Dharmakirtis And Kumarilas Refutations Of Existence Of God

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269435/1

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DHARMAKĪRTI'S AND KUMĀRLA'S REFUTATIONS
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: A CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
by
Helmut Krasser, Vienna
The chronological order of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, who are regarded as contemporaries, is still controversial. The main positions regarding their chronological relationship may be summed up as follows:' In his paper on Kumārila's Brhattīkā, Erich Frauwallner proposed that Dharmakirti's earliest writing, the so-called *Hetuprakarana, which he incorporated as Svārthānumāna chapter in his Pramanavārttika, already takes Kumārila's critique on Dignāga in his Slokavārttika into consideration, and that Kumārila in his Brhattikā refines his view in light of Dharmakīrti's considerations. Frauwallner's arguments are supported by Steinkellner in his new interpretation of Pramänavärttika I 33.' This sequence of the texts, Slokavärttika - *Hetuprakarana Brhattīkā, has been questioned by John Taber, who feels "justified in believing that the SV was composed after the BȚ and contains Kumārila's mature views" and that there exist "evidences suggesting that Kumārila is indeed sometimes addressing Dharmakirti's ideas also in the ŚV.4 The present paper does not deal with the material and arguments used by the above authors, but aims at solving the question of the relation of the Pramānavārttika and the Slokavārttika by basing itself on material that has so far not been considered. Both parties, the Buddhists as well as the Mīmāmsakas, do not accept an eternal God (iśvara) as creator of the world, and both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila refute this idea, at least partially, with more or less similar arguments in the Pramānavārttika and Slokavārttika respectively. This examination attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between these passages at all, and if so, what the direction of influence might be.
The problem is also dealt with in Tosaki Hiromasa (Bukkyo ninshikiron no kenkyū—Hosho-cho "Pramanavärttika" no genryõron (Studies on Buddhist Epistemology: The theory of perception in Dharmakirti's Pramāņavārttika), Vol. I (Tokyo, 1979), 7-20) where he refers to the opinion of Prof. Hattori who considers Dharmakirti to have had knowledge of Kumärila's Slokavarttika. In a recent paper, too, dealing with the question of the exclusion of others' (anyäpoha), Hattori proposes the same sequence of texts: Slokavārttika - Pramanavārtikasvavrtti (cf. Masaaki Hattori, "Discussions on Jātimat as the Meaning of a Word," in Srijñānāmrtam: A Memorial Volume in Honour of Prof. Shri Niwas Shastri, ed. Vijaya Rani (Delhi, 1996), 387-394).
2 E. Frauwallner, "Kumārila's Brattikā," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens 6 (1962): 78-90.
E. Steinkellner, "Kumärila, Isvarasena, and Dharmakirti in Dialogue. A New Interpretation of Pramāņavārttika 133," in Bauddhavidyasudhakärah: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pulz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1997), 625-646.
John A. Taber, "Further Observations on Kumärila's Brhattikā," The Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 56-62 (1986-92) (:179–189). 189; 180.

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At the beginning of the Pramānasiddhi chapter of his Pramānavārttika (PV II), Dharmakīrti, after having shown that an eternal entity (nitya) that could serve as reliable authority (pramāna) is not possible, states that there are neither proofs for an ephemeral (anitya) nor for an eternal entity that could be assumed to be the creator of the universe (vv. 8-9). The reasons for this he formulates in the following verses:S
sthitvāpravrttisamsthānaviseșärthakriyādişu / istasiddhir asiddhir vā drstante samsayo 'thavä // 10 // "In the case of the logical reasons put forward by the opponents, such as 'activity after a rest', 'having a specific configuration', and 'accomplishment of a purpose' (there obtain the logical faults that they are proving what is already accepted [by us), or that the probandum) is not established in the example, or (that there remains) doubt [regarding the hetus)."
The arguments referred to in this verse are, as Kamalasīla informs us, those of Aviddhakarna and Uddyotakara. In order to provide the context we may have a look at the proof of the existence of God as put forward by Aviddhakarna:
[atrāviddhakarnopanyastam išvarasādhane pramānadvayam... tad uktam) dvindriyagrāhyagrähyam vimatyadhikaranabhāvāpannam buddhimatkāranapūrvakam, svārambha Rāvayavasanniveśavisistatvät, ghatādivat, vaidharmyena paramänava iti TSP 52,16-18. "That which is to be grasped and not to be grasped by two sense organs and which is subject of (our) dispute presupposes a conscious cause, because it has a specific configuration of its parts which cling together (in order to constitute the universe), like a pot, etc. The atoms (serve) as dissimilar example."
