Conception of Reality in Mahayana Buddhism

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: Z_Nirgrantha_1_022701.pdf and Nirgrantha_2_022702.pdf and Nirgrantha_3_022703.pdf
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CONCEPTION OF REALITY IN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM: A STUDY
Y. S. Shastri
Buddhism has produced outstanding thinkers who made substantial contributions not only to Indian philosophy but also to the world thought.
Gautama the Buddha, the founder of this school, had not built any particular sect or school of thought. He was not much concerned about metaphysical problems, such as 'existence of Self,' 'Nature of the world and of Reality' et cetera. In fact, he had warned against metaphysics. As is well-known, he had emphasised on the moral aspects of human conduct; his approach was mainly ethical. He was not interested in establishing any philosophical system. But his later followers, taking inspiration from his teachings, and on the grounds of metaphysics, founded several philosophical systems.
Buddhism is divided into two principal sects, namely the Sthaviravadin (derogatorily called Hinayana) and the Mahayana. The Vaibhāṣika (Sarvästiväda), the Sauträntika, the Madhyamika (Sünyaväda), and the Yogacara (Vijñanavāda) are the four famous schools. of northern Buddhism. The first two belong to the Sthaviravadin and the last two to the Mahāyāna. The Vaibhäṣika school is so called because this school lends more importance. to the commentaries called the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Vibhāṣā on the Abhidharma treatise. They are also known as Sarvästivādins, because they believe in the existence of all things (sarvamasti), physical as well as mental. This school represents radical pluralism erected on the denial of Soul-substance (Pudgalanairätmya) and the acceptance of discrete momentary entities. According to this school, everything is momentary, there is nothing. human or divine that is permanent. For these Sarvästivädin philosophers, 75 dharmas are the ultimate elements of existence, which are momentary and yet real. The Vaibhāṣikas believe in theory of direct perception (bähyapratyakṣavāda). These thinkers argue that there is no permanent Reality as such and thus realisation (Nirvana) is also not realising something permanent spiritual entity but extinction of all desires and miseries.
The Sautrāntikas (the followers of the Sutrapiṭaka) uphold most of the doctrines of the Vaibhāṣika school, such as the non-soul theory, the doctrine of momentariness, and the liberation as mere extinction of miseries et cetera. But, according to these philosophers, external objects are not directly perceived as Vaibhāṣikas believe, but only indirectly inferred (bāhyānumeya). They admit the extramental existence of the world. We do not know the thing in itself. We can only know ideas which are copies or mental pictures and from these copies we infer the existence of the originals. Thinkers of this school of Sthaviravādins, cut down the number of dharmas (i. e elements of existence) of the Vaibhāṣikas from 75 to 43 and treat the rest as subjective or mental construction and hence unreal.
These two schools of Sthaviravadins are the upholders of the theory of momentariness. (Kṣaṇabhanga-vada). The ultimate aim of these two schools of the Sthaviravadins is the attainment of individual Nirvāṇa (liberation) which is negative (i.e. extinction of the miseries).

