Apoha And Pratibha

Author(s): Masakki Hattori
Publisher: Masakki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269600/1

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MASAAKI HATTORI APOHA AND PRATIBHA The apoha-theory which aroused much controversy concerning the meaning of the word among the Indian philosophers in the classical period was first expounded by Dignaga in his Pramanasamuccaya. The fifth chapter of this comprehensive work, which is devoted to the elucidation of the apohatheory, begins with the following verse: na pramanantaram sabdam anumanat tatha hi tat krtakatvadivat svartham anyapohena bhdsate' That means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because [the word as the basis of] it expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as [the inferential mark] 'krtakatva' or the like lestablishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark]. As is clear in this verse, the function of a word is recognized by Dignaga as identical with the function of a linga (inferential mark) in the process of inference. That a liriga functions to prove the sadhya (that which is to be proved) through the 'exclusion of others' (anya-vyavaccheda, apoha) is discussed by Dignaga in the second chapter of the same work, where he deals with the inference for one's own sake (svarthanumana),2 Take for instance the case in which one infers fire on the mountain from smoke, its linga. What is cognized by means of inference in this case is not an individual fire that possesses various attributes peculiar to it, such as flame, heat, and so on, but it is 'fire in general' common to all individual fires. However, there is no 'fire in general' as a real entity. What really exists is each individual fire possessing particular attributes. The 'fire in general' is nothing other than a concept which is produced in the mind through the process of thought-construction. One knows from experience that what is not fire, c.g., earth, water, or the like, does not possess smoke. Therefore, on seeing smoke, he understands that the object to be inferred is not a non-fire. By excluding the non-fire, he forms the notion of 'fire'. The fire thus conceived is shorn of particular color, flame, heat, etc. that constitute the characteristic features of each individual fire existing in the external world. It 61 M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 61-73. (Festschrift in Honor of D. H.H. Ingalls) Copyright 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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62 MASAAKI HATTORI is 'fire in general which is a mere concept having no objective counterpart. With this clear view of the process of inference, Dignaga asserted that a liriga established the sadhya by means of the 'exclusion of others'. The word functions exactly in the same way to denote the object. The thing which is to be denoted by the word has various aspects, and no single word is concomitant with all of them. A word stands for only one aspect of the thing. Accordingly, one applies various words to express one and the same object: vrksa (tree), parthiva (the earthy), dravya (substance), sat (existent), and so on. If a word had direct reference to the real entity, all these words would be regarded as synonymous with each other, since they all refer to one and the same thing. Or, there would be the absurdity that one thing has as many distinct realities as there are the words expressing it. It is, therefore, hardly maintained that the word denotes a real object. The thing in itself, which exists as the indivisible unity of various aspects, is grasped in its totality only by means of perception free of conceptual construction. The function of the word consists solely in differentiating the directly perceived object from the other things. The word 'vrksa' differentiates the object from those which are not tree. The same object may be referred to by the word 'dravya' when it is to be differentiated from non-substances. Accordingly, as the object is distinguished from different things, the different words are applied to the same object. Thus it is to be concluded that the word refers only to that portion (amsa) of the object which is differentiated from the other things. Since the object itself is an indivisible entity, the portion for which the word stands is nothing other than the product of mental construction. It is a concept formed through the mental act of 'differentiation from others' (anyapoha). On the basis of this keen observation, Dignaga made elaborate arguments against the opponents who held that the word had direct reference to the individual (vyakti), the universal (jati), the relation between the two (sambandha), or the possessor of the universal (jatimat), and firmly established the theory that a word expresses the object qualified by the exclusion of the other things (arthantaranivstti, anyapoha).* Individual trees are totally different from each other, but the 'differentiation from non-trees' is common to them all. Dignaga admits that the differentiation from others' is of the nature similar to the universal (samanya) which is assumed to be real by the Naiyayikas and other realists. Like the universal, the differentiation from non-trees' is single (eka) in many trees, eternal (nitya) as it resides even in a newly grown tree, and completely subsistent in each individual tree (pratyekaparisamapti). However, it is not a positive entity like the universal. It is simply attributed to the object through mental construction, and as such it has no objective reality.

