Conceptualizations Of Being In Classical Vaisesika

Author(s): Wilhelm Halbfass
Publisher: Wilhelm Halbfass
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269234/1

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CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF 'BEING' IN CLASSICAL VAISEŞIKA1
By Wilhelm Halbfass, Philadelphia
While 'non-being' and 'negation' are among the favourite topics of recent Nyaya and Vaiseṣika studies, the corresponding theme of
1 Abbreviations:
Kiranavali by Udayanacarya, in: Vaisesikadarsanam... with the comm. of Prasastapada and the gloss of Udayanacarya, ed. V. P. DVIVED! (Benares 1919; Benares Sanskrit Ser. 9).
Nyayabhasya, see ND1, ND'.
The Nyaya-Darshana. The Sutras of Gautama and Bhasya of Vatsyayana, with two comm. ed. GANGANATHA JHA and DHUNDHIRAJA SHASTRI. Benares 1925; Chowkhamba Sanskrit Ser.). Nyayadarsana of Gautama, with the Bhasya of Vätsyayana, the Vårttika of Uddyotakara, the Tatparyaṭika of Vacaspati, and the Parisuddhi of Udayana (Volume I - Chapter I). Ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR (Darbhanga 1967; Mithila Inst. Ser. Ancient Text 20). NK/PB Nyayakandali by Sridhara, in: Bhashya of Prasastapada, together with the Nyayakandali..., ed. V. P. DVIVEDIN (Benares 1895; Vizianagram Sanskrit Ser. 6).
Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. N. SUKLA, 2 vols. (Benares 1934/36; Kashi Sanskrit Ser. 106).
Die Nyayasutras. Text, Übersetzung... von W. RUBEN (Leipzig 1928; repr. Nendeln 1966; Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 18/2).
Kir.
NBh NDI
NDS
NM
NS
NVI
NVI
-PB2
PP
VS1
VS
Vy.
The Nyayavarttikam by Udyotakara Miára, ed. V. P. DUBE (Cal. cutta 1887-1914; Biblioth. Indica).
Nyayavarttika, see ND'.
Prasastapadabhasyam... with comm. Sükti, by Jagadisa Tarka. lankara, Setu by Padmanabha Miśra, and Vyomavati by Vyomasivacārya, ed. GOPINATH KAVIRAJ (Benares 1924-1930; Chowkhamba Sanskrit Ser.).
Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanatha Miśra, with Nyayasiddhi (by Jayapurinarayana Bhaṭṭa), ed. A. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI (Banaras 1961; Banaras Hindu Univ. Darśana Ser. 4).
The Vaisesika Sutras of Kanāda..., transl. by N. SINHA (Allahabad 1911; Sacred Books of the Hindus 6; contains also the Sanskrit text of the Sutras).
Vaisesikasutra of Kanada, with the comm. of Candrananda, crit. ed. JAMBUVIJAYAJI (Baroda 1961; Gaekwad's Oriental Ser. 136). Vyomavati by Vyomasiva, see PB.

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'being', although both historically and systematically more-or at least equally-fundamental, has only met with a somewhat casual interest'. The conception of sattā and bhāva as highest universal' (param sāmānyam) is, no doubt, sufficiently familiar; yet, its exact implications in the context of classical Vaiseṣika, its interrelations with astitva, sattasambandha, svātmasattva etc., and its function and describability in terms of, or in contrast to, such Western concepts as 'existence' have never been thoroughly investigated.
One of the consequences of this has been that discussions of abhava are often lacking in perspective and do not do justice to the full and proper historical and systematic dimensions of their theme. It usually remains unanswered or even completely unquestioned how and why abhāva was "added" as a seventh padartha, and how, and to what extent, certain ways of conceiving of 'being' may have been conducive to certain corresponding ways of conceiving of 'non-being'. - At any rate: An exploration of the role and development of abhava especially in Nyaya and Vaiseṣika is necessarily incomplete as long as it does not go hand in hand with an exploration of the theme and terminology of 'being' which forms its counterpart and background; and this, of course,
The following is a revised and considerably expanded version of a paper read at the 29th International Congress of Orientalists, Paris 1973. In the meantime, the stimulating discussions with the participants of my Seminar in Indian Philosophy (Oriental Studies 711) at the University of Pennsylva nia, with whom I read some of the related texts, gave me a welcome oppor. tunity to re-examine this complex of questions.
Cf., e. g., J. B. BHATTACHARYA, Negation (Calcutta 1965). J. F. STAAL, Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25/1 (1962) 52-71. - B. K. MATILAL, The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation (Cambridge, Mass. 1968). B. GUPTA, Story of the Evolution of the Concept of Negation. Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschr. f. E. FRAUWALLNER (Wien 1968; WZKSO 12/13) 115-118. D. SHARMA, The Negative Dialectios of India (East Lansing, Mich. 1970).
See below, notes 26-28; more specific references to this theme are to be found in D. N. SHASTRI, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra 1964), and especially in R. R. DRAVID, The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy (Delhi etc. 1972).
A satisfactory treatment of this intricate historical question would require a more careful distinction of the Nyaya and Vaisesika traditions than it is usually met with especially in Indian contributions. Within Vaisesika itself, it is remarkable that Candramati's Dasapadarthaśāstra, in which the Vaisesika system is restricted to a 'doctrine of categories', presents 'non-being' as a separate padartha, while Prasastapada's Padarthadharmasamgraha, which re-emphasizes the more traditional 'physicalistic' aspects of the Vaisesika philosophy of nature, has no room for it.

