Cattle Field And Barley Note On Mahabhasya

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269497/1

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A. WEZLER
The Adyar Library Bulletin Brahmavidya Golden Jubilee Volume vol. 50 1986
CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY:
A NOTE ON MAHABHAṢYA I 337. 24-27 (STUDIES IN PATANJALI'S MAHABHAṢYA III)
1.
By a foot-note (on p. 652) Pdt. Sukhlal Sanghvi and Pdt. Bechardas Doshi-in the marvellous edition of Siddhasena Diväkara's Sammatitarkaprakarana together with Abhayadevasüri's Tattvabodhavidhāyini1 we owe to them-my attention was recently drawn to a passage of the Mahabhasya (=Bh.) which seems to call for a closer study. It significance does not, however, lie in the field of grammar itself, but-as in quite a number of similar instances too-in something which is only implied or simply presupposed by Patanjali when giving an example for the operation of a certain grammatical rule. As for the present case, it is in connection with the view, discussed in the Tattvabodhavidhayini, that vanaspati-s are cetand that the learned editors refer their readers to the Bh. (and a number of related texts); and the passage which they also quote, though only in part, is indeed likely to testify to the fact that Patanjali shared the view of the 'animateness of plants'; but this has to be

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clarified by closer inspection, and it is this that I propose to do in the present note.
What I am going to offer is hence merely a very small piece of a large mosaic, and even one I did not discover myself, yet a piece which is easily overlooked by scholars who might wish to deal in a comprehensive manner with the Indian ideas about and attitudes towards vegetal life, a subject of utmost importance when the disastrous and global havoc provoked by 'progressive' Western ideas everywhere is considered. And, to be sure, such a comprehensive study could be undertaken more easily, and with much better results, if the various relevant pieces of information were collected and studied separately.
To quote the example given in the Käsikä: gacchati māņavako grāmam versus gamayati manavakam gråmam, the counter example being: pacaty odanam devadattah versus păcayaty odanam devadattena.
In his 7th värttika on this sūtra Kätyāyana states (I 337. 247): bhakşer ahimsarthasya to which, however, the word pratisedhah, mentioned in vårtt. 5, has to be supplemented, as correctly noted by Nägesa. Patanjali evidently regarded the anuutti of this expression as a matter of course, not calling for any explanation; for hc confines himself to simply paraphrasing the vartt. as (I 337. 25): bhakşer ahimsarthasyeti vaktavyam. Nevertheless what he says has to be taken to mean: 'It must be explicitly taught that Pån. 1. 4. 52 does not apply to the agent of the verb bhakşayati if the action denoted by it is that of ahimsa'; or to say it more simply, 'that this sutra of Pāņini's applies to the agent of this particular verb only if the action denoted is that of himsa'.
This is made clear also by what Patañjali regards as a proper illustration of this värttika, viz. (1 337. 25 f.): bhakşayati pindim devadattah bhakşayati pindim devadattenall, 'Devadatta eats a ball [of rice, etc.)'' '[X] makes Devadatta eat a ball [of rice etc.) (i.e. gives Devadatta ... to eat /entertains D. to...)'.
Continuing his explanation of the värtt. Patanjali himself asks about the cause of the restriction regarding the meaning of bhakşayati (I 337.26: ahimsarthasyeti kimartham), but only to answer this question with his usual brevity, namely by adducing a relevant counter example: bhakşayanti yapan balivardah/bhakşayanti balivardan
The passage in question is found in the discussion of Pāņ. 1. 4. 52- a sútra which is traditionally taken to form a restriction of 1. 4. 49, i.e. the definition of the karaka-category karman-which reads thus: gatibuddhipratyavasånärthasabdakarmakarmakanam anikarta sa pau. According to this rule the technical term karman is applicable also to that which forms the agent of a noncausal action, expressed by a verb containing the causative suffix ni (c), if this suffix is added to the verb, i.e. a corresponding causative is formed, provided the action is one denoted by verbs denoting movement (gati), cognition (buddhi), consuming (pratyavasana); or the action is one of which the object is a sound (Sabdakarma) or one which does not have an object (akarmaka).
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yavan || 'the oxen eat (the) barley [in the field]', [X] make/let the oxen eat (the) barley [plants] (i.e. graze in a barley field.)'.10
2. 1.
As for the grammatical or technical problems involved, they are conveniently explained by the commentators. Thus Kaiyața states (Pradipa II 275 a 2021):11 bhakser iti anikarteti hetumannico nisedhac curadinyanto 'py nyanta eveti präptih. Of the verb bhakṣayati: Since by [the expression] 'agent of a noncausal action, expressed by a verb not containing the suffix ni(c)' [in Pag. 4. 1. 52], what is excluded are [only verbs containing that suffix] nic [which in accordance with Pan. 2. 1. 26 is added to denote] an action the agent of which is [in accordance with Pan. 1. 4. 55] technically called hetu (i.e. a causal action) [and not just any verb ending in this suffix], [therefore] a verb ending in ni (c) in so far as it belongs to the group of cur etc. (i.e. the tenth class) in accordance with Pän. 2. 1. 25, too, is indeed a verb not ending in pi(c), (i.e. does form part of the group of verbs referred to by the expression anikarta); this is why [the verb bhakṣayati] would be subject to Pän. 1. 4. 52 [and this it is that prompted Kätyäyana to teach his värtt. 7 in order to prevent this anista application].' What all this ultimately amounts to is the statement, at once both simple and convincing, that unless värtt. 7 is really taught one might indeed apply this rule of Panini's wrongly to bhakṣayati, too, because and in so far as it forms part of the tenth class. As regards the semantic aspect,
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it is hardly necessary to state explicitly with Nageśa12 that bhakṣayati is subsumed under the group of verbs denoting 'consuming' (pratyavasana),13 and that Pan. 1.4. 52 could hence be applied to it.
2.2.
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However, the grammatical description cannot in this case be confined to exempting the verb bhakṣayati as such from being subject to Pan. 1. 4. 52, as the usage of the object language clearly attests that, quite on the contrary, the agent of the noncausal action denoted by this verb sometimes becomes the object of the action if bhakṣayati is used as a causative. Katyayana was evidently of the opinion that the condition under which this other construction is found in speech can be exactly described, viz. in terms of semantics: Pan. 1. 4. 52 has all the same to be applied to bhakşayati if, but only if, the action. denoted by this verb represents an act of himsă.
Yet, what precisely does he mean by himsă? As the semantic area of this word is comparatively broad, an answer to this question would be highly welcome. In order to try to find it, there are two paths we are methodically bound to take, viz. to check whether this expression occurs in the Astadhyayi itself or in the Värttika at other places and, if so, to see if its meaning can be determined more precisely. I do not, however, want to try the reader's patience and therefore content myself with stating the result of such an examination: himsä is used with reference to actions of wiping out, exterminating or of mauling, 15 but also to actions of

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striking and injuring. That is to say, the range of meaning this expression has with Påņini and Katyāyana is practically identical with what our dictionaries list in their entries. 2. 3.
The exegete who wishes to arrive at a precise understanding of the counter examples given by Patañjali and its implications continues to be puzzled by the fact that the commentators of the Bh. and in general later Paniniya-s from Kaiyata onwards seem not seldom to be at a loss to definitely decide between two alternative interpretations as regards the object of the act of himsa committed by the oxen. 3. Thus Kaiyata simply says (II 275 a 21-25:) bhaksayanti yavån iti / kşetrasthanam prarohanadyavasthayam yapanām bhaksanād dhimsa bhavati tadavasthayam kaišcid caitanyasyabhyupagamät parakiyayavabhakşane vă paro hirsito bhavati hirrsänge bhakşane atra bhakşir vartatell. [The oxen) eat (the) barley [in the field]: On account of the fact that the barley (plants) in the field while they are in the stage of shooting forth etc. are eaten, injury is committed, because certain people are of the opinion that in this stage they are sentient (and like every other sentient being should not be injured, not to speak of being killed). Or else, if it is the barley belonging to somebody else that is eaten, [this] other person is hármed. [In any case) the verb bhakşayati is used here to denote the action of eating a constituent part of which is doing harm.?
"At first sight it is perhaps not even clear if what
Kaiyața aims at is to point out two mutually exclusive interpretations of the sentences forming the counter example or rather to indicate that what Patañjali says can be accounted for equally by both assumptions, i.e. by assuming that of course injury is done to the plants if the oxen belong to the owner of the field, but no less by assuming that if the field happens to be the property of somebody else, it is this person to whom harm is done. On second thoughts, however, it cannot but be realized that Kaiyața in fact gives here two interpretations of which only one at a time can apply; for otherwise one would rather expect him to have at least hinted at the fact that, as for the first interpretation, he has in view a situation, one easily imaginable, that oxen eat the barley plants of their owner. Yet, which of the two possible interpretations he himself considered to be the more plausible one remains an open question. For what Helaraja says about the expression kaşámcit used by Bharthari 'in Kårika 52 of the Sadhanasamuddeśa of the VP, viz. (271. 3f.): stac ca na fästrakärasya matam kasamcid ity anyamatatvenopanyasát, cannot, even if it were true for all occurrences of this indefinite pronoun in the VP, be simply generalized and then applied also to this passage of Kaiyata's Pradipa.10
And the sequence in which the two alternatives - henceforth referred to as the first and the second oneare brought forward is hardly more conclusive than the particle va itself. As a last resort one might look into the subcommentaries. In none of them, however, is

