Avita And Avita

Author(s): Eli Franco
Publisher: Eli Franco
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269425/1

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AVITA AND AVITA
Eli Franco, Hamburg
In his admirable study "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen SamkhyaSystems FRAUWALLNER has attempted to reconstruct the beginning of the Sastitantra of Vārşaganya? by combining the evidence from Jinendrabuddhi's Pramanasamuccayarika and Simhasüni's Nyayagamanusárini. In this connection he referred to two modes of reasoning called vita and a vita, which technical terms he rendered as "direkte (Begründung)" and "indirekte (Begründung)" respectively.' FRAUWALLNER must have known, of course, that the indirect proof usually appears in Samkhya and Nyaya texts (notably in the Yuktidipika and Nyāyavārttika) with the designation
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As usual I wish to express my indebtedness to Prof. K. PREISENDANZ. The arguments presented here were developed in the course of several very long breakfasts. Reprinted in Kleine Schriften, ed. G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkellner (GlasenappStiftung Band 22, Wiesbaden 1982), pp. 223-278. (Originally published in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 2, 1958, pp. 84-139.] FRAUWALLNER has tacitly reconstructed the name of the author of the Sastitantra as Vrsagana; he took his clue probably from the fact that his followers are often called vårsaganah in the Yuktidipika. However, as Pulinbihari CHAKRAVARTI has pointed out, varsagana may also mean a follower of Vārsaganya (cf. also Astādhyayi 4.2.111), and CHAKRAVARTI's arguments in favour of Vārsaganya being the name of the Samkhya teacher referred to in the Yuktidipika scem more convincing to me. Cf. P. CHAKRAVARTI, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought, repr. Delhi 1975 (originally published Calcutta 1951), pp. 135-138. Cf. FRAUWALLNER, op. cit., pp. 228, 229. These two terms are also used by FRAUWALLNER as qualifying "inference" (Schlussfolgerung) and "proof (Nachweis); cf. ibid. p. 267. Most of the passages that deal with these terms have been collected by K KANO in a paper presented at The Third International Dharmakirti Conference (Hiroshima, 6.11.1997): "On anyathanupapatti and avila/avita." To these one may add Slokavårttika. Apohavada 166 and the commentaries there on (cf. below); Nyayavarrrikarātparyaparisuddhi of Udayanācārya. ed. A. Thakur (Nyayacaturgranthikā Vol. IV, Delhi 1996), p. 456.5 (... vitavitasadharanarvat): Abhayatilaka, Nyāyalankára, eds. A. Thakur and J.S. Jetly (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 169, Baroda 1981), p. 265.7 (ete trayo hetavo darśanantare 'pi prasiddha iti darśayari - Vita in); Vacaspatimisra II, Nyayatattväloka in K. PREISENDANZ, Studien zu Nyayasútra III/ mit dem Nyayatattvāloka Vacaspatimisras II (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 46, Stuttgart 1994), Vol.l.p. 128.10 (...ity avitahetoh ... variants: iti vitahetoh and ini na

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564
- اس سحر
For his quotation of this verse Muni JAMBUVIJAYAJI has used the edition by C.K. Raja, published in Madras in 1946. However, the same verse appears in Dvärikādāsa Sastri's edition of the Nyāyaratnākara with a variant tadăthāvitahetubhiḥ that leaves the reading ambiguous:
avita, but his paper contains no discussion of this variant; in fact, he does not even mention that the variant exists. FRAUWALLNER's silence may be explained by assuming that he has accepted Muni JAMBUVIJAYAJI'S opinion, expressed in his edition of the Nyayagamanusarini". that "even though for the most part throughout the works of the philosophical systems of Samkhya etc., the use of the word avita alone is observed, whereas throughout the Nayacakravrtti the use of the word avita alone is apprehended, nevertheless the usage of avita is indeed understood to be the correct one ...*However, the only reason provided by the revered Muni does not seem to be decisive. He merely points out that only avita appears in Kumārila's Slokavārtika quoting Apohavada 166.'
paksikuryad yadā sarvams tadäthävitahetubhih /
According to HONDA's word index to the Slokavārttika, this is the only occurrence of avita in the Slokavārttika: the word avita has no entry in this
index.
paksikuryad yadā sarvams radāpy avitaherubhih! anaikanto virodhas ca sarvalokaprasiddhirah //
The two available commentaries on this verse also do not help us to decide between the two variants, for it is clear - at least if the printed editions are to be trusted - that Jayamiśra has read avita," whereas Parthasārathimiśra has read avita."
