Exposition of Naya in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Ajit Shuk Deo Sharma
Publisher: Z_Yatindrasuri_Diksha_Shatabdi_Smarak_Granth_012036.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250090/1

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YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH -
Exposition of naya in Jaina philosophy
DR Ajit shuk deo sharma
Serious students of indian philosophy are fers of thing as a whole, nayas have relation to well aware of the brilliant part played by jaina Lo analysis, whereas saptabhangi relates to synthegicians in their polemics with Hindu and Buddhist sis. Nayavada is the analytical method of knowllogicians in ancient and medieval India. There is edge while saptabhangi or syadvada as the synno doubt about it, that jaina logic is one of the most thetical method of knowing a thing. According to valuable and ancient logic of india. Specially the H. Jacobi. It would be more correct to say that doctrines of nonabsolutism, the method of dialec- syadvada is a logical development the a corollary tical predications and the method of standpoints of nayavada. Dr A.N. Upadhye oboserves that are the separate and peculiar dialectic develop syadvada is a corollary of nayavada and that the ment of jaina logic. In the present paper I Want to letter is analytical and Primarily conceptual and the discuss the method of standpoints in broad outline, formar is synthetical and verbal. In this connecleaving out subtle details. Because the subject.is tion Dr. padmarjiah says." Although not quite inobviously very wide in scope, it cannot be treated correct, this distinction is apt to the somewhat misfully in a small dissertation like this.
understood if we are not aware of the background
against which it is made. This is because the so: My treatment of the topic falls under four sec
called primary conceptual method is also verbal, tions. Viz, 1. naya and syadvada. 2. naya and
in as much as it not merely requires the aid of word pramana. 2 Naya and Niksepa and 4. Definitions
for the the expressin ot its various standpionts but and kinds of nayas.
also has as many as three, among its seven, stand
points which are exclusively designated a 1 Nayavada ans syadvada
saptabhangi. Further he says "Similarly, in conThe method of standpoints (nayas) and the tradiction to the verdal elements of the concepmethod of dialectical predications (Syadvada) are tual' nayavada, the 'mainly verbal method of the two main wings of non- absolutism Syadvada is so much charged with the epistemo(Anekantavada). In the words of siddhasena - logical character that we might say that its verbal Divakara, Nayas offer the individual Jewels, which
side is more instrumental than intrinsic in value. But are strung together by means of syadvada, into a under Syadvada no distinctions, such as the verba! necklace. Logically, these are two complremetary modes of syadvada and non-verbal or the episteprocesses forming a natural and inevitable devel- mological modes of syadvada can be made since opment of the relativistic presuppositon of the Jaina all modes are both verbal and epistemological. metaphysics. They form a schema wihch is pereminently one of correlative methods rather than 2. Naya and Pramana of theories of reality, although they both prasuppose
Knowledge is attained by means of pramana and explain the primordial notion that all reality is
and Naya. Here, Pramana is mentioned first as it relativistic, Nayavada is principally an analytical
is of superior excellence because it is the source method Investigating a particular standpoint of a
or origin of Naya. The nayas are the division of factual situation accoding to the purpose and level
Pramana. Jaina scripturs say, "Accepting knowlof the equipment of experient (jnatr) Making a fur
edge derived from Pramana, ascertaining one ther distinction between nayavada and syadvada
particular state or mode of substance is naya. (saptabhangti) it can be said that nayas refer to
Secondary, the range of Pramana comprises all the parts of a thing, whereas the saptabhangi reiniinomotrimonio incontrario 24 hormon noronsvom imontraintenir

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-YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH attributes. Similarly, it has been said that Pramana and linguistic symbols, which fall to express the is a comprehensive view, whereas naya is a par- knowledge in its pristime comprehensiveness untial view. In other words, Pramana is called com- less their significance is rightly analysed." plete judgement (Sakaladesa) while Naya is called incomplete judgment (vikaladesa). Through com- 3. Naya and Niksepa plete judgment, it is not possible for us to describe
Etymologically, the term "Niksepa' stands for the infinite characteristics of an object. To overcome this difficulty, we use only one word that
putting together' or classifying; but this meaning
can hardly be recognised in the developed forms descibes one characteristic of that object and hold
of the concept of niksepa. It is one such technique the remaining characteristics to the indentical with
of exposition of words as well as interpretation of it. By this method we can describe all characteris
the nature of reality. Now, Naya may be distintics of an object by the description of a particular
guished from it. Naya is a point of view from which aspect only. This type of preposition is called
we make some statement about the thing, while pramana, saptabhangi or complete judgment. The
