Dignagas Criticism Of Mimamsaka Theory Of Perception

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269373/1

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory of Perception Masaaki Hattori When dealing with problems of perception in the first chapter of the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga makes an attempt to refute various theories maintained by different schools. The Mimamsakas is exposed, no less than other schools, to the severe criticism of Dignaga. This paper is intended for tracing main arguments developed therein by Dignaga with the purpose of repudiating the Mimamsaka theory of perception. At the outset, Dignaga makes reference to the Mimamsaka definition of perception. [A] The Mimamsakas maintain as follows: 'When man's senses are in contact with existence (sat), there is the origination of a cognition; that [cognition] is the perception.' (K, 106b. 2-4; V, 25a. 3 (25a. 7-8)) The Mimamsaka statement herein referred to is the first half of the Mimamsa-sutra, I, i, 4, the latter half of which runs as follows: 'And it is not the means of knowing Dharma, because its function consists in apprehending what is actually present.' According to Kumarila Bhatta's interpretation, this sutra is meant for just explaining the incompetency of perception as the means of knowing Dharma and not for giving the definition of 2) Abbrev. MS: Mimamsa-sutra, NR: Nyayaratnakara, PS(V): Pramanasamuccaya (-vrtti), SV: Slokavarttika, SVK: Slokavarttika-kasika. 1) K Kanakavarman's version, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5702. V: Vasudhararaksita's version, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku, No. 4204, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5701. The folio number of V is indicated first according to Sde-dge edition, and then to Peking edition in parentheses. Explanatory words placed in brackets are mostly taken from Jinendrabuddhi's Visalamalavati-nama Pramanasamuccayatika (J). 2) MS, I, i, 4: sat-samprayoge purusasyendriyanam buddhi-janma tat pratyaksam animittam vidyamano palambhanatvat. -724

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4) (41) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) 3) perception. On this point he contradicts the Vittikara who, dividing the sutra into two parts, construes the first half thereof as the definition of perception. If the perception, Kumarila observes, is characterized merely as the origination of a cognition following from the contact of sense with existence, then there will be no way to distinguish an erroneous perception from the valid one, because even such cognition as of silver for really a white conch-shell is found to be a product of the contact of sense with what exists. As the term 'sat-samprayoga' (the contact of sense with existence) is effective only to set aside the perception in a dream, it is untenable to take the sutra in question as the definion of perception. Kumarila, in his construction of the sutra, is in agreement with Sa* barasvamin, who takes the import of the compound 'sat-samprayoga' as 'sati samprayoge (=satindriyartha-sambandhe)', viz., when there is the sense-object contact, and not as 'sata samprayogah', viz., the contact (of sense) with existence. There are some who, against Sabarasvamin's interpretation, assert that the locative 'samprayoge' is, by itself, well expressive of the condition under which the perception arises. Kumarila hereupon lays emphasis on that the sense-object contact takes place at the present time: the object which comes into contact with sense must be actually present (sat=vidya 5) 6) 3) Kumarila's interpretation of the sutra is reduced by Sucarita Misra to the following formulae : a) pratyaksam animittam, vidyamanopalambhanatvat. b) pratyaksam vidyamanopalambhanatvam, sat-samprayoga-jatvat. c) pratyaksam sat-samprayoga-jatvam, pratyaksatvat, cf. SVK, ad IV, 21 (p. 210). 4) SVK, ad IV, 1: tad idam vrtty-antare 'nimittad avacchidya tat pratyaksam ity evam antam laksana-param vyakhyatam. This Vittikara is, according to Parthasarathi Misra, named Bhavadasa, cf. NR, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 133 : Bhavadasenaitat sutram dvidha krtva sat-samprayoge ity evam adi tat praty aksam ity evam antam pratyaksa-laksana-param...... 5) SV, IV, 10-11: na capy anena sutrena pratyaksam laksyate sphutam / tad-abhase 'pi tulyatvat svapna-jnanaika-varjanat // tad dhindriyartha-samyoga-vyaparena vina bhavet 1 kenacit samprayoga tu bhranty-adih syan niyogatah 11 6) cf. Sabarabhasya, ad MS, I, i, 4. - 723 -