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The Mahāyāna represents a revolt against (what that sect calls) the feeble mindedness and selfishness of the Sthaviravādin Buddhists. It began this way. The Mahāsānghikas revolted against the Sthaviravādin's narrow interpretation of the Buddha's teachings. They interpreted them in broader sense. To show the comparative greatness or superiority of their system, practice, and conduct, they coined the term Mahāyāna (the great vehicle) for themselves and dubbed 'sthaviras' (elders') view as Hinayāna (lower vehicle), a label not acceptable to the Sthaviravādins. Ašvaghosa, Nāgārjuna, Asanga, and Vasubandhu are the first rank thinkers of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. All these philosophers unanimously criticised the Hinayānists for not comprehending the profound meaning of Buddha's teachings. Ašvaghosa (c. 1st-2nd cent. A. D.) is the chief exponent of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. His Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpada-śāstra (The Awakening of Faith) played a very important role in the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. All the important principles of the later schools are traceable in this work, though not in a full-fledged/developed form. The special contribution of this work of Ašvaghosa to the later schools of Mahāyāna is its absolutistic approach towards Reality. Aśvaghosa declared in no uncertain terms that the Hinayānists, being feeble-minded, were unable to grasp the deeper meaning of Buddha's teachings about Reality and his aim was to unfold fundamental teachings of the Master as against the errors of the Hinayānists! As against the Hinayānists, who have maintained the elements of existence (dharmas) as real entities, he defined Reality as 'that which is ultimately indescribable, beyond all the categories of intellect, and hence it cannot be said neither existence nor non-existence, nor neither, neither one nor many, neither affirmation nor negation. It is formless. Once we penetrate beyond forms, it is discovered that all the different forms of the universe are not real differences of the soul at all, but different manifestations of One Real Power; hence it has always been impossible to speak adequately, to name correctly, or to think correctly of this One Soul, the real essence of things, which is unchangeable and indestructible. We, therefore, name it the True Essence or the True Likeness or the True Reality3. Aśvaghoșa, like the Upanisadic thinkers, believed that this reality is the essence of all things and originally only One*. This Reality, moreover, has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as 'thatness.' Describing about the relation between this Absolute Reality and phenomena (world), Ašvaghoșa, declares that they are not two different realities posited against each other. In the ultimate analysis they both are one and the same. Phenomena are nothing but appearance of Reality. Absolute has two aspects, namely conditioned and unconditioned. The unconditioned Absolute tainted with ignorance manifests itself as a conditioned 'suchness.' This phenomenal world of subjectobject duality is the result of this conditioned suchness. Absolute itself, owing to the powerful influence of ignorance, appears as the manifold world of phenomena. The relation berween them is like that of the ocean to its waves. Says Aśvaghosa : "just as calm waters of the ocean, on account of wind, appear as waves, so does consciousness on account of

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ignorance, appear as finite intellect. Just as clay is transformed into various kinds of pottery, one consciousness manifests itself as so many finite intellects." The Absolute is non-dual but the phenomenal world of objects is 'appearance' (and hence) illusory. This manifold world of phenomena arises on account of ignorance. the ignorance is the cause of all this confusion. This ignorance colours the true Reality in finite mind. As there is an influence at work, there arise false and imperfect ideas. Asvaghosa beautifully illustrates the influence of ignorance in the following manner : "Clothes have no scent but if any one smoked them with incense, the clothes would then be perfumed like the incense. So is with influences. The true Reality is Pure and has really no confusion colouring it, but ignorance in man colours his views; so there comes into play a confused state." Asvaghosa accepts two kinds of truth, one conditioned by ignorance (empirical) and the other unconditioned (transcendental) which is free from impurities caused by ignorance. Purified 'conditioned suchness' is 'un-conditioned suchness.' Really speaking, there is ultimately no difference between Absolute and phenomena. Phenomena arise from false notions of the mind. If the mind is independent of these false ideas, then phenomena disappear. When true knowledge dawns, we realise that we are no more finite things but 'absolute suchness.' This is the selfexistent, immortal Reality, calm and blissful, which must be realised?.
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This absolutistic way of thinking of Asvaghosa, remarkably influenced the later thinkers. of the Mahayana Buddhism. Inspired by the utterences of Asvaghosa, some of the Mahāyānists emphasised the negative aspect and the others positive, and thereby established their own schools of thought within the ambit of the general Mahāyāna School, known as Sunyaváda (Madhyamika) and Vijñänväda (Yogācāra) respectively.
