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A Comparative Study of the Jaina and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga Theories of Pariņāma
INDUKALA H. JHAVERI
THE concept of Parinama is very old and its beginnings can be traced
I as far back as the Rgveda. It has passed through many stages of development before it assumed its finally finished form. Today it occupies a very important place in Indian Philosophy. So much so that it has been commonly accepted as a fundamental doctrine by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy with slight modifications here or there. Though the concept has thus found almost universal recognition, we shall here confine ourselves to a comparative study of the Pariņāmavāda as postulated in the Jaina and the Samkhya-Yoga systems because these two systems show close resemblance in this respect.
Both the Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Jaina seem to have followed Yāska's definition of Vipariņāma, in their doctrine of Pariņāma, i.e., they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding entity or entities (viparinamate iti apracyavamănasya tattvad vikāram).
Umāsvāti the author of the Tattvārtha-sūtra analyses the Pariņāma nature of reality into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Vyāsa the commentator of the Yoga-sūtra defines Parināma as 'avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharma-nivrttau dharmantarotpattih'. These two views are, in substance, identical.
Vyäsa has analysed Pariņāma into Dharma-Pariņāma, LaksanaGJ.v. 1
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Pariņāma and Avasthā-Pariņāma. The Jaina has not analysed Pariņāma in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his Dravya-Paryāya and Guņa-Paryāya. Every Dravya-Paryāya (such as a pot in the case of Pudgala and manhood (manusyatva, in the case of Jiva) and GunaParyāya (such as darkness or yellowness in Pudgala or Jñana-Paryaya in Jiva) of the Jaina represents Dharma-Pariņāma or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time variations of past, present and future, it is Laksana-Pariņāma. The oldness and newness or tīvratā-mandata in the case of Jiva which a Dravya-Paryāya or a Guna-Paryāya suffers, as a result of time-process, is its AvasthaPariņāma. This Avasthā-Pariņāma, it must be noted, is possible only in the Vyañjana-Paryāya of the Jaina which abides for a certain length of time. There cannot be such Avastha-Pariņāma in the Artha-Paryaya? as it is momentary.
Both the Sāṁkhya and the Jaina understand Parināma as a wide concept including the material change in time (AparispandātmakaParināma) as well as physical movement in space, technically called Parispanda. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of kriya, viz., pariņāmatmikā kriya and parispandātmikä kriyā. In the Jaina view, the Parispanda is possible only in Jiva and Pudgala, as each Jiva and Pudgala, that is atom, is limited and, therefore, capable of movement. In Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa which are indivisible wholes and pervade this loka (universe), there is evidently no scope for Parispanda. In the Sāmkhya, Parispanda has to be negated in Prakrti which is one homogeneous whole and all-pervading. It becomes possible in the different products of Prakyti, from Buddhi onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the Praksti.
There is, however, one difficulty in understanding Parispanda in the Samkhya, viz., that it has to be visualized without Ākāśa. Vijñānabhikṣu felt this difficulty and hence, he clarified that Prakrti subsumes Ākāśa. But this interpretation is not vouchsafed by the older Samkhya texts which derive Akāśa from the Sabda-Tan-Mātrā. So we must understand
1 See Vyäsa-bhäşya on the Yoga-sutra, III. 15. 2 When we conceive the man as devoid of his subdivisions-as simply
a man, it is the one indivisible Vyañjana-Paryāya. If, however, along with the conception of a man, we at the same time are conscious of the variations of a boy, a youth, etc., these latter are said to be Artha-Paryāyas of the Vyañjana-Paryaya of a man. Samkhya-pravacana-bhāsya on the Sārkhya-sútra, II. 12. 'Nityau yau dilckālau tau alcaśa-prakrti-bhūtau prakter guna-visesau eva.'
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Parispanda in Samkhya before the production of Akāśa as something which is possible without space. For the Jaina, however, there is no such difficulty as Ākāśa is accepted as an underived entity.
The Samkhya and the Jaina show certain affinity in regard to the concept of Kāla. The Sāṁkhya does not recognize Kāla as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of Prakrti, i.e. identical with the Pariņāmas of Prakrti. A moment is identified with the unit of change of the Guņas. In the Jaina system, there are two divergent views of Kāla since the Agama period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth Dravya, while the other identifies it with the changes of Jiva and Ajīva. The second view is similar to that of the Sāmkhya.
Next, the Samkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of Pariņāma from the point of view of place (deśa), time (kāla), form (akāra) and extraneous cause (nimitta) finds a certain parallel in the Jaina view according to which the Pariņāma of every object is conditioned by substance (dravya), place (kşetra), time (kāla) and the essential characteristics which constitute a thing (bhāva). This is illustrated, by means of an illustration of a pot, in the Raja-vārtika thus : 'Yathā ghato dravyataḥ pārthivatvena utpadyate na jalatvena. Deśatah ihatyatvena na pâţaliputrakatvena. Kālatah vartamánakalatayā nātītānāgatäbhyam. Bhavataḥ mahattvena na alpatvena (athavā bhāvatah raktatvādinā)'pp. 180-182.