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) (42) mana). Thus, according to Kumarila, the compound 'sat-samprayoga' is significant of denying the possibility of the perception of Yogins, which is thought to be operative upon the past or future object. 7) 8) Now, judging from that Dignaga regards the first half of the sutra as a definion of perception, it is conjectured that his attack is turned against the predecessors of Sabarasvamin including the Vrttikara. He is unconscious of Sabarasvamin's view, to say nothing of Kumarila's. Special mention is made of the Vrttikara, but no other particular name is referred to in his discourse. With twelve verses and the commentary thereupon, Dignaga passes strictures upon every term used in the above Mimamsaka definition. He treats the term 'existence' (sat) in verses 1-4, 'contact' (samprayoga) in verse 5, 'origination of a cognition' (buddhi-janman) in verses 6-11 and 'man' or 'soul' (purusa) in verse 12. First of all, the superfluity of the term 'existence' is pointed out as follows: (Ba) Now, if [the Mimamsakas are of the opinion that the term] 'existence' (sat) is [used in the sutra] with the purpose of excluding 'non-existence' (dsat), [then their opinion does not hold good, because] it is naturally comprehended [by the effect of the term 'contact' that the 'non-existence' is excluded]. Under any circumstance, a sense comes into contact with 'existence' only [and never with 'non-existence']. [Therefore,] it is improper to mention [the term] 'existence' with the 9) 7) cf. SV, IV, 26-36. 8) It seems that Sabarasvamin puts his interpretation upon the sutra without bearing Dignaga's opinion in mind. From this we infer that Sabarasvamin is not much younger than Dignaga, whose date may be settled at ca. 470-530 A. D., cf. my article, deigunagaJi bisonoZhou Bian noNian Dai (Zhong Ben Bo Shi Song Sheng **) I hereupon propose to assign Sabarasvamin to ca. 490-550 A. D. 4 9) k. 1: sad ity asad-vyudasaya na niyogat sa gamsyate / samprayogo hi niyamat sata evo papadyate || cf. SVK, NR, ad IV, 36. -722

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10) (43) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) view to negating (the contact of senses with) 'non-existence". (K, 106b. 3-4; V, 25a.3-4. (252.8 -25b.1)) Evidently Dignaga takes the compound 'sat-samprayoga' as implying 'sata samprayogah', and the view that the term 'sat is effective to reject the perception of Yogins is not taken into consideration by him. It is ob. vious that Kumarila, being conscious of this criticism, put a new interpretation upon the sutra. Now the Mimamsakas try to vindicate the sutra by asserting that the term 'sat stands for the object of sense in general. This view, however, is not traced in any extant literature of the Mimamsakas. Anyway, Dig. naga assails this view through the following argument. (Bb) If (it should be maintained that the term 'existence') implies the counterparts (of senses),. As the mere statement that 'senses are in contact' would induce man to query as to what are (the objects) with which senses come into contact, it should be made clear that (senses) come into contact with their coun. terparts. (Thus) the term 'existence is employed (in the sutra) for the purpose of indicating the counterparts of senses. Even if [the Mimamsakas) assert in this way, (the infelicity of expression of the sutra is not excused at all, because) (the couterparts of senses) should be expressed (clearly]by (the names 11) of) those which are determined (visesya) by the senses. . Only those things which are determined by the senses, (i. e., colour, taste etc.) are deservedly called the counterparts of senses. (Therefore the sutra should have mentioned definitely that man's senses are in contact with colour etc. instead of implying the counterparts of senses ambiguously by the term 'existence'.) (K, 106b. 4-6; V, 25.4-5 (25b.1-2)] The Mimamsakas do not maintain that the sense-object contact is the only necessary condition of the perceptual knowledge. The sense-organs 10) 11) k. 2a :/ ci ste zla po bstan phyir yin/ k. 2b:/ dban po (hi) khyad par can brjod kyis / - 721 -

