Book Reviews Of Mahayana Buddhist Meditation

Author(s): J W De Jong
Publisher: J W De Jong
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269303/1

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MAHĀYANA BUDDHIST MEDITATION: Theory and Practice. Minoru Kiyota (ed.), The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1978. xv+313 pp.
This volume in memory of Richard Robinson (1926-1970) was originally scheduled for publication in 1973. Kajiyama explains in a note that due to the fact that his paper was written in 1972 he has been unable to incorporate the results of research done by other scholars in recent years. If this applies also to the other papers this has to be taken into account by the reader of this volume.
Of the nine articles in this volume only very few can be recommended without any reservations. Gadjin M. Nagao ("What Remains" in Sūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness,' pp. 66-82) examines the Yogācāra interpretation of a passage of the Cūļasuññatā-sutta according to which “ emptiness' is nonbeing on one hand but that there is, on the other, something remaining therein which, being reality, cannot be negated." This passage is quoted in Vasubandhu's Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāşya, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Asanga's Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun. Nagao points out that the Lankāvatāra-sūtra seems to quote from a Sanskrit version of the Cūļasuññatā-sutta. The existence of a Sanskrit version is indeed very probable because the Tibetan Kanjur contains a translation of a Sūnyată-nāma mahāsūtra (Otani Kanjur Catalogue no. 956) which corresponds to the Pāli text. The same passage of the Cūļasuññatā-sutta is also quoted in the Ratnagotravibhāga but, as Nagao explains, in this text it is not interpreted in the same way as in the Yogācāra treatises. Nagao's article is an expanded and corrected version of an article published by him in 1968 in the Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū (vol. XVI, pp. 497-501). The Cūļasuññatā-sutta and its treatment in Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha texts has been studied also in great depth by David Seyfort Ruegg in his La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra (Paris, 1969), pp. 319 ff.
Likewise important is Yuichi Kajiyama's 'Later Madhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation (pp. 114-143) in which he analyses Sāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālamkāra. Kajiyama shows that the epistemological stages distinguished by Sāntarakṣita are also found in the first Bhāvanākrama written by śāntarakṣita's disciple, Kamalaśīla. He translates some important passages of this text which explains how in the course of meditation different philosoph
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ical systems are investigated. His explanations of the differences between the epistemological theories of the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas, the Satyākāravāda-yogācārins, the Alīkākāravāda-Yogācārins and the Madhyamikas are precise and lucid. His article is a very welcome contribution to the study of the Later Madhyamikas who, have greatly influenced Buddhist philosophy in Tibet.
Western scholars have paid little attention to the Hua-yen school. Francis H. Cook translates Fa-tsang's commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra (Taishō no. 1712), pp. 167–206. His introduction analyses Fa-tsang's understanding of the doctrine of emptiness and discusses his teachings on meditation. As to the doctrine of emptiness, Francis Cook believes that the Hua-yen, understanding of this doctrine does not distort its original meaning according to the Madhyamika school. He remarks that peculiarly Chinese is its emphasis on the phenomenal shih and its appreciation of the harmony of the universe. Cook's translation is carefully done and calls for very few observations. In one important passage he has been misled by a mispunctuation in the Taishō text. Cook translates: "Because form and emptiness are not two different things, the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are neither exterminated nor achieved, and this is the practice without an abiding place" (p. 192). One must read ATA. .: "the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are not different and this constitutes the practice without an abiding place." Shih-hui's commentary (Taishō no. 1713, p. 564c4-9) to which Cook refers on p. 181 of his article shows clearly how this sentence has to be analysed and explained. Also in a few other passages a different interpretation seems preferable. On p. 187 Cook has: "Because the heart [of the teaching] is not revealed suddenly, there is first a brief statement of the situation. Since it does not abbreviate what it is able to present (E), there follows an extended explanation." Cook misunderstood the meaning of : "Since a brief statement cannot be complete, there follows an extended explanation." On p. 188 Cook translates
with 'beings': "He also gets his name from contemplating beings and going to aid them freely." Chi is "the right opportunity" (cf. Nakamura's Bukkyōgo daijiten, p. 213b: hazumi, kikkake, ori). In the section on absolute Nirvāņa (p. 199) Cook translates: "There is an allusion to a different [type of nirvana] which is the small-vehicle apparitional city [in the Lotus Sutra] which is established as a provisional device" (Z). A means "to distinguish from": "[The absolute Nirvāņa] is distinguished from the small-vehicle, etc."