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 63 After clearly proving that the meaning of the word is nothing other than anyapoha, Dignaga proceeds to set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence (vakyartha). apoddhare padasyayam vakyad artho vivecitah vakyarthah pratibhakhyo 'yam tenadav upajayate This meaning of the word (i.e., apoha) has been clarified after extracting the word from the sentence. The meaning of the sentence, which is called pratibha (intuition), first arises by dint of that (meaning of the word). In his own commentary on this verse, Dignaga gives the following explanation: Although a word (in a sentence] has no meaning, its meaning is to be determined by extracting the word from the sentence and assuming (its meaning in accordance with the traditional theories (agama). Since a single (word) is not used, [it is to be extracted from the sentence, just as base (prakrti) and affix (pratyaya) [being extracted from a word). As the apprehension of the meaning of words according to the traditional theories of other schools) is not appropriate, in this .(treatise), another meaning (i.e., apoha) has been laid down, which is also the assumed (meaning). [Though a single word is unreal, its meaning is to be assumed,] because, pratibha (as the meaning of the sentence] first arises, for a man who is not conversant with the relation between speech and meaning, by dint of the understanding of the meaning of the (component) words. The sentence and its meaning are sabda and artha in the primary sense, because they are not divisible linto components). ...? It is to be noted that pratibha is recognized in this statement as the meaning of the sentence. The concept of pratibha is of great importance in the philosophy of word and meaning of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartshari. In the Vakyakanda of the Vakyapadiya, Bharthari sets forth his doctrine of pratibh, in some verses, beginning with: vicchedagrahane 'rthanam pratibhanyaiva jayate vakyartha iti tam ahuh padarthair upapaditam When the meanings (of the words in a sentence] are understood by separating (the words from the sentence], there arises pratibha which is different (from the meanings of the words). That (pratibha) effected by the meanings of the words is called the meaning of the sentence.

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64 MASAAKI HATTORI It cannot be denied that the meaning of a sentence is grasped only when the meaning of each constituent word is known. However, the meaning of a sentence is not a mere sum total of the individual meanings. Bhartshari laid emphasis on the fact that the individual meanings are mingled together (upaslista) in one consciousness which flashes on the listener immediately after the speaker's utterance of the sentence. This consciousness is not brought forth through the process of relating with each other the different concepts formed one by one in accordance with the gradual utterances of the constituent words. It is immediate and intuitional. Bhartshari regarded this immediate consciousness as the real meaning of the sentence, and expressed it with the term 'pratibha. It is known that Dignaga owed much to Bhartshari for the formulation of his philosophical thoughts. 10 Most probably the concept of pratibha was adopted by him from the work of this grammarian-philosopher. The term 'apoddhara', which is employed by Dignaga in the above-cited verse to. mean the extraction of a word from the sentence, is often used in the Vakyapadiya in the same technical sense. Also in paralleling the apoddhara to the grammatical analysis of a word into base and affix, Dignaga seems to have followed the precedent found in the Vakyapadiya: yatha pade vibhajyante prakrtipratyayadayah apoddharas tatha vakye padanam upavarnyatell It is emphatically asserted by Bhartshari, who is known to be the upholder of the akhanda-paksa (the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit), that the words constituting a sentence are not significant by themselves. Dignaga shows his close affinity in thought to Bhartshari by the phrase in his Vrtti that a single word in a sentence has no meaning, which phrase is commented on by Jinendrabuddhi in his Pramanasamuccayatika with a quotation from the Vakyapadiya: asatas cantarale yan chabdan astiti manyate pratipattur asaktih sa grahanopaya eva sah12 It is (due to the incapacity of the hearer that he takes the unreal verbal elements, which are in the midst of the indivisible unit of word), as really existent. (In fact, they are nothing other than the means of the apprehension. Reference to the Vakyapadiya is made by Jinendrabuddhi also in his commentary on Dignaga's statement that a single word is not used. He says that, in the case of the word 'plaksah' being uttered alone, such verb as

