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AUTHOR: Toru FUNAYAMA (Aili Wik), Research Fellow, Institute for Reinarch in llumanities (the former name in English for the institute was: The Rescorch Institute for Humanistic Studien), Kyoto University, Japan.
TITLE: Bubun to Zentai -- Indo Bukkyo Chishikiron ni okeru Gaiyo to koki no Mondai - ten--, TONO Gokuho No.62, Kyoto, 1990, pp. 607-635. or On the whole and Its Parts in Post-Dharmakirtion Buddhism, Tono Gokuho (Journal of Oriental Studies), Kyoto, N0.62, 60th Anniversary Volume, published by Institute for Research in Humanities (Zimbun Kagaku KenkyOsyo), Kyoto University, 1990, pp. 607-635.
TABLE OF CONTENTS: $1. Introduction.
Preliminary remarks: What is the whole (avayavin) 7: The Nniyayika's
theory of the whole and the Buddhist theory of atianya. $2. Buddhist Refutation of the wholn.
1. Types of arguments for refuting the whole. 2. Significance of the refutation from the viewpoint of Dignñga' Qu-yin-jin-she-lun (I W KEKA). 3. Three kinds of refutation newly propounded by
Dharmakirti. $3. Theoretical Developments in the Post-Dhormokirtian Period.
1. On the fallacy of the non-existence of the locus in the Buddhist syllagism (ūsrayās iddhi). 2. Refutation of the Buddhist criticinm an geen in the texts of the Nyaye- and Vaigogika schools. 3. Solution to the
problem of asrayās iddhi in Buddhist Agoko's Avayavinirikorapa. 94. Concluding Remorks.
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction.
As is well known, the investigation of the real object of perception won one of the main themes among philosophical schools in India. In the historical develpment of this philosophical inqury, the problem of the whole (avayovin) and its parts (avaya vāb) was fully disputed between the Nyaya- and Vaig eg i ka schools, on one side, and Buddhist logical and epistemological school, on the other. The former held that the reol object of ordinary perception is the whole which is supposed to be a separate entity, completely different from its
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parts. That is to say, they insisted that what is perceived #hould not be the parts but the whole itself, since its parts, i.e., ntoms, are never perceptible. On the contrary, Buddhists denied the existence of the whole. They said that the so-called avayavin is never perceived anywhere, au nomething defferent from its parts; the object of perception in rnther an Dombingo of atoms manifested in one's own mind. This theory of an nsitomingo want fortifica by Dharmakirti's well-known atignyo-theory. However, the Naiyilyiko Vācaspatimigra never yielded an inch and criticized Dhormnkirti': theory, saying that there is no room for the ntifnya of atoms without admitting the existence of the whole!.
2. Buddhist Refutation of the whole.
Various types of arguments were used to refut the whole before Dharmakīirti: for example, orguments in terms of the non-prrception of the whole, of the impossibility of it having weight independent of the weights of its parts, and of its independent colour. Among them, the most popular won
vrttyanupa patteb (because there cannot be any consistent relationship between the whole and its parts)' which was discurget for over a millennium.
Why did the Buddhists refute the existence of the whole? 1 WOW anturni for the Madhyamakikas such as Nagarjuna to refute it, since they lind that everything is empty. It was natural also for the Soutrintikn-Yogācāra philosophers, for they thought that the object of perception is, as stated above, not the whole, but the internal manifestation of an angembange of atoms. Furthermore, Dignāgn's Qu-yin-jin-she-run nttractively describes the three kinds of phenomenal entities within the context of the Buddha's sermons. According to him, the Buddha (9) did not preach that phenomenal entities are one and the same (eka) or different (anyo). However, Dignago says, this fact does not mean that the Holy One admitted the ekotva or anyat va of phenomena; to the contrary, by keeping silent on this problem, the Buddha realized his deep intention to let the people emancipnte themselves from afflictions without thinking about such puzzling affairs. The same text is also reveals. the difference between the Buddhist concept of an assemblage of atoms and the Na iyāyika's concept of the whole, for Dignagn exemplifies an assemblage osa body' (Sarira/kāya) and 'wood' (vann), the Intter of which is, together with 'an army' (senā), not formally admitted as the whole by Naiyiyikog (at least not by Vidyotakara, n. 10).
3. Theoretical Developments in the Port-Dharmakirtian period. (^ Logical Problem.)
Dharmakirti, in a part of his Pin 11 which has P'YSV and PV 1 08 its
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background (n. 13),
refuted the oneness of the whole, 86 a result of which later Buddhist philosophers theorized-- the imporatance of which is not always recognized by scholars-- that the object wrongly connected with contradictory properties (viruddhadharmasamsarga, -adhyasa) is not one but many. Santaraksita/ Kamalagila, Dharmottara, Jitāri and Agoka made syllogisms for refuting the oneness of the whole, making use of the above thesis as their major premise (vyapti). On the other hand, the Naiyayikas such as Bhōsarvaja who criticized Dharmakirti and Vacaspatimigra who refuted a syllogism made by Dharmottara-- as well as the Vaigesikas such as Vyomagiva -- severely censured each Buddhist syllogism to the effect that if it is not prasanga- but svatantra-sadhana, it committs the fallacy of non-existence of the locus (asrayāsiddha, or asrayāsiddhi-"asiddhatva), along with other arguments. As far as we can survey the extant texts, Sankara-svāmin, mentioned in the Tattvasangraha-panjika, seems to be the earliest Naiуnyika who criticized Buddhist syllogisms, dividing them into prasanga- and svatantra-sadhana. We can surmise that this kind of criticism must have been made not only by the above mentioned Naiyayikas and Vaigesikas but also by others of the same period in reaction to syllogisms made by Santarakṣita/ Kamalagila and Dharmottara which were not cleary prasanga- or svatantra-sadhana. In this way, the problem of gray@siddhi in the refutation of the whole must have been discussed typically in ca 10th century. This same problem arised during discussions in a different context: the vyatireka-type of Kṣapabhanga-anumāna. It was finally solved by Jnanasrimitra and Ratnakīrti to the effect that, roughly speaking, employment of an unreal subject/ locus (dharmin) can be admitted in the case of a negative statement-- e.g., "A hare's horn is not blue" even if the syllogism belongs to the sva tantra-sadhana.
How did Buddhist philosophers before them think about this problem of the refutation of the whole? Though we may not be able to answer definitively, we can find at least one interesting solution in Agoka's Avayavinirākarapa. lle says that he is able to refute the oneness of the whole without making use of the whole as a subject only if the gross blue object (sthulo niladir arthab) is employed as a subject/ locus of the syllogism, because the gross object which is really perceived (pratyaksa) is none other than the so-called avayavin which opponents assume to be a single entity and real! There must have also been other texts expressing answers to this problem of the minor premise.
4. Concluding Remarks.
In conclusion, we can suppose that grayāsiddhi was variously and repeatedly discussed in the contexts of refuting unreal objects and
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________________ establishing a vyatireka-type of Ksanabhanga-inference in the last half of the 9th century and 10th century, as is typicolly seen in the Nyuya bhusana. Further, such dialogues provide a hint of a new direction which was to be developed later by Jrunagri's Ksop bhanga-theory. Lastly, aby-product of the above survey is the identification of a Skt. fragment collected by Muni Jambuvi jaya ji with Dhormottora's PVint (n.23).