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found an explicit statement about Kaiyata's own preference. But since one of them contains a statement which can at least be taken as indicative in this respect and since the author of another is quite outspoken, though on his own part and with reference to the Bh. alone, it will not be out of place to take notice of them in in toto. 2. 4.
Annambhatta in his Mahabhäsyapradipoddyotana remarks (IV. 325. 11- 13): acetananam yavānäm katham himså, ata äha-ksetrasthanām iticaitanyänabhyupagantmate py ahaparakiyeti himsårige himsárthasyety atrárthaśabdah prayojanavaci himsāprayojanakabhinnärthe vartamanasyeti vivaksitam iti bhāvah l ' [Kaiyata] says On account of the fact... because [one might ask] how nonsentient barley [plants could be injured. By Or else if it is the barley belonging to somebody else...he explains (the examples] also with regard to the opinion of those who do not accept that (plants) are sentient [beings]...'. The manner in which Annambhatta expresses himself in the second sentence is such that one is given the impression that he took the first alternative to represent Kaiyata's own true conviction to which the other alternative was only added in order to offer a plausible explanation for those, too, who do not share his opinion-and that there were in fact such people he thought he could hardly ignore.
Nagesa, on the other hand, gives the following explanation in his Uddyota (II 275 a 29-36): pindya aprānitväd udāharane bhakşer ahimsarthatam // nanu yavānam apy acetanatvát tadvisayasyäpi katham himsärthatvam ata äha
ksetrasthanam iti idam upalaksanam bijāvasthänām api bhaksane himsåsattvåt himsänige iti / idam ubhayasadharanam taträdye yavån himsan bhakşayati ty arthah, dviti ye tu parån ity adhyähäryam parän himsan yavan bhakşayatity arthah atradyam eva yuktam bhāsyasvarasäd ity ahuh// udāharanakakşayām bhakşayantiti bahuvacanapăthe tatsvämina iti Sesah II. "The verb bhakşayati does not in the example ['Devadatta cats a ball of rice etc.') denote an act of himså because a ball of rice etc. is not a living being. [Kaiyata] saysOn account of the fact...because [one might ask] how [the verb bhakşayati) can denote an act of his also if [the action denoted by it) refers to barley plants as these too are nonsentient [beings). [What Kaiyata says, viz. that an act of himsa is committed if barley plants in the field are eaten while they are in the stage of shooting forth etc.) implies something he does not state explicitly, viz. that injury is in fact done also when barley which is still in the stage of grains is eaten...the verb bhakşayati is used...: This holds equally good for both [alternatives, for) as for the first of them, what is meant is that [an ox] by eating them injures the barley plants; in the second case, however, the word others' has to be supplemented, [for,] what is [then] meant is that [an ox] by eating the barley plants does harm to others (i.e. other people). And it is said, of these two [alternatives] the first one alone is correct because it is in agreement with the intention of the Bhäșya. If [in the second example) the plural form bhakşayanti is read and if [thus both) the examples are paralleled, then the subject] 'their owners' has to be supplied'.21

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CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY 441 explanation is the motive for his adding api. Did he think-like Nägesa--of the grains of barley or else of men and animals as a group the cetanatva of which is a matter of course ? I find it difficult to arrive at a decision. The real importance of this passage of the Ratnaprakäsa lies anyway in that its author shows himself so firmly convinced as regards the central problem, viz. in what the act of himsă essentially consists. But with all due deference to him, one cannot but ask: Why should we fall in with his opinion, especially as that of other Päņiniya-s differs from his ?
Although the identity of those who decidedly voted in favour of the first interpretation is not clarified by Någeša and even a pronominal expression like kacit or pare is absent-which would clearly point in the one direction or the other, as shown by Thieme_the reason adduced, viz. bhäsyasvarasät, is of such a kind that no doubt is left as to Nägesa's own position: In case he did not agree with these unnamed scholars, he could hardly have let pass their argument unchallenged! Less clear, however, is what exactly is meant by sparasa. This expression-as well as its derivation svårasya-would no doubt deserve a thorough examination, especially with regard to the Uddyota (and other works of Năgesa's). But such an investigation cannot be undertaken here, nor would it seem to be absolutely necessary; for, whatever its result may be, this much is clear even now: the reason is not a particular one, does not refer concretely and directly to the problem at issue, viz. the meaning of the examples given in the Bh.
There is another Pāṇiniya who, though commenting on the Bh. itself, voices his opinion without any ifs and buts, viz. Sivaramendrasarasvati, for what he says is (Mahabhäsyasiddhantaratnaprakäsa 326. 26 f.) 23. bhakşayanti yavan iti / kşetrasthänām arkuradyavasthanam yavänäm bhaksanad dhimsa bhavati, teşām api cetanatvät/. According to him there is hence only one possibility to interpret the example: By eating the barley plants, still in the state of sprouts, an act of himsa is committed because they are sentient beings. The only problem posed by his
2. 5.
Besides, there are still other Pāṇiniya-s whose testimony should likewise be taken, and one should definitely not make an arbitrary choice and summon only the commentators on the Bh. or those who wrote subcommentaries on their works. ' '
2.5.1.
From the Kašikā not much is to be learnt, except perhaps for the fact that it shows that värtt. 7 on Pån. 1.4.52 was-together with many others on this sutra--regarded as a necessary, indispensable addition by the Pāņinian tradition, obviously from the times of Patañjali onwards. Another point worth noticing is that in the relevant counter examples the expression yavān is replaced by Sasyam-a feature the Kasika has in common e.g. with the grammar of Candragomino for no apparent reason; for, it is by no means plain

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that much is gained if 'barley (plants)' is changed into 'corn'. 25
Haradatta's comment on the second example, however, is instructive at least in so far as it shows that it was not Kaiyața alone among the Pāṇiniya-s who decided to give two alternative interpretations and to leave the matter at that; for it reads thus (1 579. 16-18): bhakşayati” balivardan sasyam iti kşetrasthanam yavänām bhaksyamänänäm himsa bhavati, tasyam avasthayām kaiścic caitanyabhyupagamåt / svamino vä himsa drastavyd. 28 In substance, this is exactly the same explanation as that given by Kaiyata.
of the field. Though this interpretation might command our respect to some extent at least, it is by no means likely to convince anybody, since Jinendrabuddhi's motives are easily seen through: If instead of deciding in favour of one of the alternatives one contends that both are simultaneously correct, this is ultimately nothing but an all too easy way to avoid having to put one's cards on the table.
2. 5. 2.
Jinendrabuddhi; however, differs remarkably (I 579. 29-37): bhakşir atra himsärthah / 'sarve sacetana bhavaḥ' ity asmin darsane himsitam sasyam iti sasyasya' bhaksarena devadatto himsito bhavati pasya hi tat sasyam tasya himpisa gamyate. The verb bhakşayati denotes here an act of himsa. In accordance with the doctrine that all things existent are living, the corn (which is eaten by the oxen) is injured, and this means that by eating the corn (ultimately] Devadatta is done harm; for what is understood [by this sentence] is that harm is done to that person to whom the corn belongs.' This is apparently an attempt to amalgamate the two alternative interpretations which consists in simply combining the two different forms of himsa, in such a manner that the first, i.e. the destruction of the crop, leads to the second, i.e. the loss caused to the owner
2. 5. 3.
As regards Bhattojidikșita, in his Siddhantakaumudi he is, not unexpectedly, too brief to reveal his opinion. Yet in his own commentary on it, i.e. the Praudhamanorama, he gives his view on the meaning of the example bhakşayatia balivardan sasyam so clearly that he leaves nothing to be desired; for what he says there by way of explanation is (666. 6-7)31: sasyam iti kşetrasthanam yavänām bhak syamanānām himså drastavyä | tasyam avasthayam teşām cetanatvät. 'The injury has to be recognized as being done to the barley plants in the field in so far as they are eaten, because at that stage they are sentient beings'. A similar, almost completely identical statement is met with also in the author's Sabdakoustubha. 9a Väsudevadikşita is therefore quite right when he remarks in his Bälamanorama commentary on the Siddhantakaumudi (420. 28-30). bhakşayati balivardan sosyam itiksetre prarüdham alūnam sasyam iha vivaksitam | tasya tadanim antahprajñajivatvāt tadbhakşanam himsaiveti bhavaḥ.
TX] makes / lets the oxen eat the crop: What is intended here is the crop grown on the field. Ibut not vet reaned