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12) 13) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) (44) must be connected with the mind, and the mind with the soul, so that the knowledge may be produced in the soul. Accordingly, the 'existence', the contact with which is productive of a knowledge, is not confined to the object of sense. The senses and the mind are as well connoted by the term'existence'. This view of the Mimamsakas is now examined by Dignaga. (Bc) (The Mimamsakas may try to justify the term 'existence', arguing as follows: - ) Here, (in the sutra,) not merely the contact of senses with such objects as colour and the like, but also that of the mind (manas) with the senses and that of the soul (atman) with the mind are implied by the term 'contact. (Although the mention is made of 'senses' only, it must be taken as synecdoche (upalaksana). Accordingly, the composer of the sutra) used the term 'existence', thereby implying all-inclusively (those with which either of the mind and the soul come into contact). Even if the above interpretation is put (upon the sutra by the Mimam. 'sakas, we observe that) it again is untenable, (because) * it is never inadmissible, that (the senses, the mind and the the soul can be) in contact with 'existence only. It has already been proved that the soul (purusa), (the mind and the senses). come into contact solely with 'existence' because they can never operate upon 'non-existence'. (The Mimamsakas may oppose our argument, citing an instance of see. ing a mirage. The fact that a traveller in the desert sometimes sees the water, which really does not exist, shows undeniably that a sense is able to come into contact with non-existence as well as with existence. Ac. 14) 12). cf. SV, IV, 60: yad vendriyam pramanam syat tasya va'rthena sangatih/ manaso vendriyair yoga atmana sarva eva va // 13) J, 74a. 4 (85b. 6-7): dban po rnams kyi (indriyanam) ses pahi tshig ni ne bar mtshon pahi don du ste / bya rog rnams las so sruns sig ces pa ji lta ba bsin no ses sems na ....... 14) k. 2c-d: (K) / yod tsam ldan pas mi rtogs pa // ma yin gan sig sgrub par byed / (V) / yod pa tsam dan phrad pa run // ma yin min te gan gis brjod /

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(45) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) 15) cordingly, it is inadmissible to say that the soul operates merely upon 'existence and never upon 'non-existence'. However, we are ready to reply to this Mimamsaka objection.) When a mirage and the like, which really do not exist, are cognized through the apparent perception, nothing, in fact, is in contact with 'non-existence'. Nevertheless the apparent perception is produced through the following process: - A certain spot (in the desert) is, at a certain time, in a peculiar condition owing to the heat of the sun. When eyes are in contact with this spot, what is seen is) indescribable (in itself, but) the illusory mind, which functions of its own accord, constructs gradually (the determinate knowledge that the object seen is the water, despite that there is no real water. It thus is the mind that produces an apparent perception. Such being the case, there is no contact of the visual sense with 'non-existence' even in the case of seeing a mirage.) Consequently, we can hardly approve of the Mimamsaka interpretation that the term 'existence in the sutra is meant for) excluding 'non-existence'. (K, 1061.6 - 107a.1; V, 25a.5 - 25b.1 (25b.2-6)] Leaving out Dignaga's further arguments against the Mimamsaka interpretation of 'sat, we proceed to trace his critique of the concept of 'contact. (C) (Now the meaning of the term 'contact (samprayoga) in the sutra will be examined.) If (the term 'contact implies that the senses come into) direct contact with their respective objects in all cases, then it is improper to employ 15) 16) J, 76b. 2 (86a. 5-6): bstan par bya ba ma yin pa ses pas ran gi mtshan nid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin pa nid kyi phyir ro / J, 76b. 2-3 (86a. 6-7): rim gyis ses pa snar dban pohi ses pa ste / de nas hdra ba nid du nes par byed pahi yid rnam par rtog paholl de nas chu la sogs pa dan hdra bahi dnos po dran paho // deni bar ma chad par de kho na hdiho ses pahi hkhrul pa yid kyi rnam par ses pa spyi la dmigs par hgyur ro / cf. PSV, I, ad Nyaya Section k. la-b: mano-bhranti-visayatvat, see my paper, Fragments of Pramanasamuccaya, JIBS, Vol. VII, No. 1, Frag. 2. (Bd-a): K, 107a. 1-5; V, 25b. 1-3 (25b. 6-26a. 1). (Bd-b): K, 1072. 5-8; V, 25b. 3-5 (26a. 1-4) have been omitted. 17) - 719