Nagarjuna (2nd c. A. D.) is a systematic expounder of Sunyavada (Madhyamika) Buddhism. He refuted the Hinayänists on the basis of dialectics. Hinayānists denied only Pudgala (existence of Self) but accepted the substantiality of dharmas (elements). For them dharmas exist objectively and independently. For Nagarjuna there is nothing which exists absolutely and objectively. Everything that exists is relative, dependent, and thus unreal. The dharmas of the Hinayänists are subjective and unreal. Nagarjuna argues that, if a thing were objective and real, it would be able to exist by itself, it must not be in need of being understood through something else. But nothing is found in thought which is not relative, everything is relative to everything else. Relativity is the mark of the unreal of the subject. For Nägarjuna, our entire experience is purely subjective; things have only an apparent existence (samvṛti) in reality. They are imaginary and unreal, the entire phenomenal world is unreal. He interprets pratityasamutpada (dependent origination) in terms of relativity and proves the dependent unreal nature of all elements. He says that there is no real independent existence of entities (pratyaya)". Since, there is no element of existence (dharma) which comes into manifestation without conditions, therefore, there is no dharma which is not śünya i.e. devoid of real independent existence. Thus phenomenal is unreal. The ground of phenomena can never be met within reason, as reason by its very nature leads to insoluble antinomies. He thus comes to the conclusion that the Absolute Reality is Sunya. It is Sünya in the sense that it is transcendent to thought, it is indescribable, non-determinate, and non

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dual (advayam tattvam). It is neither subject nor object : It is free from this duality. The subject object duality indicates relativity and whatever is relative, dependent, is unreal. He adopts more negative approach and says that this Reality is indescribable and it cannot even be equated with pure consciousness. Nāgārjuna defines Reality as that which can only be directly realised, that which is quiescent, inexpressible, that which is non-discursive and non-dual". For him Reality is indescribable, non-determinable, thus it is Sūnya. When Nāgārjuna says that Reality is Śünya, his idea is not different from that of Ašvaghoșa. Reality is Sūnya in the sense of non-describability, free from all empirical predicates. The term "Sūnya' is understood in IWO senses in Nāgārjuna's system. First, it is Sünya from the standpoint of phenomena : It means Svabhāvaśünya i. e. devoid of independent substantial reality of its own; second, from the Absolute point of view, it means Prapancaśünya i. e. devoid of verbalisation, thought construction, and plurality. It is indescribable in human language. It is transcendent to thought, it does not mean 'absolute blank.' Nāgärjuna makes it very clear by saying that it cannot be called void or not void, or both or neither but in order to indicate it, it is called void (Śünya) 2. His stand is more negative than that of Ašvaghosa. He emphasises the transcendental aspect of the Absolute. His dialectical approach does not allow him to identify this Absolute even with pure consciousness. Nāgārjuna, while speaking about the relation between Absolute Reality and the phenomenal world, says that the universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute; viewed as a process, it is the phenomenal world. In other words, the same thing when it is viewed through the glasses of causality is phenomenal world and when causality is discarded it is the Absolute or Nirvana"). In point of truth, there is no difference between Phenomena (saṁsāra) and Noumena (Nirvana)"4 He criticises Hinayānist's conception of Nirvana (liberation) which can be attained realising pudgalaniratmaya (soullessness). He asserts that Nirvana is not merely extiction of miseries but, it is the extinction of all conceptions of our productive imagination. It is beyond all categories of thought, it cannot be defined. Nirvana is giving up all views, standpoints, and predicaments 45. For Nāgārjuna there are two levels from which truth may be envisaged. The paramartha and samvrti, the absolute and relative, the transcendent and the empirical. He says that the teachings of Buddha are based on two kinds of truth, namely the empirical and the transcendent 16. These two kinds of truth are accepted by the Hinayānists also!7. But, according to Nāgārjuna, Hīnayānists have misunderstood these two kinds of truth. He severely criticises the so-called truths of the Hinayānists, namely dhātus, āyatanas, skandhas, aryasatyas etc. as matters of conventional, empirical, and ultimately they are not truth at all. Paramärtha satya is the truth relating to the Absolute reality, that which is beyond all categories of thought. Samvrti satya is the Pseudo-truth which relates to the world of phenomena that which is concerned with empirical usage (loka vyavahāra). This distinction between the empirical and the transcendent, which is epistemic, does not, however, import a difference into Reality. The Real is one and non-dual, beyond the categories of thought and can only be directly realised 18