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also requires an awareness of the implications of our own terminological tools in the area of being' and 'non-being'. It is certainly not very helpful to use phrases like "negation as an entity" or "non-existence as reality", as long as it remains unclarified how the "reality" with which ‘non-being' itself is credited has to be distinguished from, and related to, that meaning of 'to be' according to which non-being is not being.
The following remarks are meant to be preliminary and do not claim to present anything like an exhaustive answer and solution. They are by and large confined to classical Vaiseșika texts of the 1st millenium A. D., especially to Praśastapäda's Padārthadharmasam. graha and its commentaries, and they are focussing on the genesis, meaning and function of that conceptual construction which is indicated by the terms sattă, astitva, sattasambandha and svátmasattva. - Within the Indian panorama, the Vaišeşika way of dealing with 'being' is cer. tainly not the most inspiring and convincing one; yet, it is illustrative in its stubborn and honest one-sidedness, and moreover, it is one of the most important catalysts for the development of Indian 'ontology', and highly effective in terms of the critical responses which it stimulates.
As to the terminology of being in the Vaiseşikasůtras, the follow. ing short reminders may be sufficient for the purposes of our present discussion: In this text of notoriously unsatisfactory philological status, two terms, sattā and bhāva, represent the understanding of 'being' as the highest sämänya?, i. e. the most universal, all-pervasive common feature-perceptible by all senses-, of 'substances', 'qualities and 'motions' (dravya, guna, karman). It appears likely that at an earlier stage Vaišeşika did not go beyond these three 'categories' or constituents of reality. And if, in accordance with the testimony of Vyomaćiva and others, Kanāda actually announced his philosophy as a programme
K. H. POTTER, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, X. J. 1963) 200ff.
• D. N. SHASTRI, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra 1964) 395ff.
Cf. VS'. I, 2, 4ff.; on the perceptibility of bhävs cf. VS' IV, 1, 14 ( VS'IV, 1, 13).
. VSI I, 1, 4--the only passage presenting an enumeration of all six 'categories' and using the term pádártha -- is neither found in Vsnor in the Sūtra version of the anonymous commentary published by ANANTALAL THAKUR (Vaiseşikadarsana, Darbhanga 1957); the authenticity of VS I, 1, 4 was already questioned by M. R. BODAs in his introduction to Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta, ed. Y. V. ATHALYE (Bombay 1897; ropr. of 2nd ed. Poona 1963) XXXIII ff.
Cf. Vy. 47: yad sha bhavaru pam tat sarvam mayd-upacarthydavyam; Vy. 492: yad bhavarüpar tat sarvam abhi doydmi.
Lorike

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of naming, enumerating whatever has the character of being (bhavarupa), we may assume that he was referring to this group of 'categories' which are obviously more suitable for being enumerated than the 'universals' (sāmānya) etc. It would, of course, be idle to speculate on whether 'being' was already an explicitly developed theme of thought in "original" Vaišeşika, or whether the idea of 'being', which forms the horizon of this programme of exhaustive enumeration and classification, was simply and commonsensically taken for granted. - How the way of presenting asat and contrasting it with sat in VS IX fits in with the original bhāra-orientation, and whether or to what extent this section of the text may at all be regarded as old and authentic, is a question which we cannot enlarge upon here".
The most familiar rendering of sattā and its terminological equivalent bhāva is 'existence'13; this translation demands some caution insofar as it should not be taken as suggesting any contrast to 'essence'. Although the connotation of 'actuality' and 'manifestness' is undeniable in the actual usage of satis, sattă, as used thematically and terminologically, leaves 'essence' and 'existence' undivided, just as it does not establish any confrontation between 'being' and 'nothing'. Rather, it puts what. ever there is, or 'exists', on a common ground with anything else that exists, thus providing a basis for comprehensive enumeration and classification. We may also note here that the traditional verbal and actional connotations of bhāva, accentuated especially by grammarians and grammatically oriented philosophers", do not affect the Vaibesika · On the implication of completeness and exhaustiveness in Kanada's programme cf., e. g., NK 89: ... sarvajñena maharpind sarodrthopadeádya prarytiena ...; this formula is repeated on p. 149.
u See above, n. 4.
1 This translation is taken for granted in most of the general histories of Indian philosophy; it is also used, e. g., in the majority of texts referred to in notes 2-3 and 26-27. B. K. MATILAL, however (cf. n. 2), has "beingness" in his more recent publication: Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague 1971) he paraphrases "existence or being-ness".-D. H. H. INGALLS, Materials for the Study of Navya. Nyåya Logic (Cambridge, Mass. 1951)-generally a work of considerable terminological impact upon English translations of philosophical Sanskrit terms-gives "reality".
1 This connotation in the understanding of sat is also evident in the rejection of the implicit, potential 'being' which is implied by the Sårpkhya dotrine of satkarya; cf., e. g., NK 143f. - M. BIARDEAU states: “... la pensée indienne ne distingue à aucun moment l'essence de l'existence" (La philosophie de Mandana Misra vue à partir de la Brahmasiddhi, Paris 1969, p. 71).
1 Cf. L. RENOU, Terminologio grammaticale du Sanskrit (Paris 1957) 243244; 470–71.
has beinted
Made in Mateo 1971) hos Logic,