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) (46) this term in the definition of perception.] In the cases of [seeing]) colour (rupa) [through the visual sense] and [hearing] sound (sabda) [through the auditory sense], the objects which are distant (santara) [from] or larger (adhika) [than the sense] are found apprehended. The apprehension in these cases is at variance with [the apprehension of the object 18) through] the immediate [contact of the sense with it). If it should be maintained that the sense must come into direct contact in every case with its object, there would be no [possibility of the] apprehension of colour and that of sound [being caused, for their contact with the senses are not direct.] Both visual and auditory senses apprehend colour and sound together with intervenig space and also apprehend those objects which are larger than themselves. These two senses are never found to apprehend their objects directly with no interveing space, as is the case with apprehending smell (gandha) through the olfactory sense. [K, 107a. 8107b.2; V, 25b. 5-7 (26a. 4-5)] There is a divergence of opinion among schools in regard to the senseobject contact as a condition of perceptual knowledge. The Buddhists establish the theory that the senses of sight and hearing function without actual contact with the objects. In other words, both visual and auditory senses are 'distance receptors' (aprapyakarin), while other senses requires immediate contact with their objects (prapyakarin). Again, they hold that the eye and the ear, unlike the senses of smell, taste and touch, can perceive objects much larger than themselves. On the other hand, the Mimamsakas are in concert with the Naiyayikas in holding that all senses act in actual contact with their objects. The visual sense reaches out to its object, and the auditory sense comes into contact with the sound-waves sent by the object. As to the rest, there may be no question. Thus the Mimamsaka theory 19) 18) k.5: kun tu don dan phrad gran na // gzugs sgra bar du chod pa dan / /chen pohan hdsin par mthon bas na // bar du ma chod pa la gnod / (V) 19) cf. Abhidharmakosa, I, k. 44: caksu-srotra-mano 'prapta-visayam trayam anyatha tribhir ghran' adibhis tulya-visaya-grahanam matam || -718

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20) 21) 22) (47) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory(M. Hattori) is not acceptable from the Buddhist viewpoint. Dignaga offers the same criticism to the Naiyayikas too. (Da) According to a certain Mimamsa advocate, the assemblage (samagri) of the factors of cognition is the means of cognition (pramana), because the cognition as the resulted content is produced through the instrumentality of it. The Vtttikara holds the opinion that the cognition as the resulted con. tent is different (from the means of cognition). As there is, he maintains, no other result than the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman), what gives rise to a cognition must be regarded as the means of cognition. And, at the time (of the origination of a cognition), nothing can be its cause but the abovesaid conjunction (samprayoga) of the soul and other (factors, viz., mind, sense-organ and object), which has been defined as the perception (pratyaksa), together with the impulse (to produce a cognition, which is given to the soul by that conjunction. Therefore, it is the assemblage of above-mentioned four factors that should be recognized as the means of perception.) (This argument, is not free from being exposed to our criticism.) Should it and none other be (the perception), In case the assemblage of factors and none other should be called the perception, what would be the use of the term 'origination of a cognition' (bud. dhi-janman) (in the sutra)? If (the perception as the means of cognition should be taken in the sense) as has been explained (by the Vsttikara), then the sutra should 23) 23) 20) PSV, I, Nyaya Section k. 2a-b: santara-grahanam na syat praptau jnane dhikasya ca / cf. SVK, ad IV, 41, Nyayavarttika-tatparya-tika, p. 118, Randle, Fragments from Dinnaga, p. 14, HJU, E VRO + # # # ( #*#ORART XXI) p. 63 ff. 21) Owing to limited space, the explanations will be omitted henceforward. 22) k. 6a-b:/ blo yi rgyu yi tshogs pa dag // brjod las hgrol bahi tshad ma gan / 23) k. 6c-d :/ gan las ci ste hdi nid na ll de blo skye ba ci sig bya / -- 717

