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________________ Exposition of Sabda-Saktis by Siddhicandragani Dr. Satyapal Narang Siddhicandra, a contemporary of the Emperor Akbar received an epithet 'Khushfaham' from the king due to his extraordinary intelligence. He was not only a renowned commentator on the classical works like Kadambari, Jain Stotra literature, dictionaries, roots etc. but also wrote original works like Bhanucandra caritam etc. and compiled anthologies of Sanskrit and Prakta literature. His work Kavyaprakasakhandana, although not original in nature, refutes the renowned work by Mammata i.e. Kavyaprakasa. While refuting Kavyaprakasa he has refuted the uncertain power of words viz. vyanjana. This refutation is based on logical ground which has a harmony with Jain thought and philosophy. After accepting three categories of meaning viz. vacya, laksya and vyangya, Siddhicandra skips over to sanketa viz. (E f ustafa 29: 1 fanaat catfeffata al VII. (2) and VIII. Siddhicandra does not quote the original). He has quoted a verse that vacakatva has a power and this power is found in the genus (and not in individual (vyakti) zaktimattvaM vAcakatvaM zaktirjAto paraM mtaaH| The Abhidha as it is explained by some that it is a desire of the God. That a particular word should convey a particular meaning, in the opinion of Siddhicandra, is incorrect. He thinks that it is absolutely a different substance. (55aatfaraise qarafatha ) Individual or genus : The discussion raised by Siddhicandra is that of connotation of individual or genus. In his opinion, the power should lie with expression that conveys the meaning (1779). Following this logic the power should lie with individual which expresses the meaning and not with genus. But transgressing this norm of logic he supports the Jativada and thinks that individual is qualified by the genus. By accepting power in individual, three defects come into existence : i. Multiplicity of Individuals. ii. Infinitude. iii. Fallacious argument. But where anantya (infinitude) and vyabhicara defects do not exist, it may be accepted in individual also e.g. the sky where both these defects do not appear. It appears Siddhicandra does not believe in comprehension qualified by genus because it involves a long procedure of comprehension through laksana or aksepa or vyanjana which in itself requires a fiction of cause and effect relationship without which it is impossible. Siddhicandra believes in direct comprehension of words and not the indirect fictitious procedure The follower of the direct procedure, Siddhicandra lays a stress on abhidha. He accepts the traditional 44 AcAryaratna zrI dezabhUSaNa jI mahArAja abhinandana grantha
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________________ definition of abhidha viz. this word shall express this meaning which is associated with the desire of God or a natural and direct meaning associated with the word. Another problem raised by Siddhicandra pertains to the words which express their meaning through Laksana only. Following these two categories of the words i.e. the abhidha and Laksana, there shall be no consistency in reasoning. But in the opinion of Siddhicandra when the word Ganga (e.g in Gangayam ghosah) expresses the meaning 'stream', it is also the wish of God (isvareccha) which is qualified with special form (visesarupa). Such like words are corroborated by the use of technical grammatical terms also. For example, the terms ghu, ghi ti etc. in grammar have no meaning through Abhidha but their direct meaning is conveyed by the real meaning i.e. dadhaghvadap (Pan 1.2.20) which qualifies the abhidha. Similarly the word u: in the notion #aut af teary does not express crow at it first meaning but all the other apimals from whom the protection is sought. The word used in plural expresses all of them at first instance and the meaning of the word kaka becomes secondary. Siddhicandra's approach is not to widen the semantic categories of words but to delimit it to the meaning which is desired by the speaker. This approach resembles those of Mimamsakas who associate a new power tatparya (purport) with the word and reject the other powers viz. Iaksana and vyanjana. But in nomenclature Siddhicandra accepts abbidha whereas Mimarsakas accept tatparya. Siddhicandra gives only casual remarks about the categories of Laksana. Process of comprehension in "Gaurvahikah There is a difference of vocabulary in the comprehension of 'Gaurvahikah between Mammata ard Siddhicandra. Mammata has quoted the opinion of some scholars (Kecit) in whose opinion the cow qualified by foolishness etc. (Jadyamandya) identifies itself with Vahika. The instrumentality of identity are the qualities foolishness etc. Siddhicandra has also quoted the opinion of a few scholars. The cow qualified by the qualities of foolishness etc. equates itself with Vahika consisting of similar qualities Siddhicandra almost follows Mammata verbatim. Another opinion quoted by Mammata (ityanye) is that in procedure both cow and Vahika eliminate from the picture and the only remenant object is foolishness. But in the opinion of