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________________ A Comparative Study of the Jaina and the Samkhya-Yoga Theories of Parinama INDUKALA H. JHAVERI THE concept of Parinama is very old and its beginnings can be traced I as far back as the Rgveda. It has passed through many stages of development before it assumed its finally finished form. Today it occupies a very important place in Indian Philosophy. So much so that it has been commonly accepted as a fundamental doctrine by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy with slight modifications here or there. Though the concept has thus found almost universal recognition, we shall here confine ourselves to a comparative study of the Parinamavada as postulated in the Jaina and the Samkhya-Yoga systems because these two systems show close resemblance in this respect. Both the Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina seem to have followed Yaska's definition of Viparinama, in their doctrine of Parinama, i.e., they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding entity or entities (viparinamate iti apracyavamanasya tattvad vikaram). Umasvati the author of the Tattvartha-sutra analyses the Parinama nature of reality into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Vyasa the commentator of the Yoga-sutra defines Parinama as 'avasthitasya dravyasya purvadharma-nivrttau dharmantarotpattih'. These two views are, in substance, identical. Vyasa has analysed Parinama into Dharma-Parinama, LaksanaGJ.v. 1
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________________ 2 : SHRI MAHAVIRA JAINA VIDYALAYA GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME Parinama and Avastha-Parinama. The Jaina has not analysed Parinama in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his Dravya-Paryaya and Guna-Paryaya. Every Dravya-Paryaya (such as a pot in the case of Pudgala and manhood (manusyatva, in the case of Jiva) and GunaParyaya (such as darkness or yellowness in Pudgala or Jnana-Paryaya in Jiva) of the Jaina represents Dharma-Parinama or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time variations of past, present and future, it is Laksana-Parinama. The oldness and newness or tivrata-mandata in the case of Jiva which a Dravya-Paryaya or a Guna-Paryaya suffers, as a result of time-process, is its AvasthaParinama. This Avastha-Parinama, it must be noted, is possible only in the Vyanjana-Paryaya of the Jaina which abides for a certain length of time. There cannot be such Avastha-Parinama in the Artha-Paryaya? as it is momentary. Both the Samkhya and the Jaina understand Parinama as a wide concept including the material change in time (AparispandatmakaParinama) as well as physical movement in space, technically called Parispanda. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of kriya, viz., parinamatmika kriya and parispandatmika kriya. In the Jaina view, the Parispanda is possible only in Jiva and Pudgala, as each Jiva and Pudgala, that is atom, is limited and, therefore, capable of movement. In Dharma, Adharma and Akasa which are indivisible wholes and pervade this loka (universe), there is evidently no scope for Parispanda. In the Samkhya, Parispanda has to be negated in Prakrti which is one homogeneous whole and all-pervading. It becomes possible in the different products of Prakyti, from Buddhi onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the Praksti. There is, however, one difficulty in understanding Parispanda in the Samkhya, viz., that it has to be visualized without Akasa. Vijnanabhiksu felt this difficulty and hence, he clarified that Prakrti subsumes Akasa. But this interpretation is not vouchsafed by the older Samkhya texts which derive Akasa from the Sabda-Tan-Matra. So we must understand 1 See Vyasa-bhasya on the Yoga-sutra, III. 15. 2 When we conceive the man as devoid of his subdivisions-as simply a man, it is the one indivisible Vyanjana-Paryaya. If, however, along with the conception of a man, we at the same time are conscious of the variations of a boy, a youth, etc., these latter are said to be Artha-Paryayas of the Vyanjana-Paryaya of a man. Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya on the Sarkhya-sutra, II. 12. 'Nityau yau dilckalau tau alcasa-prakrti-bhutau prakter guna-visesau eva.'