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444 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN Since it is at that time a living being with [some) internal awareness, eating it definitely [constitutes] an act of himsa,--this it is what is ultimately meant'. 2.5. 4.
It is hence with no little surprise that one notices the divergent explanation given by Nageša in his Laghusabdendusekhara; for there he says-in contradiction not only to Bhattojidikşita's own clarifications, but also to what is stated in his own Uddyota (cf. above $2.4)-(678. 1-2)36. parakiyasasyabhakşane paro himsito bhavatiti tatsvamino 'tra himsa drastavyā I, i.e. he proceeds as though no other interpretation than the second alternative is possible at all. It is true that in his Brhacchabdendusekhara he mentions the first alternative too, viz. adds it to a sentence verbatim corresponding to that quoted just now from the LSS, for he says (II 851. 7) kşetrasthänām sasyänām bhak syamananām himsă drastavya/ tadavasthāyām taşām cetanatvät/. The author apart, it is no real wonder to meet again, after consulting so many different sources, the two alternatives simply put side by side and connected only by a da; but the disappointment which may nevertheless spring up is perhaps not really justified; in any case it is, I think, fully compensated for by the fact, remarkable as it is, that the idea of the plants, cetanatva has been alive for so long a time in India, 'alive' at least in the sense of still being Imown.' 2. 5. 5.
As far as I can see, there is one author only who draws out of the line as it were in every regard, and this
CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY 445 is Ramacandra who in his Prakriyakaumudi gives the following example for the verb bhakşayati denoting an act of himsa (I 394. 4).38: bhakşayaty amatyam arin rājā, the king makes his minister eat, i.e. eliminate, his enemies'. Whatever may have prompted him to thus radically change the example, the annoyance created by the lack of unequivocalness of Patañjali's example or the wish to go on his part back to the object language itself, etc., there can hardly be any doubt that Katyayana, not to speak of Patañjali, did not think of such a metaphorical use of bhaksayati.39 ...But it is not even necessary to enter into a discussion with Rämacandra or to insist that he has gone off the track. For, after all, what this study is exclusively concerned with is the examples as given by Patañjali on vårtt. 7 on Pän. 1. 4. 52 and their interpretation, and not the question, legitimate or not, if these examples meet in fact Kätyäyana's intention. And as to the examples, it should by now be clear that there are only two interpretations which are at all worthy of considerration, namely those two given already by Kaiyata...
3.
.. Even a reader who does not at all keep a look-out for passages attesting the doctrine of the animateness of plants, will most probably tend to the opinion that the first of these two interpretations should be clearly given preference as unveiling what Patañjali had in mind when formulating these examples. One of the reasons is, of course, that only if they are understood in this way the

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446 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN grammatical object of the action of eating is at the same time also that which is in fact harmed. This is (deliberately?) made particularly clear by Nägesa by thus explaining the second interpretation (cf. § 2. 4 above): parän himsan yavân bhakşayati. .
However the question is whether this argument is by itself strong enough to allow a final decision. If the problem could be solved. so easily, one would have to wonder why the second interpretation continued to appeal to quite a few Pāņiniya-s who after all were no fools either. Therefore it is advisable, to say the least, to take a closer look at the second interpretation and to see what it is ultimatly about.
3. 1.
respects. For the present purpose it will, however, suffice to have a brief look at some of the verses in the Manusmrti, quoted here in their most recent translation, viz. that of Derrett.43
8. 238: 'If cattle damage unfenced crops there the king shall not inflict punishment for that on their keepers.' 8. 239: 'One should set up a fence such as a camel cannot see over, and stop up every hole that a dog or a boar could push his head through.' 8. 240: 'If cattle are on a road," in a unfenced field," or in the village, he, the keeper, deserves to be fined too; one may drive off cattle without a keeper.' 8. 241: 'In the case of other fields the cattle should pay a pana and a quarter a head, everywhere the harvest must be made good to the owner of the field: this is the settled rule. 8. 242: Manu has said that these are not punishable: a cow within ten days of calving, a bull, cattle belonging to gods, whether or not they are
accompanied by keepers.' There is no need to go into details here in a comprehensive and systematic manner. But attention must nevertheless be drawn to the expressions used by Manuand the authors of some other Sūtra and Smsti texts as well as their commentators-when they come to speak of the 'damage to crops'. These are:? vi-hims
. According to this interpretation it is the eating of the barley plants that causes himsa to the proprietor of the field (tatsämin). That is to say, what Kaiyata and the other Päņiniya-s are here talking about is damage to crops, and this was quite understandably-a legal area in India, too. Together with related problems it is usually dealt with in Dharmaśāstra texts, if they arrange their materials at all systematically, under the heading svämipalavivāda and thus in the wider context of what is technically called vyavahara.40 The relevant ideas and regulations are summarized by P. V. Kane, but those reading German should not by any means miss the corresponding pages in J.J. Meyer's Über das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften..." which make much better and decidedy more entertaining reading in many

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(M. 8. 238), echoed by tadbhaksana in Bharuci's commentary and paraphrased similarly by bhaks in Kulluka's Manvarthamuktavali;48 (sasya-)upaghata (Bharuci on M..8. 239 and 241; cf. Haradatta on Gaut. 12. 19 and Vijñanesvara on Y. 2. 160); (sasya-)ghata (Vi. 2. 159); pid (Gaut. 12. 19-2. 3. 16; Haradatta on 12. 21 and 23); (sarva-)vinaša (Gaut. 12. 26-2. 3. 23); (sasya-)nāśa (Vi. 5. 140; cf. 5. 146 and Nandapanḍita on Vi. 5.140 ff.; Y. 2. 161 and Vijñānesvara on this and the following verses); aparādha (e.g. Maskari on Gaut. 12. 23; Vijñānesvara in Y. 2. 160) adin (Ap. 2. 28. 5., explained by Haradatta to be equivalent to sasyäder bhakṣapitr), etc. etc..
What is noteworthy in the first place is the interchangeability of vi-hims and bhaks. That the action denoted by bhaks does not, however, necessarily imply complete destruction is indicated by Nandapandita on Vi. 5. 147 in drawing a corresponding distinction (... yasya ksetre yavat sasyam pašavo bhakṣayanti näsayanti vā...); and it is clearly what Haradatta had in mind when in explaining the expression sarvavinase of Gaut. 12. 26 he says: yatha punahpraroho na bhavati tatha (sarvavinase), i.e. when he makes clear that 'complete destruction' is meant; still more explicit seems to be Vijñānesvara's remark, made with reference to När. 11. 31, viz. that this sutra is punaḥprarohayogyamülāvašeṣabhakṣaṇaviṣaya, though a reader familar with agriculture might wonder where on earth a member of the bovine species could eat more than the epigeous parts of a plant and what value e.g. barley plants should have once they have been
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eaten bare to the roots, even if the sprouted again."9 Yet, be that as it may, by the two expressions in question and the others also quoted above one may indeed by given the idea that it is this type of damage to crops that Patanjali had in mind with his example. And the subject of the Dharmasastra texts drawn upon is in fact the damage caused by cattle to the crops belonging to somebody else, as is also made clear, though rather superfluously, by the commentators, e.g. Vijñānesvara on Y. II 159 by adding para- in paraphrasing sasyaghatasya karinis1 of the verse, or by Nandapandita when introducing his explanations on Vi. 5. 141 ff. by the general remark: paśubhiḥ parasasyanaše dandam äha, etc.52
3.2.
However, good care has, of course, to be taken not to draw premature conclusions from such similarities. in expressions. For what is exactly meant by a particular expression like upa-han, pid etc. in each case is clearly determined, if not totally, then at least to a large extent, by the wider content in which it stands and how the section in which it is found is systematically organized. And regarding the Dharmasastra passages referred to above nobody will fail to realize, even when only starting to go through them, that their authors were interested in but one thing, viz. in the material damage caused by cattle; the questions of guilt and penalty for the material loss; the owner's title to compensation which cannot be denied (in certain cases); and specifically the role the
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does not in the least help to solve the problem at issue, viz. a substantiated option between these two alternative and mutally exclusive interpretations. On the contrary, now that the implications and the background of the second interpretation have been understood, it appears to be even more difficult than before to advance reasons against its not also being what Patañjali actually had in mind.
450 THE ADYAR "LIBRARY BULLETIN king is to play, and this not as an impartial judge, but significantly enough as the head of the state who himself and for his own benefit takes a vital interest in the crop yield. The idea that plants are sentient beings or could be regarded as such is not only mentioned nowhere in these passages, but the sources referred to also breathe a quite different spirit which would make it appear impossible that an idea like that of the cetanatva of plants could have noticeably impressed their authors. This is definitely not what they are concerned with, and they are not even worried about the freedom from injury of men and animals; on the contrary, doing bodily harm to beings whose: cetanatva is a commonly accepted fact is even one of the punishments they prescribe or recommend.55
On the other hand, so it might be objected and rightly at that, the Dharmaśāstra material drawn upon just now is evidence of the fact that the eating of crops by cattle was in fact considered a damage in India, most probably since of old, and even if vi-hirs were not attested in M. 8. 238 in such a context, there can hardly be any doubt that damage (to crops ) is covered by the expression himsa, too.56. Therefore, if it is because of the existence of this legal area that Kaiyata and other Paniniya-s allow for the second interpretation of Patañjali's examples-and, to be sure it cannot be dis- puted that this is in fact, the main reason , the striking difference of the second from the first interpretation in terms of its conceptual, intellectual and ethical ambience
though it was legitimate, even necessary to observe it
There is at least one passage in the Bh. regarding which there cannot be the least doubt that it has to do with the problem of the damage caused by cattle to crops, and it will certainly be useful to examine it, too. It is found at the very beginning of the discussion of Pān. 1. 4. 27 (väranärthanam ipsitah) according to which in the case of actions denoted by verbs meaning "ward off" [that too is technically called apadana] which [an agent] wishes to reach / obtain'. The question about an example for the operation of this rule-and hence about the necessity of teaching it—with which the discussion starts (I 328. 10: kim udāharanam/) is answered by adducing the sentence masebhyo gå vårayati, 'he keeps the cows away from the beans [in the field]';. the discussion is then continued thus (1 328. 10-12): bhaved yasya masa na gävas tasya māşi ipsitäh syuh / yasya tu khalu gavo na mäşa katham tasya máså ipsitäh syuk / tasyapi maşa edepsitāḥ / ataś cepsită yad ebhyo gå varayati Il.' It may be that for the person who owns the beans, but not the cows, the beans (in the field] are something which