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Shortly after Nagarjuna, some among the Mahāyānists who were not satisfied with the negative approach of Nāgārjuna, adopted revolutionary way of thinking. They have started thinking in a positive manner, calling the Absolute Reality as pure consciousness. They have accepted the theory of Sünya of Nāgārjuna and interpreted it in an idealistic manner. Pure consciousness is 'sole Reality' for them and it is Śünya. Thus pure consciousness is free from subject-object duality, is non-dual, and indescribable in terms of human language. Asanga (c. early 5th cent. A. D.) is one of the great thinkers who raised voice against Nāgārjuna's doctrine and propagated Vijñanavāda. He is a very prominent and dominating thinker in the traditions of the Vijñānaväda-Buddhists. He agrees with Nāgārjuna in criticising the Hinayānists saying that not only Pudgala (Self) is nonsubstantial but all the dharmas (elements) are also non-substantial and unreal. Everything ultimately is appearance and unreal. Pure consciousness is the sole Reality and it is one alone. He questions the very foundation of Sautrāntika's logic that, if Vaibhāsika's 75 real dharmas can be reduced into 43, rejecting others as subjective and unreal, then why, on the basis of the same logic, other dharmas are also not discarded ? Other ones also can be termed as subjective and unreal on the basis of the same logic. On the basis of the theory of causation i.e. dependent origination (pratītyasamutpada) he proves the unreality of dharmas (elements). He thus proclaims pudgalanairātmya as well as dharmanairātmya. This criticism of the realism of the Hinayānists led him to accept idealism. He accepts ideal Reality. i.e. pure consciousness. Asanga's main attack against Nāgárjuna is his extremism. As far as the conception of Reality is concerned, he differs from Nāgārjuna. For Nāgārjuna, we have already seen that Reality is indescribable, transcendental, and cannot even be called pure consciousness. Asanga, a speculative thinker is not satisfied with such type of negative attitude of Nägärjuna. He identifies this Absolute with pure consciousness which is also free from subject-object duality, indescribable, beyond determination of thought categories and nondual. He is not ready to accept the claim of Nāgārjuna that phenomenal world is merely conceptual and lacks any basis. His aim was to reach the ground of phenomena, the apparent world. Unlike the Madhyamika, he thought that phenomena, though unreal, must be rooted in some reality. There must be some basis for this worldly appearance. It must not be baseless. Asanga, thinking on this line, came to the conclusion that the base or the ground for this phenomenal world is nothing but pure consciousness. Consciousness itself appears as subject object duality, this appearance is transcendental illusion. The appearance of a form of consciousness as something objective and independent is illusory. But that which is ground for this appearance is real; it is the Reality i. e. Pure Consciousness. Asanga's view reflects not only idealism but it is also Absolutism. He was aware that mere idealistic position will not be the final goal for a 'speculative system'. Nāgărjuna has already shown through his rigorous logic that Absolutism can only be reached through dialectical approach. Nāgārjuna has mentioned that the subject and the object are relative,

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dependent, and thus unreal. Both subject and the object are co-relative categories and that one cannot be had without the other. Consciousness without an object is unthinkable. Thus, Reality cannot be called Pure Consciousness. The Reality is above all these thought categories and is inexpressible. For Asanga, Consciousness is the only Reality, true existence. This is an idealistic standpoint. Reality is ideal and it is Pure Consciousness. But he does not stop at that point. For him, from the ultimate standpoint, Pure Subject ceases to be subject. It becomes something non-conceptual20 This dialectical awareness compelled him to transcend his Idealism to Absolutism. Adopting Nāgārjuna's dialectic method, he came to the conclusion that ultimate Reality i.e. Pure Consciousness is something that cannot be called a subject in the ultimate analysis. Owing to the influence of transcendental illusion, consciousness itself appears as the subject as well as the object. The objectivity is only a mode of consciousness. When this illusory idea of objectivity is removed, the subject-consciousness also ceases to exist : when there is nothing to know, consciousness also ceases to exist21. At the transcendental level pure consciousness alone exists. This is the ultimate Reality, the essence of everything. Consciousness free from the false duality of the Subject and Object is the Absolute. Asanga defines Absolute Reality (Tattva) as That which is free from duality; ground for illusion, indescribable, and non-determinate. 