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स्व: मोहनलाल बांठिया स्मृति ग्रन्थ
BHARTRHARI'S CRITISM IN JAIN LOGIC : A STUDY :
The grammarian-philosopher Bharthari opines that Sabda is the substratum of the world of appearance and thus he accepts the theory of Sabdadvaita. However this key-stone of the Grammarians' system of Mtaphysics has elaborately been controverted by the rival schools. Here we propose to record the dialectics of the Jains Philosophers, one of the rival schools of Metaphysics.
Dr. Narendra Kumar Dash
This theory of Bhartrhari has been subjected to severe criticism by the Naiyayikas, Mimamsajas, Buddhists and Jains. Now, for our practical purpose we discuss the view of the Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi (9th century A.D.), Abhayadev Suri (11th century A.D.), Prabhacandra (1st half 12th Century A.D.), Vadideva Suri (later half of 12th Century, A.D.) and Shree Yasovijaya jee (18th Century A.D.).
The Jaina logicians argue that the Sabdabrahman is a prameya and a prameya needs a pramāņa for its recognition. There is no pramana through which we can prove the existence of the Sabdabrahman2.
1. The Mimansakas also argue that prameya is recognised only by pramana, viz., manadhina-meya-siddhi. Abhsysfrbr in sanmatitaraka-prakaranatika says: pramanadhina hi
prameyavyavastha (p.334)
2. Cf. na ca evambhuta brahmasiddhaye pramanam-upa;abhayate Ibid, 3rd Pt., Gatha 6; p. 384.
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geta fargsta
in the Tattavārthaslokavārtika, Vidyanandi opines that the Sabdabrahman is not proved by Perception, Inference and verbal Testimony. This standpoint of Vidyanandi is also supposed by Sataraksita, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra and Vadideva. However, Prabhacandra and Vadideva ask the grammarians during their discussion that the Sabdabrahman is recognised by indriyajanya pratyakṣa or by atindriya pratyaksa or by Svasamvedanasila pratyaksa? The first alternative is not qualified enough to recognise the Sabdabrahman as it is not recognised by the Jaina Logicians. They argue that this type of pratyakşa is illusary like the perception durint dream.* Thus the sensual perception may not be taken as a cause of the perception of the Sabdabrahman. In the Sanmatitarka Prakarana it has been argued that a sense perceives that which is present and which is also large (sthuta) in nature. Therefore the Sabdabrahman is not perceived by the sense organs. This is also supported by Prabhacandra in his Prameyakamalamărtanda. During the discussion, both Prabhācandra and Vadideva Suri raise the same question - by which sense organ do we receive the Sabdabrahman? either by Srotrendriya or by any other indriya. Since the Sabdabrahman is beyond the subject of the Srotrendriya that may not be a cause to know the Sabdabrahman. If we accept that this is subject of the Srotrendriya, then we have to accept that everything should
3. Cf. brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara. 4. Cf. brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara. svapnadaviva
mithyatvattasya sakalpatah svayam. The Tattvarthaslakavarttika 1/3, sutra 20, Kanike-97, p.240. Also Tattvarna sutra (with explanation)
Bombay, I am 1940, p.21. 5. Cf. na khaly yathopavarnitasvarupam sabdabrahma pratyaksath praciyate, sanvada pratiniyatartha svarupayradaktvenaivasua pratieh.
The Prameyakamala-marttanda, 1/3, Bombay, 1941, p. 45. 6. Ref. the nyayakumudacandra, 1/3, p. 142.
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La: Heing alifant Hala ere
be known by each and every indriya (sense organ). But it is not possible to accept. Again, in the Nyāyakumudacandra it has been explained that the other sense organs (i.e. other than Srotrendriya) also are not qualified enough th be cause for the perception of the Sabdabrahman; because Sabda may not be a subject of any other sense organ other than the Srotrendriya?. Thus it may be concluded that the Sabdabrahman is not recognised by the indriyajanya pratyakşa.
The Sabdabrahman is also not a subject of the atindriyapratyakşa. In the Nyāya-Kumvda Candra, Prabhacandra opines that the anindriyapratyakşa without any sense organ is not accepted by the grammarians and therefore, that should not be the cause to establish the Sabdabrahman 8. In the reply the grammarians argue that a Yogi realises the existence of the SB (Sabdabrahman) through Dhyana and therefore the existence of the SB is proved by atindriyapratyaksa of the Yogis. Now the Jaina logicians again argue that if the Sb is the only ultimate reality then who will be there to realise it? and if we accept to the Yogis, then we have to accept the Yoga also. Thus, the concept of advaita 'nonduality' will no more exist.
7. Refer the Syadva daratnakara. VII/6, p.78 and the
Nyayakumudacandra, 1/5, p. 142. 8. Ct; napyatindriyapratyaksad; tasyaivatuasambhavat; Prabhacandra
on the Nyayakumudacandra, p. 142; aso the Syadvadaratnakara, 1/
7, p, 99. 9. Ibid.