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 65 'asti' or 'bhavati' is understood to be with it by implication, and cites the following verse from the Vakyapadiya: yac ca ko 'yam iti prasne gaur asva iti cocyate prasna eva kriya tatra prakranta darsanadika 3 When the (single) word 'cow' or 'horse' is uttered in answer to the question 'what is this', (it is assumed that the verb 'is seen' is combined with that word, because there has proceeded the act of seeing or the like in the questioning itself. All these may prove that Dignaga set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence under the influence of Bhartshari. The term 'pratibha' does not occur elsewhere in the works of Dignaga's. In his further discussion, Dignaga emphasizes that a sentence generates an idea (vikalpa) in the mind of the listener without reference to the external object. "There are people who, leaving aside pratibha, consider that something else, (for example, the external object or the relation (of the objects denoted by different words), is the meaning of the sentence. Even for them, that which is recognized by them as the meaning of the sentencel is in fact nothing other than the idea. If you ask why, (we answer: - * Even when there is no external object, through repeated practice (abhyasa), there arises from [hearing) the sentences various ideas, each conforming to its own cause. "Even when there is no external object, by dint of the impression (vasana) left by the repeated practice (of forming the idea) in respect to the object, there arises from [hearing) the sentences various ideas, each conforming to (the impression as its own cause. For example, there arises the idea of tiger) from [hearing) the sentence 'a tiger is coming', (despite that there is no real tiger). From hearing a poem, there arises for a man who has passion the idea conforming to passion and for another man who is detached from passion the idea conforming to aversion, although there is no difference in phrase)."14 The influence of Bhartphari is noticeable more clearly in this passage. Bhartrhari also maintains that pratibha as the meaning of the sentence occurs in the mind without reference to the external object. According to him, there is no essential distinction between the word and the meaning, both being two divisions of the sabdabrahman, the ultimate reality which is of the nature of the word." The sabdabrahman takes the form of pratibha before it is manifested as the phenomenal words. 16 As the primary evolvent of the

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66 MASAAKI HATTORI sabdabrahman, pratibha transcends the temporal sequence of sounds and the diversity of form that characterize the phenomenal words, and it is recognized as the original form of the phenomenal words (vagvikaranam prakrtih)." It resides in the mind of the speaker before he utters the sounds, and through the sounds that constitute the phenomenal words the listener is awakened to pratibha. The thought that pratibha is effected by repeated practice (abhyasa) is also found expressed in the Vakyapadiya: abhyasat pratibhahetuh sabdah sarvo 'paraih smrtah balanam ca tirascam ca yatharthapratipadanel8 It is held by some others (who maintain the akhanda-paksal that every word becomes the cause of pratibha by repeated practice, just as in the case of teaching the meaning to children and animals. The practice of apprehending the meaning of speech is repeated not only in the present life but also in the past life, so that even children and animals are evoked to pratibha by dint of the impression (sanskara, bhavana) of repeated practice. It is through pratibh, that they understand what to do (itikartavyata).19 It is understood that Dignaga was primarily concerned with the meaning of a word when he formulated the apoha-theory. Regarding the meaning of a sentence, he simply accepted Bhartshari's doctrine, without discussing the problem how the meaning of a single word is related to the meaning of the sentence. In consonance with Bhartshari, he maintained the indivisibility of a sentence, and admitted that the utterance of a sentence immediately produced pratibha in the mind of the listener. It might, therefore, be assumed that Dignaga attributed to the sentence the faculty of expressing its meaning directly, not indirectly through the exclusion of the other meanings. However, at the close of his discussion on pratibha, Dignaga states that the pratibha generated by a certain sentence pertains to the object which is differentiated from the objects meant by the other sentences.20 In this statement it is clearly noticed that Dignaga applied the apoha-theory to the scrutiny of the meaning of a sentence. Pratibha is, according to him, the internal awareness of the idea, which is produced by a sentence. The ideas that arise in the minds of different persons on their hearing the same sentence are not the same with each other, so that each person has his own pratibha which is not communicable to any other person. However, they are generalized and regarded as the object denoted by the sentence, because they have a common feature in that they are distinguished from those produced by another sentence. It is thus to be affirmed that a sentence