22 It is called 'dvaya-rahita' (free from duality) because in it there is no room for subject and object, positive and negative. The highest Reality transcends all opposites and in it, the positives and negatives are one and the same23. Reality is indescribable and non-determinate24. It is indescribable because words are not capable of describing it. It is non-determinate, beyond all thoughtdescriminations. Thought-descriminations imply duality. Duality is ignorance and it is unreal, but Reality is non-dual, free from all types of duality. It is beyond the grasp of intellect. Reason or intellect has its own limit. The reason cannot lead us to Reality 25. It cannot be described positively or negatively. It is 'self existent' (sat) and non-relative. Thought categories are empirical. Thought cannot go beyond these categories of existence and non-existence. Reality cannot be conceived by any thought category. Asanga, therefore, denies the positive as well as negative predicates to Reality by saying: "Rise above the categories of thought-existence and non-existence, as both or neither is Reality26 Asanga calls this Absolute Reality in different terms such as Paramartha Satya (the highest truth), Dharmadhātu (essence of all things), sünya (beyond thought determination), Buddhattva (Buddhahood), Nirvana (Liberation), Suddhātman (Pure Soul), and Mahātman (Universal Soul). Asanga identifies highest Reality with Paramartha Satya by saying that the highest truth is that which is neither such nor otherwise, neither born, nor destroyed, neither increase nor decrease, neither pure nor impure27. Reality is also called Dharmadhātu i.e. essence of all elements. It is a substratum of all phenomena, permanent background of world, of phenomena. It is the principle of unity underlying the entire phenomenal world. It is essentially identical with all elements and yet cannot be defined in terms of any

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elements : it transcends them all. It is like akaśa (sky, space) which pervades everything and is affected by nothing29. The term 'Sünya' is used for Reality to indicate indeterminate nature of Reality in terms of subject-object duality. The Reality by its very nature has no characteristic of its own to describe it 30. It is also called "Suddhātman' and 'Mahātman'. He says that, realising the non-substantiality of ego and that of elements, understanding the real meaning of Sūnyatā; the enlightened ones transcend the individual existence and realise Pure Soul (Suddhātman) and became one with that Universal Soul". It is also identified with Nirvana (Liberation) 32. Nirvana is nothing but realising Dharmadhātu i.e. the essence of everything. For Asanga, every being is, in essence, the same as Dharmadhātu. It means, Nirvana is realisation of this Potentiality. Asanga thought that Nāgārjuna, emphasising as he did the transcendental aspect of the Absolute, failed to show the proper relation between Absolute and phenomena. It is true that Nagarjuna accepted the Dharmadhātu as the underlying ground of phenomena and did not treat it as an entity separate from the phenomenal world. But he did not make clear how this Dharmadhātu or Absolute, immanent in empirical experience constitutes the very soul of all things. Asanga, to show the relation between the Absolute and the phenomena speaks of double process of the Absolute, namely defilement and purification (Sankleśa and Vyavadana). Phenomenal world is the defiled aspect of the Absolute alone. He believes in certain kind of Pariņāmavāda (theory of transformation). Owing to powerful influence of ignorance, the Absolute becomes defiled and transforms itself into phenomenal world. But this defilement is not a permanent feature of the Absolute. It is foreign to it. Therefore, it can be purified by realising pure consciousness. Verily, the phenomena are not different from the Absolute. The relation between them is like that of pure and muddy water. The water is the same whether it is muddy or pure. Pure water is the muddy water from which the mud is removed. Similarly, Reality is nothing but the world from which subject object duality is removed. The things of the manifold world are taken to be real by common men34. They think that the phenomenal world for certain exists independently by its own. To remove this misunderstanding, Asanga, like the previous thinkers, says that