It is interesting to note that there is a strong resemblance between the two commentaries on this verse, which to the best of my knowledge has not been noticed so far. If the dating of Jayamisra by C.K. RAJA as
vitahetoh), in Kishore Nath Jha (ed.) Nyāyatartvaloka. A Commentary on Nyāyasútras of Gautama by Vacaspati Misra (Junior) (Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha Text Series 33, Allahabad 1992), p. 323.17: na vitahetoh This is, ol course, not an exhaustive list, cf. also Nyayakosa, s.v, vita Jambuvijayaji's edition (cf next note) bears the publication date A.D. 1966. Yel FRAUWALLNER already refers to it in the above mentioned paper that was published in 1958 (cf. FRAUWALLNER, op. cit., p. 231, n. 5). Further dates that appear on the title page of Jambuvijayaji's edition are: Vira samvat 2492, Vikrama S. 2022 and Atmal? S. 70. Vira 2492 and Vikrama 2022 correspond to 1964/65, unless the dates are giver in expired years (cf. A.L. BASHAM, The Wonder that was India, Repr. Calcutta Allahabad/Bombay/Delhi 1991, p. 496) in which case the correspondence to 1966 is possible. Barring the possibility of time-travel, one can reasonably assume that Jambuvijayaji's edition was set for print much earlier, at least to some extent before 1958. FRAUWALLNER's preface to this edition (p. 6) is dated 15th September 1958; or the other hand, Jambuvijayaji's notes (eg, bhotaparisistam p. 137, n. 1) refer k FRAUWALLNER'S "Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Samkhya-Systems." Cf. Dvadašaram Nayacakram of Acārya Sri Mallavadi kşamasramana with the commentary Nyayagamánusarini of Sri Simhasuri Gani Vadi Ksamásramana, ed Muni Jambuvijayaji. (Sri Atmānand Jain Granthamälä 92, Part 1, Bombay 1966) p. 314, n. 2. yadyapi prāyaḥ sarvatra samkhyadidarsanagranthes avitasabdasyai prayogo dršpate nayacakravrtau tu sarvatrāpy avitasabdaprayoga evopalabhyak fathāpy avitasabdapravogah suddha eva prativate Cf. the continuation of the quote in the previous note: ... kumarilabhattaviraci mimamsašlokavārstike py avitasabdasyaiva prayogál, tad yarha-.... Cf. Slokavarttikarika (Sarkarika) of Bhattaputra-Jayamisra Ed. C.K. Raja. (Madra: University Sanskrit Series 17 Madras 1946). p. 75.7.
9 Cr. Slokavårttika of Sri Kumärila Bhatta with the Commentary Nyayaratnākara of Sri
Parthasarathi Mišra, ed. Dvārikādāsa Sastri, (Varanasi 1978), p. 433. 10 Cf. Megumu Honda, Index to the Slokavårttika, (Döho-Daigaku-Kiyo Vol. 7. 1993).
pp. 33-148 = (1)-(116). This undoubtedly very useful index, however, is reputed to be
not entirely reliable. Il Cf. Sarkarika p. 74.5-6: tato 'py avitahetubhir anaikāntika iti.... 12 Cf. Nyāyaratnākara p. 433.19: avitā hetavo nāma vipaksavyāvrtkimukhena ye
sādhyam gamayanti..... 13 Cf. Sarkariká p. 75.9-12: ye hi vipaksavyatirekenalvärtham pratipadayanti le
'trăvitahetavo 'bhidhiyante. yathā prānādayo nirarmakebhyo gharadibhyo nività jivaccharire drsyamānās tadvyavacchedenaiva sārmakatvam avagamayantity arthah. kim ca nanyoginah sabda nanyavyavacchedenártham pratipadayantini lokaviruddho py ayam paksa(h).
Nyayaratnākara p. 433.20-22: avita hetavo nama vipaksavyavrfrimukhena ve sådhyam gamayanti, yathā prānādayah. te hi niratmakebhyo gharadibhyo vyavirta jivaccharirasya nirārmakatvāpohena satmakarvam gamayanti. lokaviruddham ca nanyoginām anapohakatvam iti.
Of course the exact relationship between the two commentaries needs to be investigated in a systematic manner. It is not impossible that both commentaries draw here on a common source, for the above example for the alavita argument appears already in the Nyayavārtika.
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belonging to the period before the 11th century is correct, then we may tentatively conclude that Pārthasarathimišra relies on Jayamisra's commentary. I would like to take this opportunity to draw attention to Jayamišra's commentary which has been hitherto almost completely ignored in Mimāmsã-studies.
To come back to our subject matter, it seems that the only unambiguous evidence for the reading a vita is Simhasüri's work (ca. 600?). To this one may add the later evidence of Mahävyutpatti no. 4578 which renders avitah with gsal te 'ons pa' and has no entry for avita. In view of this scanty evidence WEZLER and MOTEGI decided to follow the majority of the manuscripts and to retain, albeit with some hesitation, the reading avita in their recent critical edition of the Yukridipika.