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he wishes to obtain. But as for the person who owns the cows and not the beans, how/ why should the beans be for him something which he wishes to obtain ?57—For him also the beans are doubtless58 something which he wishes to obtain (i.e. to preserve), and to be more precise, they are something which he wishes to obtain (i.e. which he does not wish to be destroyed) because he keeps the cows away from them.'50
Though this counter argument is valid, it is not on the level of the Bh. alone absolutely clear why the herdsman or the owner of the cattle keeps them away from the beans: Because he does not want the beans to be injured since they are living beings or because he is afraid of the legal consequences of his cattle causing damage to the beans belonging to somebody else ? In this case, however, the commentators do not entertain any doubts, but are unanimously of the opinion that it is only the latter reason which can be meant here. Thus Kaiyata explains the question following immediately upon the Bh. passage quoted above viz. iha küpåd andham vårayatiti kūpe 'pädänasamjia na präpnoti... (I 328. 12 ff.) by explicitly stating (Pradipa II 251 b 16 f.) küpād iti andhasambandha küpasya na vinäso napi rajabhayam iti prafnah // 'this question arises because in connection with a blind man [to be kept away from a well] neither can [that from which he is kept away, i.e.) the well, be destroyed nor [is there any reason] to be afraid of the king. The implication, of course, is that it is these very reasons which make the herdsman keep his cows
from the beans. And statements to the same
CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY 453 effect are found in the works of other commentators too.1
Yet, in the present case one is fortunately not at all dependent on the help of the commentators, for Patañjali himself leaves his readers in no doubt about the correct interpretation of the example he has given at the very outset of his discussion of Pån 4.1.27. For, after having discussed this and some more examples he finally voices the opinion that this sutra of Pånini's-like others following upon 1.4.24-need not be taught at all (I 328.21: ayam api yogah fakyo 'vaktum); this contention quite naturally provokes the question: katham mäsebhyo gå vårayatiti, i.e. how the use of the ablative in this and similar sentences can then be accounted for. The answer to it runs thus (1 328. 21-24): paśyaty ayam yadimå gavas tatra gacchanti dhruvar sasyavināšah sasyavinäse 'dharmas caida räjabhayam ca sa ca buddhya samprapya nivartayati tatra dhruvam apaye 'padanam [Pāņ 1. 4. 24] ity eva siddham/. 'Hc (i.c. the herdsman who keeps the cows away) sees (i.e. considers 2) that, if these, cows do get there (i.c. into the field), the crop will be certainly destroyed, and if the crops is destroyed this means a breach of the prescribed conduct as well as that he must] fear (punishment] by the king. [Thus) he turns [his cows] away [from the field which they have not actually reached, but which) he has made them reach in his mind (i.e. which he conceives them he
to have reached)." This being so, the correct result (viz. the application of the term apadana to the word denoting 'beans in the field'] is simply achieved by Pan. 1.4.24.'

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at least includes the eating of the beans in the field, only that it is viewed in this case exclusively under the aspect whether or not it is in accordance with dharma, i.e. the prescribed rules of conduct.
It is hence clear not only why the commentators are not at all uncertain as to the meaning of the passage I 328. 10-12, but also that Patañjali indeed thinks here of the material loss the cows may cause and of what such a sasyavinäsa would entail, viz. that a particular prescription of dharma is not followed and that the king may in accordance with the law punish the adharmika herdsman. It is beyond all doubt that the rajabhaya is caused by the breach of the prescribed conduct, but we must not lose sight of the fact that this relation is not expressed by Patañjali who instead connected the two corresponding expressions by caiva...ca. Therefore what was evidently of primary importance to him was to state that being responsible for a sasyavinasa has bad consequences in two respects, viz. in that apart from the eventual punishment (whether it be a fine or a corporal punishment) by the king, one is also defiled by adharma substance. Neither Patañjali himself nor his com- mentators has anything to say about the expression adharma used here, and indeed it does not seem to pose any difficulties: It is most naturally understood to denote the metaphysical consequence any action has by which a prescription of the dharma is offended against, and the Dharmaśāstra material referred to above admits of no doubt that the prevention of damage to crops was in fact considered to be an element of dharma. There is hence no need to suspect that the expression adharma perhaps refers to the injuring of the beans conceived of as living beings. On the other hand it is equally patent that what is meant by sasyavináša here
Yet, so it has to be asked, what are the conclusions that may be drawn from this passage of the Bh. with regard to the problems of interpretation posed by Bh. I 337. 24-27 discussed earlier?
(1) It bears evidence of Patanjali's being familiar, at least in substance, with what is taught in Dharmaśästra texts about 'damage to crops'; there is hence not even the slightest chance of arguing against the second interpretation of the example given in the discussion of Pan. 1. 4. 52 by contending that Patañjali cannot have had in mind the material loss because he did not know the relevant rules of Dharmaśāstra.
(2) On the other hand, the concept of himså, taken to mean injury done to a living being and to be sure this is in fact the implication of the first interpretation), is conspicuously absent here, i.e. in the discussion of Pān. 1. 4. 27: It is not only not mentioned, but also not even hinted at or presupposed. But what does this prove? Admittedly it does not prove anything, but it no doubt considerably adds to the impression which one cannot but gather when comparing these two passages as wholes, viz. that in the discussion of Pan. 1. 4. 27 Patañjali is only interested in the material loss whereas in the discussion of Pån. 1. 4. 52 what is of primary