it is wrong to think that there is a difference between Noumena and Phenomena, Nirvana and Samsāra, apparent and the real. They are not two different realities posited against each other. Reality, viewed as dependent, relative as governed by causes and conditions, constitute the world (samsāra) and the phenomenal world viewed as free from all conditions is the Absolute35. The Absolute is the only real, it is identical with phenomena. Reality lies at the very heart of phenomenal world. It is identical with phenomena in the sense that it is the basis or ground and innermost essence of all phenomenal things. Absolute is in phenomena as essence of it but is itself not phenomena. It transcends phenomena. It is the basic conception in the philosophy of Asanga that Dharmadhātu-the non-determinate Reality is the ground of the determinate entities of the phenomenal world. This non-determinate reality is only the ultimate nature of the determinate phenomenal entities and not other entity apart from them. Thus, the fact, that the Absolute transcends phenomena does not mean that it is

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another reality which lies outside the world of phenomena. There are no two sets of the real. The Absolute is the reality of the apparent phenomena and it is their nature. Nāgārjuna, emphasising the transcendental aspect of Reality, categorises the whole phenomenal existence as Samvrti (empirical) Satya and does not analyse the empirical experiences in detail. Asanga, being a profound speculative thinker, is not ready to accept Nāgärjuna's extreme view of bringing all phenomenal or empirical experiences under one category i.e. under Samvrti Satya. He tried to give constructive theory of phenomena advocating three kinds of truth unlike the Nagarjuna's doctrine of two truths. The Samvrti Satya of Nagarjuna is divided into Parikalpita (imagined) and Paratantra (dependent) and Paramartha Satya of the Nāgārjuna is also called Parinispanna. According to Asanga, even in the phenomenal level, there are two kinds of experiences, one is utterly unreal or illusory and the other is dependent, real for all practical purposes. Parikalpita37 and Paratantra3% are related to worldly things while Parinispanna is related to the highest truth, Nirvana, where all klešas and imagination cease to exist39. Vasubandhu, younger brother of Asanga, upholds Asanga's view. He describes the Absolute Reality as pure undefiled existence which is beyond finite thought, the Good, the Eternal, and Blissful. It is liberation, it is Buddha's body of pure existence. It transcends the category of thought as well as the plurality of phenomenal world". This phenomenal world is transformation of Vijñana only. It is clear from the conception of the Reality of the Mahāyānists that they took great pains to prove that the Absolute is indescribable and non-determinate. It cannot be described positively or negatively. It is neither existence nor non-existence, neither both nor-neither. It cannot be called existence (bhava), because it is not subject to origin, decay, and death. There is no empirical existence which is free from origin, decay, and death. Empirical existence arises from causes and conditions. Everything which arises from causes and conditions is necessarily unreal. Whatever is produced by cause and condition has a beginning, decay, and destruction. Reality is uncaused and unconditioned; hence it cannot be termed an existence. It cannot be called non-existence also, because the nonexistence (abhāva) is a relative concept depending upon the concept of bhāva (existence). Disappearance of bhāva is known as abhāva (non-existence). To call it being or non-being (bhava or abhava) is thus absolutely wrong. Reality cannot be called both existence and non-existence at the same time because these are contradictory terms and cannot be applied to the same thing at the same time, as light and darkness cannot remain at the same time and the same place. If it is both existence and non-existence, it will not remain un-caused and unconditioned, because both are dependent upon causality. But Reality is above causality. It is not dependent on any other thing for its existence. It is self-existent (sat). Reality cannot be caught in the trap of reason. It is catuskoti vinirmukta i.e. 'is' and 'is nor' and both 'is and is not', and 'neither is nor is not'. Mahāyānists show how Hinayānist's conception that dharmas (discrete elements of existence) are momentary and yet real, is bundle of contradictions. Hinayānists denied