Siddhicandra cow and Vahika are not eliminated but it is only through their existence that the word cow expresses Vahika. It is not only the quality foolishness etc. but the really existent substance that is qualified by the quality foolishness. To illustrate he has quoted another example : where beauty is expressed and the substance face and moon do not disappear from the picture. Another opinion quoted by Mammata is that only the qualities like foolishness exist and not the real substance which is an instrument only and does not exist on the picture at all. In the opinion of Siddhicandra juxtaposition (yogyata) is a pre-requisite qualification for the identity of knowledge. To join cow with Vahika, the joining substance is foolishness. Otherwise there shall be no relationship of cow and Vahika which are absolutely separate entities. Moreover, to elaboiate his thesis, Siddhicandra has taken the resort of a dictim (nyaya) that the comprehension of knowledge can be created by the word even if the exact meaning is not communicated by it. It means the words cow and 1. Siddhicandra (K. P. Kh. p. 7.) gives only the line a r if TUFTEI 2. K P. Khandana, p. 8, 374Faraf Ter a : fa 1 jaina sAhityAnuzIlana
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________________ Vahika definitely communicate their own meaning; they may or they may not communicate the desired meaning of foolishness which is desired from it. Hence the existence of the substance which is an instrument for the expression of meaning does not at all eliminate from the picture. Refuting Laksana, Siddhicandra has first taken an argument about Sadrsya which was used in the Karika of Kavyaprakasa (II. 12). In his opinion the substitute of Laksana is "imposition of meaning" (grana). It is not necessary that the possibility of Laksana is through "Similarity" (sadrsya) only. Beyond similarity or non-similarity, there exists another relationship of cause and effect etc. For example in 'Ayurghrtam' or Ayurevedam, the relationship of Ayu and ghrta is that of cause and effect relationship. Their relationship comes into existence not due to an uncertain power but due to an extraordinary definite power.1 It appears that Siddhicandra is in favour of a definite word power which is related to the words and has its logical and rational explanation. It is not an arbitrary power, which, when applied, conveys any meaning desired by the speaker. This arbitrariness which is communicated by Laksana has been refuted by Siddhicandra on the ground of uncertainty in it. Vyanjana: Why? Siddhicandra has refuted vyanjana on the ground that it has no logical evidence (Pramanabhavat). The need of vyanjana has been negated ab initio on the ground that wheresoever Laksanamuladhvani exists, there will be no rational explanation of the words which will result in the expression of a special meaning, e.g. in : the coldness and sacredness which is related to the words through denotation (Laksana) shall appear automatically and will express its deeper meaning. If the meaning is communicated through Laksana, what is the need of the assumption of Vyanjana ? The second ground of refutation of vyanjana is its application in dramatic literature. "For the suggestion of Rasa, Vyanjana must be accepted" is the opinion in prima-facie.2 In the opinion of Siddhicandra, it is a very weak argument. Infact, aesthetic enjoyment comes into existence from the pleasure of dramas etc. directly and has no indirect channel like vyangya interferes in it. The perceptive object is not to be interpreted by an inferential logic.3 In the interpretation of the verses like bhama dhammia vIsatyo and dvayaM gataM samprati zocanIyatAm, etc., the meaning that this place is not worth walking shall be obtained by inference () and hence there is no need of vyanjana. Moreover, in his opinion, the indirect channels like inference and suggestions are not to be brought in this context because the meaning is directly obtained. Moreover, Siddhicandra has corroborated his argument by the Mimamsakas who accept tatparya (purport) as the power of the word and in his opinion there is no contradiction of tatparya with laksyartha. Refuting that vyanjakata exists in the gestures etc., Siddhicandra propounds that the gestures express their meaning only through inference because each and every gesture has a definite meaning which is attributed to it and is comprehended through inference at a later stage. Siddhicandra does not accept any other power called vyanjana. Infact, he accepts only six categories of laksana which are propunded by Mammata (KP. II. 12). In his opinion vyanjana is such a deep imagination that may attract the objects other than desired. The argument in 1. ibid., 2. K. P. Khandana, p. 9. rasavyaJjakatayA vyaJjanA'vazyamAzrayaNIyati / jbid., p. 9. rasavyaJjakatA katA vazyamAyaNIyeti tadatIvatum anabhyupamaparahitatvAt vastutastu dadarzana janyasukha vizeSasyaiva rasatvasya vakSyamANatvena tasya vyaGgyatvAbhAvAt / apitu sAkSAtkAraviSayatvAt / AcArya ratna zrI vezabhUSaNa jI mahArAja abhinandana grantha 3. 46. 8 atrAnyavailakSaNyena cAvyabhicAreNa ca tatkAritvaM phalam / P.
