Earliest Extant Vaisesika Theory Of Gunas

Author(s): Eli Franco
Publisher: Eli Franco
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269572/1

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THE EARLIEST EXTANT VAIŠEŞIKA THEORY OF GUNAS
By Eli Franco*
Anyone who works with Turfan fragments knows how rarely something hitherto completely unknown can be discovered. Many of the fragments are too small to make sense on their own, many others have their parallels either in Chinese or Tibetan translations or in the Pali canon, still others reveal information known already from other sources. Yet occasionally one comes across fragments that disclose something about which we had no inkling before.
In what follows I will try to show that the Spitzer manuscript (=SHT 810)' discusses a Vaisesika theory of gunas, or at least of certain particular gunas, that is radically different from anything known to us on the subject. This theory represents an early stage in the development of Vai esika philosophy (3rd c. at the latest) when the Samkhya influence was still considerable. In the classical period, when the differences between Samkhya and Vaibesika became more radical, this theory must have been abandoned as an alien body.
Elsewhere I have shown how some of the surviving fragments can be happily married with Moritz Spitzer's transcriptions which represent some forty lost fragments of various size. Drawing on these two sources has proved fruitful in the present case too and I will attempt to show how fragment 77' and a fragment transcribed in Spitzer's Nachlass, p. 13, can be related to each other
. I would like to thank Karin Preisendanz and Lambert Schmithsusen for their very valuable comments and suggestions. The title of this paper is meant as a tribute to D. SCHLINGLONY's contribution "The Oldest Extant Parvan-List of the Mahabharata" published some thirty years ago in JAOS 89.
II refrain from introducing the Spitzer manuscript in this context. On the manuscript in general cf. D. SCHLINGLOPY, Fragmente einer Palmblatthandschrift philosophischen Inhalte aus Ostturkistan (Ms. Spitzer). WZKSO 12/ 13 (1968/69) (= Festschrift Frauwallner), 323-328. On the current DFG.project to publish the manuscript of. E. FRANCO, avila and avita. Asiatische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques 53,3 (1999) 563-577.
Cf my "Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript," forthcoming in Minoru Hara Felicitation Volume, ed. A. WEZLER et al. (Reinbek 2001).
The number refers to the numbering of the glass frames containing SHT810 preserved at the State Library, Berlin.
WZKS 44 (2000) 157-163

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E. FRANY)
Page 13 of Spitzer's Nachlass is titled "ama II" and it contains the following transcription of a fragment that is also transcribed in reversed order i.e., a. and b. are transposed) on p. 56.
Plate
[1] ............. atrāha na khalju [v](){n}(a) stan] me?)'.,
(2) avinastam api sat" anusamavasthásamhrtam api prahīnam ity uyate yatha [3] .y. cyante tad evam ubhayatha p[r]alay.
[1] . iti atrouyate yadā (te?)" (sal(r) vv(a)[g)(a) to ......... (2) ... (ka)[ra]nam ātmā ittham camakaranam atma sukhadinam iha viruddhanam asamavāyahy........ [3] ...(pra)la)[!]yagāh" khalv api vinas(t)ā i[va?)"....
The transliterations that accompany the images reproduced below generally follow the conventions used in the catalogues of the Turfan Sanskrit manuscripts: + is used for a missing aksara, .. for an illegible aknara, for a partly illegible aksara; aksaras or parts of akaras en closed in [are uncertain or difficult to read, enclosed in () are added or conjectured by me, and those enclosed in { } are to be deleted (ie. are considered scribal mistakes). Il represents the breaking point of a fragment and * stands for virāma. Spaces in the manuscript are marked by other spaces between words are always added by me.
ko vi(e)sahr.dll l yasametam* kuta .. + + + + + + (sä?)dhanaih säddhyate tāni sadhanany asmabhir vyā hata[n)i + + + + !!
yadi ca pral(na) (apy atma?)[gu]nah atmasamavetā āprashini api + atrocyate pralinänam asam(sa)ggaulkin karanam iti atraha ātm(A)(a)manahsamyogavišesät (sa?)m.. + //(ka)tham atma karanam
is perhaps due to the fact that they are
amonggo we would still Real aprun the lengthening of the initial vowel seems to indicate an emphasis in the pronunciation, and throughout the
r go is not impossible, but the sign for oisually rotated more to the left mirror images of each other, in hf the vowel sign rests on the left arm of the alia and the right arm is curled to the right. in li the vowel listinion one has to read a) pralina instead of (a)prahina. The confusion between hi and
in lines 1 and 2 on the other side of this leaf). Further, even if we assume the nominative argge. The reading
a siun rest on the right arm and the left arm is curled to the left have to deal with irregular sandhi and an unusual construction with kin karena
ent the conjecture for instance
I
s I
* missing op. 56
On p. 56:yffel On p. 56: son
On p 56: pralinam Read pralinam of note en fragment 77a2 below. * On p. 56: wbhayap. IX
te missing on p. 56
Spitzer refers here to Tattvasangraha, p. 80. v. 173 wklad withadi comcilisemarys fa bhoktra.