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दर्शन दिग्दर्शन
Further, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri ask the apponents that if there exists the SB then why do we not feel the existence of that? Here they give two alternatives:
(i) Due to the absence of Grāhaka (Grāhakatvābhāva) (ii) Due to the Avidyā (Avidyābhibhuta).10
We may not say that due to the first alternative the SB is not manifested, because, in the Sabdadvaitasiddhanta the SB is grāhaka and the grahaka-sakti always exists in it:11 and the second alternative also is not possible as the existence of Avidya is not recognised by the Jaina logicians. It is not out of context to mention that in the Nyayakumudacandra. Prabhacandra categorical rejects the existence of the Dvaividya? This standpoint of Prabhacandra is also supported by Vadideva suri in the Syadvādaratnākara's. In this context the Jaina logicians again argue that since the gråhaka-sakti exists always in the SB, we cannot say that due to the absence of the grāhaka-sakti the SB does not manifest. Again, Prabhacandr and Vadideva Suri argue that Avidya is neither identical with SB not with other than the SB14 and if it is other than the SB then either it is a vastu or it is avastu? Both these alternatives have been rejected by the Jaina logicians in their respective works and therefore, according to them, avidya is neither a vastu nor an avastu viz. ( na ca laghepa praheyatsayasya brahmanah tadasat tathapratibhåso muktotiprasangāt nāpyavasturaśād vastuno nyathābhävo
10. € athasti kasmanna prakasate-grahakabhavat
avidyabhibhutatvada. The Nyayakumuda-Candra, 1/5, p. 142. 11. Cf. grahyatvam grahakatvam ca dve sakti tejaso yatha tathaiva
sarvasabdanamete prthagavasthite. The Vakyapadiya, 1-55. 12. Ct; sahibrahmano vyatirikta atiaikia va?
etc. The Nyayakumuda-candra 1/5, p. 143. 13. Ct; sahi sabdobrahmanah sakasadbinna bhaved-abhinna va, 11/7,
p. 99. 14. Refer note 12 above.
383
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bhavati atiprasangāt ca (N.K.C. p.143) and atha vastuh, tanna, abhyupagamaksatiprasakteh,(Ibid. 1/5, p.143). Thus the existence of the avidya has been rejected by the Jains and it may be suggested that like the Indriya-pratyakşa, the SB is also not proved by the Anindriya-pratyakşa.
Now we should thinks about the Svasamvedanapratyakşa. According to vidyanandi if the knowledge which is kşaņika and niransa (Buddhists views) is not proved by the above pratyakşa, Then how shall we establish the existence of the SB by the said Pratyaksa 15? In this connection, Prabhacandra says that during dream (Svapnāvasthā) we cannot feel the SB which manifests with ātmajyoti, by the svasamvedanapratyaksa otherwise, each and every creature will attend liberation with out any effort. Because it has been categorically mentioned it the Advaita-sabda-siddhanta that the svasamvedanatya of SB, which manifests with åtmajyoti is liberation. Again, he explains that if the SB will be svasamvedanasila, then the words like ghata and paja should be svasamvedanašila, as these words are the vivarta of the ŞB. But this is not accepted, because all the words are not svasamvedanašila. Thus, the Jaina logicians argue that the SB is not perceived by svasamvedana-pratyakşa 16. Now we may conclude that the existence of the SB is not proved by perception.
15. Cf;svatahssamvedalatsiddhihksanikandmsavittivat.
na parabrahmano napi sa yukta sadhanadvina. The
Tattvarthaslokavarttika 1/3, sutra 20, p. 240. 16. Ct; na ca ghatadis abarho va svasamviditas vabhavah
yatastadanvitatvamsvasam vedamatah siddhayet, asvasamviditasvabhavatayaivasyapratipraniprasiddhatvat. The Nyayakumuda-candra, 1/5, p. 144.
U
388 C
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Like perception, the existence of SB is also not proved by inference, another means of the valid knowledge. Secondly, it is also a fact that the inference is not recognised by Sabdavaitavadis as a way of valid knowledge. In this connection, Vadideva Says that: näpyaymanena, tasya tatsadbhāvavedakasya kasyacidasambhavat17. Acarya Vidyanandi also explains vividly regarding this problem. According to him since in the Sabdadvaiatsiddhanta, inference is not recognised as a means of valid-knowledge, how can we prove the existence of the SB by inferences.18
Again the Jain logicians ask that by which inference the Sabdadvaitavadins prove the existence of SB; either by Kāryalinganumana or by Svabhavalinganumäna1? This is also supported by Abhayadeva Suri and Prabhacandra.20 According to Jaina scholars the first alternative is not justified here, because the eternal SB has an action; neither it has any action chronologically (arthakriya), not it has any action collectively. If there is no action, then how can we, say that the SB may be established through Kāryālingānumāna. The second alternative also has no scope to prove the existence of the SB; because it is needed first to establish the existence of the dharmi SB and after that only we can prove it by inference, which is the Svarupabhutadharma of the SB. But when the DharmiSB, has no existence, then its Svabhāvalinga is automatically regarded as non-existence. Thus the SB is not established by inference, the second way of valid knowledge.