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________________ prima facie that the power which generates sacredness in the phrases like Gangayam ghosah is vyanjana, It is different from Abhidha; it consists of a relationship of meaning viz. comprehension through binding (badhitabodbakatva) wbich is not present in abidha. But Siddhicandra refutes it on the ground that the relationship of 'Badhitabodhakatva' may be derived from the abhidha itself. The dictum that the imagination of characteristics (THETAT) should be lesser than the object itself (mikalpanAto dharmakalpanA laghIyasIti nyAyAta). Only the change of nomenclature cannot prove the different object (TraTETTATUFT AFFOFTTTTTTTTT) Another argument laid down to prove vyanjana is that when we use two different expressions "Anenedamuktam" i.e. it has been said by this or vyanjitam i.e. suggested, both of them express different meanings (Pratityorvailaksanyat). In other words we have to accept both Abhidha and vyanjana as different powers. But in the opinion of Siddhicandra, in both the above cases viz. anenedamuktam or vyanjitam, there is no difference in the comprehension of the meaning. The same meaning can be comprehended if we apply the power Laksana or inference. Another argument put forth by prima facie that if there is no need of vyanjana and everything is proved by inference (anumana), the whole of the procedure of comprehension of knowledge should be different. The comprehension is, "ghatam anaya" (bring the jar) should not be through Akanksa, yogyata etc. but should have a full procedure following inference only. To explain, the procedure should not be directly related to comprehension of 'a jar' through perception but should be comprehended through inference only in order to establish the harmony in the system. Siddhicandra has accepted this challenge in order to establish inference. In his opinion juxtaposition (yogyata) has no special definition and it communicates only an unqualified doubtful knowledge.1 For the comprehension of knowledge, doubt is an obstruction. Inference in one of the means of removing the doubt when the words are the referents, there is no need of any type of application of vyapti. In agnina sincati. there is no semantic juxtaposition and we can infer the incorrectness of the use although grammatically it is correct. In the opinion of Siddhicandra, even by the application of inference we do not reach a different conclusion. So the validity of the comprehension of words through inference is also correct. Hence there is no need of far-fetched power vyanjana. Conclusion : Siddhicandra believes in the direct and definite meaning of speech. The uncertainty of speech in vyangya does not suit him. In his opinion words express definite meaning. The meaning through inference is nearer to the denotative meaning because it has a relevance to the words used whereas vyanjana has no certainty. The uncertainty in meaning would perhaps, bring anarchy not only in the language but also in the society which would apply it for its own profit and would defeat the fundamental purpose of language by false and incorrect subjective interpretations. It was against the norms of 'satya' in Jain ethics. It appears in order to bring harmony of language with Jain ethics, Siddhicandra preferred to accept 'inference' as the medium for correctness of words and gave up the conceitful expression vyanjana. 1. K. P. Khandana p. 11. saMzayasAdhAraNajJAnasya karaNatvAt / jaina sAhityAnuzIlana X9