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24) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory(M. Hattori) (48) have (simply) stated that man's sense which is in contact with existence is the perception. In such case, what is the use of the term 'origination of a cognition', which has been explained above as being resulted from that (sense-object contact ? The cognition as the resulted content being assumed by him to be different from the means of cognition, the sutra which is intended for giving the definition of the perception as the means, should have omitted the unnecessry term implying the result.) (It may be argued that the term origination of a cognition' is necessary so that such sense-object contact that is not productive of any result may be excluded. However, there is no need of such consideration, as the sense-object contact does never fail to produce the perceptul knowledge.) (K, 107b. 2-5; V, 25b.7 - 26a.3 (262.6 - 26b. 1)] (Db) Further, the above argument involves the following difficulty). Inasmuch as (the Vsttikara maintains that the object, the sense, the mind and the self, which are conjoined with each other, along with the impulse (to produce cognition should be considered as the means of cognition, he must be asked) why the assemblage (of these factors) of the origination of a cognition should be called "praty-aksa' (being direct to the sense) (instead of being called 'prati-samagri (being direct to the assemblage) or otherwise). The assemblage of all these (factors) is not fit to be called 'praty. aksa', which literally means what functions in direct connecton with each sense (aksam aksam prati vartate). The characteristic feature of the per 25) 26) 24) cf. J, 78a. 2-3 (875.8-88a.1). 25). k. 7:/ gan tshe don dan dban po yid // skyes bu sbyor ba hdu byed Idan/ /blo skye ba yi tshogs pa la ll, mnon sum brjod pa de ci ltar / 26) This is Dignaga's etymological explanation of 'pratyaksa', cf. Nyayamukha (Chin. version), Taisho, XXXI, p. 3b: S h i, Prasannapada, p. 72, Dharmottarapradipa, p. 38, Tattvasamgraha-Panjika, ad k. 1237. cf. also my paper, Dignaga's Theory of Direct Knowledge (henceforth referred to as DTDK), Bulletin of the Unio. of Osaka Phefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7, p. 6, note 13. - 716 -

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(49) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) ception (pratyaksa) as the means of cognition consists, as the term itself signifies, in the contact of the sense with its object, and the contact of the mind with the sense as well as that of the self with the mind are not to be regarded as the means of perceptual knowledge. (Against this criticism the Vsttikara may raise the following objection: even when) the sense-object contact alone is thought to be the perception, that contact, (although) being effective to apprehend the object, rests on the basis of two factors, (i. e., the sense and the object,) and does not take place on the foundation of the sense alone; (hence the sense-object contact does neither befit the term 'praty.aksa'. This dissenting) opinion, (however,) should not be admitted. (As we have already stated, the sense. object contact can be properly called 'praty-aksa' on the ground that the sense is the specific factor of perception while the object is common to other 27) means of cognition.) (K, 107b. 5-7; V, 26. 3-4 (26b. 1-3)) (Dc] (In order to vindicate the sutra, the Vsttikara construes the term 'cognition' (buddhi) as the immediate awareness of an object and its determinant, and distinguishes it from the determinate cognition to be resulted: therethrough.) The perception, she explains,) is that through the instrumentality of which the determination (niscaya) of a certain (object, which is expressible in the form of a judgement) 'this is a cow', 'this is a horse' or the like, is produced. (As the determinate cognition is resulted by conjoin. ing the object with its determinant, the immediate awareness of these two factors must be the instrument of the determination. Therefore, he concludes, the term 'cognition in the sutra is not unnecssary in sofar as it is taken in the above sense.) . (This interpretation) again is not tenable. Granting it to be true that one recognizes an object as a cow when it is conjoined with the cow-ness (gotva), the sensory apprehension (aksabuddhi) is devoid of the faculty (sakti) of conjoining (tht determinant) 27) PS, I, k. 4a-b: asadharana-hetutvad aksais tad vyapadisyate. cf. PSV, ad I, 4a-b, DTDK, p. 11. - 715