Yet the reading a vita receives unexpected support from a fragment of one of the earliest Turfan manuscripts. This manuscript is among the most precious finds of the Third German Turfan expedition. It was found in the so-called "Rotkuppelraum" in Qizil on the Northern Silk Road. The manuscript was transferred recently from the East German Academy of Sciences to the State Library, Berlin. Officially it is classified as SHT-810, but it is better known under the name that Dieter SCHLINGLOFF gave it, namely, the Spitzer manuscript." in homage of the German Jewish scholar Moritz SPITZER who was the first to work on this manuscript in 1927.
SPITZER was unable to complete his task. In the thirties, as I was told by his son Amitai Spitzer, he worked for the Schocken publishing house and made a narrow escape from Berlin to Jerusalem in 1939. Fortunately he took his transcripts with him, and they miraculously survived in a small plastic bag in his son's attic in Abu Tor, Jerusalem. I had the chance and
567 privilege to meet Amitai Spitzer in 1995, and he graciously gave me his father's Nachlass, which, as I discovered later on, contained also materials that SCHLINGLOFF sent to SPITZER in the sixties in the hope that the latter would resume his work after some fourty years of interruption. These additional materials consist of black and white photographs of the fragments that occasionally record a better state of preservation of the manuscript. A considerable number of the photographs are accompanied by SCHLINGLOFF's own preliminary transcriptions. Upon my receival of the materials Professor WEZLER showed interest in the manuscript and its history, and kindly applied for a research project with the German Research Council to enable me to publish the Spitzer manuscript. The project was finally approved last year, and if all goes well it will be completed by the end of the year 2000.
The original manuscript probably contained some 420 leaves of which only about one thousand, mostly small fragments remain. It is written in Kusana-Brähmi script and accordingly dated by LÜDERS to ca. 200 AD." and by Lore SANDER to the 2nd to 3rd century." I tend to assign the manuscript to a slightly later date, that is, as belonging to the late Kusana period, but in any case the paleographical evidence does not allow us to
14 Cf. RAJA's introduction to the Sarkarika p. XIII: "Thus we know definitely that
Jayamira must have lived before the eleventh century. " RAJA's argument for this date. however, is not cogent, for it relies on a reference to Jayamira by Srideva (ie. Vädideva Sür) who, according to RAJA himself, lived in the end of the eleventh and
the first half of the twelfth centuries." 15 Sasaki's edition p. 305 gsal te has to be corrected to bsal te: cf. c.g.
Pramanasamuccayavrtti quoted by FRAUWALLNER, ibid., p. 229. 16 Cf. A. WEZLER and Sh. MOTEGI, Yuktidipikä. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44
Stuttgart 1998), e.g. p. 89.1 (underlined as an uncertain reading) In the following I repeat and summarize parts of my paper "The Spitzer-Manuscript - Report on a Work in Progress," forthcoming in J. Kato Fellicitation Volume (ed. T. Wada et al.) Tokyo 1999?).
18 Cf the Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1928. P
LVIII, quoted in D. SCHLINGLOFF, "Fragmente einer Palmblatthandschrift philosophischen Inhalts aus Ostturkestan (Ms. Spitzer)." in Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, ed. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1968 (- Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens XII-XIII. 1968/1969), pp. 323-328, at p. 323.
It is interesting to note that WALDSCHMIDT, in his quotation of the Sitzungsberichte in Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden, Vol. I, Wiesbaden 1965, p. XXI, has omitted the sentence that dates the manuscript "etwa um 200 nach Chr." This. however, seems to be due to a simple oversight rather than to doubts concerning the dating of the manuscript. The omission has been pointed out by SCHLINGLOFF. ibid..
p. 323, n. 2 . 19 CE L SANDER, "The earliest manuscripts from Central Asia and the Sarvästivāda
mission", in Corolla Iranica. Papers in honour of Prof. Dr. David Neil Mackenzie on the Occasion of his 65th birthday on April 8th, 1991, ed. RE. Emmerick and D. Weber, (Frankfurt am Main Bern/New York Paris 1992). pp. 133-150, at p. 147

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assume that it could be later than the 3rd century20 Thus, we are dealing here with the earliest philosophical Sanskrit manuscript that survived."
Although the Spitzer manuscript contained in all probability a. Sarvästivada Abhidharma work, or even more than one such work." one of its most remarkable features is frequent references to non-Buddhist literature and topics, e.g., the Mantras, Brahmanas and Upanişads, arthasastra, kamasastra, Ramayana, Mahabharata, the sixty-four arts (kalā). etc. In his outstanding study of the Parvan-list of the Mahabharata" Schlingloff has shown what a spectacular potential the fragments of the Spitzer manuscript have and how far-reaching inferences can be drawn even on the basis of a single, not very large fragment.
