Anekanta Problem Of Meaning

Author(s): S M Shaha
Publisher: Z_Jain_Vidya_evam_Prakrit_014026_HR.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250441/1

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Anekanta and Problem of Meaning Prof. S. M. Shaha Introduction The doctrine of Anekanta is the heart of Jaina ontology, epistemology and logic. It claims the inderminateness of reality, its knowledge and verbal expression. If reality is infinitely manifold, logically, there must be infinite ways of intellectually cognizing it and verbally expressing its infinite aspects. This presupposition enables one to harmonize various apparently contradictory descriptions of reality. And therefore, the doctrine of Anekanta may serve as a beacon in studying the semantic, logical and epistemological problem of the meaning of 'Meaning.' Four types of Meaning In India, the various school of Philosophy, including those of the Sanskrit grammarians and rhetoricians have devoted much thought to the linguistic problem of meaning and have evolved different theories to explain the semantic aspect of language. As to the meaning it is supposed that a word or a sentence may convey the primary or metaphorical or suggested meaning. In addition to these three types of meaning, some Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas and rhetoricians postulate the tatparya or sentence-meaning as the fourth type. Some consider it to be independent of the first three while others associate it with one of thern. Out of these four kinds of meaning, namely the primary, metaphorical, suggested and purposive, the suggested and purposive are severally indeterminate, relative, and hence anekantic in nature. But increase of primary and secondary meanings the principle of indeterminateness or anekanta involves in selecting one between them while interpreting a given statement. Suggested meaning Of all the four types the suggestive meaning is the most indeterminate. It depends on a number of contextual factors such as time, place, occasion, the intension, intonation, gestures etc. of a speaker and the intellectual capacity, mental frame, mood etc. of a listener or spectator. It varies from context to context. Unlike the primary and parisaMvAda-4

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&C jaina vidyA evaM prAkRta : antarazAstrIya adhyayana secondary meanings it includes various socio-cultural meanings and even emotive meaning also. It is well known how numerous meanings may be evoked in the minds of different persons by the stock example, asta 34:, that is, 'the sun set.' Though the grammarians, scientists logicians and philosophers interested more in the accuracy, precision, clarity and objectivity in the use of words prefer lexical or primary meaning to the suggested one, the very indeterminate and infinite potency of the latter has rendered it more competent than the former for experiences. Because it is only through the power of connoting meanings that can not be expressed directly that the language may convey philosophical truths. In his "Introduction to Metaphysics' Bergson says! : "Language is incapable of apprehending and expressing reality. But language may be used in another way, not to represent, but to bring the hearer to a point where he himself may transcend language and pass to incommunicable insight. It is a dialectical ladder which, when we have ascended, may be kicked away." This insight intuition can not be expressed directly by words, but they can be communicated through the power of suggestion. Tat paryavrtti or sentence meaning Thus from the foregoing, the anekantic nature of suggested meaning becomes obvious. The same may be asserted in respect of even Tatparyavstti or sentence-meaning. There is difference of approach between the abhihitanvaya theory of sentence meaning advocated by Bhatta school of Mimamsa and anvitabhidhana theory of sentence-meaning propounded by Prabhakara school of Mimamsa. The former holds that the unitary meaning of a sentence is indirectly conveyed through the recollection of the meaning of the words that comprise it while the latter takes the view that the unitary meaning directly arises from the collection of the words. We neednot enter further into the controversy. Here it strikes to state that those who like Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Visvanatha etc. refer to tatparya as a separate vstti or function of words hold that the intention of a speaker, or the general purport of the utterance is obviously to give a united purposeful sentence-meaning. Here the dependence of meaning on the intention of a speaker (i.e., what he intends to be understood by a listener), or a general purport of the sentence involves the element of anekanta or indeterminateness. Because parisaMvAda-4