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importance to him is the injury done to the plants considered as living beings; or to say it in other words, that one and the same situation of everyday life in a largely agricultural society based on keeping cattle as well as on cultivation of the soil, viz. damage to crops caused by cattle, is viewed in the former under its legal aspect only, whereas in the latter attention is focused solely on its ethical dimension. But it cannot be denied that this is again but an impression, and that therefore not much progress is achieved as against the stage that was reached already earlier in the course of the present study, viz. in § 3.2.
6.
On the other hand, some side issues could nevertheless be clarified, and the prospect is hence less gloomy than it might appear now that the discussion of Pan. 1. 4. 52, i.e. to be more precise the passage I 337. 25-27, is taken up again for a renewed examination; for that it is here and only here that the solution has to be sought, if it can be found at all, has in the meantime become too clear to allow anybody to still cherish illusions to the contrary. 6. 1.
In returning to this passage, it is not, however, as though we would have to simply repeat what was already stated above (§ 3), viz. that it is the first interpretation alone which allows of taking the grammatical object of the action of eating to denote at the same time that also which is actually injured; fortunately, we do
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not have to content ourselves with just this argument. There are some further ones: If what Patanjali wanted to say by bhakṣayanti yavan balivardaḥ were that the oxen by eating the barley in the field commit an act of himsă to another person, i.c. cause a material loss to the owner of the field-and likewise to the king, too,one could not but express one's astonishment at the absence of an expression denoting this person. It would be very strange indeed if Patanjali had decided in favour of giving an example in which the real victim of the act of himsa is not mentioned at all! This leads to a further observation of like importance, viz. that if this interpretation were correct, the difference drawn between the constructions of the verb bhakṣayati if used ahimsartha on the one hand and himsartha on the other, would become quite unintelligible; for one can harm somebody also by eating a ball of rice, provided it is his or meant for him etc.!
What all these arguments amount to is that the opposition in which the first two examples stand to the following ones becomes perfectly intelligible and at the same time plausible only if the correctness of the first interpretation is accepted. And it is then only that still another element of this opposition reveals itself, viz. that Patanjali deliberately chose examples belonging to the same sphere, i.e. that of cereal plants and certain products made of their grain; for he was thus able to bring out as clearly as possible what is of central importance for an action's falling under the category of ahimsa or that of himsă, viz. whether its object is a dead thing

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6.2.
It seems advisable to dwell a little longer on the concept of himsä as implied here. For, it has clearly two aspects which have to be distinguished, though ultimately they can not be separated from each other, cither doctrinally or historically. On the one hand it is the consumption of seeds capable of germination which is considered as himså, on the other an act of himsă is taken to be committed by eating plants in the field. Many of the grammatical authors quoted above contribute considerably to the clarification of this latter idea by their explanations of the expression kşetrastha etc.: yet in that they think of the cereal plants only, although with explicit reference to the various stages of growth, beginning with sprouting, they pass through, one might gather the impression that is only these plants themselves which are regarded as living beings by them. Nägesa, however, expressly states (v. $ 2.4. above) that the idea of caitanya likewise includes the
CATTLE, FIELD AND BÄRLEY 459 seeds (bija), and, I think, he is right, and this not only as far, as Kaiyata is concerned: None of the other grammarians would have denied that seeds are equally living beings, and the explanation given by Väsudevadiksita, viz ksetre prarüdham alūnam sasyam iha vitaksitam, (cf. § 2. 5. 3 above) has accordingly to be taken to imply that even if the plants have been killed by reaping them after ripening, the seeds they yield are in their turn something living. That is to say, vegetal life is seen under two aspects in accordance with essential biological processes, particularly clearly observable in annual economic plants; any seed capable of germination is a living being because the fact that it contains life becomes manifest by the very process of sprouting, and the plants betray their animatenesss by the very process of growing out of such seeds and continuing to grow until they die or are killed.
There can hence be no doubt that the basis of all this is but one idea of animateness. This is strikingly confirmed by the material studied by H.-P. Schmidt 68. Both the aspects mentioned above are attested in his sources, too; yet, as most convincingly shown by him, they are but facets of one basic idea which he traces back to the expressed animism of Vedic times. This ‘archaic' animism was in India, as is well known, best preserved, i.e. almost unaltered, in Jainism 'according to which the whole world is animated not only animals and plants but also the elements earth, fire, water, and air consist in atomic individual souls'. And evidently it is this their doctrine to which Jinendrabuddhi refers

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when he speaks of the view that 'sarve sacetană bhāvāḥ (cf. § 2. 5. 2 above). Indeed, it is perfectly understandable that in later times it was either Jainism or perhaps still Samkhya70 also which came to an Indian's mind when the idea was spoken of or seemed to be alluded to that the whole world or at least not only animals, but plants too are animate." It is therefore no wonder at all that already Kaiyața thought it necessary to point out that the caitanya of plants is not commonly accepted, but forms part of the doctrine of 'some' or 'certain' people (... kaiścic caitanyasyabhyupagamät/; cf. § 2. 3 above). On the other hand, this remark is quite interesting for two more reasons:
6. 3.
Thanks to it, it becomes now clear that apart from, or rather in addition to, the reason adduced above (§ 3. 2) for so many Paniniya-s being unable to decide in favour of one interpretation only, a historical factor has to be taken into account too, viz. that at their time it was a particular group of people only which was associated with such a view of animateness and hence also of himsä, a group with which it is rather difficult to imagine that Patanjali was in sympathy as to its doctrines. And indeed, the reluctance of Kaiyața and his 'followers' to content themselves with the first interpretation is not only understandable, but also justified at least in so far as a particular grammatical phenomenon of the Sanskrit language as the medium of communication of all (educated) people can in fact not be accounted for by
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taking recourse to the doctrine of a group which forms but a small and rather peripherical minority among those speaking Sanskrit. At the latest it is at this point of our deliberations that it becomes evident that Kaiyata's first interpretation has for this very reason to be accepted as the only correct one, i.e. as that which alone meets Patanjali's intention. Kaiyața's main weakness is that he lacks sensibility to historical changes. Not even the suspicion could thus have arisen in him that at the time of Patanjali himself the situation might have been still a different one! This is why he was unable to arrive at the conclusion we on our part cannot but finally draw, viz. that at the time when the distinction between the two constructions of the causative verb bhakṣayati actually developed in Sanskrit it was still common belief that plants and seeds are living beings, perhaps even that 'the whole world is animate'.
Whether Kätyāyana and Patanjali were still familiar with this view as such cannot be decided with absolute certainty," but for all we know about their respective dates and about the origin and historical development of the ahimsa doctrine, there is every likelihood that at their time the consumption not only of seeds capable of germination, but also of plants was widely considered as himsă, 'injury to living beings'.
The highly interesting material which Schmithausen has recently collected from Buddhist texts and discussed in some detail, cannot be used as a comparison in the present article. Yet there is one point to which attention has nevertheless to be drawn in this connection, and it

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In another and in some regard more detailed version of his article which has, however, not yet been published, Schmithausen draws on a passage of the Vinayapitaka?s according to which the monks and nuns are prohibited from wandering during the rainy season, and the reason given for this well-known restriction is quite interestingly that otherwise small animals and green plants, which latter appear in large numbers only at this time of the year, could be trampled to death. Schmit. hausen quite understandably takes this to be another piece of evidence for the early Buddhists' sharing or at least taking into account the common belief that plants, too, are living beings, 78 or perhaps still behaving according to it; and I do not at all want to contradict him, especially in view of the fact that small animals are included here. But I think it is very instructive to note--and not only with regard to the problem of interpretation with which I have struggled in the preceding pages, but also in terms of its general importance-that the Dharmaśāstra texts referred to above--and the Arthasāstra is no exception-regard the pressing down (mardana) etc. of plants in a field as also coming within the terms of damage to crops'. However, it should be repeated that what their authors are concerned about-just
CATTLE, FIELD AND BARLEY 463 like a modern European farmer who does not want strollers or holidaymakers to trespass on his green meadow (in reality nowadays rather an area of land on which grass and nothing else is cultivated)-is exclusively the material loss; this is evident even in a seemingly generous exception to the general rules like that ascribed by Nandapandita" to Sankhalikhitau according to which there is no punishment if only a mouthful (of whatever grows on the field is eaten by cattle)' (gråse tv adandah). Nevertheless, in individual cases it may be quite difficult to decide whether a statement in a text is based on such economic considerations or rather on (ultimately) ethical ones, and the absence or otherwise of expressions like (a) himsă does not by itself render much assistance in solving the problem one is then faced with.
In the present case, too, it might be still objected that the oxen like any other member of the bovine species, etc., in so far as they are by nature herbivores, can hardly avoid injuring plants- unless they feed only on dried, i.e. already dead, plants or hay.. This is not only true, but it would also be futile to search for an invalidation of this argument by assuming that what is decisive in this regard is the difference between economic plants on the one hand which yield a harvest in form of grains, etc., and those, on the other, which are themselves directly used as fodder. For, there is, if I am not mistaken, evidence in the Bh. also for the fact that as for their animateness Patañjali expectedly did not distinguish between various types of plants, or,