Niksepa is an aspect of the thing itself. If we conidentity of all other aspects with a simple aspect is proved by the identity of time, quality, substratum,
sider the statements merely as such, its point of
view is naya; if we consider the fact which justifies relation, association and word. In the case of in
the point of view it is niksepa. complete judgment the order is reversed. Every judgment presuposes some difference in every 4. Definition of Naya and its kinds aspect or quality. In regard to a complete judgement, time, quality etc. establish identity among The Jaina doctrine of modes or stand point various qualities, whereas with regard to an incom- corresponds to the Greek doctrine of tropes, modes plete judgement time, quality, etc. prepare the ground and conditions. The Jaina epistemology elaborated for difference among various qualities. This kind of this doctrine in order to show that several judg. judgement is called Naya-Saptabhangi also. ments or propositions may be true about the same In this connection, a question can be raised,
object, but from different points or view. Here, it is
interesting to note that each fact, however trivial it how the partical truth conveyed by a naya is as valid
may appear, can be thoroughly understood in the as the full truth conveyed by pramana? The Jaina logicians attempt an answer to this by employing
context of the entire reality and only in the light of
its interconnection with the rest of reality. A real is an analogical argument, in which they compare
possessed of an infinite number of aspects and naya to a part of a sea which is pramana. "Now in
attributes which can be thoroughly comprehended so far as a part is identical with the whole itself,
only by a person who is directly acquainted with there is an essential non-difference between the
the whole order of the reality, in one word, who is two; a naya shares the validity, at any rate in some
omnicient. But this does not mean that the Jaina measure, of pramana. But, in so far as a naya is
here offers a counsel of perfection which amounts different from the whole, in some sense, it cannot
to a counsel of despair for a person like us whose be identical the whole and therefore the view of the
resources are limited. Though the full knowledge naya as identical with the whole must be invalid.
of all the possible characteristics even of a particle When it becomes invalidi.e. when its partial truth is
of dust can not be claimed by any one of us, the taken to be the whole truth, It is called a Kunaya or
knowledge of one or the other attribute can be atDurnaya. According to Dr. Tatia, the contingen
tained if we are dispassionate and free from bias cies of Naya' and 'Durnaya' arise only when a
for one angle of vision and prepared for approachknowledge situation is sought to be expressed in or
ing it from other standpoints. Therefore, we must understood through inadequate logical categories
recongnise that there are different ways of approach

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- YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH — or expressing the same truth, and it is this that peo- ther divided into three categories, viz., Naigama, ple may refer to when they speak of approaching Samgraha and Vyavahara. The subdivision of the the same trugh from different stand points, this is paryayarthikanaya are four; Rjusutra, Sabda, the way in which the Jain non absolutism dealth Sambhirudha and Evamabhuta. with opposed with oppased doctrines of the different schools. In this connection it can be said, 'It is
(1) Naigama : It seems to be somewhat obnow not merely that all theories are on an equal foot
scure and is therefore differently interpreted by the ing, in the sense that we have no way of arguing for
shcolars. According to Pujyapada it relates to the one against another, and hence the idea that one
purpose of intention of something which is not acstandpoint is superior to another must be left out."
complished. For instance, a person who goes
equipped with an axe is asked by any one for what If we look at an object from infinite number of purpose he is going. The person replies that the view, we can say that there are infinite kinds of he goes to fetch a wooden measure (prastha). But nayas because the object is composed of infinite at that time the wooden measure is based on the number of characteristics and one naya knows only mere intention to make it. Similarly, one is engaged one characteristic. Therefore, there is difference in fetching fuel, water, pot etc. He is asked by anof opinion among the Jainas on nayavada on the other person what he does? The former replies that question of the number of nayas. But looking at it he cooks food (odana). But he is not actually cookfrom a specific point of view, it is maintained thating food. He is only engaged in activity which will maya is of two kinds.
ultimately result in cooking food. Thus, in each of
the two examples food (odana) and measure (1) Dravyarthika (dealing with generality) and
(Prastha) there is a central purpose which gives (2) Paryayarthika (dealing with particularity).
meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. Again, the first is called Arthanaya in as much as
The course of conduct is represented by different they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the
modes of activity at different stages. In spite of this other are called 'Sabdanaya' in as much as they
difference the whole series and also every indipertain to terms and its meanings.