Without going into the details of the complicated formulation of the pakşa, an explanation of which is given by Kamalasīla, we now come back to Dharmakīrti in order to see why these proofs should be afflicted by these logical faults which are not at all self-evident and which we may expect to learn from the following verses. In the next verse Dharmakīrti states that an inference is based on a necessary connection between the probans and the probandum and formulates this
As a critical edition of the following verses of PV II is included in my study on Sankaranandana's isvarāpakaranasariksepa (to be published in 1999), I refrain here from text critical remarks.
6 On sthitvāpravrtti cf. TSP 54,14–16: uddyotakaras tu pramanayati-bhuvanahetavah pradhanaparanamadrstah svakäryotpattāv atiśayabuddhimantam adhisthātāram apeksante, sthitvāpravrtteh, tantuturyādivad iti. Kamalasila here probably is referring to pradhanaparamānukarmāni prāk pravrtier buddhimaikäranädhisthitäni pravartante, acetanatvät, väsyädivad iti. yathā vāsyādi buddhimata taksna adhisthitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhanaparamanukarmani acetanani pravartante. tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkäranädhisthitānīti NV 945,1216 ("Primordial matter, the atoms, and the karman become active (only) insofar as before their activity they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc. An ax, for example, becomes active when it is governed by a conscious carpenter. For it is insentient. Primordial matter, the atoms, and the karman which are insentient become active in the same way. Therefore, they too are governed by a conscious cause.") arthakriya is not reported by Kamalaśila to refer to an argument held by Uddyotakara, but in his Nyayavartrika we can find a similar proof: buddhimatkäranadhisthitani svāsu dhāranădikriyasu mahābhūtäni väyvantāni pravartante, acetanatvāt, väsyādivat NV 957,9-11 ("The elements terminated by 'air' (i.e. excluding ākāśa) become active regarding their activities such as holding when they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc.")
Instead of the term sanniveśavisista ascribed to Aviddhakarna, Dharmakirti uses the formulation samsthānavišesa which already is to be found in Uddyotakara (NV 959,10ff. on NS 4.1.22).

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general theorem by referring to Aviddhakarna's reason alluded to in the previous statement:
siddham vädrg adhisthātrbhāvābhävänuvrttimat/ sanniveśādi tad yuktam tasmad yad anumiyate II 11 // "[That kind of governor) which is inferred from such a configuration, etc., of which it is established that it follows the presence and absence of a (certainl governor, is correct."
Here he is saying, in other words, that a hetu is correct and may be applied when the necessary conditions of positive and negative concomitance, anvaya and vyatireka, are satisfied. However, as he goes on, an incorrect hetu, which is similar to the correct, established one only inasmuch as one and the same word may be applied to both of them, does not bring about a valid inference. This would be like the inference of fire from snow on account of the snow being white, like smoke.
vastubhede prasiddhasya sabdasāmyad abhedinah / na yuktānumitih pandudravyād iva hutāśane // 12 // "It is not correct to infer something that is generally known (as occurring) in the case (of the presence of one real entity (vastubhede) on account of a reason) that is not different from that entity) (only) due to the sameness of a word (applied to both of them). [This would be like (the inference) of fire on account of a white substance."
When we apply this critique to Aviddhakarna's proof, it means that the reason sanniveśavisistatvāt is not a property of the paksa to be proven. For the property sanniveśavisistatva which belongs to the pot where the pervasion (vyāpti) has been established, and the property sanniveśavisistatva belonging to the sādhyadharmin are two completely different things, even if the same word is applied to them. If the opponent nevertheless insists on this kind of procedure, he is ridiculed. The opponent would then have to accept a termite hill as being produced by a potter like a pot, for both of them are modifications of clay:
anyatha kumbhakarena mrdvikārasya kasyacit / ghatādeh karanāt sidhyed valmikasyāpi tatkrtiḥ // 13 // "Otherwise it would be established that a termite hill is also a product of this (potter), because a
certain modification of clay such as a pot is produced by that potter."
