam hetv-ady-arthat pradarśyate. PS, III, k. 7 6 b, 8-7 a, 1, 127 b, 1–2): gan phyir gtan tshigs bsgrub byaḥi chos // phal cher der snan ba yin te // de phyir de rgyas pa ni snar // brtag bya rtag (=rtags) sogs śugs kyis so /
NM, lb, 4–5 is almost identical with this verse, though it is written in prose. The first half is quoted in NVT, as indicated by Tucci (NMD, p. 11, cf. his transl.).. : 7. VA, p. 580, 16, 29: samudayârtha-sadhyatvad dharma-matre'tha dharmiņi, amukhe’py eka-deśatvāt sādhyatvam upacaryate. PS, III, k. 9 (7a, 2, 127 b, 4): bsdus paḥi don ni bsgrub byaḥi phyir // chos sam yan na chos can la/ Igtso bo min yan phyogs gcig phyir // bsgrub bya ñid du btags pa yin/
The object to be inferred being the thing (S) combined (with P), mere P or S is not (to be regarded as) the essece (of it). However, both P and S are metaphorically called the object to be inferred because of their being a part of it. That the object to be inferred is S qualified by P is established in PS, II (see above, Frag. 4), where both views that S is inferred from M and that the connection (sambandha) between P and S is inferred from M are rejected. In the preceding verse to the above (Randle, Frag. J, 1-2= PS, II, k. 8), the middle term is expressed by the term 'pakşadharma', i. e., the attribute of S; thus what is meant there by the term paksa
sādhya' (the object to be inferred) is mere S and is not S combined with P. The above verse is meant for explaining a reason for this different usage of the same teim. (cf. NM, 1b, 8-10)
8. VA, p. 647, 9: dvayoh siddhena dharmena vyavahārad viparyaye, dvayor ekasya câsiddhau dhrmy-asiddhau ca nêsyate. PS, III, k. 10 (7 a, 3, 127 b, 7):
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Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya (M. Hattori) gñi ga la grub chos kyis ni // tha sñad bya phyir gñi ga dan // gcig la ldog dan the tshom dan || gși ma grub la mi ḥdod do /
(The valid reason is to be) expressed by the medium of an attribute (M) which is equally recognized (as residing in S) by both (the disputant and the opponent). When (a) both or (b) either of them oppose to or (c) are dubious of the residence of M in S, or (d) when (the existence of) s is not proved, the reason) cannot be accepted as valid. Four varieties of asiddha are enumerated here, namely, (a) ubhayâsiddha, (b) anyatarâsiddha, (c) sandigdhäsiddha and (d) aśrayasiddha. (cf. NM, 1 b, 17-23) In stanza c, câsiddhau may be incorrect because both Tibetan translators render it to the tshom (samdeha, samdigdha). Vasudhararakṣita perhaps erroneously renders dharmyasiddha to chos grub.
9. Svavrtti, p. 350, 1: yathaha “pramāņa-visayâjñānād” iti. cf. Karnakagomin: yathāhêty ācārya-Dignāgah. asti pradhānam ity anena pradhānasvalakṣaṇam eva sādhyata iti yat Sāṁkhyenôktam tat pramāṇasyânumā. nasya visayajñānāt sāmānya-vişayan hy anumānam svalaksana-visayam (=avişayam ?). PSV, III (141 b, 4-5): (de la re sig gtso bo ni yod pa yin te ......hdi gal te gtso bo yod pa ñid bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te / tshad maḥi yul ni mi ses phyir / (spyiņi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin pahi rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no șes bstan zin to )
The Sāmkhyas maintain that the primodial matter does exist, thereby giving five kinds of reason. If, however, the primodial matter, which is sādhya of their inference, is the particular, then there is no possibility of their inference being valid, because “the particular can never be cognized as the object of inference". According to Dignāga, perception apprehends the particular only, inference apprehends the universal exclusively (PSV, ad. I, k. 1), and besides these two there is no other source of knowledge which may apprehend both the particular and the universal.
10. VA, p. 487, 33 : sva-niscaya-vad anyeşām niscayôtpadanêcchaya, pakşadharmatva-sambandha-sadhyôkter anya-varjanam. PS, IV, k. 6 (9 a, 2–3, 150 b, 7): raň la nes bșin gșan dag la // nes pa bskyed par ḥdod pa yis // phyogs chos ñid dan ḥbrel ba dan / bsgrub bya brjod bya gşan dag span/
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In order to produce in the mind of others the ascertainment in the same way as it is produced in one's own mind, one should state (a) that M is resident in S (hetu), (b) the connection between M and P (drstanta) and (c) the proposition to be proved (pratijñā). Other (members of syllogism, i. e., upanaya and nigamana) are to be excluded (because they are no other than the repetation of hetu and pratijña). This verse exactly coincides, as indicated by Miyasaka (Journal of Ind. & Bud. Studies, VI, 1, p. 31), with NM, 3 a, 7-8, and Tucci seems to have misread it (NMD, p. 44, XIII). The latter
half of the verse is cited in NV (cf. Frauwallner, WZKM, 40 Bd., p. 304).