vidual item tend towards the idea aimed at. Dravyarthika is the view of looking at the iden
Again, Naya-karnika says that it views an tity of things, while Paryayarthika is the view which
object is possessing both the general and particulooks at the difference of things. Man speaks of
lar properties, because no object is possed of a something either from the standpoint of identity or
general property unaccompanied with some parfrom that of difference. Statements of things from
ticular property nor even of a specific property the former point of view are put under the head of
unaccompanied with the general one common to dravyarthika. Propositions of ogbects from the
its class. Consider, for instance the statement. 1 standpoint of difference fall under the category of
am concious'. Here, the property of being conparyayarthika. Many minor classifications of things
scious is a general quality that exists in all living ranging between general (dravyarthika) and par.
beings whereas 'l' indicates the speaker a person ticular (paryayarthika) view points are also possi
or an individual. ble. But briefly speaking, there can be only two groups of statements. The view point of itentity, According to the true relations of the teleologiupon which are founded the statements of gener- cal and interpreting idea, this naigama is sub-dialisation, is called Dravyarthika Naya, while the vided into three viz. vartam ana, bhuta and view point of difference, upoin which are founded bhavisyat or bhava. Vartamana naigama belong the statements of particularisation is called to the past, yet transferred to present. When we say paryayarthika Naya. The dravyarthikanaya is fur- that today is the parinirvana day of Lord Mahavira,
imeminiminimiminiminirati
26 minstensioniminiranimiranim

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-YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH we do not mean that the Lord Mahavira is to attain
The fallacy of this naya occurs when we conor attaining nirvana on the day we actually sosider the general property alone as constituting a spoke. The event took place many centuries ago thing. This kind of fallacious propositions gives rise on a corresopnding day of that year. Because of to confusion of thought, because the general qualithis correspondence an event true of the day cen- ties alone can never constitute an actual object. turies ago is also associated with all such corre
(3) Vyavahara : This Naya means the popusponding days of the subsequent years. In the
lar and conventional point of view, which rests on Bhuta naigama instead of looking back to the past
sense-parception of the concrete present. The conwe may look forward to a remote future, instead of
crete reality of things is sufficient for our practical detecting in the concrete present the continuity of
life. It amounts to knowing things by the Co the past, we may discover in it something which is
value. It takes into consideration a general oot yet to be. As for example, when on perceiving
as possessing specific properties. It does not deal would be king we say, "Here comes His Royal High- with generality as does the sangraha nava. On ness.' It means that he is not yet king now, but is the other hand it classifies the subject matter of going to be one soon. Similarly we may speak of the sangraha in the mode of particularity. Examievery Bhavyajive a good soul as siddhajiva, a per nation of the specific Dravyas. Jiva Dravya and fect soul. For somehow in the far off future perfec- Ajiva Dravya, both belonging to the Dravya Genus. tion will be the goal of all; for everyone is God in whould be an illustration of the vyavahara naya. the germ. Such an assertion is true according to
Fallacy of Vyavahara Naya lies in wrong se. Bhavanaigam or future Naigam.
lection of species. When the generic correlative of (2) Samaraha : This standpoint is that which specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant comprehends several different modes under one
fallacy comes to have only the semblance of this common head through their belonging to the same
naya. Which select, only four primary elements as class. In other words, it deals with the general char
real, is the best example of this naya. This type of acteristic of an object or the class character of a
fallacy is found in the Indian philosophy. factual situation. As for example, 'reality is one (4) Rjusutra : The argument underlying this because it exists' is prossition of this naya. It does
standpoint is that of immediate utility which natunot look at the particular properties of reality but rally must be grounded upon the present aspect of regards the general property as its subject matter a thing. It denies all continuity and identity. It is though there can be no general or universal with- purely momentary. It is important to note here that out particular, yet the enquiring from this stand- it does not refer to the past or future of the thing. In point keeps in view the generic qualities only. this respect it is still narrower than the vyavanaric
present. At least for vyavaharic view there is a tolThis naya is of two kinds, para-sangraha
erable duration; for the present and the conven(ultimiate class-view) and Apara Sangraha (infe
tional things are real so far. But according to this rior class-view). Every existing thing partakes of
naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematithe nature of reality. Hence we may speak of all
cal moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rethings as one in the ultimate Reality and it is the
jected by this view as an unwarrented assumpexample of Parasangraha naya. But the different tion. Thus it enables to secure the balance between classes of things living and non-living included in change and permanence. Accordingly when we this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken claim to know a thing; we mean thereby to know it of as different classes and it is the subject matter only with reference to its present substantive state of the Apara-sangraha naya.