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to be more precise, that what alone counted with regard to an action's falling under himsä or ahimsa was according to him nothing but the question whether the plant forming its object is still alive or already dead: What I have in mind is the passage II 176. 7f. where it is asked with regard to värtt. 2 on Pan. 3. 4. 37: asti punar ayam kvacid dhantir ahimsarthaḥ yadartho vidhiḥ syat, 'but is this [root] han ever used as denoting non-injury so that a prescription is needed for it (i.e to safeguard the formation of the absolutive in -am)?'; and the answer is: astity aha panyupaghatam vedim hanti, 'I say yes, it is in fact [used in this sense, too, e.g. if it is said] "He strikes the vedi (i.e. he makes it flat and firm) by striking with the hand upon it". The editors of the NSP edition of the Bh. are perfectly right in explaining in a foot-note (III 266 b) pranaviyogānukülavyāpāro hi himsă, să ca vedyam nästiti bhavaḥ; but they could have added that the action denoted by han does not, in the present case, constitute an act of himsă because the Kuśa grass which is strewn over the vedi is already dead since it was plucked, and this action of injury is over.78
:: As for the counter example given by Patanjali in his discussion of Pan. 1. 4. 52, it cannot but be realized that the fact that eating is an act of himsä, has nothing to do with its particular object, the barley plants. However, one should also not lose sight of the fact that the question of the ethical evaluation of this act of himsă does not arise at all, or rather is by no means in the foreground. What Patanjali wanted to do was to adduce convincing and clear examples for the use of the
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causative verb bhakṣayati when used ahimsartha in contradistinction to its being used himsartha; and it cannot, I think, be disputed that he did achieve his aim. However, whether by giving precisely these and no other examples and counter examples he wanted to intimate in additon that men, or at least certain people, are able strictly to avoid any himsă (by leaving the unavoidable killing to others), whereas for cattle the very process of living means continuously committing injury to other living beings or whether Patanjali at least thought of this distinction, will most probably remain a question which can never be answered.
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NOTES
1 Acaryaśrisiddhasenadiväkarapraṇitam Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam, Jainasvetämbara-rajagacchiyapradyumnasürisisya - tarkapañcananasrimad - Abhayadevasarinirmitayd Tattvabodhavidhayinya vyakhyaya vibhusitam ...päthäntara-tippanyddibhiḥ parişkṛtya samsodhitam, Gujaratapuratattvamandira, Amadābād, samvat 1980-1985. Reprinted Kyoto 1984.-I am not sure whether it is this edition which is referred to as no. 2294 in Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Bibliography (Revised Edition), Delhi 1983.
What I have in view here is, of course, in the first place, H. Lüders' famous article 'Die Saubhikas. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des indischen Dramas', originally published in: BSB 1916, pp. 698-737 and reprinted in: Philologica Indica, Göttingen 1940, pp. 391-428.
This expression is clearly used here in the general meaning of 'plant' and not as a technical term by which the Indian 'botanists' etc. distinguish 'trees which bear fruit without having flowered' from 'trees which bear fruits after having flowered', 'creepers" and 'shrubs'; cf. e.g. Manu 1. 47 f.
30

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* I am aware of the fact that this expression refers to certain intellectual faculties (e.g. faculty of perception, viz. ekendriyatua etc.) rather than to the mere fact of belonging to the class of living beings. But since the distinction between these two aspects does not play any role in the material drawn upon by me, it is totally neglected in the present article.-Cf. however p. 316 (377) and fn. 5 in P. Thicme's article 'Beseelung in Sprache, Dichtung und Religion' in: Paideuma, Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, VII (1960), pp. 31324 Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1971 (reprinted 1984), pp. 374-85.
5 These include also c.g. the Jainendravyákarana and Hemacandra's Sabdanudsana; but I thought it advisable to keep my own investigation within the limits of the Pāņiniyan tradition only.
• On this interpretation and that of the navinas cf. e.g. Gokulanåtha Upadhyāya's Padavákyaratnakara (cd. together with Yadunatha Misra's Gadharthadifika by Nandinātha Misra, Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamala, Vol. 88, Varanasi 1960), pp. 597 ff.
Reference is, of course, to the edition of F. Kielhorn (Poona 1962").
• Uddyota II 275 a 29 (the edition I use is that of the NS Press): värttike pratisedha iti Sesah II.
Yudhisthir Mimämsak (Patailjali-viracitam Mahabhd syam Hindi-uyakhyaya sahitam, dvitiyo bhāgah, Dilli, vi. sam 2029, p. 504) takes pindi to denote a particular sweet dish (pindi-pinni misfanna višes); yet, the problematic derivation of Hindi pinni apart, there is, as far as I can see, no evidence whatsoever that this word is used here in a meaning different from that listed in our dictionaries, viz. 'ball of rice' or even more generally 'lump of food.'
10 The opinion of the authors of the Petrograd Dictionary, viz. that yava denoted in the earliest times probably any grain or corn yielding flour or meal', if acceptable at all, is definitely not valid for the time of Patanjali. Cf. also fn. 65.
11 Reference is, of course, also to the NS Press edition. 1° Uddyota II 275 a 28f.: bhakseh pratyavasánarthatsat prdpribl.
13 cf. also the Paņini ya-Dhatupatha 10. 22 bhakşa adane (which is identical with 1. 941, but it is, of course, the root bhaks as forming its present stem by adding -aya-, that is used by Patañjali).
14 cf. Pån. 2. 3. 56 and Candra-utti on 2. 1. 95 as well as Pān. 6. 1. 141 (together with Sisupalauadha 1.47).
15 cf. vårtt. 2 on Pan. 1. 3. 15.
cf Pån. 3. 4. 48 and Candra 1. 3. 140 as well as vårtt. 2 on Pāṇ. 3. 4. 37.
17 The edition referred to is K.A. Subramania Iyer's Vakyapadiye of Bharthari with the commentary of Helaraja, Kända III, Part 1, (Deccan College Monograph Series 21), Poona 1963.
" Which, of course, it is not, as becomes obvious already by the fact that Helaraja thought it necessary to explain just this occur. rence of a form of kafcit.
This holds good likewise for the observations made by Thieme with reference to Nägesa; cf. his article. The Interpretation of the Learned' in: Felicitation Volume presented to S. K. Belvalkar, Benares 1957, p. 50 fn. 2= kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1971, (reprinted 1984), p. 599 fn. 2.
20 I quote from M. S. Narasimhacharya (ed.), Mahabhasya Pradipa Vydkhyanani IV, Adhyâya 1 pâda 2-4, Pondichéry 1977.
"Någesa seems to have given preference to the reading bhaksayati while Kielhorn places it in the critical apparatus attached to his edition. The fact that most of the later Papiniya-s obviously knew this reading only, does not help much to solve this textcritical problem.
* cf. the article mentioned in fn. 13.
As for the edition used sce fn. 20.
* As in many other cases, the fact that a particular vårtt. of Katyayana's is not refuted by Patañjali is here also taken into account by Candragomin by introducing a corresponding sutra into his own grammar. This is 2. 1. 49 bhakser akimsiyam which is explained in his Vrtti thus (ed. B. Licbich, Leipzig 1918, p. 104 C.): bhakser ahimsarthasya prayojye kartari doitiya n bharati. bhakşayati pindin Devadattma. ahimsiyam iti kim? bhakşayati balioardan sasyam...
* Or is this replacement perhaps due to the wish to avoid the misunderstanding that the act of himsd has something to do with the particular variety of cereal plants, viz. barley, mentioned by Patañjali? Or was it one of the interpreters concerned first of all only with the legal aspect (see below $ 3) who deemed it better to