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) with the thing (perceived by itself. Therefore the determinate cog 28) nition cannot be resulted by the sensory apprehension.) According to the opponent's view, the sensory apprehension is competent to get an immediate awareness (alocana) of a cow itself shorn of any determinant as well as of that upon which it depends (asraya), (i. e., its determinant 'cow-ness"). Admitting that this view is right so far, it is impossible (for the sensory apprehension) to conjoin these two factors her. And where there is no conjunction of a bare thing with its determinant, there can be no means of determining that thing to be, for instance, a cow. In conclusion, we consider that all sorts of conceptual knowledge concerning the relation of the determinant and the determined (visesana-visesya) or of the name and the named (abhidhana-abhidheya) are but the subjective construction (upacara) of the mind, and they are not within the range of sensory apprehension. For, it is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form that becomes the object of . . sense. Although the thing to be apprehended by the sense is composed of many elements, what presents itself to the sense is a particular (asadharana) form, which causes the cognition thereof to originate. (This particular form pre 29) 28) k. 8:, ba lan nid sogs ldan las don // ba lan la sogs hjal bar byed // don dan yan dag hbrel pa la // dban pohi blo ni nus yod min / The same argument is found in PSV, I, ad Vaisesika Section k. la-b. cf. my paper, 7,- TOMT 12 +-### t BECAME). Jinendrabuddhi, in the course of his comment on Dignaga's Vstti annexed to this verse, says as follows :/ ho na gzegs zan brtag par don hdi / yul la lta don can nid kyi phyir, khyad par rnams kyis mtshams sbyor min/ (PS ,1, Vaisesika Section k. la-b) ses pa bsad zin pa kho na stel de slar yan brjod pa ci se na / de kho na/ ran gi rigs bya ses pa la sogs pas bar ma chad par hgyur bahi rigs pas / sin tu gsal bar byas pahi don duho / J. 79a. 2-3 (89a. 2-3). 29) k. 9a-b:/ rig bya ran nid bstan med pal/ gzugs don dban pohi spyod yul lo/ This verse exactly coincides with PS, I, k. 5c-d: svasamved yam anir. desyam rupam indriya-gocarah/ cf. DTDK, p. 13, note 34. cf. also J, 79a. 5-6 (89a. 7): ran gis rig bya ni ses pa la sogs pas......hdi yan du mani no bohi chos can ni (dharmino 'neka-rupasya......PS, I, k. 5) ses pa hdini nan du bsad zin to / -714 -

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30) 31) (51) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory(M. Hartori) sented to the sense is deemed, from another point of view, to be the ob. jective side of the cognition itself and, therefore,] is self-cognizable or self-luminous like the cognition itself. (That is to say, the cognition of this particular form does not connote any subject-object relation in its constitution.) As such, (the object of the sense) is inexpressible, because what is expressible is only the universal properties of the object. (K, 107b. 7-108a. 4; V, 26a.4 - 26b.2 (26b.3 - 27a.1)) (De) If it should be maintained that the means of cognition consists in) the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman), (Now the Mimamsakas may harbor), a doubt (against our argument, asserting) that the perception is learnt universally to be the origination of a cognition concerning a certain thing. Confronting this doubt, we answer as follows: (if the origination of a cognition should be considered to be the means of cognition (pramana),] those who maintain that the result is different from the means would get into self-contradiction, for it) would then be impossible to find the result other (than the means). Why is it impossible ? Now that the very cognition has originated, (there is) no (need of any) other result being produced. The result to be produced through the means of cognition is the appre. hension (adhigama) (of an object), which, however, is nothing else than the cognition (buddhi). Accordingly, should the cognition (itself) be regard. ed as the means of cognition, there could be no result (to be distinguished from that means, and the Mimamsakas would inevitably be led to the disaffirmance of the theory that the means and the result of cognition are different from each other). (K, 108a. 1-3 ; V, 26b. 6-27a. 1 (27a. 6-8)] (Df) In case the origination' (janman) is distinguished from the cog. 32) 33) 30) (Dd) K, 108a. 4-108b. 1; V. 26b. 2-6 (27a, 1-6) has been omitted. 31) k. 10a :/ ci ste blo skye bar hdod na / 32) k. 10b :/ hbras bu gsan ni rned ma yin/ 33) k. 10c-d :/ blo nid skye ba yin na ni // de las gsan pa hbras bu med // - 713