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________________ JAINA AND SAMKHYA-YOGA THEORIES OF PARINAMA : 3 Parispanda in Samkhya before the production of Akasa as something which is possible without space. For the Jaina, however, there is no such difficulty as Akasa is accepted as an underived entity. The Samkhya and the Jaina show certain affinity in regard to the concept of Kala. The Samkhya does not recognize Kala as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of Prakrti, i.e. identical with the Parinamas of Prakrti. A moment is identified with the unit of change of the Gunas. In the Jaina system, there are two divergent views of Kala since the Agama period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth Dravya, while the other identifies it with the changes of Jiva and Ajiva. The second view is similar to that of the Samkhya. Next, the Samkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of Parinama from the point of view of place (desa), time (kala), form (akara) and extraneous cause (nimitta) finds a certain parallel in the Jaina view according to which the Parinama of every object is conditioned by substance (dravya), place (ksetra), time (kala) and the essential characteristics which constitute a thing (bhava). This is illustrated, by means of an illustration of a pot, in the Raja-vartika thus : 'Yatha ghato dravyatah parthivatvena utpadyate na jalatvena. Desatah ihatyatvena na pataliputrakatvena. Kalatah vartamanakalataya natitanagatabhyam. Bhavatah mahattvena na alpatvena (athava bhavatah raktatvadina)'pp. 180-182. 4 "Kalas ca iti eke'-Tattvartha-sutra, V. 38. 5 In the Samkhya-Yoga, all things being composed ultimately of the three gunas, there are no intrinsic differences between them (sarvam sarvatmakam). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the gunas. Theoretically, therefore, it is possible to change anything in the world to any other provided the necessary collocations could be arranged. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree for in the constitution of the relations of the gunas, there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. These limitations may generally be counted in the phenomenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmir being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pancala country even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly, there are no rains in the summer season, therefore, the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer.' Tattvavaisaradi on the Yoga-sutra, III. 14. Sarvah sarvatmakam iti. Desa-kalakara-nimittapabandhat na khalu samanakalam atmanam abhivyaktir iti.'-Vyasa-bhasya on the Yogasutra, III. 14. the growly, there are nuses of its grow in the
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________________ 4: SHRI MAHAVIRA JAINA VIDYALAYA GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME 'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pataliputra, etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present and not in the past or future. From the standpoint of Bhava, it comes to have the Mahat-Parinama and not the Alpa-Parinama (or it comes to have the qualities of redness, etc.).' The causal theory of the Samkhya is the Satkaryavada which is deducible from his doctrine of Parinama. It means that the effect preexists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jaina, even though accepting the doctrine of Parinama, calls his causal theory Sadasatkaryavada, i.e., the effect is both pre-existent and pre-nonexistent. It is existent in so far as it potentially pre-exists in the cause, and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jaina, too, in the way of the Samkhya, regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase Satkaryavada being suggestive of 'Ekaratism', the Jaina as an 'Anekantist brings in Asat along with Sat. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaisesika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaisesika sense. For the Samkhya, too, it must be noted, the manifestation (abhivyakti) is non-existent (asat) and is brought about by the operation of the Karakas but he does not use the term Asat. Vidyananda in his Astasahasri draws attention to this by stating that the Jaina view is really meant by the Samkhya even though he does not profess it, and that the Samkhya cannot maintain his Satkaryavada in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics. The differences in the application of the theory of Parinama between the Samkhya and the Jaina are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Samkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the principle of 'Sentience' (Cetana), and 'Non-sentience' (Jada) and the second way is to view reality as Parinami and Aparinami or Kutastha. He identifies the sentient with the Kutastha and all change, physical and mental, is relegated to the nonsentient Prakrti. The Jaina dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz., Sentience (Jiva) and Non-sentience (Ajiva) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Sarnkhya and the 6 Asta-sahasri, p. 104.
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________________ JAINA AND SAMKHYA-YOGA THEORIES OF PARINAMA : 5 Jaina. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Parinama. For him, all reality (Sat) has the characteristic of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jiva and the Ajiva must possess this characteristic. Next, the Samkhya regards the transforming Prakrti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Prakrti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Samkhya phraseology, called Tattvantara-Parinama; while the subsequent parinama is called Dharma-Laksana-Avastha Parinama. For the Jaina, it was not necessary to have Tattvantara-Parinama because he starts with the five or six tattvantaras as fundamental and underived entities. The Jaina is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jivas, he assumes four underived Ajiva categories, viz., Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akasa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the Parinamas of Jivas, all material phenomena from the Parinamas of Pudgala-consisting of infinite atoms; while Dharma, Adharma and Akasa make possible the movement (gati), staticity (sthiti) and occupation (avagaha) respectively of Jiva and Pudgala. As just said, the essential difference between the Samkhya and the Jaina lies in the fact that the principle of Parinama is not applied to Purusas by the Samkhya, while the Jaina would apply it both to Jivas and Ajivas. From this difference ensue various differences of views between the Samkhya and the Jaina. The denial of Parinama in the Purusas has made it highly difficult for the Samkhya to relate them to the changing Prakrti and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world-phenomena. In fact, Prakyti, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such Purusas whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of Prakrti teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity with sentient beings. Another consequence of this assumption is that jnana, bhoga, bandha, moksa, etc., which appear as of Purusa, become really so many transformations of Prakyti. Purusa is never bound and, therefore, has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of Prakyti. Thus, in Samkhya, truly speaking, bandha and moksa, are the transformations of Prakrti. The above difficulties do not confront the Jaina. The application of Parinama to Jivas enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., Jiva
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________________ 6: SHRI MAHAVIRA JAINA VIDYALAYA GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME and Pudgala, and explain their mutual influence and interaction. The Jaina theory of Parinama, which in the case of Jiva takes the form of bhava-karma and in the case of Pudgala, that of dravya-karma, makes it possible to attribute jnana, bhoga, bandha, moksa, etc., to Jivas directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to Jivas, as objects of knowledge or enjoyment and as objects from which Jivas have to be free, are consistently explained by the Jaina theory of Parinama. The only difficulty that the Jaina will have to face is that, if by definition, Jiva and Pudgala are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (parinamas) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the Samkhya, there is no such difficulty, because the Purusas and Praksti are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The bhoga and moksa in the Purusa are always 'aupacarika' (i.e., are only a way of speaking). The Samkhya is thus metaphysically in a stronger position, while the Jaina's position is empirically more comprehensible. a uzale hu Oo ooo