Among the non-Buddhist philosophical doctrines that are referred to in the Spitzer manuscript one clearly recognizes references to Samkhya, Vaiseșika and Lokayata. These seem to be the only non-Buddhist philosophical systems known to the author, and perhaps indeed are the only ones that existed in 3rd century in India. It was my hope to present here today all the fragments that deal with Samkhya thought, but this task will have to be postponed for another occasion. Instead, let me present just a single fragment that bears on the topic of avita and avita. The fragment, frame 286 (1.9 x 3.6 cm), reads:
We can assume that the statement that preceded iti contained an example of the avita mode of reasoning, but even if this assumption is correct, the example itself seems to be irretrievably lost, and so far I was not able to determine anything meaningful about the original context of the fragment. The size of the aksaras seems to indicate that the fragment does not belong to the middle portion of the manuscript, nor to its very end. The only thing that we know for certain about the context are the few syllable written on the other side of the fragment. We can merely gather that something unknown is separated from something else, equally unknown, that is referred to by a word ending in sa:
II/ saviyuktam ity elll
Illity etad āvitam
SCHWARTZ and PFEIFFER's Rückläufiges Wörterbuch - that indispensable tool for working with Sanskrit fragments - lists more than a thousand words (including compounds) ending in sa, and this is more than enough to dissuade us from any further speculation on the subject.
Nevertheless, important information can be gained from our fragment. So far, our earliest primary references to avita date to ca. 600, namely, the references in the Nyayagamănusarini and possibly in the Slokavårttika. Our earliest secondary reference is from the Tibetan translation of Dignåga's Pramanasamuccayavrtti. Similarly, the earliest references to avita, namely, in the Nyayavarttika and the Yuktidipika, are not older than the 6th century. Thus, the reference to avita in the Spitzer manuscript precedes the hitherto earliest known references by some three centuries. From this reference we can also conclude that the mode of reasoning called avita was well known at least a centurys earlier than the Sastitantra, because FRAUWALLNER
20 It should be noted, however, that none of the early Turfan manuscripts is dated in
colophons, etc. The dating of these manuscripts is based on the similarity between
their script and dated inscriptions of the Kusåna period 21 For a masterful short survey of the Kusana manuscripts and the secondary literature
thereon cf. SANDER's paper referred to in note 19. 22 SCHLINGLOFF suggested that the manuscript contained two works, the one divided
into ähnikas, the other into prakaranas; cf. SCHLINGLOFF, "Fragmente...". p. 325. Further, one can discem at least three, possibly more, different hands, and at least one
fragment is written in a Gupta script. 23 C.D. SCHLINGLOFF, "The oldest extant Parvan-List of the Mahabharata," Journal of
the American Oriental Society 89, 1969, pp. 334-338.
24 Cf. W. SCHWARTZ and O.E. PFEIFFER, Rückläufiges Wörterbuch des Altindischen
Reverse Index of Old Indian Wiesbaden 1978. 25 Of course, the distance in time between Värsaganya and the Spitzer manuscript need
not be a full 100 years. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that the author

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ascribed Värsaganya's work to the beginning of the 4th century, and as far as I can see this dating cannot be challenged at the present. By the same token we also conclude that Vārsaganya was not the first to use this mode of reasoning, but only adopted it to his purpose. FRAUWALLNER himself, let me hasten to add, must have been of the same opinion: although he says in a rather sweeping manner that "Vrsagana's epistemology is thus his own achievement and his own merit," when he refers specifically to avitareasoning he says: "Valuable and innovative was finally the way in which Vrsagana made use of the indirect proof and incorporated it in his system of inference, 28
Thus, the variant avita has now acquired a pedigree that is significantly older than that of avita. Can we decide which of the two variants is the correct one? Before we attempt to answer this question it would be presumably not out of place to ask what the terms vita, avita and avita actually mean.