On p. 56: /?yagalit 12 Onp. 56. vena(?)?
..
77a (4.7x20.2)
3

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Plate II
77b
ABERE VOLL REN
2. pralinan nopala bhyate ev(a)n[tada].. ++++te gunah atmasamavetäḥ pralina (n) nopalabh[y]an(t)e tas(m)ã/// 1 //[k](i)ñcin necchati... sya ni[v]r(t)t. ätmany eva tu pralinan' nopalabhyate O tatha vacam samhrtya tuşṇīm a [d]rstäntavirodhad ahet(ub) +++++++ (it) [y] (u)cyate sukhaduḥkham atmani samavetam natma.. +++//
as
pralinatvan. It seems preferable, therefore, to coniecture here, in analogs with the heute because in this case one would expect true here; it cannot be an accusative plural because the sentence with the passive predicate upalabhyate singular). The adjective in the singular could refer to a samaharadvandva such sukhaduḥkham in line 3. It may be reminded that a and manuscript. Cf. also n. 13 below.
a are often confused in this
could not be
sum
The Earliest Extant Vaisesika Theory of guyas
These two fragments obviously belong together and we are, therefore, justified in drawing on the one in order to understand the other. Moreover, I believe that they form parts of two consecutive leaves and I will present them in what I think was their original order. However, this assumption is not necessary for my argument; it suffices if we assume that the fragments belong to the same context, that is, that the same topic is discussed in both fragments. It is my contention (1) that the tenets presented in these fragments are those of the Vaisesika school or at least of certain adherents of this school and (2) that in stark opposition to everything known to us from the surviving Vaiseşika texts, the Vaisesika philosopher in the Spitzer manuscript claims that qualities (guna) are absorbed (pralina) into the atman after their disappearance and that they continue to inhere in the atman in an atomic form or state." Thus, the absorption does not imply non-existence (i.e., the absorbed qualities have not perished [avinasta]), but a contraction into the state" of an atom (cf. anusamavasthasamhṛta). The affinity of this doctrine with the satkaryavada of the Samkhya, as well as its incompatibility with the causal doctrines of the classical Vaiseşika, is clear. On the other hand, the differences with fundamental Samkhya doctrines are equally clear because the Samkhya does not admit the samaväya relationship (cf. atmasamaveta, almani samaveta, asamavaya) and because according to the Samkhya, mental states such as pleasure, pain, desire, hatred (which are usually not designated as gunas in Samkhya texts) do not belong to the soul (which is also not usually referred to by the term atman), but to matter.
159
The first contention concerning the identity of the speaker is easily justified. samavāya is a unique concept of the Vaisesika; of course, in
The word pralina is difficult to translate here. It carries with it the connotation of the Samkhya cosmic absorption or reversal of the emanation process (pralaya, pratisarga) on a small scale. One can imagine the gunas entering and "hiding in"/"clinging to" the atman in very much the same manner as an element such as earth, after its devastation, retreats into the waters. It is not clear to me whether the prefix sam- plays a semantic role here: perhaps samavastha means a fixed or durable state.
15 For the most recent valuable study of satkaryavada ef. J. BRONKHORST, Satkāryavada and asatkāryavada. In: F. JOSEPHSON (ed.), Categorisation and Interpretation. Indological and comparative studies from an international Indological meeting at the Department of Comparative Philology, Goeteborg University. A volume dedicated to the memory of Goesta Liebert. Goeteborg 1999, p. 43-55. BRONKHORST, who investigates in this paper the correspondence principle in respect to the words of a sentence, points out that certain Vaisesikas known to Mallavädin admitted that things exist before their connection to the universal existence (sattasambandha) and come thereby dangerously close to the position of the Samkhya. For a different interpretation of the same discussion ef. W. HALRPASS, On Being and What There Is. Albany 1992, ch. 8 passim, esp. p. 174.