(Dravya) name (Nama) and form. For example, we

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YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH say, "It is very pleasant now." This proprsion more exaggerated than the above nayas. The falpredicats something which is true of the subject lacy of this naya consists in treating the synonymus only at the moment of the predication.
words as having absolutely different meanings. The fallacy of this naya occure when the per
(7) Evambhuta : Etymologically, evambhuta manence of things is altogether denied. Each and means the truth of the word and its sense in its every object is taken to be momentary without hav- entirety. It calls for a different designation for each ing any kind of general features in it.
of the different attitudes which the same object
assums under different conditions. In other words, (5) Sabda : The present stand point of syno
it recognises an object denoted by a word only in nyms refers to the function of synonymous words
respect of its own natural function as suggested which, despite their differences in tense, case;
by the derivative meaning of that word. Thus, acgender, number and so forth convey the same
cordingly to this principle, the redical sense in genmeaning. In other words, it reats synonymous
eral is not the appropriate sense of a term. Even words as all having, the same sense. The mean
the root signification must have different gradations ing is that the sabda-naya does not concern itself
and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradawith but simply deals with symomymous as if they
tions in the manifestations of the thing. Only one were pure equivalents of one another. For instance
particular aspect or gradation is contemplated by kumbha, kalasa, ghata are all expressive of one
the root of a term and it is this contemplated asand the same object viz. jan. Again, Jiva, Atman,
pect or gradation which is the legitimate meaning Prana etc. are synonymus terms and though these
of the terms in its current usage. The very same differ from one another in their etymological hear
thing in a different attitude must he designated by ings, yet they all refer to the one and the same
a different term altogether. For instance, Purandara thing conventionally.
should be designated as such only when he is Fallacy of Sabadanaya occurs when we ig
actually engaged in the act of destroying his ennore the distinguishing features of it and deal with
emies. Similarly the designaton sakra' is approsynonymous words as absolutely having the same
priate only when he is actually manifesting his meaning. The sabdadvaitavadins and a few otherprowess. Thus Purandara becomes as different schools in Indian Philosophy are said to have come from sakra as a cow is from a Jara. mitted this fallacy.
The fallacy of this naya lies in making the ex(6) Samabhirudha : It is the differentiation of istence of a thing absolutely dependent on the perterm's according to their roots. The difference in formance of the special function with reference to the roots must mean a corresponding difference
which a particular name has been awarded to it. in the terms and therefore in their meanings. In
Thus, each of the seven nayas has a greater other words, it distinguishes the meanings of syn
extent or denotation than the one which follows it. onymous wordts purely on etymological grounds.
Naigama has thus the gratest and ebambhuta the For instance, a jar (Kumbha), a pitcher (kalasa)
least extent: Naigama deals with real and unreal. and a pot (ghata) signify different things according
Samgraha deals with real only Vyavadhara with to their meanings. The point is that while the sabda
only a part of the real. Sabda with only the expres. naya would treat synonyms as equivalent words,
sion of the real. Samabhitrudh with only one parthe samabhirudha naya would distinguish them
ticular expression. Evamabhuta with only that parfrom one another on etymological grounds. Thus
ticular expression which applies to the thing in its it is only a special application of sabdha-naya. In
present activity becoming specialised it becomes narrower and
Thef
.
:

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YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH In this connection, it can be noted that there 2. Padmarajiah, Y.J. Jaina Teories of Reality and cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifica- Knowledge, p. 301 tions of birth and decay. On the other hand, modi- 3. Jacob, H- Studies in Jainism, p. 17.52 fications cannot exist without an abiding or eter
Upadhye, A.N. (edd) Pravacanasara, Intronal something, a permanent, for birth decay and
duction-LXXXV stability-these three constitute the characteristic of a substance or entity. These three characteristics
Padmarajiah, Y.J. Jaina Theories of Reality must dwell together in harmony to make a real
and Knowledge, p. 304 diffinition of a thing in its integral form. In this re
6.
Ibid. P. 305 spect each naya, therefore, if taken independently 7. Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, Sutra - 6 isolated from the other, can never yield an edequate 8. Satkhandagama - p. 163. idea of an entity. Both these therefore, divorced from
Vidyananda, Tattvarthasloka Vartika 1-6., each other, are wrong in their standpoints. Therefore, Jaina logicians say that a man who holds
Suri, Vadideva : Syadvada-ratnakara vol. IV., the view of the cumulative character of truth
p. 44. (Anekantavada) never says that a particular view 11. Vidyananda : Astasahhastri, p. 209 is right or that a particular view is wrong. Again if do Tattvarthaslokavartika, 1-6 . all the nayas arrange themselves in a proper way 12. Samantabhandra : Aptamimansa, Gatha - and supplement to each other, then alone they are
108 worthy of being termed as the whole truth or the
Vidyananda : Astasahhastri, p. 290 right view in its entirety. But in this case they merge
13.. Tetia, N.: Acarya Bhiksu Commemoration vo. their individuality in the collective whole." There
Sec. III, P. 103 fore the right approach should be to accept the relating validity of knowledge. In order to give a
14. Jayadhavala, p. 283 logical shape to this view the Jainas have formuled; Sthananga - 209 a theory of relative standpoint" and they are of
There are four distinct phase of the develop opinion that there can never be an absolute claim
ment of the doctine in the exegalical and logiabout the truth of any expression."