11. TSP, ad. k. 1515, p. 441, 13–15: yat tûktam anyápohena bhāṣata iti tatra bhāṣaṇam dyotanam jñāpanam iti yāvat. tathā câsya vivaranam "tat krtakatvádi-vad arthântara-samband hena vyavacchedena dyotayati” iti. PSV, V, ad. k. 1 (156 a, 5–6): de byas pa ñid la sogs pa bșin du don gșan rnam par bcad pas gsal bar byed pa (dehi phyir rjes su dpag pa las tha dad pa 'ma yin no 1)
• It (=knowledge derived from words) indicates its own object) through a contact with or by excluding other things, as for instance the words 'being a product' (desinate their own meaning by excluding other things which are not product or are eternal. Therefore, this means of knowledge does not differ from inference). ‘Anyápohena bhaşate' is the stanza d of PS, V, k. 1, which is wholly quoted in TSP (cf. Ihara, Annals of Phil. Studies, Kyūshū Univ., XIV, p. 114).
12. PKM, p. 436, 15–16: Dignāgena višeșaņa-višeşya-bhāva-samarthanar. tham“nilotpaladi-sabda arthântara-nivstti-vićiştan arthân ahuh” ity uktam. cf. Karnakagomin ad. Svavrtti, p. 248, 26–27: katham tarhy ācārya-Dignāgena " sabdo 'rthantara-vyavrtti-visistan eva bhāvān aha” ity ādy uktaṁ. PSV, V (159 a, 6–7): u tpą la sńon po șes bya ba la sogs paḥi sgra ni gşan sel baḥi tha dad pa yod kyan hgren ba dan.... /
Words, e. g., 'blue lotus’ etc., (cannot express the object itself directly, but they) designate the object (indirectly) as qualified by the exclusion of other things, (e. g., white lotus, a blue piece of cloth etc.)
13. VA, p. 44, 29--30: kāryatvânyatva-leśena yat sadhyasiddhi-darśanam, tat
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________________ (71) Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya (M. Hattori) karyasamam etat tu tridha vaktr-abhisandhitah. PS, VI, k. 7 (12 a, 4, 171 b, 1): hbras nid gsan gyi cha yis ni // bsgrub bya ma grub par mthon gan // de ni hbras mtshuns hdi yan na // smra pohi bsam pas rnam gsum mo/ This verse gives the definition of karyasama and further states that it is classified into three in accordance with the intention of the disputant. The part of definition (stanzas a-c) is identical with NM, 5 b, 1-2 and is cited in NVT and TSP (cf. NMD, p. 66) and also at PKM, p. 275, 6-7. Three kinds of karyasama, i. e., asiddha, viruddha and anaikantika or drstantabhasa are referred to at NM, 5 b, 27-5 C, 1. Prajnakaragupta quotes the first verse of Alambanapariksa at VA, p. 336, 5. The verse cited by Kamalasila at TSP, p. 582 (cf. Poussin, JA, 1930), slightly differs from the Tibetan version, with which the following qoted in VA is exactly coincident. yady apindriya-vijnapteh karanan paramanavah, atad-abhataya nasya aksa-vad vinayo'navah |dban poui rnam par rig pahi rgyu // phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyil. | der mi snan phyir deni yul ni // rdul phran ma yin dban po bsin/ Note: (Abbrev.) NM, Nyayamukha (Chin.), Taisho, XXXII; PKM, Prameyakamalamartanda, Bombay, 1941; Svavrtti, Acarya-Dharmakirteh Pra. manavarttikam, Svarthanumanaparicchedah, Allahabad, 1943; VA, Prama. navarttikabhasyam or Varttikalamkarah of Prajnakaragupta, Patna, 1953; others are as commonly used. Folio number of PS (V) shows that of Pek. Ed. No. 97 (Ce). Kanakavarman's transl. is referred to in principle, while Vasudhararaksita's transl. is touched upon only in case of necessity. Besides the concerned studies so far published both in Japanese and in foreign languages, I, thanks to the kindness of Jain Muni Jambuvijaya, could refer to the proof of his PS (V), Pratyaksapariccheda, Appendix to Nayacakravrtti, which will soon be published. PS (V), I, kk, 1-13deg is almost perfectly reconstructed by him, who extensively refers to sources in which passages of PS (V) are quoted. - 325 --