While perusing the secondary literature on the topic I was surprised to find out that - with one notable exception - no one seems to have translated vita, avita or avita literally, FRAUWALLNER's rendering (cf. above) of vita and avita as "direct" and "indirect" was, of course, not meant to be a literal rendering of the two terms, but rather a contextual translation or a descriptive conveyance of the way these two modes of reasoning function. The fact that this translation is purely contextual is clearly seen from the fact that even publications that do not follow FRAUWALLNER's preference for avita use "direct" and "indirect" for vita and avita respectively. The first scholar to have used "direkt" and "indirekt" for vita and avita is probably Albert BÜRK in his study of inference in the Samkhya
tattvakaumudi." This translation was later adopted by GARBE himself." JACOBI, on the other hand, who first drew on the parallel materials from the Nyāyavärttika and the Tätparyatika, is implicitly critical of these translations; he leaves the terms untranslated and seems to favour positive" or "affirming" and "negative" or "negating" as their original (preUddyotakara) meaning." Pulinbihari CHAKRAVARTI renders vita and avita as "modus ponens" and "modus tollens.)? Whether one considers these terms to be appropriate or not, it is clear that CHAKRAVARTI did not intend them to convey the literal meanings of vita and avita. KUMAR and BHARGAVA translate vita and avita in the Yukridipika as direct inference" and "inference by elimination. JHA, in his translation of the Samkhyatattvakaumudi, sometimes leaves the terms untranslated (on karika 5) and sometimes translates avita as "negative inference" (on kariká 9);" similarly, he translates avitaherubhih in the Slokavārttika "with a view to negative arguments. In his translation of Nyayavärttika on 1.1.35 vita and avita appear as "affirmative" and "negative," and later on (on 3.1.54) as positive" and "negative" proofs. LARSON and BHATTACHARYA use "positive inference" and "exclusionary inference". Finally one may also
of the work preserved in the Spitzer manuscript was the first to use the terms vita and
avita. 26 Cf. FRAUWALLNER, ibid. In. 21. pp. 274, 276. Seyfort RUEGG argued that the
beginning of the fourth century is the terminus ante quem for Vårsaganya on the basis of a reference to the latter in the Yogācārabhumi; cf. "Note on Värsaganya and the
Yogacarabkümi," (Indo-Iranian Journal 6, 1962), pp. 137-140. 27 Cf. FRAUWALLNER, ibid. p. 274: "Vrsagana's Erkenntnislehre ist somit seine eigene
Leistung und sein Verdienst." 28 Cf. FRAUWALLNER, ibid. p. 276: "Wertvoll und neuartig war schliesslich, wie
Vrsagana die indirekte Beweisführung verwertete und in sein System der Schlussfolgerung eingliederte." Note the distinction between verwerten and the more neutral verwenden that is lost in the translation
29 Cf. A. BORK, "Die Theorie der Schlussfolgerung (Anumana) nach der Samkhya
tattva-kaumudi des Vacaspatimicra." (Vienna Oriental Journal XV, 1901), pp. 251.
264 30 CE.R. GARBE, Die Sámkhya-Philosophie. 2nd edition Leipzig 1917, pp. 219-220. He
does not mention vita and avita in the first edition of 1894 31 Cf. H. JACOBI, "Vita und Avita," in Kleine Schriften, ed. B. Kõlver, (Wiesbaden
1970), Teil 2, pp. 613-621 (= Aus Indiens Kultur. Festgabe für Richard v. Garbe
Erlangen 1927, pp. 8-16), esp. p. 618. 32 Cf. P. CHAKRAVARTI, op. cit., (n. 3) pp. 190-191. 33 Cf. Sh. KUMAR & D.N. BHARGAVA, Yuktidipika. (Delhi 1990) Vol. I, pp. 1, 169, etc. 34 Cf. The Tattva-Kaumudi Vacaspati Misra's Commentary on the Samkhya-Karika
Trans. by G. JHA with Introduction and Critical Notes by H. D. Sharma, Revised and Re-edited by M. M. Patkar, (Poona 1965), pp. 24-25, 48. In the critical notes, p. 8.
avita is referred to as "negative reasoning. 35 Cf. G. JAA (trans.), Slokavārtika, (repr. Delhi 1983), p. 327 (= Apohavada 166). 36 Cf. G. JHA, The Nyaya-Sutras of Gautama, with the Bhasya of Varsyāyana and the
Vartika of Uddyotakara, (repr. Delhi 1984), Vol. I. p. 396 CF also Vol. III, p. 1233 (on 3.1.54 = 3.1.56 in the Calcutta edition): "negative proof and positive proof" (for
avita and vita) 37 Cf. G.J. LARSON and R.S. BHATTACHARYA (eds.). Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies. Vol. IV: Samkhya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy

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vividhena prakarena itah prapto vitah, paksavyapakatve vyāphyāvāptyä сa, tasmád anyo 'vita iti.
sati sapaksa.
vita (means) 'has gone,' [ie] 'has obtained.' by various ways, liej by pervasion and non-pervasion of the sapaksa while it pervades the paksa. What is different from it (.e., from vita) is avita."