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only the Pudgala (impermanence of Self) and accepted discrete elements as real entities. Mahāyānists, adopting the dialectic method, severely attacked the Hinayānists by saying that these being lower intellectuals, cannot see even impermanence of dharmas, and existence of all elements (dharmanirātmya). Without realisation of both i.e. pudgalanirātmya (non-substantiality of soul) and dharmanairātmya (non-substantiality of all elements) it is not possible to reach the state of Nirvana. Again Nirvana is not something which can be gained or achieved as Hinayänists believe. Ultimately, there is no difference between Nirvana and Samsāra. Nirvana is not merely annihilation or extinction of misery but it is realisation of the germ of Buddhahood which is within one's own heart. It is nothing new but transcending the subject-object duality and giving up the all standpoints. Mahāyāna and Upanişads The Mahāyāna Buddhism is profoundly influenced by Upanisadic philosophy which temporally is anterior by several centuries. The Upanisadic conception of Reality as beyond reach of mind and intellect and as indescribable in human language, apparently had much influence on these Mahāyāna Buddhists. Absolute Reality (Brahman) is described in positive as well as in negative terms in the Upanişads. We are told in the Māndükya Upanisad that the Supreme Reality is that which cannot be seen, cannot be described, cannot be grasped, cannot be thought, cannot be designated, and so forth 42. The Katha Upanişad tells us that the Reality is neither born nor does it die. It is unborn, eternal, everlasting, and primevalo. Again, it is said that the Reality cannot be reached by speech, by mind, and by sight“. Knowledge of Reality cannot be obtained simply by argument or reason". Brahman or the Absolute is that from which all speech within the mind turns away, unable to reach it" The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad declares that the Atman or Reality can only be described by 'neti' 'neti', ('not this', 'not this')*7. The intended meaning of this statement is that the Absolute is characteristicless and indefinable, which cannot be logically demonstrated. It can only be experienced within. The Absolute Reality is also described in positive terms in the Upanisads. The Taittirīya Upanisad describes it as "Existence, consciousness, and Infinity. 948 Reality is eternal, all pervading, omnipresent, and extremely subtle“. We are told in the Brhadaranyaka that this great Being, infinite and boundless, is only a mass of consciousnessso. This consciousness itself is Absolute5i. The realisation of this Absolute is a matter of mystical experience. This is an experience where all duality vanishes altogether. In this state, there is no distinction between the knower and the known, subject and object. We have seen that the Mahāyānists describe Reality in positive as well as in negative terms like Upanişadic thinkers. Nāgārjuna emphasised the negative aspect of it, while Vijñānavādins describe Reality in positive as well as in negative terms. The Mahāyānists apparently were greatly influenced by Upanişadic thought. The main reason for this seems to be that most of the Mahāyānist thinkers were learned Brahmins before their conversion to Buddhism. Thus, it is not surprising if these Mahāyānists brought Buddhism closer to the Upanişadic Philosophy.

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Annotations : 1. D. T. Suzuki, Awakening of Faith, p. 47. 2. Ibid., P.59. 3. T. Richard, Awakening of Faith pp. 46-47. 4. bid., p. 56. 5. Richard, pp. 51, 54. 6. bid., p. 59. 7. शान्तं शिवं क्षैमपदं अच्युतं तत् । सौन्दरानन्द २६-२७. 8. मध्यमकशास्त्र १-१० Cf. Ed. 9. न हि स्वभावो भावानां प्रत्ययादिषु विद्यते -M.K-1-5. 10. अप्रतीत्य समुत्पन्नो धर्मः कश्चिन्न विद्यते । यस्मात्, तस्मात् अशून्यो हि धर्मः कश्चिन विद्यते | Madhyamaka-Karika XXIV.
19. 11. अपरप्रत्ययं शान्तं प्रपञ्चैरप्रपञ्चितम् । निर्विकल्पमनानार्थं एतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥ M.K. XVIII-9. 12. शून्यमिति न वक्तव्यं अशून्यमिति वा भवेत् ।
उभयं नोभयं चेति प्रज्ञप्त्यर्थं तु कथ्यते ।। M.K. XXII-11. 13. या आजवं जवीभाव उपादाय प्रतीत्य वा ।
सोऽप्रतीत्यानुपादाय निर्वाणं उपदेश्यते ॥ M.K. xxV.9. 14. न संसारस्य निर्वाणादस्ति किंचिद्विशेषणम् ।
न निर्वाणस्य संसारादस्ति किंचिद्विशेषणम् | M.K. XXV-19. 15. मुक्तिस्तु शून्यतादृष्टेः तदर्थाशेषभावना । M.K. 16. द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।
लोकसंवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः । M.K. XXIV-8. 17. Kathāvastu, pp. 33-8. 18. M.K. -XVIII-9. 19. Mahāyānasātrālarikāra, (=MSA) XVIII-82, Commentary. 20. ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन निरूपयितुं अशक्यत्वात् - M.S.A. p. 182. 21. ग्राह्याभावे ग्राहकाभावात् M.S.A.VI-8, Commentary. 22. तत्त्वं यत् सततं द्वयेन रहितं, भ्रान्तेश्च सन्निश्रयः ।
शक्यं नैव च सर्वथाभिलपितुं यच्चाप्रपंचात्मकम् M.S.A.X-13 23. भावाभावसमानता M.S.A. XI-41. 24. अनभिलप्यं अप्रपंचात्मकं च परिनिष्पन्नस्वभावः M.S.A. XI-13. 25. अतो न तर्कस्य तद्विषयः M.S.A. I.12 commentary. 26. न भावो नापि चाभावो बुद्धत्वं तेन कथ्यते । M.S.A. IX-24. 27. न सत् न चासत् न तथा न चान्यथा । न जायते नव्येति न चावहीयते । न वर्धते नापि विशुध्यते तत् परमार्थलक्षणम् ॥ M.S.A.