In the next verse Dharmakīrti objects that his criticism could be misunderstood to constitute a false objection, jāti or dūsanābhāsa, called kāryasama, 'similar to the effect' or 'balancing the effect' (Tucci).
sādhyenānugamät kārye sämänyenāpi sādhanel sambandhibhedād bhedoktidosah käryasamo matah // 14 // "[And our criticism does not constitute the dusanābhāsa called käryasama, for the fallacy that is assumed as kāryasama consists in pronouncing a difference between the effect which serves as hetu and the effect known in the example) (only) because of a difference of the related terms (i.e.
8 karyasama is defined by Dignāga in Pramanasamuccaya VI v. 7 and in Nyāyamukha, Taisho vol. 32, 5b (translated in Giuseppe Tucci, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga (Heidelberg, 1930), 60).

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sadhyadharmin and drstäntadharmin) when an effect is a probans also in general because it is accompanied by the probandum (in general)."
In verse 15 Dharmakirti repeats what he had formulated in verse 12 with regard to a real entity (vastu), but relates his statement to general concepts (jāti) by which he means notions such as 'effect' (kārya) or 'configuration' (samsthāna) or that of any other universal. By the last verse dealing with the refutation of the opponents' proofs for the existence of God, he expresses the view that things are not established by the mere utterance of the words denoting them.
järyantare prasiddhasya sabdasämänyadarśanāt / na yuktam sādhanam gotvād vāgādinām visānivar // 15 // "[However) a proof of something that is generally known (to occur) in the case (of the presence of the property consisting of] a certain general concept on account of knowing (darśana) a universal consisting of a word (applied to both of them) is not correct. (This is) like (proving) that speech and so on have horns on account of their having the property consisting of the general concept of the gotva (because the word go denotes, besides other things, 'cow' as well as 'speech')."
vivaksāparatantratvān na sabdah santi kutra vā / tadbhävad arthasiddhau tu sarvam sarvasya sidhyati // 16 // "Or, since (words) depend on the speaker's) intention, is there any (object) for which there are no words? (However) if objects were established by the (mere) presence of that (word applied to them), everything would be established for everybody."
Now, if we consider these verses again, we may say that nos. 11-16 are more or less selfevident and can be understood without difficulty. This also applies to verse 14, the definition of the kāryasama dūsanābhāsa, although at first glance it does not look that obvious. For this is nothing but a reformulation of the definition as given by Dignāga in his Pramānasamuccaya VI v. 7. These verses do not, however, constitute an explanation of verse 10 as one would have expected. The logical fault addressed in verse 12, for example, is, as one can easily see, that the hetu is not established (asiddha). This classification also obtains for verse 15. And this is the exact way that Dharmakīrti himself classifies this fallacy of the reason addressed here, for he had incorporated vv. 11-16 into the third chapter of his Pramānaviniscaya (vv. 70–75) under the heading of the hetvābhāsa called asiddha. Thus it is quite obvious that vv. 11-16 are not intended by Dharmakīrti as a comment on verse 10 but as an additional criticism. However, why the proofs of the opponents constitute the fallacies of proving what is already established for the Buddhists (istasiddhi) and of the probandum's being unestablished in the example (asiddhir vā drstānte), etc., still remains unclear.
As it is unlikely that Dharmakīrti would accuse his opponents of using incorrect arguments without discussing them and without showing why these fallacies should obtain, we may assume that this has been formulated elsewhere either by himself or by somebody else and that here in
Derge Tshad ma Vol. 14, No. 4227 Tshe (1-178a3): 12825-129b1 = Peking Vol. 137, No. 5727 We(1-20963): 150a7-15166. For a Japanese translation and explanation of these verses, cf. Motoi Ono, "Pramāņaviniscaya ni okeru shusaishin sonzai ronsho hihan" (Critique of the proof for the existence of God in the Pramānaviniscaya). Hikaku Shiso no Michi 5, 1986: 65–71.

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the Pramanasiddhi chapter he presupposes that explanation. But such an explanation is, at least to my knowledge, not to be found in any of Dharmakirti's works. However, help in understanding that verse may be obtained from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika.
In Slokavärttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 74-82ab, Kumārila considers the argument of Aviddhakarna, reformulating it at the beginning of this section in the following way:
sannivesavisiṣṭānām utpattim yo grhädivat/
sādhayec cetanādhisthām dehānām tasya cottaram || 74 ||
"Now (ca), the [following is our] answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation (utpatti) of bodies specific in configuration must be governed by a conscious being (cetanadhiṣṭā), like [the creation of] houses, etc."'ll
In the first part of his answer, in vv. 75 and 76ab, Kumārila argues that this proof is not valid because it proves what is already established for the Mīmāmsaka:
kasyacid dhetundtratvam yady adhisthätṛteryate3/
karmabhiḥ sarvajivānām tatsiddheḥ siddhasadhanam || 75 1/15
"If [you] assume that to govern something means no more than to be its cause, then [you] prove what already is established [for us]. For that [fact of being no more than cause] is constituted (tatsiddhi) by the [past] actions (karma) of all beings."
icchāpūrvakapakṣe 'pi, tatpūrvatvena karmanām / 76ab //
"[The same defect disqualifies you] even if [you take] the alternative [and claim] that [to govern something means] presupposing the will [of that governor]. For the actions [themselves] presuppose that [will]."
In the second half of v. 76 Kumarila shows that the proving property would not occur in the example if this governing agency (adhisthātṛtā) were understood in such a way that things come into existence immediately after he had wished it.
icchanantarasiddhis tu drstante 'pi na vidyate // 76cd //
"[You may assume that to govern something means] to come into existence (siddhi) immediately after that will. But (tu) this is not to be found in any example."
Verse 77 expresses the idea that the body of God could be taken as a counter-example, for his body possesses the proving property, namely utpatti and being specific in configuration, but the property to be proven, i.e. being governed by a conscious being, is not to be found. For the opponent does not assume that for its creation God's body requires yet another conscious being: this would lead to an infinite regression. As the hetu thus occurs where the property to be proven
10 celanadhisthām ŚV: cetanadhisthā Kā sam [cf. ŚV 4672]
"I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Alexis Sanderson, Oxford, for kindly providing his translation of SV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 42c-114b.
12 mätratvam ŚV: matrasya NBhus, Vyom
13 adhisthätṛtesyate SV: adhisthatṛtocyate NBhus, Vyom
14 sarvajivānām SV, NBhūs, NM: sarvabijänām Vyom
15 v. 75 quoted in NBhus 448,11f.; Vyom 103,20f.; v. 75cd quoted in NM 510,11

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is available as well as where this is not the case, it would be inconclusive, anekānta.
anekäntaś ca hetus te taccharirädina bhavet/ utpattimämś ca faddeho dehatväd asmadädivat // 77 11 "Moreover, your reason would be inconclusive because of his body, etc. And you cannot deny that) his body had an origin, because it is a body, like ours."
If, as formulated in the next verse, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, in order to avoid this fault, argues that his body does not serve as a counter-example (vipaksa), for his body, too, is governed by God himself, then it follows that God, in order to create his body, would have to be a governor without a body, like any other liberated soul. To govern without having a body, however, is not possible.
atha tasyäpy adhisthānam tenaivety avipaksata / aśariro hy adhisthātā näsau' muktātmavad bhavet // 78 // "If (the opponent claims) that (God's body) is not a counter-example, for that (body) too, is governed by this (God) himself, [we answer that this assumption is not possible). For he would have to be a governor without a body, like any other) liberated soul."
Verse 79 shows another case where the example lacks the proving property. This fault would obtain, Kumärila argues, if one assumes pots, for example, to be governed by God. For this has not been seen by anyone. If, on the other hand, one assumes that pots are governed by potters, then the undesired consequence follows that they could not be governed by God.
kumbhakärädyadhisthānam ghatadau yadi cesyate'? / nesvaradhisthitatvam syād, asti cer sädhyahinatā // 79 //18 "Moreover, if you hold that in case of the pot and so on the governing agency (adhisthana) is that of the potter, etc., then (pots, etc.) would not be governed by God. If (on the other hand] (they are (governed by God himself), then the example) is lacking the property to be proven."
Aviddhakarna's reason is not only considered to be inconclusive (anekānta), but also to prove the opposite of what it is intended to do. For if the example is understood to exhibit the property to be proven, then it would follow that the atoms are governed by human beings which are neither God nor eternal. Thus the reason would be contradictory.
yathāsiddhe ca drstänte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā /19 aniśvaravināsyādikartrmattvam prasajyate // 80 11 "And if you understand) the example as it is normally understood (yarhäsiddha), then the reason would be contradictory. (For) it would follow that the subject to be proven) would have a creator who is a non-God and perishable (vināśin)."