It is difficult to be very enthusiastic about the remaining six articles. Elvin W. Jones has contributed a long article entitled 'Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths' (pp. 3-45). The first part of it traces the development of philosophical speculations about the nature of reality in ancient Greece, in pre-Buddhist India and in the different Buddhist systems. The
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second part is based on the Tibetan siddhānta literature and the works of Tson kha pa. According to the author "To attempt to reconstruct the thought of Nāgārjuna set forth in the Karikās and other treatises without the writings of Tson kha pa would probably be as thankless a task as to attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of Aristotle without the works of Thomas Aquinas" (p. 38). This is an astounding statement. Thomas Aquinas had no access to the Greek texts of Aristotle's works which he knew only from Latin translations from the Greek original or from the Arabic. Moreover, in common with other scholars of his time he accepted as genuine works which had been wrongly attributed to Aristotle. Tson kha pa and the Tibetan authors of Grub mtha's were better informed about Indian Buddhist philosophy than Thomas Aquinas was with regard to the philosophy of Aristotle. It is certainly very instructive to study the works of Tson kha pa and the Grub mtha's but this requires a very good knowledge of Indian Buddhist texts in the Sanskrit original and in Tibetan translation. Elvin W. Jones seems to consider it superfluous to consult original Sanskrit texts with the inevitable consequence of obscuring the meaning of passages quoted by him. For instance, on p. 32 he translates a passage from the first Bhāvanākrama: yasmäd yad advayalaksanam [jñānam] advayavādinām śreştham paramārthenäbhimatam tad api nirātmakam niņsvabhāvam advayanirābhāsena jñānena paśyati yogi. Jones translates: "Thus, that understanding of nonduality which is held by the consciousness doctrine (Vijñānavāda] as the highest truth is empty, and by the wisdom of the unmanifest [nirabhașa (sic!)] the yogin comes to see this nonduality as ultimately unreal." One wonders what a non-informed reader can make out of this 'wisdom of the unmanifest.' The same passage has been translated by Kajiyama in his article (p. 140) in which he explains clearly the meaning of advayanirābhāsam jñānam. One must add that a rather random collection of quotations from a great number of texts, even if correctly translated, is not the best way to explain difficult philosophical notions.
The same preference for Tibetan commentaries can be found in an article by Charlene McDermott on 'Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of Valid Cognition in Dharmakirti and Rgyal-tshab' (pp. 144-166). The author is inspired by Richard Robinson's remarks on "Tibet's rich contribution to world cultural ecology.” Charlene McDermott's article is of little help in understanding Rgyal-tshab's commentary, of which only very few passages are quoted. As an example of her interpretation of Rgyal-tshab (his work is not at my disposal) it is sufficient to quote one passage: slob dpon chos muchog gi gsung nas. Ihang tsher gyis bar du chod pa bzhin du. sgom bya'i don mthong ba de ni rab kyi mtha’i gnas skabs yin la. lag mthil du she (sic) sgong bzhag pa bzhin du mthong ba ni mngon sum yin no zhes gsung ngo (cf. n. 43). The author translates: "According to what is said by the teacher Dharmottara, [at first it is] as if (one's view] were obstructed by [a cloud) of mica; in the state (or condition] approaching the extreme limits,
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one envisions the object of concentrated contemplation as if it were an āmalaka situated in the palm of one's hand” (p. 152). Rgyal-tshab abridges the following passage from Dharmottara's commentary (cf. Nyāyabindu, Tib. tr., Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. VIII, pp. 27.16–28.1: gang gi tshe lhang tsher gyis bar du chod pa bzhin du bsgom par bya ba'i-don mthong de ni rab kyi mtha'i gnas skabs yin zhing lag mthil du shel sgong bzhag pa bzhin du bsgoms pa'r don mthong ba gang yin pa de ni rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum yin no (for the Sanskrit text see Nyāyabindu, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. VII, p. 12.1-3). The underlined words are omitted by Rgyal-tshab. However, it is difficult to admit that rnal 'byor pa'i is missing in Rgyal-tshab's text. Dharmottara distinguishes three stages: 'In the first stage of intense meditation (bhāvanāprakarsa) the vision begins to be clear; in the second stage in which the intense meditation reaches its limit (prakar şaparyantāvasthā) the object is seen as it were separated by mica (Skt. abhraka; Tib. Ihang tsher). In the third the object is seen as an amalaka grain placed in the palm of one's hand. The third stage is the yogipratyakşa. The passage translated by Charlene McDermott refers to the second and third stage: "According to what is said by the teacher Dharmottara: The vision of the meditated object as separated by mica is the state in which the intense (meditation) reaches its limit. The vision [of the object] as an āmalaka placed in the palm of the hand is the yogi)-pratyakşa.” Stcherbatsky translated abhraka by 'a thin cloud.' This accounts probably for the '[a cloud] of mica' in her translation which combines Stcherbatsky's translation with the meaning of Tibetan lhang-tsher (cf. Chos-grags's Tibetan dictionary). If she had consulted the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Dharmottara's commentary, she would have seen that the dot after bzhin du has to be omitted. This article shows again that the study of Tibetan works can lead to fatal consequences if not sufficient attention is given to the basic texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan.