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Anekanta and Problem of Meaning so far as the intention of a speaker is concerned it is associated with different psychological contexts. It is possible for the same sign to belong to different psychological contexts; a word may mean different things in different cases. Even the same thing can be examined from different angles without exhausting its characters; but from the linguistic point of view we are only concerned with so much of the thing as required to elucidate what the speaker intended the listener to understand. Even though what is in the mind of the speaker at the time of the utterence is something subjective, and not capable of being put to an objective anlalysis, the idea intended to be conveyed to the listener by the speaker could be determined to a great extent with the help of contexual factors. Thus, as in the case of suggested meaning the dependence on contextual factors while interpreting the sentence-meaning is indicative of anekantic element in tatparyavrtti. It is true that the Mimamsakas even use the term tatparya for the purport of a passage dealing with a particular topic, and refer to six lingas by which it could be obtained objectively without any reference to the speaker or author. But in our opinion whether the real purport of the passage is identical with or different from the intention of the speaker or author, the dependence of interpretation on the contextual factors such as six lingas as consistency in meaning between the introduction and conclusion (upakramopasamharau) etc. is indicative of anekantic nature of the tatparyavstti or sentence-meaning. Primary and Secondary or Metaphorical Meaning Now let us examine the anekantic aspect of primary and secondary or metaphorical meanings. We restrict our query to the domain of philosophy only and that also particularship to the Mimamsa, vedanta and Jaina systems. Mimamsa The Mimamsa devides the Veda into two parts: Vidhi and Arthavada. Vidhi refers to the supra-mundane affairs and has to be interpreted literally, that is in the primary sense; while the Arthavada part roughly refers to the matters of ordinary experience. It has no logical system. It merely reiterates facts otherwise already known. Its purpose is to flatter a man into the doing of good actions or to frighten him out of evil ones. Taken independently the Arthavada has no use. parisaMvAda-4

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890 jainavidyA evaM prAkRta : antarazAstrIya adhyayana It ought to be interpreted liberally, that is, in secondary, metaphorical or figurative sense. Thus Mimamsa lays down canons of interpretation in connection with determining what portion falls under these two heads namely, Vidhi and Arthavada, that is, the primary and secondary meanings respectively. It holds that only vidhis or injunctions are directly authoritative; for, they teach us what to do and what not to do. Sentences which merely state something are of no use; for, nobody gains thereby anything. Hence all the arthavadas are authoritative only in so far as they form a unitary passage with commond sentences. For example, the arthavada, 'vayu is a swift deity' forms a unitary passage with the injuction, 'one who wants prosperity should touch a goat relatingt o vayu', because taken independently the arthavada has no use, while taken as a corroborative statement of the injunction, it praises the god vayu and suggests that a rite in connection with god is highly praisaworthy." Thus according to the Mimamsakas action is the guiding principle of interpreting a particular word or sentence and ascribing to it a primary or secondary meaning. In this respect they equally attach importance to contextual fectors as well as a purport also. Even they maintain that an action consists of parts; and words corresponding to them may be divided into parts if necessary to express their idea. consequently it follows that not only the meaning but even form of a word may also be indeterminate in nature. For example, the word 'svaha' may be divided into sva, a, ha meaning "(sva) the soul, (a) leading to or associated with (ha, 'an exclamation of satisfaction) satisfaction." Hence it expresses the satisfaction of the soul with action, with result that it can eontinue to act. Similarly, if we divide the word dana into parts,-d, a, na-the meaning would be "(d) sacrifice (a) associated with (na) the senses of knowledge;" and it would signify "the sacrifice or proper function of the senses of knowledge," and the idea becomes different from that of a "gift." These examples illustrate one of the mimamsic methods of interpretation which ascribes a special meaning to a common word by dividing it according to the context, purpose and purport. This indicates the indeterminate or anekantic aspect of their concept of meaning. The canons of interpretation laid down by the Mimamsakas are of great value not only to those who want to understand the veda aright but to all who are engaged in the work of finding out the exact import of fixed texts like legal codes."7 parisaMvAda -4