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160
E. FRANCO
later times it was accepted by the Nyaya and the Mimamsa as well, but not in the 3rd c. A.D. which is the latest possible date for the Spitzer manuscript. At this time Nyaya probably did not yet exist as a philosophical school, and samaväya was introduced into the Mimämsä around the 6th c. A.D. Other expressions used here, such as atmamanaḥsamyogaviseṣāt (77b3), are also typical of the Vaiseṣika. Further, the Vaiseşika considers mental states such as pleasure and pain as qualities that inhere in the soul (cf. 77a2 and 77b2: gunaḥ atmasamavetāḥ). So unless we encounter here a completely unknown philosophical school which also accepted the above mentioned tenets of the VaiSeşika and vanished without leaving a trace, we must conclude that our text refers to the position of a Vaisesika opponent.
The second contention is more difficult to prove. Let us have a look first at the surviving fragment. In 77al the (Buddhist)16 opponent seems to argue that a philosophical tenet is established by proofs or inferences ((sa) dhanaiḥ saddhyate) and that the proofs (of the Vaiseşika?) have been disproved or contradicted by "us" (Buddhists) (sãdhanany asmabhir vyähatä(n)i). It is impossible to know whether this statement concludes a previous discussion or begins a new section. In any case, in the next line (77a2) the Buddhist opponent poses two questions against the Vaisesika: 1) How could the atman be a cause ((ka)tham ātmā kāranam)? 2) Further, if absorbed qualities inhere the atman, what is the difference between such qualities and non-absorbed qualities (that also inhere it) (yadi ca pra[l](i)[na] (apy atma?)[gu]nāḥ atmasamaveta apralīnā api ko v(i)s(e)s(a)h...).
The reply of the Vaiseşika must have been that the absorbed qualities are not in contact (with the manas?) whereas those that are not absorbed are. Upon this the Buddhist asks: What is the reason/cause for the absorbed qualities not being in contact (atrocyate pra[1]inānām asam (sa)[r]gg(e) kin käraṇam iti)? The answer is incomplete; however, the Vaiseșika seems to reply that the contact is due to a special conjunction between the soul and the manas (ätmamanaḥsamyogavisesat). Such contact presumably does not occur in the case of the absorbed qualities.
On the other side of the same leaf (77b1) the Vaisesika explains that (the gunas that have disappeared, such as pleasure and pain) are not perceived precisely because they are absorbed in the atman; in the same way (one does not perceive speech) when one becomes silent after
16 My understanding of the discussion is that the Vaisesika forms the purvapaksa and the Buddhist siddhantin argues as the purvapaksin of the purvapaksin.
The beginning of the question has probably been lost. One can imagine that it was introduced with the mention of some presupposition, e.g., as something eternal cannot be a cause, how could the eternal ätman be a cause?
The Earliest Extant Vaisesika Theory of gunas
having withdrawn speech (atmany eva tu pralin(am) nopalabhyate. tathā vācam samhrtya tusnim a...). Speech seems to have been conceived here as a capacity which can be exercised or be kept dormant. Unfortunately, no further information can be gathered from the second line. There is also a slight uncertainty about the interpretation of the text as I have to take recourse to two conjectures (cf. above) to construe it meaningfully: these qualities, as something inhering in the atman, are not perceived inasmuch as they are absorbed in it.
161
In the next line (7763) the Buddhist charges the Vaiseşika with the fallacy of drstäntavirodha, that is, the reason employed by the Vaiseşika is no reason at all (ahetu) because it is contradicted by the example. There is considerable uncertainty about the nature of the inference, for it is possible that some of the elements of the proof, such as the example, do not appear on what is preserved of this leaf. However, if we try to operate with the information that is available on the fragment, then the only item that could serve as an example is speech, or perhaps the capacity of speaking, which is withdrawn when one remains silent. Perhaps the proof was formulated as follows: Qualities such as pleasure and pain are not perceived because they are absorbed, just like speech. If this was the form of the proof, the Buddhist could argue that the example contradicts the reason, because speech as something which does not inhere in the atman, cannot be absorbed in it. From what seems to be the Vaišeşika's reply to this objection nothing useful for our purpose remains. It begins with the familiar statement that pleasure and pain inhere in the soul ((it) [y] (u)cyate sukhaduḥkham atmani samavetam nätma...).
At least one more objection must have been formulated after this reply because what remains of the next leaf (lost fragment al) begins with the Vaisesika answer that (the qualities of the atman such as pleasure and pain) have not perished (atraha na khalu vinaṣṭan ...). The next line explains further: Also something that has not perished, i.e., also something withdrawn into the state of an atom, is called absorbed (avinastam api sat anusamavasthāsamhṛtam api pralinam ity ucyate). In other words, being "absorbed" does not mean for the qualities of the soul that they do not exist.