The less said about Stefan Anacker's "The Meditational Therapy of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāşya' (pp. 83-113), probably the better. He translates' chapters 2, 4 and part of 5 of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāşya. A few examples may suffice to show how fully unprepared the translator was for his task. P. 94: "Leading towards the view of self, obstructing insights regarding this and external objects, the extinction of suffering, the Path, the Gems, others' attainments and being satisfied with little" (satkāyadīştes tadvastuno 'pi cal/nirodhamārgaratneşu läbhasatkāra eva ca/samlekhasya parijñāne). P. 95: “The fetter of envy is an obstruction to satisfaction in others' attainments, because it wishes to see only others' faults" (ir syāsamyojanam lābhasatkāraparijñāne taddošādarśanāt). P. 96: "To welfare arises the lack of means to rouse oneself from inactivity, lack of complete use of one's sense fields, and careless activity” (kusalasya triny avaranāni aprayogo 'nāyatanaprayogo 'yonisah prayogaś ca). There is little point in trying to correct these and other nonsensical translations. For
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an excellent translation of the entire Madhyāntavibhāgabhāşya the reader may be referred to Nagao's translation published in 1976 in volume 15 of the Daijo butten (pp. 215-358, 380-409).
In 'Samathavipaśyanāyuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist Meditation' (pp. 46-65), Geshe Sopa presents a general overview of Buddhist meditative practice. It is of course impossible in such a brief compass to give a clear and precise description of the meditative practices as described in the texts mentioned in the final note. The understanding of this complicated topic is not promoted by the translation of technical terms which are clearly based upon Tibetan renderings of Sanskrit terms. For instance, the author translates nirvedhabhāgiya with "the approximations to the definitive separation." In Tibetan nirvedha is rendered by ries-par 'byed-pa but the meaning of nirvedha is definite insight (niścito vedhaḥ), cf. Abhidharmakośa (ed. Pradhan), p. 386.3. The author even creates such words as nābhisamskāra (pp. 47 and 48) and translates maula with 'mastery' (p. 54).
Minoru Kiyota's 'Buddhist Devotional Meditation: A Study of the Sukhāvativyūhôpadeśa' (pp. 249-296) contains an analysis and translation of the Sukhāvativyūhôpadeśa attributed to Vasubandhu. In his introduction Kiyota discusses the attribution of the text to Vasubandhu and points out that this was accepted by Yamaguchi. Although he mentions several of his publications he does not mention Yamaguchi's Seshin no jõdoron (Kyoto, 1963) which contains a detailed explanation of the Sukhāvativyūhopadeśa. Kiyota declares that the issue of whether this text is a composition by Vasubandhu or a Chinese pseudepigraphon is not a crucial issue. According to him the crucial issue is that it is a Mahāyāna text (p. 273). Certainly nobody disputes the · Mahāyāna character of this text. However, whether the text was composed in India or in China is of very great importance for the history of Buddhism in India and China. Kiyota's translation is in general adequate but suffers from being often too loose and imprecise. For instance, a very important passage mentions the 'sameness dharma-body'
but is not translated by Kiyota (cf. p. 284): This crucial term is not mentioned at all in the notes although Kiyota does not hesitate to give some very elementary information (sometimes rather curiously Worded; for instance: n. 41, “Bhagavāt (sic) = Bhagavān, meaning the glorious, divine, adorable, venerable. It refers to the Buddha”). Kiyota's translation of this passage (Taisho vol. 26, p. 232b1-3) is not only incorrect but also incomplete. He omits part of a phrase AC
which is found in the Taisho edition used by him (cf. n. 3) but omitted in other editions (for instance, Yamaguchi Susumu, op. cit., pp. 200-201). The entire passage together with the explanations given by T'an-luan is translated on p. 275 of the Hõbögirin (fasc. 3, Paris, 1937). The Hõbögirin explains that "byōdō hosshin 4 , Corps d'Essence d'Egalité, désigne soit un des Corps
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de Buddha correspondant à une des Terres de Bodhisattvas, soit plus spécialement dans la secte Jôdo, le Corps que revêtent les Bodhisattvas dès la 8e Terre, et que peuvent même revêtir, par la grâce opérante du Buddha Amida, les Bodhisattvas des Terres inférieures."