4 "Kālaś ca iti eke'-Tattvärtha-sūtra, V. 38. 5 In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, all things being composed ultimately of the
three guņas, there are no intrinsic differences between them (sarvam sarvatmakam). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the guņas. Theoretically, therefore, it is possible to change anything in the world to any other provided the necessary collocations could be arranged. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree for in the constitution of the relations of the gunas, there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. These limitations may generally be counted in the phenomenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmir being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pāñcāla country even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly, there are no rains in the summer season, therefore, the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer.' Tattvavaiśāradi on the Yoga-sutra, III. 14.
Sarvaḥ sarvatmakam iti. Deśa-kālākara-nimittāpabandhät na khalu samanakālam atmanām abhivyaktir iti.'-Vyāsa-bhasya on the Yogasūtra, III. 14.
the growly, there are nuses of its grow in the
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'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pāțaliputra, etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present and not in the past or future. From the standpoint of Bhāva, it comes to have the Mahat-Pariņāma and not the Alpa-Pariņāma (or it comes to have the qualities of redness, etc.).'
The causal theory of the Sāṁkhya is the Satkāryavāda which is deducible from his doctrine of Parināma. It means that the effect preexists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jaina, even though accepting the doctrine of Pariņāma, calls his causal theory Sadasatkāryavāda, i.e., the effect is both pre-existent and pre-nonexistent. It is existent in so far as it potentially pre-exists in the cause, and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jaina, too, in the way of the Samkhya, regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase Satkāryavāda being suggestive of 'Ekāratism', the Jaina as an 'Anekāntist brings in Asat along with Sat. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaiseșika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaišeşika sense. For the Samkhya, too, it must be noted, the manifestation (abhivyakti) is non-existent (asat) and is brought about by the operation of the Karakas but he does not use the term Asat. Vidyānanda in his Astasahasri draws attention to this by stating that the Jaina view is really meant by the Samkhya even though he does not profess it, and that the Samkhya cannot maintain his Satkāryavāda in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics.
The differences in the application of the theory of Pariņāma between the Sámkhya and the Jaina are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Sāṁkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the principle of 'Sentience' (Cetana), and 'Non-sentience' (Jada) and the second way is to view reality as Pariņāmi and Aparināmi or Kūțastha. He identifies the sentient with the Küțastha and all change, physical and mental, is relegated to the nonsentient Prakrti. The Jaina dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz., Sentience (Jiva) and Non-sentience (Ajiva) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Sārnkhya and the
6
Asta-sahasrī, p. 104.
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Jaina. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Parinama. For him, all reality (Sat) has the characteristic of utpåda, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jiva and the Ajiva must possess this characteristic.
Next, the Samkhya regards the transforming Prakṛti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Prakrti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Samkhya phraseology, called Tattväntara-Parinama; while the subsequent pariņāma is called Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avastha Pariņāma. For the Jaina, it was not necessary to have Tattväntara-Parināma because he starts with the five or six tattväntaras as fundamental and underived entities. The Jaina is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jivas, he assumes four underived Ajiva categories, viz., Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the Parinamas of Jivas, all material phenomena from the Parinamas of Pudgala-consisting of infinite atoms; while Dharma, Adharma and Akasa make possible the movement (gati), staticity (sthiti) and occupation (avagaha) respectively of Jiva and Pudgala.
As just said, the essential difference between the Samkhya and the Jaina lies in the fact that the principle of Parinama is not applied to Purusas by the Samkhya, while the Jaina would apply it both to Jivas and Ajivas. From this difference ensue various differences of views between the Samkhya and the Jaina.
The denial of Parinama in the Purusas has made it highly difficult for the Samkhya to relate them to the changing Prakrti and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world-phenomena. In fact, Prakyti, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such Purusas whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of Prakrti teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity with sentient beings.
Another consequence of this assumption is that jñana, bhoga, bandha, mokṣa, etc., which appear as of Purusa, become really so many transformations of Prakyti. Purusa is never bound and, therefore, has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of Prakyti. Thus, in Samkhya, truly speaking, bandha and moksa, are the transformations of Prakṛti.
The above difficulties do not confront the Jaina. The application of Pariņāma to Jivas enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., Jiva
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________________ 6: SHRI MAHAVIRA JAINA VIDYALAYA GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME and Pudgala, and explain their mutual influence and interaction. The Jaina theory of Parinama, which in the case of Jiva takes the form of bhava-karma and in the case of Pudgala, that of dravya-karma, makes it possible to attribute jnana, bhoga, bandha, moksa, etc., to Jivas directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to Jivas, as objects of knowledge or enjoyment and as objects from which Jivas have to be free, are consistently explained by the Jaina theory of Parinama. The only difficulty that the Jaina will have to face is that, if by definition, Jiva and Pudgala are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (parinamas) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the Samkhya, there is no such difficulty, because the Purusas and Praksti are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The bhoga and moksa in the Purusa are always 'aupacarika' (i.e., are only a way of speaking). The Samkhya is thus metaphysically in a stronger position, while the Jaina's position is empirically more comprehensible. a uzale hu Oo ooo