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usage. - Although awkward, an expression like beingness' might therefore be a more appropriate translation of satta.
While sattā and bhāva, if and insofar as they are used terminologi. cally, are obviously treated as synonyms in the Vaiseşikasūtras15, there is, nevertheless, a functional difference which has to be taken into consideration: While satta has a strictly terminological role, to which it remains basically confined also in later texts, bhavale is much more flexible and open to various other, less terminological functions, which should not be taken as evidence for the Vaiseșika doctrine of being' or 'beingness'17. Yet, this variety of other usages is by no means negli. gible. The very fact that it exists and that it accompanies, and inevitably intrudes into, the doctrinal and terminological statements about 'being' is itself a potential stimulus of raising questions and objections, 6. g. concerning such issues as the problem of self-reference, and it may thus have its direct or indirect bearing on the thematic and doctrinal level, too 18.
Prasasta pada goes on using sattā and bhäva in accordance with the language of the Sūtras, presenting 'beingness' as an attribute compar. able with, and only more extensive in its scope, than 'blueness'; insofar as they are factors of unity and similarity, objective bases of recurrent perception and linguistic repetition, they are on equal terms. In trying to accentuate his point, Praśasta påda even refers to the unity of the blue liquid which can give blueness to many different things in the process of dying: yathā parasparavišişteşu carmavastrakambalādigv ekasmān niladravyäbhisambandhän nilam nilam iti pratyayānuvyttiḥ, tathi parasparariţişteşu draryagunakarmasv avišiştā sat sad iti pratyayānuvyttiḥ, să ca- arthäntarād bhavitum arhati-iti, yat tad arthantaram să satta-iti siddha. - In addition to satta, however, Prasasta pada has a term which is symptomatic of his way of restructuring and rounding off the Vaiseșika system: the common abstract attribute' (sādharmya) astitoa,
" The synonymity of both is explicitly stated by Candránanda on VS' I, 2, 4. - There is no evidence for equating Kanada's bhava with Prebastapäda's Astitva, as D. N. SHASTRI, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra 1964) 148, would like to do.
16 To a lesser degree, this may be said about sattva (not in Vs), too, which appears sometimes in terminologically less committed functions than atti; cf. Vy. 126; NK 19.
17 In contrast with VS I, 2, 4, cf., e. h., the less terminological was of bhava and abhava in VS I, 2, 9ff. (= 'I, 2, 10 ff.).
1 Cf. the two levels of using abhäva in locutions liko abhdaasya prihag anupadeso bhdvopdratantryan na to abhavde (NK 7).
10 PB 311-312.

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‘is-ners**, which, together with jñeyatva ('knowableness') and abhi. dheyatva ('nameableness'), covers all six 'categories' and can accordingly be predicated of sattā itself. 'Beingness', like all 'universals' (sämänya), 'is' itself in that sense of 'to be' which is represented by astitva; its 'being' in the sense of sattā would, of course, lead to an infinite regress (anarnstha). -- Although there is no such second-level term and concept of 'being in the Vaišeşikasūtras, there are nevertheless certain locutions
-e. g. draryagunakarmabhyo 'rthäntaram sattā 11 - which may be taken as presupposing or implicitly requiring it; the word arthântara, often, but somewhat loosely used in the Sūtras, is, as we have seen, explicitly referred to by Prasastapāda, and it is obviously one of the signposts for his account of being'*
Subsequent to his introduction of the term astitva-sannām api padārthanam astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni --Prasastapāda characterizes drarya, guna and karman as having sattā sambandha, 'connection with beingness and sämänya, višeşa and samavāya as having svätmasattva, 'beingness of, or by virtue of, the own nature'. He does not explain these terms, which-if we may disregard here the occasional use of sattānusambandhaus -- occur only once in his text. There have been several usually rather incidental attempts to translate, paraphrase or account for this conceptual structure and its constituents. M. HIRIYANNA explains svātmasat as "intrinsically real" and contrasts it with the "bor. rowed being" of dravya etc.; he adds: “This distinction is remarkably like that between subsistence and existence" 24—but without really clarifying his understanding of these Western terms. G. PATTI interprets astitva as 'essentia' in the scholastic sense and sattā as 'existentia', and he paraphrases svátmasattva as "Wesen, das sich selbst genügend ist". T. VETTER finds intimations of a transcendental approach (in the Kantian and Post-Kantian sense) in the Vaiseșika formulations.By and large, the implications of the fact that there is a twofold concep
* On the conception of a mahasamanya as coinciding with padarthatoa according to Jaina commentators cf. H. UI, The Vaiseshika Philosophy ("Varanasi 1962) 35ff.; it seems that Candramati himself does not have tho term and conocpt of astitva.
11 VSI': 1, 2, 8.
* See above, n. 19.-In Candramati, sotto appears a separato padartha.
# PB 16. # PB 17; 19. # PB 312. * Indian Philosophical Studies I (Mysore 1957) 111. » Der Samaväys im Nyåya-Vaiseşika-System (Roma 1956) 143. * Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakirti (Wien 1964) 94.