Leon Hurvitz has contributed an article entitled 'Fa-sheng's Observations on the Four Stations of Mindfulness' (pp. 207-248). Fa-sheng (Dharmaśri?) is the author of a text consisting of 250 verses and a prose commentary (Taishō no. 1550). The Chinese title is A-p'i-t'an hsin lun (Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra or Abhidharmasaraśāstra?). A second version of this text contains the same verses with a prose commentary by Upaśānta (Taisho no. 1551). A third version, due to Dharmatrāta, adds 350 verses to the original 250 verses and contains a more detailed prose commentary (Taishō no. 1552). The four smrtyupasthanas are discussed by Dharmaśrī in the beginning of chapter 5. This is a very brief passage of three verses with a short prose commentary (Taisho vol. 28, 818a-b). This passage is not very noteworthy and it is not made clear by Hurvitz why he has selected it for such extensive treatment. Although Hurvitz states that the core text of his study will be Dharmasri's text, he also paraphrases or translates the corresponding passages of the two other texts (I and II). Hurvitz begins by quoting the first verse of chapter 5 of III without indicating that this verse is found in III only but not in I and II. Hurvitz would have greatly facilitated a better understanding of the contents of the corresponding passages of these three texts if he had indicated the considerable differences between 1 and the two other texts, which incorporate several topics not treated in 1.1 After translating and commenting upon the first verse of chapter 5 of III Hurvitz quotes the Sanskrit text and de La Vallée Poussin's translation of Kosa vi. 14cd (15cd in Gokhale's edition of the kārikās, but 14cd in Pradhan's edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya): kāyaviccittadharmāṇām dvilakṣaṇaparikṣaṇāt. This is followed by a translation of Vyakhyā p. 529.2-15 in which Hurvitz demonstrates once more his very poor knowledge of Sanskrit. For instance, prajñām amtarena "without knowledge" is rendered by "this side of wisdom," jñānavadhyāḥ kleśā iti "the passions are to be killed by knowledge" by "the defilements are the killers of gnosis." Yaśomitra explains that by the dharmas mentioned in vi. 14 the dharmas other than kaya, vedanā and citta are meant, and not all dharmas collectively: dharmās tribhyo 'nya iti asambhinnavyavastham abhisamdhayaivam ucyate "the 'dharmas other than the three' is used in view of their non-mixed state (i.e., they are distinguished from kaya, vedanā and citta)." Hurvitz's translation says exactly the opposite: "The expression 'the dharmas other than the three' is used by naming them col
1 Cf. José van den Broeck, La saveur de l'immortel (A-p'i-t'an Kan Lu Wei Lun), Louvainla-Neuve (1977), pp. 68-69.
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lectively, without distinguishing the latter one from another." Yasomitra continues by explaining that when the dharmas are mentioned collectively they include the body, etc. and all composed and non-composed dharmas: sambhinnavyavasthāyām tu kāyādayo 'pi nigrhyamte. punaḥ sarve samskṛtā asamskṛtāś ca dharma draṣṭavyāḥ "However, in the mixed state (i.e., when the dharmas are mentioned collectively), the body, etc. are also included. Moreover, all dharmas, composed and non-composed, have (then) to be considered (as included)." Hurvitz translates: "In case a distinction were made, they would be specified as 'body, etc.' Then all dharmas, constituted and unconstituted, are to be [so?] viewed." On pp. 231 and 233 Hurvitz translates two other passages of the Vyakhyā and again makes some elementary mistakes.
In the following pages (pp. 221-229) Hurvitz translates several suttas from the forty-seventh section of the Samyuttanikaya and the corresponding texts from the Chinese Agamas. His translation of the first verse of chapter v of 1 is to be found on p. 229:
In this way the Sage severs His labors
And his multitudinous fears. The basis [of the severance]
And the like, the right knowledge [cheng chih E, representing
samyagjñāna?]