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Anekanta and Problem of Meaning 171 Advaita-vedanta In my article 'Badarayana and the Doctrine of Anekanta," I have discussed in details the anekantic basis of Badarayana's philosophy. Here I may point out that his flexible usage of the primary and secondary meanings while interpreting upanisadic passages and there by reconciling even cotradictory philosophical views is one more dimension of his anekantic philosophy. In the Brahmasutra he uses the terms mukhya, pradhana etc. for denoting the primary meaning while terms such as Bhakta, Gauna or Gauni', arthavada 10 in the sense of sencondary ineaning. Thus, for example, in a sutra 701970971TTET FIAT 5TTETI#19 a gta alfacala 11 he contends that the mention of these words (birth and death) with relation to moving and stationary bodies is in a primary sense while it is to be taken in a secondary sense with referenee to the individual souls in habitating them. The very idea that meaning of a particular statement may either be primary or secondary according to the intention of the author as well as the context indicates its indeterminate or relative nature. We may cite one more example. In the aphorism T hara 2, Badarayana says, "If it be argued that the "seeing" is in a secondary sense, we say, not so, owing to the use of the word self." The sankhya wants to ascribe seeing" figuratively to the insentinent pradhana which is referred to by the word Existence and supposed to be the primardial cause of universe. Badarayana objects it by discarding the secondary meaning of "seeing" in favour of primary meaning and thereby he asserts that not pradhana (i.e. praksti) but Brahman is the cause of universe. From Badarayana when we come to Sankara we find that Sankara uses the concept of primary and secondary meanings enormusly and exuberantly while interpreting the aphorisms of the Brahmasutra. For secondary meaning he employs the following terms or forms : yma1318, yurgare', quare 15, qfafa 18, gufaaral, status, norca 19, 17011:0, atut4897121, torria, tarafa3, oala24, H774,25 or #, 3941728, atqatft**?, 3971783f728, 374EUR429, JOTBO, semafa), 55277127082, tafq*f6789, 3512-60734, 7127faca fafe, 95, fara36, Beratzxf9a37, 141733 etc. while in the context of the primary meaning the terms or forms occurring are :-48939, 7e47a40, E7141, HET-1924, getrete itt9fa43 etc. For example, Sankara while commenting on the aphorism parisaMvAda-4

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172 jaina vidyA evaM prAkRta : antarazAstrIya adhyayana I paraM jaiminirmukhyatvAt 14 contends that according to Jaimini the primary meaning of the term param is the Supreme Brahman and the secondary meaning is the inferior Brahman. He further adds that between the primary and secondary meaning one readily understand the primary alone. Again while cornmenting on the aphorism carAcaravyapAzrayastu 43 Sankara argues that the words birth and death with regard to the individual souls, are used figuratively while primarily in the context of material bodies inhabitating them. Thus, Sankara's interpretation of the aphorisms of the Brahmasutra, in the light of primary and secondary meanings is indicative of an anekantic element involved in them. In passing, we may add that the Advaita Vedanta school following Sankara has thoroughly developed the concept of purport and primary as well as secondary meaning while interpreting the Upanisdic Mahavakyas such as 'That thou art' etc. For example. Vedantins like Suresvara, Vacaspati, Vidyanaranya, Prakashatman, Dharmaraja, Madhusudana consider the Mahavakyas as 'That thou art' to be the purport of the Upanisads. They further make distinction between the primary and secondary meaning and try to interpret Mahavakyas by ascribing either of it to them. Thus, Suresvara applies Laksana to the Mahavakya "That thou art' while Dharmaraja rejects it.46 We need not enter into further details here. The very sharp differences in the interpretations of Mahavakyas suggest the indeterminate or anekantic nature of meaning in general. Finally, we turn our attention to the treatment of the primary and secondary meanings in the Jaina philosophy. Jainism The Jaina logicians, rhetoricians, grammarians and philosophers have been discussing different aspects of meaning right from the early centuries of Christian era. For example, in the epistemic and logical theories of Nayavada, Syadvada or Saptabhangi, Niksepa etc. deal with the problem of knowledge and meaning thoroughly. The concept of Sabdanaya and arthanaya is indicative of their linguistic views applied to epistemology. Even to present the brief outline of these multifarious endeavours is beyond the scope of this paper. How ever, we shall precisely discuss Kundakunda's position with regard to the primary and secondary meaning. parisaMvAda -4

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Anekanta and Problem of Meaning Kundakunda's treatment Kundakunda in his monumental philosophical work Samayasara elucidates the empirical self from the empirical standpoint and the transcendental self from the transcendental standpoint. Since the empirical standpoint deals with the impure, accidental, pervert, superimposed and unreal condition of the mundane soul, its statement may yeild the figurative, metaphorical and secondary meaning. Again, since this accidental impurity is caused by the material body, the physical qualities like color, touch, smell, taste, form etc. are superimposed on or transfered to the self ; and conequently all non-self qualities are figuratively affirmed of the self. 47 Thus, for example, Kundakunda contends that from the empirical standpoint the self and body are certainaly one and by lauding the holy body of Arhat one may think that the Arhat is lauded and adored. But from the transcendental or real standpoint, the qualities of body are not found in the perfect soul. He who lauds the attributes of the perfect soul, really lauds the perfect soul. *4 For, just as admiring the the city can never become admiration of the king, so by lauding the qualities of body the attributes of perfect soul are never lauded. 4 9 Again from the practical standpoint the remark is made of (king's) military forces, "the king has gone out," (although not) the king only out also his military forces are gone out with him.60 Common people, seeing some one looted in the way, say, "the way is looted", but no way whatsoever is really looted. Similarly, seeing the karmic matter in the soul it has been said from the empirical standpoint, "this colour etc. is of the soul".5% From a few examples cited above it is obvious that kundakunda's statements of practical or empirical standpoint may suggest the secondary meaning while his statements of transcendental or real standpoint may convey the primary or 'real' meaning. It is needless to say that his doctrine of standpoints is the corollary of the theory of anekanta or indeterminateness. Conclusion To conclude, we may observe that a word or a sentence may possess multivalance, multilevels and multi-dimensions of meaning. Like the manifold, indeterminate and realtive reality its knowledge parisaMvAda-4