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tuul purcetrom. st. satta-ustna on the one hand, sattasambandi svātmasattva on the other hand, have not really become thematic in these discussions.
Returning now to Prasastapāda's own text, we may first of all observe that the terms in the immediate neighbourhood of sattāsambandha resp. sātmasattva suggest some commonsensically obvious implications of such a distinction. The bringing about of 'merit' and 'demerit', the status of cause and effect, impermanence, etc. (dharma dharmakartstva, kāraṇatva, kāryatva, anityatva) - these features are restricted to the realm of particulars, which are, and have a concrete, 'manifest' being, insofar as sattā is inherent in them". With regard to the second group of 'categories'--sc. 'universals', 'individualities' and ‘inherence' - Prasastapāda says: sämânyādinām trayānām svātmasattvam buddhilaksanatvam so akāryatvan akāraṇatvam asāmānyaviseşavattvam nityatvam arthasabdānabhidheyatvam a ca-iti*. 'Universals' etc. can be said to be, insofar as they are genuine objects of knowledge; they are irreducible constituents, parts of the world; they are, however, not physically separable entities, nor metaphysically superior archetypal powers.
As for astitva, which covers both groups of 'categories' and their respective ways of being, the conjunction with 'knowableness' and 'nameableness', together with the whole context in which it appears, gives us some hints: astitva means the applicability of the word 'is', i. e. the fact that there is an objective basis and condition for saying 'it is', in the sense of its being identifiable, recognizable, distinguishable from, not reducible to other entities, and thereby knowable, speakable, suitable as truth-condition for thought and speech. - We may recall here Prasastapāda's familiar practice of justifying the assumption of entities by claiming them as indispensable causes or conditions (kāraña, hetu, nimitta") of undeniable occurrences in thought and speech (pratyaya, vyavahāra). The word asti may be used to accentuate the veridical claim attached to such assumptions, as, e.g., in the following statement
PB 17-18.
* The term buddhilakpanatva obviously refers to the buddhya pekpam of VS". I, 2, 3; cf. NK 19.
ArthasabdánabhidKeyatva reflects Vg1 VIII, 2, 3(= VS: VIII, 14): artha iti dravyagunakarmasu; as to the characteristic akaranatva, Sridhara specifies that it can only exclude samavdyycaamavdyikaranata, not, how. ever, nimittakaranatva as capability of 'causing' knowledge or apprehension (NK 20).
# PB 19. » Cf. Vy. 118. " On 'causality in the case of 'universals' eto. see abovo, n. 31.

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with regard to samavāya:... iti pratyayadarsanad asty eşām sambandha iti jñāyates.
Sridhara praphrases astitva as svarūpavattva, and he determines that it is the characteristic nature of any entity which constitutes its ‘is-ness' (yasya rastuno yat svarūpam tad eva tasya-astitvam *). Obviously, this is in keeping with the connotation of identifiability and recognizability in Prasasta pāda's use of Astitva and, moreover, with his use of the term svarūpa, as in atmasvarūpa, sarūpābheda, svarūpālocanamätra, etc. 7. At the same time, however, the concept of svarūpa, in its functional openness and almost universal applicability, can hardly safeguard the ontological positivity which Prasastapäda connects with his notion of astitva, which, according to the whole context and orientation of his thought, is not supposed to include 'non-being' (abhäva). - Already Udayana romarks: abhāras tu starūpavān api ...*, and a critic like
Śriharşa can justly emphasize that identifiability and distinguishability, · as constituted by svarūpa, are no basis for contrasting ‘being' and 'non
being', reality and fiction". – In spite of its veridical functions, Prasastapäda's astitva preserves a basically 'existential' connotation. It is insofar characteristically different from tattva, as it is at home in the more epistemologically oriented Nyāya, where it is explained as including both sat and asat: Both 'being' and 'non-being', 'presence' and 'absence' may be objective correlates of thought and speech, insofar as they may have a truth-conditioning function with regard to positive resp. negative propositions". Tattva is an essentially veridical term; and it indicates a framework and context of thought which was certainly more conducive to the later development of abhāva than the original, 'positively' ontological world-orientation of Vaišeşika.
The second group of 'categories', sc. 'universals' etc., may easily be subsumed under this all-inclusive notion of astitva: Their whole
# PB 325; cf. 311: yod anugatam asti ... (on sámánya).
* NK 16. Cf. the uses of nabhava, svarūpa, wadharma in NBh on IV, 1, 38 (NDI 707 ff.; NS IVa 35 in Ruben's edition).
" PB 311f.; 186f.
* Kir. 6; Udayana discusses why abhava has not been mentioned a a special 'category' and adds: pratiyoginirūpaņddhinanirūpanatvde, na tu tucchatuit cf. also Nyåyakusumáñjali on Kårika I, 10. -Unlike later commentators, Udayana does not, as it is sometimes maintained, take astitva as including abhava, and insofar not as co-extensive with jñeyatva and abhidheyatva; cf. Kir. 27.
» Cf. Khandanakhandakhadya, ed. with Hindi comm. by C. SUKLA (Benares '1961/62) 21 ff.; also 421ff.
· Cf. NBh and NV on I, 1, 1 (ND: 1; 11f.); concerning V8 I, 1, 4, which may have been modelled on NS I, 1, 1, se above, n. 8.