[which is] the expedient means [thereto],
I will now tell. Listen well!
Hurvitz adds that "certain syntactic liberties had to be taken in order to
preserve the order of the verses."
The text translated by Hurvitz is as follows:
如此聖斷勞来恐怖之本
等方便正及盡煩惱怨
In 1975 Charles Willemen published a translation of the Abhidharmahrdaya: The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahṛdaya (Bruxelles). His translation is as follows:
Thus the noble eliminate hardship, the root of all fear. The right knowledge of the preparatory applications will now be explained. Listen well!
prayoga. However,
Willemen adds in a note: sam translates certainly samyagvyāyāma. This is confirmed by the fact that the term E is found in II (p. 848b24). In Chinese is used to render both sam- and samyak. Hurvitz's translation of it by 'the like' makes complete nonsense of the verse. It would be a waste of time and energy to point out all the mistakes committed by Hurvitz in his translations of the beginning of chapter 5 in the three texts I,
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II and III. His carelessness is well shown by the fact that he overlooked completely a variant on p. 818a (note 5). The Taishō text has EKSE. One must of course read : "the applications of mindfulness to the body, to feeling, to thought, and to the dharmas are thus produced one after another" (Willemen, p. 68). Hurvitz translates: "The meanings of the said body, sensations, thought, and dharma shall now be brought forth in due order."
In translating such sometimes difficult Abhidharma texts a good knowledge of Chinese is far from sufficient. It is necessary to know well the technical terminology in both Sanskrit and Chinese in order to prevent misunderstandings. It is a particularly delicate task to trace the original Sanskrit terms. Hurvitz does not hesitate to reconstruct even entire phrases. His reconstructions of terms and phrases are often far from the mark. For instance, on p. 209 Hurvitz states that may represent niyatabhāgakusalamulāni. This Chinese expression undoubtedly renders nirvedhabhagiyāni kuśalamulāni. Hurvitz is not aware of the fact that the same Chinese expression can be used to render different Sanskrit terms. In the texts translated by him renders both vyāyāma (see above) and prayoga (cf. Willemen, p. 229, n. 12). Hurvitz always translates it by upaya (expedient means, device).
Although Hurvitz has made much use of de La Vallée Poussin's translation of the Kosa, he has failed to see that the threefold contemplation (of aśubha, ānāpāna, and dhātu) is taught to the following three categories of men: the rāgacarita (cf. LVP, Kośa vi, p. 149), the vitarkacarita (ibid.) and the drsticarita (LVP, Kosa iv. p. 174, n. 6). In ш (p. 908b3) the text has T. Hurvitz translates "he who is driven about by (false) views" which, according to him may stand for: yo dṛṣṭibhiś cāryate (p. 234 and note 18)!
The smṛtyupasthānas are treated also in chapter 31 of the Ta chih tu lun (cf. Étienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, III, Louvain, 1970, pp. 1150-1176) and not in chapter 36 (Lamotte, pp. 1329-1430) as stated by Hurvitz (p. 207). The Ta chih tu lun explains that the objects of the smrtyupasthanas are the ten material ayatanas and a small part of the dharmayatana (i.e., the avijñapti, cf. Lamotte, p. 1170, n. 2). The same topic is treated in II according to which the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇāni) are the ten material āyatanas and a small section of the dharmāyatana which is rūpa (p. 848c16). Hurvitz translates: "By the former [i.e., svalakṣaṇāņi] are meant part of the ten rūpāyatanas and the dharmayatana" (p. 235).
Willemen's translation of Dharmasri's Abhidharmahrdaya was published in 1975. Probably Hurvitz was able to see this excellent work only after having submitted his paper. Willemen's work shows how Chinese Abhidharma texts are to be translated whereas Hurvitz's article shows how they are not to be translated. Recently Mrs. I. Armelin published a French translation of the Abhidharmahrdaya: Le coeur de la loi suprême (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1978)
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BOOK REVIEWS which I have not yet read. I hope to be able to report on both translations in a future issue of The Eastern Buddhist. The long delay in the publication of this volume has not prevented the presence of a great number of misprints. Particularly annoying are the transcription errors in Sanskrit and Tibetan words, which abound in several of the articles. However, one would gladly accept these imperfections if the contents of this volume were more satisfactory. According to the introduction "these studies and essays are representative of the work of modern Buddhist scholarship." Happily enough, this is not the case. Let us hope that they are not even representative of Buddhist scholarship in the United States! J. W. DE JONG. 161