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimansaka Theory(M. Hattori) (52) 34) 35) nition' (buddhi), (then it must be recognized that the former is the effect (karya) of the latter. As the relation of an effect to its cause (karana) is thought to be the intimate relation (samavaya), it follows that the 'origination') is intimately related to its own cause, (namely the 'cognition'. Accordingly, it may well be conceived here that the origination' is resulted through the instrumentality of the intimate relation, which, in this respect,) is deemed to be) the means (pramana) (in regard to the origination of a cognition). Even so, however, how can (the 35) intimate relation, which is perpetually present (nitya),] be the means [of the origination' which naturally is limited in time) ? The Vaisesikas hold the view that the 'origination' as the effect [of a cognition) is intimately related either to its own cause, viz., the cognition, or to the universal existence (satta), [attribute-ness (gunatva), cognition. hood (buddhitva)) and so on, (which are the universals related to the cognition. On this point the Mimansakas are in concert with them.) * There, if we admit, in accordance with their view, that the 'origination of a sensory apprehension is resulted through that intimate relation, then it follows as a necessary consequence that the intimate relation is the means in regard to the origination) of a perceptual knowledge. In fact, however, the intimate relation, being perpetually present, has no concern with the 'origination'. Accordingly, it hardly stands to reason to presume that the origination of a sensory apprehension is resulted through 37) 38) 34) cf. Kanadasutra-vivsti, ad VII, ii, 26 : karya-karanayor avayavavayavinor yatah samband hat ihedam iti pratyayah sa samavayah. 35) Regarding the nityatva of samavaya, cf. Vaisesikasutro paskara, ad VII, ii, 26, Athalye, Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta, Bombay Skt. Ser., p. 97. 36) k. lla-c:/ gal te blo las skye gsan ma yin yan gan las der / cf. NR, ad IV, 53: yadi buddher arthataran janma, tat kis vaisesikoktah karane karyasya samavaya iti cen na. tasya nityatvenaksanadhinatvat pratyaksatvanupapatteh. cf. also SVK, ad IV, 53. 37) cf. J, 80b. 1 (906. 5) 38) J, 80b. 2 (90b. 5): dpyod pa pa rnams kyis kyan deni (=ka na bhu dza yi) lugs kho na la brten to / - 712 -

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(53) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) 39) 40) the instrumentality of the intimate relation in either case (when the origination is intimately related to the cognition or to the universal existence and so on). If, (on the other hand, the origination' is) not distinguished (from the cognition), then the term "origination' will be meaningless. In case the origination does not differ from the cognition, then the purport of the sutra will be well conveyed by the term 'cognition' alone.) As the term 'cognition' is expressive of that the cognition is the means of perceptual knowledge, it does not make any sense to reiterate the import by the term 'origination'. (K, 108.3-6 ; V, 27.1-3 (27a.8 - 27b.3)] (E) If the soul should come to be modified at the time when a cognition originates, then it would be non-eternal. If it be maintained that the soul (purusa) operates upon the object, changing its previous state due to the origination of a cognition, the soul must be recognized as transient (anitya). This assumption, however, is inadmissible (for the Mimamsakas who maintain the eternity of the soul). If, on the other hand, the soul should remain unmodified even when a cognition originates, it cannot be a cognizer (pramats). It again is inconsistent to maintain that the unchangeable soul, which, even at the moment of the origination of a cognition, does not alter its previous state of non-cognizerhood, is nevertheless presumed to be a cognizer. (K, 1082.6 - 109a.1 ; V, 27a.3-4 (27b.3-6)] The theories of perception set forth by others do not, as have been examined above, establish that the very perception is the means of valid cognition, as many faulty expressions are found therein. 40) 39) k. 11d: ci ste gsan min brjod don med / cf. NR, SVK, ad IV, 53. 40) k. 12: buddhi-janmani putsas ca vikrtir yady anityata / athavikftir atmayam pramateti na yujyate // cf. SVK, ad IV, 53, Tattvasarngraha-panjika, introd. to k. 273 (p. 108). NR, ad IV, 53: kah punah purusah, na taval laukikah kayah, tasyacetanatvat. atha atma, sa yadi buddhi-janmana vikriyate, ksiravad anityah syat, avikriyatve va purvavad apramatstvad asat-tulyah syat, yatha'ha-buddhi-janmani...... - 711 -