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‘is-ness' is svātmasattva, often paraphrased as svarūpasattā 4; as such, it consists exclusively in their being identifiable natures, forms of their oun and is consequently, although implying 'absence of beingness' (sattaviraha"), eternal, unchangeable and independent.
The application of ‘is-ness' to the particular 'manifest' 'substances' (drarya) etc. and their way of being is more intricate. In order to avoid confusion, we have to keep in mind that there are two kinds or levels of ontological dichotomy in Prasastapäda (satta --astitva and sattasambandha - Svätmasattva), and we have to take into consideration that in the passage under discussion he uses the word sattasambandha, not simply satta“. Within the context of his thought, this is by no means negligible: Dealing with the common and specific attributes of all six "categories', he can, according to his own principles, only speak in terms of sadharmya and vaidharmya, not in terms of sámánya resp. sämänyavisepa. Therefore, any use of sattă in this context and on this level of discourse would be illegitimate. The 'categories' and their instances, such as sattā itself, represent his way of naming and enumerating the components of the real world; they are immediately world-oriented ('intentio prima'). The dharmas (sādharmya -vaidharmya) as abstract attributes“, on the other hand, do not present any further separable or juxtaposable world. components, but ways and viewpoints of comparing and conceptually relating the actual world.components. They constitute a kind of second level of the system, which still deals with the real objective world, but is less immediately world-oriented, more concerned with systematic and structural devices and without the crudely hypostasizing ontological commitment of the 'first level'. - Prasastapāda does not have a theory of semantic levels, but he has a keen systematic mind and is keeping himself constantly aware of the danger of anavastha, 'infinite regress'. He carefully avoids confusing his two levels of discourse and never treats a sämänya and & sādharmya as commensurable or comparable. Consequently, the question what satta and astitva have in common remains unasked; and the 'ontological dichotomy' which is involved here does not become explicitly thematic.— The term sattasambandha, which is used in the sādharmya analysis, does not refer to satta, 'being.
a Cf. NK 19: ... sparūpam yot admdnyadinam tad eva tepdm sattvam. In Vyomaćiva's 'ontological' sections, the notion of sarūpa plays « less prominent role than in Sridhara and Udayana. Vyomasiva seems to be more interested in psychological explanation than in conceptual analysis.
4 Kir. 30.
# Although this distinction is not really carried through by tho oom. mentators.
u On the use of dharma, of. NK 16: yady api dharmdil pappadarthobhyo na vyatiricyante...