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 67 denotes its object through the differentiation from others' (anyapoha). Dignaga admitted as a psychological fact that pratibha flashed upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis that a sentence expressed its meaning through the exclusion (apoha) of the other meanings. Because of the brevity of his discussion on the meaning of the sentence, and because of his heavy dependence on Bhartphari, his theory seems not to have been duly understood by his opponents. Dignaga's theory of apoha was vehemently attacked by the realists, who held that either an individual (vyakti) or a universal (samanya, jati) was the meaning of a word. Uddyotakra criticized Dignaga in the course of his discussion on the word-meaning in the Nyayavarttika, II.2.66, and Kumarila Bhatta devoted one chapter of his Slokavarttika comprising 176 verses for the refutation of the apoha-theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail of their arguments, but one verse in the relevant chapter of the Slokavarttika deserves special notice, since Kumarila refers to Dignaga's view of pratibha in it. As a Mimamsaka, Kumarila maintains that a word is denotative of the universal (aksti, jati),21 which, according to him, is a real entity and is directly perceived. To disprove the apoha-theory, he lays stress on the fact that, on hearing the word 'cow', we have the notion of cow' and not that of 'non-non-cow'. In the process of his close examination of Dignaga's arguments, he points out the inconsistency found there with the following words: asaty api ca bahye 'rthe vakyarthah pratibha yatha padartho 'pi tatha syat kim apohah prakalpyate22 [You admit that, even when there is no external object, there is pratibha (in the mind of a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, which pratibha is recognized by you) as the meaning of the sentence. It may be (consistent for you to hold) that the meaning of a word is (directly apprehended) in the same manner. Why is apoha (unnecessarilyl devised [by you)? The first pada of this verse is made to conform to Dignaga's expression in the above-cited section. Kumarila considers it hard to maintain that the two verbal units, sentence and word, express their respective meanings in different manners. From his view-point, it is inadmissible for Dignaga, who admits that a sentence generates pratibha which is of positive form (vidhirupa), to deny to a word the faculty of producing a positive knowledge. He is not unconscious of Dignaga's application of the apohatheory to the case of pratibha, but he places emphasis on that a positive

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68 MASAAKI HATTORI cognition is derived from a sentence as well as a word, and ignores Dignaga's logical analysis with the remark that the cognition does not carry with it, apart from its own form, any other portion that might be characterized as the differentiation from the other cognitions'.23 Kumarila's criticism gave an incentive to the Bauddhas to modify the apoha-theory. The thought that a word has as its direct import a positive image is found clearly expounded by Santaraksita in the Sabdarthapariksa of his Tattvasamgraha. Santaraksita closely follows Dignaga and Dharmakirti in repudiating the objective reality of the universal that is supposed by the realists to reside in many individuals. Against the view held by the realists including Kumarila that a real universal is apprehended by means of a word, Santaraksita proves the conceptual nature of the universal by the example which was originally adduced by Dharmakirti: some plants, dhatri, abhaya, etc., which are totally different from one another and in which no universal is found to reside, are classed under the general concept 'herb', because they all have the power of producing the same effect, that is, the curing of fever.24 It is thus the concept that unifies many individuals, and the word which is applied indiscriminately to many individuals stands for this concept. Up to this point, Santaraksita does not deviate from his predecessors. However, he changes the negative tone of the apoha-theory to the positive by giving weight to the fact that there appears in the conceptual cognition the image of a thing (artha-pratibimba, o-akara). This image is formed on the basis of the perceptions of the individuals, and for this reason it is apt to be apprehended as the real object.25 It is, he asserts, this image that is directly referred to by a word. Apoha is for him a name applied to this image. It is not that santaraksita disregarded the process through which the concept is formed. He states as the main reason for which the image is called 'apoha' that it is distinguished from the image produced by another word (anyasmad apohyate).26 However, he is chiefly concerned with the psychological fact that the image of an object appears immediately in the mind of the man who hears a word. As a matter of fact, 'apoha' is a nagative. Santaraksita explains the meaning of 'apoha' in terms of the two kinds of negation: paryudasa and nisedha (or prasajyapratisedha).27 A paryudasa implies the affirmation of something other than what is negated, while a nisedha has no affirmative implication. According to Santaraksita, apoha as the function of a word is a paryudasa, because the word 'cow', for example, generates the image of cow by negating the non-cow.28 Dignaga admitted that pratibha was directly derived from a sentence, but an objection was raised to him by Kumarila, who considered that the