दर्शन दिग्दर्शन
17. The Syadvadratnakara 1/7, p. 100.
18. Cf. nanundanattatorthanam pratitedurlabhatvatah. paraprasiddhirapyasya prasiddhanapramanika. The Tattvarthaslokavarttika, 1/3, Sutra, 20 Verse97, p. 240.
19. Cf. napyannmmanatah / tatha hi anumanam bhavat-karyalingam bhavet svabhavalingam va? Kamalasila on Tattvarthasamgraha-panjika-tika verses 147-148, pp. 92-93.
20. Refer the Sanmatitarkaprakaranatika, Gatha-6 p. 384 and the Pramayakamalamarttanda, 1/3, p. 45
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In the Tattvartha-Sloka-varttika, Vidyanandi refutes the possibility that the SB is proved by the means of Verbal Testimony. He says:
āgamādeva tat-siddhau bhedasiddhistathā na kim. nirbadhād-eva cettacyam na pramanamatarad-rte.21
Further, the explains that the followers of the Sabdădvita concepts say the existence of the SB is recognised by verbal testimony, which is free from any kind of obstacles (badharanita). Here Vidyanandi does not support the nirbādhatva of the verbal testimony as there is no valid knowledge to prove this22.
Again, an interesting doubt has been raised by Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri that the SB is identified with verbal testimony or the SB in separate from the verbal testimony? In the Case of former alternative the verbal testimony? In the case of former alternative the verbal testimony may not be a cause for the establishment of the SB due to the lack of the relation of cause and effect (Karya-karana bhava'). The second alternative is also impossible here, because if we accept two things like the SB and the verbal testimony, then the advaita "non-duality" character of the SB will no more exist. It is needless to say here again that the grammarians accept the SB as "nonduality", and says every thing is produced from it viz.:
tad-āgamasya niscetum sakyam jatu pariksakaith. nacāgamastato nginnaḥ samasti paramarthatan. 23
21. The Tattvarthasiokavarttika 1/3, Sutra - 20, Verse-99, p.241. 22. In the commentary the author opines that : na ni
bharantiriyamakhilabhedapratitir-ityaniscaye tadanyathanupapattya tadbijabhuttam sabdatattvam anadinidhanam brahma sidhyati/ etc.
Ibid, p. 241. 23. Ibid, verse 100; also the Prameyakamalamarttanda. IV/3, p.46, also
the suadvadratnakara 17, pp. 101.
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To refute the objection of the Jaina logicians, the grammarians may argue that Verbal Testimony is the Vivarta of the SB. However, Vidyanandi nicely rejects this type of argument of the grammarians. According to him if the Verbal Testimony or will be the Vivarta "appearance" of the SB like other things, then this means of knowledge will be treated as avidya, which is asat. Now he asks the opponents that an asat, i.e. the Verbal Testimony may not be a cause for a sat one i.e. the SB viz tad-vivartastva vidyātma tasya prajñapakah katham.24 Thus the verb as testimony may not be a case to prove the existence of the SB.
In the Tattvarthaslokavarttika, Vidyanandi not only rejects the existence of the SB, but directly attains Bhastrhari quoting his first verse from the Vakyapadiya. He also opines that there is no such type of Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects from whom the creation of the world proceeds viz.
tato natva oaram brahmastyānādinidhanātmakam. Vivarte-tvarthabhavena prakriya jagato yataḥ. 25
Thus the Jaina logician rejects the existence of the SB, which is, according to the grammarians, the real cause of this universe. They not only reject the existence of the SB, but who argue that the world is not engulfed with worlds
Sabdamaya". According to them since the SB is eternal in character, how any change "vivarta or parināma" is possible with that? Again, they think if the grammarians argue that at
24. The Tattvarthaslokavrttika Ibid verse 101, p. 241. 25. Ibid, verse 103, p. 241.
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________________ FaHTC Difer the time of change the SB leaves its own quality or not? As the SB is eternal, the first alternative does not seem to be possible and if the second will be accepted, then, as all the things are engulfed with SB, a dwarf "Vadhira" will be able to listen everything after seeing the things produced from the SB viz. rupa samvedana samaya vadhirasya sabdasamvedana prasanga etc. 26 Like this, the Jainas, studied the philosophy of grammar in general and Bhartrhari especially and rejected the view that the world is produced from the SB, which is eternal and the world is engulfed with words. Besides, they reject the theories like : knowledge in general is sabdanuviddha, there is eternal relation between sabda and artha etc. These kinds of studies among the Jainas had taken place in between 9th century A.D. to 19th century A.D. The Jainas not only studied the philosophical side of the sanskrit grammar, but they also prepared their own treatises on the word-formation, some of the works are critically edited and published, but many works are still in manuscript forms. 26. The Sammatitarkap panatika, p. 381. 2010_03