VI-1. 28. सर्वधर्माश्च बुद्धत्वं धर्मो नैव च कश्चन | M.S.A. IX-4. 29. यथाम्बरं सर्वगतं सदामतं तथैव तत् सर्वगतं सदामतम् । M.S.A. IX-15. 30. प्रकृतिशून्य ! M.S.A. XIV-34. 31. बुद्धाः शुद्धात्मलाभित्वात् गता आत्ममहात्मताम् । M.S.A. IX-43.

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36 Y. S. Shastri Nirgrantha 32. M.S.A. XI-47, and XVIII-66. 33. यथैव तोये लुतिते प्रसादिते न जायते स पुनरच्छतान्यतः / मलापकर्षस्तु स तत्र केवल: स्वचित्तशुद्धौ विधिरेष एव हि / / M.S.A. XIII-18. 34. तत्त्वं संछाद्य बालानाम् अतत्त्वं ख्याति सर्वतः M.S.A. XIX-53. 35. न चान्तरं किंचन विद्यतेऽनयोः M.S.A. VI-5. 36. His followers (Aryadeva, Candrakirti) divided Sarivrti Satya into two types, namely tathyasamvrti and mithyasamyrti. 37. M.S.A. XI-13, 39. 38. M.S.A. XI-40. 39. विकल्पोपशमार्थः शांतार्थः परिनिष्पन्नलक्षणम् निर्वाणम् / 40. स एव अनास्त्रवो धातुः अचिन्त्यः कुशलो ध्रुवः / सुखो विमुक्तिकायोऽसौ धर्माख्योऽयं महामुनेः / T.M.S.-30. 41. आत्मधर्मोपचारो हि विविधो यः प्रवर्तते / विज्ञानपरिणामोऽसौ ! T.M.S.-1 42. अदृश्यं, अव्यवहार्य, अग्राह्यं, अलक्षणम्, अचिन्त्यम्.... Mundaka Up.7. 43. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं कुतश्चिन्नबभूव कश्चित् / अजो नित्यो शाश्वतोऽयं पुरणः / Katha Up.1-11-18. 44. नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षुषा / Katha -II-VI-12. 45. नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया | Katha-I-II-9. 46. यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह / Taittiriya-Up.II-4, 9. 47. स एष नेति नेति इत्यात्मा अग्राह्यः / Brhadaranyaka-IV-IV-22: 48. सत्यं ज्ञानं अनंतं ब्रह्म / Taittiriya UP.II-I. 49. नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम् / Mundaka UP.I-I-6. 50. विज्ञानघन एव / . Br. Up. I. IV. 12. 51. प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म. Ait. Up. III. 3. Bibliography 1. D. T. Suzuki, Awakening of Faith, Chicago 1900. 2. T. Richard P. Awakening of Faith. Ed. : A. H. Walton, London 1961.. 3. T. R. V. Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1960. 4. A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 1970. 5. Isadyastottarasatopanisad, Ed : Vasudev Sharma - Pansikar, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay 1917. 6. Madhyamakasastra, Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1960. 7. Mahayanasutralankara, Ed. S. Bagchi, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1970. 8. Y. S. Shastri, Mahayanasutralankara of Asanga-A Study in Vijnanavada Buddhism, Indian Book Centre, Delhi 1989. 9. Ten Principal Upanisads, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 1978.