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have a more general statement corresponding to the topic of sasyanāša, -vindsa, -upaghata, etc.?
Reference is to the edition of the Padamarljari contained in: The Kafikavrtti.... Pl. I, critically edited by Swami Dwarika Das Shastri and Pt. Kalika Prasad Shukla, Varanasi 1965.
97 cf. fn. 21.
28 cf. also Visvesvarasüri's Vyākaranasiddhantasudhanidhi, Benares 1924, 861. 25 f.: yavabhakşane tatsuamino á himsd.
1 The edition has in both cases fasya. 30 cf. fn. 21.
31 I quote from the cdition of Dr. Sitarama Shastri, Praudhamanoramd of Sri Bhaffoji Dikshita together with Brhacchabdaratna, an unpublished commentary of Sri Hari Dikshita, and Laghusabdaratna of Sri Nagesa Bhatja, Ist Vol., Varanasi 1964.
* viz. in the edition of Pdt. Gopal Shastri Nene, Benares 1929, 138. 1-3. Cf. also JMånendra Sarasvati's Tattuabodhini, and Siddhantakaumudi 1. c.
* I quote from Ma. Ma. Sribhattojidikritaviracita Vaiyakaranasiddhantakaumudi Srivasudevadiksitakyta-Balamanorama-vyakhydsakita ... Pandila-Srigopalakastrinene-sampadita..., prathamo bhāgah, Varanasi 1958.
* Instead of the expression antahprajita, known from Mandukyopanişad 4 and 7, I would have rather expected antahsamjila- which seems to have been a Sámkhya term, attested in certain Puranic passages and the Manusmrti (1.49), among others; I intend to deal with it on another occasion.
» Reference is to the edition by Pt. Nandkishore Shastri (Shri Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala No. 14) with Rare Commentaries. ..., Benares 1936.-In order to enable the reader to locate this and other quotations) in editions other than those used by me, I should like to mention here that the prakarara is, of course, that about the deitiyakaraka', in the Siddhantakaumudi and the texts depending on it directly or indirectly.
The edition from which I quote is: dgesabhaffaviraciták Brhacchabdendusekharah (dvitiyo bhagah), sampadakah Dä. Sristarâmasästri .... (Sarasvatibhavana-Granthamäla 87), Vårāṇast 1960.
. It may be noted here that Haridiksita, too, in his Bhacchabdaratna (p. 666. 14; as for the edition see fn. 31) considers it necessary to add to what is said in the Praudhamanoramd: sa(read: lat.) suamino od hims drastanya. • Reference is to K.P. Trivedi's edition, Part 1, (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. 78), Poona 1925.
Brought into relief by Vitthala in his commentary on the Prakriya kaumudi by explaining: bhakrayaty amatyam iti: himsayality arthall. -Note that a similar phrase is found in the Varaparpini, a subcommentary on the Laghusabdendusekhara, where it is however only adduced as a secondary example; for what Guruprasáda Sastri says is (677. 32-33; cf. fn. 35): himsångeti himsa=duhkhajanako wydparah, arigamphalar yasyety arthah hisaphalake iti yavat / yatha 'manusyam bhakşayati' iti parah=krivaladih (cf. the passage of the LS$ quoted above in $2.5. 4, which is preceded by the statement: himstige bhaksane bhakser orttik, going back to Kaiyara (cf. 2. 1. above)]; see also fn. 67.
On this term cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Vol. III, Poona 1973, pp. 245-248 as well as J.D.M. Derrett, Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law, Vol. I, Leiden 1976, p. 81 fn. 2 and Vol. IV, Leiden 1978, p. 399 f. As a separate "vyavaharapada' the saamipalavidda is mentioned c.g. in Manu 8.5 and, of course in later works like' e.g. Nilakartha's Vyanaharamayikha.
"O.C., Vol. III, pp. 497-501.
und ihr Verhältnis zueinander und zu Kautilya, Leipzig 1927, pp. 120-128.
i Bharuci's Commentary on the Manusmrti, (The Manu-SastraVivarana, Books 6-12) Text, Translation and Notes. Vol. 1: The Text, Vol. II: The Translation and Notes, Wiesbaden 1975. (The quotation is found there on p. 166 f.).
"I fail to understand why Derrett takes the locative pathi in the verse to be on a par with kette, whereas he renders the phrasc... kim pathi ketram andoytam...of the commentary by ... that the field alongside the path was unfenced'. In as much as all the commentators on this verse of Manu's and its parallels in other Dharmasastra texts as well as their translators etc. are, as far as I can see, unanimously of the opinion that 'a field that is near a

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public way (Kane, O.c., p. 500) is meant, one would have liked to know the reasons for D.'s differing from the opinio communis (which I still find much more convincing).
- In fn. 2 on p. 129 of his edition Derrett justly points out that what J.J. Meyer (0.c., p. 127) considered to be the correct reading here, viz. pariurte, is actually found in his manuscript and is confirmed also by Bharuci on his part (cf. the passage quoted in fn. 44).
The text-as given by Derrett, 0.c., Pt. I, p. 129-reads thus : taträparivlam dhanyam vihiinsyuh pasado yadi na latra pranayed dandan nepatih palu-raksinam // 238 optim tatra tu kurvita yam wstro ndalokayet chidram cavarayel sarvam fua-sukara-mukhānugam // 239 pathi kşetre "parierte grámantiye 'thava punah / sa palah dala-dandarho vipalam vdraget pašum // 240 kgetres anyesu tu patuh sapadami panam arhati sarvatra tu fato deyak kşetrikasyeti dhärand // 241 anirdašāham gam sutăm ursän dra-pasans tatha /
sapalan ni 'by apalan od na dandyan Manur abravit // 242 In this connection I cannot help remembering an observation I made in Nepal in 1972 which spotlights the consequences the rule (given in the last of these verses) may have in reality. Among the various and quite impressive 'holy' bulls which at that time used to stroll in the streets of Kathmandu, but which one could also meet in the already rural outskirts of the city, there was a dappled one of which I was particularly fond. One day-the rainy season had already started a couple of weeks earlier and the valley had turned almost totally into a paddy field-I met him again in the bazar, but one of his hind quarters was nothing but a continous stretch of almost raw flesh. Upon inquiry I was told that he had obviously been sprinkled with kerosene--which had then, of course, been set on fire-in order to drive him once and for ever away from the paddy fields where he had been caught grazing. Ruthless cruelty to animals including members of the bovine species is unfortunately not so rare a phenomenon in India and
adjacent countries) as Neohinduism would like us to believe; cf. e.g. J.L. Kipling, Beast and Man in India, London 1891 in particular pp. 119f., 126f., 142 ff.); N.S. Ramaswamy, The Management of Animal Energy Resources and the Modernization of the Bullock-Cart System, Bangalore 1979 (sec. ed) (in particular the photographs at the end) and J. H. Lensch, Probleme und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Rinder- und Büffelhaltung in Indien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 'Heiligen Kle ine interdisziplinäre Betrachtung, (Dissertation) Göttingen 1985, pp. 100 ff. . I do not strive for completeness here.
* cf. also this commentary on M. 8. 240-241.
" That members of the bovine species may destroy also the roots of plants by their hoofs, e.g. by repeatedly treading on the same path or by pawing the ground, is a quite different phenomenon. --Corn if it grew again after having been caten bare to the roots could, of course, be used as green fodder; but evidently this is not what it was grown for in India; it is also hardly probable that ratoon cropping was of any importance. See also $$ 6.3 and 6.4.
0 Vijñanesvara's motive is, of course, the avoidance of any disagreement between the Smrti texts. .
cf. also Apararka's explanation: bhaksanamardandbhyam parasasyopaghatini mahişi makiso ud..... Närada (XI 28 and 29) in that he confronts the herdsman (ala) with the owner of the land (tatstvimin), aims at the same clarification..
* By setting up a fence and taking similar measures, what one wants to achieve (apart from following the rules of dharma) is to protect one's fields against the cattle belonging to others, and, of course, also against such wild animals as might cause equal danger; cf. c.g. the verse ascribed by Apararka (on Y. 2. 162) to Katyayana (cf. Katyayana-mata-Samtgraha .. by N. C. Bandopadhyaya, Calcutta 1927, p. 50): ajateso coa sasyesu kurydd dvaranam mahal dukkhena hi niodryante labdhassadurasa mgah II, as well as Patanjali's (Bh. I 100.1) na ca wegah santiti yaad nopyante (where the damage to crops caused by forest animals is, however, looked upon as something one sometimes has to reckon with).