cal literature of the Janas, Viz. At last, we can say in the words of G.H. Rao 1. Niksena as doctrine of verbal usage, that each philosophy approaching reality from a 2. Nikespa as a doctrine of aspects of reality particular and a partial standpoint, looks upon the 3 Nama-niksepa as entailing a doctrine of imone they adopt as the only true standpoint. Jainas
port of words and reject the idea of the absolute which is playing
Niksepa as a critique of absolutism. havoc in the field of philosophy by creating absolute monism, absolute pluralism, and absolute ni
Dr. Tattia, Acarya Bhiksu commenoration volhilism. By thus rejecting the absolute and one
ume, Sect. III, p. 71 sided, they claim to save philosophy from the 15. Raju, P.T. The philosophical Traditions of inchaos of conflicting opinions. Without partiality to dia, p. 97 any one they promise to give us a theory of relativ- 16. Hemachandra : Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda ity which harmonises all standpoints."
dvatrinshika, SU-5, Akalanka : Laghistraya
Tika-62 NOTES AND REFERENCES
17. There are mainly three traditions which are 1. Siddhasena Divakahr, Sanmatitarkah
based on the number of nayas occuring in Prakarana, Gatha-22-25.
the classification adopted by each of them

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26. YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH - within the framework of reality which is con Akalanka : Tattvarthavartika - Sut. 1/33 ceived to be fundamentally dravya 24. Vinayavijaya; Naya Karnika, Sutra 8 Suri, paryayarthika. The first one adopts a classi Vadideva : Pramana naya tattvaloka - vol. fication of seven, our treatment of the subject VII-23-4 has been based on this classification. The 25. Ibid. second tradition drops ama which is the first Prabhacandra : Nyayakumudacandra, p. among the seven nayas recognised by the first tradition. The third tradition reduces the 636,792 Samantabhadra : Laghistraya, Karika 43,71 number from seve to five by sub-suming samabhirudha and evambhuta, the last two Vinayavijaya : Naya Karnika, Sutra 14 standpoints under sabda, and thus treating Akalanka : Tatvarthavaratika - 1/33 them as two subdivisions of the sabdanaya. Vidyananda : Tattvarthaslokavartika p. 272. Dr. Padmrajiah, Jaina Theories of Reality and 273. knowledge, p. 325 27. Siddhasena Divakara : Nayayavatara (Edd. 18. Siddhasena Diakara : Sanmatitarka P.L. Vaidya), p.82. Prakarana - 1.3. 28. Vinayavijaya : Naya Karnika sutra 15 19. Suri, Vadideva: Pramana-naya tattvaloka, Prabhacandra : Nayakumudacandra vol. ll. p. Vol. VII, P.6 638 20. Ibid., p. 27 Suri, Vadideva, Pramananayatattvaloka, vol. 21. Vinaya Viaya : Nayakarnika - Sutra-5. VII. 36 Akalanka. Tattvartha-raja vartika 1/33. 30. Ibid. p. 40 Suri, Vadideva : Syadvada-ratnakara, Vol.V. Vinaya vijaya : Naya Karnika sutra 17.18. P. 1052 31. Sidasena Divakara : Sanmatitarka, Gatha 1/ Prabhacandra : Nayakumudacandra, p. 84 12,13 Pujyapada : Sarvartha Siddhi, Sutra Vidyananda : Tattavarthstokavartika, p. 249. 30 Samantabhadra : Laghiyastraya, p. 39, 68 32. Siddhasena Divakara : Sanmatitarka, Gatha 22. Edd. Chakrabarty, A : Sacred Books of 1/25,28 Jainas, Vol. III. p. C-III. 33. Pandey, R.C.: A Panorama of Indian Philoso23. Vinaya-vijaya : Nayakarnika, Sutra-6 phy, p. 44 Pujyapada : Sarvarthasiddhi 34. Rao, G.H.: The half yearly Journal of the Vidyananda ; Tattvarthaslokavaratika - p. 270 Mysore University (1942) pp. 79-80. 29. คิติที่6-456- 6666 3 0 556eAwOAC""""