As a final refutation of Aviddhakarna's proof Kumārila adds that if, unlike the creation of a pot by a potter, God creates the world without having a body by his mere will, then the atoms
16 näsau 1 Pu (cf. ŚV 468'): nătmă ŚV "cesyate ŚV. NBhūş: vesyate is 18 v. 79 quoted in is 6,4-5; NBhūs 449,11-12 19 v. 80ab quoted in is 6,6; NBhū$ 449,13

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could not obey to his will, for they are unconscious by nature.
kulálavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate20 / acetanah katham bhāvas tadiccham anurudhyate? // 81 82 "And if his activity is not held to be of the same kind) as that of a potter, how could an entity that is insentient (acetana) (like an atom obey (this will of his?"
tasman na paramānvāder ārambhah syat tadicchayā // 82ab // "Therefore, the atoms do not cling together (in order to constitute the world) due to his (merel will.
will."
In this small section of the Slokavārttika we have seen so far that the fallacies of istasiddhih, asiddhir va drstānte, and samśayo 'thavā referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV II 10 are explained here in extenso in verses 75-76ab, 76cd and 79, and 77-78 respectively. Thus, these verses could be a candidate for what Dharmakīrti may have had in mind when he accused the opponents proofs of containing the fallacies just mentioned. In order to see whether Kumārila's critique is also acceptable for a Buddhist, we should have a look at how Dharmakirti is explained by his commentators. • The fault of siddhasādhana as explicated in SV 75 obtains, because, under the condition that 'the being mere cause' (hetumātratva) is intended to be the sādhya, this fact of being the mere cause is constituted by the actions of all living beings. And this is the very way in which this fallacy is expounded by Dharmakirti's commentators. For the sake of convenience I do not follow one commentary only, but quote those passages where the correspondence with Kumārila's ideas finds its most clear and succinct expression. In this case we will have a look at Prajñākaragupta's Pramanavārttikalarkara:
... istasyaiva siddhiḥ siddhasādhanam....karmalaksanacetanädhisthitam ca sakalam isyate. PVA 35,298 "... 'proving what already is accepted [by us)' means 'proving what already is established (for us)... And we assume that everything is governed by volition (cetana) which is defined as karman."
In this context the commentators normally quote Abhidharmakośa IV lab, which says that "the variety of the world arises from action. And this (action) is volition and that which is produced through volition."23 Here there is no doubt that the argument as formulated by Kumarila and the one adopted by Prajñākaragupta are the same. One could now assume, however, that Dharmakīrti was thinking of this passage from the Abhidharmakośa alone. But this does not seem very likely to me. For he could not expect an opponent to understand and react to such an accusation that his proof when understood in a general way contains the fault of istasiddhi because of that statement in the Abhidharmakośa alone.
20 kalpyate 3 Pu (cf. ŚV 469%), NM, NBhus : kalpate ŚV 21 anurudhyate ŚV, NBhús : anuvartate NM 22 v. 81 quoted in NM 508,8-9; NBhus 453,14-15 23 karmajam lokavaicitryam. celana tarkrtam ca tat. Abhidharmakośa IV lab

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Be this as it may be. The next fault, namely asiddhir vā drstānte, which, according to ŚV 79, obtains when the opponent wishes to prove that things are governed by a specific conscious being, namely God, is explained in the very same manner, for example, by Devendrabuddhi having Uddyotakara's proof in mind:
ci ste de las gzhan pa'i phan 'dogs par byed pa la ltos pa med pa'i skyes bu gcig gi khyad par gyi blos byin gyis brlabs pa sngon du song ba can nyid sgrub pa de'i tshe/dpe ma grub pa yin te /dpe bsgrub par bya bas stong pa zhes bya ba'i don to // PVP D 8b47, P 9b5f "If (the opponent) wishes to prove that things) presuppose the governance of the mind of a specific, single purusa that is independent of subsidiary causes (upakäraka) different from him, then (the probandum) is not established in the example. That means that the example is lacking the property to be proven."