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ness' as such, but rather to the condition of being related to it, which, though being common to all the individual 'substances' etc., is not an actually pervasive and ontologically separable factor of community liko sattā itself: Being found in all particular 'manifest' entities (vyakti), it nevertheless leaves them confined to their particularity. It is the universality of beingness' in the particularity of its being 'manifested' by individual entities.
In a sense, sattasambandha comes closer to 'existence' than satta itself“, insofar as there is a more notable connotation of actuality and temporality: 'Connection with beingness' is the, in itself temporal and in the more ordinary cases impermanent, condition of being qualified by the qualifying universal 'beingness', which is as such eternal or rather atemporal. - In Prasastapāda commentaries and other later texts, the formula 'connection with beingness' often serves —especially in the compound svakaranasattasambandha, 'connection with the beingness of the own cause'--the purpose of explaining utpatti, 'genesis', and karyatva, the destructible contingent being of effects, i.e. composite entities. The question of its applicability to the ultimately simple and indestructible components or causes, such as the atoms, remains out of consideration or is, obviously not quite in agreement with Prasastapada's own position, explicitly dispensed with. - It may be noted that in later texts not only sattasambandha tends to coincide with 'destructibility' resp. 'producibility'; also sattā itself, not being distin. guished from sattasambandha, appears in a more temporal perspective, and its role is often reduced to serving as a counterpart and presupposi. tion of pradhvamsābhāva, i. e. non-being resulting from destruction.For a Vaibesika critic of the 1st millenium like sālikanātha, on the other hand, satta still represents an understanding of 'being' which leaves no room for temporality and change".
Accepting Prasastapäda's own terms, the structure of his system and hiß way of not explicitly touching upon certain questions, one may concede that a conceptual settlement has been reached, and that
4 The basic unsuitability of 'existence' -- 'essence', 'contingent' and 'necessary' being, 'esse ab alio'--'esse & se' etc. for the translation of Pra. kastapäda's 'ontological' terminology should, however, always be kept in mind. - On the temporality of ratudsambandha cf. Bhåsarvajña, Nyiya. bhūsana (Varanasi 1968) 468.
E. g. Vy. 126; 129; 143; NK 18. . 67 E. g. NK 17; Vy. 126.
Cf., e. g. Dinakari on Visvanatha's Kårikåvall, v. 9; od. SANKARA RAXA SASTRY (Mylapore, Madras 1923) 114.
Cf. Rjuvimala on Prabhakara's Bphatl, od. A. CHWASWAN Serra (Banares 1929) 120f.; also PP 97 ff.

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his treatment of the problem of 'being' has its peculiar consistency. There are at least two ways and levels of talking about 'being': There is 'being' as sattā, the most comprehensive instance of the 'category' såmänya, hypostasized 'somethingness' which has itself become a something, a datum of sense-perception, one real and ontologically separable factor and component among others which constitute the world as it is given to us; and there is being' a8 astitva, which merely, and in a sense tautologically, states that whatever is, is (asti), i. e. has a certain character of positivity, identifiability.- Acceptance of this framework is, of course, not what we may expect from an opponent; and in the following centuries, this whole complex of being' was a highly welcome target of criticism and ridicule especially for Buddhists, Jainas, and Mimāmsa kas, then also for Vedāntins 50. The commentators- I am mainly referring to Vyomasiva, Sridhara, and Udayana -are forced into sometimes rather desperate conceptual efforts; occasionally, however, they cannot avoid to lay bare and make explicit the inherent tensions and ambiguities of Prasastapāda's apparently well-closed system.
It is beyond the scope of our present discussion to give a detailed account 51 of the origin and systematic implications of the objections to sattā as they are stated in the pūrvapakpa sections of the Vaibesika commentators. Consequently, we cannot fully explicate how these com. mentators try to defend and justify both satta and astitva, nor can we analyze their attempts to rephrase the conceptual relationship between sattasambandha and svātmasattva; it may suffice here to recall their practice of utilizing the concept of 'metaphorical being' (upacarasatta, aupacáriki sattā 5) and of applying the principle of 'co-occurrence' (sämänadhikaranya ss; cf. also sädhāranadharmādhikaranatā ), which accounts for the extrapolation of 'being' to whatever has a common substratum with beingness', i. e. also to 'universals' etc. - At any rate, 'beingness', satta itself is stubbornly defended against epistemological, pragmatistic and other decompositions (pramanasambandhayogyatá, arthakriyākāritra, vartamánakālasambandhitva 56). The argumentation is
. Such as Sriharsa (800 above, n. 39).
" Exemplary materials from these discussions will be presented and analysed in a monograph now under preparation.
" Cf. Vyomaćiva's use of upacarasatia, Vy. 124ff.; on the function of this concept in the philosophy of grammar 100 K. A. SUBRAYANA IA Bhartshari (Poona 1969) 209ff.
Cf. Kir. 24: sattaikarthasamavdya. - Vy. 142f.
# E. g. Vy. 126f.; NK 12; vartamdnatva becomes again prominent in Raghuntha; cf. K. H. POTTER, The Padarthatattvanirūpapam of Raghu. Dåtha Siromani (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 61f.