In the next line (a3) the Vaiseşika concludes that there are two modes of absorption (tad evam ubhayatha p[r]alay...). The one presumably consists in complete destruction, the other consists perhaps in a contraction and penetration into another entity.18
On the other side of the leaf (bl) there is a reference to an omnipresent entity probably by way of an adjective in the masculine no
18 In this connection one has to consider fragment 471 which probably belongs to the same leaf as the lost fragment transcribed by Spitzer:

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162 E. FRANCO The Earliest Extant Vaisesika Theory of goas 163 minative singular (sarvagato), which in this context must refer to the atman. This reference is of particular interest because it has been widely assumed that in early Vaisesika the atman was only as large as the body.'' If this assumption is correct, our text provides the earliest reference to the new atman doctrine of the Vaisesika and confirms that this change in the atman doctrine took place at a rather early stage in the history of the Vaisesika, perhaps as early as the 2nd c. A.D. So far the earliest reference to this doctrine could be found in the work of Aryadeva whose date (3r-4th c.?) is still unsettled. Further, I would suggest that the reference to an omnipresent or all-pervading atman indicates that the Vaisesika opponent did not consider his doctrine about absorbed qualities in substances to apply to all qualities and all substances, but only to some, in any case to qualities of omnipresent substances. Indeed, it would be difficult to maintain that a quality in an atomic state - or in fact several such qualities inhering in an atom - could be absorbed, i.e., contained, in a substance that is also atomic, that is, not larger in size than the quality itself. On this point too the Vaisesika qualities as presented in the Spitzer manuscript would differ from those accepted in classical Vaisesika, as the latter are not spatial entities because in classical Vaisesika size was conceived as a quality, and the school did not allow qualities of qualities: qualities cannot have size, neither small (atomic) nor medium nor large. One may also consider whether medium-size composite substances could absorb qualities. Unfortunately, our fragment does not disclose anything on this point. In the next line (b2) the atman is called camakarana. The concept of camakarana does not seem to make sense and, as far as I know, it does not occur in the relevant literature. I have no doubt that Spitzer's transcription is correct. He must have also had his difficulties with this concept and apparently rechecked his transcription, for above the transcription of the word cama- he added two small exclamation marks. Perhaps one should conjecture ca na karanam. The whole sentence could then read: ... (in this manner) the atman is (not) a cause; and in the following manner the atman is also not a cause: pleasure etc.. that contradict each other here in this world / in the Vaisesika system) are not inherent (in the atman) when/if(?) ... (... (ka) [ra]nam atma ittham ca na karanam atma sukhadinam iha viruddhanam asamavayah y.). This statement is probably due to the notion that a substance cannot possess contradictory qualities or properties. Unfortunately the precise nature of the possible contradiction is unexplained, at least in what remains of the leaf.21 Finally, in the last line the Vaisesika may have explained that those entities that proceed to absorption are as if they had perished (i.e., as good as destroyed or destroyed for all practical purposes, but not entirely inexistent) ((prala) yagah khalu api vinas(t)a i[va?)). One final remark in this connection. The adjective pralina has almost completey disappeared from classical Vaisesika texts. There is only one context where it is used regularly, namely, in the context of dreams. The dreaming person is called pralinamanaska when the manas withdraws to a region of the atman called "the inner heart" (antarhrdaya), which is devoid of senses, and stays there without movement.21 471a (1.4x4.5) 471b a ///(pra?)layasabdah misri(bhuta)!ll a lll(it)y u[C]yate o yadi catmany. /// This implies, quite correctly, that by pralaya is meant that two entities, the absorbed and the absorbing, have merged. 19 Cf. T. ADACHI, On the size and the mobility of the atman in the early Vaisesika. Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques 48,2 (1994 (= Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaisesika, Hong Kong, August 1993, ed. J. BRONKHORST) 653-663; cf. also further references therein (p. 653, n. 1) to the relevant pas sages in studies by NOZAWA, WEZLER, PREISENDANZ, BRONKHORST and FRALWALLNER 20 Cf., however, Vaisesikasutra (ed. MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI. Baroda 1961) X.2 and Candrananda's commentary thereon. 21 Cf. Word Index to the Prasastapadabhasva, ed. J. BRONKHORST and Y. RAMSELER (Delhi 1994), p. 42-43: yada ... antarhrdaye nindriya atmapradese miscalam manas tisthati tada pralinamanaska ity akhyayate.