mention NAKADA'S rendering of vitahetu as "parallel to paksadharmarva": 38
As mentioned above, so far I was able to find only a single attempt to translate vita and avita literally. In Der Mondschein der Samkhya-Wahrheit published in 1891, GARBE translates vita and avita with "geradezu gehend" and "nicht geradezu gehend. "39 It is interesting to note that BURK'S translation of vita and avita, which has become the standard translation of these terms, is based on this rather inappropriate translation which he accepts uncritically. "Avita means 'not going straightforward'; and 'indirect' means indeed precisely the same thing." Even though one has to disagree with GARBE's literal translation," it has an advantage over all other translations inasmuch as it makes clear that the translator has understood the term vita to be the past participle of the root Vi with the upasarga vi, which is not at all obvious. GARBE's interpretation of the term is further endorsed by Vacaspatimisra who analyses the term while commenting on Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika:"2
Delhi/Varanasi Patna/Madras 1987. The index refers to pp. 32, 96-103, 230, 243-244,
304-305, 490-493, avita has no entry in the index. 38 Cf. N. NAKADA. "On the Three Aspected Logical Reason in Asanga's
Madhyäntänugama-sastra," in Science and Human Progress. Professor D.D. Kosambi Commemoration Volume (Bombay 1974), pp. 164-166. Nakada follows on this point a previous study by H. HADANO, "Suron gakuha no ronni setsu, vita avita ni tsuite". Bunka 1944, X1/3 pp. 177-219. X1/4 pp. 306-326. In another paper, however, NAKADA translates vita and avita as "direct" and "indirect." C. N. NAKADA, "Three Kinds of Inference in the Commentaries on Samkhyakärikä (Part II)". Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XV/1, 1966, pp. (38)-(48) = pp. 437-427 (esp. pp. (47)
(48)). 39 Cf. R. GARBE, Der Mondschein der Samkhya-Wahrheit. Vacasparimiçre's Sa mkhya.
tartva-kaumudi. (München 1891), p. 32 - (548). In a different context (p. 47 - [563]), on karika 9) he attempts a formulation that stands half way between a literal translation and a paraphrase: -sadhanány a vitani is rendered "die von negativer
Betrachtung aus beizubringenden Beweise." 40 Cf. BORK, ibid., (n. 29) p. 255: "Avita heisst nicht geradezu gehend' und 'indirekt
bedeutet ja genau dasselbe." 41 GARBE, BORK (in following GARBE), F.M. MOLLER, etc, ignore the simple fact that
v + Vi cannot mean "going straightforward." but rather "going apart," etc. 42 Cf. Nyayavarttikatatparyatika p. 291.18 (on 1.1.53) in Nyayadarsanam. With
Vätsyāyana's Bhäsya, Uddyotakara's Värttika. Vācasparimisra's Tätparyatika & Visvanatha's Vrtti. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Culcutta Sanskrit Series 18. Calcutta 1936.
If I understand correctly, Vācaspati interprets avita as a kevalavyatirekihetu, i.e., a reason characterized merely by negative concomitance because there is no sapaksa; vita could be either a regular reason that pervades the sapaksa wholly or partially, or a kevalanvayi-hetu, i.e., a reason that also pervades the sapaksa wholly or partially, but is characterized merely by positive concomitance because there is no vipaksa." Whatever the case may be, Vacaspati's interpretation reflects a more advanced stage of logical development and could hardly be taken as representing the original meaning of vita and avita." This in itself does not discredit the etymological interpretation of vita as derived from the root Vi with the upasarga vi. However, a serious problem in this interpretation is that it renders the wellattested old variant avita difficult to account for. In my opinion, any reasonable solution of our problem, even if it eventually favours the variant avita, must account at least for the possibility of avita as well. For if any one of the two variants made no sense to begin with, how could one explain that such a variant persisted for centuries? Furthermore, it seems prima facie advisable to attempt to derive both vita and a/āvita from the same verbal root.
Now, the term avita poses no serious problem. However, the combination a + vi+Vi does not seem to exist in the Sanskrit language; at least none of the dictionaries at my disposal records it, and one may add that the combination of the two upasargas ä+vi is extremely rare."
This leaves us with two ways to interpret avita, namely, as a past passive participle either of the root vvi or of the root Vvye. Among the two, the alternative of a+Vvye is less than satisfactory. The basic meaning of the
43 Cf. Vacaspatimisra's similar formulation with regard to Uddyotakara's two anvayin
reasons in NYTT p. 365.26-27: dasama kadašau sapaksavyaptya vyapríbhyam
anvayingu hetu. 44 Cf. also E. SOLOMON, Indian Dialectics, (Ahmedabad 1976), Vol. I, p. 382. 45 The Monier Williams records only three verbs with the combined upasargas d+vi:
vi-tan (also in APTE). a-vi-bhā, and a-vi-han.