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largely ad hominem; and all the opposing interpretations of 'being' are charged with leading to an infinite regress (anarastha, anavasthana 5). However, it is evident that the positive establishment of satta as common denominator of whatever exists and its defense in terms of 'supreme similarity' becomes increasingly difficult and awkward in this atmosphere of discussion. Sridhara incidentally concedes that this alleged similarity of all 'beings' ultimately consists in their being distinguishable from non-being 57. In this way, he obviously weakens the old claims concerning the independence (svātantrya) of the conception of being' 58 and consequently the defense-line against the Buddhist apohavāda.-Astitva, being more of a functional concept, is in general more open to re-definition and re-interpretation, and accordingly subject to a process of semantic evaporation which is due to an increasingly epistemological and reflexive attitude. Its positivity is eventually relegated to the positivity, the affirmative character of the apprehension of which it is the object or content: Sridhara explains astitva occasionally as vidhi pratyayavisayatva 5o; Udayana's widely accepted formula is vidhimukhapratyayavisayatva. The difficulties and potential consequences of defining astitva as svarüparattve, as identifiability, distinguishability of what. ever may 'be' identifiable or distinguishable, have already been referred to - The problems inherent in Prasastapāda’s ‘ontological construction and generally in the conception of sattā as pervasive and qualifying sā mānya of whatever is sat are further illustrated by a question which was not explicitly considered by Prasastapāda himself, but, as one of stock arguments of the Vaiseșika critics, had to be faced and discussed by his commentators: Does that which is connected with 'beingness' have any 'being' in itself or not? Pursuing the implications of this question we may add: 'Is there' anything like an individual entity in itself of which 'beingness' would just be a further 'real predicate'?
u Vy. 124 ff.; NK 12f.
17 NK 12: ... teşam abhavavilaksanena rupena tulyatá pratibha.sands; in his defense against Prăbhākara objections (cf. PP 97ff.), Sridhara has to face the fundamental difficulties which Aristotle avoided by not accepting 'being' as 'highest genus' (nor any summum genus at all).
56 Cf. NV 11f.; this passage is referred to by Sridhara, NK 226. * NK 15; cf. NK 226: vidhirupats. • Kir. 27; Udayana adds pratiyogyanapekpanirūpaņatva. " See above, notes 38-39.
* Vy. 126: kim sala saldm atha-asatam; NK 17: kim sattdsambandhan mato 'sato vd. - But see also below, n. 76.
According to Kant's formulation, Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 626: "Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat ...".

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Is there an astitva of 'substances' etc. apart from their satta? And does satta actually add anything to what an individual thing 'is' as such? One method of reacting to this notorious dilemma (vikalpa) had been not to accept it as such and to deny any temporal, 'physical' implications of the idea of a 'connection with beingness': na sataḥ sattasambandhaḥ, na- asataḥ | yada-eva tad vastu tada-eva sattaya sam. baddham....The Vaisesika commentators are familiar with kind of reply and refer to it in their argumentation; yet this does not take care of all their problems: The basic Vaisesika attitude of dissection and juxtaposition precludes them from simply and firmly grounding the meaning and unity of 'being' in the concrete unity of the vastu; as their reactions demonstrate, the difficulties caricatured by this 'dilemma about being or non-being' (sadasadvikalpa) are, indeed, deeply rooted in the ontological orientation of the system.
Especially Sridhara, blurring in a sense Prasastapada's distinction of two levels of discourse, goes rather far in suggesting an actual onto. logical cleavage. Arguing that both astitva and satta are necessary to adequately describe and explain the world as it is, he says that while satta is necessary to account for our apprehension of 'being' in its unity and universality, astitva or svarüpavattva is indispensable insofar as satta would never inhere in what does not have a svarupa, a characteristic nature of its own". Arguing against the attempt of the Prabhakaras to understand 'being' in terms of the mere vastusvarupa, the 'characteristic nature' and self-identity of each single entity, and without the assumption of a real sattāsāmānya (satta being reduced to an 'extrinsic qualification'-upadhi, sc. pramāṇasambandhayogyatā, 'suitability for being connected with a means of knowledge'"), Sridhara never says, nor does he presuppose, that there is no such thing as an independent vastu svarupa. Instead, his whole emphasis is on that it would not be sufficient to explain our apprehension of the unity of 'being' in the different entities. Vice versa, the Prabhakara's denial of an independent real
44 NV 322; cf. NM I 286.
"Cf. Vy. 126: tad asat, nispädasambandhayor ekakalatvät; cf. also NK 15 (concerning samaraya in general): svakaraṇasamarthyad upajayamanam eva tatra sambadhyate, yatha chidikriya chedyena Vy. 690 has: nisthāsambandhayor ekakalatvad iti; this may go back the Vakys and Bhasya commented upon in Prasastapada's lost Tika: see below, n. 76.
4 NK 16.
7 See the references given in n. 49; a long discussion concerning this point is found in Mandana, Brahmasiddhi, ed. 8. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI (Madras 1937) 85 ff. Cf. also pp. 289 ff. (on svarupamätra as skāki bhavaḥ). NK 11f.; cf. Kir. 23.