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5* This interest of the king is expressly stated c.g. in Närada XI 42 and 43:
grhaksette ca deste due vasahata kufumbinam tarmi te notksiped rajā tad dhi malam kufumbinam // vyddhe janapade räjšo dharmah kosas ca vardhate /
hiyate hiyamáne ca urddhihetum atah srayel ll; It is, of course, also the reason for the Kautiliya Arthasástra's containing a section on 'Damage to fields and roads' (ksetra pathahimsa), viz. 3.10.1 ff.
This statement refers, of course, to this particular subject or 'chapter' only in the Dharmasastra texts under discussion, but not to these texts taken as wholes.
5 According to Bühler's translation of Ap. Dr. S. 2. 11. 28. 5, cattle themselves are punished, though of course, only physically (any finc being impossible as rightly observed c.g. by Kulloka on M. 8. 240 and Aparärka on Y II 159), in that the owner of the crops which they have caten up is permitted to make them lean [by impounding them]'. J. J. Meyer (Das altindische Buch vom Weltund Staatsleben..., Leipzig 1926 p. 728), however says that instead of kardayet (paśün) one should read karjayal, which he renders by 'rounding up'. .. To support his argument he refers to Moh. III 58.244 and Baudh Dh. S. 1.5.84 (=I 10.29)=M. 3.66, i.e. to the fact that karşayatil karşati occurs there too, viz, in the syntagmas phalamilani karşayan and karsanti ca mahad yasah, where it indeed seems to have the meaning of 'bringing together, collecting Less problematic, however, are the passages in which a corporal punishment, i.e. being beaten with a stick, is prescribed for a servant in tillage and especially a herdsman when he is negligent in his duties: c.g. Ap. Dh. S. II 11. 28.2 and 3, Närada XI 29 and Y. II. 161; cf. also the verse quoted from Brhaspati by Nandapandita on Vişnu 5. 141 (ed. by Pt. V. Krishnamacharya, Madras 1964, Vol. I. p. 125.
"It is in fact used in this sense in the Arthasästra; see fn. 53.
57cf. Kaiyata's Pradipa II 251 a 25f.: yasya tv itiyasyatmiyd givah parakiyas tu mášās tasya na ta ipsitäh !!.
... cf. Kaiyata's Pradipa II 251 a 31 f.: mäsa metienakaro bhinnakramah / ipsitä сoety arthah/l.
cf. Kaiyața's Pradipa II 251 a 33-36: tasydpiti/ ipsitasabdah kriydabda dfriyate na tu rūdhifabdah / tatra sdranakriyayd parakiyd api mdyd udarayitur aptum isla bhavanti ma ndann ele ity debhyo 'sau gd darayati Il; and Nāgesa's Uddyota II 251 a 38-b 6: dptum ista iti udranam (-pravrttioighdtah sa ca laduyaparajanyalatphalabhandprayojako bhaksanddijanakawyparabhāvanukalo vydparan kvacit (viz. agrar minavakam odrayatily atra) taduydpdrajanyatal phalabhd naprayojakah samyoganukilavyaprabhavanukalavyaparah ll eam c laddhatuarthaprayojyaphaldsraydity arthas tad dha-md ndann itinalabhavanipaphalena vyptum istity arthah / nafabhavas ca bhaksanabhävaparyandSannas tasya tasya ca phalasya dhatuarthatoaparyantam någrahat mafanáte hi sati rdjabhayam adharmas ca sydd iti bhanah Il.
cf. Nägeśa's Uddyota II 251 b 19f.: nanu püroodä haranad asya ko vifesa ity aha--andheti Il. .
cf. Sivaramendrasarasvati's Ratnaprakifa IV 259. 21 f.: no hi küpasandhapalanena ndio bhavati nopi tena rajabhayam iti bhavan l; cf. also Nägesa's Uddyola II 251 b 33 ff.
cf. Nägeša's explication (Uddyola II 252 b 20): blisye paraty ayam iti vicarayadity arthakll.
cf. the Ratnaprakása on the expression samprapya of the Bh. (IV 296.4): sampraptam (read: pták) jalatoety arthah Il.
" In this connection it may be noted that the idea is repeatedly expressed in the Bh. that a region yasmin gåvah sasydni ca parlante is called a bhogaron (II 340.12), gunaydn (II 367.4) or arthavn delan (II 401.11). The remark which J. Jolly makes on Närada XI 42 (quoted fn. 53) in his translation, viz. that 'this maxim shows that the compiler of the Narada-smyti wrote for an essentially agricultural people', holds hence good for the Bh. too.
In this connection, but also with regard to the replacement of pavdn by Sasyam discussed above ($2.5.1), Peri Venkateswara Sastri says in his commentary on the passage of the Laghufabdendulekhara quoted above ($ 2.5.4), viz. (Andhra University Series No. 26, Kumbakonam 1941, p. 1291. 10 ff.): ... bhásye yanafabdasya sadhdranatoniyatra sthitandự bijdvasthapannanam bharjitanam di bhaksare tesám himsi na bhavatiti tada layar (viz. of the second alternative) /

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vastutas tu prarohavasthanukalyapannan yavadikam wa bhäsyakdriyapratyudaharanasthitayanasabdena grhyaleala eva male (i.c. in the Siddhantakaumudi) praro-inukalvadyolan irtham bharjitavydorttaye tatkaryasasyapadopidanam samgacchale / tatra sasyapadena ladanukalyan yaudnd dyoyale / Iddrsanam caitanyan abhyupagatam iti tadbhaksare 'Akurddirdpena prawyddhyabhavarüpahinsa tesdm ma bhavati eat ca sase parakiyalvavidesanam anupadeyam masasyandim api kipsd y darlitated ata coa bhd gw udharane vinastaprarohdasthabodhakapindipadoddánart, pratyuddharane ca praroha vasthanukalabijasadharanayanapadopdddnam ca starasata upapadyale / bhagyasvarase 'oy adyavyakhyddm evli vadatd Uddyotokyldpy ayam arthah sphufikyta ili bodhyam.
* See fn. 68.
67 cf. Bhagavata Hari Sastri's explanation of the expression himsdinge (Chitraprabhi. A Commentary of Haridikshita's Laghulabdaratna, ed. by Tata Subbaraya Sastri, Waltair 1932, p. 391, 22 f.): prdnaviyogaphalake galadrodelasamyoganukalavyapare ity arthah Il. In reality, however, the injurious act of eating starts with the tearing off of the barley plants from the lower part of the halm.
'The Origin of ahimsa' in: Mélanges d'indianisme à la mé moire de Louis Renon, Paris 1968, p. 625-655.—'Seeds capable of germination etc. in particular are referred to at pp. 626, 635, 638, 648. At p. 635 Schmidt refers to Baudh. Dh.S. 3.2.13 (tusavikinams tandulan icchati sajjanebhyo bijani od) quoted by him in fn. 5 and commented upon by the remark: 'lusavihina refers probably to bijani, too. The sutra together with this remark made me realize that I was not at all well up in the relevant botanical facts. It was not easy to get the necessary information, but by consulting various botanists I think I got a clearer picture: Rice is in India not only traditionally stored in the form of paddy, i.e. rice in the husk, (cf. e.g. The Welth of India, Raw Materials, Vol. VII: N - Po, New Delhi 1966, p. 164), but it is the unhusked rice which is also sown. This is, unfortunately, in the dictionary just referred to nowhere stated explicitly, but clearly implied e.g. by a statement like that at p. 139 that some varieties of rice 'finish germination by 2-3 days after sowing while others take about a week, the rapidity of germination being probably related to the thickness and hairiness of the husk'. Indeed, mechanically removing the husk of rice grains
almost inevitably leads to injuring the embryo and has thus the consequence that the seeds are no longer viable. This holds good for some other cereals, too, e.g. barley and oats, but by no means for all of them (c.g. wheat and rye), and surely not for all 'seeds' which were--and still are-grown as food in India. This latter type of seeds, i.c. which do not lose the capacity of germination when they are husked, are in their turn, of course, 'killed' e.g. when they are crushed in a mortar, and it is noteworthy that this it is of which Haradatta is thinking in connection with Gaut. 1.3.22 (varjayed bijauadham). As regards Baudh. Dh. S. 3. 2. 13, there are in fact only three possibilities of interpreting the sutra since we have no reason to assume that its statement is based upon a botanical error: (1) that travihina indeed refers to bijani, too, and is meant to express that only such seeds are to be collected which are 'killed' by being husked, and only if they have already been husked, or (2) that though referring to tandulan alone what is implied by it is that bijas also should only be accepted if they have been 'killed', by whatever means, or (3) that the capacity of germination and hence the animateness of seeds does not form part of the purpose of the rule.
" Quoted from H.-P. Schmidt's article, p. 625. . See fn. 34. With the relevant material found in the Moksadharma, quoted also by the editors of the Tattoabodhaoidháyini (cf. fn. I above), I intend to deal in a separate article.
"A good example for the fact that at least some of the traditional Pandits are rather in a state of helplessness when confronted with this view, is the note of Sivadatta Shastri-on the expression tasydm aasthiyam (tesan celanatode) in the Tattoabodhini on the Siddhantakaumudi (cf. $ 2.5.3.)- which reads thus (The Siddhanta Kaumudi of Bhattoji Deekshit..., printed and published by Khemraj Shri Krishnadas, Bombay 1959, p. 165 fn. 9): sasyavasthayam 'pomayah pränah [Ch. U. 6. 6. 5; cf. 6. 7. I and 6] iti frutek adblir vind glayam inatoardpaprdnatasattoena pranaviyoganukilaudparasyaina (cf. fn. 67) sattuena hiyardlodvyághatat ll 'clanatodi' iti tu na samyak stutinin dabhyam harşafokánudbhavdt 'celanat sendriyar drapyam nirindriyam acelanam' ili carakác ca [viz. Sūtrasthāna 1.48, which, however, runs: sendriyam celanam drapyar) anubhilandriydnim tadi celanatodnabhyupa

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