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 69 apoha-theory was inconsistent with the idea of pratibha. With a view to defending the apoha-theory against Kumarila's objection, Santarak sita makes the following statement: pratibimbatmako 'pohah padad apy upajayate pratibhakhyo jhat ity eva padartho 'py ayam eva nah29 That apoha which is in essence the image and which is called pratibha is instantly produced (not only from a sentence but also from a word. This indeed is for us the meaning (of a sentence and) of a word as well. Evidently, "pratibha and 'pratibimba' (image) are regarded by Santaraksita as synonymous with each other. According to him, both the sentence and the word function to produce immediately in the mind of the listener a positive image, which is expressed by the term 'pratibha' or 'pratibimba'. This image is also named 'apoha', since it is differentiated from the image generated by the other sentences or words. The inconsistency found by Kumarila in Dignaga's view is thus dissolved by Santaraksita with the new interpretation of the apoha-theory. Dignaga maintained in concert with Bhartrhari that the meaning of a .sentence was not dissolvable into the meanings of the component words. The alteration of Dignaga's view was made by Sanktaraksita also on this point, and the incentive to it was given by Kumarila. For the purpose of proving that the apoha-theory does not hold good with the meaning of a sentence, Kumarila contends that it is impossible, in respect to the meaning of a sentence, to indicate the counter-correlate (apohya) which is to be excluded. It is not right, he means, to assert that the sentence, for example, 'caitra gam anaya' (Caitra! Bring the cow), functions to exclude a-caitra, etc., because the exclusion of a-caitra is the meaning of the word and not that of the sentence.30 In answer to Kumarila's criticism, Santaraksita states: A certain number of word-meanings which are conjoined with each other are called the meaning of the sentence. It is quite clear that those which are dissimilar (vijatiya) to the word-meanings are the countercorrelates of the word-meanings as well as of the meaning of the sentence, because there is no meaning of the sentence apart from the word-meanings. When the meaning of the sentence 'caitra gam anaya' is comprehended, the exclusion of the other agents, the other objects, etc. is understood by implication." The theory that the meaning of a sentence is the relation of the individual meanings expressed by the component words (abhihitanvaya) is known to

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70 MASAAKI HATTORI have been maintained by Kumarila.32 According to him, the syntactic unity of a sentence is based on mutual expectancy (akanksa), logical competency (yogyata) and phonetic contiguity (asatti, samnidhi) of the words constituting the sentence, and by virtue of these three conditions, the meanings denoted by the individual words are related with each other to constitute the meaning of the sentence. In the above-cited statement it is noticed that santaraksita is very close to Kumarila in holding that the meaning of the sentence is nothing other than the conjunction of the individual word-meanings. The ground for advancing this view was prepared by Santaraksita through the new interpretation of the apoha-theory, according to which the positive images are directly produced by the words constituting the sentence. With a view to meeting the objections raised by Kumarila, Santaraksita introduced a modification on the apoha-theory, thereby granting to a certain extent the realist contention that the cognition derived from a word is of positive form. His interpretation of the apoha-theory was criticized by the Bauddha logicians of the later period because of the over-emphasis on the affirmative aspect of the apoha-theory. Kyoto University NOTES PS: Pramanasamuccaya, V, k. 1, cited in TSP: Tattvasamgrahapanjika (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), p. 539.17-18. 2 Cf. PS, II, k. 13 and Vrtti. The Tibetan text and a Japanese translation are given in H. Kitagawa, Indo-koten-ronrigaku no Kenkyu - Jinna no Taikei -(A Study of Indian Classical Logic - Dignaga's System - ), Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1965, p. 462, p. 112. Cf. also E. Frauwallner, 'Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,' WzKSO, III(1959), p. 102. 3 PST: Visalamalavati Pramanasamuccayatika of Jinendrabuddhi, Tibetan version, Sde-dge ed., 2376.7-238a.2 (Peking ed., 269a.3-5): The thing to be denoted by the word (abhidheyartha) has many portions (amsa): satta, jneyatva, etc. The word, for example, *vrksa' is not inseparably related to all of them. It denotes that (portion of the thing) to which it is (inseparably) related through the exclusion of the other things (arthantaravyavaccheda), just as krtakatva or any other (inferential mark establishes the sadhya through the exclusion of those which do not possess the inferential mark]. This thought is expressed by Dignaga in PS, V, k. 12, cited in Slokavarttikatika (Sarkarika), ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1946, p. 46.7-8: bahudhapy abhidheyasya na sabdat sarvatha gatih / svasambandhanurupyena vyavacchedarthakary asau //