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root is "to cover, to wrap. to conceal," while the upasarga å functions in a reflexive sense (i.e., "to cover oneself," especially with the sacred thread which was originally probably a larger piece of garment). Neither this meaning nor the other meaning recorded only by APTE, namely, "to sew." seems to apply to an inference or a mode of reasoning. I for one fail to make any sense of an inference or a reasoning that is covered or concealed (by what?) or an inference that covers or conceals itself.
This leads us by elimination, that is by an avita mode of reasoning, to the last alternative, namely, avita as derived from the root Vvi and the upasarga å. The basic meaning of this root is "to have in view, to approach, to strive for," and this meaning can easily be construed as qualifying an inference or a mode of reasoning. Moreover, the Tibetan translation of avita, namely, bsal te 'ons pa." seems to support this interpretation, for 'ons pa could well translate vita as derived from the root vi. Whether bsal te represents an attempt to translate the upasarga á however, is a more difficult question. So far I have come across no evidence to suggest that this is the case, and I assume that the Tibetan translation represents a mixture of literal and contextual elements. Literally it can be rendered as "an inference/reasoning that) has come to its object) after/inasmuch as it has excluded (all other alternatives)." The problem with this interpretation of avita, however, is that it does not seem to allow for a meaningful distinction, not to say opposition, between avita and vita, if both are derived from this root. If vita means "had in view, approached," etc., then vita and avita mean pretty much the same thing."
Therefore, our attempt to explain vita and avita as derived from the same verbal root has failed, and we have to conclude, again by an avita mode of reasoning, that if vita cannot be derived from the roots Vvi or Vvye, then it must be derived from the root Vi. This conclusion is also
supported, at least to some extent, by the Tibetan translation of vita as rnam par Idan pa. For rnam par is the usual translation of the upasarga vi. Thus, the Tibetan translators and lexicographers seem to have understood vita as derived from vi+Vi even though their translation does not contain a representation for the root Vi itself. With this we have now come full circle and returned to our starting point. Väcaspatimisra's analysis of vita. Of course, we should not accept his interpretation as to the varieties of vita," but we can accept that vita reasoning is a reasoning that has various modes, perhaps the five modes that are mentioned in the Şastitantra. This interpretation is certainly compatible with the literal meaning of the term in the sense of "going apart, going in different directions."
Our interpretation of vita and avita as being derived from different verbal roots can also explain the origin of the variant avita. When one encounters the compound vitāvita it is indeed most natural to assume that both words are derived from the same verbal root. And when one fails to make sense of the two words vita and avita derived from either Vvi or vi, it is also most natural to read the compound as comprising vita and avita derived from Vi."
Thus, I would like to conclude that the reading avita, as preserved in the anonymous Central-Asian fragment, the Nyāyāgamānusarini and probably in the Slokavårttika, and as reflected in the Tibetan translations, is the original reading of the term. In the final analysis we can therefore endorse the statement by OBERHAMMER et alii that avita is probably only a "secondary simplification. This, however, does not mean that we have to correct avita to avita wherever the term appears. It is entirely clear that at
46 The Mahavyutpatti reads gsal te 'ons pa, but, as mentioned above, this has to be
emended, gsal (to be clear, distinct, bright, visible, etc.) does not make sense in the present context, whereas bsal, the perfect stem of sel ba (to remove, to reject to refute), fits perfectly with the definition of vita as amving at its object by elimination (parisesa) or by criticizing - and thereby excluding the possibility of the position of
the opponent (parapaksapratisedha), etc. 47 Cf also W.P. SCHMID, "Die Wurzel VI. im Rgveda," in Mélanges d'Indianisme à la
mémoire de Louis Renou. (Publications de l'institut de civilisation indienne 28. Paris 1968), pp. 613-624, at p. 618: "vi- erlaubt den Zusatz von Richtungsadverbien dupa pra, prati, ohne dass die Handlungsrichtung des Verbums sich änderte."