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satta, by reducing it to pramānasambandhayogyata, does not at all affect his acceptance of the independent extramental existence of things (vastu) as such. And, of course, no Vaiseṣika author ever says that without satta there would simply be nothing; the very idea of 'nothing' or 'nothingness' is, in fact, quite outside their horizon. On the other hand, to predicate satta of 'universals' etc. is regarded as mistaken only insofar as it superimposes a factor of unity and universality upon what has, or 'is', just its own form', svarupa".
Satta, thus reduced to a factor of unity-in-diversity, appears as a kind of extra to the individual existence of each particular (dravya etc.); and according to its status as a real, epistemologically and ontologically separable 'universal', it cannot simply coincide with, and not even completely depend upon, the fact that things are or exist. Sattå is not the being of the world, which is as such never really thematized; satta is and remains an occurrence in the world.
What seems to be at the bottom of this understanding of 'being', and especially of the conceptual bifurcation of satta and astitva, is a deep-rooted ambivalence in classical Vaiseṣika which again is the result of an attempted integration of different historical levels, that is of an enumerative, physically oriented philosophy of nature and of a categorial analysis. In other words: It has to do with a tendency to present findings of categorial analysis in the old and traditional shape of an enumeration, juxtaposition of different entities. Initially, there may have been an enumerative philosophy of nature in terms of 'elements' or 'substances'. But then the substances themselves became subject to what is actually a categorial and conceptual analys and decomposition. They were distinguished from, and stripped of, their qualifications resp. qualifiers (visesana), which-satta being regarded as one of themappear as separate entities, side by side with their qualificands (viseşya). The Vaiseṣika's drarya is insofar quite different from the Mimamsaka's vastu or, e. g., Aristotle's Tóde T. Nevertheless-and this adds to the ambivalence-it continues being regarded as having its own, quasicomplete nature and being, and even some kind of separate percepti. bility"; it is never reduced to an unformed λ and not even to what is
NK 19: bhinnasvabhāvesv ekānugamo mithya-eva, evarüpagrahanam tu na mṛṣā, svarūpasya yathārthatvāt.
7 Vyomasiva (Vy. 143) says about 'universals', in a context dealing ⚫ with satta: samastasrayavindée 'py avasthanam işyate.
" Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Zur Lehre von der vorstellungsfreien Wahrnehmung bei Prasastapada. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 14 (1970) 125-129. How the 'facticity' and 'positivity' implied in the perception of the actual thing (dravya) qua viscaya has to be related to the

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called 'bare particular' by some recent and contemporary philosophers".-In spite of their conceptual courage, the Vaiseṣikas are too commonsensical to enlarge upon the more startling 'ontological' consequences of their system according to which, at the end of a process of enumerative dissection into factors and constituents, the unity of the world and each single thing has to be restored by postulating an additional enumerable and juxtaposable factor, i. e. 'inherence', samavāya.
197
In conclusion, we may say that astitva has not only the function of circumscribing the whole realm of 'categories', but also of regaining a meaning and type of 'being' which is not, like sattā, a logically, epistemologically and ontologically separable attribute of what there is. Satta and astitva represent two different levels of philosophical reflection and thematization". In trying to integrate these in one system, Prasastapāda shows a sound systematic instinct. Nevertheless, his construction remains easily accessible to misunderstandings and attacks, and, as the further development shows, it does not provide any firm and fertile ground for a tradition of ontology: While the old concept of sattā appears more and more fossilized and obsolete", astitva represents a meaning of 'being' which tends to evaporate with the development of epistemological reflection, insofar as it tends to coincide with the mere objectivity or thematicity of whatever has been objectified and is positively taken into account at any given level of thought75.
However, in stating that the Vaisesika conceptualizations of 'being' do not really lead to a tradition of ontology, we should not forget what
apprehension of satta qua visegana is a question which does not really become thematic in Vaisesika; and there is nothing like the Vedanta attempt to equate what is given to 'indeterminate' (nirvikalpaka) perception with 'pure being' (sanmatra, sattämätra).
7 Cf. M. J. Loux (ed.), Universals and Particulars (New York 1970), esp. 235 ff.
"Relating our discussion to the old theme of the one and the many, we may say that satta represents a meaning of 'being' according to which it is basically one, while astitva posits what there is in its irreducible mani. foldness. It is symptomatic that satta itself is understood in terms of astitva.
74 It is no longer acceptable to Raghunatha Siromani; cf. reference given in n. 55.
" Insofar, it may be said to coincide with padarthatva (cf. n. 20) and to amount to a sense of 'being' as mere 'somethingness', as it is advocated by what is known in our days as 'allgemeine Gegenstandstheorie'.-On the difficulties of defining astitva, cf. Vardhamana and Rucidatta on Udayana in: Kiranavall by Udayanacaryya, ed. S. C. SARVVABHOUMA (Calcutta 1911) 137ff.

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198 WILHELM HALBTASS has already been emphasized in our introductory remarks--sc. the historical role of this 'ontological theory as an important, stimulating and truly catalytical target of criticism?6. * According to Mallavadin's Dvadasaranayacakra, as presented by Simhasuri, it seems that Prasastapada's (= Prasastamati's) lost Tika on a Vaibesikabhasya (by Atreya !) contained more detailed discussions of 'ontological' questions, esp. of the concept of sattasambandha; see the extracts from Mallavadin's work in: VS' 147-152. Mallavidin explains Prasastapada's understanding of the formula nisthasambandhayor ekaka. latvdt (also quoted by Vyomasiva, cf. above, n. 65) as follows: siddhasya vastunah sakaranaih sattayd ca sambandha iti prdeastamato 'bhiprdyah (loc. cit. 162). - The question to what extent Prasastapada's 'ontology' may have been prepared during the somewhat obscure period between VS and PB, which was excluded from the present, more systematically oriented sketch, will be taken up in the projected monograph, referred to in n. 31.