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 71 * Vrtti ad PS, V, k. 36d, cited in Pramanavarttika-Svavrtti (ed. R. Gnoli, Roma: ISMEO, 1960), pp. 62-63: sabdo 'rthantaranivsttivisistan eva bhavan aha. 5 Vrtti ad PS, V, k. 36d, cited in TSP, p. 389.9-12: sarvatrabhedad asrayasyanucchedat krtsnarthaparisamaptesca yathakramam jatidharma ekatva (-nityatva-) pratyekaparisamaptilaksana apoha evavatisthante. ... As the characteristic features of samanya, Prasastapada mentions nityatva, ekatva and svavisayasarvagatatva, cf. Prasastapadabhasya (Vizianagram Skt. Ser., vol. 4), p. 314. Explicit mention of pratyekaparisamapti is not found in the extant Vaisesika and Naiyayika works of the early period. The clear expression is given in Nyayamanjari (Kashi Skt. Ser., 104), p. 284.27-28: ...ucyate pratipindam kartsnyenaiva jatir vartata iti. Cf. VyakaranaMahabhasya, ed. Kielhorn, Vol. I, p. 243.24-25: evam tarhy...(akstih) pratyekam ca parisamapyate yathadityah. PS, V, K. 46, cited in TSP, p. 363.15-16. ? PSV: Pramanasamuccayavrtti, (K): Kanakavarman's version, Peking ed., 168a. 7-168b.1, (V): Vasudhararak sita's version, Peking ed., 82b.2-4 (Sde-dge ed., 77a.2-4). 8 VP: Vakyapadiya, II. 143. The verse number of VP is given in accordance with M. Biardeau, Vakyapadiya Brahmakanda avec la Vrtti de Harivrsabha, Paris 1964 for I (Brahmakanda), and with K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (ed.), Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. Poona 1965 for II (Vakyakanda). The doctrine of pratibha is expounded in VP, II.143-152. Cf. also ibid., 1.118, II.117, etc. Bharthari's doctrine of pratibh, is discussed in K.A. Subramanya Aiyar, 'Pratibha as the meaning of a sentence,' Proceedings and Transactions of the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference, Madras 1941, pp. 326-332; Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959, pp. 244-264; S. Ruegg, Contributions a l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique Indienne, Paris 1959, p. 77 ff.; M. Biardeau, Theorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique, Paris - La Haye 1964, p. 315 ff. For the concept of pratibha in wider scope of Indian literature, vide Gopinath Kaviraj, 'The doctrine of Pratibha in Indian Philosophy,' in Aspects of Indian Thought, Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 1966, pp. 1-44; J. Gonda, The Vision of the Vedic Poets, The Hague 1963, pp. 318-348. 10 The close relation of Dignaga's Traikalyapariksa to the Vakyapadiya is made clear in E. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 107-116. VP, II. 158 and 155 are quoted by Dignaga in his Vrtti on PS, V, k. 50; and VP, III. 14.8 is found cited in PSV, (V) 70b.8 (66b.6-7). 11 VP, 11.10. Cf. ibid., III.1.1: dvidha kaiscit padam bhinnam caturdha pancadhapi ca / a poddhrtyaiva vakyebhyah prakstipratyayadivat // 12 VP, 1.85. This is cited in PST, 287b.3 (324a. 7-8) as follows: gan smras pa / med kyani nan gi ba yi ni // sgra rnams yod do ses sems te // rtogs pa po yi nus med de // hdsin pahi thabs kho na deho // ses so / 13 VP, II.271. This is cited in PST, 2875.6-7 (324b.3-4) as follows: de skad du yan bsad