The last fault addressed by Dharmakīrti, samsayo 'thavā, may correspond to ŚV 77-78, where Kumārila explains that the hetu brought forward by the opponent is inconclusive (anekānta) because of the body of God which is not governed by another sentient being. This defect is illustrated by Devendrabuddhi, who—as was the case with the previous one-considers Uddyotakara's proof in the following way:
sdod nas 'jug pa'i phyir dang/don byed par nus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni/ yang na the tshom za ba yin te/(v. 10d) de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu de nyid kyis ma nges pa yang yin no ll de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu gzhan gyis phyin gyis brlabs pa de ni sdod cing/sdod nas lus la sogs pa dag la jug par byed na /thug pa med pa thal bar 'gyur pa'i phyir ro // PVP D 867-9al; P 9b8-10a2 "Or there (remains) doubt regarding the logical reasons (such as) 'because [they act after a rest and because (they are capable of accomplishing a purpose'. This means that these hetus) are also inconclusive (ma nges pa, anaikāntika) because of that very puruşa (i.e. God) which is of such a kind (as you assume). For if he fi.e. God) becomes active regarding such things as his and others') bodies by being governed by another purusa of that kind, then an infinite regression (anavastha) follows..."
Because from the above examination it is quite obvious that all of these fallacies alluded to by Dharmakīrti are illustrated by his commentators in the very same way as they have been demonstrated by Kumārila and because PV II 10 could not have been understood at that time in a proper context without knowledge of the critique as formulated in the Slokavārttika, we safely may conclude that Dharmakīrti was aware of the criticism by Kumārila when he set out to refute the Nyāya-Vaišesikas' proofs for the existence of God.
The fact that Dharmakīrti did not include the hetu's being contradictory (viruddha) or the statement that the atoms, being insentient, could not obey God's will, may be explained in such a way that he considered it to be enough to refer to that passage in the Slokavärttika by mentioning some of the faults shown there, and that he felt no need to repeat all of them. What is noteworthy in this connection is that Dharmakīrti's commentators did not refer to these fallacies either.24
24 It is only Śäntaraksita in TS 74 and Kamalasīla in his Panjikā who consider the hetus to be also viruddha.

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Dharmakirti's and Kumarila's Refutations of the Existence of God 223 Abbreviations is . NBhus NM NV PVUI isvarasiddhi (Utpaladeva): Madusudan Kaul Shastri, ed. The Siddhitrayi and the Pratyabhijnakarika-vritti of Rajanaka Utpala Deva. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 34. Srinagar, 1921. Nyayabhusana (Bhasarvajna): Svami Yogindrananda, ed. Srimad-acarya-Bhasarvajnapranitasya Nyayasarasya svopajnam vyakhyanam Nyayabhusanam. Saddarsanaprakasanagranthamala l. Varanasi, 1968. Nyayamanjari (Jayantabhatta): K. S. Varadacharya, ed. Nyayamanjari of Jayantabhatta with TippaniNyayasaurabha by the editor. Vol. I. Mysore, 1969. Nyayavartika (Udd yotakara): Nyayadarsanam Bhasya-Vartika-Tatparyatika-sahitam, with Vatsyayana's Bhasya, Uddyotakara's Varttika. Vacaspati Misra's Tatparyatika and Visvanatha's Vrti. Vol. I. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calculla, 1944. Reprini, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982. Pramanavarttika (Dharmakirti), chapter 2 (Pramanasiddhi): Yusho Miyasaka, ed. Pramanavartukakarika (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2 (1971/72): 2-41. (Chapter 1 in Miyasaka's edition.) Pramanavarttikalarkara (Prajnakaragupta): Rahula Sankrtyayana, ed. Pramanavartikabhashyam or Vartikalarikarah of Prajnakaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanavartikam. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series I. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953. Pramanavartikapanjika (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, Che 161-32664), P 5717(b) (vol. 130. Che 1-390a8). Slokavarttika (Kumarila Bhatta): Svami Dvarikadasa Sastri, ed. Slokavarttika of Sri Kumarila Bhatta, with the commentary Nyayaratnakara of Sri Parthasarathi Misra. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978. Tattvasamgraha (santaraksita): Swami Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. Tattvasangraha of Acarya Shantaraksita with the commentary 'Panjika' of Shri Kamalashila. 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981-82. Tattvasamgrahapanjika (Kamalasila): See TS. Vyomavati (Vyomasiva): Gaurinath Sastri, ed. Vyomavati of Vyomasivacarya. Vol. I. Varanasi, 1983. PVA PVP TS TSP Vyom