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174 jainavidyA evaM prAkRta : antarazAstrIya adhyayana as well as verbal expression may also be manifold, indeterminate and relative. It is for our practical purpose only that we fix meaning of a particular word or sentence according to the context, the intention of the speaker, the general purport and so on. However, meaning is as inexhaustible as reality itself ! Abbreviations BS Brahmasutra of Badarayana SS BS SB Brahmasutra of Badarayana with Sankara's Bhasya. ITM Indian Theories of Meaning. hy K. Kunjuni Raja, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, Madras, 1963. Samayasara of Kundakunda, English translation with com mentary by J. L. Jaini, Ajitashram, Lucknow, 1930. RRAD Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta, by K. Satchida nanda Murty, Motilal Banarasidas, Reprint, 1974. EOIH The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna, Allen & Unwin, 1969 7th impression. MIMAMSA : Mimamsa, by N. V. Thadani, Bharat Research Institute, Delhi, 1952. References 1. ITM, p. 293. 2. Ibid, p. 194. 3. Ibid, p. 182. 4. Ibid 5. RRAD, p. 68. 6. Mimamsa, p. 273. 7. EOIP, p. 140. BS, II, 3. 15. 9. BS, I. 1. 6. 10. BS, III. 4. 2. 11. BS, II. 2. 15. 12. BS, 1. 1. 6. 13. BSSB. I. 3. 3; III. 1.7; 3.42. 14. Ibid, I. 3. 33. parisaMvAda-4

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Anekanta and Problem of Meaning 175 15. Ibid, I. 1. 6. 16. Ibid, III. 3.19, 56, 58. 17. Ibid, III. 3. 19. 18. Ibid, 1. 1.4, 6, 7. 22, II. 3.3.5, 7. 4.1, 2, 3, III. 1.4, 25. 2.3, IV. 1.3, 12. 19. Ibid, I. 1.6, 7, II. 3.5, 7. 20. Ibid, IV. 3.8. 21. Ibid, I. 1.7. 22. Ibid, 23. Ibid, 24. Ibid, 25. Ibid, II. 3.15. 26. Ibid, 27. Ibid, 28. Ibid, 1. 1.5. 29. Ibid, I. 1.7, 8, 12 30. Ibid, III. 1.22, 2.21, 3.7, 9, 4.20, IV. 1.68, 2.1. 31. Ibid, III. 3.9. 32. Ibid, I. 4.11 33. Ibid, III. 3.30 34. Ibid, II. 4.19, III, 1.10, 6. 35. Ibid, II. 4.17 36. Ibid, 1. 3.32, 33, III. 3.38, 4.2, 3.38; 4.2 4.28 4.31. 37. Ibid, 1, 1.7 38. Ibid, III. 3.42, 49. 39. Ibid. I. 1.4, 5, 6, 8, II. 3.29, 43, III. 1.7, 3.6, IV 1.3, 1.3 etc. 40. Ibid. I. 1.6, 14, 4.9, II. 3.5, 4.17, IV. 3.12 etc. 41. Ibid I. 1.26. 42. Ibid I. 1.22 43. Ibid III. 1.24 44. Ibid IV. 3.12 45. Ibid II. 3.16. 46. RRAD, p. 94. 47. SS. verse 61. 48. Ibid, verses 31-35. parisaMvAda-4

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176 jainavidyA evaM prAkRta : antarazAstrIya adhyayana 49. Ibid, verse 35. 50. Ibid, verse 52. 51. Ibid, verse 63. 52. Ibid verse 64. Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Poona, Maharastra parisaMbAda-4 ,