48 In this sense it can be said that we revert to DEUSSEN's position in Allgemeine
Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. I, part 3. (Leipzig 1920), pp. 367, 418, which was severely criticized by SUALI; cf. L. SUALI, Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Indiana. (Pavia 1913), p. 415, n.1cf. also GARBE, Samkhya-Philosophie (n. 30) p. 219, n. 2. However, what DEUSSEN considered as "getting lost in subtleties" ("da .. Vác, sich in Subtilitäten verliert") we consider as an attempt to harmonize the position
of the Samkhya with that of the Nyaya and bring both traditions up-to-date. 49 The theofetical possibility of understanding vita and avita to be both derived from vvi
can be discarded because it would imply that an avita reasoning has not had in
view/approached its object. 50 Cf. G. OBERHAMMER unter Mitarbeit von E. PRETS und J. PRANDSTETTER,
Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien. (Beiträge zur Kulturund Geistesgeschichte Asiens 9, Wien 1993), Band I. p. 123, s.v. avitah

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some point two traditions concerning this term began to exist side by side. Even if one or the other of these traditions has come into existence by mere misunderstanding, misreading or miscopying, once it has been established it continues to exist in its own right. It is obvious, for instance, that Vacaspatimisra has read and understood avita as containing an alpha privativum when he explains avita as that which is different from vita (cf. above tasmad (vitad) anyo 'vita iti). To emend avita to avita in such a case would be nonsensical. Vacaspatimisra's reading and interpretation of avita may have exercised an influence on the manuscript tradition of the Yuklidipika. The Samkhyatattvakaumudi has become by far the most popular commentary on the Samkhyakarika, and because all the available manuscripts of the Yuktidipika are younger than the Samkhyatattvakaumudi, one may well imagine that some manuscripts were "corrected" accordingly. Basically we have only two manuscripts for the relevant sections of the Yuktidipika," one of which consistently reads avita. Furthermore, most of the occurrences of alavita are ambiguous, i.e., the word appears either as the second member of the compound vitavita or is preceded by ca, na or tada."? I was able to find only four occurrences in the entire work where the reading is unambiguous. Thus, if someone is convinced, due to Vacaspatimisra's influence or some other reason, that avita is the correct reading, he may reasonably conclude that the few cases that read otherwise are simply scribal mistakes, and may therefore be tempted to correct them. This scenario is not a pure speculation, because we have some evidence that the manuscript was tampered with at some stage. Fortunately this tampering has left some meager but telling traces. One of the four cases, on p. 89.1, reads: vita avita iti. This is not simply a case were the sandhi rules were not applied (as one could conclude from Pandeya's edition that reads vitah avita iti$4), but clearly a case of wrong sandhi. Therefore, I tend to assume 371 that the statement originally - and correctly as regards the sandhi - read vita avita iti, as in manuscript A, the a was changed to a, but vita was not changed to vito, and the new a was not omitted or replaced by an avagraha. If this assumption is accepted, then the original reading in the YD must have been avita. . One final observation in this connection. The terms vita and alavita are usually associated with the Samkhya, and they are indeed typical for that system. However, it would go too far to claim that they are exclusively Samkhya terms or that the terms are recorded only for the Samkhya tradition." Uddyotakara has attempted to prove the existence of an atman using an avita argument;56 in the Slokavarttika (cf. above) it is a Buddhist opponent" who attempts to justify his apoha-theory by having recourse to avita mode of reasoning; Bhasarvajna interprets Nyayasutras 1.1.34-35 as referring to vita and avita respectively, 58 and these are not purvapaksasutras, but clearly represent the opinion of the Sutrakara. Vita and avita, therefore, were not originally associated with a specific philosophical school. They seem to have been part of the vada-tradition in general, the tradition of public philosophical debate in which the beginnings of Indian logic in the early centuries of our era can be located. It is probably because Samkhya logic did not change significantly after the fourth century that the expression vitavita remained closely associated with it. In the other schools the developments in the theory of inference that occurred after Dignaga and Dharmakirti rendered these terms archaic and somewhat obsolete; consequently they are only occasionally, indeed rarely, used or mentioned. Yet the Naiyayikas have never quite forgotten that their sutras were associated with these terms although they are not mentioned explicitly in them. This tradition has never quite disappeared. It is recorded at least as late as the 15th century, and in one form or another it probably continues up to the present day. 51 That is, manuscripts A and K. Manuscript B covers only pp. 224-270, and manuscripts D and P are derived from K. 52 Cf. Yuktidipika pp. 1.3, 71.13, 71.15-16, 84.19-21, 89.10, 92.25, 96.22, 97.12, 106.17-19, 107.3-4. 53 Cf. Yuktidipika 89.1, 89.12, 90.23, 97.6 (twice). Of course, it is possible that I have missed some occurrences. This statement will have to be re-examined when the promised Index to the Yuktidipika will have been published by Wezler and Motegi. 54 Cf. R.C. PANDEYA (ed.), Yuktidipika (Delhi 1967), p. 40.22. 55 Cf. OBERHAMMER et al., op. cit., (n. 50] p. 123, col. 1: "Der nur fur die Samkhya Tradition belegte Terminus (avita)..." 56 Cf. Nyayavarttika (in Nyayadarsanam see n. 42] 538.19f. 57 The opponent may be an imaginary one, of course, but the fact that Kumarila attributes the use of avita-hetu to a Buddhist defending the apoha theory indicates that he did not consider this mode of reasoning to be exclusively Samkhyistic. 58 Cf. Bhasarvajna, Nyayabhusana, ed. Yogindrananda, (Varanasi 1968), p. 308.2: sadharmyad iti vitasya laksanam vaidharmyad ity avitasyety ato dvividha eva hetuh.