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MASAAKI HATTORI pa / gan yani hdi ci ses dris sig // ba lari rta ses kyan brjod pani // dri ba kho na bya ba ste // de la rab sugs mthor bahi phyir // ses so / The thought that a single word is recognized as being accompanied by the verb 'asti' is found expressed in VP, II.270: yac capy ekam padam drstam caritastikriyam kvacit / tad vakyantaram evahur na tad anyena yujyate // Cf. Yogabhasya, III.17: sarvapadesu casti vakyasaktih, vrksa ity ukte 'stiti gamyate... " PSV, (K) 1686.2-5, (V) 826.5-83a. 1 (77a.2-7). 15 Cf. VP, II.31cd: ekasyaivitmano bedau sabdarthay aprthaksthitau. 16 Bharthari recognized three stages through which the sabdabrahman evolves into articulate speech, namely, the pasyanti, the madhyama and the vaikhari, cf. VP, 1.142. In Vrsabhadeva's Paddhati on VP, I. 14, pratibha is identified with the pasyanti: 'pratibham...' iti yeyam samastasabdarthakaranabhuta buddhih yam pasyantity ahuh. 17 Cf. Vrtti on VP, 1.14. 18 VP, II. 148. This verse is cited with slight modification in TS: Tattvasamgraha (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), k. 891. 19 C. VP, II.146: saksac chabdena janitam bhavananagamena va / hitikartavyatayam tam (=pratibham) na kascid ativartate // ibid., 1.121: itikartavyata loke sarva sabdavyapasraya/yam purvahitasamskaro balo 'pi pratipadyate // 20 Cf. PSV, (K) 1686.5-6, (V) 83a. 1-2 (77a. 7-776.1). 21 The Mimamsa view that a word denotes akrti is established in the Mimamsa-sutra, 1.3.30-35 (Akrtisakty adhikarana), and the same view is found maintained in the Vrttikaragrantha cited in Sabarabhasya, 1.1.5, cf. Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 14.17-18: atha gaur ity asya sabdasya ko'rthah. sasnadivisista akrtir iti brumah. Kumarila supports this view through detailed discussions in SV: Mimamsaslokavarttika, Akrtivada and Vanavada. He takes the term 'akrti' as synonymous with jati' and 'samanya', cf. SV, Akstivada 3: jatim evakrtim prahur vyaktir akriyate yaya / samanyam tacca pindanam ekabuddhinibandhanam // 22 SV, Apohavada 40 (=TS, 922). 23 Ibid., Apohavada 41 (TS, 923): buddhyantarad vyavacchedo na ca buddheh pratiyate / svarupotpadamatrac ca nanyam amsam bibharti sa // 24 TS, TSP, 1004. Cf. ibid., 722-725; Pramanavarttika, 1.74-75. 25 TS, 1005: tan (=arthan) upasritya yaj jnane bhaty arthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthatmatabhave 'py artha ity eva niscitam // Cf. Pramanavarttika, 1.76-77. 26 Santarak sita gives four reasons for which the image of an object (arthapratibimba) is called 'apoha'. The first reason 'pratibhasantarad bhedat is, according to Kamalasila's interpretation, adduced on the basis of the primary sense of the word 'apoha' (mukhyatah): apohyata ity apohah, anyasmad apoho 'nyapoha iti vyutpatteh. The other reasons are based

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APOHA AND PRATIBHA 73 on the figurative sense of the word (upacarat). They are: (1) that the image is the cause for attaining to the real thing which is excluded from the other things (anyavyavstta-vastu), (2) that it arises through (the perception of] the real thing which is excluded from the other things (aslista-vastu = anyato vyavrttam vastu), and (3) that it is erroneously taken for the particular which is excluded from the dissimilar things (vijatiya-paravrttam svalaksanam). Cf. TS, TSP, 1006-1008ab. 27 The two terms 'paryudasa' and 'prasajyapratisedha' (*nisedha' in TS, 1003) are variously rendered by modern scholars: 'exception limitative' and 'prohibition valable apres application (virtuelle) in L. Renou, Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit, Paris 1957, p. 202, p. 230; 'Exklusion' and 'reine Negation' in E. Steinkellner, Dharmakirti's Hetubinduh, Teil II: Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wien 1967, p. 165; 'limitation (al negation)' and 'negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying' in G. Cardona, 'Negation in Paninian rules,' Language, 43(1967), p. 34; 'nominally bound negative' and 'verbally bound negative' in B.K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968 (HOS 46), p. 156, etc. 28 santaraksita distinguishes two kinds of paryudasa: mental (buddhyatmaka) and ontological (arthatmaka), cf. TS, 1003. According to him, apoha is primarily mental, but it has ontological implication, because the individuals to which the image pertains are ontologically differentiated from the dissimilar things, cf. TS, TSP, 1008. 29TS, 1027. 30 SV, Apohavada 143cd (=TS, 977cd). Cf. TSP, p. 384.12-15: ya catra 'caitra gam anaya' ityadav acaitradivyavacchedarupanyanivsttir avayavaparigrahena varnyate, sa padartha eva syat, na vakyarthah. tasyanavayavasyettham vivektum asakyatvad ity avyapini sabdarthavyavastha. 31 TS, 1159-61:... / padartha eva sahitah kecid vakyartha ucyate // tesam ca ye vijatiyas te 'pohyah suparisphutah / vakyarthasyapi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi // caitra gam anayetyadivakyarthe 'dhigate sati / kartskarmantaradinam apoho gamyate 'rthatah // . 32 Cf. Bishunupada Bhattacharya, A Study in Language and Meaning (A Critical Examination of Some Aspects of Indian Semantics), Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1962, p. 158 ff.; Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar 1963 (The Adyar Lib. Ser., vol. 91), p. 203 ff. 33 According to Kamalasila, the word-meanings stand in the causal relation to each other, cf. TSP, p. 435.2: 'sahitah' in TS, 1159) iti parasparam karyakaranabhavena sambaddha ity arthah.